

# The *Gorgias* of Plato

Revised Text

Exegetical Notes

New Translation

by Kenneth Quandt

## PREFACE

The edition of E.R.Dodds (Oxford 1959) is still the standard. Despite all its philological virtues, including his updated review of the Mss., his collection of testimonia, and his occasionally amusing editorial sleights-of-hand,<sup>1</sup> a commonplace midcentury and obsolete Anglo-American prejudice against Plato as being an idealist, and a standard prejudice that the dialogical dramas are to be read as expressing Plato's own thought at one stage or another of its development, continually distract him from the thought of the dialogue<sup>2</sup> – from why and how the characters, including Socrates, are saying what they are saying.<sup>3</sup>

Greekless readers witness a similar disappointment in the highly respected translation and commentary of T. Irwin (Oxford 1979). While his translation is often the most accurate in English, his commentary, rather than helping the reader grasp the continuity and integrity of the drama set before him, treats Socrates's interlocutors as students in a philosophy class and Socrates's questions as expressing his own or Plato's beliefs. Irwin takes it upon himself to articulate those beliefs as propositions – which as propositions exist unspoken and invariant exactly because expressed by nobody and divorced from any conversational context – and then tests whether these are logically consistent on the presumption that they should be so, as if constituting the thought of a single living mind after all. Exactly because Plato chose not to speak in his own voice, there is no bar against attributing such thought to him, and yet for the same reason this sort of interpretation touches him not but devolves into an exercise in shadow-boxing. The commentator is doing all the thinking and only his own questions are being pursued,<sup>4</sup> while on the other hand he often finds himself left with the task of explaining how a great philosopher like Plato could be so confused or express himself so poorly.

It has been the main thrust of all my own work on the dialogues so far (*Republic, Laches, Phaedrus*) to watch these dialogues “create their own horizons,” as I have put it: that is, to trace the autonomous movement of the conversations Plato has invented on the assumption of an inherent verisimilarity. As a result they are revealed to be stories of perennial human significance. In the present case I have also seen fit to sketch out three antidotes to the fashions of criticism with which I disagree: (1) a quick review of Aristides' criticism of the *Gorgias* as a paradigm of captious shadow-boxing more obvious to us merely because the prejudices of the Second Sophistic are so very different from the analytical fashion we adopted last century; (2) a study of Callicles's manner of speaking, in lieu of a propositional analysis of what he says, to show what his words really mean; and (3) a collection of data for what might be called a “poetics of dialogue,”<sup>5</sup> that could serve as a foundation for reading a philosophical drama of the Platonic sort.

My new edition of the text and my apparatus incorporate the extensive new collations of Cantarín (Madrid 2000); I have vetted and recorded the *similia* stored up in the great philological editions of the 19th century lest they be lost and forgotten forever; and I have spent a good deal of time comparing and contrasting existing translations, since translation ultimately displays meaning in a way that philological commentary and analysis only describes, like a picture that embodies a thousand words. For this reason I ventured, in the end, to include a new translation of my own.

1 See my notes 142, 1504, 1744, 1941.

2 Nn. 1121, 1592, 1791, 1872, 1893, 1904, 1985 and 2013, 2068, 2283, *infra*.

3 Nn. 376, 841, 848 899, 909, 993, 1016, 1047, 1168, 1336, 1592, 1791, 1866, 1973, 2014, 2016, 2024, 2189, 2253.

4 Nn. 390, 390, 472, 649 and 650 and 651, 711, 731, 783, 841, 904, 1734, 1780, 1904, 2005, 2019, 2100, 2117, 2248.

5 Such a poetics would consider such things as: 1. *Pragmatics of dialectical argument and dialogical movement*: (A1) Distinction between dialectic and oration (162, 169, 174); (A2) Distinction between assertion and name-calling – the τί and the ποῖον τί (169, 1270, 1316); (B1) Tension between parallelism (matrix) and casual variation (1599); (B2) Starting with the πρόχειρον (150); (B3) Pacing (elaborate detail giving way to streamlining: 2010); (B4) Indecipherable initial question buying time for backfilling (*Gorg.* 491-2, 1321). (C1) Epagoge from particulars to universals versus from cases to a target case; (C2) Line-drawing, slips to weld, proleptic skews (1592, 1637); (C3) “passing notes” (467, 572, 263, 1037, 1313, 1879, 2123); (C4) *A fortiori* arguments (1892). (D1) Answering a series of questions by answering the first (254) or the last (174); (D2) Marking stages and “dialectical time” with “chiasm of before and after” (1489, 1499, 1768); (D3) Repetition of word in retort (336); (D4) Nuances and modalities of infixed ἴσως (483, *al.*) and οἴμαι (395, *al.*); (D5) Poetics and force of the vocative (155, 443, 1452, 2021, 2051); (D6) Significance of asyndeton (20). – 2. *Vocabulary of Dialectic and Dialogue*: Verbs for asking (211, 214, 284); ἀνάγκη denoting logical necessity (1789); ἐλέγχειν versus διελέγειν (*hapax*, 350) and ἐξελέγειν (716, 750, 799, 803); ἐρηγήθη of non-dialectical assertion (412); γίγνεται (371, 1458), φαίνεται (414), συμβαίνει (373): dialectical uses; ὑποταίνειν used of epagogic matrix (172); δὲ δὴ and τί δὲ δὴ (1603); the “person” of the demonstrative (1494, *al.*); the imperfect of citation (935, *al.*). – 3. *Lists*: Lists are already arguments, since they depict both steps and movement in thinking (this is an area hitherto understudied). (A) “Background” lists, revealing the presumptive classification things operating behind the scenes (339, 1412, 1672, 2041 – *n.b. Gorg.* 491, n. 1316); (B) “Metabatic” lists, depicting unargued inferences (407); (C) Special powers and structures of triadic lists (339, 1350 / 384); (D) Heaping lists (1887); (E) The various uses of καί and τε καί (407, 1066, 1188, 1596, 1610, 1617 [cf. 960], 2064); (F) Connectives absent, minimal, maximal, sporadic (2258); (G) Infixed ἄλλος (2032), αὖ (1766), πᾶς (1766), τί (1671); (H) Closure by elaboration of final item (856, 2232); (I) Article present and absent (691).

In response moreover to the basic trend toward studying and reading online I have exploited the conveniences of hyperlinks and document search by presenting the material of my study online, at [onplatosgorgias.com](http://onplatosgorgias.com).

I wish to thank my stalwart collaborator MTheo of Berkeley for his continuing support and guidance in the production of my writings over the last ten years, and in particular for discovering a systematic error I made in the production of the present book which has now been repaired. Also I thank Miss Hannah Rossbach of the University of Warwick for her scrupulous proofreading, fit in between her more important pursuits. Above all, I dedicate this work, with thanks, to my student-of-a-lifetime, Matthew Morrissey.

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# INTRODUCTION

## 1. Gorgias in the *Gorgias*

Plato chose to bring several sophists onto the stage in his thirty-five dialogues. Their effect upon the young, the effect of their teachings and of the promises they make to those who hire them, and perhaps most of all the confusion they introduce about *sophia* and *philosophia*,<sup>6</sup> are for Plato sources of trouble for the souls of the sophists' clients as well as the cities where they operate, especially in the rich and powerful democracy of Athens. The most important of the sophists are Protagoras, Hippias, and Gorgias;<sup>7</sup> all three have dialogues named after them, as also Euthydemus (who comes with his sidekick brother, Dionysodorus). We meet Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, but he hardly qualifies to have the *Republic* named after him, though it is his famously inflammatory rhetoric<sup>8</sup> that then motivates Glaucon and Adeimantus to insist, after Socrates's opening bout with him, that Socrates refute the emotions he aroused by what they heard him say, which then takes almost three hundred pages.<sup>9</sup> Surely the *Euthydemus* (with Dionysodorus) deserves its name since that dialogue consists of a series of displays by him from beginning to end; as do the *Hippias* and the *Protagoras*, their namesakes on stage throughout.

In comparison, the *Gorgias* is unique: though he is acclaimed the most important of the sophists, or equal alongside Protagoras, he is center stage for only a tenth of the dialogue, and all we see of him is his rather tedious back and forth with Socrates answering what "the oratorical" is, a continuous speech answering what "the oratorical" will enable a man to do (though two thirds of the time defending it against being maligned), and then an inconclusive dialogue attempting to resolve whether his training includes the teaching of political virtue,<sup>10</sup> inconclusive because he is relieved from answering Socrates by his understudy, Polus, who interrupts and changes the question by accusing Socrates of hypocrisy in asking it.<sup>11</sup> Polus thereby inherits the burden of defending, for twenty pages, the art of speaking in public against Socrates's challenge that it is not even an art,<sup>12</sup> not once adducing anything Gorgianic in its defense. Moreover, Gorgias's infamous "ontology" which we encounter in his treatise *On Non-being*,<sup>13</sup> is entirely absent from the dialogue – both its terminology and its arguments; and finally, of the spellbinding eloquence he is praised for inventing,<sup>14</sup> we witness none: as if to add insult to injury, Plato has Socrates arrive too late and denies us an opportunity to witness what by all accounts had been a thrilling display of his skills.<sup>15</sup>

It was not an accident Socrates arrived late. In fact, neither Gorgias's display that day nor even Socrates's overlong conversation that detained him in the agora actually took place. Plato, not chance, decided that Socrates would

6 The clearest statement I have seen about Plato's sense of what *philosophia* is and of its relation to *sophia* is now available in English: *Inventing the Philosopher: An Essay on the Dialogues of Plato* by Monique Dixsaut (Academica Press 2022).

7 Callicles in this dialogue insists that his teacher Gorgias is an orator not a sophist, but this is merely to insist that learning oratory was his sophistry of choice. The term is hard to define, as Plato himself spent some time showing, and showing why, in his *Sophist*. Modern accounts of the type or the group tend to ignore that treatment on the grounds of his hostility towards them.

8 *Phdrs.* 267C7-D4.

9 Cf. *Rep.* 358BC. There is some evidence that *Republic* Book One was originally a separate dialogue called *Thrasymachus*. It would then have a structure very much like the *Gorgias*, with similar proportions for similar reasons: Socrates's first interlocutor (Cephalus ~ Gorgias) being relieved by his assistant or heir (Polemarchus ~ Polus, twice as long), followed by a spirited interruption and *ad hominem* attack on Socrates by a third interlocutor whom Socrates brings to shame (Thrasymachus ~ Callicles, longer than both combined). But note that the parallelism makes all the more salient that the *Gorgias* is *not* named after its climactic interlocutor, as the *Thrasymachus* is taken to have been.

10 457C4-461B2.

11 461B. With Benardete (p.2) the conversation goes further and further off course from Socrates's original question, but against Benardete it goes off on its *own* course, not some Socratic course Benardete imagines and hypothesizes Socrates or Plato or himself preconceives.

12 462B-481B.

13 Versions available in Sextus Empiricus (*adv. math.* 7.65ff = Diels-Kranz 82B3 [2.279-83]) and in the ps.-Aristotelian treatise *Melissus Xenophanes Gorgias* (979A-980B). Plato does deal with his theory, indirectly and without mentioning his name, as a sophistic offshoot of Parmenides's theory of being, in the *Sophist*.

14 The Souda gives a list of the figures he contributed: τροπαί, μεταφοραί, ἀλληγορίαι, ὑπαλλαγαί, καταχρήσεις, ὑπερβάσεις, ἀναδιπλώσεις, ἐπαναλήψεις, ἀποστροφαί, παρισώσεις (cf. D-K 82A2: 2.272.29-31). See also Diod. 12.53.4 (=D-K 82A4 [2.273.10-12]). His speech in the *Gorgias* shows none of these but does include some striking moments, as we shall see. It should be said that what we see in the fragments we have is hardly spellbinding but closer to tedious nonsense.

15 The case of the dialogue entitled *Euthydemus* is quite the contrary: here Plato has given us a live representation of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus's sophistical display, framed by a conversation between Socrates and Crito that also passes judgment on it, though rather tongue-in-cheek.

miss Gorgias's speech and, more importantly, contrived thereby that we would not hear Gorgias's performance either! This in a nutshell is what makes the *Gorgias* unique in the corpus: Plato has taken pains to under-represent its famous namesake.<sup>16</sup> He has contrived that Gorgias not need to respond to Socrates's broadside against "the oratorical" by forcing it to take place during Socrates's conversation with Polus;<sup>17</sup> and he has allowed Gorgias to remain on the sidelines during the conversation with Callicles as well, having him intervene only to insist that Callicles continue rather than becoming involved himself.<sup>18</sup> Of a piece with this, Plato has chosen to give us a dialogue in direct form, without omniscient narrator to comment on what is happening,<sup>19</sup> and thereby left it almost entirely to us to notice that Socrates's interlocutors very often delay to answer. In Socrates's conversation with Polus, Polus delays or demurs to answer several times; in his conversation with Callicles three times as many – but in many of those cases the only indication Plato gives us is asyndeton.<sup>20</sup> Perhaps the quietest surprise along these lines is that Plato leaves it to us to realize that Callicles misquotes Pindar's νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς (484B7); and, worse, that his indirect method risks serious misinterpretations by his very readers going back to antiquity, as when Socrates appears to condemn tragedy at 502B and to defame the Four Greats at 519Cff, leading readers to infer that Socrates was expressing Plato's own sincere opinions rather than speaking to Callicles in the context of the dialogue, as a way to smoke out whether Callicles has anything to say in their defense. Moreover, in lieu of a narrator mediating for us and ushering us along with transitional remarks,<sup>21</sup> we only get "what happens," a series of interruptions by one and then the next interlocutor: Polus interrupting Socrates's dialogue with Gorgias<sup>22</sup> with an *ad hominem* against Socrates, and then Callicles interrupting his conversation with Polus with an escalated *ad hominem*.<sup>23</sup> It was not too late for war and battle that he arrived, after all, we are left to realize.<sup>24</sup> And finally, Plato tells us nothing about the audience present for the discussion (except the sudden and telling fact that they ardently want Socrates and Gorgias to continue their dialogue<sup>25</sup>). Instead, he has left it to us to suspect, notice, and measure how much Gorgias and Polus might be adjusting their behaviors and remarks to please these prospective clients.<sup>26</sup>

There is a reason Gorgias's role and participation is suppressed. The most important thing about him is something he *cannot* say, and it is something his student or helpmate Polus prevents him from having to say and then himself cannot say, exactly because he is his follower and is like him; and it is something even Callicles cannot admit, despite all his bluster and self-proclaimed parrhesiasm. Above all it is something Plato *disallows* them to say in order, I believe, to require us to recognize it on our own. It hasn't to do with what Gorgias teaches (even Protagoras did not merely present a simple curriculum when he answered that question for Socrates, but rather a performance meant to bowl over his audience and make them wish they could likewise bowl over whatever audience they might some day speak before). It hasn't to do with something Gorgias alone knows nor even some technique he alone could teach – such techniques are no secret but are already visible in everything Protagoras (for instance) says. What is being suppressed is his clients' motive for hiring him, and indeed paying him a considerable sum: their desire that Gorgias confer upon them what he, and Socrates also, can only call a power – not a knowledge or even a skill but finally a power – a power "if only you knew, Socrates,"<sup>27</sup> a power to manipulate other men's minds. As to what one's own ends may be in doing so,

16 The case is quite otherwise in the other sophist dialogues: we not only see how the sophists act and hear how they speak, but learn their "theories." The subjectivism of Protagoras is the central theme throughout his dialogue (though more thoroughly examined in the *Theaetetus*), and Hippias's theory of wholes comes in for detailed treatment in the *Hippias Major* though the central topic of that dialogue is beauty.

17 Note well that Socrates promises after his expatiation that Polus will have his chance to reply: the only reason he must speak at length is that Polus is incompetent to ask questions along the way (463D6-E7). In this connection Socrates's remark that his criticism might not apply to Gorgias since he is not really sure what Gorgias teaches (462E8-463A2) is mere politesse; Benardete's over-interpretation of Socrates's deferential uncertainty as an indirect indication of deeper issues with which only Benardete is occupied (17-19), is characteristic.

18 Gorgias interrupts, on behalf of the audience and himself, to request that Callicles continue through to the end of what Socrates is endeavoring to prove (497B4-10, 506A8-B3). Why? Does Gorgias really want to hear the rest, or to appear fair and open-minded (for which compare his remark at 463A5)? Why does he not step in and relieve Callicles? And Callicles, against his own desires and despite losing face in the process, does acquiesce in Gorgias's request to let Socrates finish (497C1-2, 501C7-8, 506C4, 510A1-2; cf. 522E7), for a while at least. Why does this brash hothead defer to Gorgias? The question was broached on the first page were we see he is proud that Gorgias is his house guest, and is sure he will do him a favor (447B7-8).

19 Contrast the way the narrated form enables Plato to describe the blushes of Hippocrates on the way to visiting Protagoras (*Prot.*312A2), and of Thrasymachus when he is defeated in argument (*Rep.*350D3).

20 In the case of Polus, see 465A7, 467B1, 468D6, 470A3-4, 474B2-C3 and for Callicles 489A1, 2, 4; 490C6-7, D2; 497D3; 499B2; 500D4, D10-E1; 504B9, C2, C4, E4, E9; 509E3; 515A7-B1, B3, C3; 516B2-3; 519D5 – all with nn. *ad loc.*; sometimes the only tell for the delay is an asyndeton between the questions, 468C7, 470A4, 473E2, 474C8, 475D5, and (for Callicles) 489A1 and A2, 490C7, 504C2, 515B1-3, 519D4-5.

21 As in *Republic* 357A, 362D, 367E6-8A1, and *passim*.

22 461B3-C4.

23 481B6-C4, 482C4-E2.

24 447A1-2.

25 458C.

26 At 458B4-D4 in the midst of Socrates challenging Gorgias whether his teaching includes justice, Gorgias worries perhaps the audience should be consulted as to whether they should go on, it having already been detained or fatigued by his performance before Socrates arrived. Both Chaerephon, Socrates's "ally," and Gorgias's client Callicles enthusiastically encourage them to continue, reporting to us that the audience present raised a hullabaloo of encouragement. Still, the conversation has so far been rather tame and inconclusive: I believe it is not what they have so far said as much as the issues they are skirting that has piqued the audience's interest, and yet again Plato has led me to ask this question but given me no way to answer it for sure.

27 456A4-8.

Gorgias is silent and remains discreet.<sup>28</sup> This he will also allow a potential client not to mention when he approaches him; this he will not mention to the client: instead it is your money he expects, and your paying it is the only answer he wants and needs. He will then display how to hide that very motive, and teach his client how to appear to be an upstanding person instead, with high purpose for the city and high regard for fellow men, while in fact persuading the crowds he addresses to do whatever he wants. And who are those crowds one speaks to? About this Gorgias is perfectly candid: the juries in the law-courts and the legislators in the assembly. He has come after all to democratic Athens: the political arrangement in his hometown of Syracuse affords but a tiny client-base in comparison to the arrangement of Athens which at the time had become wealthy and powerful through her leadership of the Delian League during the last fifty years.

As to his conversation with Socrates, at first he says he will teach his clients to speak to the various political assemblies of Athens<sup>29</sup> but his later remarks make it clear that the skill he teaches has not to do with the political character of those gatherings but rather their size.<sup>30</sup> We have an idea what this might mean for we know what demagoguery is. And yet, unfortunately for Gorgias, the very name of the paradigmatic political gathering in Athens keeps displaying the etymon δίκη, justice;<sup>31</sup> and so Socrates has at least some foothold to ask him whether the expert at addressing those bodies might himself be an expert on that underlying topic; and more, whether in having an expert knowledge of justice the speakers he turns out will themselves be just men. We do not need the analytic logic choppers to “query” whether this is a fallacy:<sup>32</sup> the point is that Gorgias cannot answer it directly without betraying the secret he is guarding and fostering, in the audience of his potential clients, present though silent. He has to do better than flatly to lie that his potential clients will be made just by him, when their primary motive is to become astutely self-serving. Instead he must turn the question he has been asked to his own profit: he must rise to the occasion and show his clients by his own example how they in turn will be able to wiggle out of this contradiction.<sup>33</sup> But Socrates has reached the question through gradual steps, continually respectful and solicitous for Gorgias’s agreement both in principle and in method;<sup>34</sup> and when the question arrives<sup>35</sup> there is no wiggle room. This is why his assistant Polus must interrupt and come to his aid, by turning the tables on Socrates and impugning his motive for even asking the question.

In saving Gorgias from embarrassment Polus now must confront him, which in his coltish impulsiveness he is eager to do; but like an Aristophanic hero, he will rush in to find himself over his head. After the smooth and solicitous orderliness of the first conversation with Gorgias, this one becomes a scherzo: Polus tries to shift the burden onto Socrates and ask him what sort of art oratory is according to him, but immediately proves himself unable even to ask questions without making his own argument.<sup>36</sup> In the end his own argument will backfire on him and he will have to agree that the efficacy of oratorical skill is exactly the opposite he advertises it to be,<sup>37</sup> or else fall silent – or, as it turns out, be rescued in turn by an interruption by Callicles.<sup>38</sup>

But in the meanwhile our author serves us up another twist: Polus’s inability to ask what Socrates thinks since his only motive is to challenge it, incites an interruption from Gorgias: “I, too, would like to know what you think about the oratorical art, Socrates: let loose with it!”<sup>39</sup> He consents to say what he thinks “the oratorical” is, not to characterize Gorgias himself, for he makes no claim of really knowing what Gorgias teaches,<sup>40</sup> but just to answer Polus. Plato thus gives Socrates an uninterrupted opportunity to give his answer without Polus’s captious questions interfering at every step, and has not only given Socrates four pages to hold forth at length (and argue no less than that “the oratorical” is mere pandering), but at the same time has shielded Gorgias from direct confrontation with him, for once Socrates has finished, Polus is to be given all the opportunity he wants to question him.<sup>41</sup>

28 And in another dialogue we hear him deride the very question: “You’ll never hear him say he teaches virtue; he laughs when he hears others promise they will; he just thinks he must make a man δεινός at speaking” says Meno at 95C1-4.

29 452E.

30 454B6, 454E5-6; cf. 455A5, 458E7.

31 δικαστήριος (452E2). Gorgias himself makes the connection at 454B6 and Socrates then holds him to the connection at 455A3-4.

32 Gorgias himself volunteers that he teaches persuasion ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις ... καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικοι (454B6-7).

33 Socrates, *à propos* of nothing and only to drop it quickly, candidly alludes to the mixed motives his prospective clients might have for studying with him, at 455C6-8 (*n.b.*, ἴσως αἰσχύνονται ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι, C8).

34 Indeed Socrates’s continually solicitous treatment of Gorgias is another unique feature here. It is something else than his usual irony of deferential faint praise, with which he might approach a Protagoras. At every point in this brief and rather tame discussion where his questions to Gorgias might seem to challenge the great man he attenuates the confrontation, as when continually he inserts a methodological apology before insisting on an answer (453A8-C4, 454B9-C5, 457C4-458B3), and when he introduces imaginary interlocutors to give Gorgias a model to follow in answering (451A7-C9 and at 452A1-D4). Why the kid gloves? Commentators infer Socrates holds him in high regard, and moreover that Gorgias is a respectable gentleman; my sense is to prevent his evasion.

35 460E5-461B2.

36 462A-E.

37 480A6-481B5.

38 481B6-7.

39 463A5.

40 462E8-463A1.

41 And unsurprisingly his first question is again incompetent (466A4-8).

It will turn out that this speech of his, a quarter of the way through the dialogue, is not only a huge and elaborately argued broadside on nothing other than the oratorical skill Gorgias must be selling, but will also introduce a Distinction and an idea that will return over and over again, continually restoring order in the all-out combative final section of the dialogue. The Distinction is that there are, broadly, two “activities” one might practice, either to pander to peoples’ desires any way one can, or to improve them by oneself mastering and then administering expert moral therapy. The principle will not be applied in the remainder of the conversation with Polus, which will be a playful skirmish – at most a battle – but will continually be on hand in that last act, an act that will be something of an all-out verbal war.

And yet where is Gorgias in the rest of the dialogue? He is silently present, sitting aside the scenes. In the movie version I would pan over to him now and then. Polus his colleague has come to his aid to cover up for him; but Callicles next comes onto the stage and shows himself to be the very man who would hire a Gorgias, and will show it unawares (another connection Plato leaves us to make). As far as titles go, the dialogue may very well have been called the *Callicles*; but in truth Callicles is a minor character, because he is a minor man. It is called the *Gorgias* because Callicles is just the sort who might hire Gorgias, even though at the same time it would be an occupational hazard for Gorgias to point to him among his graduates. As we shall see, Callicles is unable to keep Gorgias’s cat from getting out of the bag.

All this will become evident as we go through the dialogue, but the key that unlocks it all is to keep in mind the unstated motives of Gorgias, of his friend Polus, and of those prospective students, among whom one or two, Plato leaves us to imagine and indeed hope, will after witnessing the conversation choose *not* to take the course after all. Among those who do will be the types that will prosecute Socrates.

The massive indirection by which Plato here chooses to present his main theme resembles that of the *Parmenides*, which defends the hypothesis of the forms exactly by researching what happens without it, and the only suggestion Plato gives us is Parmenides’s sudden question at 135C5-6, just as suddenly shelved, τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι;

## 2. The Oratorical in the *Gorgias*

Socrates’s first question to Gorgias is what his teaching consists in. He is willing to call it ῥητορικὴ. Note that this is merely an adjective: it suffices as a name because some noun is understood. The noun in this case, according to the world and Gorgias, but surprisingly and unsurprisingly not to Socrates, is τέχνη, something we translate with “art” in the sense of an organized ability or skill, a notion we understand partly in connection with our notion of “science,” both to pair them (as we speak of the “arts and sciences” as subjects of study in contrast with professional studies) and sometimes to distinguish them, as when we speak of something being an art but not a science. It is noteworthy that the reverse is not something we say – that a given field of study or knowledge or competence is a science but not an art. In privileging science over art in this way we are saying there is something unscientific about art, but again we hardly say that science is artless. I believe that τέχνη in Greek has a similarly ambiguous status in the Greek mind, in comparison with the corresponding Greek word for science, namely, ἐπιστήμη.

The interesting thing is that the criterion of science is truth, whereas the criterion of art is some kind of success, a competence in the technician, a fineness achieved; often beauty, beauty even at the expense of or distinct from truth. In Greek, this array of admirable things is nicely covered by the very Greek notion of τὸ καλόν – the beautiful, the fine, the admirable. Indeed it might be the distinctive trait of that notion that it can range from a purely esthetic sense of beauty to the operational efficiency of the proper knife for the job (*Rep.*353A4-5). What these extremes have in common is that they are admirable, and the word καλόν approaches the notion of the admirable and of τιμή, value.<sup>42</sup> When a Greek announces χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά with a prideful or rueful flick of the eye, he is acknowledging the pain and struggle that goes into achieving something beautiful and fine. This special connection between beauty and its admirability – or conversely the way beauty might in the Greek mind serve as a paradigm for what stimulates admiration – is moreover confirmed by the semantic range of its contrary or opposite term, αἰσχρόν, meaning the ugly but also the shameful.

In sharp contrast with τέχνη and its admirable efficiency, fineness, and beauty, the range of its sister-term ἐπιστήμη notoriously and without prejudice can even concern itself with paltry, trivial, and what we might call ugly subject matters. This is something of which Parmenides reminds the young and enthusiastic Socrates when he asks him if there are “forms” of such entirely unadmirable (ἀτιμότατον) things as mud and hair and dirt – that is, whether such things are proper objects of science the same way the most important things are, like the just, the beautiful, and the

42 Cf. καλλίστω, *Rep.*358A1 and my note *ad loc.*

good;<sup>43</sup> and the mature Socrates habitually reminds his interlocutors of this same thing by bringing up dice-playing as requiring a respectable amount of mental acuity and effort though otherwise pointless.<sup>44</sup>

What we will learn early on in the *Gorgias* – even in Socrates’s short conversation with Gorgias – is that the practitioners of “the oratorical” employ this “art of speaking” not to teach but to persuade.<sup>45</sup> As such, “orators” are meant not to speak the truth about something but to speak in such a way as to make something attractive (the Latin metaphor of *persuadere* is to make something “sweet”);<sup>46</sup> and conversely not to prove that a thing is bad but make it unattractive. Of Socrates’s three interlocutors Gorgias alone is a thinking man: he is in fact a *theorist* of persuasion, arguing that men do not say “things” but only say “words” – that men have no contact with the realities words are thought by them to represent but only the words they use for them.<sup>47</sup> Thus the manipulation of words can control and modify men’s sense of the real – so much so that Gorgias can perform a *Praise of Helen* that will persuade his audience she not only is not to blame, but cannot be blamed, for the Trojan War.<sup>48</sup> In his conversation with Socrates there is no evidence of the manipulative techniques such as we see in his *Helen* and his *Palamedes*, but this is to be expected. A master will not reveal his gimmicks in his casual talk; only a lesser practitioner would be guilty of letting them bleed through (as Hippias does in his dialogue,<sup>49</sup> coming off a parody of himself), but he would have given at least a taste, within his performance, which we missed. We must imagine that he will talk to a closed group of prospective clients differently from the way he would have them watch him talk with others who will not be paying him, with such persons as Plato’s readers and ourselves!<sup>50</sup>

Very soon this quiet theorist and *magister ludi* will yield the floor to Polus and Polus to Callicles, both of them blowhards for whom speaking is almost exclusively an attempt to manipulate the preferences and aversions of their audiences, whether it be *ad rem*, by casting a thing in a good light and its opposite into the shade; or *ad hominem*, by capturing the benevolence of their audience for themselves and then praising their client or ally, while demeaning or disqualifying their opponent or his. In both cases their audience is not their interlocutor but those eavesdropping and also themselves. We should expect no more than such language from the exponent of an “art,” as opposed to the language of a knower – let alone that of a seeker who knows he does not know.

For Socrates, who is neither an artist nor a scientist, conversing with such men will perforce be a warped affair, for Socrates is a seeker, a seeker after the καλόν, the true καλόν, rather than “seeking” to come off as a καλῶς λέγων, and a seeker after the true δίκαιον and the true ἀγαθόν as well. When he asks a question they will view answering it as nothing but an opportunity to capture the admiration of the audience – not to satisfy the questioner nor to answer his question. At the beginning Socrates wants to ask Gorgias what the oratorical is, and Polus interposes himself and offers to answer on Gorgias’s behalf, not because his answer would be as definitive as the expert’s they came to see: Chaerephon would rather hear from Gorgias, but Polus bristlingly retorts that he is able to answer “well enough” for the likes of Chaerephon (σοί γε ἰκανῶς). This means not that Chaerephon would not be able to understand a more expert or refined answer, but only that Polus’s answer will be something Chaerephon will lack the oratorical skill to gainsay.<sup>51</sup> And the speech he subsequently delivers doesn’t answer the question, and isn’t an answer, but is an encomiastic priamel that succeeds merely in passing through a foil of lesser candidates to reach “the oratorical” and accord it the highest (though utterly unspecified) praise. His quickly spent *tour de force* closes with a doubling of superlatives: “Gorgias is the best (ἄριστος) at this most beautiful (καλλίστη) of the arts.”<sup>52</sup> A question, even from one who seeks knowledge, is for Polus merely a trigger for a performance.

Gorgias sees it the same way. When Chaerephon first asks him whether he would be willing to answer Socrates’s question, Gorgias answers, “For many years now, nobody has asked me a question I couldn’t answer.”<sup>53</sup> He doesn’t mean he is omniscient and has had the answer for any question, the way Mr. Memory in *The 39 Steps* knows how far it is from Winnipeg to Montreal,<sup>54</sup> but that he has been able to *dispose* of questions with an ἀπόκρισις καλή, stunning, pleasing, enchanting, adequate, and accordingly met with applause.<sup>55</sup> When Socrates soon asks him whether as a teacher of the oratorical he is himself an orator; Gorgias answers “Yes, and a good one if I may say so.” And when he

43 *Parm.* 130B1-D5. The three items Parmenides here refers to – δίκαιον, καλόν, ἀγαθόν – are continually and consistently referred to, together, as τὰ μέγιστα throughout the Platonic corpus. Conversely, the usual term for what I here refer to as “paltry” is φαῦλον.

44 Cf. 450D7; *Leg.* 820C7, D1-2; *Polit.* 292E7; *Rep.* 374C5-6; *Charm.* 174B4 treats πεττεντικὴ as a paltry ἐπιστήμη, and *Alcib. I* 110E5, as a skill which though φαῦλον not everybody can teach.

45 454C7-455A7, whence its stately description as πειθοῦς δημηγορός; cf. n. *ad* 453A2, *infra*.

46 Here and in the sequel we should keep in mind Horace’s distinction between the *utile* and the *dulce* (*Ars Po.* 343).

47 *Gorgias*, *On Non-being* (S.E. *adv. math.* 7.84-86 = Diels-Kranz 82B3 [2.282.20-283.2]).

48 *Gorgias*, *Praise of Helen* (D-K 82B11 [2.288-294] esp. §§13-14).

49 E.g., Hippias at *H. Maj.* 281A3-B4, 282D6-E8.

50 This is the significance of the term οἱ ἔνδοξοι at 447C7, 455C6 (cf. *Prot.* 317C5).

51 Cf. 448A6-B1. Similarly, Thrasymachus thinks he has an ἀπόκρισις παγκάλῃ to unleash (*Rep.* 338A7), a killer answer that will stop the flow of the conversation and scandalize the audience, namely that justice is “nothing but the interest of the stronger.”

52 448C4-9. This little speech does exhibit many of the Gorgianisms listed in the Souda (cf. n. 14).

53 On the sense of his καινὸν οὐδέν (448A2-3) cf. my n. *ad loc.* The sense is that Gorgias found a καιρός each time.

54 The overenthusiastic Philostratus (*VS* 1.1 = D-K 82A1 [2.272.18-21]), says a bit too much: Gorgias did *not* show that he knew everything but that he *could* always find the καιρός.

asks him if he can make another man an orator, he answers “So do I claim, everywhere I go.” When Socrates then asks him if he would please answer more directly than Polus had, he answers, “Brief answers are another of my specialties,” and takes the opportunity to coin a word to describe himself: nobody is βραχυλογώτερος.<sup>56</sup>

The oratorical art enables its practitioner to λέγειν καλῶς, which will come down to λέγειν καλά,<sup>57</sup> i.e., to praise and blame (ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν). But the sort of λόγος καλός Socrates is looking for, in answer to his question about oratory and all his questions about even more important things, is not some speech delivered by a single man to a passive audience, but a dialectical process of questions and answers in hopes of reaching an agreement. It is likely from the get-go that practitioners of “the oratorical” will be answering questions in the way that will obstruct the dialectical movement from advancing to the next question and the next answer; and conversely unlikely that they will be able to ask questions that are more than accusations, boasts, or put-downs. When Polus opts to take a turn at questioning (462AB), he means to put Socrates on the defensive and can only ask two questions at a time – an oratorical maneuver, if ever there was one.<sup>58</sup> And all he is aiming at is to reveal whether his answerer thinks the oratorical art is something good or bad – which for him is tantamount to asking whether he is for or against something.<sup>59</sup>

When back at the beginning Socrates complains that Polus’s first answer about the oratorical tells the ποιόν (of what quality) rather than the τί (of what sort),<sup>60</sup> he does not mean to be delivering a lesson in logic, as the analytic commentators immediately say. What is at issue is not that Polus fails to distinguish primary and secondary attributes (which dialectical procedure will, I grant, require him to do): rather, the oratorical *as such* deals only in what Aristotle would call secondary attributes, and not even all secondary attributes, but only the adjectival predicates that express approval and disapproval, praise and blame. The oratorical will never be interested in what something is, but only how an audience can be made to approve or disapprove of it; and the orator has the skill to make them view it positively or negatively without prejudice.

The orator praises and blames in order to modify the desires and aversions of his audience. Included among the things he must praise is himself, and among what to blame, his adversary. So he must keep the opinions of his audience in mind and maintain the appearance that he himself conforms with them, and that his client or his cause is consistent with or supports them, whereas his opponent is alien to them.<sup>61</sup> In short, he must own all the things they think good and eschew all they think bad. Moreover if his audience, the crowd, entertains opinions that include contradictions of which they are unaware or (more importantly) which they more or less consciously wish to neglect or overlook, he must avoid such topics or gingerly skate past them on the thin ice that barely covers them over. And it is mostly this latter circumstance that makes his job particularly difficult and calling for special skill, since the mob is always lying to itself.<sup>62</sup> But the upside is that when he succeeds to control the mind of his audience, they do not simply give his opinion more weight than that of his adversary and select it. Rather, the opposing advocate “disappears,” as Gorgias strikingly puts it in his speech, stripped of his credibility;<sup>63</sup> or alternatively the opponent is transformed or flipped or turned inside out, as when Gorgias says that the other professionals will become the orator’s servants and slaves – that the money maker will suddenly be seen to be making money, alright, but making it for *you*, if you have the power to persuade the mob.<sup>64</sup> These turnings of the table, these knockout blows, are among the things “the oratorical” promises to provide with its answers and in its speeches. Though these Gorgianic hyperboles of disappearance and enslavement depict the effects of oratory as factual events in the objective world, they actually take place only in the minds of the audience and nowhere else.<sup>65</sup>

It is only in a rich and powerful democracy that winning over a feckless majority can wield significant results, and that is why Gorgias and Polus are in Athens today. But since the interlocutors Plato gives to Socrates are oratorical in their very desire to speak, can this conversation have any real substance?

55 When Thrasy-machus unleashes his “killer response” nothing happens, and he asks “Where’s your praise?” (ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς, 338C2-3). Compare *Euthyd.*303B1-7.

56 449AC.

57 For the overlap between the intransitive λέγειν with adverb λέγειν καλῶς and the transitive with the noun of the adverb (λέγειν καλά), compare the idiom καλῶς ἀκούειν, to hear good rumors about oneself.

58 The *petitio principii*: “Do you still criticize your wife?”

59 462C8: “Are you saying or not that the oratorical is καλόν?” 462E2: “Are you saying the oratorical is like pastry-making?” 463D3: “Is it καλόν or αἰσχρόν?” And at the end of Socrates’s long and complicated speech (463A-466A) he asks: “So are you saying oratory is the same as pandering?” Soc: “No, only a *species* of pandering” (466A4-6).

60 448E2-7.

61 This becomes explicit late in the dialogue, at 513B3-C2.

62 The mob, by its peculiar alchemy of awareness and codependent obliviousness (for which cf. *Rep.*493A6-C8), can more easily be seen to “contradict itself.” Socrates often projects that self-contradictoriness into the individual who serves the mob, as here he accuses Callicles, the lover of the demos, with the rather awkward formulation οὐ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὃ Καλλίκλεις (482B5-6): within the individual soul there is less place to hide and at the same time far more damage being done per capita.

63 456B8-C1, 457B2. The metaphor is used also by Demosthenes (*Or.*18.310 and 19.116).

64 452E4-8.

65 I leave aside the question how unanimity can so quickly arise in a mob.

### 3. Polus and Callicles, “Oratorical” Interlocutors

Gorgias’s speech<sup>66</sup> “unveiled” the incredible power of oratorical persuasion but also used almost twice the space to defend the teacher against being held responsible for misuse of the power by his students: in short, oratorical skill is good for its practitioners (and potentially so for Gorgias’s onlooking audience of potential clients), while those who criticize Gorgias as its teacher (and thus any client who hires him) are bad. In saying that it all depends upon how the teaching is used, his implicit suggestion is that once the student has learned his art he will be able to fend off the charge that he is using it for evil purposes, the very purposes in pursuit of which he would pay for it in the first place: power and pleonexy.

Subsequently, Socrates lectures Polus, under cover of Polus’s inability to ask questions, as we have seen. Based on the agreement he had made with Gorgias that oratory does not teach but only persuades, he introduces his great Distinction between two activities (those that truly help and those that imitate these but merely please), so that oratory only sweetens something for the audience but does not support or improve them with true edification or teaching. The argument is tantamount to saying that oratory is strong only because its audience is weak,<sup>67</sup> but all Polus hears is that Socrates is attacking oratory, is saying it is bad. So Polus must make it appear good again. He does not defend oratory on the merits but simply reiterates Gorgias’s claim that it confers power onto its practitioners; but his reassertion now includes an *ad hominem* attack on Socrates as if he were ashamed to admit he himself wants power.<sup>68</sup> Are we to presume he would prefer to be overpowered rather than to have power, a loser instead of a winner? Polus simply thinks he has won the day by threatening Socrates, by ridiculing him, or by having him voted down by what everyone thinks.<sup>69</sup> Socrates identifies these as oratorical techniques, and asserts that his only criterion is reasoning, and reasoning with his partner, and takes up Polus’s present assertion in a dialectical way, that doing it is better than having it done to you. The problem Polus runs into is that he cannot afford to hold a moral position but only the power of handling oratory “astutely.” Thus he will say that it is surely bad to undergo it (which his skill will enable one to avoid), but that to commit injustice is primarily shameful (something others would condemn). He cannot grant that one must *be* good (rather than bad), but only *seem* so in the eyes of others (rather than αἰσχρόν), which oratorical skill will enable his client to manage. But once he agrees that the fine-admirable (καλόν) is either pleasant or beneficial or both, he cannot sustain his distinction between the ugly-shameful and the bad under dialectical scrutiny. That both are bad, and that avoiding the just punishment is worse than undergoing it, will lead to the very paradoxical conclusion that the only real value of oratorical skill is to persuade judges to punish oneself (and one’s allies) so as to remedy them of wrongdoing, and to exonerate one’s enemies and leave them unremedied. Of course the political power Gorgias’ and Polus’s potential clients would gain by studying with them would consist in an ability to get friends off when they act unjustly and to destroy enemies even when they are innocent.

Socrates’s third and last conversation, with Callicles, is something more. It is longer than all that has come before.<sup>70</sup> Like Polus, Callicles enters the conversation by interrupting and begins with an *ad hominem* attack on Socrates (asking Chaerephon if Socrates can be serious in what he has argued), but soon goes off on his own tangent at great length. He is not interested in defending “the oratorical,” like its practitioners before him, but rather praising his own self-image as a man of great power as being a law unto himself, in contrast with the life of a person who would engage them in conversation the way Socrates has just displayed. Of the three interlocutors he is in one sense the most oratorical, in the sense of trading exclusively in praise and blame, the ποῖον rather than the τί, but also the least oratorical for his brutish and insouciant manner – in particular his abuse of language itself, its semantics and syntax and grammar, as we shall see. It is his will that is speaking, and the words and expressions he uses will simply have to take whatever he will subject them to, often needing our help to make any sense at all. The only “value” he holds is the hope that he himself might become top dog; and this eventuality for him deserves every approbative name, whatever that name might in itself mean. Thus, that he be top dog is the only justice worth treating as real (a sentiment he dresses up in a dubious distinction between convention and nature<sup>71</sup>), his strength the only good, his astuteness and courage the only virtue, his success the only happiness.

The other two have just blown into Athens to pick up some cash and leave, but Callicles lives there for the duration, in a democratic regime and as a fellow citizen of Socrates. In order to set into relief his own position, he sets himself against the philosophical manner of Socrates as his foil, the peculiar and redoubtable power of which he has just witnessed in Socrates’s surprising inversion of Polus’s argument. His work is cut out for him. For Socrates, for Plato, and

66 456A7-457C3.

67 Socrates alludes to this as a corollary, at 464D5-E2.

68 Not without asking another double-question, which Socrates characterizes as the beginning of a speech (466A9-B1).

69 Threat: 473D3; ridicule: 473E2-3; voting him down: 473E4- 474B1.

70 34 Stephanus pages (447-481) versus 46 (481-527).

71 The “distinction” between φύσις and νόμος is a watchword of the times. I believe it cannot survive dialectical scrutiny (cf. n. 1077) and that it betokens in its proponents “no faith in the distinction of right from wrong” (with Woolsey, *Introd*, xviii) – but the merits of the distinction are quite irrelevant to the dialogue: Callicles merely uses it as a club.

for us, we have finally reached a scenario in which a dialectical search for truth will really count, and the ensuing argument is worth describing.

In the course of his long speech<sup>72</sup> praising himself and castigating Socrates, he puts many chips on the table, and will provide Socrates a great deal of material to submit to dialectical scrutiny as he later removes those chips one by one. We shall see that Callicles's assertions are little more than "name calling." Willful, he wields his words as clubs. The problems he runs into in the ensuing dialectical question and answer conversation about his ideal man, are all due to a confusing of logical extension and logical intension: since the object to be praised must be given all praise, he will attribute to it all the adjectives of praise, extensionally.<sup>73</sup> This, however, requires the adjectives to be co-extensive; but these adjectives each denote a distinct essence, intensionally. Their compresence in a single subject, or the exclusion of their contraries from that single subject, raises contradictions. For instance the many are foolish and fearful, and the great man courageous and strong; but in a democracy the many are politically stronger. A humorous and tedious dialectical game therefore ensues,<sup>74</sup> finally culminating in a clear statement by Callicles: his strong-man, this law unto himself who deserves "more," will be a leader astute, courageous, and just (by his "nature").<sup>75</sup> These virtues *are* compatible and *can be* compresent, but in their very mention the fourth of the cardinal virtues lurks unmentioned. Again Plato challenges his reader to notice: the fourth is temperance, which Callicles, by all he assumes himself to be, must despise. Because his will is blind and he cannot look at himself but only outward toward the world he imagines conquering, the very mention of this fourth virtue<sup>76</sup> immediately unthews him, the way the wicked witch melts with the mere touch of water, and his explosive reaction is the dramatic climax of the dialogue.<sup>77</sup> He suddenly admits all he wants is pleasure and the means to satisfy his own desires as ever they arise; his astuteness and courage and "natural justification" are merely the instruments by which he will continue to slake his desires, to the envy of others who cannot.<sup>78</sup> It is not an assertion of hedonism but a confession he is addicted to pleasure, though Plato gives only his tone and manner to let us infer this (few commentators have) and leaves us to begin wondering whether what is driving him might be an attempt to deny his conscience by enslaving himself to any and all desires he might be able to feel, so as to continue to avoid asking who or what he is.<sup>79</sup>

Socrates notices the confessional dimension in what Callicles has said and tries engaging his conscience with a pair of myths about the soul as sieve. Callicles is affected by neither but doubles down, praising any and all desires and their fulfillment.<sup>80</sup> Socrates next shows him the shameful corner his pursuit will force him into,<sup>81</sup> which slows him down enough to enable Socrates to answer his excited mood by raising it to the level of theory, with the question whether the pleasant is identical with the good, now to be treated dialectically.<sup>82</sup> The dialectic gradually refutes Callicles's claim that pleasure is the only good,<sup>83</sup> but rather than conceding this, Callicles claims he was only kidding in upholding it: "Of course some pleasures are bad."<sup>84</sup> Socrates complains about his deceiving him but moves on nevertheless, continuing with dialectic<sup>85</sup> to try to answer the question that Callicles's concession implies: if the goal of life is not to get pleasure but to get the good (now that they are not identical), how shall we determine what is good? The conversation has now reached the greatest of questions, how to live one's life, in particular whether in politics (as Callicles advocated) or in philosophy (as lived by Socrates, according to Callicles).<sup>86</sup> To decide this he brings back the great Distinction,<sup>87</sup> which itself already presupposed the non-identity of pleasure and the good: the one occupation studiously benefits, the other seeks haphazardly to please. Callicles agrees to continue only at the request of Gorgias and to hasten Socrates toward finishing his argument.<sup>88</sup> In which category, then, does "the oratorical" lie? And now Socrates introduces a surprising epagoge. Various arts of entertainment aim at pleasure, not moral benefit – flute playing, dithyramb, and perhaps even

72 482C-486C.

73 In this connection the crucial term is *πάγκαλον*.

74 488B2-491A6.

75 491A7-B4. Here come to the surface three of the four conventional (cardinal) virtues: wisdom (*σοφία*), courage (*ἀνδρεία*), and justice (*δικαιοσύνη*).

76 491D4-E2.

77 491E5-492C.

78 Plato has presented us a *fil directeur* running through the whole argument, again leaving it to us to notice and follow: (1) Gorgias had dangled the bait that the accomplished orator can do whatever he wants (456B6, C1; 457B1); (2) Polus found out we are not so good at knowing what we want though we think we do know (466D8ff: that his clients think they do is after all crucial for his being hired by them); (3) Callicles has revealed his own measure by revealing unreflectively what he unreflectively thinks he wants. Deeper, we can imagine why Callicles is so vulnerable to Gorgias's pitch: he likes to be pleased above all else! Again Plato leaves the connection for us to see.

79 This is the implication and suggestion of Socrates's myths about the soul as sieve (492E-494A).

80 492D5-494C3.

81 As we shall see, Socrates is alluding to the life of an anal-passive prostitute. This is the closest Plato comes to stating explicitly that the orator panders to others in order to pander to himself (cf. 527C2)!

82 495B2-499B3 (note *διελοῦ*, 495C3).

83 495C-499B.

84 499B4-8.

85 ἔστιν ... ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί (499C6-7). N.B. *διαρῆσθαι*, *διελομένους* δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντες ἀλλήλοις, 500D1-2.

86 500B5-C8.

87 500A-501A.

88 501C7-8.



tragedy. But is there really a difference between the tragic poet and the orator? Take away dance and music, restrict yourself to the episodes, and strip away the iambics and you have the same thing: orating before a crowd!<sup>89</sup> Though Callicles had thrown all the other entertainments under the bus without pause, comment, or reserve, he here for once will not give a blanket answer: it depends upon the orator, since as everyone knows there have been Great Men. He mentions Pericles and three others but Socrates rejects his candidates as quickly as he himself had rejected the entertainments, likewise without argument,<sup>90</sup> and moves directly toward a dialectical treatment,<sup>91</sup> on the level of principle. It is the rational arts that identify and bring about order and beauty, in artifacts and in the body no less than in the soul, where the beauty and order that rational art imports is the very opposite of the boundless concupiscence Callicles had advocated.<sup>92</sup>

With this sudden backhanded rejection of Callicles's view from several pages back, Socrates has removed a major chip from the table, and Callicles reacts by saying he doesn't know what Socrates is talking about, and asks him to dialogue with someone else, or even play both questioner and answerer himself. Socrates, inveterate, is willing to try, on the condition that Callicles interrupt if there is anything he disagrees with; and Gorgias again chimes in to encourage Callicles to stay in the game (though of course not entering it himself, just as he has been a bystander all along). Socrates now summarizes what they have reached through dialectic, and on that basis<sup>93</sup> infers that the moral life leads to happiness, whereas the self-centered life at the expense of others that Callicles advocated is wholly out of tune with the universe, with god, and with man: it is *ἄκοσμία*. This in turn implies that, yes (in answer to Callicles's slurring remark to Chaerephon when he interrupted) he *was* indeed serious in what he said to Polus: public oratory should to be used for this moral end, and the orator must indeed know about justice – as Polus had kept Gorgias from having to admit.<sup>94</sup> With this recall and dismissal of the discussions with Polus and even Gorgias, Socrates is becoming the horse running back to the barn.<sup>95</sup> Waiting for no response from Callicles he moves on to the other things Callicles said in his long speech. First, that he himself would be helpless without pursuing politics, vulnerable to anyone who would want to take him down. Of course with this Plato is leaving it to us to recognize that Socrates is prophesying his own fate and is previewing the *apologia* he will deliver in court some years later, though Callicles does not. Being done injustice is less damaging than committing it: all their arguments have led to this conclusion, and now he posits them and is bound to them as if by adamantine chains until they are refuted.<sup>96</sup> But how indeed can one help oneself avoid not only to be dealt injustice but also avoid doing it? With this question Callicles gingerly re-enters the conversation:<sup>97</sup> one can avoid being dealt it by being the ruler or one of the ruler's cronies. And yet to become an associate of an unjust ruler will make oneself unjust; to which Callicles in retort reminds Socrates that the associate will be killing the one who does not associate. For the third time in the dialogue Socrates has been faced with the assumption that death is the worst thing that can happen to a man<sup>98</sup> and he girds himself up to respond with a long speech. There are other arts that save lives every day, that of the boatman or the builder of war machines or the generals that use them: that the grandiose orator should think himself greater than they, in that department at least, is laughable. Moreover, there is nothing highly noble in the lengthening of life, but only in living it well, while conversely, to become a grandiose orator will likely cost you your virtue.<sup>99</sup>

Callicles's response feigns a new despondency: "You have a point there Socrates, but like a lot of others I am not persuaded." – "It's because you want the demos to favor you," Socrates replies, a QED corroborating his last point. Callicles's remark and Socrates's response foreshadow still more vividly the trial of 399. More and more the conversation with this nobody, and the entire dialogue that led up to it, is becoming an occasion for us to see just how a fascination with oratorical power in a democracy could result in the citizens of Athens being persuaded to vote for Socrates's guilt and execution. Still inveterate Socrates continues, for there are other outstanding claims to impugn and chips to remove. He again adduces "The Distinction" as his starting point:<sup>100</sup> surely the real art of politics will be the improving type of activity, not the pandering type, and he now applies that distinction to Callicles's advice that he join him in public life, and again he uses his triad of goods, external, bodily, and psychic,<sup>101</sup> in an epagoge in which Callicles

89 For this strange and imaginary analogy Plato coins the word, *ῥητορεύειν* (502D2)!

90 An argument will be given later (515C5-517A7), but already this flat-out rejection is enough to arouse objections from the interpreters all the way back to Aristides's *Reply to Plato: In Defense of the Four*, on which cf. Appendix 3. The evaluation of these men and also that of the art of tragedy lives only within this fictional conversation: there is no warrant to attribute the positions taken by Socrates and Callicles to represent the beliefs of Plato, which are quite irrelevant to the battle underway.

91 Note *ἀτρέμια σκοποῦμενοι*, 503D5.

92 And exhibited! 503D-505B reaches the contrary the peroration in Callicles's parrhesiastic speech (491E-492C), in which he rashly claimed his life was true virtue and happiness (492C4-8).

93 Note *τίθεμαι*, 507C8.

94 505C1-508C3. Gorgias is again exonerated from making any remark, since Socrates is now talking with Callicles.

95 The dialogue is marked by Socrates's dialectical inventiveness and resiliency against evasive, recalcitrant, and nefarious interlocutors.

96 509A: The juxtaposition of adamantine certainty and a readiness to be refuted captures Socrates in a nutshell.

97 510A11-B1: notice his oratorical way of saying "yes": *ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαυεῖν ἂν τι καλῶς λέγεις*. His answer, in his own eyes, is nothing but a restatement of what he had said before. Contrast his truculent attitude about continuing, just above (510A1-2).

98 It was implicit in Polus's praise of oratory and explicit in Callicles's opening praise of the political life, and is one of the biggest chips Socrates has to remove.

99 510B2-513C3, including the very individuality Callicles so highly and foolishly prizes: he will have to assimilate himself to the mind of the masses, but because he is inexperienced (we are left to infer) he does not know it yet.

100 513D1-515B.

101 As above, 467E4-5, 477B1-C5 and 477E7-478B5, 503E4-504D4, 511D1-2. Cf. n. ad 504A2, *infra*.

does participate. If it were to join as architects for the city we would prove our eligibility by citing teachers and showing fine private projects; if it were as a public doctor and someone asked me to show credentials, I would have to produce some private patients; but if it is to become an oratorical political leader as you are beginning to do<sup>102</sup> and ask me to join you, whom can you point to as having improved his soul, Callicles?

Because Socrates has contrived to aim the epagoge at Callicles in particular,<sup>103</sup> Callicles now takes his argument to be *ad hominem* (comfortable in accusing Socrates of doing the very sort of thing he himself constantly does),<sup>104</sup> when in fact by the assumption of the argument and his advocating the political life, he truly should be the best qualified to answer. To keep things going, Socrates transfers the charge and the question to those Great Men that Callicles had cited above<sup>105</sup> as his obvious cases of Great Men.<sup>106</sup> One by one he now proffers historical cases that Miltiades, Pericles, and Cimon had left the Athenians worse off than when they started, and indeed were hated by them at the end of their careers – so that they were failures not only as true orators but also as panders!<sup>107</sup> “Ah, but none of the current orators will be able to achieve the great works they did!” is Callicles’s riposte, repeating what Gorgias had adduced as evidence of the power and influence of oratory back at the beginning,<sup>108</sup> but at the same time abandoning the very ground for which he had introduced those men, namely as proponents and examples of an improving type of politics and oratory.<sup>109</sup> He has thrown Socrates a curve, but Socrates goes with the pitch and mounts another oration of his own. Resuscitating the Distinction once again as his principle, he recasts it as a distinction between mere servitors who give the citizens what they desire (bread and circuses) and the true politician that can redirect and elevate their desires to what will truly improve them and their way of living. He spells out this distinction at great length to infer the further observation that the citizenry, in their ignorance, will blame the ill effects of the indulgent “servitor” leaders Callicles admires on the politicians that succeed them a generation later, once their sickly and jaded policies set in. They might even try to do their current leaders some harm (which bespeaks a warning for us to notice that Callicles himself had better take care as he enters politics!), but Socrates will infer still more. Just like the good politician, the good sophist and teacher will render his students better instead of worse and they will hold him in esteem rather than treat him unjustly (there are, indeed, cases on record when such teachers sued their students for stiffing them their fees!) – with which Socrates, without mentioning any names, implicitly answers the question whether Gorgias’s students learn justice from him!<sup>110</sup> Instead, he points to Callicles’s first accusation against him, that his peroration to the session with Polus, in which he inverted the worth of oratory, was a piece of demagoguery,<sup>111</sup> and blames the need to deliver a sustained oration on the fact that Callicles would not continue sharing the logos with question and answer.

With this turning of the tables he can now put the question to Callicles. Which type of politician he is advocating Socrates to be?<sup>112</sup> And Callicles chooses the servitor (I paraphrase):<sup>113</sup>

Soc. “The flatterer then, Callicles?” you will survive.”

Soc. “There you go again! And again I will say it will be as a just man at the hands of injustice that I will die.”

Call. “How naive you persist in being: As if you were living in a separate world though any pipsqueak could draw you into court and get you killed!”

Soc. “I wouldn’t be surprised at all.”

And with this Socrates breaks into another discursive statement, reverting again to the great Distinction but this time applying it to himself! Speaking he always does with an eye on the best not the pleasant, hardly clever in political stratagems; and as he said when he drew that Distinction, it will be a jury of virtual children

102 That Callicles is just now beginning a career in politics (515A1-2: σὸ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχη τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα) comes as a complete surprise (though not to Socrates). It is another trick of Plato’s by which he is testing whether we are reading critically. With all his bloat and bluster we may well have foolishly assumed, along with most commentators, that Callicles was already active and influential!

103 Socrates imagines the case of the doctor (body) as a challenge to himself (514D6-9) so as then to imagine the apply the case of the politician (soul) as a challenge to Callicles (515A4-B2): cf. n. 1949.

104 515B5.

105 Quite a while ago, at 503C1-3.

106 Socrates remembers everything and will leave none of Callicles’s assertions unimpugned.

107 515C5-517A6.

108 455DE. Gorgias, too, had relied upon the high reputation of Themistocles and Pericles exactly for having built the sort of public projects to which Callicles here alludes.

109 517A7-B1. It is noteworthy that Callicles did not attempt to gainsay Socrates’s account and evaluation of his heroes’ reigns. To Plato’s contemporary readers his lack of any response would be an index of his utter incompetence and ignorance, and shows he merely admires and emulates their celebrity. Aristides’s real beef is not with Socrates or Plato but with Callicles!

110 517B2-519D7. At the same moment he does not blame Gorgias explicitly he apologizes for making such a long argument on the grounds that Callicles has been unwilling to participate in question and answer. This recalls his opportunity to divulge his great Distinction because of Polus’s inability to ask questions properly. Gorgias’s silence is again deafening.

111 482C5.

112 In the wording by which Socrates frames his question (521A2-7), he alludes to almost everything that has come up in their conversation (cf. n. 2123) We sense the end is near.

113 521A2-C8.

that will judge him:<sup>114</sup> He will be accused of causing them the pain a doctor causes. Imagine the uproar if he got up and said it was all for their own good! Still and again the impermeable Callicles again wonders, “And you think it’s good to be helpless in the face of such treatment?” But Socrates replies that they had several times reached the agreement that the best help one can be to oneself is to maintain one’s own virtue. If he were dragged into court for failing to do this, he would indeed be vexed; but given the arguments they have reached today, if it is only out of a failure in pandering oratory that he loses in court, he would face death with an even disposition. The sentiment and the expression could not come closer to that of the *Apology*.

In a final attempt to bring the point home to Callicles’s inward conscience, Socrates offers to tell him a *muthos*, as he had done thirty pages ago when Callicles confessed he was addicted to pleasure and he brought in the myth of the soul as sieve. Callicles grants him leave to do so, once again in hopes Socrates will finally be done with his logos, but the content of Socrates’s closing speech will show Callicles that his troubles have not even begun.<sup>115</sup>

\* \* \* \*

## On the Presentation of the Greek Text

The Greek text provided is based on the OCT of Burnet, its readings and paragraphing modified as necessary. In lieu of presenting a separate *apparatus criticus* at foot-of-page, I have placed textual information within my exegetical footnotes, imitating the catholic and open-texture method of Irigoin,<sup>116</sup> which combines the readings of the mss. in tandem with the opinions of the commentators and editors. I have relied upon the very broad and meticulous textual work of Cantarín and Díez (Madrid 2000) including their recensions and stemmata with some hundred and thirty corrective or new reports, and I have adopted their *sigla* (including those of the papyri), the bulk of which I tabulate below, first in alphabetical order and then by their families. I have spelled out their scrupulous avoidance of redundancy in reporting the readings.

The advantage of reporting the manuscript readings and commentators’ opinions in tandem is that the entire historical record and scope of controversy are presented synoptically, but in order to retain the formal reportage of a conventional *apparatus criticus* I have adopted several expedients, as follows. I first report the reading I prefer, and then *after a comma* I list the editors and translators who also chose that reading, with “*legg.*” (~ *legunt*), *even if what they “read” is an omission in a manuscript or a deletion by a previous editor*; thereupon, open parenthesis and listing the other mss. with the usual space and a colon between, and their respective “*legentes*” followed by closed parenthesis. I use the designation “mss.,” as is commonly done, to represent a consensus of the leading manuscripts (BTWF, always careful to honor the high testamentary value of the single ms. F). Likewise, when the overwhelming majority of the fifty commentators and translators I have consulted agree on a reading, I refer to them as “*edd.*” rather than listing them *nominatim* (including among “*edd.*” those translators whose opinion as to readings can safely be inferred), but I do call out by name the minorities that disagree. Editors’ names are listed with a space between but no commas or connectives, and I also have employed non-space to append a short comment pertinent to a single name in the sequence, so as to associate the comment with that name alone (e.g., “Ast[1819]” for the 1819 ed. of Ast as opposed to his commentary of 1832 – see illustration below). And I beg indulgence for my blanket use of Latin *pace* to indicate by name those who hold an opinion different from mine.

Italics are used for words or quotations outside English, but also for emphasis in English (and non-italics for emphasis within an italic context or for italics within an italic context). I cite ancient works with a space between the author’s name and the work’s title, but no space between title and page, section, or line numbers within the work, and I use the abbreviations in LSJ for both author and title (thus, Plut. *Mor.*345A, and T. 1.29.2).

Here is a sample note by way of illustrating these protocols (this is note 1122).

Reading διαφυγών only (A4) with BTPF, *legg.* *edd.* (διαφυγών και E3S2YV [*silet* Cantarín!], *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast[1819] Coraes Bekker : *secl.* Naber[*Obs.Crit.*7], *legg.* Schanz Theiler : και διαφυγών *secl.* Morstadt[*Emend.*5]).

114 He refers once again to 464D5-E2: cf. n. 67.

115 Plato gives Callicles no response, and with a final ironic twist leaves it, even to his original audience, to infer why they have never heard of this boastful nobody (though commentators seek to find him and describe him).

116 I have this on the testimony of Monique Dixsaut, who studied with him in Paris.

## Principal Manuscripts Listed Alphabetically

Aug	Augustianus gr. 514	
B	Bodleianus Clark 39	=Bekker <i>Gothic U capital</i>
B <sup>2</sup>	vetus διορθωτής codicis B	
C	Parisinus 1809	
Γ	Coislinianus gr. 155	
Γ1	Vaticanus gr. 1297	
Γ2	Vallicellianus gr. 106	
E	Escorialensis gr. y.i.13	
E1	Vaticanus gr. 229	
E2	Parisinus 1812	
E3	Parisinus 1811	=Bekker E
Est	Estensis ms. gr.249	
F	Vindobonensis 55 suppl. gr. 39	
Flor	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 85.6	=Flor.Laur. Stallb.
J	Parisinus 1815	
L	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 59.1	
Lau <sup>f</sup>	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 89.78	
Lau <sup>s</sup>	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 69.25	
Lob	Lobvicianus VI.F.a.1	
M	Maletestianus plut. 128.4	
N	Neapolitanus gr.337	
Ξ1	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 186 (=601)	
Ξ2	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 184	=Stallb. Ξ
O1	Bodleianus misc. gr. 189	
O2	Bodleianus misc. gr. 104	
P	Vaticanus palatinus gr. 173	
Par	Parisinus gr. 1808	
Q	Parisinus gr. 2953	
Qb	Vaticanus gr. 933	
R	Vaticanus gr. 1029	=Bude V
S2	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 189 (=704)	=Burnet S // Stallb. Σ
T	Venetus append. class. 4 cod.1	=Bekker <i>Gothic t</i>
T <sup>2</sup>	vetus διορθωτής codicis T	
V	Parisinus 2110	
Vat	Vaticanus gr. 225	= Stallb. Δ
Y	Vindobonensis phil. gr. 21	=Stallb. Vind2 / Bekker <i>υπισλον</i>
Φ	Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 109	=Stallb. Vind.6
W	Vindobonensis 54 suppl gr.7	=Stallb Vind.1
x	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 85.7	x alibi
X	Vindobonensis supp. phil. gr. 116	
Za	Neapolitanus gr. 338	
Zb	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 85.12	
The Papyri		
Π1	Pap. gr. vindob.(Rainer) 39880 and 26001	
Π2	PL III / Oxyrhyncus pap 454 and PSI 119	
Π3	PSI 1200	

## Principal Manuscripts Listed by Family:

### Principal Witnesses:

First Class	B	Bodleianus Clark 39	ix	=Bekker Gothic u
	T	Venetus append. class. 4 cod.1	x	=Bekker Gothic t
	P	Vaticanus palatinus gr. 173	x-xi	
	W	Vindobonensis 54 suppl. gr. 7	xi	=Stallb.Vind.1
Second Class	F	Vindobonensis 55 suppl. gr. 39	xiii-xiv	

### More Recent Witnesses

Family I (ex B)	Vat	Vaticanus gr. 225	xiv	= Stallb. Δ
Family II (ex T)				
II-a				
	Par	Parisinus gr. 1808	xii or xiii	
II-a-1				
	E	Escorialensis gr. y.i. 13	xiii	
	E1	Vaticanus gr. 229	xiv	
	Est	Estensis ms. gr. 249	xiv-xv	
	E2	Parisinus 1812	xiv	
	E3	Parisinus 1811	xiv	=Bekker E
II-a-2				
	Ang	Angelicus gr. 107	xiii?	
II-a-3				
II-a-3A				
	N	Neapolitanus gr. 337	xiii	
	Flor	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 85.6	1355	=Stallb. Flor.Laur.
	V	Parisinus gr. 2110	xv	
	J	Parisinus gr. 1815	xvi	
II-a-3B				
	Z	Vaticanus gr. 61	xiii	
	Za	Neapolitanus gr. 338	xiv	
	Zb	Mediceus laurentianus plut. 85.12	xiv	
II-a-4				
	C	Parisinus gr. 1809	xiv	
II-a-5				
	L	Mediceus Laurentianus plut. 59.1	xiv	
II-b				
	Q	Parsinus gr. 2953	xiii	
	Qb	Vaticanus gr. 933	xiii	
II-c				
	Γ	Coislinianus gr. 155	xiv	
	Γ1	Vaticanus gr. 1297	xv	
	Γ2	Vallicellianus gr. 106	xv-xvi	
Family III (ex consensus PW)				
	Lob	Lobcovianus VI.F.a.1	xiv	
	R	Vaticanus gr. 1029	xiv	=Bude V
	Φ	Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 109	xiv	=Stallb.Vind.6
Family IV (ex F)				
	x	Mediceus laurenianus plut. 85.7	1420	=x <i>alibi</i>
	J	Parisinus gr. 1815	xvi	
Family V (ex consensus Z Za R F)				
	Y	Vindobonensis phil. gr. 21	xiv	=Stallb.Vind.2 / Bekker Y
	S1	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 590	xiv	
	S2	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 189	xiv	=Burnet S // Stallb. Σ
	X	Vindobonensis suppl. phil. gr. 116	xiv	
	Ξ1	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 186	xv	
	Ξ2	Venetus marcianus gr. Z 184	xv	=Stallb. Ξ
	Aug	Augustanus gr. 514	xv	
	O1	Bodleianus misc. gr. 189	xv	
	O2	Bodleianus misc. gr. 104	xvi	

END OF INTRODUCTION

## The *Gorgias* of Plato

CALLICLES: “It’s to war and battle, they say, that you should arrive in this way Socrates!”(447)

SOCRATES: “Don’t tell me we’ve ‘arrived after the feast’ and are late?”

Call. “Yes and quite a splendid feast it was: Gorgias has just finished a really fine performance for us.”

Soc. “Let me tell you, Callicles, it was Chaerephon here that made me late. He made us tarry in the agora.”

CHAEREPHON: “No problem, Socrates: I will make you whole as well. Gorgias is a friend of mine and so he’ll put together a performance for us – now if that seems best, or another time – whichever you want.”

Call. “What’s this, Chaerephon? Are you saying Socrates desires to hear Gorgias?”

Chaer. “Well that’s the reason we are here...”

Call. “Then just come to me, to my *house* that is, and *whenever* you want. It’s with *me* that Gorgias is lodging, and you’ll get your performance!”

Soc. “That’s kind of you, Callicles, but let me ask something. Would he be willing to *converse* with us? I want to get some information about the power of the fellow’s art, and what it is he professes to teach. As for a performance let’s just have that ‘another time,’ as you suggest.”

Call. “There’s nothing like asking the man himself, Socrates, since this was one of the elements of his display. Just now he invited anybody within to ask him whatever they wanted, and declared he would give an answer on any topic.”

Soc. “That’s quite something. Chaerephon, question him!”

Chaer. “What am I to ask him?”

Soc. “Who he is.”

Chaer. “How do you mean?”

Soc. “If for instance he were a provider of shoes he would presumably respond he is a cobbler – or don’t you get my meaning?”

Chaer. “I get it and I’ll ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, is it true what Callicles here says, that you profess to answer whatever question a person asks you?” (448)

GORGAS: “True it is, Chaerephon, and in fact I was carrying out that exercise just now, and I can say that nobody has yet asked me a question too exotic to answer, for many years now.”

Chaer. “It seems you really do have an easy time answering, Gorgias.”

Gorg. "Now's your chance to try and test my claim, Chaerephon."

POLUS: "Yes by Zeus, if only you will spend that chance on *me*, Chaerephon! Gorgias seems to me to have begged off performing. After all, he's taken us through a lot just now."

Chaer. "My gosh, Polus, do you imagine *you* could do a finer job of answering than Gorgias?"

Pol. "What difference does that make as long as I'm able to answer well enough for *you*?"

Chaer. "None at all. Since *you* are willing, answer."

Pol. "Ask."

Chaer. "Ask I will. If Gorgias were a master of the art his brother Herodicus has mastered, who would we properly be calling him? Wouldn't it be the same as we call his brother?"

Pol. "Quite so."

Chaer. "So if we were saying he was a doctor we would be saying the right thing?"

Pol. "Yes."

Chaer. "And if it were of the art of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon or his brother that he was master of, what then would we correctly designate him to be?"

Pol. "A painter, obviously."

Chaer. "So given the art he *has* in fact mastered, by what professional designation would we correctly designate him?"

Pol. "Let me tell you, Chaerephon. Many are the arts in the world of man, invented as they have been out of devoted endeavor. For it is endeavor that ushers our lives along artfully, whereas without endeavor, life would proceed according to chance. Now of these arts, one man has a share of one and another of another, each in their different way; of the greatest of arts it is the greatest men that have a share: one of these in fact is my man Gorgias here, and he has a share in the finest."

Soc. "Finely indeed does Polus seem to come equipped for speaking, Gorgias, but he is not making good on his promise to Chaerephon."

Gorg. "What can you mean by that, Socrates?"

Soc. "He is not really answering what he was asked."

Gorg. "Well then *you* question him, if you please"

Soc. "In case *you* would want to answer I would much prefer to ask you. It's clear, particularly from what Polus has just said, that he is well practiced in the 'oratorical' so-called, rather than in conversing."

Pol. "How's that, Socrates?"

Soc. "Well, Polus, though Chaerephon asked what art Gorgias was the master of, you praised the art as though someone were criticizing it, but you didn't answer what it is."

Pol. "So I didn't answer that it was the finest."

Soc. "Quite forcefully you did. However, nobody is asking you about the quality of Gorgias's art but which art it is and which kind of professional Gorgias ought to be said to be. Just as before, when Chaerephon laid out some cases for you and you responded to him succinctly, (449) so now follow that method and say which is his art and what we are to call him. Or better, Gorgias, tell us on your own behalf what we are to call you, and of what art you are a master."

Gorg. "The oratorical, Socrates."

Soc. "And so one ought call you an orator?"

Gorg. "A good one, Socrates, if you would call me 'what I hope and brag to be', as Homer puts it."

Soc. "Surely I would."

Gorg. "Then call me that."

Soc. "And shall we also declare you able to make others into orators?"

Gorg. "Well, I do profess to do so, both here and elsewhere as well."

Soc. "Would you perhaps be willing, Gorgias, to continue in the manner of our conversation just now, with first a man asking and then a man answering? As to this lengthy expression we just saw – the sort of exordium Polus launched into – might you be willing to put that off for another occasion? Make good on your promise, instead – don't play false – and acquiesce to answer what is asked in the briefer manner."

Gorg. "Among answers, Socrates, there really are some that must of necessity make their statements with length. Nevertheless, I assure you I will endeavor to make my answers as short as possible. In fact this, too, is one of the items I claim, that nobody could say the same thing in fewer words than mine."

Soc. "I assure you that's what we need, Gorgias. In fact make me a display of just this, of short speaking, and put off the display of lengthy speaking for another time."

Gorg. "Alright I will: than nobody, you will say, have you heard a shorterspeaker?"

Soc. "To move on, then, you are claiming to be a master of the oratorical art and that you can make another man also an orator, but oratory: what things is it actually about? For example, weaving is about the manufacture of cloaks – right?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "And musical art is about the composing of melodies?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "Hera bless you, Gorgias! How I admire your answers, and how you are answering in the shortest possible way!"

Gorg. "The reason is that I think it quite appropriate to do this."

Soc. "I am glad to hear it. So now answer me in the same way about the oratorical art, too: about which things is it a mastery?"

Gorg. "About speeches."

Soc. "Just 'speeches,' Gorgias? The speeches that explain, in the case of the sick, what kind of regime would make them healthy?"

Gorg. "No."

Soc. "So oratory is not about any and all speeches."

Gorg. "Certainly not."

Soc. "But it does make people able to speak."

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "And to be knowledgeable about the topics about which it enables them to speak?"

Gorg. "Yes, how not?"



Soc. “So (450) to follow up on what we are now saying, it would be the medical art that enables persons to speak about and understand the sick.”

Gorg. “Necessarily.”

Soc. “So the medical art, too, is about speeches, as it seems.”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “Namely the speeches that are about diseases.”

Gorg. “Exactly.”

Soc. “The gymnastic art is also about speeches, those about the body being in good shape and bad shape.”

Gorg. “Quite.”

Soc. “And to be sure it’s the same with the other arts, too. Each of them is about speeches, namely the ones that concern the activity that is the peculiar province of the art.”

Gorg. “Seems so.”

Soc. “And so just why do you not call the other arts oratorical arts, being as they are about speeches, if that is what you would say the oratorical art is, the art about speeches?”

Gorg. “Because, Socrates, the competence of the other arts lies in the work of the hands and other such actions if I may put it this way, whereas in oratory there is no such business at all with the hands. To the contrary, all its operation and all the success it achieves come through speech. This is the reason I make my claim that the oratorical art is about speeches, in a rigorous sense I would say.”

Soc. “Am I then catching on to what sort of thing you are calling it? Perhaps I’ll know if only you’ll answer: We have arts, right?”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “Now of all these arts, I fancy that some consist largely in activity and need a minimum of speech, while others need none at all but could complete what they do even in silence, like painting and sculpture and a lot of others. It is these sorts you seem to mean when you say they are not the oratorical art.”

Gorg. “You are taking up my meaning quite nicely Socrates.”

Soc. “But another group of arts execute their entire function through speech, needing no supplement of actions at all, if you will – or quite a small amount – like arithmetic and counting and geometry, and dice-playing for that matter, and many others – arts a few of which might have a virtually equal amount of speech as action, whereas the majority have more speech than action, so that viewed overall the entire ‘action and success they achieve’ comes through speaking – and it is to this last group that you seem to be arguing that the oratorical art belongs.”

Gorg. “True.”

Soc. “But still, you know, I’d guess you don’t want to call any one of this latter group oratorical, merely because on the face of it you have said that ‘the art that achieves what it achieves through speech is oratorical,’ so that a person could latch upon what you say, in a captious and literalistic way, ‘Therefore arithmetic is oratorical.’ No, I don’t think you are arguing that arithmetic or geometry is oratory.” (451)

Gorg. “You guess right, Socrates and have taken up my meaning fair-mindedly.”

Soc. “So then take your turn to complete your answer to the question I’ve asked. Since a certain one of these arts that operates largely by means of speech is oratorical, but there are in fact others that are of this kind, try and tell me *which* art, wielding its power through speech in *what* field, is the oratorical art? Just as if someone asked me, ‘Socrates, which art is the arithmetical art?’ I would give him the reply you just made, that it is one of the arts that wields its power through speech; and if he went on to ask, ‘Of those concerning what subject?’ I would say of that it is knowledge of those concerning the even and the odd, and how much each of these two are. And if he asked me another question, ‘And logistic: which art do you say *that* is?’ I would say that this one too belonged to the group that govern what they govern by means of speaking. But if he went on to ask, ‘Concerning what?’ I would answer, to adopt the style of the scrivener, that the logistic art is ‘the same as arithmetic in all the ways above’ – for it concerns the same thing, the even and the odd – but it differs to this degree, that the art that takes charge of the questions of how these relate to themselves and to each other in quantity is the art of logistic. And say someone should challenge me on astronomy, once I had said it wields its entire authority by means of speech, and should ask me, ‘But these speeches that belong to astronomy: what are they about, Socrates?’ I would say they are about the movement of the stars and the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities.”

Gorg. “And you would be speaking properly, Socrates.”

Soc. “So now you take a turn, Gorgias. The fact is that the oratorical art is among those that carry out their entire activity and wield all their power by means of speech, correct?”

Gorg. “So it is.”

Soc. “So, out of those, try to tell us concerning what is it that, out of all entities, the speeches the oratorical art uses are about?”

Gorg. “The most important of all human things, Socrates, and indeed the best.”

Soc. “But Gorgias, you are asserting something again disputable and therefore not yet definitive. I imagine you have heard men singing that ditty at drinking parties, in which they list off in song how “being healthy is the best thing but the second is to become beautiful, while the third (quoting still from the author of the ditty) is to become wealthy, fair and square.” (452)

Gorg. “Yes I have heard it, but what is the connection?”

Soc. “Here is the connection: Let’s imagine the providers of those things the poet praised in his ditty showing up at your side – the doctor that is, and the trainer and the businessman – and let’s say the first to speak was the doctor and he said, ‘Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you. Your fellow’s art concerns not the most important good for men – but mine does!’ If I then asked him, ‘But you, what kind of artist are you to say that?’ He would probably answer that he is a doctor. ‘What, then, are you saying? That the thing your art achieves is the most important good?’ ‘How could that not be health, Socrates? What greater good is there for mankind than health?’

“Imagine then that the trainer would argue, ‘I, too, would be surprised, Socrates, if Gorgias has a more important good to display coming from his art than I have coming from mine.’ I would again respond by asking, ‘But you, sir – who are you and what is it that you produce?’ ‘Trainer’s my name, beauty and strength for men’s bodies is my game.’

“After the trainer the businessman would speak, with scorn I imagine against each and all: ‘Think about it, Socrates! Is there going to be some obvious better than wealth, in your eyes, whether it be what you get by associating with Gorgias or with anybody else?’ ‘We would reply, ‘Aha! Is that what *you* provide?’ He would say it is, and we would ask, ‘But being who?’ ‘A businessman;’ and we will say, ‘And *you* for your part choose wealth to be the most important good for mankind?’ and he would reply, ‘How could it not be?’ We would say, ‘Yet my man Gorgias here disputes this, and says the art one gets in *his* company results in a more important good than yours does,’ to which he would surely reply, ‘And just what is this good you are referring to? Let me hear

it from Gorgias!’

“So come along, Gorgias. Take it that you were being asked this question both by them and also by me, and answer what is this thing you, for your part, declare is the most important good for mankind, and that you are the professional that brings it about.

Gorg. “The thing, as I said before, Socrates, that is the most important good, in truth, and is what confers freedom upon the men that have it, and the power to control others in his respective city.”

Soc. “So what is it that you describe in this way?”

Gorg. “Persuading. Being able to persuade with speeches, whether it be in a law court the jurors or in the council the councillors or in the assembly the assemblymen or in any other gathering, whatever constitutes a political gathering. Let it be known that this power will in turn place that doctor in your thrall, and that trainer in your thrall, and as for that businessman of yours, he will find himself doing business for somebody else and not himself, namely for *you*, the man who is able to speak and thereby persuade these several masses.”

Soc. “Now, I think, you are coming as close as one can hope, Gorgias, to having revealed what art you take the oratorical art (453) to be. You are saying, in fact, if I basically get your meaning, that the oratorical art is a “producer of belief,” and that this, on the whole and in chief part, is what it busies itself to achieve. Or is there something more you can say oratory is able to do, beyond creating persuasion in the soul of those who are listening?”

Gorg. “Nothing at all, Socrates. You have marked it off adequately: this is its chief element.”

Soc. “So listen, Gorgias. When it comes to me, you may be sure, as I have persuaded myself, if *anybody* who is conversing with someone wants to know just what it is they are talking about, I am surely one of those people – and I would think this much of you, too.”

Gorg. “But what do you make of this?”

Soc. “I’ll tell you straight. For me, as to this persuasion that comes from the oratorical art, as to what it is that you are talking about and about what things, you may be sure that I do not know *exactly* what you have in mind, despite the fact that I do have my suspicions as to what you are saying it is and about what. Nevertheless, I will ask you what is the persuasion you are saying comes from oratory, and about what things. But why do I ask you when I have suspicions of my own, rather than taking the initiative to say what those suspicions are? It is not out of deference to you personally but deference to our discussion, so that it might proceed in such a way as to make as clear and certain as possible what is being discussed. Consider therefore and decide whether I am justified in putting this question to you – just as if I were now asking who is Zeuxis among the portrait painters and you said he is the one that paints portraits: wouldn’t I be justified to press the further question, ‘The one who paints which kinds of portraits, and where?’”

Gorg. “Quite justified.”

Soc. “And isn’t that because there are other portrait painters painting lots of other kinds of portraits?”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “Whereas if on the other hand nobody else than Zeuxis were painting, in that case you would have already acquitted yourself of answering well?”

Gorg. “How not?”

Soc. “Then come and tell about the oratorical art. Do you think that it alone produces persuasion, or do other arts do this also? I mean the following sort of thing: if you have a person who teaches something – anything – is he persuading in connection with what he is teaching?”

Gorg. “No indeed, Socrates. He is persuading more than anyone!”

Soc. “So then let’s go through the same arts we just went through. Arithmetic teaches us how big a number is, as does the arithmetical man.”

Gorg. “Quite.”

Soc. “Does it also persuade?”

Gorg. ”Yes”

Soc. “And so the arithmetical art is also a ‘belief producer’.”

Gorg. “It appears so.”

Soc. “And if someone asks us, ‘Of what sort of persuasion and persuasion about what?’ I presume we will answer him by saying it is a teacherly persuasion about numbers (454) and how large they are. And we will be able to show in the case of each and every one of the arts we reviewed before that they are “persuasion producers,” and what sort of persuasion they provide and about what – no?”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “Therefore it is not only the oratorical art that is a ‘persuasion producer’.”

Gorg. “What you say is true.”

Soc. “But since you agree that it is not this art alone that carries out this task but that there are others that do so also, we would be justified, as we put it above in the case of the portrait painter, to follow up and confront the man who has said this with the question, ‘Of just what kind of persuasion, then, and persuasion about what, is oratory the art?’ Or do you not think it justified to confront him with this follow-up question?”

Gorg. “No but I do.”

Soc. “Then answer that question, Gorgias, given the fact that you do think this.”

Gorg. “The *sort* of persuasion I say it provides, is that sort that occurs *in* courts of justice and the other crowds as I was saying a moment ago, and *about* those things: what is just or unjust.”

Soc. “Indeed I was suspecting you were speaking of that kind of persuasion and about those topics, Gorgias. Still, don’t be surprised if soon again I ask you something that seems obvious but nevertheless put it to you as a question – as I have said, this is only to enable the argument to succeed step by step and not out of consideration for you, lest we should settle into assuming on our own what each other is thinking so as to ambush each other’s arguments. But please, decide for yourself how you would want to carry on, in accordance with the position you have taken.”

Gorg. “In my judgment you are doing the right sort of thing, Socrates.”

Soc. “So come then and answer me this: Is there something you would call ‘having learned’?”

Gorg. “There is and I do.”

Soc. “How about ‘having become sure’?”

Gorg. “I do.”

Soc. “Do you think they are the same thing, ‘having learned’ and ‘having come to trust,’ and learning and trusting for that matter, or are they different?”

Gorg. “For my own part, Socrates, I’d guess they are different.”

Soc. “You guess well, but from the following you will *know* it is true. If someone should ask you, ‘Is there such a thing, Gorgias, as false certainty as well as true?’ I believe you’d say yes.”

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "But knowledge? Is there both false and true?"

Gorg. "No way."

Soc. "For in their case we know they aren't the same thing."

Gorg. "That's true."

Soc. "And yet those who have learned have been persuaded no less than those who have been become certain and have come to trust?"

Gorg. "That's correct."

Soc. "Would you want us then to posit two kinds of persuasion, one that brings about feeling certain without knowing and another that brings about knowledge?"

Gorg. "Quite so."

Soc. "Now which of the two kinds of persuasion does oratory produce, in courts of justice and in other crowds on the topic of justice and injustice? The type from which confidence arises without knowing taking place, or the one from which knowing arises?"

Gorg. "I think it's clear that it is the type from which confidence arises."

Soc. "So the oratorical art is (455) the "*trusting* persuasion producer," not the "*teacherly*," on the topic of the just and the unjust?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "And the orator, in turn, is not a teacher-man of the courts of justice and the other crowds on the topic of the just and unjust, but a "confidence-man" only. After all, he could not instruct such a large crowd about matters so great in so little time."

Gorg. "Certainly not."

Soc. "Come, then, let's see what we are actually saying about the oratorical art. For my part, I cannot quite grasp what I should say. When it is about selecting physicians for the city that a gathering occurs, or about shipbuilders or some other group of providers, on that occasion shall I say the oratorical expert will not give counsel? For clearly in these several selections it will be the most skillful man that must be selected. Nor when it is about the building of walls or the furnishing of harbors and dockyards: rather, the architects will give counsel. Nor in turn when the deliberation is about the choice of generals or the choice of a certain formation to use against the enemy or capturing a territory: rather, the experts in generalship will then be the ones giving counsel, and the oratorical expert will not. How about you, Gorgias? What is your attitude about these things? For since you claim that you yourself are an orator and also make others oratorical, it would be appropriate to receive information about this art of yours from none other than you. And recognize that I am at the same time being zealous for your cause. For it may be the case that one of those who listened to you within is wanting to become your student, as I perceive people are now doing in virtual droves, who may perhaps be ashamed to put this question to you. Though you are being posed the question by me, think of it as if it were being put to you by them: 'What will we get once we study with you? On what matters will we become able to counsel our city? Will it only be on questions of justice and injustice, or also on the subjects Socrates just now mentioned?' Try to answer them."

Gorg. "Try I will, Socrates, to unveil to you clearly the power of the oratorical art in all its glory, for you have given me just the segue I need. After all, I presume you know that those very dockyards you mention and the walls the Athenians call their own, as well as the furnishing of the

harbors, happened because of the counseling of Themistocles, and others of these because of the counseling of Pericles – and not because of your craftsmen.”

Soc. “I have heard, Gorgias, about Themistocles’s influence; as for Pericles I was myself in the audience when he advocated the inner wall.” (456)

Gorg. “And whenever there is a choice taken on the topics you just now went through, Socrates, you can see with your eyes that the orators are the ones giving counsel and the ones that win the measures concerning these things.”

Soc. “It is exactly because I have wondered at this, Gorgias, that I have been asking all along what is the power of the oratorical art. For it strikes me as superhuman when I see the way it wields such sway.”

Gorg. “If only you knew the whole story, Socrates! It’s as if it contained within itself all the powers there are, and marshals them all under its sole command. I will give you a telling indicator of this. Often in the past have I gone in with my brother, and with other doctors, too, to the bedside of one of their patients who was unwilling to take his medicine or to give in to his doctor to be cut or cauterized; and though the doctor lacked the power to persuade him otherwise, I persuaded him, and I did so with no other art than oratory. I declare that if an oratorical expert likewise goes in to a city – any city you wish – along with a doctor, and they should be required to contend in speech with each other, in the assembly or in some other gathering, as to which of them should be chosen as city doctor, the doctor will fall out of view, and instead the man who is able to make a speech will be chosen, if that’s what he wants. And if he should contend with any other “provider” you may wish to name, it would be he, the oratorical expert, who would persuade them to select himself and not the other, no matter who he was. For there is no subject on which the oratorical expert could not speak more persuasively than any of the providers, in the presence of a large audience.

“Such then is the extent and nature of this art’s power, and yet I must add that one must, Socrates, deploy the art of oratory just as one would deploy any skill in athletic competitions as well. For the arts of competition also ought not be deployed against any and every person merely because of this, that a person has learned to box, or to fight the pancration, or to battle in armor, and has thus become stronger than friends as well as enemies. One ought not because of this beat up his friends or stab them, and so kill them. Nor for that matter, Zeus be my witness, if a person in good physical condition has done a stint at a wrestling studio and has become an expert at boxing, and then goes on to assault his father or his mother or some other member of his household or a friend, one ought not because of this despise the physical trainers or the men that teach fighting in armor and exile them from the cities. Those worthies, for their part, handed it down for its just use by these students, against their enemies and those who have wronged them, for the purpose of defending against them, not to initiate an aggression, (457) but the others perverted it so as to use their physical strength and their skillful expertise for improper ends. Thus it is not the teachers that are wicked nor the art that is culpable or wicked because of this, but rather those who would employ it I’d say improperly.

“The same argument applies to the oratorical art. Able he is, our orator, to speak against any opponent and about anything, in such a way as to be more persuasive in the presence of large audiences on almost any topic, if he so choose. But not at all because of this ought he strip the doctors of their reputation, merely because he would have the power to do so, nor the other providers, but must employ the oratorical art with fairness, just as one must employ athletic skill. If a person I’d say has become oratorical and thereupon by means of this power and this art does commit injustices, one ought not despise the man who taught him and exile him from the cities. All he did was pass on the skill for a just man’s use, whereas the other used it in the opposite way. To despise the man who employed it in a manner that is improper, is just – and also to exile him and to execute him – but not the one who taught him.”



Soc. “What I daresay, Gorgias, is that like myself you have experienced many discussions and have come to observe what I have. Men are not so able to converse in such a way as to define clearly what it is they are trying to discuss as they try to learn from and teach each other so as to bring their conversations to completion, but rather that if they have different views on some point and the one says the other is incorrect or unclear in what he says, they become angry and think that they are arguing out of rivalry about the positions they are taking, and that they are trying to beat the other out of pride rather than to search for and learn the truth about the topic they are talking about. Among these, some terminate their conversations in the ugliest of ways, giving themselves over to slander, and dealing out as well as being dealt a treatment one to the other that then embarrasses the group listening to their conversation for having thought it worthwhile to pay attention to men of such ilk!

“But ‘for what purpose,’ as you put it, do I say all this? It’s because in our present conversation you seem to me to be arguing things that don’t really follow from or jibe with what you were saying at the beginning about the oratorical art. At the same time, I am afraid to test you step by step, worried you might take my arguments not to be contending with you about the problem so as to clear it up, but contending with you about you personally. (458) For my part, if you are the kind of person I am, I would gladly interrogate you step by step; but if not I would let it go. And what is this kind of person I am? I and others like me would gladly be refuted if arguing something false or gladly be doing the refuting in case someone else should argue something false, and would be no less glad to be refuted than to refute. For in my view this would be the greater boon, to the same extent it is a greater boon oneself to be released from the greatest of evils than to release somebody else. For I think there is no evil for a man so great than false belief about the things we are discussing just now. So – if you are like this also, let’s have a dialogue; but if it seems better just to let it go, let’s call it quits and break off our discussion.”

Gorg. “Well, Socrates, though I am of course of the very kind you have described, still more, perhaps, ought we take into consideration those who are present. It’s been a while now, even before you two came, that I was giving a big presentation to the people here, and we will be stretching things out even further if we carry on a dialogue. So we ought to be mindful how it is for these people here, in case we are detaining some of them from doing something else they might be wanting to do.”

CHAEREPHON: “The general commotion you can hear for yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, from these men, wanting as they do to listen if only you will continue talking; but for myself I pray I never become so busy that I would pass up arguments on these topics carried on in this way because I had something else more profitable to be doing.”

CALLICLES: “Yes, by the gods, Chaerephon! For I myself have attended many conversations in the past but cannot say I have ever felt such enjoyment as now. For me at least, if you were willing to spend even the entire day in dialogue, you’d only make me glad.”

Soc. “Well, Callicles, I have no objection, if only Gorgias is willing.”

Gorg. “You’ve left it only to me to take the shame for being unwilling, especially since I myself issued the challenge to ask me whatever question one wanted. If it seems best to these people here, go ahead and conduct your dialogue: ask whatever you want.”

Soc. “Alright then hear, Gorgias, what I found so surprising in what you said. It could be that you were arguing correctly and I just didn’t understand correctly. Do you claim to be able to make a man an orator if he is willing to study under you?”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “And thus to become persuasive on any topic in a crowd, not by teaching but (459) by persuading?”

Gorg. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And did you just argue that even on the topic of health the orator will be more persuasive than the doctor?”

Gorg. “Yes I did, in a crowd at least.”

Soc. “But this ‘in a crowd’ expression of yours means among those whom you assume lack knowledge? For presumably he would not be more persuasive among those have knowledge.”

Gorg. “That is true.”

Soc. “So if he is more persuasive than a doctor this implies he is more persuasive than a knowledgeable person?”

Gorg. “Quite so.”

Soc. “While he himself is no doctor?”

Gorg. “Yes.”

Soc. “But if the man is not a doctor then he is presumably unlearned in the things in which the doctor is learned?”

Gorg. “Clearly that is so.”

Soc. “Therefore, the person who is ignorant will be more persuasive among the ignorant than the person who knows – if, that is, the orator is more persuasive than the doctor? Is that what follows or does something else follow?”

Gorg. “It follows in that case at least.”

Soc. “But doesn’t it hold this way for the orator and his oratorical art in each and all the other arts, that his art does not need to know the truth about their various subject matters, but rather must have invented some persuasion-device so as to appear to ignorant people to know more than the knowers do?”

Gorg. “Quite a *bonus* isn’t it that a person who does not know the other arts but knows only this one, should in no way be worsted by all those specialists!”

Soc. “Whether or not your orator comes off worse than the others by virtue of having only this ability you describe we will consider in a moment, if it becomes relevant. But first let’s investigate this: Is it the case that the oratorical expert has the same relation to the just and the unjust, the ugly and the beautiful, and the good and the bad as he has to health and the subject matters of the other arts? That is, does he also not know what the good and what the bad are in themselves, or what is beautiful and what is ugly, or just and unjust, but instead has mastered a device for persuasion on these topics also, which makes him seem among ignorant persons to know more than the man who does know, though he does not? Or is it that he does need to know and the candidate who would learn oratory must likewise master this before coming to you; whereas if he hasn’t, you as a teacher of oratory will teach none of this to the student who comes to you – it’s not your job to, after all – but will make him *seem* to know those sorts of things as he stands among the many, though he doesn’t, and *seem* to them a good man though he isn’t? Or will you be unable even to begin to teach him oratory unless and until he has learned the truth about these things? Or what is your position on this, Gorgias? (460) In Zeus’s name pull back the veil from oratory, as you said a moment ago, and reveal its true power!”

Gorg. “Well, Socrates, I’d guess if he happens not to know he’ll learn that, too, from me.”



Soc. "Bear with me, then. You've said something fine: that if you really are to make a person a trained orator, it is necessary that he know the just and the unjust, having learned them either before he came or afterward, from you."

Gorg. "Quite."

Soc. "So what about this: Does a person who has learned about matters of building become a trained builder?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "And the person who has learned about musical things becomes a trained musician?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "And about medical things a medic? And similarly with the other categories of things: the person who has learned the respective things becomes the sort of person that the respective knowledge turns him into?"

Gorg. "Quite so."

Soc. "By the same argument is the person who has learned about just matters just?"

Gorg. "I should think so, most assuredly!"

Soc. "But presumably the just man behaves justly?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "So we can infer that the trained orator is a just man, and that the just man has a mind to act justly?"

Gorg. "Well, it *seems* so."

Soc. "So never will the *just* man, since he is just, be of a mind to act unjustly?"

Gorg. "That follows necessarily."

Soc. "But our trained orator necessarily, by the force of what we have said, is just."

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. "Therefore the trained orator will never be of a mind to act unjustly."

Gorg. "Well, it *seems* at least that he won't."

Soc. "So do you remember what you said a moment ago, that one ought not to bring charges against the trainers and expel them from the cities if the boxer employs the boxing art and also commits an injustice, and that analogously if the orator uses the oratorical skill unjustly you advised us not to bring charges against the man who taught him and drive him out of the city, but to bring them instead against the man who acts unjustly and uses the skill incorrectly. Was all this said in your speech, or not?"

Gorg. "It was said."

Soc. "But now we are seeing that this same person, the trained orator, would never act unjustly – aren't we?"

Gorg. "So we are."

Soc. "And, mark you, during the conversation we had at the beginning, we were arguing that the oratorical art was not about speeches concerning the odd and the even but speeches concerning the just and the unjust – correct?"

Gorg. "Yes."

Soc. “Let me tell you, at that point I took you to be saying that oratory could never be unjust in practice given that it is always formulating arguments about justice, but then a moment later when you were arguing that the orator (461) *could* use oratory unjustly I was so struck with the sense that what we were saying was out of tune with itself that I made those remarks that if you thought it profitable to be refuted, as I do, it was worth the trouble to discuss the matter, but if not that we should just let it go. And still later, in the course of our closer scrutiny of the matter, you can see with your own eyes that we have now gone back to agreeing that it is impossible for the trained orator to use oratory unjustly – to act unjustly, that is. By the Dog, Gorgias, to investigate adequately how it stands with this will call for a session far from short.”

POLUS: “What’s this, Socrates? Don’t tell me you, too, subscribe to *that* attitude! Do you really think – given that Gorgias would demur to stipulate for you that the real orator is of course cognizant of justice, and also the beautiful and the good, and that if someone did come to study with him who was not already knowledgeable about these things that he would himself teach him, and consequently because of this ‘agreement,’ as you might see it, there follows some contradiction in what he has said – do you really take pleasure in this, that you can lead someone into these questions of yours? Who after all do you think will deny even of himself that he knows what is just, or would refuse to teach it to others? My gosh! To lead us into such as that shows a huge boorishness as to what speaking and discourse is all about!”

Soc. “But most excellent Polus, let me just say how lucky we are to have our very sons as companions, so that as we grow older and slip and fall we have younger men standing by who will take it upon themselves to keep our lives upright by getting us back on our feet, not only literally but also in what we say. And so, just now, if Gorgias and I have somehow stumbled in our conversation, here you are, standing by to pick us up – you owe it to us elders – and as for myself, if there is some step in the things that have been agreed to that was erroneously agreed, I am willing that you retract whatever you want to, as long as you try to get one thing under control...”

Pol. “What thing is that?”

Soc. “Your macrology, Polus – if you would please hem it in – which you tried launching into at the start.”

Pol. “What’s this? I’m not to be allowed to say as much as I want?”

Soc. “What shocking abuse it would be, my finest of men, that you should arrive here in Athens, home of the broadest freedom of speech in all of Greece, only to be the one person denied the privilege! But look at it the other way: if you speak at length, shirking to answer the question you are asked, would it not be an abuse equally shocking that I would suffer if I should not be allowed (462) to walk out rather than sit here listening to you? Nay, if you find that you care about the argument that has been made and want to redeem it, then as I just said revise it as ever you wish, taking turns to question and be questioned, to refute and to be refuted, as Gorgias and I have agreed to do. You do affirm, don’t you, that you also are a master of the same things as Gorgias?”

Pol. “I do.”

Soc. “So do you also make a practice of telling people to ask you whatever they want, thinking yourself a master at answering?”

Pol. “Quite so.”

Soc. “Just so, do whichever *you* have a mind to: play the questioner or the answerer.”

Pol. “I will do what *you* are suggesting. Answer me, Socrates. Since you find Gorgias to be in a jam about oratory, which do *you* say it is?”

Soc. “Do you mean to ask which *art* I think it is?”

Pol. “I do.”

Soc. “No art at all, in my opinion, Polus, if I am to speak candidly.”

Pol. “But what is oratory in your opinion?”

Soc. “The thing that you, in your manual, allege has made it into an art, as I have recognized just now.”

Pol. “What are you talking about?”

Soc. “A kind of ‘experiencedness’ I’d say.”

Pol. “You believe oratory is a ‘being experienced’?”

Soc. “I do, unless you say otherwise.”

Pol. “Being experienced at what?”

Soc. “At effecting a sort of good cheer or pleasure.”

Pol. “So it is a *fine* thing you judge oratory to be, as being able to please our fellow men!”

Soc. “What’s this, Polus? Have you already learned from me *what* I say it is, so that you go on to ask me the next question, whether I don’t think it *fine*?”

Pol. “So I didn’t learn from you that it is a kind of ‘being experienced’.”

Soc. “Since you value pleasing people, would you be willing to please me in a small way?”

Pol. “I would.”

Soc. “Then ask me about producing delicacies, whether it is an art.”

Pol. “Alright. Which art is it that produces delicacies?”

Soc. “No art at all, Polus.”

Pol. “But then what is it? Say!”

Soc. “Say I will: it is a kind of being experienced.”

Pol. “At what? Say!”

Soc. “Say I will: at the effecting of good cheer and pleasure.”

Pol. “And producing delicacies and oratory are the same thing!”

Soc. “Oh no, not at all, but parts at least of one and the same occupation.”

Pol. “And what occupation is that, according to you?”

Soc. “I hope telling what I truly think will not seem even more slovenly of me! I shrink from answering because of Gorgias, fearing he’ll think I am trying to parody his own occupation. Let me put it this way: I do not know whether what I am talking about is the sort of oratory Gorgias (463) is occupied with – after all, the discussion we just conducted left not at all clear what your man holds on that question – but still, for me, what *I* am calling oratory is a part of an activity not at all among the things that are fine.”

GORGAS: “A part of what activity, Socrates? Out with it! Blush not for *me*!”

Soc. “Alright then, Gorgias. It seems to me to be a sort of practice not truly artful, but rather the practice of a soul bold at guessing and by nature clever at dealing with people. Speaking on a general level I would call it pandering; within it there are other parts besides this one, one of which

as I was saying is delicacies, which may seem to be an art though what I am trying to say is that it is not an art but a sort of empirical knack. And I call the oratorical knack another part of it, as well as the cosmetic knack and the sophistic knack – four parts, these, operating on four things respectively. If Polus is interested in getting answers, let him ask. For he has not yet asked what kind of a part of pandering I say oratory is, and he failed to realize that I had not yet answered that question. Instead, he moved on to ask if I didn't think it was a *fine* thing, but I won't answer whether I think oratory is a fine or an ugly thing before I first answer *what* it is. To do that is not proper, Polus. Instead, if you want to ask questions, ask what kind of part of pandering I say is the oratorical one.”

Pol. “Ask I will. Answer what kind of part.”

Soc. “Is it conceivable you will understand my answer? For I say that the oratorical is an image of a part of the political pandering.”

Pol. “So *now* I will ask whether you say oratory is a fine thing or an ugly thing.”

Soc. “Ugly is my answer – for I call bad things ugly – since I must answer you as though you know what I am saying.”

Gorg. “By Zeus, Socrates, even I am not getting what you are saying.”

Soc. “That's to be expected, Gorgias, since I have not said anything at all clear as of yet, whereas this coltish Polus I am having to deal with is young and headstrong.”

Gorg. “Just let him go and tell me, instead, what you mean by saying the oratorical is ‘an image of a part of the political pandering’.”

Soc. “Then I'll try to express what the oratorical seems to be to me at least, and if it turns out not to be, this Polus here (464) will do the refuting. Presumably you call something body and something soul?”

Gorg. “How not?”

Soc. “And do you believe that each has its own state of well being?”

Gorg. “I do.”

Soc. “How about this: do you believe they have an apparent well being that is not real and true? I mean something like this: many people appear to be well in their bodies, people one could not readily perceive not to be well unless he were a doctor or a gymnastic expert of some kind.”

Gorg. “That is true.”

Soc. “The sort of thing I am speaking about, in both in body and in soul, is what creates the appearance that the body and the soul are well, while their actual state has nothing to do with it.”

Gorg. “That is how it is.”

Soc. “Come then. If I am able, I will lay out for you more clearly what I am trying to say. Just as there are two things, I say there are two arts: the art dealing with soul is what I call the political; as for the art dealing with the body, though I do not likewise have a name for it as a single art, while itself single this caring for the body has two parts, the one being the gymnastic art and the other the healing art. And of the political art, the part that correlates to the gymnastic I call the legislative, whereas the correlate to the healing art I call justice. Now these several parts have some overlap with each other, respectively, since each pair deals with the same thing – the healing art overlapping the gymnastic, and justice overlapping legislation – while at the same time they are distinct from one another.

“Now while they are four and while it is always with a view to its noblest state they are administering their care, the one pair for the body and the other pair the soul, the pandereutic,

sensing them – not understanding, that is, but guessing – distributes itself fourfold, and, donning the apparel of these four parts respectively, feigns that it actually is the thing it dresses up as. It has no concern at all for the best state of things, but by exploiting any opportunity to maximize pleasure, it always hunts after mindlessness and works its deception with the result that it is judged a thing of highest worth. In the robes of the healing art lurks the pandering of the delicatessen, and portrays itself as knowing what are the noblest of foods for the body, so that if among children there should be a contest between the delicatessen and the doctor – or for that matter among grown men as mindless as children – as to which of these can really tell the difference between foods wholesome and corrupt, the doctor or the delicatessen, the doctor would starve for patients. I call the thing pandering, and I condemn it as ugly (465), Polus – this answer I direct to you – because it aims at pleasure without regard for the noble. Moreover, an art I deny it to be, only accumulated experience, because it has no rationale at all by which it prescribes the things it prescribes, according to what they are by nature, out of the lack of which it is unequipped to say what causes what. For my part I do not call any activity that lacks a rationale an art.

“... If you dispute these things I am willing to defend them in argument...”

“Now as I am arguing, in the garb of the healing art lurks the delicatessen’s pandering. In that of the gymnastic art by the same token lurks cosmetic pandering, a practice destructive, deceptive, ignoble, and slavish that deceives with lines and colors and smoothness and sensation so as to create a beauty that people can bring on to themselves that is quite alien to the appearance that is their own resulting from their neglect of exercise. To keep from going on too long I would put it to you as the geometers do – you doubtless can already follow it: as the cosmetic is to the gymnastic, so is the delicatessen to the medical – but now make it thus: as the cosmetic is to the gymnastic, so is the sophistic to the legislative; and as the delicatessen is to the doctor, so is oratory to justice. Now as I already said, they really are distinct in this way from each other by nature, but by dint of their being close to each other, the sophists and the orators are mixed together and taken to deal with the same things, so that they do not know which name to use for themselves, just as the rest of mankind doesn’t know what to call them. For so it would be if the soul were not overseeing the body but rather the body oversaw itself; and if it were not by the soul that the pair of them, the delicatessen and the doctor, were observed and distinguished, but rather the body were the judge, weighing between them the pleasantries they render it: we would have the Anaxagorean condition in a big way, Polus my pal – something for which you have your own knack. All things would be mixed together in the same place, with medicine and health and delicacies indistinguishable.

“So you have now heard what I say oratory is: the correlate for the soul to what delicacy was for the body. Perhaps, in summary, I have done something very untoward in not allowing you to make long speeches while I myself have stretched out a continuous and long speech. Looking back, perhaps I deserve some clemency, since when I spoke in short compass and directly, you were not getting my meaning nor were you able to deal with the answer I gave you, but were needing to be taken through, step by step. And so if I, too, (466) prove unable to deal with an answer of yours, go ahead and stretch out your own explanation in turn; but if on the other hand I am able to deal with it, let me deal with it. So much is only fair. And likewise, if you are able to deal with my answer, deal away!”

Pol. “So what are you saying? To you, oratory is *pandering*?”

Soc. “A *part* of pandering, I said. But you don’t remember, Polus, though you are so young. What are we to expect from you as you become older?”

Pol. “Do you really think our goodly orators in the cities are held in low esteem because people think them panders?”

Soc. “Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?”

Pol. “I only mean to ask.”

Soc. "They are not even estimated."

Pol. "How can you say they are 'not estimated'? Don't they wield the greatest power in the cities?"

Soc. "No, if you are saying that having power is something good for the person who has it."

Pol. "But I certainly do."

Soc. "Well in that case, of all the people in the city the orators seem to me to have the least power."

Pol. "What? Don't they, like the tyrants, execute whomever they want, and fine and exile from the cities whomever they decide to?"

Soc. "By the Dog, I really cannot decide, Polus, whether what you are saying are arguments you are making in trying to reveal your own opinion, or whether they are questions for me to answer."

Pol. "You heard me, I *asked* you!"

Soc. "In that case, my dear, I'll say you are asking me two things at once."

Pol. "How two?"

Soc. "Didn't you just say, 'Do the orators not execute whomever they want, as the tyrants do, and fine and expel from the cities whomever they decide to'?"

Pol. "I did."

Soc. "Well then I say to you that your questions are two, and as such I will give you an answer for both of them. What I say, Polus, is that both the orators and the tyrants have the smallest amount of power in the cities, as I was just saying, for they do almost nothing they want, though I do say they do what they judge is best."

Pol. "And isn't that having great power?"

Soc. "Not so, as Polus asserts."

Pol. "I *deny* it? You may be sure I *assert* it!"

Soc. "Oh my, no! Not you of all people, since you just said having great power was a good thing for the man who had it."

Pol. "So I do say."

Soc. "So do you think it a good thing whenever someone does what is in his eyes noblest, assuming he has no understanding? Is even that having great power, according to you?"

Pol. "No."

Soc. "Then will you show the orators to be understanding and (467) show oratory to be an art rather than a pandering, thereby refuting me? If you are going to leave me unrefuted, the orators who enact what they decide in the cities, and the tyrants, will have none of the good you see in that. But power is a good thing, as you assert, whereas doing what one judges to be best without understanding is a bad thing, as you grant along with me. No?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "How then could the orators 'have great power,' or the tyrants, in the cities, as long as Socrates has not been shown to be wrong by Polus in respect to their doing what they want?"

Pol. "What am I to do with this man!"

Soc. "I deny they are achieving what they want. Come on, try and refute me!"

Pol. “Weren’t you just now agreeing that they achieve what they judge to be best, right before you said this?”

Soc. “I do agree, even now.”

Pol. “But not that they achieve what they want?”

Soc. “I say no.”

Pol. “Achieving, however, what seems to them best?”

Soc. “I say yes.”

Pol. “It’s an intractable argument you make, and outlandish.”

Soc. “No accusations, peerless Polus, if I might address you in your own style. Instead, if you are able to ask me questions, bring to light that what I am saying is false. And if you are not able to ask questions, then play answerer.”

Pol. “Nay I *will* play answerer, if I might see what it is you are arguing.”

Soc. “Say then whether you judge that men are always doing what they want, or whether what they want is that for the sake of which they are doing what they do. For instance, people that drink the medicine given them by doctors, do you judge that they want to do the thing they are doing – drinking the medicine and feeling horrible thereby – or do they want that other thing, being healthy, for the sake of which they drink?”

Pol. “Clearly, being healthy.”

Soc. “Also with those who are sailing or are engaged in some other money-making activity. It isn’t the thing they are doing that they want (for who wants to put himself at risk on the high seas and make trouble for himself?) but the thing for the sake of which they sail: to be wealthy. For it is for the sake of wealth that they sail.”

Pol. “Quite so.”

Soc. “Isn’t it this way in general? Whenever somebody does something for the sake of something, it is not the latter which he is doing that he wants but the former, for the sake of which he acts.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “Now is there anything that is neither good nor bad, nor somewhere in between and neither good nor bad?”

Pol. “Very necessarily not, Socrates.”

Soc. “Would do you say that good is wisdom and health and wealth and the other things like these, whereas bad are the opposites of these?”

Pol. “I would.”

Soc. “And would you say the following sorts of things are the things that are neither good nor bad: things that sometimes have some good in them but other times some bad, and still other times neither, like sitting and (468) walking and running and sailing, or again stones and sticks and the other things of that sort? Do you not say so? Or is it some other things you would call neither good nor bad?”

Pol. “No, these things.”

Soc. “Which is it, then? Is it these in-between things that people do for the sake of the good things, when they do them, or do they do the good things for the sake of the in-between things?”



Pol. "Presumably it is the in-between things for the sake of the good ones."

Soc. "Therefore it is in pursuit of the good that we walk when we walk, thinking it better to do so, or oppositely when we stand still we stand still pursuant the same thing, the good. No?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "And we execute if we do execute somebody, and exile or fine a person, thinking it better for us to do these things than if we didn't?"

Pol. "Quite so."

Soc. "Therefore it is for the sake of the good that people who act do all these things they do?"

Pol. "I say yes."=

Soc. "And so we have agreed that the things we do for the sake of something, we do not because we want those things but because we want that for the sake of which we do them?"

Pol. "Exactly."

Soc. "Therefore we don't just want to cut a man's throat nor exile him from the cities nor fine him, according to your image. Rather, whenever doing these things leads to some benefit we want to do them, given what they are, and whenever they are harmful we do not. For it is good things that we want to do, as you yourself affirm, whereas things that are neither good nor bad we do not want, let alone the bad things.  
 "Is that how it is? Do I seem to you to be speaking the truth, Polus, or not?"  
 "Why aren't you answering?"

Pol. "True."

Soc. "So if we do agree to these things, then, if a person executes somebody or exiles him from a city or fines him whether in his capacity as a tyrant or his capacity as an orator, thinking it is better for himself, but if in fact it makes things worse, we may say such a man is doing what he decides.  
 "... Isn't he?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "Is he also doing what he wants, if as we said the thing is in fact a bad thing?"  
 "Why don't you answer?"

Pol. "Alright, then, he does not seem to me to be doing what he wants."

Soc. "And so is there any way the man in this situation is wielding great power in that city of yours, if wielding power is a good thing, as you agreed?"

Pol. "There is not."

Soc. "Therefore what I was saying was true when I said that it is possible that a man who achieves what he decides in a city is not wielding great power, and is not doing what he wants."

Pol. "But *you* of course would *refuse* the prerogative to do whatever one 'decides' in the city, rather than not – and you never feel envy when you see somebody executing or fining or binding in chains whatever popped into his mind to 'decide'."

Soc. "Do you mean justly or unjustly?"

Pol. (469) "Whichever way he does it, isn't it enviable both ways?"

Soc. "Don't talk that way!"

Pol. "What way?"



Soc. "One ought not envy the unenviable any more than men who are wretched, but rather pity them."

Pol. "What now? Do you think the men I am talking about are in that state?"

Soc. "Why wouldn't they be?"

Pol. "So in the case where a man executes whomever he decides to, but is executing him justly, do you still judge the man to be a pitiful wretch?"

Soc. "I do not, but neither do I judge him enviable."

Pol. "You didn't just now declare him to be a wretch?"

Soc. "The one who killed unjustly, yes, my fellow, and pitiable to boot; but the one who did it justly I declare to be unenviable."

Pol. "Ah so: it's the one that did the unjust *dying* that is pitiable and wretched?"

Soc. "Less so than the one who killed unjustly, and less than the one who dies justly."

Pol. "How can *that* be, Socrates?"

Soc. "Here's how: the fact is that the greatest of all evils is acting unjustly."

Pol. "So *this* is the greatest? Being done injustice isn't greater?"

Soc. "Hardly."

Pol. "You, then, would want to be dealt injustice rather than to deal it out?"

Soc. "As to what I would want, I would want neither; but if it were necessary either to deal it out or be dealt it, I would choose to be dealt it rather than deal it out."

Pol. "You, then, would not welcome exercising a tyrant's power?"

Soc. "No, not if you describe exercising it the way I do."

Pol. "Well *I* describe it as I did just now: having the prerogative in the city to do whatever seems best to one, whether killing or fining or doing whatever, according to his decision."

Soc. "My redoubtable fellow, give me a chance to describe it my way and then confront me with your description! Imagine in the open marketplace I were carrying a concealed dagger and came up to you and said 'Polus, I have just come into a certain power of an amazingly tyrannical sort: All I have to do is decide by my own lights that one of these men you see around you here must die right now, on the spot: dead will he be, whichever I decide. And if I decide some one of them is to have his head bashed in, he'll have it bashed in, right now on the spot; or have his cloak cut off him, then cut off his cloak will be so great is my power in this city of mine.' And thereupon, when you didn't believe me and I showed you my dagger, once you saw it you might say, 'Socrates, by that argument everybody would have great power since a house could be set on fire if you decided to and for that matter the harbors of Athens and her triremes and all the boats, public and private.' So this isn't what having great power consists in – 'doing what one judges' – or would you judge it is?"

Pol. "Not at all, not *that* way."

Soc. (470) "So can you say what it is you find fault with in that kind of power?"

Pol. "I can."

Soc. "So just what is it?"

"... Tell me!"

Pol. "The person who does things that way would necessarily be punished."

Soc. “But isn’t being punished bad?”

Pol. “Quite bad.”

Soc. “And so my admirable fellow, back to the topic of having great power, it again seems to you that if he who is doing what he decides to do benefits from it then it is a good thing, and moreover that this, as you see it, is what it means to have great power; whereas if he does not benefit, doing what he wants is a bad thing and constitutes having little power. But let’s also investigate my point, too: We are agreeing, aren’t we, that sometimes it is a better thing to do what we were now talking about, ‘to execute and exile men and disenfranchise them,’ but sometimes not?”

Pol. “Quite.”

Soc. “On this much at least we agree, both you and me.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “So *when* would you say is it better to do these things? Tell me how you draw the line.”

Pol. “Since this is your question, let’s let *you* answer it.”

Soc. “For myself, then, Polus, if it pleases you more that I should play answerer, I say that when it is justly that one is doing these things it is better, but whenever unjustly then it is worse.”

Pol. “You may be hard to beat in conversation, Socrates – but no, even a child could quash what are now saying as untrue.”

Soc. “Great, then, would be my gratitude to the child – and equally so to you, if you refute me and relieve me of talking nonsense. So please don’t let off but help a fellow who’s your friend. Bring on your refutation.”

Pol. “Fine, Socrates, but there’s no need to look to yesteryear for grounds to defeat your position: the latest news you have is quite enough to pull it off, and to show that many men who practice injustice are happy.”

Soc. “And what is this ‘latest’?”

Pol. “Archelaus, the son of Perdiccus whom you see ruling Macedon.”

Soc. “Even if I haven’t seen him I have heard about him, at least.”

Pol. “Well, do you judge him happy or destitute?”

Soc. “I don’t know, Polus: I’ve never spent any time with the fellow.”

Pol. “What’s that? If you spent time with him you could tell but you can’t already tell he is happy?”

Soc. “Zeus be my witness, not at all!”

Pol. “Clearly then, Socrates, you will say you do not even know that the Great King is happy!”

Soc. “And in so saying I will be speaking the truth. I don’t know about his upbringing or his justness.”

Pol. “What? On this alone all happiness is based?”

Soc. “So do I argue, at least, Polus: it is the fine and good man and woman that I say is happy, and the unjust and base unhappy.”

Pol. (471) “Unhappy then is our Archelaus.”

Soc. “Yes, provided he is unjust.”

Pol. “But really – how could he *not* be unjust, he who in the first place has no proper claim to the realm he now holds, born as he is from a slave of Alketes, the brother of Perdiccus, so that as for justice he is a slave of Alketes, and if he wanted to do what justice commands he would be serving as a slave to Alketes and as such would be a happy man according to your argument. Instead he has become astoundingly *unhappy*, since he has by now committed the greatest of unjust acts, he who started out by summoning that very master of his for the purpose of restoring to him the rule that Perdiccas had stripped him of. He received him into his house as a guest, him and his son Alexander, who was his cousin and about the same age, and got them drunk and loaded them into a cart and drove them out under cover of darkness, slit their throats and dispatched their bodies. Even though he committed these greatest injustices it was lost on him that he had become most miserable and he had no regrets. Soon after it was his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a child of about seven to whom the rule was passing on by right: Archelaus did not want to become happy by raising him justly and passing on the rule to him, but threw him into a well instead and ran off to his mother, Cleopatra, to report to her breathlessly that the boy had been hunting a swan and fell into the well and made him drown. And just so, at present, seeing that he has committed the greatest injustice in all Macedon, he is the most unhappy of all the Macedonians – not the happiest after all – so that Yes, we’ll find some Athenian, starting with you for instance, who would sooner be any Macedonian *other* than Archelaus.”

Soc. “Just so, early on in all our talk, Polus, I said in praise of you that it seems to me you are well brought up in oratory, but that you have ignored dialogue. So too, now: Is this really the speech by which even a child could “defeat” me? Do I now stand utterly *defeated* by this speech in your eyes, for claiming as I do that the man who behaves unjustly is not happy? On what basis, my good man? In very fact, I do not agree with *anything* you have said!”

Pol. “You aren’t willing to – since you believe what I am saying.”

Soc. “My redoubtable fellow! Now I get it: you are trying to refute me oratorically, the way they take it to be refuting in the law court. In those venues, the one party is judged to be refuting the other if he brings in lots of reputable witnesses to testify for the positions he is advocating, whereas his opponent has brought in only one somebody-or-other, or even none. But your kind of refutation is worthless (472) as to the truth. In fact, a person is sometimes even brought down by large numbers of influential persons who give *false* witness. Just so in the present case, almost everybody will corroborate what you are saying, Athenians as well as foreigners, if it is witnesses you want to adduce who will testify against me that what I am saying is not true. As witnesses you might call Nicias the son of Niceratos, if you wish, and his brothers to back him up, for whom those tripods have been set up in a neat line in the Dionysian Theatre, or if you wish Aristocrates the son of Skellios in whose honor that fine monument stands in the Pythian Stadium – or if you want the entire family of Pericles, or some other clan you might single out from these parts. But I, a single person, disagree with you, and you are not compelling me. Instead you try to adduce many false witnesses against me so as to exile me from the realm of what really counts and what is true. But as for me, if I fail to summon you yourself as my witness, a single man to corroborate what I am saying, by my lights I have achieved nothing worth mentioning, whatever comes up in our conversation. And my sense is that you haven’t either, unless I myself as a single man serve as your witness and all those others of yours you leave aside. That is a refutation in a way, according to you and many others; but there is another kind according to me. Let’s set them side by side and see how they differ. For in very fact the question we find ourselves on opposite sides of is no small matter but I daresay the one question about which to be knowledgeable is the finest thing and ignorance the most shameful. For ultimately it is a matter of succeeding or failing to recognize who is happy and who is not. Just so, as to the present question, the first point is that you really hold that it is possible that a man can be blessedly happy who commits injustice and is an unjust man, if in fact

you hold that Archelaus is unjust but nevertheless happy. Let this be our interpretation of what you believe, unless you say otherwise.”

Pol. “Quite.”

Soc. “And what I say is that it’s impossible. That is the first thing about which we differ. Next, if one acts unjustly will he be happy if he encounters the penalty and recompense?”

Pol. “Hardly, given that at under those circumstances he would be most destitute.”

Soc. “But if he does not encounter the penalty, then according to your argument, he will be happy.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “But conversely, according to my opinion, Polus, the man who commits injustice and is unjust is utterly destitute, but even more destitute if he does not meet with justice and pay the penalty, having acted unjustly, and yet less destitute if he does pay the penalty and meet with justice, at the behest of gods and men.”

Pol. (473) “The thing you are trying to argue is kooky, Socrates!”

Soc. “Nevertheless I will try to bring you to make the same argument that I do, for I view you as a friend. But as of now, here is the point on which we differ – and see if you think so. In what we have said so far, I have declared committing injustice to be a greater evil than suffering it.”

Pol. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And you, that suffering is.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “And I argued that those who act unjustly are unhappy, and was fully refuted by you –”

Pol. “You can be quite sure of that!”

Soc. “– as you think.”

Pol. “Thinking truly.”

Soc. “Maybe, but you for your part think those who act unjustly are happy, as long as they don’t pay the penalty.”

Pol. “Very much so.”

Soc. “And I for my part assert they are the most unhappy of people, while those who pay the penalty are less so. Do you want to challenge this point also?”

Pol. “Oh my, Socrates, this is even harder than your other point to defeat.”

Soc. “No, not harder: impossible. The truth is never defeated.”

Pol. “How can you say that? If a man is caught in the unjust act of plotting a tyranny, and once caught is strung up and castrated and has his eyes burnt out, and, himself having suffered disfigurements many and great and looked on as the same things were inflicted upon his wife and children, then meets his end by being nailed to a board or burned alive, shall this man be the more happy than if he were to get away with that act and assume the tyrant’s throne and live the rest of his life in his city doing exactly what he wants – envied and counted happy by the citizens and by foreigners to boot? *This* is the thesis you are saying cannot be defeated?”

Soc. “Now you trying to intimidate me, brave Polus, and not refute me. And before you were calling witnesses! And yet remind me: did you say, ‘If he *unjustly* plots against a tyranny?’”

Pol. “I did.”

Soc. “Well then happier neither will ever be, neither the one that captures the throne unjustly nor the one that pays the penalty – of a pair of destitute men neither can be the happier – but you *can* say that the one who gets away with it and becomes tyrant would be unhappier.

“... and what’s this, Polus – you laugh? Still another type of refutation when somebody asserts something, that you ridicule it but not refute it?”

Pol. “Don’t you think you have already been defeated, when you find yourself arguing something of such ilk that no man would agree? Just ask any of these here!”

Soc. “Polus, please! I don’t make a career of politics: Just last year, when it fell to my tribe to serve in the Prytany, I had (474) to put something to a vote and I was laughed down for not knowing how to do it. So don’t bid me to put this to a vote now, among these here; instead, if you have no better method of refutation to run than these, give me a turn at it, as I said before, and try to work through the sort of thing I call a refutation. In my case there is one witness I know how to adduce for what I argue, the very man with whom I am having my discussion: the testimony of the many I forgo. Likewise it is one man that I know how to poll: with the many I likewise forgo to dialogue. See then if you will finally submit to testing by playing answerer. I truly do think that both I and you and everybody else believe that committing injustice is a worse thing than suffering it, and that not paying the penalty is worse than paying it.”

Pol. “And I think that neither I nor anybody else does – since you *would* accept suffering injustice more than committing it.”

Soc. “You would, too – and everybody else.”

Pol. “Far from it: not I, not you, not anybody.”

Soc. “So you won’t answer?”

Pol. “I certainly will, for I am eager to know what in the world you are going to say!”

Soc. “Then tell me, so you can know, as if we were starting all over with this question: ‘Tell me, Polus, which do you judge is worse, to do injustice or to be done it?’ ”

Pol. “To be done it, I would say.”

Soc. “But which is more *shameful*? To do injustice or be done it?  
“... Answer!”

Pol. “To do it.”

Soc. “Is it also worse, if as you say it is more shameful?”

Pol. “Not in the least.”

Soc. “I get what you are saying: You deny that the same thing is both fine and good, or bad and shameful.”

Pol. “Yes, not at all.”

Soc. “What about this: Of all things that are fine, whether bodies or colors or shapes or voices or practices, are you calling them fine in each case looking off to nothing as a reference? For instance, first of all, bodies that are fine: don’t say they are fine in accordance with their usefulness in connection with whatever in each case they are useful for, that it is in connection with this that they are fine, or in accordance with some pleasure they provide, if in being beheld they give joy to the beholders? Have you anything else to mention besides these two, as to the fineness of a body?”

Pol. “No I haven’t.”

Soc. “And isn’t it so for all the other things, whether for shapes or colors, that either because of some pleasure or some usefulness or because of both, you denominate them ‘fine’?”

Pol. "Yes I do."

Soc. "And isn't it also so for voices and everything else that is musical?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "Moreover, in the matter of laws and practices: they are not exceptions, presumably, the fine ones, from being either useful or pleasurable, or both."

Pol. (475) "They do not seem exceptions to me."

Soc. "And is the fineness of studies similar?"

Pol. "Quite so. Indeed you are doing a fine job of distinguishing this time, using the pleasant and the good as distinguishing marks of the fine."

Soc. "Is it by the opposite that we define the ugly – by pain and by badness?"

Pol. "Necessarily."

Soc. "Therefore whenever one of two fine things is finer, it is because it exceeds the other in one or both of these two aspects that it is finer, whether in pleasure or in usefulness or both."

Pol. "Quite."

Soc. "And so, on the other hand, when one of two ugly things is uglier, it is either because it exceeds the other in pain or in badness that it is uglier – or does this not necessarily follow?"

Pol. "It does."

Soc. "Come then, what was being said just a moment ago about committing and suffering injustice? Were you not saying that undergoing injustice was worse but committing it was uglier?"

Pol. "So I was."

Soc. "And if as you aver committing injustice is uglier than undergoing it, it is either more painful – exceeding the other in pain, that is – or in badness, or in both? Is this equally necessarily?"

Pol. "How could it not be?"

Soc. "So first let's investigate whether it is in pain that doing injustice exceeds undergoing it, and whether those who act unjustly suffer more pain than those who are dealt injustice."

Pol. "That, for sure, Socrates, is not the case."

Soc. "So it is not in pain that it exceeds."

Pol. "No indeed."

Soc. "And if not in pain then the possibility of exceeding it in both is ruled out."

Pol. "Clearly."

Soc. "And so to exceed in the other is what is left."

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "In badness."

Pol. "So it seems."

Soc. "And since exceeding in badness, doing injustice would be worse than suffering it."

Pol. "Clearly so."

Soc. “Now didn’t we agree just a moment ago that, according to the majority of mankind and to you yourself, doing injustice is uglier than suffering it?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “But now it appears also to be worse?”

Pol. “Seems so.”

Soc. “So would you sooner accept something both worse and uglier than something less so?  
“Don’t shrink from answering, Polus – no harm will come to you. Have the heart to give yourself over to the argument, as to a doctor, and answer. Say ‘Yea’ or ‘Nay’ to what I am asking you.”

Pol. “You’re right, I would not accept it, Socrates.”

Soc. “And would any other man?”

Pol. “No, it seems to me, given this argument.”

Soc. “And so it was true when I said that neither I nor you nor any man would accept doing injustice rather than suffering it – for the fact is, it is worse.”

Pol. “So it seems.”

Soc. “So now you can see, Polus, by setting one style of refutation alongside the other, that they resemble each other not at all: in yours all others agree with you except for me, whereas in mine it suffices that you, as only a (476) single man, agree with me and serve as my witness, and in polling only you I can ignore the others.  
“Let’s let that be how it stands between us on this first topic. Next, let’s investigate the second question on which we had discrepant views: whether for the man who acts unjustly to pay the penalty is the greatest of evils, as you were thinking, or whether not paying it is a still greater evil, as I was thinking. Let’s investigate the matter as follows. Are paying the penalty and being justly punished, when one has committed injustice, according to you, the same thing?”

Pol. “They are.”

Soc. “Are you able to argue against the idea that all just things as such are fine, to the extent they are just? Think carefully and answer.”

Pol. “Nay, I *do* judge them to be, Socrates.”

Soc. “Then think also about this: Would you say that if somebody does something, that by necessity there is also something that undergoes what this doer does?”

Pol. “I think so.”

Soc. “And does this thing, by virtue of undergoing what the acting agent does, also take on the quality of what the agent does to it? What I mean is something like this: if somebody strikes something, it is necessary that something is struck.”

Pol. “Necessary.”

Soc. “And if he who is striking strikes intensely or fast, the stricken thing is struck in like manner?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “The undergoing that belongs to the stricken thing is of the same quality as the way the striking element struck.”

Pol. “Quite.”



Soc. "And if someone burns, it is necessary that something is being burned?"

Pol. "How not?"

Soc. "And if he burns it intensely or painfully, so also is the cauterized thing cauterized – namely, the way the cauterizer cauterized it?"

Pol. "Quite."

Soc. "And is it analogous if he cuts something? Is something cut?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "And if the cut is large or deep, or it is painful, the cut that was cut has the quality as the cutting agent's cutting?"

Pol. "It seems so."

Soc. "And bundling all that together see whether you agree, as I just now put it, that in all cases, whatever way the acting agent performs his action so does the undergoing element undergo it."

Pol. "But I do agree."

Soc. "That being agreed, let me ask, is paying the penalty an undergoing or a doing?"

Pol. "Necessarily it is an undergoing."

Soc. "An undergoing under some active agent?"

Pol. "How could it not be? Under the agency of the punisher."

Soc. "Does he who punishes correctly punish justly?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "Doing just things or not?"

Pol. "Just things."

Soc. "Does he who is punished, in paying the penalty, undergo just things?"

Pol. "It seems so."

Soc. "But hadn't it been agreed that just things are fine?"

Pol. "Quite."

Soc. "Therefore, one of these two does fine things and the other undergoes them, namely the man being punished."

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. (477) "If they are fine, are they good, as being either pleasurable or beneficial?"

Pol. "Necessarily."

Soc. "Therefore it is good things that the person paying the penalty undergoes?"

Pol. "So it seems."

Soc. "He is being benefitted, therefore?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "Is it the same benefit that I assume it to be – that he becomes more noble in soul if he is justly punished?"

Pol. "Well, I guess so."



Soc. “And so the person paying the penalty is released from a badness of soul?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “Is it from the greatest evil he is released? Look at it this way: as to the status of a man’s possessions, do you observe any other badness than poverty?”

Pol. “No, it is poverty.”

Soc. “What about the state of his body? Would you declare that weakness is its evil, and disease and ugliness and such things?”

Pol. “I would.”

Soc. “Do you also take it that there is a baseness of soul?”

Pol. “How could there not be?”

Soc. “And would you call this injustice and ignorance and fearfulness and such things?”

Pol. “Quite.”

Soc. “So for the three things – possessions, body, and soul – you have named three basenesses: poverty, disease, and injustice?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “Which of your three basenesses is the ugliest? Isn’t it injustice and intemperance and baseness of soul in general?”

Pol. “Quite so.”

Soc. “But if the ugliest, isn’t it also the worst?”

Pol. “How would you argue that?”

Soc. “Here’s how. Always, the ugliest thing is ugliest because it brings on the greatest pain or the greatest harm, or both, based on the agreements we have already reached before.”

Pol. “Exactly.”

Soc. “But didn’t we reach just now the agreement that what is ugliest is injustice and the whole badness of soul taken together?”

Pol. “So we did.”

Soc. “Isn’t it the ugliest of these things as being the most annoying and exceeding in annoyance, or as being exceedingly harmful, or both?”

Pol. “Necessarily.”

Soc. “Is it a more painful thing than being poor or being sick that one should be unjust and unbridled and timid and ignorant?”

Pol. “Not in my opinion, Socrates – not at least on the basis of the present agreements.”

Soc. “Then it is by exceeding all others in some extraordinary and great harm and some astounding evil, that the badness of soul is the ugliest of all things since it is not so in its painfulness, as you argue.”

Pol. “It seems so.”

Soc. “But presumably what is exceeding in this greatest of harms would as such be the worst of all things that exist.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “Injustice therefore, and rashness, and the rest of the badness of soul is the greatest evil of all things that exist.”

Pol. “Evidently.”

Soc. “Now which art is it that relieves us of poverty? Not the art of moneymaking?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “And which of disease? Isn’t it medicine?”

Pol. “Necessarily.”

Soc. (478) “But which of badness and injustice? If you don’t have any ideas at the moment let me make a suggestion. Where, and to whom, do we lead people who are sick in their bodies?”

Pol. “To the doctors, Socrates.”

Soc. “And where do we lead those who are committing injustice and those who are acting rashly?”

Pol. “You are saying that it is to the judges.”

Soc. “In order to pay their penalty?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “And isn’t it by employing a kind of justice that those who punish correctly are doing their punishing?”

Pol. “Clearly!”

Soc. “So moneymaking relieves poverty, medicine relieves sickness, and justice relieves licentiousness and injustice.”

Pol. “Apparently.”

Soc. “Which then of these that you are speaking of is the finest?”

Pol. “Which ‘these’ do you mean?”

Soc. “Moneymaking, medicine, justice.”

Pol. “Far superior, Socrates, is justice.”

Soc. “So it, in turn, creates the greatest pleasure or benefit or both – given that it is the finest.”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “Now is being treated by a doctor pleasant? Do those who are being treated enjoy it?”

Pol. “I think not.”

Soc. “But it’s beneficial – right?”

Pol. “Yes.”

Soc. “After all, one is being relieved of a great evil, so that it profits him to endure the pain and be healthy.”

Pol. “Of course.”

Soc. “Now is this the way for a man to be happiest about his body – if he submits himself to medical treatment – or if he doesn’t even fall ill in the first place?”

Pol. “Clearly, if he doesn’t fall ill.”

Soc. "For happiness never was merely being released from evil, but never having taken it on in the first place."

Pol "That is true."

Soc. "What about this: Of two men who are in a bad way, which is the worse off, whether as to body or soul: the one who is getting treatment and being relieved of the evil, or the one who though badly off is not getting treatment?"

Pol. "To me it seems the one who is not getting treatment."

Soc. "Was paying the penalty a release from the greatest evil, from baseness of soul?"

Pol. "It was."

Soc. "For what tempers them and thereby makes them juster and turns out to be a medicine for baseness is justice."

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "So the happiest man is he who is not bad off in his soul, since it became apparent that this is the greatest of evils."

Pol. "Clearly, indeed."

Soc. "And second happiest, I presume, is the man who is being relieved of it."

Pol. "It seems so."

Soc. "But this was the man, by our argument, who submits himself to reproach and chastisement – who, in short, pays the penalty."

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "And so if he has injustice and is not being relieved of it, he is living the worst life."

Pol. "Apparently."

Soc. "And isn't this man the one who, while committing the greatest of injustices and adopting injustice as his way of life, contrives never to be chastised (479) nor punished nor pay the penalty, all set up like Archelaus, according to you, and those other tyrants and orators and strong men of yours?"

Pol. "So it seems."

Soc. "For what these men, my best of fellows, have contrived is virtually the same thing as if a person wracked by the greatest of ailments should contrive to avoid paying the penalty to the physicians for his sins against his body, and avoid being treated by them, out of a childish fear of being cauterized or cut merely because it is painful. Would you agree with this?"

Pol. "I at least would."

Soc. "... yet ignorant all the while, as it seems, of what sort of thing the health and virtue of the body is. It may just be, given the agreements we have reached, that they would be doing the same sort of thing as those who seek acquittal from paying the penalty, Polus: looking at the pain involved but utterly blind to the benefit and ignorant of how much worse it is to be living and dwelling with an unhealthy soul than with an unhealthy body, a soul unsound and unjust and impious, which for its own part leads one to do everything he can to avoid paying the penalty and to avoid being released from the greatest evil, both by managing his money and his alliances, and by hoping to become as persuasive as possible at speaking. But if the agreements you and I have reached are true, do you see the upshot of our discussion? Or should we perhaps summarize them?"

Pol. "If you already plan to."

Soc. "Doesn't it turn out that the greatest evil is injustice and acting unjustly?"

Pol. "It seems so."

Soc. "But it became apparent that paying the penalty is a release from this evil."

Pol. "Looks like it."

Soc. "Whereas not to pay the penalty is to abide in the evil."

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "The mere act of committing injustice is therefore the second greatest of evils, though in the true nature of things to do so without paying the penalty ranks the first and greatest of evils."

Pol. "Seems so."

Soc. "Isn't this the very gravamen of our disagreement, my friend, you admiring the happiness of Archelaus as a doer of injustice who never paid a penalty; and I thinking the opposite, that any man, whether Archelaus or anyone you wish, who does not pay the penalty after acting unjustly, can only expect to exceed all other men in being badly off, and that always the man who commits injustice is worse off than the man who has it done to him, while the man who does not pay the penalty is worse off than the man who does. *These* were the things that were proposed by me, weren't they?"

Pol. "Yes."

Soc. "Does it now stand proved that the points proposed are true?"

Pol. "Apparently."

Soc. (480) "Well then, if these things are true, Polus, wherein lies the great usefulness of oratory? For we have come to agree that one must first and foremost scrupulously avoid acting unjustly, oneself, recognizing that to do so in itself already constitutes quite enough trouble. No?"

Pol. "Quite so."

Soc. "And that if a man does commit an injustice, whether himself or somebody else under his care, what one must do is voluntarily to betake himself to you-know-where, where he might be able to pay the penalty right away, just like going to a doctor, lest the illness being prolonged should make the soul fester and render it incurable. What else are we arguing than this, Polus, assuming of course that our earlier agreements stay put. Isn't it necessarily true that drawing this conclusion is consistent with those earlier agreements, and drawing a different conclusion is not?"

Pol. "What indeed, then, Socrates, *are* we to assert?"

Soc. "Well, for mounting a defense of unjust behavior, whether one's own or that of fathers or associates or children, or of the fatherland when it commits an injustice, oratory is of no use at all for you and me, Polus, unless if one should assume to the contrary that one must *prosecute*, in the first instance, oneself, and then one's family members and any others that are friends who might at some point become involved in injustice, and seek not to conceal the unjust act but bring it into the light of day, so that one might pay the penalty and be healed; and to compel both oneself and the others not to shrink in timidity but to step up and grit their teeth and step forward with nobility and bravery, as if they were to be cut or cauterized by a physician, in pursuit of being good and admirable and were taking no account of the painful involved, whether it be being beaten for having done something deserving of stripes, or being imprisoned if that is the penalty, and exile if exile is what one deserves or dying if it is death, oneself being his own first accuser and that of his relatives also, and using oratorical power for just this purpose, so that by their unjust deeds becoming totally

visible they might achieve a release from the greatest of all evils: injustice. Shall we declare this to be so, Polus, or shall we not?"

Pol. "To my mind it's kooky, Socrates, though to your mind it may well jibe with what came before."

Soc. "Isn't it necessary either to dissolve those agreements, or else to accept that these entailments necessary follow?"

Pol. "With that much I can agree."

Soc. "And to look at the other side of it, if one is called upon to treat a man badly, whether an enemy or anyone else – with the sole exception when oneself is suffering injustice at this enemy's hands, in which case he must worry about his own downside – but if instead it is somebody else that his enemy is treating unjustly, in that case one must use all means (481) available in speech and in action to manage that he *not* pay the penalty and *not* come before the judge. And if he does, one must machinate that his enemy somehow escape judgment and get off without paying the penalty – instead, if he has stolen a lot of gold, that he not pay it back but keep it and be spent on himself and his people unjustly and impiously; and in turn that if he has committed misdeeds whose penalty is death that he not see his death but if possible will live forever as a base man, and if not that, at least live that sort of life just as long as possible. It is for these purposes, Polus, that oratory seems to me useful, seeing that for somebody who is not bent on injustice I'd say it's of no great use, if of any use at all – which at least our previous discussion has plainly shown it not to be."

CALLICLES: "Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious in what he says or is he kidding?"

CHAEREPHON: "If you ask me he's dead serious – but 'there's nothing like asking the man himself!'"

Call. "But Zeus be my witness, I'm really eager to. Tell me, Socrates, are we to say you are serious or joking in arguing this? For if you are serious and what you are saying ends up being the truth, the way we now live as people would be turned upside down, and likely everything we are doing is exactly the opposite of what we ought to be doing!"

Soc. "Callicles, I have to say that if there were no certain experience undergone by men, some undergoing it for one thing and others for another thing or for the same, but instead some one of us underwent some private experience rather than that of the others, then it would not be at all easy for the one to describe what he was undergoing to the other. I say this recognizing that you and I do in fact undergo the same experience and feeling, both of us being in love, each with his own, I with Alcibiades and philosophy, and you with a pair of Demoses, the demos of the Athenians one as well as Pylilampes' son. Just so I have often looked on and witnessed that whatever your beloved asserts – however he says things stand – clever man though you are, I see you powerless to contradict him but flip upside down and backwards however you must to suit him: in the assembly when you are making a case and the Demos of the Athenians denies that that's how it is, you shift your position and say what *Demos ipse* wants, and you act the same way, *mutatis mutandis*, in the presence of the son of Pylilampes, your beautiful boy. You just can't oppose your beloved, whether in his counsels or in what he says, – and the result is that if someone on such an occasion were to express bewilderment as to how you could say things so strange at his behest, you would perhaps say to him – if you wanted to tell him the truth – that unless someone intervenes and causes your beloved to stop saying those things you aren't going to stop saying them, either. (482) So believe likewise that you are hearing the same kind of thing from me: don't express bewilderment at what I am saying, but instead intervene and cause philosophy, my beloved, to stop saying them. For she it is who is saying what you have just heard, my friend and fellow, and she is a good deal less excitable than

my other beloved. That son of Cleinias is of different minds at different times, but philosophy's arguments are always the same, and just now you express surprise at the things she says though you yourself were present while they were being argued. So either defeat her in what I argued with Polus just now by arguing that it is not true that doing injustice and that not paying the penalty for acting unjustly is the ultimate of all evils, or, if you allow this to stand unchallenged, then I aver by the Dog, that Egyptian god, that Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be in disharmony every day of his life. Yet to my mind, my best of men, it is better for me that my lyre be poorly tuned and play discordantly – and a chorus, too, if ever I should lead one – and that the vast majority of men not be agreeing with me but hold the opposite position, than for me who am but one man to be out of harmony with myself and to be arguing contradictories.”

Call. “Socrates! You come across as playing the virtuoso in your way of arguing, making a real public speaker of yourself! Here you are, playing it up to the crowd that Polus is undergoing the same experience he criticized Gorgias for undergoing in his conversation with you. Polus said, didn't he, that when Gorgias was asked by you whether, when a student who wants to learn oratory arrives for instruction having no knowledge of justice, whether Gorgias would instruct him, that he was shamed into saying that he *would* instruct him, simply because this is the way people act and people would hold it against him if he said he would not – that once he had agreed to this he was forced into contradicting himself, that this is all you are trying to bring about – and he ridiculed you for it – correctly, as I at least thought at the time. And this time he himself is undergoing this same experience all over again, and I am less than pleased with Polus over this, that he yielded to your suggestion that doing injustice is uglier than undergoing it. Once he agreed to that, it was his turn to become ensnared in the nets of your argument and be reduced to silence, ashamed to say what he plainly sees in his mind. You really do force the argument into such crass and demagogical notions, Socrates, though you claim you are pursuing the truth of the matter, in particular into this notion of what by nature is not admirable though admirable by convention. Most of the time these things are contrary to each other, nature and convention, so anytime someone out (483) of shame does not dare say what he thinks and knows, he is compelled to contradict himself. Just so you, having mastered this paltry trick, are cheating in your way of talking. Whenever someone says something according to convention, you ask a question tacitly aimed at what is according to nature; and if he talks nature you talk convention. So it is in the present case, the case of committing injustice and suffering it: when Polus was saying which is more shameful and ugly according to convention, you attacked the convention according to nature.

“For by nature it is entirely uglier, besides being worse, to undergo injustice, though by convention uglier to commit it. For indeed to suffer this lies not in store for anyone who is a real man – to undergo injustice – but for a man in chains, who would be better off dead than alive: the sort who though wronged and besmirched hasn't the resources to do anything for himself nor for anyone under his care. But as to law, let me tell you the people that make the laws are the weak men, the many. It is with an eye to themselves and their advantage that they write their laws, praise what they praise, and blame what they blame: In order to deter those who are the more vigorous of mankind and able to have the upper hand, lest they have the upper hand over *them*, they make their case that it is shameful and unjust to have more, that this is the essence of injustice, to seek to have more than the rest – for they are satisfied for themselves – I'll say it – if they have “equality,” given the fact that they are inferior. And so by convention this is said to be unjust and shameful – seeking to be better off than the many – and they call the act a crime. But regardless, nature herself makes plain the facts: It is *just* that the better have more than the worse, and the more able than the less able. She shows this not only in the animal realm but the human also, among whole cities and among the races of mankind, that this is how justice is determined: the stronger rules over and is better off than the weaker. Since what kind of justice did Xerxes employ when he brought his army against Hellas, or his father against the Scythians, or thousands of other such cases one could speak of along these same lines. Anyway, my sense is that these men did these things in accordance with

nature, the nature of the just – indeed, by Zeus, in accordance with the *law* of nature, if you will, but not, you may be sure, in accordance with the law that *we* institute, molding the noblest men like clay, the most vigorous in our midst, taking charge of them from their youth like young lions; by singing incantations and magic spells over them we enslave them to believe (484) the story that equality must be the rule and this is what is the fine and the just. But mark you if ever a man is born with an adequate endowment from nature, shaking all that off and breaking it down and eluding it and trampling under foot our edicts, our charms, our incantations, and our laws, each of them contrary to nature, then *Voilà!* he who was our slave arises now as our master, and embodied in him, right then and there, the justice of nature bursts into the light!

“Our Pindar is evincing the same thing in his poem where he says,

*It is law that is the king of all,  
Of mortals and immortals alike.*

It is this supernal king-law, he says, that

*Achieves the most just of forceful deeds  
With insuperable hand. My witness is  
The deeds of Heracles, since...’*

... ‘*unpurchased ...*’ something like this: I don’t know the poem by heart. What he means is that Heracles led off the oxen without paying for them and without Geryon giving them to him, believing that what is just according to nature is this: that oxen and all other possessions that belong to those who are worse and weaker belong to the nobler and stronger man.

“Now that’s the truth of the matter, and you will come to recognize it if you move on to bigger things and finally say goodbye to philosophy. I grant you it is a pleasant enough thing, Socrates, if one takes it on in a moderate way during youth. But if one gets more deeply involved in it than one ought it becomes the ruin of men. For even if one is well endowed by nature and philosophizes beyond his youth, it is inevitable that he will come out unfamiliar with all the things one ought to be familiar with if he is to become a good and fine man, and a reputable man. For instance, they show up unfamiliar with the laws of their city, and with the ways of speaking that a man must employ when relating to people in negotiating agreements both private and public, and with the pleasures and desires of people, and to put it generally they prove to be utterly unfamiliar with range of human personalities. So when they enter into some private or public action they come off laughable, just as I daresay that political men, conversely, if they go into the kind of activity and conversations of you and yours, also come off laughable. What Euripides says is right on point, each man is brilliant in this, and ‘hastens toward this,’

*... devoting most of his day  
Where as chance has it he is more noble than himself.’ (485)*

But where he is meagre, thence does he flee, and casts aspersions on it, but praises the alternative instead, out of self-serving goodwill, thinking that in doing this he is praising himself. Regardless, my sense is that the most proper thing is to have a share in both: in philosophy, to the extent that it is part of education, it is good to have a share, and it is not shameful when one is a lad to philosophize; but when a person, once he has gotten older, continues to philosophize, the thing becomes laughable, Socrates. And for myself, my experience of those who philosophize is just like my experience of those who lisp and act like a child: when I see a young child whom it still befits to talk that way – lisping like a child – I enjoy it and it seems to me a charming thing and natural and appropriate to the child’s time of life, whereas when I hear a little child conversing with clear articulation it is a bothersome thing to me, and it pains my ears and has something slavish and forced about it; but when one hears a grown man lisping or sees him acting childish, one finds him laughable and immature and needs to be slapped. And that’s the way I feel about philosophers. In a strapping youth it makes me glad to see philosophy, and it seems appropriate to me, and I have the impression this is a freeman, while in contrast the one that does no philosophizing seems crabbed



and lacking the ambition ever to pursue a fine or noble career. But when I see an older man still doing philosophy, not giving it up, at that point it is a whipping it seems to me he needs, Socrates, that man of yours. For as I was just saying, what's in store for that type, despite his inborn gifts, is to turn out less than a man, since he shuns the center of the city and its business, the places where 'the eminent' are turned out, as the poet says. Lying low instead, he lives the rest of his life with lads off in a corner, three or four of them murmuring nonsense, never to be heard giving a speech free, substantial, and adequate.

"Really, Socrates, I view you as something of a friend. And so I might find myself in the same position as Zethos toward Amphion in the Euripides passage I just mentioned. In fact the very sorts of things come to my mind to say to you as he said to his brother: You are neglecting, Socrates, the things you should be taking care of, and 'the nature of a soul so noble as yours' you are (486) 'perverting into the form of a teenager's'; and 'you could not speak on the planning of justice, nor could you grasp what is likely' and persuasive; nor 'on behalf of another could you give inventive counsel.' And yet, friend Socrates – and don't be angry with me, for what I shall say is meant in all good will toward you alone – don't you think it shameful to be the way I think you are, as is the case with any others that stay on too long in philosophy? For as you are, if somebody arrested you or any of the others like you and tried dragging you off to prison on the claim you did some wrong though you didn't, face it: you would not be able to handle the situation, but would get all confused and sit there agape not knowing what in the world to say, and once you got up to the podium in the law court, even if you had drawn an accuser quite petty and base, you would be condemned to death if that were the penalty he preferred against you. And yet how can this be a wise thing, 'some art that took hold of a man and made him a worse one,' and made him unable to come to his own aid nor to rescue him or anybody else from the greatest of dangers, but instead to be stripped by his enemies of all his wealth and to live virtually disenfranchised in his city? A man like this, if I may cut to the chase, one can slap in the face and get away with it without being penalized. Nay rather, my good man, listen to me: 'Put a stop to your cross-examinings!' 'Practice the great art of deeds!' and practice what might make you seem sound of mind. 'Leave these subtleties of yours to others!' whether they are to be dubbed ravings or flights of nonsense, 'leading you to inhabit an empty home'; emulate not men when they make these small points of yours but those who have a living, a reputation, and goods in abundance!"

Soc. "If my soul were made of gold, Callicles, don't you think I would be pleased to have found one of those stones that test for gold, in fact the best one, if when I applied it it would confirm for me that I have properly tended to my soul – then I would know for sure that I really am alright after all, and that I need no other sort of trial?"

Call. "What are you talking about?"

Soc. "I'll tell you. I now think that in my encounter with *you* I have by coincidence encountered a thing of that sort!"

Call. "Huh?"

Soc. "I am sure that if ever *you* agree with me about what my soul is opining, then it is opining the very truth. I say this because I am thinking (487) that the person who intends to perform an adequate test of the soul, whether it is living properly or not, needs to have three things, of which I now realize, you have all: knowledge, good will, and frankness. In my experience I have encountered many who are unable to test me because of their not being wise – like you; but then others who are wise, alright, but are not willing to tell me the truth because they do not care about me – like you; and then these two visitors here, Gorgias and Polus, are wise enough and friendly enough toward me, but are lacking in frankness and are more modest than they should be. Who could deny it? They have come to such a peak of embarrassment that, emboldened by shame, they went so far as to make arguments contrary to their own thoughts in the presence of many people,



and on the most important things, to boot! But when it comes to you, you have all the things one or the other of these lacks. Your education is sufficient, as many of the Athenians would vouch, and you are well disposed toward me – how do I know this? I will tell you: I know that the four of you, Callicles – you, Teisander of Aphidna, Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausikydes of Cholargos, have become colleagues in wisdom. One time I overheard you taking counsel with each other about how long one ought pursue the discipline of wisdom, and I know that the opinion that won the day among you was this: you encouraged each other not to pursue philosophizing to some refined degree, but rather to take care, as you became more and more wise, to avoid being destroyed unbeknownst. And so now, hearing as I do that the advice you are giving me is the very advice you reached with your closest companions, I have sufficient reason to believe you are truly well-disposed toward me. And that you are disposed to speak frankly and not be ashamed, you yourself declared, and the speech you just gave corroborates it. And so here is how these things stand at this time: If you reach agreement with me in conversation, the matter will then and there have undergone a sufficient test, carried out by the two of us, and there will be no further need to bring the question to some other test. For you could never have granted it out of a deficiency in wisdom nor out of an excess of shame, nor would you grant it out of deceiving me, for you are my friend as you yourself declare. And so, in truth, for you and me to agree will mean we've reached the truth.

“An inquiry on the very things you criticized in me is the finest inquiry of all. What kind of man is one to be? What should his pursuits be (488) and at what point in his life, when younger and when older. As to myself, if there is some way I am acting improperly in the course of my life, you can be sure of this, that I am erring not intentionally but out of my own damned ignorance. And as for you, just as you set out to correct me, don't leave it off but show me sufficiently well what it is that I should be trying to do, and how I might acquire it; and if you get me to agree with you today but later on find me not doing the things I agreed to do, count me quite an imbecile and give me further correction never again, seeing as how I am unworthy of your efforts.

“Take the whole thing up from the beginning, for me: What do you say is the situation with justice, you and Pindar, this justice by nature? Is it just that the stronger man pillages by force the weaker men, and that the nobler man rules the inferior ones, and that the better man has more than the worse one? Maybe you said something else – or have I remembered correctly?”

Call. “No, that is what I *was* saying then, but also I say it now.”

Soc. “Let me ask, do you call the same man nobler as well as stronger? I ask because I didn't get what you were saying at the time. Do you call the hardier men stronger, and say that obeying the hardier man is what the more feeble men must do, as I think you were trying to show when you said that the large cities march against the small cities ‘according to the just by nature’ – because they are stronger and hardier, thinking the stronger or hardier and the nobler are one and the same? Or is it possible for a man to be nobler and yet weaker and more feeble, or stronger and yet baser? Or is the extent of the nobler and the stronger one and the same? The line between them is what I need you clearly to draw: are they the same thing or different, the stronger and the nobler and the hardier?”

Call. “Nay, I say it loud and clear: they are the same.”

Soc. “Are the many stronger than the one, according to nature? Those, that is, who in fact establish the laws that rule the individual, as you said just now?”

Call. “How could it be otherwise?”

Soc. “So the convened beliefs of the many are the convened beliefs of the powerful men?”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “Thus the beliefs of the nobler men? For the stronger men are the nobler men by far according to your argument.”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “So the beliefs of these are fine according to nature, since they are they are the more powerful men?”

Call. “I affirm it.”

Soc. “Now is it the case that the many hold the following belief, as again you were saying a moment ago: that having an equal amount is what is just, and that committing injustice is more shameful than undergoing it? (489)

“... Is that the case or not? And take care that you don’t take a turn at being caught by shame for your own part.

“... Do they believe it or not, the many, that having an equal amount rather than a greater is just, and that it is more shameful to commit than to undergo injustice?

“Callicles, don’t begrudge me an answer, so that by your agreeing with me I might achieve confirmation by your witness, given that a man adequate at deciding will be on record agreeing!”

Call. “Nay, the many do believe that.”

Soc. “Then it is not only by convention that committing injustice is more shameful than undergoing it and having an equal amount is just, but by nature also. So that you just might not have been speaking the truth in what you said before, nor were justified in bringing the accusation against me, when you argued that convention and nature are opposite each other, that I was aware of this and was playing unfair in the conversation, when my partner was speaking of matters according to nature, in leading the discussion to matters according to convention, and when according to convention to matters according to nature.”

Call. “Will you look at this fellow! He just won’t stop spewing nonsense! Socrates, are you not ashamed to be chasing after words, at your age, and exploiting every opportunity to make hay of it when someone errs in his expression? Do you actually think I am saying that for men to be more powerful is anything other than for them to be more noble? Didn’t I tell you long since that I assert that the more noble and the more powerful are one and the same thing? Don’t tell me you take me to mean that if you rounded up a gang of slaves and sundry sorts of men, worthless except in bodily exertion, and if such a group weighed in, such would *eo ipso* be the lawful convention?”

Soc. “Alright, then, most wise Callicles, is this what you are arguing?”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “Well I have to say, my marvelous man, that I have long since guessed this is the sort of thing you were saying is the more powerful, but I have put the question to you out of eagerness to see unambiguously what you are arguing. For *you*, obviously, would not hold that two are more noble than one, nor that your slaves are more noble than you because they are stronger than you. But go back to the beginning and tell me what you say the nobler men are, since it is not the stronger. And, my marvelous man, teach me more gently or else I might leave your tutelage.”

Call. “Such irony!”

Soc. “By your Zethos not I, Callicles, whom you just now greatly used in an ironic attack on me! – But anyway, who do you say are the nobler?”

Call. “The better.”

Soc. “Look how it’s *you* that are mouthing words without indicating the meaning. Tell, won’t you, whether you are saying the nobler and stronger are the smarter or somebody else?”

Call. “Nay, by Zeus, I am saying just these – and exceptionally smart they are.” (490)

Soc. “Sometimes then, a single man, when he is thinking, is stronger than thousands if they are not thinking, according to your argument, and this is the man who must rule, and the others must be ruled, and the one who is ruling must be better off than those being ruled. This is what I think you want to argue – and I am not just trying to pin down your expression – in the case when the single individual is stronger than thousands of others.”

Call. “No that *is* what I am saying. For exactly this is what I think is the just by nature: to be the ruler and to have more because one is nobler and smarter than one’s inferiors.”

Soc. “Stop right there: What are you saying *this* time? Imagine we were in the same place, as we are now, a good number of us gathered together, and there was a good deal of food and drink here for us we held in common, but that we were a motley crew, some strong and others weak, and one of us was smarter about food and drink – a physician, say – while himself being in all likelihood more robust than some of us but also slighter than others: won’t he, given that he is smarter, be nobler and stronger regarding food?”

Call. “Exactly.”

Soc. “So is he to get the better share of this food than the rest of us because he is more noble? Or, although he is the one to distribute all the food by virtue of being in charge because of who he is, still, when it comes to the eating up and finishing off of the food he is not to have more of it for his own body, if he is not to suffer the unhealthy outcome that would result in, but instead to have a greater share than some and a lesser one than others? And in case he happens to be the slightest of all, then the least share is to be had by the noblest man, Callicles?”

“... Isn’t it this way, my good man?”

Call. “What’s this? You’re talking food and drink and doctors and nonsense; I am not talking those things.”

Soc. “Aren’t you saying the smarter person is nobler?”  
“... Say yes or no.”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And don’t you say that the nobler ought to have more?”

Call. “Not more food! Not more drink!”

Soc. “Oh, I get it: Maybe more cloaks? And the cloakiest man ought to have the largest cloak and go about dressed the finest and the mostest?”

Call. “Cloaks shmoaks!”

Soc. “Then *shoes* the man clearly ought to have in excess, the one smartest and noblest at that? The shoemaker ought to have the largest shoes and strut about better shoed than everyone?”

Call. “You blather shoe-talk!”

Soc. “If that’s not what you mean, maybe it’s this: Take a farming man, who is smart about farmland, and fine and good: maybe it’s this person that ought to have a larger share of seeds, and employ a maximal seed-use – in the farmland that is his own.”

Call. “Amazing how you, Socrates, are always saying the same things!”

Soc. “Not only that, Callicles, but also *about* the same things.” (491)

Call. “By the gods, you just won’t stop talking leather-workers and wool-carders and cooks – along with doctors – as if you think our discussion is about those.”

Soc. “But you – will you say about what the stronger and smarter person, in having an excess, justly has an edge? Or will you neither abide my promptings nor volunteer an answer yourself?”

Call. “But I *am* saying it and have been: First of all, as to the stronger, which ones they are, I’m not talking about shoemakers and butchers but anybody who is smart about the business of the city, how it would be well managed, and not only smart but also brave, being up to the task of carrying through whatever he has in mind rather than giving up early out of feebleness of soul.”

Soc. “Anybody can see, my most noble Callicles, that what you accuse me of is not the same as what I accuse you of. You say I am always saying the same things and blame me for it; but I charge you with the converse, that you never say the same things about the same things. Instead, at one time you define the nobler and stronger as the more powerful while at another time it is the smarter; and just now you serve me with something else: the stronger and the nobler are now said to be somehow braver. So my good man won’t you just deliver yourself of your opinion and be done with it, as to who the nobler and stronger are, and stronger at what?”

Call. “But I’ve already said it is those who are smart at the city’s business and brave. For it is fitting that these be the rulers of cities, and the just is this, that these have more than the others, the rulers more than the ruled.”

Soc. “What? than themselves, my friend?”

Call. “Who they?”

Soc. “As rulers or as ruled?”

Call. “What do you mean?”

Soc. “I’m talking about each individual as himself ruling himself. Or is that unneeded – ruling oneself – only ruling others?”

Call. “What do you mean, ‘ruling oneself’?”

Soc. “Nothing tricky – just what most people mean – being a mindful master of oneself, ruling over the pleasures and desires within oneself.”

Call. “How naive! It is the imbeciles among us you are referring to as being mindful. How can you deny it?”

Soc. “Nobody would fail to recognize that that is not what I am saying!”

Call. “But that *is* most assuredly what you are saying – since how could a person be happy if he is enslaved to *anybody*? Nay, here is what is fine and just by nature – finally I will express it in all frankness: He who is to live the right way must allow his own desires to grow to the maximum and not bridle them, (492) but also must be adequate to the task of serving these though they have become as great as can be, by dint of his manly courage and intelligence, and fulfilling each and every desire as it might arise. But this, I daresay, is beyond the ability of the many, and so they condemn such men out of shame. They try to divert attention from their shameful lack of power by calling ‘shameful’ the lack of a bridle, just as I was saying before, in their attempt to turn the naturally nobler men into slaves; lacking the power in themselves to satiate their desires with pleasures they praise moderation and justice because of a lack of manly courage in themselves. Since for anyone who had in store from birth to be sons of kings or, through natural endowment, to be adequate to procure some office for themselves, whether tyranny or dynasty, what in very truth could be more shameful and evil than moderation and justice for men such as these, if though able to rake off the goods for themselves with nothing impeding them, they should by their own choice bring law or usage to bear on themselves as their master, or the repute and censure of a mere majority? How, I ask you, could they not come off as losers for being overcome by the fine thing that justice and temperance is, and distributing no more spoils to their friends than to their enemies though they hold the very reins of the city? No! In very truth, Socrates, since the truth is what *you* claim to be after, here is how it stands: Luxury, license, liberty as long as it has serving support at

hand, *this* is virtue and happiness. The rest you mention, this prettifying camouflage, these compacts contrary to nature, are nonsense, human, and of no worth.”

Soc. “With no mean frankness, Callicles, do you prosecute our subject, for now you are stating very clearly what the others are thinking but are unwilling to say. I beg you please not to let up, so that we might truly grasp for once and for all how we are to lead our lives. Tell me: you are saying that one must not rein in his desires if he is to live as he ought, but that as he allows them to grow as great as possible he must try to work on having the means to fulfill them from separate sources around him – and that is what virtue is.”

Call. “That is my position.”

Soc. “So the saying that those who are in need of nothing are happy, is incorrect?”

Call. “Yes: mere stones would in that case be the happiest, and the dead for that matter.”

Soc. “But by the same token, you would have to agree that being *alive* would be one hell of a thing if you are right. In fact, I wouldn’t be so surprised if Euripides was right in saying,

*Who knows whether being alive is really being dead,  
And being dead being alive? (493)*

and that somehow we are in fact dead. Indeed, I have heard from some wise man that we are now dead and our body is for us a tomb; and that the part of the soul where desires reside is of such a nature as to be fickle and subject to the most extreme vacillations in mood, and that, as he told me, some clever man, maybe a Sicilian or an Italian, made up a fable about it – that since it is both *pithanos* (persuasive) and *pistikos* (trustworthy) he called this part a *pithos* (a pot for storage) respelling the letters; and by another respelling he called mindless persons (*anoetous*) uninitiated (*amuetous*), and the place in the soul of the mindless that is the regime of the desires he called the unbridled part of it and unsealed for holding things in, as if it were a perforated pot, expressing with this image its insatiability. This fellow gives the picture – quite the opposite of yours, Callicles – that among the inhabitants of Hades (*Haidēs*), which he calls the “invisible” realm (*aeides*), these are the most destitute – namely, the uninitiated ones – in that they carry water to a perforated pot with something likewise perforated – a sieve: The sieve he speaks about is for him the soul, as the man who told me reported, and he likened their soul – that of the mindless – to a sieve as itself being perforated, inasmuch as such a soul is not able to keep what is in it because of its lack of trustworthiness and its forgetfulness.

“I grant this story is strange enough, but it does show the picture I want to put before you, to persuade you, if I might, to switch your vote and in place of living insatiably and debauched, to select a life meet and satisfied with whatever is ready to hand. But say whether I am at all persuading you actually to switch to the outlook that the happier people are those who are graceful and moderate rather than dissolute and rash? Or would you be no more disposed to change even if I came up with a whole lot of such fables?”

Call. “The latter result you laid out is the truer.”

Soc. “Come then: Shall I give you another image from the same school, and see whether you would do the following about the life of each, the temperate man and the dissolute man? Imagine that each of the two own many pitchers, and that those that belong to the one are sound and full, one of wine, one of honey, and one of milk, and many others full of many other liquids; and that the sources from which they draw these liquids are few and far between and difficult, accessible only with great and hard labor; and that the one man, once he has filled them up, would neither be lugging them back and forth nor be at all anxious, but was calm about the whole matter; whereas for the other, that the sources, just as for the other man, can be reached but only with difficulty, and that his vessels are perforated and cracked, and he has to be filling them (494) all the time, through

night and day, or else suffer the greatest of pains. What do you say? Given these respective lives do you say the life of the dissolute man is happier than that of the moderate? Am I persuading you at all in saying this, to give in and say that the moderate life is better than the dissolute one? Or am I not persuading you?"

Call. "Not persuading, Socrates. The man who has finished filling them up no longer feels any pleasure: this is what I was just saying was living like a stone once he has filled them, no longer feeling either joy or pain. But the life of pleasure consists in maximizing successive influx."

Soc. "And yet doesn't a maximal influx require also that much leaves, and the perforations would need to be quite large to allow for the outflows?"

Call. "Quite so."

Soc. "Then you are talking about the life of a little gully, rather than of a corpse or a stone! But say more. Are you talking about something like becoming hungry and then once hungry eating?"

Call. "I am."

Soc. "And becoming thirsty and then once thirsty drinking?"

Call. "So I am, and saying it about the other desires as well, each and every one: it comes upon him, he has the power, he fulfills the desire, he reaps his enjoyment, he lives a happy life."

Soc. "Bravo, my noblest of men! You are carrying it through just as you began, and let's hope you can continue shamelessly! And it seems I mustn't let shame stop me, either. So for starters, tell me if, also, feeling an itch and desiring to scratch, being abundantly able to scratch, carrying through scratching one's life away, is to live a happy life?"

Call. "You're a damn kook, Socrates, and an unscrupulous demagogue."

Soc. "Stop and think, Callicles! Polus and Gorgias I shocked and brought to shame – but you – please! Don't be shocked and ashamed! You are a brave man! Just answer!"

Call. "Alright then, I say that even the scratcher would be living a pleasurable life."

Soc. "But if pleasurable, happy also?"

Call. "Quite so."

Soc. "If it is only his head that he is desiring to scratch? Or should I proceed a bit further with my questions? Mind what you will answer, Callicles, in case someone goes on to ask you about all the connected parts right down the line till he reaches what is the culminating case of things of this ilk, the life of a Ganymede, serving all and sundry: isn't that a hellish and shameful and destitute life? Or will you dare say these are happy, as long as they have an abundance of what they crave?"

Call. "Have you no shame, driving our conversation into such topics?"

Soc. "So is it I who drive them there, my redoubtable friend? Or is it any man who so unguardedly asserts this thesis of yours, that those who are having enjoyment whatever the enjoyment might be, (495) are happy, and does not draw a distinction among pleasures as to which sorts are good and which are bad? But even now: say whether you declare that the pleasurable and the good are the same, or is there any pleasurable thing that is not good?"

Call. "In order to keep the argument from going inconsistent on me in case I shall say they are different, I say they are the same."

Soc. "You are undermining what you said at first, Callicles, and you can no longer examine the truth in an adequate way with me, if as you say you are going to argue contrary to your opinion."

Call. "... just as you are doing, Socrates."



Soc. "I'll say I am not acting properly myself, if in fact I am doing that, no less than you. But, my winning friend, look closely to see whether the good really could be this, enjoyment of any and every kind, since many shameful things such as were alluded to just now come into view as entailments of that position, but many others, too."

Call. "So *you* think."

Soc. "But *you*, are you really going to maintain this position?"

Call. "I am."

Soc. "Shall we then make a test of this argument, supposing you are serious?"

Call. "Absolutely!"

Soc. "Come then: if that's our consensus, let's make the following distinctions. Presumably you think there is such a thing as knowledge?"

Call. "I do."

Soc. "And weren't you speaking of a kind of courage that goes along with knowledge?"

Call. "So I argued."

Soc. "But thinking of courage as other than knowledge, you were speaking of them as two different things?"

Call. "Very much so."

Soc. "And what about this: are pleasure and knowledge one and the same thing or different?"

Call. "Different I should think; now it is *you* who seem so wise!"

Soc. "And is courage different from pleasure?"

Call. "Of course."

Soc. "So let us review. Callicles, an Acharnian, has said the pleasurable and the good are the same thing, and that knowledge and courage are different both from each other and from the good."

Call. "And meanwhile Socrates from Alopece does not agree with us on this – or does he?"

Soc. "He does not agree. But I'd guess Callicles won't either, once he sees himself aright. Just tell me, don't you take it that people who are doing well are undergoing the opposite of those who are doing badly?"

Call. "I do."

Soc. "So isn't it necessarily so, that if as you aver these really are opposites to each other, it stands with them the same as with health and disease – that a man cannot thrive and suffer sickness at the same time, nor can he secure an abatement of health and of disease at the same time?"

Call. "What does *that* mean?"

Soc. "Take for example any part of the body considered by itself. (496) Say a man is sick in his eyes – it's called ophthalmia, right?"

Call. "Of course."

Soc. "Presumably it is not the case that at the same time he is healthy in the same respect, in his eyes."

Call. "No way."

Soc. "What about when he has an abatement of ophthalmia? Can he at that time also have an abatement of health in his eyes, so that he ends up in a state of simultaneous abatement of both?"

Call. "Hardly!"

Soc. "That leads to a surprising and nonsensical result, right?"

Call. "Very much so."

Soc. "But I fancy he can take on and lose either of them in turns."

Call. "I affirm that."

Soc. "And isn't it similar with strength and weakness?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "And speed and slowness?"

Call. "Quite."

Soc. "How about good things and happiness, and their opposites, bad things and misery? Does one get the one at one moment and lose it at another, in the case of both these?"

Call. "Surely, I think."

Soc. "And so if we find things which a man can be relieved of and in possession of at the same time, it is clear that they cannot be the good and the bad. Are we in agreement as to that? Think hard and well about it before you answer."

Call. "But I overwhelmingly agree!"

Soc. "Then come, let's review what we have agreed to before. Being hungry: did you say it was pleasurable or painful? Being hungry considered in itself."

Call. "I said painful, though eating when hungry is pleasurable."

Soc. "I get that, but in any event being hungry in itself is painful? Or not?"

Call. "Painful."

Soc. "Likewise with being thirsty?"

Call. "Very painful."

Soc. "Am I to ask more along these lines or do you agree that any and every lack and desire is painful?"

Call. "I agree: no need to ask."

Soc. "Alright then. As to drinking when one is thirsty: do you say that is anything but pleasurable?"

Call. "Agreed."

Soc. "Presumably, the 'when thirsty' in your expression 'drinking when thirsty' means when being pained?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "Whereas the 'drinking' part of it, on the other hand, is a filling of the lack and a pleasure?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "So it is in reference to his drinking that you say he is enjoying."

Call. "Exactly."



Soc. “Assuming ‘when thirsty’.”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “That is, when pained?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “Do you see the implication? When you say ‘drinking when thirsty’ you are saying that when pained he is at the same time enjoying. Or is it not happening at the same place and time, whether in the sphere of the soul or the body, as you wish – myself, I don’t care which. Is this true or not?”

Call. “It is true.”

Soc. “And yet you averred it is impossible to be doing badly (497) while doing well.”

Call. “And I do aver it.”

Soc. “And yet to be enjoying while being in pain you have now agreed is possible.”

Call. “So it seems.”

Soc. “That implies that enjoying is not doing well and being in pain is not doing badly, so that the pleasurable turns out to be different from the good.”

Call. “I don’t see what all this cleverness is about, dear Socrates.”

Soc. “You do see but no doubt you play dumb, dear Callicles – but move on to the next step...”

Call. “Seeing that you are continuing to babble?”

Soc. “...so that you may see how clever you are to scold me: Isn’t it the case that one stops being thirsty at the very same moment one stops having the pleasure that comes through drinking?”

Call. “What’s the case is that I don’t know what you are talking about!”

GORGIAS: “Quit that, Callicles! Answer for our sakes at least, so that our conversation can be completed.”

Call. “But this is how Socrates always is, Gorgias, pressing his worthless little questions to defeat his interlocutor.”

Gorg. “What difference does that make to you? No way does it affect our estimation of *you*. Just bear up under Socrates as he contrives whatever ‘defeat’ he is trying to contrive.”

Call. “Go ahead, you, and ask these small and tight questions of yours, since Gorgias says so.”

Soc. “Happy you are, Callicles, that you have been initiated into the larger questions before the smaller – I didn’t think it worked that way. So, answer from the point where you left off: whether it is at the same moment that any of us stops feeling thirst and feeling pleasure.”

Call. “I say that it is.”

Soc. “And does one also stop feeling hunger and leave behind the other desires and pleasures at the same moment?”

Call. “That is the case.”

Soc. “And pains and pleasures one leaves behind at the same moment?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And yet goods and evils one does not leave behind at the same moment, as you agreed. But do you not agree, now?”

Call. "I do agree – what of it?"

Soc. "That it entails, my friend, that the goods are not the same as the pleasurable, nor the bads the same as what hurts. One leaves the one pair behind at the same moment but not the other pair – seeing them to be different from one another. So how could what is pleasurable be the same as what is good or what's painful be the same as what's bad?"

"If you want, I have another way to investigate it as follows – for it seems that even by that way the refutation does not reach your agreement – but look into this nevertheless: Isn't it by virtue of the presence of good things that you call your good men good, just as you call beautiful those to whom beauty is present?"

Call. "I do."

Soc. "But really, do you call foolish and cowardly men good? You didn't a moment ago, when you were calling the brave and intelligent good.

"... Or do you not call these good?"

Call. "No but I do."

Soc. "And this: have you ever witnessed a mindless child feeling joy?"

Call. "I have."

Soc. "And have you never yet witnessed a mindless man feeling joy?"

Call. "I suppose I have, but what's all this you're up to?" (498)

Soc. "Never mind, just answer."

Call. "I have."

Soc. "What about a mindful man feeling pain and feeling joy?"

Call. "I have."

Soc. "Which of the two are more joyful or pained, the intelligent ones or the mindless ones?"

Call. "To me there doesn't seem much difference."

Soc. "But that's enough. In war have you ever witnessed a man being cowardly?"

Call. "Of course."

Soc. "And when the enemy is receding which do you think the more joyful, the cowardly or the brave?"

Call. "I don't think the more of either, though presumably their reactions are about equal."

Soc. "It doesn't matter: In any event, the cowardly do rejoice."

Call. "Definitely."

Soc. "And so do the mindless, it seems."

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "And when the enemy approaches, is it only the cowardly who are pained, or the brave as well?"

Call. "Both."

Soc. "Equally?"

Call. "Maybe the cowardly somewhat more."

Soc. "And when they are receding do the latter not feel greater joy?"

Call. "Maybe they do."

Soc. "So when it comes to feeling pain and joy, the mindless and the intelligent and the cowardly and the brave behave similarly, as you say, but the cowardly more than the brave?"

Call. "So I say."

Soc. "And yet the intelligent and the brave are good, whereas the cowardly and mindless are bad?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "Therefore when it comes to feeling pain and joy the good and the bad behave similarly."

Call. "So I say."

Soc. "Would you say that the good and the bad are good and bad similarly to each other? Or are the good still more good, and the bad still more bad?"

Call. "Wait! By Zeus I really don't know what you are saying."

Soc. "You mean you don't know that you say that good men are good by virtue of the presence of good things, and likewise the bad bad by the presence of bad things? And that the good things are the pleasures, whereas the things that are painful are the bad things?"

Call. "I do."

Soc. "And so for those who are enjoying themselves, the good things are present – the pleasures – if in fact they are enjoying themselves?"

Call. "How could it be otherwise?"

Soc. "And good things being present, those who are enjoying themselves are good."

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "And for those who hurt aren't the bad things present – the pains?"

Call. "They are present."

Soc. "And it is by virtue of the presence of bad things, you say, that bad men are bad? Or do you no longer say that?"

Call. "I still do."

Soc. "Therefore those who are enjoying themselves are good, and bad whoever is in pain."

Call. "Quite so."

Soc. "And those who are doing so more are more good and more bad; and if less so, they are less good and less bad; and if equally, are equally good or bad?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "Do you claim that the intelligent and the mindless have similar experiences of pleasure and pain, and also the cowardly and the brave – or if anything the cowards a little more?"

Call. "I do."

Soc. "Put together along with me what is the upshot for us from what we have agreed. They say, you know, it is fine (499) to say fine things two and three times, as well as to inspect them more carefully. We have said the intelligent and brave man is good, right?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "And bad the man who is mindless and cowardly."

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And we agreed in turn that the man who is enjoying himself is good.”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And bad the man who is hurting.”

Call. “Necessarily.”

Soc. “And that the good and bad feel pain and pleasure similarly – the bad man more, if anything?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “So the bad man is bad and good in a way similar to the good man, or if anything the bad man is more good than the good. Doesn’t this follow, and those earlier things, too, if one asserts that the pleasurable is the same as the good?

“... Isn’t all that necessary?”

Call. “You know, I have been listening to you lecture for some time now, Socrates, agreeing at each step down the line and thinking all along that even if someone grants you something only in jest you latch on to it gladly, just like a teenager. As if you actually believe that I or anybody else no matter who doesn’t believe there are better and worse pleasures!”

Soc. “Oh no! Callicles! How unscrupulous you are to toy with me so, at one moment averring the same things to be so that at the next moment you deny, in order to trick me. I have to say at the start I had no idea I would be tricked by you, not intentionally at least, for I took you as a friend; but as it has turned out I was deceived, and it seems I will have to ‘make do,’ according to the old saw, and ‘work with what is left me’ by you. It seems that your position now, as you have said, is that among pleasures some are good and some bad. Is that so?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “Are the beneficial ones good, whereas the harmful ones bad?”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And beneficial are the ones that do some good, whereas the pleasures that do something bad are bad?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “Do you speak of pleasures as follows, that for example as to pleasures of the body having to do with eating and drinking that we were just talking about, if, I now infer, the one set of these producing health in the body or strength or some other goodness of the body, this one set comprises good ones, that conversely the ones that produce effects opposite to these are bad?”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And isn’t it the same for pains – some of them are useful and others are worthless?”

Call. “Of course.”

Soc. “And one should select out the useful pleasures and pains and pursue these?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “But the worthless ones not?”

Call. “Clearly.”

Soc. “For if you remember, it seemed to Polus and me that it’s for the sake of good things that everything is to be done in each instance. Does it seem so to you, also? That the goal of each and

every action is the good, and that for the sake of the former all the rest is to be done, (500) rather than the former for the sake of everything else. Will you join us in this, making three who vote this way?"

Call. "I will."

Soc. "Therefore it's for the sake of good things that we must do all the rest, including all pleasurable things, but not for the sake of pleasurable things that we do good things."

Call. "Quite."

Soc. "Is just any man capable of selecting out which sorts are good – of pleasurable things, that is – and which are bad, or is there need for an expert in each case?"

Call. "An expert."

Soc. "Let's call back to mind, in turn, the things I had occasion to say to Polus and Gorgias. I was arguing, if you remember, that acts of provision are of two kinds, one kind endeavoring to bring one to pleasure but no further than just that, ignorant of the question of what is nobler and what baser; and another kind that knows what is good and what is bad. And among the provisionings that concern themselves with pleasure, I listed the butcher's, as a knack but not a skill, whereas among those concerned with the good I listed the doctor's, as a skill. And in the name of Zeus-Friendship himself, Callicles, don't get the idea that you ought to kid with me or answer any old thing contrary to your opinion, and conversely don't take it that I am kidding in what I am saying to you. For it is plain to see that for us, what we are talking about is something than which even the least thoughtful of men could not take something else more seriously – that is, the question, "What should be one's orientation in life?" To turn toward the life you are advocating for me, doing those deeds a "real man" does, as you put it, speaking in the assembly, practicing oratory and doing politics in this way you all do politics? Or toward my kind of life, the life in philosophy? – and the question, "How does this life differ from that life?" Maybe the best thing to do, as I tried to do a moment ago, is to draw distinctions, and having drawn them and having agreed with each other about the distinctions, thereupon – assuming they really do constitute two alternative lives – to go on to investigate how they differ from each other and which of the two is worth living.

"... Maybe you still don't know what I am saying..."

Call. "I certainly don't!"

Soc. "Well then I will make it clearer. Since you and I have reached the agreement that there is such a thing as the good and such a thing as the pleasurable, and that the pleasurable is a different thing from the good, and that in the case of each of the two there is a commitment, if you will, and an instrumentality for acquiring them – the one a hunt for the pleasurable and the other a hunt for the good

"... But first, agree or don't agree with me so far.

"... Do you agree?"

Call. "Yes, I agree."

Soc. "OK then, consider agreeing step by step with what I was arguing with my two associates and tell me if you judge what I was saying is true. I said that the delicatessen's work was not in my judgment an art but a knack (501) but medicine was, arguing that the one has both investigated the nature of the thing it serves, and has investigated the reasons it should itself do what it does, and that it is able to render an explanation for each of these things – I speak of medicine; but that the other, in its alterity, of pleasure with which alone it is concerned, goes at this alone, flat out and without art, neither investigating the nature of pleasure nor what causes it, and with no method at all keeping track of virtually nothing, but by dint of experience and knack retaining only a memory of what usually works – and this is how it provides what pleasures it does. Tell me first whether you

judge this much to have been adequately argued, and whether there do exist certain similar occupations having to do in an analogous way with soul, some of which qualify as artful since they have some prudential concern for the best state of the soul while others neglect this so as to devote themselves, as in the case of the others, to investigate only the pleasure of the soul and by what turn of events this in itself arises, without investigating the question which of the pleasures are nobler or worse, being concerned only that enjoyment occurs, whether nobler or baser. I ask because in my judgment, Callicles, these do exist, and I do say that this sort of thing is pandering, whether about the body or the soul or any other thing for which one might cater to its pleasure with no regard for the question of the better and the worse. But you, do you posit with us the same judgment about these things, or do you say ‘Nay’?”

Call. “No ‘Nay’ from me! I yield it instead, both to help you finish your argument at last and to cater to my man, Gorgias.”

Soc. “Does this pertain to one soul but not to two or for that matter to many souls?”

Call. “No, it pertains also to two and to many.”

Soc. “And likewise, is it possible to please in one fell swoop a *gathering* of souls, with no regard at all for what is best?”

Call. “I do think so.”

Soc. “Can you say which are the professions that do this? Or instead, if you like, I will ask about them, and if one in your judgment falls into that category say so, or if not say not. First, let’s look at flute playing. Doesn’t this seem to you to be of that sort, to be pursuing our pleasure and paying attention to nothing else?”

Call. “Seems so to me.”

Soc. “And what about the following sorts of things, such as cithara playing as it is done in public contests?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And what about directing choreography and the composing of dithyrambs? Doesn’t it strike you as being that sort? Or do you have the sense that Kinesias the son of Meles is paying attention to improving those who hear it, rather than to what is going to give enjoyment to the crowd of spectators?” (502)

Call. “It’s clear in the case of Kinesias at least!”

Soc. “What about Meles, his father? Did he seem to you to be considering what is the best for us when he sings to his cithara? Or in his case was he not even concerned with the most pleasant: it would depress the spectators when he sang! But think about it: Doesn’t cithara playing as a whole seem to you, along with the composition of dithyrambs, to have been conceived for the sake of pleasure?”

Call. “I seems so to me.”

Soc. “And what about this thing judged so solemn and wondrous, tragic compositions? Is their aim, in *your* judgment, and all the elaborate fuss they stir up, meant only to give enjoyment to the spectators, or also to take up cudgels against what though it pleases them and gives them enjoyment, is an evil thing, so as not to say it, and conversely in case something is unpleasant but beneficial, to present this, both in episode and chorus, whether the spectators enjoy it or not? For which of the two has the composing of tragedies been developed, in your judgment?”

Call. “This much is clear, Socrates, that it is driven more toward pleasure and to entertaining the spectators.”

Soc. "Now isn't this sort of thing what we just now called pandering?"

Call. "Quite so."

Soc. "Come then. If one sectioned off melody, rhythm, and meter from poetry of any kind, wouldn't speeches result as the residue?"

Call. "Necessarily."

Soc. "And aren't these speeches spoken to a big crowd, even a deme?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "Then poetry is a kind of demagoguery!"

Call. "Seems so."

Soc. "It would be an oratorical demagoguery. Or do you not judge the poets are doing what orators do, though in the theaters?"

Call. "So they are."

Soc. "Thus by our own lights we have discovered an oratory of sorts, delivered to a deme of sorts, one that consists of children and women and men both slave and free, an oratory we hardly admire – for we have dubbed it 'pandering'."

Call. "Quite so."

Soc. "Well then. What about the oratory delivered to the deme of Athens, and to the other demes in the cities, those that also consist of free men: how shall we characterize this? Do you judge that the orators characteristically speak with what would be best in mind and aiming for this – how the citizens might in future become as noble as possible as a result of their speeches? Or are these, too, driven toward pleasing the citizens and neglect the common interest for the sake of their own personal interest, addressing their demes as children, seeking only to give them enjoyment, paying no mind to whether they will become better or worse because of what they say?" (503)

Call. "This last question is no longer black or white. There are some that care about the citizens in saying what they say, but there are some that are like those ones *you* are arguing about."

Soc. "You've given me enough with that, for if at least the question is black *and* white, the one part of it would clearly be pandering and shameful demagoguery, and the other part admirable, the activity of providing that the souls of the citizens be as noble as possible and of taking up cudgels in their arguments for the noblest ideas, no matter whether these be more pleasant or more painful for the audience to hear. You at least have never yet seen oratory practiced *that way* – otherwise, if you do have such a man to mention among the orators, why didn't you say his name?"

Call. "By Zeus surely you can't expect *me* to be able to point to a single one of *our* orators!"

Soc. "What then? From among orators of former times can you mention one through whose services the Athenians are praised for having been made more noble from the time he began orating, they having been less noble before? For my part I do not know who it is you have in mind."

Call. "What's this? You don't hear it said that Themistocles came to be a great man, and so did Cimon, and so did Miltiades, and the great Pericles, who only recently died, whom you yourself heard?"

Soc. "Only if what you on your own were arguing virtue was, a while ago, is really true: the mere fulfilling of desires, whether one's own or those of others. If this is not true but instead what we together were forced to agree in the interim is true – that whatever desires make a man nobler through being fulfilled, true virtue is to fulfill these and not those that make him worse; and true



that to do this requires art – that such a good man as that, one of these orators of yours came out to be, are you able to say?

Call. “I know not *what* I am to say about the matter.”

Soc. “Search properly and you will find out what. Let’s investigate it just that way – carefully, that is. Try this: The man of virtue, who as such speaks for the best in whatever he says, will speak not at random but with his eye on a certain something, won’t he? Just as all other experts have their eyes on their own work when each of them ministers selectively to his own task, not by chance but with the view that the job he is working on should achieve a certain shape for him. Look for example at the painters, if you will, the builders, the ship-makers, all the expert workmen, any one you wish: See how in every case they place each thing they place into an order! How each part requires the other parts to be appropriate so as to fit, so that in the end the whole work stands together as an ordered and finely arranged object! (504) Likewise the other experts but particularly those we were just talking about who deal with the body, the trainers and the doctors, give a fine arrangement and coordination to the body as it were. Are we in agreement that this is how this is, or not?”

Call. “Let’s say this is how it is.”

Soc. “So that once the building has reached organization and arrangement, it would be a worthy building, but if disorganized it would be a faulty one?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And the same with a boat?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And can we also say so about our bodies?”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “How about the soul? If it reached a disorganization will it be worthy, or if it reached some sort of order and arrangement?”

Call. “Necessarily, given the foregoing, this case falls under the same account.”

Soc. “So what is the name for the thing that arises as a result of order and arrangement within the body?”

Call. “Let me guess: You mean health and strength?”

Soc. “I do. And what, in turn, for the thing that arises in the soul as a result of order and arrangement?

“... Try to find it and say what its name is, as you did for body.”

Call. “Why don’t you take a turn answering that one?”

Soc. “If that would please you more, I will; but you for your part, if you judge I’ve spoken well, then say you agree, and if not, challenge me and don’t just let it pass. In my judgment what to call the orderly arrangements in the body is ‘healthy,’ and from the ‘healthy’ arises ‘health’ and all the rest of the body’s virtue. It is this correct, or not?”

Call. “It is.”

Soc. “But for the soul’s orderings and arrangements, the name is ‘lawful’ and ‘orderly,’ whence men become lawful and well-behaved; and these two results are justice and moderation. Do you agree or not?”

Call. “Let it be so.”



Soc. “So the orator I dream of – the artful and virtuous one – will keep his eye on these matters as he ministers to the souls with whatever speeches he delivers and whatever deeds he does, and will grant whatever reward he grants and exact any fine he exacts with his mind always directed toward this: how, for his fellow citizens, justice might be instilled in their souls and how injustice might be let go; how moderation might be instilled and licentiousness let go; and how the rest of virtue might be instilled and vice might take its leave.

“... Do you acquiesce in this conclusion, or not?”

Call. “I acquiesce.”

Soc. “After all, what benefit is it, Callicles, to give a body that is sick and in a wretched state a lot of food, even if the most pleasurable, or drink, or anything else, if there is no way it will be the more beneficial for the body itself, or on the contrary, according at least to a just accounting, might even be less beneficial?

“... Isn’t that so?” (505)

Call. “Let it be so.”

Soc. “After all, it doesn’t pay off for a man to be living with a wretched body, for necessarily his living, too, will be wretched. Or is that not so?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And also to satiate the desires – for example for a hungry man to eat as much as he wants or for a thirsty man to drink. The doctors usually allow it when he is healthy, but when he is sick they almost never allow him to indulge his appetites. Do you yourself agree with this much, or not?”

Call. “I do.”

Soc. “But in the case of the soul, my best of men, isn’t it the same? As long as it is vicious, because mindless and unbridled and unjust and impious, one must hold it back from its desires and not accede to its doing anything other than what will make it nobler. Do you agree, or not?”

Call. “I do.”

Soc. “For this would be the better course for the soul, considered in and for itself.”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “And to hold it back from what it desires is to restrain it?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “Therefore to be constrained is better for the soul than the sort of unconstrained license you were just now thinking to be better.”

Call. “I don’t know what you are saying, Socrates. Ask somebody else!”

Soc. “This man! He won’t tolerate being helped, even when undergoing the very thing we are talking about, being restrained.”

Call. “No more than I care at all about what *you* are saying; and the answers I gave were only for the sake of pleasing Gorgias.”

Soc. “Well then what are we going to do? Are we breaking up the argument right in the middle?”

Call. “That will be totally up to you.”

Soc. “But they say it’s not right to leave off even *stories* in the middle, before one has capped them with an ending – otherwise they will run around headless. So answer the rest, so that the argument, too, can be given a head.”

Call. “You’re so *pushy*, Socrates! May I persuade you to let this argument go – or else dialogue with somebody else.”

Soc. “But who else is willing? Please let’s not leave the argument unfinished.”

Call. “Can’t you go through the rest of the argument, off by yourself, or by answering your own questions?”

Soc. “Just to make Epicharmus’s thing come true in me: ‘The things before, I spoke as two men,’ I should prove able while being only one? But why even ask, when it appears completely necessary? So let’s go ahead and do it this way: Myself, I’d say all of us ought to vie to know what is the truth about the matters we are discussing and what is false, since it’s obviously a boon for all of us if the very truth of the matter comes into view, no matter by whose lights. I will go through step by step how things stand as I see them, (506) and in case any one of you thinks it is an untruth I am granting myself as answerer, you must take the floor and try to refute me. For it is not as if I presume to be speaking knowledgeably in what I am saying. Instead what I am doing is searching jointly with you, and thus if the person that argues a different position from mine brings something to light, I will be the first to grant it. But still, I propose all this only if you all do judge the argument should be pursued to completion: if you do not want this, let’s drop it as was suggested, and part our ways.”

GORGIAS. “Surely in *my* judgment, Socrates, we really ought not as of yet part company, but rather your argument should be brought to completion – it looks like the others agree. I *do* myself want to hear you yourself, as you go through the rest.”

Soc. “Just as surely, Gorgias, would I gladly be continuing the dialogue with this Callicles here, to the point of having delivered to him Amphion’s counter-speech to the speech of Zethus. And you, Callicles, since you are not willing to join with me going through the argument to the end, still, at least, interrupt me as you listen in case you judge I am putting something badly. And in case you refute me soundly, I will not be angry with you, as you were with me: instead, you will be commemorated forever, in my world, among my greatest benefactors!”

Call. “Speak on by yourself, my worthy, and get it over with.”

Soc. “Listen then, as I resume the argument from its beginning: Are the pleasurable and the good identical? – No, not identical, as Callicles and I agreed. – Are we to do the pleasurable for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasurable? – The pleasurable for the sake of the good. – And what is pleasurable is what by virtue of its becoming present to us, makes us feel pleasure, and good that by whose presence we are good? – Quite so. – And yet we are *good*, as are all things that are good, by virtue of a certain goodness or virtue becoming present? – I at least think that is necessarily true, Callicles. – But the *virtue* of any thing, whether a tool or a body or a soul of any animal, does not become present to it in the finest way just by chance, but rather by orderliness and correctness and by an art, whichever art is devoted to each of these things. – I at least would say so. – Therefore it is by dint of orderly arrangement that this distinct virtue of each thing has its order and decorum? – I would say so – Is it therefore a coming into being of the distinct decorum peculiar to each thing that confers distinct goodness upon all the things? – Yes in my judgment. – So a soul, too, by virtue of having the decorum-principle proper to it is better than an indecorous one? – Necessarily. – And yet the soul that has decorum is decorous. – How is it not to be so? – But (507) if decorous, then temperate? – Quite necessarily. Therefore the temperate soul is virtuous and good.

“For myself, I have nothing to affirm against all that, friend Callicles; but if you do, please tell me where I am wrong.”

Call. “Speak on, my worthy.”

Soc. “Speak I will. If the temperate soul is virtuous, the one that has undergone the contrary of the temperate soul is vicious and bad. But the vicious soul was the mindless and unbridled one. – Quite so. – And yet the temperate man by the nature of the case would behave with propriety, both in regard to gods and in regard to men: he would not be acting temperately if he behaved inappropriately. – Necessarily that is so. – But to behave appropriately toward men is to behave justly, and appropriately toward the gods is to behave piously, and one who behaves justly and piously is necessarily just and pious. – That is true – But in fact he also is necessarily brave, for it is hardly the mark of a temperate individual to pursue and prosecute any more than to flee and defend what is inappropriate, but rather what one must, whether it be actions and men or pleasures and pains to avoid as well as embrace, or defend and prosecute, and have the fortitude to stand the ground he must.

“So, Callicles, as we have now seen, step by step, there is an overpowering necessity that the temperate man, by virtue of being just and brave and pious, is a good man in the fullest sense; that by virtue of being a good man he does whatever he does in a way that is good and admirable, that by virtue of behaving this way he is blessed and happy, while he who is base and does evil is a hapless loser. This latter type would be the man living in the opposite state to that of the temperate man, this unbridled man whom *you* were praising.

“I propose all this by my own lights, and assert that this is true. But if it is true, then it would appear that if one wants to be happy, he must pursue temperance and make that his practice, and must run away from licentiousness as fast as my legs and yours can carry us, and we must so equip ourselves as never to need being chastised in the first place, but that if we should, whether it be one of us or of one of our own, whether an individual or our city, we must impose the dictates of justice and chastise the person, if he is to have any hope of being happy. This, by my lights, is the target one must keep in his sights in living his life, and concentrate everything both private and public on this, at making justice as well as temperance be present in him who hopes to live a blessed life: these things to do, and not to allow his desires grow uncontrolled and then endeavor to fulfill them – an evil that knows no end! the life of a whore! For neither by his neighbor could such a man be loved, nor by a god: he is unable to share, and a person who lacks the ability in himself to share cannot have friendship. But the wise men say, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together in the embrace of sharing and (508) friendship and decorum and temperance and justice (and for this reason they call all the great whole a cosmos, my fellow), not of chaos and indecency. But in your case, I think you pay no attention to all this, clever man though you are: you are utterly unaware that equality – the geometrical type – among men and among gods, has great power, while you think that you must devote yourself to having more than the next man: you do not appreciate the geometry of things.

“But enough: either we must refute the argument that by acquiring justice and temperance the happy are happy and by evil the unhappy, or if this argument is true we must follow out what it implies. Callicles, every damn one of those things follow about which you at first asked me whether I was being serious, when I said one must summon into court both himself and his son and his associate in case they committed an injustice, and that this was what oratory was to be used for; and also that what you thought Polus was ashamed to grant was true after all, that committing injustice really is more evil than suffering it, to the same extent that it is more shameful; and also that the man who would practice oratory properly must, after all, be just and knowledgeable in matters of justice, which Polus in turn said Gorgias had been unwilling to admit, out of shame.

“Given all this, let’s look into what you reproach in me and whether the argument for it is correct, namely that I am really unable to be of any help either to myself or to any of my friends and

family, and powerless to rescue them from the greatest of dangers, but that I am like a disenfranchised sitting duck for anybody who wants, yes, to slap me “in the face” as you so petulantly put it – or strip me of my possessions, or exile me from my city, or after all that to kill me; and that to be so situated is of all things the most shameful, as your argument has it. What is my argument, you ask? One that has been said many times already though nothing prevents its being said again: I deny, Callicles, that being slapped in the face unjustly is the most shameful thing, nor for that matter being cut up, whether it be my own body or my purse, but rather that the act of striking me or mine unjustly as well as cutting is both more shameful and more evil; and add that stealing too, and kidnapping, and breaking in, and in short doing any unjust act against me and mine is a thing more evil and more shameful for him who commits the injustice than it is for me who suffer it. And since these things, having become apparent to us as being so in the previous discussion above, are held together and have tied me up with reasonings iron and adamant – (509) if I, too, may be permitted a vivid metaphor – so at least it would seem at present –, and if you will not untie them, either you or someone still more petulant, then one cannot well argue other than as I have argued them now. For in my world the argument is always the same: I do not know how these things stand, and yet of all the men I have encountered, including present company, nobody is able to argue them otherwise without making a ridiculous fool of himself.

“So for my part I will in the meanwhile posit anew that this is how it is, so that if it is so, and the greatest of evils is injustice for the man who commits it, and it is even a greater one than this, though already the greatest, if such is possible, for a man who commits injustice not to pay the penalty, then what sort of help would a man be laughable for being unable to provide himself? Wouldn’t it be whatever would avert from us the harm we could undergo that is greatest? It is inescapable that this is the most shameful aid one would be unable to provide, whether to oneself or to his friends and family, while the second most shameful applies to the second most evil, and the third to the third – and so in general: the magnitude of the given evil determines how admirable is one’s ability to provide help when it happens, and likewise how shameful it is that he not be able. Is it otherwise or is it so, Callicles?”

Call. “Not otherwise.”

Soc. “So between the pair of evils – committing injustice and undergoing it – we are saying that committing injustice is the greater evil and undergoing it the lesser. And so what should a man best prepare for himself as an aid to possess both these benefits, an aid that averts committing injustice and an aid that averts undergoing it? Is it power or will? Here is what I mean: Is it the case that if he does not *will* to undergo injustice, he will not undergo it, or that if he equips himself with *power* to avert undergoing it that he will not?”

Call. “This much is clear: with power.”

Soc. “And what about averting to commit injustice? If he wills not to do it, is that sufficient – for he simply won’t? Or against this must he be equipped with some power or art, such that unless he does learn certain things and makes a practice of them, he will commit injustice?”

“... Won’t you just answer me this at least, Callicles, whether we seem to you properly to have been forced to agree, during the arguments that came before, Polus and I – or were we not – when we agreed that nobody chooses to commit injustice, but rather that all who commit injustice do so unintentionally?” (510)

Call. “So be it just for you, Socrates, so that you might get to the end of your speech.”

Soc. “And so against this, too, we must be equipped with some power or art, in order that we not commit injustice.”

Call. “Quite so.”

Soc. “What then could the art be for equipping oneself against suffering injustice or suffering it as little as possible? See if the way seems the same to you as to me. This is what it seems to me: one must himself be the ruler of the city, or even its tyrant, or else must be allied with the current regime.”

Call. “Just watch, Socrates, how ready I am to confer my praise once you say something admirable! This seems to me to be stated quite admirably.”

Soc. “Alright then, see whether this also you judge I say well. In every individual case, to me it seems a man is friendly with a man who, as the ancients and the wise put it, is like to like. You too?”

Call. “Me too.”

Soc. “Would you say that wherever a tyrant is ruling who is rough and uncultured, if someone in the city is much nobler than he, the tyrant would presumably fear him, while he would not be able to become friend to him without misgivings?”

Call. “That’s right.”

Soc. “Nor for that matter could an utterly insignificant man: the tyrant would despise him and would never take him seriously as one does a friend.”

Call. “That, too, is true.”

Soc. “So by elimination, the only logical alternative as a friend to such a person is one who has a like character, and praises and blames the same things, and thus would be willing to be ruled by and subservient to the ruler. Here is the one who will have great power in this city, here the one nobody will happily mistreat. Isn’t that so?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “So if one of the youths in a city in that condition should consider in his mind, ‘How might I have great power and no one really would mistreat me?’ *this* it seems would be the path available to him: to train himself from his youth to welcome and be put off by the same things as the despot, and to equip himself as much as possible to be like him. Isn’t that so?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And so by this means an immunity from being treated unjustly, at least, and acquiring great power in his city, will have been achieved, as we are now arguing?”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “And also from committing injustice? Or won’t he be far from that if he is to be like his ruler, who is unjust, and will wield great power right alongside him? Instead I imagine the opposite: that in being this way, he will be equipping himself to be able to do the greatest amount of injustice and while doing so not to pay the penalty. Am I right?”

Call. “So it seems.” (511)

Soc. “So the greatest of evils he will have in store, being corrupted in his soul and denatured by his attempt to imitate his master, as well as by his own power.”

Call. “How is it that you’re always twisting arguments into the opposite, Socrates. Don’t you see that this imitator will be killing anyone who doesn’t imitate his great original, if he wants, and will strip him of all he has?”

Soc. “I do see, my good Callicles, unless I am deaf. I hear it both from you, from Polus several times a while ago, and in fact from nearly everybody in our city. But hear me also: ‘Yes he will kill, if only he wishes to, a base man killing a man good and decent.’”



Call. “That’s what really gets one’s goat!”

Soc. “Not one who is thinking, given the dictates of the argument. Or do you imagine that one must equip himself for this, that he live as long as possible and practice those arts that will rescue us from whatever dangers might arise, just as the one you are suggesting I practice, this oratorical profession that comes to our rescue in cases at court?”

Call. “Yes, by Zeus – and valuable counsel it is.”

Soc. “But what, my most noble man? Does the knowledge of swimming also seem to you a high and exalted thing?”

Call. “No, by Zeus, not to me.”

Soc. “And yet this too saves men from death when they find themselves somehow in waters that call for this knowledge. Still, if this seems a minor knowledge to you, I will mention a greater one: navigation, which saves not only life but limb and one’s possessions from the ultimate and terminal dangers, no less than oratory does. And yet this knowledge, itself modest and orderly, puts on no airs as though achieving something marvelous, but while it achieved things equal to those of a litigator, if it saves a man coming hither from Aegina the cost will be two obols; or if all the way from Egypt or the Pontus, for this helpful work – saving as it does all that I just mentioned, his client, children, goods, women, and disembarking them at the dock – it’ll cost two drachmas at most; and the man – the individual who possesses this art and made this money – gets off and stretches his legs down at the harbor by his boat like anybody else. For he is able, I think, to weigh in his mind that it is unclear which ones of those who sailed with him he helped by keeping them from drowning at sea, and which he harmed! For he knows (512) that they stepped off his boat no better than they were when they came on, whether in body or in soul. He estimates that it is not the case that if the one man, afflicted with great and incurable diseases in his body, was not asphyxiated, that this man was badly off for not dying and was not at all benefitted by him, whereas if for another it was the more honorable part of him, his soul, that is afflicted with many incurable diseases, him he needed to keep alive and that he benefitted him by saving him whether from the sea or from the law-courts or from anywhere else. To the contrary he knows that for an evil man it is not better to be alive: the life he lives will perforce be vicious.

“This is why it is customary that the captain not put on airs even though he keeps us safe, nor for that matter the engineer who at times is able to save no fewer than a general can, nor fewer than a captain nor anybody else: in fact there are times when he even saves a whole city! Don’t tell me you put him on the same level as your lawyer! And yet if he should want to say the same things you all do, Callicles, in exalting your *métier*, he would bury you with his arguments, with proofs and recommendations that you simply must become engineers, that all the rest is nothing – and there’s a lot on his side. And yet you despise him and his art nonetheless, and would disparage him as a ‘mechanic,’ and would never give his son your daughter’s hand in marriage and neither yourself take his. And yet, out of all you have said in praise of your own occupation, what can you point to that justifies you to look down upon the engineer and the other professionals I have just now mentioned? Yes, you’ll claim yours is ‘nobler and of nobler lineage.’ But as to this ‘nobler,’ if it is not what I say, but if instead the only virtue is saving one’s self and one’s own no matter what his character happens to be, then to condemn the engineer no less than the doctor and the other arts that have been created for the sake of saving lives, becomes ridiculous for you.

“But my splendid fellow what is noble and good must be something other than saving and being saved – it might be just this: to live, yes, but as to how long, a real man must let that go and not be so fond of life but leaving that up to the god and trusting in the women that no man can elude his fate, he must on top of that ask what might be the way to live the time left to him the best way he can. Will it be by conforming (513) himself to the city in which he happens to make his home, no matter which? – which in the present case would mean that you must liken yourself as

much as possible to this deme of Athenians if you are to be liked and thereby wield great power in the city. But beware whether this would pay off for you and for me without suffering, my redoubtable one, what they say the Thessalian maidens suffered when they brought down an eclipse: that we will bring down ‘our dearest possessions’ to pay for seizing this power you are thinking of within the city.

“But if you imagine that anybody on earth will confer upon you the sort of art you have in mind that will make you powerful in *this* city while remaining unlike it in your civic outlook – whether better than it or worse – in my judgment you are making a mistake, Callicles: You must not merely *mimic* them but *be* the same as them in your very bones if you are to achieve redoubtable popularity among the deme of the Athenians – and also, by Zeus, with the son of Pylilampes as well! The one who will actually make you most alike to them will be the one who will make you the politician you desire to be, a politician-orator. For everybody enjoys a character that is their own making the arguments that are presented to them, and are bothered by what they find alien – unless of course you disagree and argue otherwise, my dear fellow. Do we have anything to say in response to this, Callicles?”

Call. “Somehow you seem to be making a good argument, Socrates – and yet I feel the way they all do: I’m not particularly persuaded.”

Soc. “As for that it’s your demos-love, Callicles, deep in that soul of yours that aligns you against me. But if we ever really investigate this matter, persuaded you will be.

“Be that as it may, please recall that we said there are two activities one may practice in treating something, whether body or soul, the one conversant with pleasure and the other with finding the noblest: not bare gratification but rather the taking up of cudgels. Wasn’t that the distinction we drew before?”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “And the first of them, the one aiming for pleasure, is ignoble and turns out to be nothing but flattery. Right?”

Call. “Let it be so, if you want.”

Soc. “But the other aims that the thing be as noble as possible, no matter whether it is body or soul we are caring for.”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “Now in treating the city and its citizens mustn’t we likewise busy ourselves with making the citizens as noble as possible, in themselves? For without this, as we discovered in our previous discussion, not a single improvement of them is of any use (514) unless the mindset of those who are going to be getting a lot of money, or rule over some group, or acquire any other power whatsoever, is good and decent. Shall we posit this?”

Call. “Quite – if you find it more pleasing.”

Soc. “If then we were giving suggestions to each other, Callicles, thinking to carry out the public management of city contracts having to do with construction – the bigger edifices like walls or harbors or temples – would we need to be checking our own credentials and examining first of all whether we are competent at the art or not – the art of building, that is – and asking from whom we might have learned it? Would we be needing to do that or not?”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “And secondly, if we had ever built a house for private use whether for one of our friends or our own home, and whether this building was beautiful or ugly. And if, on the one hand, our investigation revealed men who taught us that were worthy, who had accrued good reputations, and

that many beautiful buildings had been built by us in concert with these teachers, and many buildings done by ourselves as well, after we had left studying with them, if on the one hand we were so situated it would intelligent for us to move up to the management of public works. But if on the other hand we had nary a teacher of ourselves to point to, nor any building or many unworthy ones, in such a case it would surely be mindless to take up the construction of public works and encourage each other to do so. Shall we affirm this is a correct formulation?"

Call. "Quite."

Soc. "And wouldn't we carry out such an examination not only in other areas but in particular when getting involved in public business we were encouraging each other, thinking ourselves suitable and adequate as physicians: we would presumably check each other's credentials, I yours and you mine, saying: 'Reply under oath: This Socrates, is he himself healthy in respect to his own body?' or, 'Is there any record of someone getting over a disease through Socrates's help, whether a slave or a free man?' And I imagine I would be asking similar such things about you. And if we failed to discover anybody who had gotten physically better because of us, neither a foreigner nor a local, neither man nor woman, then in the name of Zeus, Callicles, would it not be laughable for us to cut the figure of such foolish men that before some career in private practice where we had often done some things indifferently by our own lights but also had done others correctly, adequately disciplined by the art involved, we should before that "learn ceramics by by making a pithos," as the saying goes, and should take up practicing in public and should encourage each other to do so? Doesn't it seem unintelligent to you to act this way?"

Call. "Yes." (515)

Soc. "But now consider our present situation, my best of men. Since you yourself are just now beginning to engage in the business of the city, and you are encouraging me to do so and berate me for not doing so, shall we not likewise investigate each other: 'Come: as to Callicles, is there some record of him having made someone a better man? Is there anybody who earlier was vicious – unjust and intemperate and mindless – that become fine and good through the agency of Callicles, whether a foreigner or a local, slave or free?"

"... Tell me: if somebody examines you in this way, Callicles, what you would say? What man will you affirm you improved through his association with you?"

"... Do you shrink from answering whether there really is some work you performed while still a private individual, before you took up politics?"

Call. "You win, Socrates."

Soc. "It's not to compete with you that I ask, but truly wanting to know how in the world you think one is to practice politics among us. Or will we find you have some other concern for us as you enter politics than to make us citizens the best men we can be? Have we not said this several times already, that this is what a political man is supposed to do?"

"... Have we agreed to this, or not?"

"... Answer!"

"... 'We have indeed agreed to this': I will answer for you. And so if it is this that the 'good man' is meant to provide for his own city, remind me and talk about those famous men you mentioned a little earlier, and whether they still seem to you to have been *good citizens*, Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles."

Call. "They do seem so to me."

Soc. "And if in fact they were good, clearly each of them was working at making the citizens better instead of worse – were they doing so or not?"

Call. "They were."



Soc. “So when Pericles began orating in the deme, the Athenians were worse than when he was addressing them at the end?”

Call. “Maybe.”

Soc. “Not maybe, my noblest, but necessarily, as our agreements imply – if at least that famous man of yours was good as a *citizen*.”

Call. “What are you getting at?”

Soc. “Nothing. Just tell me this about him: are the Athenians said to have become better because of Pericles, or to the contrary that they were corrupted by him? That’s what *I* hear, at least: that Pericles made the Athenians lazy and fearful, talkative and materialistic, being the first politician to institute the policy of mercenaries.”

Call. “You hear that from your guys that cauliflower their ears.”

Soc. “On the other hand I not only hear but know, and so do you, that at first Pericles enjoyed a good reputation and the Athenians never voted a shameful indictment against him during the time they were worse; but once they had become fine and good (516) by his doing, at the end of Pericles’s life, they indicted him for embezzlement and came close to executing him, clearly thinking him a corrupt man.”

Call. “Ha! And that’s what was *wrong* about Pericles?”

Soc. “Well, clearly a caretaker of asses or horses or cows that acted that way would be judged a bad herdsman, if upon taking on a herd that did not kick against him nor butted nor bit him, he turned them out so clearly fierce as to do all those things. Or do you not think it’s a bad caretaker that takes on relatively tame wards and turns them out more fierce than he had taken them on, no matter what kind of caretaker nor what the animal?

“... Yes or no?”

Call. “‘Quite so’ – Let me please you.”

Soc. “And please me the more by answering this: Would you say that men also are animals?”

Call. “How not?”

Soc. “And was it not men that Pericles was taking care of?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “So, wasn’t it necessary that they, as we just agreed, had become more just in place of having been less just, under his care, if he was “good” at political matters?”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “And aren’t men who are just, tame as such also, as Homer has it?  
“What do *you* say? Isn’t that so?”

Call. “Yes.”

Soc. “And yet they showed themselves to be fiercer than they had been when he took them on, and fierce toward himself to boot, which was hardly his plan.”

Call. “Do you want me to agree with you?”

Soc. “If at least you think what I’m saying is true.”

Call. “Let it be so.”

Soc. “And if fiercer, more unjust and worse?”

Call. “Let it be so.”

Soc. “Therefore Pericles wasn’t good at politics, based on this argument.”

Call. “Not, according to *you*.”

Soc. “Nor you, by Zeus, given what you have agreed to. But let’s turn to the case of Cimon. Didn’t they ostracize him, the very persons he was taking care of, so that they wouldn’t have to listen to his voice during ten years? And they did the same to Themistocles adding exile to his punishment. And against Miltiades, who served at Marathon, they brought an action to throw him into a pit, and if it hadn’t been for the Prytany he would have gone down. And yet these men of yours, if they were “good men” in the way you mean it, would never be suffering such treatment. Surely it is not the case with good charioteers that they are not thrown from the traces at the beginning, but once they take care of their horses and themselves become better charioteers, only then they are thrown. That’s not how it works with chariots or anywhere else. Don’t you agree?”

Call. “I agree.”

Soc. “Therefore it looks like our previous arguments were true: (517) we have seen not a one that turned out to be a man good at politics in our city here. You agreed that none of the present are, but thought earlier ones were, and you brought up these men, but now they have proved to be on the same level as the present ones, so that if it is “orators” we are to call your men, it was neither true oratory they were practicing – for they wouldn’t have fallen out of favor – nor the flattering kind!”

Call. “In any case, it’s a far cry, Socrates, that anybody *these* days should pull off a deed like the deeds *they* did, any one of them you might wish to name.”

Soc. “My dazzling man, I fault them not for their being *servitors* of the city: Indeed, they seem to me to have turned out more servitival than those of our day, more able to provide the city what it was desiring. And yet, as for redirecting its desires rather than giving in to them, by persuading and by pushing toward what would make their citizens better, they were not a whit better than these – the one task that defines a good citizen. As to ships and walls and harbors and a lot of other such things, I too agree with you that those men were more clever than these at providing them.

“So I have to say we are making a laughable affair of our arguments. During our whole dialogue we keep going in circles back to the same place, continually unaware of each other and what we are trying to argue. For my part, at least, I think you have agreed and recognized several times that this activity is in a way two-fold, both about the body and about the soul, and that the one part is a serving activity, by which a man becomes able to provide food for our bodies if they are hungry, and drink if thirsty, and cloaks if they are cold, as well as blankets, shoes, and other things for which desire arises in our bodies. And it is right for me to go through the same examples so that you might more easily understand what I am saying: to be a provider of these things, whether by being a merchant, an importer, or indeed a maker of any of the things in question, as a cook or a delicatessen or a weaver or a shoemaker or a tanner, it is not at all strange that, being such, one should seem both to himself and to others to be a caretaker of the body – to anybody, that is, who does not know that besides all those professions there is an art consisting in gymnastics and medicine, which is the *true* therapy of the body and which as such properly rules over all those arts and determines the use of their products, because it knows among foods and drinks which is helpful and which harmful as to the virtuous conditions (518) of the body, while all those other arts don’t; and hence that these latter are slavish and ancillary and dependent concerning the business of the body – the other arts – whereas gymnastics and medicine have just title to be their masters.

“That the same then holds for soul you seem sometimes to understand from my arguments and give me your agreement as if you knew what I was saying, but then a bit later you come and say that we have had certain fine and good political types in our city, and when I ask which men you mean, you appear to me to bring up the very sorts of men in politics as you would answer if I were asking you who are known to be good in gymnastics and are therapists of the body, and you would say to me, in all seriousness, ‘Thearion the baker, and Mithaikos the author of the Sicilian

cuisine, and Sarambos the merchant – these are the most wonderful therapists for our bodies, the one for providing us with wonderful loaves, the other with delicacies, and wine the third.’ You might well get upset if I said, ‘Buddy, you are completely clueless about gymnastics: you are talking about servitors, guys who provide for the desires but don’t know the first thing of any worth about them, who willy-nilly engorge and fatten the bodies of men and receive their praise in return, but who will only further destroy what health they started with. And they for their part, out of inexperience, will not blame those feasting them as being responsible for their diseases and the loss of the health they had originally had. Instead it is whatever persons happen to be there in charge of policy – the moment all that satiety comes over them to make them sick, even though soon after, brought on with no consideration for the healthy – it is these they will blame, these they will berate, and will do them some harm if only they are able, but will sing praises to the ones that started it all and who are responsible for their ills.

“Just so, Callicles, you are doing the very same thing. You sing praises for men who regaled our people and served them up whatever they desired, and they say they have made the city great: but that it is now outwardly bloated and festering within (519) because of those who were in power before, this they do not perceive. It was they after all who, with no regard for moderation or justice, engorged the city with breakwaters, harbors, walls, tariffs and taxes, all such stupidities; so when the onset of weakness occurs this time, it is whoever happens to be present at that moment that they will blame as their counsellors, but Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles they will praise, the ones who are actually responsible for their ills. And they might just lay their hands on *you*, if you aren’t careful, and my ally Alcibiades as well – the day they lose their principal capital in addition to what they have made with it, even though you and he are not the cause of their troubles, though you might just be guilty in part.

“Just so what I see among the present ones is as mindless as what I hear about the greats that came before. I notice that once the city starts treating one of their political men as a wrongdoer they become vexed and complain how horribly they are being treated: ‘Despite having done all the great things they have done, my gosh! how unjustly they are being brought down by her!’ – so they say. But the whole story is a lie: No *leader* in a city would ever be unjustly brought down by the very city he is leading! And perhaps it is the same with the sophists as with these pretend-politicians. For in fact the sophists, though wise in every matter, do the same strange thing: although they claim to be teachers of virtue, they are known to bring accusations against their students for doing them wrong, in shorting them their fees let alone giving them any thanks at all, although they had treated them so well. And yet what reasoning could be more unreasonable than this, namely, that men who are becoming good and just by first being stripped clean of injustice by their teacher and then acquiring justice in its place, should commit injustice with the very instrument they no longer possess?

“... Doesn’t that seem strange to you, my friend?

“... And look: I grant I am making a big speech, compelled to do so by you, Callicles, since you are unwilling to answer!”

Call. “As if you would be unable to speak if there was no one to answer you!”

Soc. “It seems I could! At the moment at least I am drawing out long swathes of argument since you are unwilling to answer. But, my good man, tell me in the name of friendship: don’t you think it nonsense that after claiming to have made an individual virtuous, he should be criticizing him, claiming that although he became and now is virtuous under his tutelage, in the next breath he’s the opposite of virtuous?”

Call. “I do.”

Soc. “And do you hear such things said by those who claim to be educating men to become virtuous?” (520)

Call. "I do, and yet what else is there to say about such worthless types?"

Soc. "And what would you have to say about the ones were were just talking about, the ones who after claiming to have taken charge of the city and to be concerning themselves with making it as virtuous as it can be, turn on her and accuse her at some point of the uttermost vice? Do you think these are any different from those? My blessed fellow, an orator is the same as a sophist, or nearly so and equivalent, as I argued with Polus. Out of ignorance you think the one thing is sensational – oratory – but the other you despise. In truth, sophistic is more admirable than oratory to the extent that legislation is more admirable than remedial justice and gymnastics than medicine. These together but only these, I also was thinking – the public speakers and sophists – are barred from faulting the very thing they themselves teach as wreaking evil against themselves, else at the same time and by this same argument they are accusing themselves of not having helped at all those they claim to be helping. Isn't that so?"

Call. "Quite."

Soc. "And to give away this help of theirs free of charge was in all likelihood possible only for them, if in fact my claim is true. For if it is some other help one has actually been helped by, such as to have become quicker through the services of a trainer, he would perhaps withhold his thanks if the trainer should render his services for free, and not having agreed with him on a fee should try to collect his pay right at the moment he conferred speed onto him. For I don't think it is by slowness that men commit injustice but by injustice."

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "Now if one strips away *this* thing – injustice – he needs not at all worry he will ever be treated unjustly: rather, he alone becomes safe in giving his services for free, if in truth one should be able to make men virtuous. No?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "This then is the reason, it seems, that taking money to give consultation in other areas, as for instance about house-building or the other arts, is nothing to be ashamed of."

Call. "So it seems."

Soc. "Whereas in counseling on *this* activity – how one might be as noble as possible and might best manage his household or his city – we take for granted that it is shameful to refuse to give counsel on condition of being paid. True?"

Call. "Yes."

Soc. "For clearly it is because this benefit, alone among benefits, made its beneficiary desire to do good in return, so that there is good reason to believe that in rendering benefit in this way one will be treated well in return – but if he does not, he will not. Is this the way it is?" (521)

Call. "It is."

Soc. "So distinguish for me which of the two kinds of ministering it is that are you encouraging me to take up in ministering to the city. Is it the ministry of taking up cudgels for the Athenians that they be as noble as possible, analogous to that of the doctor, or that of a servitor with the purpose of catering to their gratification? Tell me the truth, Callicles, for it is only right that just as you embarked upon speaking frankly to me you should tell the rest of what you have in mind. So speak again with all your noble brashness!"

Call. "I will say catering."

Soc. "Pandering, then, you are encouraging me to do, most brash of men."

Call. “Call it what you will, Socrates. You’d better *do* it, or else –”

Soc. “Don’t say what you have said so many times: ‘or else anybody who wants will kill me,’ for then I’ll have again to say ‘he being evil, me a good man.’ Nor say he will strip me of whatever I own, or else I’ll say ‘But what he strips from me will be of no use to him,’ and that ‘just as he stripped me unjustly so will he use what he took unjustly – and if unjustly, shamefully – and if shamefully, badly.’”

Call. “How you seem to trust, Socrates, you could not undergo any one of these things, as if you lived out of reach and so could not just be dragged into court by some man quite evil and insignificant.”

Soc. “A nitwit I am in very truth, as you say, Callicles, if I do not think that anybody could have who-knows-what done to him in this city! But of this I am certain, that if I do indeed find myself hauled into court and facing one of these dangers, then as you yourself say it will be a base man that brought me in – no worthy man would bring in, as a person guilty of nothing – and it would be nothing strange if I should be killed. Would you like to know why I expect this?”

Call. “Very much.”

Soc. “I imagine that few Athenians, maybe myself alone, are putting their hand to what truly deserves the name of political *art* and that I alone among current men am practicing “politics” in that sense. So, since it is not for entertainment that I say what I say in my daily conversations but for the noblest and not the most pleasing, and since I am unwilling to practice what you recommend – ‘these subtleties of yours’ – I will indeed be at a loss for words in the law-courts. I’ll put it the way I put it to Polus: I will be judged the way a physician accused by a maker of delicacies would be judged in a court of children. Just think how such a man would defend himself, brought before such a jury, against an accuser who would say, ‘Children of the jury, many are the evils this man I bring before you has wreaked on you – upon your very persons! Even the youngest among you he has debilitated with his cutting and burning, and (522) by starving and suffocating you he stops you in your tracks, giving you the bitterest of drinks or forcing you to fast or thirst, so different from me who have been regaling you with such a wide variety of sweets!’ What do you fancy the physician, caught up in this evil situation, would have to say in his defense? Or, if he spoke the truth and said, ‘I confess I have done all those things, children, but *for your health*,’ how big an outcry do you imagine would then break out among such jurors as these? Wouldn’t it be deafening?”

Call. “Perhaps? You can bet on it!”

Soc. “And so do you imagine he would be entirely unable to make his case?”

Call. “Quite.”

Soc. “So there you have the sort of treatment I, too, know I would suffer, if I went into court. For neither will I have pleasures to tell of having provided – which they would count as good deeds and benefits, whereas I neither envy those who provide nor know the means by which a pleasure is provided – and if someone claims that I corrupt young men by making them stop in their tracks, or that I slander their elders by saying things they find bitter, before others or in private, I will not be given a hearing to say, ‘*For justice* I say and do all this, indeed in your interest, men of the jury!’ nor to say anything else. So yes: ‘perhaps’ just about anything will happen to me.”

Call. “And so would you judge a man honorable, if he had such standing in his city as you describe, unable to help himself?”

Soc. “Only if he has within himself that one asset, as you have often agreed: if he himself was his defense, for never having said or done anything against men or against gods. This is the most important kind of help for himself, as we have often agreed. So, if someone should with argument show me out as unable to help myself or help another with *this* kind of help, I would be ashamed



for being shown out, whether in the presence of many or of few, or even alone with him; and if I were put to death because of this sort of inability I would be very upset. But if it is because of a shortage of pandering oratory that I should meet my end, I am sure you would see me accepting my death lightly. The mere fact of death nobody fears, unless he be utterly destitute of intelligence and bravery, but committing injustice he surely does fear: That a soul should arrive in Hades freighted with unjust acts is the worst of all evils. And if you'll consent, I would tell you a story."

Call. "Now that you've gone all the way with the other, go the rest of the way with this." (523)

Soc. "'Hearken then,' as they say, 'to a very fine story,' which I'd guess you will take to be a myth, whereas I think it factual. What I am about to say I will say believing it true.

"As Homer tells us, Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto arranged to divide the rule among themselves after they took it over from their father. Now the law concerning men, under the regime of Cronus as it ever was and still is among the gods – is this: Whoever among men went through his life justly and piously, once he died he was to go off to the Islands of the Blessed and live there in complete happiness exempt from evils, but if unjustly and atheistically, he was to go to the prison of judgment and vengeance which they call Tartarus. The judges over these, in the time of Cronus and up until Zeus newly took control, were living judges judging the living, and they rendered their verdicts on the very day a man was to die.

"They were rendering their verdicts poorly. Pluto, along with the caretakers of the Islands of the Blessed, came and told Zeus that men were arriving into both their demesnes who did not deserve it, some into this and others into that. Zeus said, 'I know it well, and I will be putting an end to it: at present, the judges are rendering their judgments ill. The men are clothed as they are being judged,' he said, 'since they are being judged while still alive. Many of them, though they have wicked souls, are clothed in beautiful bodies with marks of their family and wealth, and during the judgment many witnesses come forward witnessing on their behalf that they had lived just lives. The judges are distracted by these,' he said, 'and at the same time are themselves clothed as they render their judgments, their souls ensconced behind their eyes and ears and their bodies as a whole. All these layers get in the way, both their own clothing and that of those being judged. First,' he said, 'they must stop knowing in advance when they are to die – as now they do. As to this, at least, the announcement has been made by Prometheus of his goal to stop it among them. But second, they must be stripped naked of each and all these things. They must be judged after they have died. And the judge must be naked, himself dead, observing with his bare soul a soul that is bare, without exception, right after the individual died, apart from all his family members and having left behind on earth all that ornamented him, so that the judgment might be just. I recognized the need for this before you did, and set up my sons as judges, two of them from Asia – Minos and Rhadamanthus – (524) and one from Europe: Aeacus. These, once they die, shall sit in judgment in the great meadow where the path splits in two, the one path leading to the Islands of the Blessed and the other to Tartarus. And those who come from Asia Rhadamanthus will judge; those from Europe, Aeacus; and in case either of them object to the other's decision I grant to Minos the prerogative to settle the matter, so that the judgment be as just as possible as to which path men are to take.'

"That, Callicles, is what I have heard and I rely on it as true. And from this story I infer the following. What dying is, in fact, is just the unbinding of the pair of things, the soul and the body. And once they are unbound from each other, look at them: each retains the condition it had been in when the man was alive no less than the other, both the body retaining its nature and all the ways it was cared for and what it underwent altogether visible – for example if a man's body was large when he was alive, whether by nature or by nurture or both, large also is his corpse once he is dead; and if fat, then fat in death – and so on. And again if he kept his hair long in life, you'd see it there in his corpse, too. Or if he was a man that needed to be whipped and has traces of the blows he received during his life, welts on his body, whether from whips or other wounds he suffered, the dead man's body could likewise be seen to bear the same. Or if his limbs had been broken or

contorted during his life, these same things are visible in his corpse when he is dead. To put it simply, whatever the bodily state he was in when he was alive, all its effects are visible once he is dead, or most of them, for some time at least. And, Callicles, it seems to me the same in fact with regard to the soul, if again you think about it. All these things in the soul are there to be seen once it is denuded of the body, both its natural endowments and the effects the man had acquired in his soul from pursuing the things he pursued in life.

“Now once they come before the judges, the ones from Asia, that is, before Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus has them stand before him and studies each man’s soul, knowing not whose soul it is: for all he knows is looking upon the soul of the Great King himself, or any other king or powerful man you may wish to name, and beholds within it nothing to recommend it, but instead that it has been whipped all through and is full of welts (525) from oath-breaking and injustice, marks which his distinct behavior left as smudges on his soul, and he sees everything made crooked by lying and bragging with nothing straight, because his way of life owed nothing to truth. A soul filled with the licentiousness and gluttony and violence and cravenness of his deeds, and disproportion and ugliness, is what he beholds, and beholding this indignantly consigns it directly to the prison where upon arrival it will undergo a suffering suited to it.

“What is suitable for everyone being punished, if being rightly punished by another, is either that he become better and benefit from it or that he serve as a paradigm for others, so that such others in watching him suffer what he suffers will, out of fear themselves, become better. The ones who are benefitted in paying the due penalty exacted by gods and men are those whose sins can be remedied; and yet it is only through pain and wailing that the benefit accrues to them, as here on earth so also in Hades: indeed there is no other way one can be exonerated of one’s injustice. But the ones who commit the ultimate injustices and by dint of such injustices are rendered irremediable: these are the ones who supply the paradigms, whereas in themselves they receive no benefit from it at all inasmuch as they are irremediable, whereas others receive benefit, those who behold them undergoing without surcease the greatest, the most painful, the most fearsome of sufferings on account of their sins, baldly hung up there on display, in the prison in Hades, to serve as paradigms for the unjust as they arrive there, admonitory spectacles of injustice – among whom I declare will number Polus’s Archelaus if what Polus said about him is true, and any other tyrant of his ilk. And I imagine that the majority of these paradigmatic men came from the tyrants and kings and from the powerful men who had on earth been employed in political affairs. For these are the ones who, given their opportunities, commit the greatest and most impious sins.

“We have testimony of this from Homer. He depicted kings and dynasts as the ones in Hades who were suffering eternal punishment, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But nobody ever depicted Thersites, or any other private man who was evil, as being beset with huge punishments for being incurable – for I don’t think he had the opportunity, and in fact he is luckier than those who did. But in any case, Callicles, it is from the ranks of the powerful, indeed, that extremely evil men also come to be. (526) And yet nothing prevents that even among these there are found men who are good, and it is quite right to wonder at and admire those who are. For it is difficult, Callicles, and highly praiseworthy, that a man who comes to enjoy great opportunity to commit unjust acts lives his life justly instead. Such men are scarce. Yes, both here and elsewhere they have appeared, and I imagine that in future there will be men well endowed in the virtue of carrying out with justice whatever is turned over to them. In fact there did appear one man widely rumored as such among the Greeks at large: Aristides the son of Lysimachus. But, my best of men, the majority of the powerful turn out bad.

“So as I was saying, when the awesome Rhadamanthus takes in hand one of that sort, though he saw nothing else about him – neither who he is nor his family – but that he is a wicked man. And once he saw this he sent him off to Tartarus, placing a mark on him as to whether he judges he can be reformed or is irremediable, and when he arrives there he undergoes the appropriate penalty. But from time to time he sees in that of another one who had lived a pious life

and true, whether of a man outside politics or someone else (especially, I would add, Callicles, that of a philosopher) who minded his own business during his life and did not play the busy-body, he sent him off in admiration to the Islands of the Blessed. So also with Aeacus: both of them judge with a staff in their hand, and Minos supervises them from his seat, he alone with a golden scepter, as Homer's Odysseus says he saw him:

*holding his golden scepter he decrees justice to the shades.*

“For my part, Callicles, I am persuaded by these stories and so I watch for the ways by which I will show myself before the judge as a soul as hale as possible. Passing by the honors sought and conferred among the majority of mankind and practicing only honesty, I will try in truth to live ever as nobly as I am able and, when the my time comes, as nobly as ever to die. And to the extent I am able, I enlist all men – but you in particular I enlist, over against your advice to me – to join in this life, this contest, which I would rank alongside all the other contests of this world put together; and I say against you in my turn that you will be at a loss to help yourself when the time comes for you to face the trial and the judgment I now have described. You'll come before the judge – (527) that awesome scion of Aegina – and once *he* gets hold of you and brings you in, it will be you who go agape and become dizzy in that place no less than I in this place, and you might just receive that slap of the disenfranchised on your face, and every other degradation.

“But maybe all this seems to you an old wives' tale and you scoff at it. There would be nothing strange in scoffing at these things if through research we were able to find something better and truer to say. But as it is we have you three, the very wisest Greeks of our day, you and Polus and Gorgias, and you are unable to demonstrate that we should live a different life than this, which now appears also to hold the advantage in the world beyond. Instead, among so many arguments, the others all being refuted, the only argument that still stands firm is this, that we must take more care not to commit injustice than to avoid undergoing it, and that what a real man must concern himself with above all is not merely to seem good but to be so, both in his private and his public life. And if one has become bad in some way he must be chastised, and this is the second best good, second after *being* a just man, namely to *come to be* so through chastisement in paying the penalty. And that pandering of any kind, both concerning oneself and the others, concerning both the few and the many, must be avoided. And that oratory is only to be used only in pursuit of justice, and so also with the whole of human activity.

“Hearken to me, then, and follow me to the place where you will find happiness both in life and afterwards, as reason has made clear. And let somebody despise you as mindless and degrade you, if he prefers, and by God buck up to let him strike you with that dishonoring slap of yours. You'll suffer nothing dire if you are a decent man in truth and you are practicing virtue. And later, after we practice this together, only if it *then* seems we ought, will we make our entry into politics, or do whatever it seems we ought to do: only then shall we make our plan, since then we will be better at giving and taking counsel than we are at present. For it is shameful that people in the state in which we now find ourselves should nevertheless try to make a novel appearance on the scene, as if they were somebodies, when in fact they never think the same thing about the same things, and about the most important questions to boot! Such is the measure of our lack of preparation and understanding!

“So let us adopt as our leader the argument that has now become clear to us, which dictates to us that this is the best way of living, to practice both justice and the rest of virtue, both in the way we live and the way we die. Let us follow this way, and let us call on the others here to join us – not to take the path you called me to with such confidence. That path is of no worth, Callicles.”



## ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ

[447] ΚΑΛ. πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασί<sup>117</sup> χρῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς<sup>118</sup> ἤκομεν καὶ<sup>119</sup> ὑστεροῦμεν;

ΚΑΛ. καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.<sup>120</sup>

ΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὄδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς<sup>121</sup> διατρῖψαι.<sup>122</sup> [b]

ΧΑΙ. οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα,<sup>123</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ<sup>124</sup> ἴασομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη,<sup>125</sup> εἰς αὐθις.

ΚΑΛ. τί δαί,<sup>126</sup> ὃ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου;

117 φασί (447A1): Such a proverb is not listed in *CPG*. The σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (Mistriotes *ad loc.*) suggests a poetic origin. Compare the proverbs οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγέλλεις (*CPG* 2.84: *Leg.* 702D6, *Phdrs.* 242B6) and σχολῆ που ὁ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτε ἔλοι πόλιν (*Soph.* 261B8-C1) for related sentiments. By its position and redundancy Callicles invites us to supply its complement. He has no idea how wrong he is for he will indeed have arrived in time for the battle that will ensue.

118 κάτοπιν ἐορτῆς (A3): The proverb is catalogued in *CPG* 1.265 and 2.119. Helmbold has no grounds for assuming it is a continuation of the very proverb Callicles had alluded to (in the manner of Falstaff's remark at *Henry IV Part 1*, IV.1, "To the latter end of the fray and the beginning of the feast | Fits a dull fighter and a keen guest"). Socrates has guessed at a way to complement the war and battle that Callicles has alluded to, and shows he is in the game by matching proverb for proverb and even syllable for syllable (21 each). Chaerephon will then join the game with καὶ ἴασομαι. Moreover, what for Callicles might count as a battle of words may well at the same time for Socrates constitute a feast of argument.

119 Reading καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν (A3) against the athetization of C.G. Cobet (*de arte interp.* [Leiden 1847] 141, asking *quis umquam trito proverbio inutilem et putidam explanationem addit?* – sniffing out a rival counter-Tiro he can outsmart, in order to improve the text of Plato, against all mss.: such athetizations are his specialty [cf. Dodds *ad* 447A5], and here his objection is accepted by Thompson and Lamb only, which requires them also to be smelling the rat). Its absence in Olymp. is hardly grounds for removing it from the text, since Socrates can use an illative καὶ just as well as a copyist writing in the margin might use an epeexegetical one.

120 ἐπεδείξατο (A6), used absolutely, in a usage that is something of a concession to the Sophists, who display their wares rather than their subjects (cf. n. 132). Here is the first use of καλόν in the dialogue.

121 ἡμᾶς (A8) refers to the two of them, and is not "royal" (*pace* Schleiermacher, Cope). It pairs off with the ἡμῖν used by Callicles.

122 διατρῖψαι (A8): Its understood object is χρόνον idiomatically omitted, but when used in connection with Socrates the term always serves as a vague understatement for the sort of unnamable thing that always happens when one "spends time" in his company (cf. *Lach.* 180C2-7). It is meant to stand in contrast with ἐπιδείξεται. Again Socrates replies with matching length (indeed, exactly the same number of syllables if, with Hirschig, we delete ἐορτῆς).

123 οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα (B1): Sauppe *ad loc.* illustrates the expression from a wide spectrum of genres: *Euthyph.* 3C7, *E. Med.* 451, *Ar. Ran.* 1215, *D.* 8.31.

124 καὶ ἴασομαι (B1): The schol. takes it to be a third proverb, as referring to Telephus, wounded but then also healed by Achilles (ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἴασται, cf. *Paroem. Gr.* 2.763; *Ov. Met.* 12.112). Heindorf *ad loc.* objects that the metaphorical use of ἴασθαι and related medical terms for remedying a situation is too common to imply an external allusion, but it is the καί that led the schol. to think of Telephus and Achilles, as Woolsey saw.

125 ἐὰν δὲ βούλη (B3): Chaerephon wants to "make Socrates whole," and thus goes so far as to offer him *unconditional* access to Gorgias.

126 Reading τί δαί (B4), with Ast, Bekker, Stallb., Woolsey, Kratz, Sommer, Hirschig Mistriotes, first reported from B by Stallb., an underappreciated particle (also 448A9, 454D6, 461B3 and D8, 469A6, 491D4, 497E3, and 503C1; and cf. nn. to 469A3 and 474C7). Starting in the late 19th c. (beginning with Deuschle-Cron and Schanz [claiming to distinguish hands in B: cf. Hermann]), edd. reduced this expression to τί δέ (*sed contra*, Woolsey, Kratz, *ad loc.*), even to the extent of failing to report the variant in their *apparatus critici* (*sic* Burnet, Croiset; Dodds and of

ΧΑΙ. ἐπ’ αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

ΚΑΛ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ’ ἐμὲ ἦκειν οἴκαδε· παρ’ ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἐθελήσειεν ἂν [c] ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι;<sup>127</sup> βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ τίς ἡ δύναμις<sup>128</sup> τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός,<sup>129</sup> καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει·<sup>130</sup> τὴν δὲ ἄλλην<sup>131</sup> ἐπίδειξιν εἰς αὐθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιήσασθω.

ΚΑΛ. οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν<sup>132</sup> τοῦτ’ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιο τῶν ἔνδον<sup>133</sup> ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα<sup>134</sup> ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν,<sup>135</sup> ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

ΧΑΙ. τί ἔρωμαι; [d]

ΣΩ. ὅστις<sup>136</sup> ἐστίν.

course Cantarín are exceptions), though in comparison with the variant δέ it qualifies as *lectio difficilior*. Cf. Valckenaer *ad Ammonius diff.*, s.v. δαί (his edition [Erlangen 1787] 54-5), my n. to *Lach.*184D5, and *AGPS* 2.1032. Why is Callicles surprised that Socrates should be interested? With ἐπιθυμεί Callicles steps up Chaerephon’s βούλεσθαι and asks him rather than Socrates because he is vying with Chaerephon to seem the one who has the better access to Gorgias.

- 127 διαλεχθῆναι (C1): Another never-quite-innocent term when occurring in a Socratic context, though Callicles cannot be expected to appreciate this.
- 128 δύναμις (C2): As the commentators keep telling us, the term can be synonymous with φύσις (cf. *Phdrs.*246A7 and my n. *ad loc.*, *Leg.*643A5, *Polit.*308C4, *Tim.*28A8), so that Jowett translates it “nature.” Lamb compromises with “function” (even at the dramatic moment, 460B2). Later we shall have realize (as Olympiodorus recognized right away [14.16-18], despite his neoplatonic pre-occupations), that Socrates means it more literally than we might at this point think. “What it can accomplish” (Zeyl) ends up being wrong – a literal translation is best.
- 129 ἀνδρός (C2) is perhaps never otiose. With the essentially commendatory term Socrates acknowledges Gorgias’s reputation at the same time that he questions what it is based on.
- 130 ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει (C2-3): The claim is a claim to teach, at the same time that the teaching is the proof of whatever is being claimed. For the dyad compare μήτε ὑπεσχόμεν μᾶθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα (*Apol.*33B5-6), and *Meno* 95B9-10.
- 131 ἄλλην (C3) may be taken in the adverbial (or “appositive,” with *AGPS* and Gildersleeve §599) sense (~“besides”) so as to be dismissive here, setting aside performance *per se* (not just performance on “other topics,” *pace* Ficinus [tr. *ceterarum rerum expositio*] Findeisen [*apud* Bekker] *Ast Cope Waterfield*), since performance is quite a different thing from the kind of *conversation* that Socrates here, as always, hopes to have. In the same spirit εἰς αὐθις, though repeated from above, may now take on its distinctly dismissive sense (cf. my n. to *Rep.*347E2).
- 132 ἐν τοῦτ’ ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως (C6): Socrates wants to postpone display and ask Gorgias instead to characterize *what* he is displaying, but Callicles takes ἄλλην in its adjectival sense (~“other”) and eagerly points out that “answering questions, too,” was part of the display, and so he can offer Socrates the good news of getting an answer and a display at one and the same time. Since the dialogue is in dramatic form Plato is leaving it to his readers, who know Socrates better, to notice the disconnect.
- 133 τῶν ἔνδον (C7): The audience is *sequestered* in some sort of performance venue, in contrast with the persons Socrates met in the agora. For the expression cf. 455C6 and *Prot.*317C5.
- 134 πρὸς ἅπαντα (C7), neuter plural (*pace AGPS* 68.39.2.A). At *H.Min.*363C7-D4, Hippias is made to describe himself as putting on a performance at Olympia consisting first of delivering whatever speech his audience might like to hear from a catalogue of prepared speeches (*παρεσκευασμένον*), and then presenting himself for questions (ὅ τι ἂν τις ἐρωτᾷ), presumably as an *ex tempore* complement. The “questions” are *requests*, as we see from Cic. *de fin.*2.1 ‘*poscere questionem*’ *id est iubere dicere qua de re quis vellet audire*, and Philostratus (*Vit.Soph.* 1.1) who says Gorgias invented this kind of performance (which he calls *σχέδιος λόγος*): *παρελθὼν γὰρ οὗτος εἰς τὸ Ἀθηναῖσι θεάτρον ἐθάρρησεν εἰπεῖν “προβάλλετε” καὶ τὸ κινδόνευμα τοῦτο πρότος ἀνεφθέγγετο, ἐνδεικνύμενος δῆπου πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντός δ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ.* Compare the *ἐπάγγελμα* of Alcidas (*Soph.*31): *ὑπὲρ ἅπαντος τοῦ προτεθέντος εὐκαίρως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν.* For the fearlessness cf. *Meno* 70B5-6 ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι; Alc. *Soph.*16: *θορύβου πλήρη τὴν γνώμην*; Cic. *de fin.*2.1 *primus est ausus*. The confusion between performance and discussion can therefore continue.
- 135 Ὡ Χαιρεφῶν (C9): By placing the vocative in the initial position, Socrates indicates he is addressing his remark to someone other than the person he was just talking with (cf. my n. *ad Lach.*181B5). This is one of Plato’s means for indicating what is happening when he has no narrator to tell us. Socrates asks Chaerephon to do his asking for him, and in a moment Polus will take on Gorgias’s role and do the answering, himself.
- 136 ὅστις ἐστίν (D1): The question is unexpected both in its content and in its formulation. First, we had thought he wanted to know the δύναμις of oratory, but now it is “Who is Gorgias,” that Socrates wants him to ask; second, the expression of the question insouciantly leaves its meaning and purport unclear. The interrogative is indefinite in form, but using the indefinite is usual in referring to the question without asking it (cf.453A1, B6 [*bis*]; 454A3 [*bis*], 491B1, 508D5; and nn. 504, 1818). Dodds, moreover, correctly recognizes that τίς *can* refer to the person’s identity: his profession or social role (for which the commonest general term is *δημιουργός* as in the next line: cf. *Lach.*195B9 with my n. to 196A2, and Dalfen 169-70), but Chaerephon was not ready to take it that way without Socrates spelling it out. Hence to translate it “what” rather than (Cary and Zeyl’s) “who” rather lets the cat out of the bag. As with Socrates’s use of the term δύναμις above (C2), and as very often in the dialogues, the thought behind an unexpected expression will become clear later (cf. n. on 448D9, *infra*). Note also the distinction drawn by

ΧΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΧΑΙ. μανθάνω<sup>137</sup> καὶ ἐρήσομαι. εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

[448] ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελόμην, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινόν<sup>138</sup> οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. ἦ που<sup>139</sup> ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρίνει,<sup>140</sup> ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.<sup>141</sup>

Gildersleeve §130 and AGPS 61.8.0 (ad 448E7): “the neuter [τί] queries the essence of the thing, the personal form [τίς] queries the classification of the thing in its kind.”

- 137 μανθάνω (D6): Chaerephon grasps immediately from Socrates’s example what he had meant by τίς, showing he is on the same page as Socrates where the other two might not be (contrast nn. 131,132, *supra*). For the idiom cf. n. 842. As we shall see, Polus never quite understands what Socrates is trying to focus upon because he is preoccupied with his own agenda.
- 138 καινόν (448A2): Although *quod mihi nondum ab aliis propositum fuisset* (Ast) is the denotation, *qui ait pu me sorprendre* (Croiset) is the connotation. The phrase οὐδὲν καινόν is something of an idiom to admonish the audience not to be startled by something that will at first seem novel, so as then to introduce an explanation: the “explanation” would then be Gorgias’s answer (cf. *Phdo.*100B1; *Rep.*399E1, 414C4 [justifying the γενναῖον ψεύδος as a Φοινικικόν τι]; *X. Cyrop.*7.5.85). τὸ καινόν is topical in oratory (*Isoc. ad Nic.*41, *Antid.*47, 55-6, 82-3, *Paneg.*8,30; *D.*4.1, 4.10, 15.9, 20.89, 25.20, 35.1, 58.43; pr. 1.1, 29.1; *Din.*2.2), and καινὸν εἰπεῖν is a sophistic virtue (*Ar. Nub.*1031, *Vesp.*1053; *X. Mem.*4.4.6 [where Hippias grants that he gives the same answer when asked about numbers, but when asked about things like justice he gives an answer that cannot be gainsaid!]; cf. *Phdros.*267B1). πολλῶν ἐτῶν does not mean that although at the beginning of his career questions were of course asked for the first time he has now accumulated something of a backlog, but that he has a perfect record of never appearing to be discombobulated. He always succeeds to produce the appearance described by his student Alcidas as being able ὑπὲρ ἅπαντος τοῦ προτεθέντος εὐκαιρῶς καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν (*Soph.*31), later described in similar terms by Philostratus as the *appearance* of knowing everything, such as is conveyed by ἀφοβῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι (*Meno* 70B6-7) and the ability to seize upon the καιρός in any case (πάντα μὲν εἰδέναι, περὶ παντός δ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν ἐφίεις τῷ καιρῷ): compare *Isoc. Soph.*13. Ps.-Alexander’s comment (*in SE=CAG* 2.3[Wallies]196.3ff), interpreting οὐδὲν καινόν to mean πάντα ὅσα μέ τις ἐρωτᾷ, οἶδα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὃ με διέλαθεν, is too narrow. Though οὐδὲν καινόν strictly claims that he has never yet been asked a question for which he did not know the answer, in practice it will have sufficed to have an answer – i.e., something to say that would “satisfy” the questioner (indeed, cf. σοὶ γε ἰκανῶς, B1). It is something of a joke that Meno when asked about virtue suffers no *aporia* in answering, which for him means he easily finds an εὐπορία of answers (71E1-2A5, *n.b.* οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν, 72A1-2), whereas for Socrates the *aporia* is that he does not know what virtue in itself is (contrast what happens to *Meno* at 80A6-B4). Aristotle reports (*SE* 183B36ff) that Gorgias’s teaching (παιδείους) included (and perhaps consisted in: *n.b.*, ταχεῖα, 184A1), supplying his students with speeches to memorize that would suffice for the greatest number of occasions (πλειστάκις). Cf. Socrates’s description of the skill as “knowing how to answer” *simpliciter*, at 462A9. The reliable antidote to the challenge of τὸ καινόν is ἐμπειρία (on which cf. 457C4ff).
- 139 ἦ που (A4), the collocation expressing “wondering, admiring” (Lodge).
- 140 Reading the ἀποκρίνει (A4) of T with Heindorf Ast Woolsey Kratz Sommer Hirschig (ἀποκρῖνεῖ B, *legg.* Stallb. Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Schanz Schmelzer Mistriones Hermann Croiset : ἀποκρινῆ PF : ἀποκρίνη *scr.* Routh : ἀποκρινῆ Vat, *legg.* Cantarín Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Erler/Kobusch Heidbüchel). For a similar discrepancy among the mss. cf. 494E2 and n. 1423 *ad loc.* The choice between the two forms of the contract future (-εἶ and -ῆ) is indifferent to the sense; the only issue is whether the present (read by T) is more appropriate to the “flow” of the conversation. At D6-8, Chaerephon essentially asked permission to ask Gorgias Socrates’s question, but Gorgias’s answer exploited the opportunity to advertise himself (448A1-3). With the future, ῥαδίως means willingly, and Chaerephon now nails down that he has permission to ask; with the present, Chaerephon idly admires how easy a time he imagines Gorgias is having (with ῥαδίως being used as at *Phdo.*62C10 and 63A7). Gorgias’s response then either invites him to determine *whether* he will answer, or to test his *ease* in answering: the latter is the more appropriate.
- 141 Reading λαμβάνειν (A5) rather than the λαβεῖν of F (and Olymp.) which was preferred by Ast Dodds Cantarín (who cite *Prot.*342A1, though the present is used at 348A6 as well as at *Alcid. Soph.*31). Here (as at *Lach.*189B5, πεῖραν δίδοναι, the converse of λαμβάνειν) the present of the mss. is conative. Gorgias mildly challenges Chaerephon to have a try, in response to Chaerephon remarking on his confidence.

ΠΩΛ. νῆ Δία· ἄν<sup>142</sup> δέ γε βούλη, ὧ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι<sup>143</sup> μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. τί δαί,<sup>144</sup> ὧ Πῶλε; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; [b]

ΠΩΛ. τί δὲ τοῦτο,<sup>145</sup> ἔάν σοί γε<sup>146</sup> ἱκανῶς,<sup>147</sup>

ΧΑΙ. οὐδέν·<sup>148</sup> ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ.<sup>149</sup> εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ<sup>150</sup> Ἡρόδικος, τίνα<sup>151</sup> ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

- 142 νῆ Δία· ἄν δέ γε (A6) is read in *all* mss. but Dodds printed Νῆ Δί' ἄν δέ γε and left his otherwise generous apparatus empty. In his comment he cites the opinion of H. Richards as to the sense of the interjection (*Platonica* [London 1911] 54) where Richards prints (likewise without reference to the mss. reading) Νῆ Δί' ἄν δέ γε . . . , not only eliding the α of Δία but retaining the semicolon of the editors (the retention was probably a typo), and then tells us that “there should be no stop after Νῆ Δία” and that it should be taken closely with what follows, *similia dans*. Dodds has agreed with Richards on this point and removes the malingering semicolon as well as quietly removing the alpha (he ignores the issue in his commentary also), and then, arguing that the words that so closely follow tell why Polus does not want Gorgias to be questioned, he decides that Νῆ Δία means “No” (more exactly, “Look here!”) rather than “Yes” as it is usually translated. Neither of them admits that the hiatus tolerated by the alpha they omit from the mss. (restored by subsequent edd.) calls for a pause and therefore tells against their interpretation (which is accepted by Irwin). It is δέ γε that introduces the note of comeuppance or outbidding, as it commonly does in retort (*Phlb.*48E4, *Polit.*295B7, *Tht.*165D2, cf. P. Shorey, *CP*14[1919]170), in this case to specify and appropriate to Polus’s own use Gorgias’s πεῖραν λαμβάνειν (understood) with ἐμοῦ. “I quite agree – if it’s me you would please try the test on.”
- 143 ἀπειρηκέναι (A7) retains its root sense that Gorgias has *expressed* something. Polus interprets, or feigns to interpret (μοι δοκεῖ), that Gorgias’s νύνη αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν (A1-2) has the under-meaning, πολλὰ ἄρτι διελήλυθα: the perfect διελήλυθεν explains the aftermath in which he claims Gorgias has begged off the request (ἀπειρηκέναι) and infers an assertion of exhaustion from Gorgias’s imperfect, ἐπηγγελλόμεν, which Polus takes to mean not that Gorgias has been claiming but has been making good on the claim of answering questions.
- 144 Reading τί δαί (A9): cf. n. 126 *ad* 447B4. ἄν indicates that the construction underlying the indirect discourse is potential optative, the apodosis of an ideal condition: “Do you fancy you would do better?”
- 145 τί δὲ τοῦτο (B1) *sc.* διαφέρει or ἐστίν. The expression is unclear for the sake of being abrupt, as at 497E8.
- 146 As Mistriotes noted, σοί γε (B1) answers Chaerephon’s slightly edgy σύ (A9, as if to say “You’re no Gorgias”), and the tit-for-tat is then continued by σύ, B2.
- 147 σοί γε ἱκανῶς (B1): In all strictness, for an answer to be adequate it must be adequate to the question, not the person asking it, but ἱκανῶς can be subjective as well as objective in Greek and so Polus’s selection of this term continues, now into his conversation with Chaerephon, the “disconnect” that had already come to the surface between Socrates and Callicles (from his misinterpretation of ἄλλην and εἰς αἰθίς) and then Gorgias (from his use of καίνον). Polus in a sense is challenging or even daring Chaerephon to ask him something καίνον, in Gorgias’s sense of the term.
- 148 For οὐδέν (B2) quickly defusing belligerent challenge (as again at 498A1, 515E2) cf. *Rep.*472B7 and my n. *ad loc.*
- 149 ἐρωτῶ δὴ (B4): δὴ is common in retorting an imperative.
- 150 ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ (B5). The “matrix” Chaerephon constructs relies upon comparing Gorgias with an *individual* who in doing X gets the name ‘X’. He does not ask, What is a man who makes shoes called? (A: A shoemaker) – but What does Gorgias (X) do so as to be called what (‘X’)? His parallels therefore need to be individuals referred to by their proper names. In Socrates’s good epagogic manner he starts with an example that is πρόχειρον (cf. *Charm.*159C3ff, 161D3-9; *Ion* 537A5ff; *Prot.*311B5-C2, 352B2-4; *Rep.*474D2-5C; *Tht.*154C1ff [an ex. from mathematics which had been the topic above]: cf. *Meno* 75D6-7: δι’ ἐκείνων ὃν ἂν προσομολογῇ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος), an individual nearest to hand for Gorgias, namely his brother (cf. *Meno* 71B5-7, *Prot.*311B5-6, *Rep.*459A1-5 for *irrelevantly* personal first examples): If Gorgias were the same as he (a physician) what would he be called? Similarly, Aristophan and his brother (who *do* happen to do the same thing: for the irrelevant use of family relations in the *concatenation* of examples cf. 502A4 and n. 1599 *ad loc.*) are called painters after *their* craft. Schmelzer’s guess (*ad loc.*, followed by Dodds *ad* 448B4-C1, and by Dalfen 170, 171) that Chaerephon’s choice of examples is motivated by a desire to adduce more polite professions than the shoemaker’s with which Socrates began, is therefore unlikely.
- 151 Reading τίνα (B5) with all mss., *legg.* Routh Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sommer Hirschig Mistriotes Hermann Lamb Croiset Dodds Cantarin, against Olympiodorus’s τί, *legg.* Thompson Schanz Sauppe Burnet Theiler Erler/Kobusch Heidbüchel. Chaerephon’s expression is loose and *ad sensum* (see next note), and ὀνομάζειν can be used with εἶναι meaning to designate what something is by naming it (cf. *Apol.*23A3, *Lach.*192A10, *Parm.*133D2, *Prot.*311E4-5, *Tht.*160B8-9). For the subsequent “easy transfer to the actual idea” (Deuschle-Cron) by the shift to neuter ὅπερ (*pace* Findeisen Christ, who read ὄνπερ) cf. *Crat.*424A2-4, and, with Stallb., *Phdo.*105E2, *Phdrs.*238B1, *Symp.*212C2-3.



ΧΑΙ. εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος<sup>152</sup> ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν; [c]

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα<sup>153</sup> ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῖμεν;<sup>154</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ὦ Χαιρεφῶν,<sup>155</sup> πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἠύρημένοι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὄδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.<sup>156</sup> [d]

152 ἔμπειρος (B12) casually replaces ἐπιστήμων (B4) in the matrix of terms, just as ὀρθῶς replaces καλῶς and δικαίως and ἐκαλοῦμεν replace ἐλέγομεν and ὀνομάζομεν. The shifts (which Schleiermacher rather translates out) indicate that a matrix is at work at the same time that they avoid a deadening stasis in thought. The fact that Herodicus is Gorgias's brother and they do different things whereas Aristophan and his unnamed brother (i.e., Polygnotus, as we can infer from *Ion* 532E8 and Simonides frg.160 Bergk) as well as their father, Aglaophon, are all painters, adds unnecessary detail that requires the mind to focus on what does matter. Chaerephon got the point quickly (447D6) and shows some facility in the Socratic manner of induction, just as Polus in his answer (C4-9) will show himself a suitable stand-in for Gorgias.

153 τίνα (C2), the τίς of D1, not τί (sc. ὄνομα).

154 The target question (C2-3) borrows semantic elements from both the last illustrative parallel (ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν: B12-13) and from the first one (τέχνης ἐπιστήμων: B4-5).

155 ὦ Χαιρεφῶν (C4): The vocative is now placed in initial position not because Polus is changing interlocutors (as at 447C9) but because he is changing the character of his discourse: cf. *Lach.* 181B5 and my n. *ad loc.* for parallels and explanation. Though in truth he has broken off answering and begun responding with an oration, from his own point of view he is finally presenting an Answer in the epideictic sense. Polus is not *unable* to grasp what Chaerephon had grasped with a single example, as several editors have asserted, but *uninterested* in doing so. His motive and his desire to answer, even before Chaerephon gave him any examples (A6-B2), was only to stand in for Gorgias and impress Gorgias or the onlookers with a Gorgianic answer.

156 The speech (C4-9) in form and content is a priamel of the sort that might begin an encomium (cf. ἤρξατο, 449B6, with n.). As to its content, it introduces as foil the entire field of human endeavor, including a reference to human vicissitude (in ἐμπειρία / ἀπειρία – partly motivated by ἐμπειρος above), and then by two steps locates Gorgias's art as the representative of the finest (καλλίστη) of the most virtuous (ἀριστῶν) of these. Behind the two superlatives is the conventional formula καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, which purports to identify true value by means of a comprehensive doublet that rather blandly adduces the moral and the esthetic (H. Wankel [*KALOS KAI AGATHOS* {New York 1979} = diss. Würzburg, 1961], who leaves this passage out). With ἄρισται Polus first filters out the best of the human arts and then with καλλίστη he selects the finest from among these best (ἄριστος and καλλιστος are not mere synonyms or parts of each other as Helmbold makes them [*“and so ... in the noblest”* in his tr.]). Thereby he has presumptively determined the single art that is Gorgias's province, in the sense that there could not be two finests among the best. As to its form, in addition to the two step *gradus* note the chiasm for closure: whereas three times arts are mentioned before the men that are their exponents, in the capping case of Gorgias the order is reversed (ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ... τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν, C8-9), so that Polus can end with the term with which he began, namely the topic of Chaerephon's question. Notable also are τέχνη / τύχη echoing across the antithesis (tr. *Kunst/Gunst* Schleiermacher, *arteforte* Ast) and the redundant amplitude of ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως and ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως for which Polus is famous (*διπλασιολογία*, cf. *Phdrs.* 267C1); the satirical redundancy of ἐμπείρως is only defanged by the ameliorating conjectures of Richards (ἐμπειρίας) or Naber (ἐμπείροις; *Mnem.* n.s.36 [1908] 250).

Merely to identify details of style with testimonies about Polus, as commentators since Olympiodorus have done (though Olympiodorus does note it is θεατρικῶς [20.5] and Sauppe does notice *ein feierlich Ton* and Ovink *hoogdravende wijze*), misses the more important fact that the answer he gives has a completeness or integrity of sorts, under the rhetorical rubric of the προοίμιον (noticed to be sure by Socrates [ἐγκωμιάζεις, E3] but missed by Mistriones, who writes, καθ' ὅλου ὁ Πῶλος καλύπτει τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ σκοτεινῷ τῆς ἐκφράσεως). Ovink at least notices the climax at the end enough to ridicule it (*Aan het slot kijkt P. triumfantelijk rond*). Only Dalfen says as much as that Polus has herewith “sung a praise” – and not only for oratory but also for his teacher, Gorgias (172). Compare for these features the “answer” of Meno, Gorgias's other student (at *Meno* 71E1-2A5), which likewise climaxes in vapidly. These lines are found, in part, in Syrianus (in *Hermog. comm.* v.2, 8.23-9.1 Rabe), in Stobaeus (*Anth.* 3.1.183 = 1.130.15 Wachsmuth), and in Aristotle (*Met.* 981A3-5) and others, but that does not prove that those authors lifted these words *ipsissimis verbis* from some book that Polus wrote. This very passage may be the source of those quotations, and though Socrates refers to a written treatise below (462B11-C1), I take the sense of ἐναγχος ἀνέγνω in that passage not to be that he “just read it” but that he had “just come to know” its contents – from the present speech of Polus, that is, which according to the hypothesis of the conversation should have been *ex tempore*, though Socrates there reveals his intuition that it was already written out (cf. *παρεσκευάσθαι*, below, and my n.). Schanz assumes it is quoted from the book, but then on the basis of Stobaeus's excerpting, cuts off the quotation at ἄριστοι, mutilating Polus's climax; similarly A.J. Egelie (*Obs.crit. in Pl.* = diss. Amsterdam 1902), approved by Dodds *ad loc.*, ruins the climax by adding ἄριστε after ἄριστοι to fill out a parallel with ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, where it was exactly the lack of a parallel third term that left the hiatus to be filled by καλλίστη. Pietre leaves out the climactic clause (ὧν καὶ Γοργίας ... τεχνῶν) in his translation. The question whether it was written or not is in any event mooted by the likelihood that it was *memorized* by Polus, according to the manner of the τέχνη as Aristotle describes it at *SE* 183B6ff.

ΣΩ. καλῶς γε,<sup>157</sup> ὃ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι<sup>158</sup> εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. τί μάλιστα,<sup>159</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.<sup>160</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ<sup>161</sup> ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην “ῥητορικὴν”<sup>162</sup> μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. [e]

ΠΩΛ. τί δὴ,<sup>163</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὃ Πῶλε,<sup>164</sup> ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος,<sup>165</sup> ἥτις δὲ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

157 καλῶς γε (D1): With γε Socrates gives a nod to Polus’s capping and conclusive term.

158 παρεσκευάσθαι (D1): The perfect may suggest that the very speech he just delivered was prepared in advance and recited from memory, as Socrates will explicitly assert only later (462B11-C1), but may also merely mean that Polus comes well-equipped in general with the topics and set techniques that can prevent any question from seeming kainón. Compare παρεσκευασμένον at *H.Min.*363D3 referred to in n. 134.

159 τί μάλιστα (D4): Gorgias does not know what Socrates means, since by his lights Polus has just given a more than adequate “answer”: the ambiguity or discrepancy between oratory and dialectic is continued.

160 ἐροῦ αὐτόν (D6): It is possible not to notice the perfect absurdity of person A suggesting to person B that he ask person C who person A is because person C had failed to answer the question when it was asked him by person D: Gorgias (person A) would presumably have the easiest time telling who he is, but he would prefer to give his student an opportunity to continue his display. Indeed it is exactly a continuation of display that Socrates next indicates he hopes they will forgo.

161 εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν (D7): This periphrastic formulation, here interrupting the connection between οὐκ and ἀλλὰ with with urgent backpedalling, is commonly used by Plato’s characters in deferential request for what would please them (ἥδιον *vel sim.*): cf. *Crat.*384A7 (ἠδέως, A5), *Phdo.*78B1 (εἰ σοὶ ἠδομένῳ), *Rep.*358D6 (ἐπιθυμῶ, B4; χαίροι, D8), and *Lach.*187C1 (where Lysimachus then playfully echoes the construction to describe his own motive as requester: ἠδομένοις, C4). Cf. also Antiphon 6.8.

162 τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν (D9): With καλουμένην Socrates evinces reluctance to use the term ῥητορικὴ or to let it stand without being questioned: indeed it may be coined right here! The idiomatic “adjectival noun” treats it as something like ἰατρικὴ, presuming it is an ἐπιστήμη or a τέχνη and not just an activity or pastime (e.g., an ἐπιτήδευσις). It is no secret that Gorgias is a teacher of ῥήτορες. Indeed at first we may have wondered why Socrates wanted Chaerephon to ask “what” or “who” he was since we knew this, and we think we know what it is since it is a category (at least) known to modern readers. But in then explaining his question (447D3-4) Socrates had indicated that it is what the δημιουργός does (ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός) that provides him with his professional name (σκυτότομος) and that this kind of name is what he is after (*i.e.*, τίς ἐστί). Chaerephon’s parallel questions therefore asked for the exponent to be identified, not the art (ἰατρός, B8; ζωγράφος, C1), and in fact even avoided introducing a name for the art by means of consistently designating persons by their proper names (cf. n. 150). In his answer, however, Polus focused on the art (and so merely as the finest one, without even identifying it), and as such avoided the question of what we should call Gorgias as its exponent (again referring to him only by his proper name at C8). Now if he, Polus, had identified this “best and finest art” as “oratorics” he would have exposed himself to answering the question *pari passu* with the others, and would have had to say that Gorgias is an “orator.” But just as plainly as we know that Gorgias is a teacher of oratory, we know that he is not really an orator, for if he were he would be at home in Leontini delivering speeches and participating in politics there. This entire problematic lurks in the background, and with καλουμένην Socrates broaches the question whether “the oratorical” is something one teaches (and professes) or whether it is something one does (like making shoes), or in other words whether “the oratorical” creates orators or creates speeches. It is noteworthy that exactly this same technique of questioning is used at the beginning of the *Protagoras* by Socrates, on the way to defining what Protagoras will do to Hippocrates (311B2-2A4).

163 τί δὴ (E1): Polus relies upon δὴ to convey a claim that his objection is warranted without articulating it. His manner is curt when he is challenged (cf. B1) but lavish when given the floor. Socrates’s remark that he did not really answer means to him, in his terms, that his answer was not ἱκανόν (B1). Just as Chaerephon has been led by Socrates to imitate or take on his manner of questioning, Polus has arrogated to himself an opportunity to imitate Gorgias’s method of answering. In his answer he hopes to impress Gorgias and the company as much as he hopes to “answer” Chaerephon, and now rises to defend himself against Socrates’s attack. We can compare the moment in *Rep.* Bk.I when Socrates’s and Thrasymachus’s followers stand in for them momentarily (340A1-B9), after which Thrasymachus retakes the floor and boldly advances an even more controversial position.

164 ὅτι, ὃ Πῶλε (E2): With his asyndeton Socrates answers, *pari passu*, as curtly as Polus interrupted. Greek conversation shows a penchant, then as now, for matching the vocative of one’s interlocutor in response, placing it in a similar position (cf. also n. 118).

165 ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος (E3-4): Polus “answered” Chaerephon with his speech of praise. Socrates persists in treating it as an answer in order to convey what he means by an answer, and thus he invests Polus’s “answer” with a dialogical motive, as if to “reply” to someone who had just said that oratory is a bad thing. Polus however is not thinking of answers as being answers to questions, but, in the Gorgianic manner, as holdings forth (ἐπιδείξεις) *fulfilling* (not answering) *requests* (not questions) on a *topic*. But there is also the unstated possibility of a prejudice against oratory, a prejudice that soon enough receives great emphasis, the response to which dominates the last two thirds of Gorgias’s great answer about oratory, below (456C6-457C3).

ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ<sup>166</sup> ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἶη ἡ<sup>167</sup> καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα.<sup>168</sup> ἀλλ' οὐδεις ἐρωτᾷ<sup>169</sup> ποία τις ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς,<sup>170</sup> καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν· ὥσπερ<sup>171</sup> τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο<sup>172</sup> Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ καλῶς [449] καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἶπε τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὃ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἶπε τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.<sup>173</sup>

ΓΟΡ. τῆς ῥητορικῆς,<sup>174</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ῥήτορα ἄρα<sup>175</sup> χρὴ σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. ἀγαθόν γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι<sup>176</sup> εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

ΓΟΡ. κάλει δὴ. [b]

- 166 γὰρ (E5): For this semi-indignant use cf. n. 474: it is not really a question, nor does οὐ require it to be (*pace* AGPS 64.5.0.B).
- 167 ἡ (E5), read by BTP, is certainly needed (first brought in from the mss. by Heindorf [tr. Schleiermacher] and read by subsequent edd., against its omission in F which was followed by Routh). Polus believes his superlatives have determined which art is Gorgias's art merely by ranking it (cf. n. 156).
- 168 καὶ μάλα (E6) is more specific than *Ja wohl* (Schl.), *vel sim*. He means the answer was more (and therefore less) than an answer.
- 169 Reading ἐρωτᾷ (E6) with all mss. against ἠρώτα, orig. conjectured by Stallb. (*Var. Lect.*, 168) but then rejected by him, printed by Bekker (*legg. Hirschig Schanz Feix Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarin: quaerebat* tr. Ficinus) to justify the subsequent optatives εἶη (present in all mss. though placed after ποία τις in BT and after Γοργίου in F: *del. Burnet Erler/Kobusch*), and also δέοι. AGPS (544.3.12.A) deems the optatives potential without ἄν, giving *similia* where the absence of the ἄν is compensated for by indefinite τίς (and even interrogative τίς!) functioning as subject. But it is the "present of present and past combined" (Smyth §1885a) referring in fact to the immediate past, and as such establishes secondary sequence. Dodds calls Socrates's distinction between the questions ποῖον and τί a "first lesson in logic," on the basis of passages in other dialogues (cf. Piètre *ad loc.*), where the distinction is theorized (e.g., *Meno* 71B, *Prot.*360E6-1A3, and even *Th.*182A8-B7), but here it is merely a distinction between assertion and praise, and no more a logical distinction or lesson than the related distinctions between questioning and requesting, and answering and responding, that have not become explicit. Cf. n. 613.
- 170 ὄντινα (E7): For the indefinite interrogative following the definite (τίνα) and (less often) the converse, cf. Lobeck (*Phrynichus* p.57, n.) who notes, "*Graecos data opera in interrogationibus obliquis pronomina ἀναφορικά et ἐρωτηματικά ἐφφugiendae repetitiones causa commiscuisse.*" See also AGPS 51.17.2, and cf. 486D4, 500A5, 500D3-4, 501B6-7, 503B6; *Charm.*160D6-7; *Crito* 48A6; *Leg.*632C2-3; *Phdr.*271A10; *Phlb.*17B7-8; *Rep.*400A7, 414D1, 578E5-6; *X. Cyrop.*7.3.10; *S. OR* 71-2 (with Jebb); *Arist. Rhet.*1359B34; *D.* 15.34.
- 171 ὥσπερ (E7): Mild asyndeton is tolerated when the illustration of a general point is introduced, as here by ὥσπερ (e.g. *Alc.* 1 108D5, *Rep.*413D8-9) or (elsewhere) by ἐπεὶ (e.g., 483D6, *Lach.*183C8), αὐτίκα (472D1, n. 782), and οἷον (499D4, 501E5, 503E4, 524C1; *Phdo.*70E6, 73D3, *al.*).
- 172 ὑπετείνατο (E8): "Stretching out under" refers to the way Chairephon's "matrix" of examples provides an underlying structure or set of blanks to be filled in (Proper Name / Type of Artist) by the answer to the propounded question (cf. Ast, *quaestionem ita proponere ut alteri subiicias quid respondendum sit*; Jahn, *die Fragen geflissentlich so stellen, dass der Gefragte auf die gewünschte Antwort hingelenkt wird*), a meaning that is consistent with the other two uses of ὑποτείνειν in Plato: *Th.*179E1, *Cleit.*408D1. Cf. *E. Or.*915.
- 173 The chiasm (449A1-3) τίς τέχνη / τίνα καλεῖν // τίνα καλεῖν / τίνος τέχνης is a "chiasm of the alternative" for closure. Socrates has now altered the matrix to add the art as a term between the person and his professional designation.
- 174 τῆς ῥητορικῆς (A5), *sc.* τέχνης ἐπιστήμων εἰμί. Gorgias has, according to a well-established convention, answered only the second of two correlative questions (cf. n. 1584): cf. *Rep.*374D7, 433C3, 462D6, 463B13, 477E2, 495C7, 529D4-6, 611A9, and my n. to *Rep.*333D9. Socrates now moves on to the first. Somehow, Socrates's desire to learn about the δόναμις of oratory has led him to require this double question: he could otherwise have now asked Gorgias, as a master of the oratorical art, what its δόναμις is, but this does not occur until 455C3-D5. It is too much to say (with Dalfen, 174) that Gorgias has not noticed the fact that two questions have been asked, but it is good that Dalfen has noticed it. Moreover, Gorgias has given the briefest possible answer rather than merely agreeing to do so, so that again his answer is a display. Socrates for his purposes will take the behavior to constitute not only an acquiescence in his request for pertinence in answer, but even a promise that Gorgias will continue at it (B7). As to the sense, since ῥήτωρ only means orator ("Redner" Schleiermacher and Erler; not "rhetorician" Cary and Allen), we should translate ῥητορικῆ as "oratory" ("Redekunst," Erler) rather than confuse the matter with our term "rhetoric," (as most trr. do) a field that by now has become more a recognized academic discipline than an essentially political skill.
- 175 ἄρα (A6) makes clear that the argument is etymological: the mastering of the art "by definition" makes him a ῥήτωρ. As to the sense of the term, cf. note *ad* B1, *infra*. In 427 BC, Gorgias came to Athens and dazzled (ἐξεπλήξε) the assembly with a speech, seeking and winning their support to defend Leontini against the Syracusans (Diod. 12.53 = Diels-Kranz 82A4 [2.272.39-16]). Cf. also *H.Maj.*282B4-C1. He moreover delivered a speech at Olympus advocating ὁμόνοια among the Greeks (Philost. *Vit.Soph.*1.9.4-6), and a funeral oration for Athenian dead (a significant fragment preserved by schol. in *Hermogen.*5.548 Walz = Diels-Kranz 82B6).
- 176 εὐχομαι (A7) is the Homeric part of what he is saying (cf. *Il.*6.211, 8.190, 14.113; *Od.*1.180), for this is how Homer's heroes introduce themselves, but the vaunt pertains to ἀγαθόν rather than ῥήτωρ, which by itself is not enough of an answer for Gorgias (though the τί ἐστὶ is all Socrates is looking for), since anyone who gets up to speak is *eo ipso* an orator, though when Lysias (for instance) says the orators control the show (e.g., 18.16, 30.22, 31.27) he is referring to the formidable ones. There is moreover the possibility, already broached by Socrates in response to Polus, that the teacher of oratorics so-called arrives at a place like Athens on the defensive (cf. Olympiodorus 24.24-26).

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν;<sup>177</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ἐπαγγέλλομαί<sup>178</sup> γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἐθελήσῃς ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος,<sup>179</sup> τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο,<sup>180</sup> εἰς αὐθις<sup>181</sup> ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνῆ,<sup>182</sup> μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. εἰσὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ [c] πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι,<sup>183</sup> μηδένα<sup>184</sup> ἄν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ<sup>185</sup> εἰπεῖν.<sup>186</sup>

ΣΩ. τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποιήσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας,<sup>187</sup> μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς αὐθις.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου<sup>188</sup> ἀκοῦσαι.

- 177 φῶμεν (B1), as well as καὶ and Gorgias's reply to the question, suggest that whereas ἡ ῥητορικὴ makes him a ῥήτωρ by definition (thus ἄρα, above), it does not *eo ipso* enable him to make others orators. Socrates does not complicate matters by repeating Gorgias's value term, nor should we supply it (*pace* Ast Stallb. Jahn Sommer), for Socrates does not ask that, though surely Gorgias does intend it in his answer.
- 178 ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ (B2): Though he *boasts* of being a good orator (εὐχομαι), his actual *profession* (ἐπάγγελμα) is to make others orators (a similar question arises in regard to Hippias of Elis: cf. *H.Maj.*282B1-C1). Despite his title this is all he does, else he would not be traipsing around all Greece but keep to being a citizen in Leontini. His claim to be both requires that everything he says sounds like an oration, but also that his orations may only be paradigmatic and topical rather than devoted to specific legislative or juridical questions. Even if Dodds's source (*ad* A6) is correct in saying the term ῥήτωρ has a range of meanings that might include "rhetoric teacher," such a claim diminishes not at all the presumption that the term means orator at A6 just as it does at B1, and it is not incumbent upon us to make a special concession to Gorgias for the language by which he contrives to advertise his services (*pace* Nichols, 28 n.12). For the second time Gorgias answers whether he can do something by saying that he has claimed he can, at another time (cf. 448A2-3) or elsewhere (καὶ ἄλλοθι, B3). This manner of answering puts his interlocutor into the position of asking him to do it again, here and now (as Chaerephon almost does at 448A4). In other words his answer is essentially a solicitation for business. Gorgias is not taking into consideration with whom he is talking, nor engaging in a discussion to see where it might lead, but instead sees his interlocutor as a potential client. Socrates shows he is aware of this, later on (455C5-8).
- 179 τὸ μὲν / τὸ δὲ (B5): It is noteworthy that he does not say ὁ μὲν / ὁ δὲ. The persons are being spoken of in terms of the roles they take on that make dialogue possible.
- 180 ἤρξατο (B6), recognizes the proemic structure of Polus's answer to Chaerephon at 448C4ff., as Thompson was first to see (citing *Soph.*242B6, *Tim.*36E4; cf. the repetition of the idea below [ἀρχήν, 466B1]), and reveals the reason Socrates realized he needed to interrupt as he did (D1). Compare Phaedrus's launching into a proem at *Phdrs.*228D1-5, likewise interrupted by Socrates (δείξας γε πρῶτον (C6): cf. my n. *ad loc.*)
- 181 εἰς αὐθις again (B7), suggesting that we associate the lengthy manner of speech with ἐπίδειξις (447C3).
- 182 ὑπισχνῆ (B7): Gorgias did not explicitly promise to answer κατὰ βραχὺ (whence Ast suggested εἴπερ for ὅπερ) but indicated he would do so by the way he answered Socrates's first question (τῆς ῥητορικῆς, A5).
- 183 Reading καὶ γὰρ ... τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι (C1-2), with BPFt (ἐνεστιν TW): Callicles had used the same expression (καὶ γὰρ ... ἐν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως, 447C5-6) of another aspect or element of his "fine display of many things," as he had initially put it (447A5-6). Presumably it is another expression in the advertiser's vocabulary (cf. English "feature"). For the intrusion of the preposition (διὰ) between ὡς and its superlative, Riddell (§298) compares *Apol.*40A5-6 (πάνυ ἐπὶ μικροῖς), *Phdo.*70C1-2 (οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων). *Rep.*395B3-4 (τούτων ... εἰς μικρότερα), *al.*
- 184 μηδένα (C2), the stronger denial.
- 185 τὰ αὐτὰ (C2): The claim that a propositional content that can equally well be verbalized in many ways that differ only in their length is stunningly insouciant.
- 186 The answer (B9-C3) is again both more and less than an answer: εἰσὶ μὲν immediately begins an oration (*G. spricht als Sachverständiger vom hohen Ross*, Cron) and ends up introducing foil for his assertion that he can answer in briefer compass than anybody else – another advertisement for himself.
- 187 ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου (C4-5): For the verbal play on displaying something in your behavior and making a display of something, cf. *Lach.*183D2-4. The difference at stake is however deeply pertinent since it represents the difference between Socrates's two questions, "what" is the art and "who" is the artist.
- 188 βραχυλογικωτέρου (C7): The comparative is a coinage by Gorgias, enabling him to "answer" Socrates's "request" for a demonstration of βραχυλογία by saying in four words (one of them a real mouthful) what he had previously said in eight (C2-3), even at the expense of courting misunderstanding. Thus Ast, *breviloquentior*; Schleiermacher, "ein Wortkarger;" Nichols, "no one briefer of speech."



ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ·<sup>189</sup> ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης [d] εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἢ ῥητορικῆ περι τὶ τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὕσα; ὥσπερ ἢ ὑφαντικῆ περι τὴν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικῆ περι τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. νῆ τὴν Ἥραν,<sup>190</sup> ὃ Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνη ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς<sup>191</sup> τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περι τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περι τὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη; [e]

ΓΟΡ. περι λόγους.

ΣΩ. ποίους<sup>192</sup> τούτους, ὃ Γοργία; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμνοντας,<sup>193</sup> ὡς ἂν διαιώμενοι ὑγιαίνουσιν;

ΓΟΡ. οὐ.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα περι πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἢ ῥητορικῆ ἐστίν.

ΓΟΡ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περι ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;<sup>194</sup>

189 The force of φέρε δὴ (C9) is revealed by the “programmatic” γάρ, by which Socrates resumes the true business of the discussion: it announces a challenge and the subsequent clause explains the basis for the challenge (whence Routh and Sommer placed these words in parentheses). The word order (ῥητορικῆς γ. φ. ε. τέχνης) momentarily freezes the attention.

190 For νῆ τὴν Ἥραν (D5) in grateful surprise, cf. *Lach.*181A4 with my n. The article is required in oaths to the gods except to Zeus (Gildersleeve §542).

191 εἰκότως (D7): He claims to be behaving properly (“*comme il faut*,” Sommer; “*ganz gehörig*,” Sauppe Apelt; “*wie es sich ziemt*,” Heidbüchel). In particular he deems the questions Socrates is asking should properly be answered in short compass (according to the distinction he expressed above, B9-C1). γάρ tells against the usual interpretation, according to which he is bragging (for which we would expect αὐτός or nothing, rather than τοῦτο), which moreover requires subsequent εὖ λέγεις to mean Socrates agrees with his boast rather than that he approves of Gorgias’s assertion.

192 Ποίους τούτους (E1): For anarthrous ποῖος expressing surprise (*Quarum tandem*, Ast) or indignation, cf. n. 1297.

193 κάμνοντας (E2), *de aegrotantibus* (Ast), not κάμνουσι (*pace* Schleiermacher Cary Apelt Croiset Helmbold Chambry Hamilton Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Piettre): it is a proleptic “lilies of the field” construction (*ostendunt qua ratione vivendi aegrotantes convalescere possint*, Ficinus: *sic* Stallb. Jahn Deuschle-Cron Lodge Ovink) and is idiomatic (many exx. of the idiom collected by Heusde *Spec. Crit.* 51-4), without the stiffness of “it manifests the sick, and explains how they are to become well,” (Benardete, 14, who at least notices the problem). The prolepsis is Socrates’s way of indicating as soon as possible that he is talking about iatrics, under the circumstance that he does not wish to use the term ἰατρική or ἰατρός, in order to avoid circularity. What is at stake in the distinction will become thematic below, when we learn that the doctor’s λόγος, for all its correctness, might be ineffectual when addressed to the patient, for persuading whom a different λόγος might be needed (456B1-5).

194 πῶς γὰρ οὐ; (E6) is a response that grants the point because denying it seems absurd, and it often gets Socrates’s interlocutors into hot water (e.g., *Lach.*190C7). That the person who can speak well does know what he is talking about is readily accepted here by Gorgias in the wake of his denial that the orator should *eo ipso* be able to make a logos telling how a sick person can become well: the reason he cannot is manifestly that he

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, [450] ἦν νυνδὴ λέγομεν, ἡ<sup>195</sup> ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν καμνόντων ποιεῖ  
δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;

ΓΟΡ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τοὺς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;

ΓΟΡ. μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν  
σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχνηαι, ὧς Γοργία, οὕτως [b] ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν  
περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους οἱ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ  
τέχνη.

ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν δὴ ποτε<sup>196</sup> τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὔσας περὶ λόγους,  
εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἂν ἦ<sup>197</sup> περὶ λόγους;

ΓΟΡ. ὅτι, ὧς Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας  
πράξεις<sup>198</sup> ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν<sup>199</sup> πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν  
τοιούτον χειρουργημα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις<sup>200</sup> διὰ λόγων [c] ἐστίν.<sup>201</sup> διὰ  
ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

is ignorant of (i.e., οὐ φρονεῖ περὶ) ἰατρικὴ.

195 Reading λέγομεν ἢ (450A1) with BWY (read by Deuschle-Cron) rather than ἐλέγομεν ἢ (V, read by edd.) as being the *lectio difficilior* with superior credentials both to that reading and to the λεγομένη of F (read by Schleierm.[*ut vid.*] and Dodds). For this sloppy present of λέγειν cf. *Apol.*21A5, *Lach.*193E8, *Leg.*708A6, and Smyth §1185a. ἦν νυνδὴ λέγομεν ἰατρικὴν *scr.* Routh, Beck.

196 τί οὖν δὴ ποτε (B3) brings forward (with οὖν) the sense of surprise (with δὴ ποτε) that he had initially expressed at Gorgias's answer, περὶ λόγους, when he asked him ποίους τούτους (449E1, cf. n. *ad loc.*); and the formulation of the ensuing question as suggesting a *reductio ad absurdum* explains it.

197 ἢ ἂν ἦ (B5) tucks in a subjunctive protasis that makes καλεῖς a generalization and thus makes the *definiens* a sufficient condition for determining the *definiendum*.

198 τοιαύτας πράξεις (B7): Anarthrous demonstrative adjective, as again τοιούτον χειρουργημα, along with ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, is dismissive. For the derogatory neuter cf. *Phdrs.*249D1 and my n. *ad loc.* Schleiermacher gets the prejudice against working with the hands by translating, *gewisse Handgriffe und dergleichen Handlungen*.

199 ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (B7): Socrates below (D5-6), with almost all commentators, takes this with subsequent πᾶσα (the proleptic position is idiomatic [456A7-8, 501A6; *Apol.*17A4; *Phdo.*66A4-5], as is the quantitative use of the expression [e.g. with οὐδέν, 466D8-E1]). But perhaps, with Routh (*actiones, ut ita dicam*), it apologizes for the term πρᾶξις, with which he generalizes χειρουργία so as to set up a μέν / δέ contrast between ἔργον and λόγος that is the idea underlying the whole statement though it is left implicit.

200 πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις (B9): Again Gorgias cannot tell merely what it does (πρᾶξις) without also praising its efficacy (κύρωσις). As opposed to the others it is a πρᾶξις instead of a ποίησις (as Dalfen noticed, 183) that the art brings about, and as such it culminates not in the creation of an object (*effiziertes Objekt*, Dalfen) but rather of an effect, for which he uses the recondite term, κύρωσις (Sicilian, along with χειρουργημα, according to the scholiast), which as such smacks of a sales pitch. Socrates will acknowledge the formulation to keep Gorgias in the conversation (D9-E1, E6, 451C6) but will not be distracted from pressing for a description of the πρᾶξις itself and what Gorgias teaches. To call κύρωσις “jargon” (Dodds) might be derogatory but is unilluminating, as is his mention of the rumor from the *Meno* that Gorgias speaks τραγικῶς.

201 διὰ λόγων (B9): Behind this and χειρουργημα is the distinction of words and deeds, but by dint of Gorgias's recondite diction, the approbative accent is shifted from the latter (which is usual) to the former (which is exceptional).

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω<sup>202</sup> οἷαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἶσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι·<sup>203</sup> εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχνη. ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. πασῶν δὴ οἶμαι τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία<sup>204</sup> τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔναι δὲ οὐδενὸς ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνονται ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας [d] μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἧς οὐ φῆς τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι· ἦ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἕτεροι<sup>205</sup> δὲ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνυ, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχνη, ὧν ἔναι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ [e] κύρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιούτων τινὰ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαι σε βούλεσθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι<sup>206</sup> οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κύρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὦ Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαι σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.<sup>207</sup>

[451] ΓΟΡ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

202 For μανθάνω (C3) in the present (and the imperfect in back-reference [465E5]) expressing the hunch that one is gathering what his interlocutor means, cf. n. 842. Cf. also the negated aorist at 488C1 denoting that the process did not take place.

203 This (C3-5) is the first of several self-interruptions and asides (uniquely frequent in this dialogue) by which Socrates takes the trouble to explain to Gorgias the motive of his coming question. In this case he stops only to say he will start; the true motive of the question will be explained below (453A8-C5). τάχα tends to be temporal in poetry but modal (ἴσως) in prose (Coraes, *apud* Bekker, *Anecdota Gr.* 1.309), but not universally (Ast and Stallb. *ad* 466A7: cf. n. 573).

204 ἐργασία (C7) replaces Gorgias's recondite χειρουργία and his commonplace but too vague πράξις with a term cognate with the term he is avoiding, ἔργον – which Socrates will then reach just below (D5).

205 ἕτεροι δὲ γε (D4): ἕτεροι is more specific than ἄλλαι, pointing not to others but to the alternative kind (e.g. *Lach.* 183D2).

206 For τῷ ῥήματι (E5) cf. 489C1, *Rep.* 340D5, *Thi.* 166D8; for elliptical οὐχ ὅτι ~ “I was not going to deny that” cf. Riddell §153.

207 This time (E4-9), as opposed to the moment above (B3-5), Socrates couches the perfectly warranted inference that Gorgias's characterization of oratory as “about speeches” is still too wide, as an attack of an imaginary captious interlocutor in order to avoid forcing Gorgias into a corner, because he wants Gorgias to describe his art rather than defend who he is. To this end he immediately interposes some illustrative examples (451A3-C9) to help Gorgias find his way.

ΣΩ. ἴθι νυν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἤν<sup>208</sup> ἠρόμην διαπέρανον.<sup>209</sup> ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ<sup>210</sup> τυγχάνει μὲν οὕσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὕσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἢ περὶ τί ἐν λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις με ἔροιτο ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν· ὧ Σώκρατες, τίς **[b]** ἐστίν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἵποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσῶν. καὶ εἴ με ἐπανέροιτο<sup>211</sup> τῶν περὶ τί; εἵποιμ' ἂν ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν γνῶσις,<sup>212</sup> ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνη ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἵποιμ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστίν τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανέροιτο· ἢ περὶ τί; εἵποιμ' ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ **[c]** συγγραφόμενοι,<sup>213</sup> ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει—περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστίν, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν—διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστικὴ. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο,<sup>214</sup> ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὧ Σώκρατες; εἵποιμ' ἂν ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρῶν φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει.<sup>215</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ὀρθῶς γε λέγων σὺ, ὧ Σώκρατες. **[d]**

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ σὺ, ὧ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ οὕσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων τινῶν·<sup>216</sup> ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

208 Reading ἤν (451A3), with all mss. Sauppe's emendation (ἦ), resuscitated by Dodds (not his "correction," *pace* Nichols), is unneeded: "complete the answer I asked" is a *constructio praegnans*. Conversely the mere dative is not quite enough to disambiguate answering a question from answering the question in a way that scrupulously follows the form, which Dodds wishes to impress upon Sauppe's dative.

209 διαπέρανον (A3): By using this term, which he just used of the efficacies of the various arts (περαίνωτο, 450C9, as a synonym of Gorgias's vaunting term, κύρωσις, above [450B9]), Socrates (as noted by Heidebüchel) is in a sense asking Gorgias to apply his ability to speak so as to achieve a description of his art that will avoid captious criticism. The term occurs again at 454C2, and becomes thematic late in the dialogue when Callicles consents to continue only so that Socrates might "finish."

210 Only Bekker and Ast read ἢ before ῥητορικὴ (in A4), present in ms. F *teste* Cantarín, and make it subject. But Socrates is asking for the specific differentia of the "linguistic" art that determines it to be oratorical.

211 ἐπανέροιτο (B2): ἐπι- specifies that it is a follow-up question. Cf. B7; 454A8, B1; 463C3; *al.*, for which Socrates is here preparing Gorgias (the next question because parallel is introduced with αὐ: B5).

212 Reading γνῶσις (B4) from all mss., with Heindorf Cary Jahn Jowett, against the needless and unlikely excision of Bekker followed by most edd. (but not "all," *pace* Thompson).

213 οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι (B7-C1): Perhaps a reference to the way a "rider" or codicil to a measure passed in the council (βουλή) might be inserted when it reaches the assembly (*n. b.*, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ), as in the inscription, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ, ἀναγράψαι δὲ Φανόκριτον τὸν Παρίανον πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργετὴν αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ (= Boeckh *I.G.* 1.84). Cf. also Ar. *Thesm.* 431-2: ταῦτ' ἐγὼ φανερώς λέγω, | τὰ δ' ἄλλα μετὰ τῆς γραμματέως συγγράφομαι; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29.3: Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοὺς αἰρεθέντας ἔγραψεν . . .

214 ἀνέροιτο (C5): ἀνά- adds a tone of confrontation to the questioning or to the decision to ask it. Cf. 455C8 and D1, and *Rep.* 454C1 with my n.

215 πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχους ἔχει (C9): *AGPS* (47.10.5A) helpfully gives examples of this double construction of ἔχειν with genitive and adverb.

216 Reading τινῶν (D3) from BTW, with Cantarín (τις *supersc.* f and now reported from Y by Croiset and Par<sup>2</sup> by Cantarín, *legg. edd.* : *om.* F [secluserat Hermann]), *legg.* Jahn Thompson Christ).

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί<sup>217</sup> ἐστὶ τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

ΓΟΡ. τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.<sup>218</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλ', ὃ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ<sup>219</sup> τοῦτο λέγεις [e] καὶ οὐδὲν πω σαφές.<sup>220</sup> οἶμαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ᾧ καταριθμοῦνται ἀδοντες ὅτι “ὕγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν” ἐστὶν, τὸ δὲ “δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ,” ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, “τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.”<sup>221</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

[452] ΣΩ. ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν<sup>222</sup> οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἰατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἰατρός ὅτι “ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή” —εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην, “σὺ δὲ τίς ὧν ταῦτα λέγεις;” εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι ἰατρός. τί οὖν λέγεις; ἢ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν; “πῶς γὰρ οὐ,” φαίη ἂν ἴσως, “ὃ Σώκρατες, ὑγεία; τί δ' ἐστὶν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν [b] ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας;” εἰ δ' αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι “θαυμάζοιμί τᾶν, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς εἴ σοι ἔχει<sup>223</sup> Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδειξαι

217 If we take τῶν περὶ τί (D5) as expanding the expression from above as follows, τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπ. τ. κ. κυρουμένων περὶ τί, as the editors do, we need a second τί, added by Heindorf against all mss. (*legg. edd.*), to introduce what in the subsequent words then appears to be a restatement of the question. This is paleographically easy, consistent with the paraphrase (but not the lemma) of Olymp. (34.17-19), but unnecessary. With Ficino (*Dic ergo quid ex omnibus id sit potissimum, de quo hi sermones habent quibus utitur rhetorica*) and Serranus (*Dic vero ecquae ex rebus omnibus ea sit potissimum in qua oratio illa sit, qua utatur rhetorica*) we can keep to the mss., whether taking περὶ in anastrophe and τῶν interrogative (with Findeisen), or tolerating a slight anacoluthon: “Say in particular, of those that do, about what of all things this is, about which oratory employs its speeches.”

218 μέγιστα ... καὶ ἄριστα (D7-8): Gorgias answers just as Polus had, not because he, too, is stuck in an unscientific “rut” (Lodge Sauppe Feix Dodds) but because he, too, needs his “answer” to be an ἐπάγγελμα advertising the value of oratory without defining it (cf. nn. 140, 178, and 186 *supra* and Olymp. 34.26-35.1). Compare the fragment from the *Kolakes* of Eupolis (φημί δὲ βροτοῖσι πολὺ πλείστα παρέχειν ἐγὼ | καὶ πολὺ μέγιστ' ἀγαθὰ· ταῦτα δ' ἀποδείξομεν, frg.160 Kock [*CAF* 1.302]), a play about Protagoras coming to town (Ath. 5.218BC). Gorgias understands his potential client to be asking him not what will he do for him, but what *good* thing he will do for him. In the end he will succeed in his strategy of postponement since Socrates's imaginary interlocutors will provide him foil and all he will then need to do is say that their goods are each and all procured by his art (452D5-E8), again avoiding to define the art itself. Compare also the way Socrates serves him up an opportunity later on, when he remarks, αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω (455D7-8). Of course Gorgias begs the question with his answer, but it is also by definition the most important question that he begs, for the μέγιστα might just be – as Socrates easily assumes them to be in other conversations – τὸ τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (as Olymp. anticipated, 35.3-4, quite apart from his ensuing enthusiasms [35.4-15]) – to which considerations of bodily and external goods often lead, in the dialectic (e.g., 459A1-E1: cf. n. 620). Instead of making that argument here he simply adduces the skolion.

219 καὶ (D9) compares his current answer with his own previous answers (449E1, 450C1-2), not with the answer of Polus (448C4-9), though it was very similar both in content and intention.

220 The καὶ with οὐδὲν (E1) is illative. In saying it is the most important and best thing, he needs to prove what is most important and best for the answer to have any definitive clarity (τὸ σαφές), for otherwise certain other candidates might not be excluded by his characterization.

221 Preserved at Ath. 14.694E (=PLG 3.645 [Bergk]) – abbreviated for Socrates's purposes, as schol. says, since the fourth good (ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων) is not provided by a δημιουργός. This skolion again serves as a basic authority for the conventional list of goods at *Euthyd.*279A7ff. and *Leg.*631C1ff, 661A5ff. Though in predicate position ἀδόλως goes only with πλουτεῖν since the (copulative) main verb can do nothing with it (cf. *AGPS* 50.10.4).

222 παρασταῖεν (452A1): The verb is used of people who show up arguing, for the arguments themselves, or for the thoughts that might “come upon” or “occur,” then expressed in the arguments (*Leg.*678A4, *Phdo.*66B1, *Phdrs.*232B5, 233C6). Whether we read ὅτι εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν with F, as I do (first adopted by Burnet, then Lamb Helmbold Theiler Dodds Irwin Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler Cantarín), or ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν παρασταῖεν from Y and f (with all *edd.* before Burnet, to my knowledge, and after him Croiset Apelt Feix Chambry Hamilton Piettre) is indifferent to the sense (whereas BTP's bare σοι is impossible), though Burnet's choice, which postpones the apodosis to εἴποι ἂν at A7, obviates the problem noted by Woolsey (and Hirschig and Lodge) that εἴποι at A3 should have a repeated ἂν, due to change of subject.

223 Reading ἔχει (B2) from PWF *teste* Cantarín, as the *lectio difficilior* (ἔχοι BT, *legg. edd.*). The trainer is surprised by Gorgias's assertion more than by the prospect of its being true. The mixed construction is not uncommon but regular in Plato (e.g., 492E8: *Apol.*25B7-C1, 30B5-6; *Crat.*428B1-2; *Prot.*315E2-3; *Rep.*584E7-9, 585A6; *Tim.*26B6-7). Indeed Dodds claims the optative is used only where the reference is to the



τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς,” εἶπομι’ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον· σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὃ ἄνθρωπε,<sup>224</sup> καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; “παιδοτριβῆς, φαίη ἂν, τὸ δὲ ἔργον μου ἐστὶν καλοῦς τε καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.” μετὰ δὲ<sup>225</sup> τὸν παιδοτριβὴν εἶποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῶμαι πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων·<sup>226</sup> [c] “σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῆ<sup>227</sup> τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἢ παρὰ Γοργία ἢ παρ’ ἄλλω ὄτωσιν.” φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· τί δὲ δῆ; ἢ σὺ τούτου δημιουργός; φαίη ἂν. τίς ὢν; “χρηματιστής.” τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. “πῶς γὰρ οὐκ;” ἐρεῖ.<sup>228</sup> καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε<sup>229</sup> τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ<sup>230</sup> τέχνην μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σὴν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροισι’ ἂν· “καὶ τί ἐστὶν [d] τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας.” ἴθι οὖν νομίσας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναί τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ<sup>231</sup> μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. ὅπερ<sup>232</sup> ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς<sup>233</sup> τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ<sup>234</sup> ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις; [e]

future (e.g., *Apol.*24A2, *Rep.*337C9-10).

- 224 ὃ ἄνθρωπε (B5) is slightly contemptuous, or at least confrontational, suggesting a comparison of this interloper with the dignified Gorgias (Heindorf). Cf. 518C2. Note, with Kratz, σὺ δὲ δῆ (B4) as more impatient than σὺ δέ, above (A6).
- 225 Reading δέ (B7) from Y, *legg.* edd. since Heindorf (δῆ BTPF : δέ δῆ *coni.* Deuschle-Cron), needing the adversative. Deussethchle-Cron’s δέ δῆ is attractive but the extra punch it brings was already spent just above.
- 226 ἀπάντων (B8): The first two only argued the special good they offer was better than Gorgias’s; the businessman now argues there are no grounds for anticipating that *anybody’s* good, Gorgias’s or otherwise, including even persons beyond the other two, is better than his.
- 227 ἐάν σοι ... φανῆ (C1): The indicative is the usual construction with σκόπει *vel sim.* (453C4-5, 459C6-7, 493D6, 501B2, 510A7; cf. 476D2 and 513A4 (ὄρᾶν). Here, the subjunctive with ἂν looks to the future *in order to challenge assent* (“will you ever see ...?”; contrast the “objective” use of the future indic. at 474B1). The businessman treats the value of money as self-evident (φανῆ ... ὄν) because its effects are visible (Mistriotes).
- 228 πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; (C5): This is the very same prejudicial and unthinking response the physician had given about the health he can provide (A8).
- 229 Γοργίας ὅδε (C6) continues the play of pronouns that the imaginary interlocutor started when he said τοῦτου at A5. Socrates shows Gorgias that his own assertion is disputable (451D9) by creating an imaginary conversation at the end of which he himself must enter to dispute the inverse (ἀμφισβητεῖ, here). This is an advance in the vividness with which he engages Gorgias in a dialectical conversation, over the captious imaginary interlocutor he had cut off at the knees, above (450E4-9).
- 230 παρ’ αὐτῷ (C6): Cf. C2.
- 231 σὺ (D3) is emphatic, pointing up the contrast between Gorgias and the other imaginary δημιουργοί he is being matched against – or more exactly the wares of those that his wares are being matched against.
- 232 περ (D5) ~ ‘as I said before.’
- 233 αὐτοῖς (D6), “the men that have it” (Woolsey). For ἅμα referring to two sides of the same coin cf. *Phdo.*63D2, *Rep.*348B3, *Symp.*191C5-8; S. *Ant.*436. Though Dodds gets the sense, the passage he cites from Thuc. (ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, 3.45.6) is not relevant since it pertains only to states (καὶ οὐχ ἦσον τὰς πόλεις, *ibid.*) throwing off an external yoke or imposing a yoke upon others (so also ps.-X. *Ath. Pol.*1.8). Jowett’s “gives men freedom in their own persons and to rulers the power of ruling” and Lamb’s “cause not merely of freedom for mankind at large but also of dominion to single persons” or Erler’s “*Freiheit für die Menschen und jedem einzelnen Gelegenheit ... in seiner Stadt über andere zu herrschen*” introduce without warrant an idealistic notion of freedom (e.g., *Unabhängigkeit*, Erler; “personal freedom,” Waterfield; “freedom for mankind,” Zeyl) quite alien to what Gorgias subsequently says in exegesis, according to which freedom is *nothing but the enslavement of others* (δοῦλον, κτλ., E5-8). The doublet is expressed compendiously in Meno’s remark about Gorgias: ἄρχειν οἷόν τε εἶναι (73C9; *n.b.* not ἄρχειν ἐπίστασθαι). There is no contradiction between the freedom of the men considered in themselves and their ability to rule others (*pace* Lodge Sauppe). Compare Thrasymachus’s notion that ἀδικία is ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον than δικαιοσύνη (*Rep.*344C5). Nor, conversely, is the first ἅμα phrase obviated by the second (*pace* Schmelzer, *ad loc.*), since the ability to rule others is not *eo ipso* a good thing unless one identifies personal freedom with the arbitrary exercise of one’s will (believes, that is, that his freedom to choose will guarantee that he chooses what he truly wants, a common presumption soon to be scrutinized [466A9-468E5]). By his discreet and indirect manner Gorgias leaves it to his auditor to connect the dots; Thrasymachus’s technique is more explicit but both contrive by their expression to make the prospect of studying with them irresistible.
- 234 Reading τοῦ (D7) with BTPf and edd. over τῶν (F). The benefit that Gorgias advertises his potential client will garner from the art he is selling is an inward autonomy or self-determination that consists merely in its sway (“*Steuerung*,” Heidbüchel) over “others” around him, people whose identity is left appropriately fuzzy by his referring to them without the article.

ΓΟΡ. τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἷόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις<sup>235</sup> καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς<sup>236</sup> σύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι<sup>237</sup> ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει<sup>238</sup> δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις<sup>239</sup> τὸν ἱατρὸν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστῆς οὗτος ἄλλω ἀναφανήσεται<sup>240</sup> χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ<sup>241</sup> λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.<sup>242</sup>

ΣΩ. νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα<sup>243</sup> τὴν [453] ῥητορικὴν ἦντινα τέχνην ἡγῆ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι<sup>244</sup> ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός<sup>245</sup> ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ·<sup>246</sup> ἡ

- 235 τοῖς λόγοις (E1), presumably as opposed to a πείθειν by means of force, threats, money, promises, supplication (Mistriotes). Cf. Philebus's report that according to Gorgias, πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆ (sc. πειθεῖ) δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, *Phlb.* 58B1-2. And now compare Thrasymachus's vision once again, where he imagines the common run of humanity *admiring* the unjust man for enslaving them (*Rep.* 344B5-C2).
- 236 πολιτικὸς σύλλογος (E4): The stress on the locations, which are listed first and determine the designation of the persons being persuaded, indicates that the size of the gathering is crucial. πολιτικὸς must therefore refer to the institutionalized number of people gathered rather than the subject at issue.
- 237 On καίτοι (E4) ~ "Let it be known that," trumping the logical sequence, Kratz (*Anhang* 160) cites Hdt. 3.81.2; *Phdo.* 62C9; X. *Cyrop.* 3.3.19; *Isoc. Pan.* 96; D. 2.20, 18.215. Cf. Denniston 562-3 and *AGPS* 69.33.1.H.
- 238 δυνάμει (E5): Gorgias now employs the curious term Socrates had used at the beginning (447C2: cf. n. 128). With this term Gorgias means to point up that his τέχνη is a sort of second-order τέχνη, in the sense that rather than produce something it has the *power to control* the arts that produce something, or more exactly to control the circumstances under which the other arts might succeed. Thus Gorgias will not be a δημιουργός in the received sense of the term after all, and we can see the point of the curious question with which Socrates began his inquiry (ὅστις ἐστίν, 447D1). The businessman's haughty attitude (*n.b.* categorical ἀπάντων, B8) was due to his sense that his money-making art was also in a sense second-order, in the sense that money can presumably *buy* trainers and doctors.
- 239 ἔξεις (E5), second singular (cf. climactic σοί, E7). Gorgias, emulously forgetting himself in the face of these three δημιουργοί, has now begun to sell *Socrates* on becoming an oratorical whiz. Gorgias's notion of freedom (ἐλευθερία, D6) consists in the ability to enslave others.
- 240 ἀναφανήσεται (E6): The unforeseen turnaround will be visible to all (compare Callicles's use at 484A6). Gorgias counters the businessman's claim of the palpability of wealth's importance (cf. φανῆ [C1] and n. 227).
- 241 All three will become slaves to him, but the arrogant businessman, who had spoken with particular scorn (B8), and said in particular that what he produces – money – is of greater value than anything any person (not just the other three) can provide, is singled out with equal scorn (οὗτος, E6: for derogatory οὗτος cf. *Crito* 45A8; *Lach.* 182D8, 183C8, 195C9; *Symp.* 181E4), for more particular treatment in the culmination of a tricolon crescendo (E6-8) capping the anaphora of δοῦλον: in his case the orator alienates his opponent from *himself* by appropriating for his own use the money the businessman makes; and at the last moment the appropriating victor becomes "you," Gorgias's addressee, who at the moment happens to be Socrates. Gorgias hesitates not at all to presume this outcome would appeal to him. Thus does he "reveal" to Socrates his art, by out-orating the several δημιουργοί with a more recondite eloquence.
- 242 τὰ πλήθη (E8), here plural to refer back to the several σύλλογοι πολιτικοί (contrast ἐν πλήθει, 456C6). Again we are given to infer that what makes a gathering political (E4) is that people are present *en masse*.
- 243 ἐγγύτατα (E9), along with νῦν and δηλῶσαι, points to the disarming candor (a thing quite different from the "accuracy" [Jowett], "precision" [Hamilton], or "correctness" of an answer [Lodge]: *n.b.* δηλοῦν is not διορίζειν, *pace* Schmelzer Helmbold, as well as Gorgias himself [A6-7], on which cf. Dodds *ad* 453A6; and *n.b.* Erler [tr.] has left out ἡγῆ!) with which Gorgias has very nearly "shown his hand" (even so the superlative indicates that something is still hidden!). What is shocking in what he has revealed is that the great benefit for mankind (τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, D6) is in fact the empowerment of one man to enslave many! Socrates's dialogical art, including his various techniques for keeping Gorgias on board, is progressively 'hulling out the kernel' (Cron). But Socrates at the moment demurs to draw inferences about the purport of what Gorgias is saying. Meanwhile, what Gorgias is saying is revealing who he is in the sense of revealing what his teaching really consists of, and it is not pretty.
- 244 εἴ τι (453A1): for this quasi-diffident τι cf. A4, 458C4-5, 462A1, 472C7 and *Lach.* 182A8, 195C9, 197A6 (with my nn. *ad locc.* – an affectation in Nicias's way of speaking).
- 245 δημιουργός (A2) reverts to the original terminology of Socrates's questions (447D3), with a personification for the sake of emphasis that is said by ancient sources to go back to Corax or Tisias (cf. Walz, *Rhet Gr.* 4.19.19-20; Amm. Marc. 30.4: *Tisias* suasionis opificem esse memorat assentiente *Leontino Gorgia*), and to Xenocrates (S.E. *adv. math.* 2.61), and to Isocrates (Quint. *persuadendi opifex*, 2.15.4). Dodds (*ad loc.*) guesses those sources are wrong and suggests instead that δημιουργός + gen. is "typically Platonic, or Socratic" (citing *Charm.* 174E9 [ὕγεια; δημιουργός] and *Symp.* 188D1 [φιλίας δημιουργός]), but among the Platonic/Socratic uses the personification is often encomiastic (*Symp.* 188D1, *Rep.* 500D6-8) in a way that parallels the higher language of tragedy (e.g., E. frg. 136.4, 1059.7 [TGF, Nauck]; cf. S. *Ai.* 1035), an effect imitated by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1273B32), Aeschines (3.215), and Demetrius (*Eloc.* 215). It is for its high tone that the phrase is remembered by later authors, not because it is "typically" Platonic. The question is not a matter of whose phrase it is but what is its force, which is something equally crass as referring to a university as a "knowledge factory." As with his repetition of Gorgias's κύρωσις above (cf. n. 200), Socrates acquiesces in his magnification of oratory in order to persevere in the attempt to bring out just what it is.
- 246 τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ (A3): The expression reflects Gorgias's language at 450E.

ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλεόν τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθῶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ<sup>247</sup> ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἰκανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. ἄκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὡς [b] ἑμαυτὸν πειθῶ,<sup>248</sup> εἶπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλω διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναί αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἓνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. τί οὖν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν.<sup>249</sup> ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ, ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὄντινων πραγμάτων ἐστὶν πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἄλλ'<sup>250</sup> ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἶμαι σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὄν· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἤττον ἐρήσομαι σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς [c] ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου,<sup>251</sup> ἵνα οὕτω προῖη ὡς μάλιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ποιῶι περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστὶν τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῶων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;<sup>252</sup>

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε. [d]

ΣΩ. ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα;

247 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (A5): Socrates is always prone to remark explicitly that λόγοι have an inward effect, and prone in general to identify the seat of a man's identity, by introducing this term. Cf. *Lach.* 185E1-2, *Apol.* 29D7-E3, *Soph.* 250B7. At the same moment he acknowledges Gorgias's emphasis on persuading a plurality – broaching the paradox whether it is a mass that is persuaded or a soul. In this connection it is noteworthy that he does not say ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς.

248 ὡς ἑμαυτὸν πειθῶ (A8-B1): For the phrase cf. *Meno* 76E6-7, *Phdo.* 92E1. Again, Socrates interrupts his questioning to identify his motivation and methodology, so as to secure Gorgias's "buy-in" to continue conversing.

249 νῦν (B5) functions as a forward-pointing demonstrative (τόδε), mitigating hiatus. Cf. 486E2.

250 οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' (B7), when answering μέν in lieu of δέ, "normally denotes that what is being said cannot be gainsaid, however strong the arguments to the contrary: marking in fact the deliberate surmounting of an obstacle recognized as considerable" (Denniston, 28). That is, Socrates's uncertainty what Gorgias means, though extremely important, is weaker than his strong suspicion – and yet he will keep silent as to what it is, to say exactly what it is. He feels he has every warrant to believe his suspicion except for one, the warrant of the logos – as he goes on to say.

251 οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου (C2-3): Socrates now begins to disambiguate his motive for all the scrupulosity he has been exercising in his treatment of Gorgias so far. It may have seemed out of deference to the great man (σοῦ ἔνεκα: cf. 450C3-4, 452D9) but now that it has become unavoidably clear (δηλώσαι ... ἐγγύτατα) that Gorgias is presenting his message indirectly, that he is inviting his potential client to "connect the dots" on his own, Socrates refers to this connecting of the dots he is supposed to be making as his "suspicion" about what Gorgias is saying. By dialectical questioning he will require Gorgias to say it himself, but in order for that actually to occur, the conversation must remain a real conversation (ἔνεκα λόγου) and not a conspiracy to play along with an unstated under-meaning. Note in this regard that Socrates refers to the λόγος as something that is being said rather than something they are saying (λέγεται, C4). Socrates asks Gorgias if he thinks such a requirement is just (C4-5), before continuing.

252 Reading καὶ ποῦ (C8) with all mss. and some edd. (πῶς *coni.* Routh, cf. Ficinus *quo pacto* : τοῦ Coraes : πῶσος *coni.* Heindorf : ἢ οὐ *coni.* Woolsey, *legg.* Cary Schanz Christ Sauppe Croiset Apelt : *alia alii scribentes tergiversantesque*). The paleographically "easiest" emendation of Coraes gives a sense that is at the same time maximally irrelevant to the argument. Socrates is noticing the emphasis that Gorgias has placed on the locations in which ῥητορικὴ is practiced (452E2-3, implying presumably different oratorical techniques for different audiences deliberating about different sorts of things: cf. Sauppe *ad* 452E2-4, Canto n. *ad loc.*, Heidbüchel), and so now he uses the location of the paintings as a characterization of types of painting (e.g., decorative painting in a private home versus monumental painting in public buildings or temples [so Kratz, *Anhang*160] – cf. "and where do you find them?" Jowett, "*et pour les mettre où?*" Canto, "and where his works can be seen," Waterfield). It is not the specific location of the painting that is at issue (e.g., the Helen located at Croton versus another Helen located somewhere else), since this would individuate but not characterize (*pace* Deuschle-Cron, Lodge, Dalfen – though at the end of their notes they do notice, as does Kratz, Gorgias's *subsequent* characterization of oratory by place [454B5-6]). Schmelzer's ingenious notion of the medium "in which" he paints (e.g., canvas or wood) is too abstract for ποῦ. The use of ποῦ at *Phdr.* 235C1 is not parallel since it there means πῶς (*ibid.*, D5). Cope's translation, "and on what occasions" is close enough.



ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοὶ ἀπεκέκριτο;

ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ μόνη ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει<sup>253</sup> ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.<sup>254</sup> [e]

ΣΩ. πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν<sup>255</sup> λέγωμεν ὧν περ νυνδὴ· ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός<sup>256</sup> ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ;

ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ [454] ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττόν ὅσον ἐστίν· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχναις ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδείξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὔσας καὶ ἤστινος καὶ περὶ ὅτι· ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶν δημιουργός.

ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως<sup>257</sup> ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα<sup>258</sup> ποίας

253 ὁ διδάσκει πείθει (D10): τοῦτο is the understood antecedent, which we may conceive of as direct object or accusative of respect with πείθω.

254 πάντων μάλιστα (D11): Gorgias answers both questions by answering the first rather than the second: cf. Riddell §§305-6. We must take πάντων as masculine and the question arises who the others might be and in what the lesser or weaker persuasion would consist (for μάλιστα, too, is vague), but in any event Gorgias has already acknowledged that a knower is more persuaded than a believer, and so his answer paves the way for the distinction Socrates wants next to draw (453E1-454E2). Dodds thinks of the distinction as Platonic (p.206) but what is Platonic about it is the importance it is given in the dialogues.

255 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν (E1): Kratz (*ad loc.*) nicely remarks that ἐπὶ is used rather than περὶ since the arts in question will serve as the substrate for what will be said, rather than its topics. Cf. *AGPS* 68.40.5.B.

256 πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός (E4-5): To be able to use this rubric for arithmetic, and to be able to repeat it several times below, of course takes some of the air out of the sails.

257 δικαίως (454A7): Socrates brings forward from 453C5 the notion of “just” questioning and emphasizes it with repetition (δικαίον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι, B1), and even waits to get explicit permission to proceed, in order to pre-empt Gorgias from blocking the inquiry with a complaint about, for example, his “asking the same thing over and over.”

258 ἐπανεροίμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα (A8): With the introduction of an imaginary thesis-holder (τὸν λέγοντα), Socrates slightly distances Gorgias from the position he has been upholding (as he does Glaucon at Rep.588B6-11, on which crucial passage cf. my n. *ad loc.*) and instead (with the first plural designating those who are questioning him) brings him over to his own side as partner rather than opponent – again for the sake of the logos.

δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἢ ῥητορική ἐστὶν τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοὶ [b] δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

ΓΟΡ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ΓΟΡ. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις,<sup>259</sup> ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδिका.<sup>260</sup>

ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπόπτειον<sup>261</sup> ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὃ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον [c] εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ – ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς ἔνεκα περαίνεσθαι<sup>262</sup> τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα<sup>263</sup> ὑπονοοῦντες<sup>264</sup> προαρπάζειν ἀλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν<sup>265</sup> ὅπως ἂν βούλη περαίνης.

ΓΟΡ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. καλῶ.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

ΓΟΡ. [d] ἔγωγε.

259 ὄχλοις (B6): The size of the audience, continually mentioned above, is now seen to be crucial enough to his definition that it is the specific differentia of the persuasion involved, over against διδασκαλική (453E7). Choosing this term over σύλλογοι (which is the true genus of the several public assemblies he named at 452E1-4) is perhaps not derogatory (Lodge Dodds) but does emphasize the quantity over the political credentials of those present, and its derogatory potential as such does come to the surface by the time Socrates repeats it the second time (455A5).

260 περὶ τούτων, ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδिका (B7): The very reference to the topic of τὸ δίκαιον is entirely new, but to Gorgias an insignificant detail. Hitherto it was the spectrum of public venues by which he had characterized the art, filling out the names of the venues with the names of their attendants rather than their subject matters (e.g., ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστάς). To that spectrum he had just now referred by a generalization (ὄχλοις) from a single case (δικαστηρίοις), which case was the first venue he had listed above (452E2); and he compensates for the abbreviation (not an extension, *pace Dodds ad loc.*) by his back-reference (ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον). Under the force of referring to the whole with a single case he now fills things out with respect to that case (whence ταύτης is brought forward by τούτων – as Socrates notices in his reply [B8-9]), by referring (again *per etymologiam*) to the subject matter corresponding to that case. τούτων virtually points backwards, not forwards (that would have been τῶνδε, for which cf. *Apol.* 37A4-5 [οὐκ ἔστιν ... τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον]; *Crito* 48B3-4; *Lach.* 189E1-2; *Meno* 81D6-E1, 90C11-D1 and *St. George Stock ad loc.*; *Rep.* 423C6, 440D8 and my n. *ad loc.*). Had he chosen the venue of the council (ἐν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις) he would have said ἃ ἐστὶ ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακὰ, but this would fall short of the figure.

261 ὑπόπτειον (B8): As the oratorical art is becoming narrower and narrower at every stage Socrates increases his “meta-commentary” on the process of question and answer, repeating in substance what he had said just before (453B7-C4), but now adding μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν, which further specifies ἔνεκα τοῦ λόγου (453C2-3) by envisioning how the argument might crash. Gorgias’s usual interlocutor (i.e., his prospective client) just might conspire with him to leave unsaid the shameful truth about wanting to learn what he teaches and his wanting to teach it (which would vitiate the initiative above, καταφανὲς ποιεῖν περὶ ὅτου λέγεται, 453C4), but Socrates might also hold back his objections to Gorgias’s under-meaning in order to refute him after he has said more. With this new alternative, Socrates brings opposition and controversy closer to the surface than before; and again he asks for permission before proceeding (C4-5).

262 περαίνεσθαι, again (C2), and again (περαίνης, C5): Compare 451A3, 450C9 and n. 209. Socrates prefers that their logos – both his dialectical way of speaking and Gorgias’s oratorical way, might together achieve what a logos can (κῶρως).

263 μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα (C2-3): The verb is not inherently negative: the habit is usually a bad habit (510D6; *Apol.* 35C5, 38A8, 38E2; *Leg.* 659D5, 706C2-D1, 707A4, 788B7, 935B2, 942A8; *Meno* 70B6; *Rep.* 396A3, 562E7, 563C8, 590B8; *Th.* 165A7), but not always (e.g., *Leg.* 653B5, 660A3, 681B2, 717D8, 793B7; *Phdo.* 67C7, 81B8; *Rep.* 604C9; *Soph.* 225B9).

264 ὑπονοοῦντες (C3): Cf. *Andoc.* 1.5. For προαρπάζειν cf. *Euthyd.* 300D1; *Hdt.* 5.50.3, 9.91.2.

265 κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν (C4), according to the agreed-upon program as at *Leg.* 812A4.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. οἴομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. καλῶς γὰρ οἶει· γνώση<sup>266</sup> δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γὰρ τίς σε ἔροιτο· ἄρ' ἔστιν τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς; φαίης ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δαί;<sup>267</sup> ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΓΟΡ. οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. δῆλον γὰρ· αὐ<sup>268</sup> ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. [e] ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι<sup>269</sup> εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ποτέραν οὖν ἢ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις<sup>270</sup> περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἢ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΓΟΡ. δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

ΣΩ. ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς [455] δημιουργός ἐστὶν πιστευτικῆς ἄλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ ἄδικον.<sup>271</sup>

266 γνώση (D4): It is very nearly a joke, and certainly an instance of “self-instantiation” (on which cf. n. 1720 and my note to *Rep.*335E7), for Socrates to draw a distinction between Gorgias’s guess and his knowledge, just before teaching him that knowledge is different from opinion!

267 Reading τί δαί (D6) from *J teste* Cantarín, with Bekker (only). The question is pre-loaded.

268 Reading γὰρ αὐ (D8), with BTWF accepted by Heindorf Ast Stallb. Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hermann Schmelzer Lodge Feix (ἄρα Olymp., *legg.* Thompson Hirschig Schanz Theiler Dodds Chambry Irwin Canto Cantarín Pietre Nichols Dalfen : γὰρ οὖν E3 Steph., *leg.* Beck). Burnet conjectured ἄρ' αὐ (accepted by Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Heibüchel Erler); *scripserant alia alii*. γὰρ is explaining the certainty that δαί (also emended out: cf. prev. n.) had expressed (along with Gorgias’s responsive οὐδαμῶς, as Cope noticed), before the parallel (whence αὐ) question about knowledge was even asked.

269 πεπεισμένοι (E1): The term is introduced to provide a common genus for learning and trusting. This explains the expression used at 455A1 and determines the reading needed at A4 (cf. n. 272). To be persuaded is close to trusting in English, until we realize it is people we trust and ideas we are persuaded of.

270 ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις (E5-6): Socrates has noticed and scrupulously repeats the expression of Gorgias at 454B5-7 (cf. n. 260), including emphasis upon size (again with syntactical variation, at 455A3-4).

271 Socrates provides (E9-455A2) “syllogistically” a conclusion in the form of a succinct definition with specific differentia. Note the shift from *περὶ* plus genitive plural to *περὶ* plus accusative singular. The new term, διδασκαλική, is merely the other side of μεμαθηκέναι, with which the passage began (454C7) and continued until E2 (it was suddenly replaced by the notion of ἐπιστήμη [E4] and εἰδέναι [E7-8]), but now the notion of a teacher at work becomes relevant again, and the reason is that the counterpart of didascalical persuasion is the persuasion caused by another person, the producer of *confidence in himself*. The term for this counterpart may well be a coinage by Plato: coinages are needed for new things and with this expression we might well anticipate that Gorgias’s method is a new thing (producing belief in the man not his argument: cf. nn. 299, 377, 430).

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικαίων τε περὶ καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον.<sup>272</sup> οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναίτο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ<sup>273</sup> διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

ΓΟΡ. οὐ δῆτα.<sup>274</sup>

ΣΩ. φέρε δῆ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν<sup>275</sup> περὶ τῆς [b] ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτὸς πῶ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω.<sup>276</sup> ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῆ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς<sup>277</sup> οὐ συμβουλεύσει;<sup>278</sup> δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι.<sup>279</sup> οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως περὶ ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων [c] καταλήψεως συμβουλή ἢ, ἀλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ<sup>280</sup> τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ· ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτὸς τε φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει

272 Reading πιστικὸς μόνον (A4) with BT and Ficinus, *legg.* Routh Schleiermacher Ast Stallb. Cary Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Sommer Jowett Mistriotes Sauppe-Gercke Burnet Apelt Helmbold Chambry Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Heibüchel Erler (πιστικὸς μόνον W : πιστικὸς μόνον T<sup>2</sup>P *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Steph. Heindorf Coraes Hermann Jahn Cope Kratz Schanz Schmelzer Christ Lodge Croiset[*sine noto!*] Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds Theiler Hamilton Pietre Cantarin Dalfen : πιστικὸς μόνου F). The term, like πιστευτικὸς (A1), appears to be coined on the spot for the sake of the argument, which needs an adjective co-specific with διδασκαλικὸς under the genus of persuasion (πεπεισμένοι, 454E1). The fact that mss. elsewhere wrote this unusual word when πιστικὸς was needed (Heindorf Buttman Thompson Dodds-L.SJ: e.g., X. *Cyrop.* 1.6.10, S.E. *adv.math.* 2.75, Arist. *Rhet.* 1.2, 1355B28) does not prove that that happened here. The context pre-empts any need to question the term. That it should according to those editors (and Lodge) be awkward is also irrelevant: “confidence” and “trust” are synonyms. *Polit.* 304C10 and *Leg.* 723A2 are irrelevant since teaching is there functioning as co-specific with persuading. It is for his immediate dialectical purposes, arguing with Gorgias and his praise of the δημιουργὸς πειθοῦς, that Socrates here constructs the new division according to which πειθὸς is a genus. The testimonial value of S.E. *adv.math.* 2.75 reading πιστικὸν here (if we are to take it as such), is vitiated by the fact that it reads πιστευτικῆς at A1, which is impossible.

273 ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ (A5-6) refers of course to the clepsidra. The remark, and Gorgias’s agreement with it, are two-edged. They assert and agree that there are important topics about which knowledge would be preferable to mere belief, but at the same time that the art of belief-persuasion can dispense with any need for such knowledge and argumentation.

274 δῆτα (A7): Emphatic agreement: for Gorgias and his would-be clients (to whom Socrates will presently refer) this is a virtue rather than a deficiency of oratory, and index of its power rather than its weakness.

275 Reading καὶ λέγομεν (A8) with the mss. (καὶ λέγωμεν S2). The force of καὶ, after (e.g.) an interrogative questioning obligation (ὀρῶμεν hortatory), is to insist on focussing upon and questioning the act, given the new or revised or updated context in which it is to take place: cf. *Euthyph.* 6B2, *Lach.* 182E4, *Rep.* 434D5, *Soph.* 232B11. Cf. Kratz, *Anhang* 160-161 and, with Denniston, 313-316 § iii(b), “the question cuts at the foundations of the problem under consideration.” The choice between indicative (λέγομεν) and subjunctive (λέγωμεν) is less important than recognizing that Socrates will now go on to *infer* (reading the indicative) or *suggest* (with the subjunctive) the implications of all they have agreed to through dialectical question and answer, up to this point: that oratory is not teaching, nor in charge of any action, nor in charge of thought (for some others deal purely in λόγοι), but in charge of the best thing – not health or beauty or wealth but persuasion, and not of the persuasion of knowledge but only the persuasion in large masses of people, on the topics of justice and injustice, albeit not knowledgeable conviction but the conviction of a crowd that can be turned toward a vote. . . . And one more time, Socrates scrupulously leaves room for Gorgias to agree or disagree with the inferences he draws – for they do not describe the reality, as Socrates already knows and as Gorgias will point out on the next page.

276 λέγω (B2) is deliberative subjunctive (with Waterfield) after hortatory ὀρῶμεν above, leading to the question πῶς λέγεις below (C2), addressed to the other person included in the hortatory first plural. We need not guess what Socrates is uncertain about (*pace* Deuschle-Cron and Lodge), for it becomes clear on the next page. According to all they have agreed to so far, the orator will not advise on technical questions, as he here will say (B4, C1-2), but in fact the orator *does* counsel on walls and harbors – as Socrates has known at least since the day he heard Pericles advocate the wall (E5-6). This is the source of his wonder at the extraordinary δύναμις of this art, to learn about which has been his motive all along (πάλαι, 456A4, referring to 447C1-2: cf. n. 293).

277 ὁ ῥητορικὸς (B4): It is noteworthy that this adjectival expression, here and in the sequel, replaces the noun, ῥήτωρ, used at A3.

278 οὐ συμβουλεύσει (B4): The future vivid condition is an inference from what they have said (brought forward by γάρ), which will turn out patently to be false, as will the related prediction given below in B6-C2. Cope’s and Helmbold’s “will *refrain from* giving counsel,” imputing that it is the choice of the orator not to speak, and Croiset’s “*appartient-il à l’orateur de donner un avis*,” and Canto’s “*a-t-on jamais prié l’orateur...*” which ask not what will happen but what should, are over-translations, just as Dodd’s remark that Socrates and Gorgias are “limiting the field in which the rhetorician can be useful” is an over-interpretation.

279 αἰρεῖσθαι (B5) is more likely passive than middle, as at 456B8 (*pace* AGPS 52.10.1.A).

280 στρατηγικοὶ (C1) not στρατηγοί – ἀρητορικοὶ rather than ῥήτορες (B4). Note that the examples are ascending in public importance and prominence. If the orator shall not speak on these what shall he speak on?

τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ<sup>281</sup> πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν<sup>282</sup> ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον<sup>283</sup> ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἳ ἴσως αἰσχύνονται ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι.<sup>284</sup> ὑπ' [d] ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτῶμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν;<sup>285</sup> περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι<sup>286</sup> τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω.<sup>287</sup> οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα [e] καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων<sup>288</sup> καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν,<sup>289</sup> τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.<sup>290</sup>

ΣΩ. λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τεύχους. [456]

- 281 τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ (C4) recognizes the twin calling of Gorgias, as both teacher and as exponent of the art (cf. n. 162, *supra*). In deferring to Gorgias as the dispositive expert on his own art, Socrates only continues the thesis he is in the midst of arguing!
- 282 σπεύδειν (C5) and its cognates can denote avidity to study (cf. *Lach.*184C5 and 182E4) but with τὸ σὸν it here refers to solicitous support of a person's interests (cf. *S. El.*251). Cf. τὸ τῶν παρόντων, 458B5-6; τὸ ὑμέτερον, 522C1, *al.*
- 283 τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων (C6): On ἔνδον cf. 447C7 and n. 133.
- 284 ἀνερέσθαι (C8) risking confrontation, again at D1 (cf. n. 214, *supra*: Cope incorrectly takes the ἀνά- to denote *repetition* of the question). At the beginning of the *Protagoras* we see such an ashamed diffidence in Hippocrates since he asks Socrates to accompany him to the great man, but shame also when Socrates asks him what he wants to become by being with Protagoras (*Prot.*312A1-7). For it is “success” that the sophist's students want – in the present case, freedom for themselves that consists in nothing more than controlling the thought of others! In broaching these issues, Socrates has both foisted upon Gorgias an opportunity (as Cron says; cf. *ἐπαρθείς*, *Olymp.*45.24), but also an onus, to present his *ἐπάγγελμα* on his own terms – which we should expect will itself be quite a performance and surely not a brachylogical response. In a sense we will finally find out, or more likely be given a chance to infer, what Gorgias thinks oratory is – or more exactly what he has in mind to teach – even though the dialectical search, managed so carefully by Socrates at every turn, has so far succeeded only in discovering what it is not.
- 285 συνῶμεν (D2): For *συνεῖναι* (*vel συγγίγνεσθαι*) as a metaphor for studying with someone cf. *Apol.*19E6, 25B4; *H.Maj.*283C3, 286D4; *Lys.*223B3; *Lach.*196B6, 201C2; *Phdrs.*239B1; *Prot.*316C2 and 8, 318A3. Also *X. Apol.*17; *Mem.*1.2.5, 1.2.38, 1.3.1, 1.6.11, 3.8.1; *Symp.*2.5.
- 286 With ἀποκαλύψαι (D7) Gorgias announces a higher level of discourse than that to which he has allowed himself to be confined hitherto (whence πάντα τὰ μυστήρια, *Olymp.* 45.25): with his retort of *πειράσθαι* he is announcing that his difficulty is not to defend it but to do it justice. We are about to learn that final hidden increment Socrates alluded to with his superlative, *ἐγγύτατα*, at 452E9 (cf. n. *ad loc.*).
- 287 ὑφηγήσω (D8): “*tu m'a toi-même fort bien montré la voie*” (Chambry). The reasonable behavior of assemblies that Socrates expected, especially in connection with building walls and harbors, is different from the reality. Socrates's mention of walls and harbors therefore gives Gorgias the perfect “segue” to strip away the veil. Gorgias's recognition and exploitation of the opening is exactly what is meant when one says that the great orator finds the *καίρος* (e.g. *Phdrs.*272A4, Alcidas §3 and *passim*, D. L. 9.52).
- 288 Reading τὰ Ἀθηναίων (E1) against Cobet's faithless deletion of these words, present in the best mss., as an *inficitum emblema* (*Mnem.*3 [1875] 119). They are, rather, a polite compliment from a visitor to Athens. Stallb. notes that τὰ as opposed to τῶν, creating the appositive or “second” attributive position for the adjectival genitive, not only singles out the walls and harbors as Athenian but compares them with those of others, so that “*cum gravitate quadam Atheniensium esse dicuntur*” (so also Cron). Dodds on the other hand finds the construction regular with proper nouns.
- 289 ἐκ τῆς ... συμβουλῆς γέγονεν (E2): The preposition arrogates to the *person* of Themistocles the power and efficacy of an art as described above, in connection with learned or believed persuasion: cf. *ἐξ ἧς ... γίγνεται*, 454E7-8. On the basis of *Prot.*319B3-C7, where Socrates claims that he sees (ὄρω) the Athenians “sending for” experts and laughing down a man who tries to advise them if he is not a specialist (δημοιουργόν, C2) no matter his looks and wealth and family, Dodds argues that in the present passage Gorgias is exaggerating the influence of Themistocles and Pericles (and that “Plato knows it”). But in the context of *Prot.* the issue is knowledge, not influence. Socrates is not there concerned with the non-specialist politician or orator giving counsel, but with the *wrong* specialist giving counsel, and so only as foil for observing that conversely any and all specialists (δημοιουργοί) are allowed to give counsel on the general διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως so as to infer that Athenians do not believe that larger policy questions are objects of knowledge. Far from being a different point, it is exactly this belief of theirs that enabled them, according to the present passage, to hearken to (mere) orators and politicians like Themistocles and Pericles, who know *even less* than the specialists do (for which compare of course the ἀγαθοὶ δημοιurgoί of *Apol.*22D6-8). If anything it is Socrates who exaggerated when (at B6-7, above) he depicted huge policy decisions such as the building of walls and the outfitting of harbors as problems for designers to decide.
- 290 Reading τῶν δημιουργῶν (E3), with all mss. The brachylogy is insouciant and derogatory (the tone is gotten by Lamb's “your craftsmen” for τῶν; compare “*mere craftsmen*,” Helmbold). Despite offending “*virī doctī*” (Stallb.), such as Buttman who proposed the half-measure of emending τῶν into τῆς, or Cobet's τῆς τῶν, followed by some edd., the reading of the mss. is to be kept. For similar brachylogy cf. *Prot.*358C7-D2; *X. Cyrop.*3.3.41; *E. Andr.*220.



ΓΟΡ. καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἴρεσις ἦ ὧν νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὀρᾶς<sup>291</sup> ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορες εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας<sup>292</sup> περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὧ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δυνάμις<sup>293</sup> ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

ΓΟΡ. εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὧ Σώκρατες,<sup>294</sup> ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῆ ἔχει.<sup>295</sup> [b] μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ·<sup>296</sup> πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἰατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρὰ τινα<sup>297</sup> τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου<sup>298</sup> τοῦ ἰατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῆ ῥητορικῆ. φημί δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπη βούλει ἐλθόντα<sup>299</sup> ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἰατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ

- 291 ὀρᾶς (456A2): The verb is not otiose. Gorgias stresses the empirical fact in contrast with the logical inference Socrates had voiced above (cf. 470D5 with n. 722, Laches's expressions at *Lach.* 183C2 and 185C7, and Socrates's ὀρῶ at *Prot.* 319B5). Gorgias is not saying (*pace* Canto) that only these can hold the day but that, contrary to Socrates's inference from what they have said, one nevertheless finds them doing so. It is again a reason for studying with him that Gorgias wishes to convey.
- 292 οἱ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας (A3): γνώμη here refers to the policy or measure (objective) not the agreement or judgment in its favor by the audience (subjective), *pace* Kratz, *ad loc.* Gorgias asserts both that the orators are the ones *selected* to speak on a motion (εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες: the participial construction with definite article is a very different thing from συμβουλεύουσι [cf. 455B4, C1]) – not “dictate policy,” *pace* Hamilton, and also that when they are so selected, they are the ones who win (οἱ νικῶντες) – indeed this is why they were selected to speak! (*n.b.*, οἱ ῥήτορες is predicate *per* Gildersleeve §668: cf. n. 2251). For the former (τὸν συμβουλευόντα εἶναι), the common expression is γνώμην λέγειν (cf. *Ar. Eq.* 267, 654; *Antiph.* 6.45; *Lys.* 20.14; *Andoc.* 1.73; *Aesch.* 1.20, 1.181, 3.108), but γνώμην (or γνώμη) νικᾶν means to advance the motion and carry it through to adoption: cf. *Hdt.* 1.61.3, and *Ar. Nub.* 432: ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γνώμας οὐδεὶς νικήσει πλείονας ἢ σὺ, and *Vesp.* 594). It has finally become evident why, according to Gorgias, large numbers must be involved in the success of the orator's persuasion: it is because the orator's “persuasion” consists not of teaching (453D7-455A7) but of *winning a majority of votes!*
- 293 δυνάμις (A5): By choosing this term and πάλαι Socrates comes back, full circle, to his opening question at 447C1-2. The back-reference is ushered in with καὶ before θαυμάζων. In sum he has learned from Gorgias, apologizing at every step for pressing his question as we have seen, that the oratorical art enables a person to make someone else an orator (449B1), that the orator only deals in pure speech though he is not alone in this (449D8-451D4), that this pure speech is an asset greater than health, beauty, or wealth because it enslaves even the providers of these to the orator (451D10-452E8), that though it may be dubbed “persuasion-producer” oratory produces not the persuasion that constitutes learning but only opinion, and that it operates in large audiences on the topics of justice and injustice (454B5-455A7). Given all this, one would expect not to see orators even stand up in the assembly when a technical issue is raised; but Socrates has known all along that (1) they do (and are allowed to) stand up, and even more that (2) when they do they win the day – whence he calls its power δαιμονία (“übermenschlich,” Schleiermacher). With this remark, as well as his invitation above, we have completed the initial dialectical section, and he gives Gorgias the “green light” to perform, rather than answer – though for Gorgias, as we shall see, he is indeed “answering” a question, in the sense he advertised at the beginning.
- 294 εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὧ Σώκρατες! (A7): Compare the very similar sophistic ἐπάγγελμα at *H.Maj.* 282D7 (εἰ γὰρ εἰδείης ὅσον ἀργύριον εἰργασμαι ἐγὼ, θαυμάσας ἄν). The addition of τί *vel sim.* (Madvig [*Advers.* 1.409] Schanz Richards Croiset Chambry) is unneeded. For suppression of the apodosis in exclamation Dodds compares *E. Phoen.* 1347, *Ion* 961. Alternatively we may supply θαυμάζους ἄν from Socrates's previous remark.
- 295 ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῆ ἔχει (A8): This is not, *pace AGPS* 56.3.6.B, a case of a periphrastic construction with ἔχει (as for example at *Phdr.* 257C2, θαυμάσας ἔχω): Although δυνάμεις goes with both verbs, ἀπάσας goes with συλλαβοῦσα only, and ὑφ' αὐτῆ goes with ἔχει only.
- 296 μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ (B1): The τεκμήριον is a well known technique for “proof,” in forensic and deliberative speeches (*Antiph.* 1.10, 2.4.10, 4.4.2; *Andoc.* 1.24; *Lys.* 22.11, 30.15; *X. Mem.* 1.1.2) as well as historical narrative (*T.* 2.39.2, *Andoc.* 3.2, *Hdt.* 2.58) and even the satirization thereof (*Ar. Av.* 482: all citations *grâce à* Dalfen). Its salient characteristic is that an event or fact is cited and its theorization is left to the audience, as though *res ipsa loquitur*. So in the present case Gorgias can point to the fact that he persuaded the patient without acknowledging the role played by the patient's stupidity, both in requiring to be persuaded and in being amenable to persuasion; or played by some inappropriate bedside manner of the doctor(s): rather, *res ipsa loquitur!* His whole point, as always, is to indicate that nothing succeeds like success, and in this way to allow us to infer that oratorical skill trumps everything.
- 297 παρὰ τινα (B2-3): For once, we have the art operating not on a large group but on an individual, though here the point is that the experts failed to persuade, knowledgeable though they are. Conversely, even though the patient was persuaded to do what is presumably the right thing (since Herodicus advised it), it is strictly out of his ignorance that he was persuaded by Gorgias instead of by his doctor to adopt the course of treatment. Socrates makes this explicit only later (459A3-5).
- 298 οὐ δυναμένου (B4): The negative is not otiose: Gorgias is bragging about the *power* of his art (... οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ...): thus in the sequel about the city the doctor's salubrious advice will lose out to Gorgias's oratory even though the only value of his power to persuade his brother's patients was for their health about which in truth he knows nothing: it was the prescription that healed them. It is worth keeping in mind that besides burning and cutting even the drugs the physician prescribes will cause pain (cf. 467C9, 478C2, 522A1-2, etc.).
- 299 εἰς πόλιν ... ἐλθόντα (B6): He focusses the analogy by repeating the expression εἰσελθεῖν, above used of the orator “going in” to the patient's bedside (B2), as noticed by Olymp.(48.1-3). The dual of P.P.Dobree (*adv.* v.1 [London 1883]128) – ἐλθόντε, *legg.* Thompson Christ) – is unnecessary since it is the *orator's* “going in” that Gorgias at that moment wishes us to focus upon. The analogy however is not perfect: in the previous case Gorgias's target (to persuade the patient to follow a specific course of treatment) was provided by the δημιουργός he is helping; but in the present he *competes* with the δημιουργός. This imperfection indicates that all he is concerned with is capturing the trust of his auditors (πίστις) rather than convincing them of anything (πειθῶ), a distinction that will become explicit in the sequel (cf. n. 430).

διαγωνίζεσθαι<sup>300</sup> ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ<sup>301</sup> ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι ἱατρὸν, οὐδαμοῦ [c] ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρὸν,<sup>302</sup> ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατὸν,<sup>303</sup> εἰ βούλοιο.<sup>304</sup> καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι ὁ ῥητορικὸς<sup>305</sup> μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν<sup>306</sup> περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει.

ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη<sup>307</sup> τῆς τέχνης· δεῖ μέντοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ.<sup>308</sup> καὶ γὰρ [d] τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθεν πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι.<sup>309</sup> οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία<sup>310</sup> ἐάν τις εἰς παλαιστράν φοιτήσας εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα<sup>311</sup> τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα<sup>312</sup> δεῖ τοὺς [e] παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις

300 λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι (B7) is almost oxymoronic: λόγῳ is there to stress that λόγος can take the place of and do the work of ἔργον. Cf. n. 308, *infra*.

301 ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ (B7): Once again Gorgias characterizes the many venues of oratory with a single case (cf. 454B6 and n. 260), this time the *largest* assembly to emphasize the reach of oratory's mastery.

302 οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρὸν (B8-C1): For parallels to this use of οὐδαμοῦ cf. A. *Pers.*497, S. *Ant.*183, E. *Andr.*210, X. *Mem.*1.2.52, D. 18.320; and for the expression οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι cf. D. 18.310, 19.116; Cic. *de fin.*5.30.90, *ne appareant quidem* – but Gorgias does not need a parallel for the magical power he accords to the oratorical skill he teaches. He gives his own exegesis below at 457B2 (τὴν δόξαν ἀπαραιεῖσθαι: cf. n. 325).

303 εἰπεῖν (C1): The aorist (rather than the present) indicates being able to *deliver* a speech rather than merely being able to argue (Lodge).

304 εἰ βούλοιο (C2): Not an index of Gorgias's arrogance (Findeisen, Stallb., Ast, Woolsey) but a bit of his seductive sales-pitch (with Jahn and Místriotes). Cf. 452E4-8 (and nn. *ad loc.*), B6 above, 457B1, 508C8 below; *Th.*201A9-10; Gorg. *Hel.*§13, ὅπως ἐβούλετο (=D-K, 2.292.5).

305 ὁ ῥητορικὸς (C3): Gorgias persists in using this adjectival formulation, postponing it for emphasis, rather than ῥητῶρ. Anybody who gets up to speak becomes a ῥητῶρ thereby but Gorgias means a well-trained ῥητῶρ. Finally we can see why he insisted he was not only a ῥητῶρ but a good one (449A7).

306 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν (C4): With idling redundancy, Gorgias corroborates (γάρ, C4) his general conclusion (καὶ ... πρὸς ἄλλον γε, C2) by denying its inverse (οὐ ... οὐκ C4), with minimal variation of terms (ἄλλον ... ὄντιναοῦν, C2; ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν, C4; ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν, C5) or even word order (lack of chiasm is salient).

307 τοσαύτη ... καὶ τοιαύτη (C6-7): The quantity/quality doublet answers, in a “chiasm of before and after” (cf. n. 1768), the two issues about which Socrates had expressed wonder: the nature and the sway (μέγεθος) of the oratorical δύναμις (A4-6). His scrupulously thorough claim, along with μέν, indicates this sentence is transitional, dismissing the issue of the δύναμις of the oratorical art (Socrates's question) for something else. As to that “something else,” we have no idea what it will be (Hamilton telescopes Gorgias's punch by adding, with no textual support at all, “but there are of course limits to its proper use”), and this is why it is introduced with μέντοι, which indicates not only a transition but a change of topic (cf. 458B5 and n. 357). In the event this matter will be given almost twice as much space. Lamb's “So great, so strange, is the power of this art” fails to indicate the transition but does bring forward Socrates's confession that the art is accorded more power than it deserves (δαμονία, A5); Helmbold, conversely, breaks paragraph after the μέν clause.

308 τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ (C9): ἀγωνία, unqualified, refers to physical athletic contests (ἀγῶνες), not competition in general, and not rigorous (agonizing) exercise (cf. *Lach.*184E1 and my n. *ad loc.*), even though it, like the notion of the ἀθλητής, is a ready metaphor for other kinds of strife and competition (as above in the metaphor λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι, B7; cf. also *Lach.*182A2). Oratory is not one of these and so not a species of that genus, so that ἀλλῆ, here and in the next line, must be “adverbial” (meaning “besides”), as at 447C3 (cf. n. *ad loc.*). Thus it is not needed in the restatement below (καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ, 457B4).

309 Note τε καὶ (D5) setting off killing as a result common to boxing and to combat with the hoplite's short sword. For a list of this structure (two parallel items set off from a common third by τε καὶ) I can only compare *Th.*167C1-2 (χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς: “useful and valid *because* true”).

310 μὰ Δία (D5): In his restatement of the idea, Gorgias ups the ante to parents, and with this oath takes the opportunity to display personal indignation, just before extending the argument beyond blaming the student to exonerating the teacher – i.e., himself. For this oath in the context of assaulting one's parents cf. *Rep.*574C6 and my n. *ad loc.*

311 ἔπειτα (D7): This strictly illogical use of this conjunction (repeated with εἶτα below, B5), linking circumstantial participles and finite verbs, is common for the purpose of establishing or stressing a distinction between one phase and another, and often to distinguish *post hoc* from *propter hoc*: cf. 461E3, 519E5, 527D6; *Apol.*20C6-8; *Charm.*163A6-9; *Lach.*186A8 (with πρῶτον), 192B5-8; *Phdo.*90D1 (and Burnet *ad loc.*); *Prot.*343C7-D1 (*n.b.* πρῶτον), 358C1; *Rep.*331B3 (with my n. *ad loc.*), 336E8, 337E5 (*n.b.* πρῶτον), 434B1. Also in comedy: Ar. *Eq.*392, *Lysistr.*560, *Nub.*624. Cf. Smyth §2082. Syntactically, ἔπειτα functions as an “adverbial modification of the leading verb” that “isolates the participle” (*AGPS* 56.13.3).

312 οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ (D8): The phrase is repeated from the first scenario (used there first in prolepsis at D1, and then in hyperbaton at D4), where the student is imagined applying his powers indiscriminately merely because he has learned them. It is now applied to a very different second scenario, where the student's misapplication is judged by some third party to be caused by the teacher. Gorgias wishes by the faulty parallel to induce his listener to believe that just as the student did not misuse his skill merely because he learned it, so the student does not misuse it merely because someone taught him: that is, if study is not to blame, neither are the teachers.



διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.<sup>313</sup> ἐκεῖνοι<sup>314</sup> μὲν γὰρ παρέδωσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως<sup>315</sup> χρῆσθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας,<sup>316</sup> ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας·<sup>317</sup> [457] οἱ δὲ<sup>318</sup> μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἔνεκά<sup>319</sup> ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὴ<sup>320</sup> χρώμενοι οἴμαι<sup>321</sup> ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ<sup>322</sup> καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν<sup>323</sup> [b] ἔμβραχυ περὶ ὅτου ἂν βούληται· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ<sup>324</sup> οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν<sup>325</sup> ἀφαιρεῖσθαι— ὅτι δύναίτο<sup>326</sup> ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι—οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι,<sup>327</sup> ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δὲ οἴμαι<sup>328</sup> ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός<sup>329</sup> τις κᾶτα ταύτη τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ

- 313 πολέων (E2): The plural is empirical (cf. n. 574): Gorgias is speaking of an actual practice that threatens his profession, not just public policy in the abstract.
- 314 ἐκεῖνοι (E2) refers to the proximate antecedent, which implies it means *illi*. This complimentary designation, implicitly relying upon a respect for teachers *per se*, is one means by which Gorgias seeks to exonerate the teacher; the other is his use of *παρέδωσαν*, by which the teacher is depicted as merely passing something down without adding lessons or suggestions of his own (cf. the comparison drawn by Isocrates from *inheritance*, *Antid.*251-2 and n. 335, *infra*); but third, we must note, his very recognition that such powers may be misused, and that justice must curb such misuse, recommends himself – a teacher of oratory – as being morally sensitive. At the same time it was he himself who advertised that his wares enable a man to oust anybody he wishes (εἰ βούλοιο, C2, *supra*, and ὅτου ἂν βούληται, 457B1, below), just as he might also in an emulous moment recommend it as a means to *enslave* all the other δημιουργοί (452E4-8).
- 315 δικαίως (E3): It is no surprise that the activity of the orator described in the first part of the speech leaves behind entirely any advice the orator gives on justice (it is only that he will “be chosen” that Gorgias advertises); but in case we remembered the topic of justice Gorgias mentioned only in passing (cf. n. 260) – as Socrates surely did (455A2, D3-4) – it is almost ironic that Gorgias now brings it up as something about which the orator has any scruples at all.
- 316 τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας (E3-4): The articles are possessive, and τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας is not identical with τοὺς ἀδίκους. At the same time that Gorgias claims the art is meant by the teacher to be used defensively by his student, he leaves it up to his student to decide who to declare his “enemy” because he is “doing him wrong.” The passage illustrates how complacently one can expect a Greek not only to identify justice with harming one’s enemies (and helping one’s friends) as Polemarchus so easily does in *Rep.* Bk.I, but also complacently to convert the proposition, so as to infer that his enemy is *eo ipso* treating him unjustly. Waterfield’s “who wish them harm” for πολεμίους weakens the pretext Gorgias is suggesting his prospective client might employ.
- 317 μὴ ὑπάρχοντας (E8) *sc.* τῆς ἀδικίας (cf. ample illustration of the verb by Valck. *ad E. Phoen.* 1576). μὴ is used because the participle is final (Cron). For the antithesis (*sese defendentes non adorientes*, Ast), cf. *Leg.* 879D4 (cf. 869D1); *Isoc. Pac.* 79 (οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχοντες ἀλλ’ ἀμυνομένοι καὶ ... παθόντες), *Evag.* 28 (ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ μὴ προτέρου ὑπάρχειν).
- 318 οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες (457A1): οἱ δὲ may be substantive (after ἐκεῖνοι μὲν, as ὁ δὲ will be, below at C1) referring to the students in contrast with them (as τούτοις had, above) so that μεταστρέψαντες is circumstantial, in which case the misuse of oratorical skill is made conditional upon its being perverted by students. Alternatively, μεταστρέψαντες may be attributive with οἱ δὲ, in which case the abuse of oratorical skill is stipulated as a reality and blamed upon perverting students.
- 319 οὔτε ... τούτου ἔνεκα (A3) again, in refrain.
- 320 μὴ (A3) is again final (as at 456E4).
- 321 οἴμαι (A4): The insertion of parenthetical οἴμαι in this late position is striking. He utters it exactly where his crucial assumption comes into play – that oratory in itself is neither good nor bad. Hamilton (tr.) simply leaves it out. Cf. n. 1090. *AGPS* 55.4.8 fails to recognize that this usage is meant to *combine* “the expression of subjective opinion” with “bold-as-brass assertions of soundness.” Cf. 460A3.
- 322 Now we get ὁ ῥήτωρ (A5) – “our orator” – again postponed for emphasis.
- 323 ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν (A6): Not only the size, but again the “location” is referred to (with ἐν).
- 324 οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ (B1-2): The catchphrase τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ is brought forward in a strengthened version, again as if *eo ipso* it applied to the present scenario. As in its first use (456D1) it is proleptic (pointing to ὅτι δύναίτο ἂν).
- 325 τὴν δόξαν (B2): Here is voiced the presumption, in the case of the doctor at least, that the expert is honored as being above the misuse of his ability (cf. n. 314 on ἐκεῖνοι, 456E2). Gorgias now reveals what lurks beneath his metaphor at οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆται τὸν ἱατρὸν (456B8-C1), that the orator wins not by appearing to be a better doctor but by appropriating the doctor’s credentials altogether. Socrates will show that he noticed this (464E1-2).
- 326 Reading δύναίτο (B3) from F (and *in ras.*T) accepted by edd., rather than δύναιτο (BPTY Schleiermacher Heindorf Jahn).
- 327 ἀλλὰ ... χρῆσθαι (B4) is dependent upon δεῖ, a connection we can make only if we have already anticipated what Gorgias will be saying after ἀλλὰ. With ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ he brings forward, with correlative καὶ, the phrase ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ from the opening sentence of the section (C8), as a sort of *quod erat demonstrandum* (cf. n. 329, *infra*) – again a sort of proof by repetition.
- 328 οἴμαι (B5) parenthetical again (and Hamilton leaves it out again). It is inserted exactly where his expression presses the analogy with athletic arts: see next n.
- 329 ῥητορικὸς γενόμενος (B5): Cf. πικτικὸς γενόμενος (456D6-7). The formulation follows closely – even too closely – the language of the athletic scenario to which the situation of the orator is meant to be analogous. So, subsequently, κᾶτα (surely to be read, with Q?QbE3Ξ1 against κατὰ BTPFY and καὶ E1: cf. *ἔπειτα*, 456D7 and n. 311) and οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ (cf. οὐ ... δεῖ ... τοὺς ... διδάσκοντας, 456D8-E1), but most of all μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (B6-7), which repeats the language of the previous scenario (456E2) so slavishly as to keep the plural although here the singular (τὸν διδάξαντα) is needed! Ficinus and Schleiermacher translated out the plural here, and likewise Hirschig suggested athetizing the repetition of ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (followed in this by Helmbold) for being redundant! Compare Sauppe’s excision of ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ

μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ [c] δικαίου<sup>330</sup> χρεία παρέδωκεν,<sup>331</sup> ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται.<sup>332</sup> τὸν οὖν οὐκ<sup>333</sup> ὀρθῶς χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι<sup>334</sup> ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.<sup>335</sup>

ΣΩ. οἶμαι,<sup>336</sup> ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον<sup>337</sup> εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων<sup>338</sup> καὶ καθεωρακέναί ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες<sup>339</sup> ἑαυτούς, [d]

ἀγωνία (at B4-5).

- 330 Reading δικαίου (C1), the reading of BTWFLob, accepted by Routh and Burnet only among the edd. I have seen (and so tr. by Irwin), over δικαία (NFlorRY *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd.). The edd. of the 19th Century chose the minority reading (Heindorf Bekker Ast Stallb. Schanz mentioning the strongly attested alternative, whereas Deuschle-Cron Hirschig print it *sine notis*); Dodds acknowledged the weakness of the attestation for δικαία but supported reading it nevertheless, arguing that the subj. gen. with χρεία does not occur in Plato – but cf. ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεία τινὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, *Rep.*372A2. That the justness that determines the proper use of oratory resides in the user rather than in the art itself or even in the act of implementing it, was already suggested by the shift to accusative in ἀμυνομένους μὴ ὑπάρχοντας at 456E4 (accusative with implied subject of χρήσθαι despite intervening dative τούτοις, 456E3).
- 331 ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίου χρεία παρέδωκεν (B7): Again ἐκεῖνος means *ille* (cf. 456E2) and again Gorgias simply repeats the words as if what they assert might seem to have empirical corroboration because the same words have been heard before (456E2-3).
- 332 ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται (B7-C1): Note again the close parallel in expression, namely the unillustrious reference to the other person as ὁ δέ (οἱ δέ, 457A1), and the litotes ἐναντίως, varying the litotes οὐκ ὀρθῶς (457A1-2).
- 333 Note οὐκ / οὐ (C2-3) instead of μή (A3): The supposititious case has, under the force of the preceding sentence, “become factual.”
- 334 The triad μισεῖν ... καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι (C2-3) recalls immediately the dyad of reprisals against the teacher of oratory that Gorgias is pressed to show are misguided (μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, 456E2, reprised at 457B6-7), but also (because of ἀποκτείνουσι) recalls the triad still farther above, which exemplified the abilities of the athlete (τύπτειν καὶ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι, 456D4-5). It is as if ἀποκτείνουσι were added for the sake of closure by remote back-reference, but there is something else to notice: ἐκβάλλειν as well as ἀποκτείνουσι have now become not merely violent acts the Athenian public might inflict upon an itinerant sophist (τὸν διδάσκοντα) but judicially sanctioned punishments they might prefer against one of their own citizens (so that the plural ἐκ τῶν πόλεων must be dropped).
- 335 The speech (456A7-457C3) is long, relative to other speeches in the dialogues. It consists of a praise of the power of the oratorical art (456A7-C6) and then a lengthy apology regarding its misuse (456C6-457C3) almost three times as long, which must as such be considered something of an outburst (Is there here some inkling of the reason that Socrates found Polus’s opening speech apologetic [448E3-4]? Does Gorgias take the opportunity to defend himself and his art against opprobrium in the democratic cities where he is selling it? We should keep in mind that he had trouble in Argos! [Olymp. 46.11ff.]). The key to its structure and inner motivation is the paradox or contradiction between *praising* the power of the art as enabling the orator to defeat *anyone he wishes* (456C2, 457B1) – something tantamount to his ‘freedom to enslave’ (452D5-E8) – suddenly receiving what purports to be a rational corrective that denies exactly what he just dangled before the emotions: he who learns it can use it without limit, but just because he has it does not mean he will use it without limit (!). But this utterly mendacious latter point is next extended by logic-less linguistic parallelisms to an exoneration of the teacher as well. The vision of the all-powerful orator is presented with force and directness, whereas the subsequent backpedalling is redundant and insipid for it does nothing to articulate the very needful criterion for proper and improper use of this awesome power but seeks only to protect the teacher’s interest in making his living in a democratic society. The redundancy of its expression is perhaps Gorgias’s attempt to appear he himself has a conscience about the just and the unjust, but to a cannier listener it will be received as the height of astuteness, arch, and cheek. As to the question of proper use, Gorgias allows and therefore indirectly invites his prospective client to decide that, and if anything he encourages him to justify his use of the skill against his enemies (τοὺς πολεμίους, 452E3) by providing him the excuse that they are acting unjustly (τοὺς ὀδικοῦντας, E4). It moreover serves not the art but the teacher of the art – Gorgias, that is, who in truth is not an orator else his business would be in Sicily. He is a teacher who travels from city to city, selling his wares to citizens where democracy is alive, to be used to their advantage against their fellow citizens. Thus he argues that himself, the itinerant sophist, should be allowed entrance in “the cities,” and that it is the abusive citizens that should be exiled from them. As to the style of the speech, the most salient feature in both form and content is the repetition of ideas and phrases as if repetition makes the argument they contain more valid or true (with Deuschle-Cron, he “*kommt immer wieder auf denselben Gedanken zurück, als sollte der Wortschall [ῥῆκος] die Gedankenarmuth verhüllen*”). Notice the *Steigerung* from saying that sheer competence in boxing does not justify (τούτου ἕνεκα is suitably vague) beating up friend as well as foe, to saying that sheer competence in boxing used against father and mother should not be blamed *on the teacher*. A similar argument and a similar *Steigerung* is used by Isocrates (*Antid.*251-2: the use of inherited money dishonorably not to be blamed on the ancestors // mastery of battle or boxing used to slay fellow citizens not to be blamed on teachers of the arts of war and fighting), where Isocrates, like Gorgias, likens teachers to bequeathers (*παράδόντες*) as merely passing something down (cf. *παρέδοσαν*, 456E3).
- 336 With οἶμαι (C4) Socrates abruptly repeats Gorgias’s little apology for subjectivity, in asyndeton. The connection comes across in none of the translations I have seen. For playful repetition of one of the interlocutor’s words in retort or transition, cf. 449C7 (ποιήσω), 497A6-7 and 498D1-2 (οἴσθαι), 507A4-5 (λέγειν), 520A1-3 (λέγοις); *Charm.*174B8-9 (μάλαστα); *Leg.* 658A3-4, 820A2-3, 896B9-10, 961D11-E1; *Phdo.*90B3-4; *Phlb.*24B9-10 (γε); *Rep.*394B2-3 (μανθάνειν), 449C6-7 (ὀρθῶς), 470B10-C1 (πρόπου), 500B1 (συνοίεσθαι), 514B7-8 (ὀρᾶν), 519B6-7 (εἰκός), 527B12-C1 (ὡς οἶόν τε); *Symp.*199B8-C1 (cf. Denniston, 17).
- 337 ἔμπειρον (C4) might recall, but does not allude to, the term used by Polus in his “display” of Gorgias’s skill (448C4-9).
- 338 λόγων (C5) is read in all mss. δύνανται seems to need a personal subject. Routh Heindorf Ast read οἱ ἄνθρωποι after δύνανται, C6, on the slim evidence of ms.E3, first reported by Bekker and confirmed by Cantarin, but subsequent editors drop it. Theiler later inserted οἱ συνόντες. Alternatively, several edd. have suggested emendations of λόγων so as to supply an antecedent, at least, for the understood subject of δύνανται (φιλολόγων Schanz : *λογιῶν* Madvig [*advers.* 1.410] : *ἀνθρώπων* Cobet), but Stallb.’s parallels (*Crat.*387C6-7, *Ar.* *Pl.*133, *T.* 7.69.2) show the omission is permissible (obviating also Richards’s addition of *τινὲς vel sim.*: Richards persistently assumes a license to alter the text only because he is improving upon or extending the conjecture of another: cf. *ad* 456A7, 456B6, 465D6, 467B8, 470A9, 472C3, *al.*). The sequel recalls remarks Socrates had made previously to Gorgias about dialogue (453C).
- 339 διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες (C6-7): The triad describes the shared means and method of the investigation and then separates the two persons into their two dialogical roles (for which cf. 462A3-4; *Prot.*310A1, 347D6-7, 362A4; and Mistrisotes *ad loc.*). Very

οὕτω<sup>340</sup> διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περί του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν<sup>341</sup> καὶ μὴ φῆ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας<sup>342</sup> τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες<sup>343</sup> περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας<sup>344</sup> ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν,<sup>345</sup> ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἠξίωσαν [e] ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα<sup>346</sup> λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ<sup>347</sup> οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα<sup>348</sup> οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς· φοβοῦμαι οὖν<sup>349</sup>

similar in content and also in form is *Rep.* 528A4-5 λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. This triadic form (A, B<sub>1</sub>, B<sub>2</sub>, or A, a<sub>1</sub>, a<sub>2</sub>) is a favorite of Plato's: cf. 483B6-8, 508C6-7; *Euthyd.* 271B4-5; *H. Maj.* 304B3; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Leg.* 744B6, 766E1-2, 776D8-E1, 777B5-6, 782A6-7, 933A2-3 (μαγγανεία is the genus), 947E5, 950E5-6; *Phdo.* 85E3-4; *Phlb.* 17E4-5, 22A3; *Prot.* 325A6; *Rep.* 411D3-4, 431B9-C1, 476B5; *Soph.* 219D5-6, 260C8-9 (εἶδωλα the genus); *Symp.* 219D4-5. διορισάμενοι does not with Cope mean that they have "come to a definite agreement on questions" but that they have defined what it is they are investigating (cf. 500Dff), for which Sauppe aptly compares ὁμολογία θέμενοι ὄρον from *Phdrs.* 237D1.

- 340 οὕτω (D1) points to the participial triad – dialectical procedure – which is here being made out to be the description of a conversation that will succeed, even though it is given subordinate syntactical status. διαλύεσθαι is otiose, *pace* Jahn, who adds *gemeinschaftlich* to *festzustellen*, and *pace* Jowett who injects "do not always terminate to the satisfaction or mutual improvement of the disputants:" and *pace* Helmbold "to an agreeable end" or Hamilton "mutually enlightened" or Heidbüchel guten *Abschluss* (against this cf. the neutral or even negative διαλύεσθαι, below). Dalfen and Erler make the participles concessive and bring διαλύεσθαι back to life: "though they start well (*wenn Leute miteinander festlegen...*) they do not finish so well (οὕτω)." But in the sequel it becomes clear that it is the failure to do the former that makes the rest of the conversation (διαλύεσθαι) difficult, and it is this διαλύεσθαι that οὐ ῥαδίως modifies, not the triad of participles (*pace* Zeyl Irwin Allen Waterfield Nichols). The point is that it is only by dialectical means that a conversation will be achieved, and what makes conversing difficult for men is that they do not know or properly employ this means. Such "subordinate insubordination" with semi-redundant οὕτω is very common in Greek (cf. 507E1 and my nn. to *Rep.* 368D6 and to *Phdrs.* 260D7) but not in English and, with Schleiermacher, one may translate it out (cf. *dass nicht leicht eine Zusammenkunft so auseinander gehen kann, dass sie dasjenige, worüber sie zu sprechen unternehmen, gemeinschaftlich bestimmt ...*; compare Piettre's "ce n'est pas sans mal que ..."). The successfully neutral case is next contrasted with a failed version of itself (cf. n. 343, *infra*). Socrates restates the issue in brief compass at the end of the paragraph as διαλέγεσθαι versus ἤδη διαλύεσθαι τὸν λόγον.
- 341 ἀμφισβητήσωσιν (D1) merely means to have differing views (*verscheidener Meinung sind*, Dalfen Erler: cf. *Prot.* 337B1), *pace* Jahn Cope Zeyl Heidbüchel (cf. ἀμφισβητήσιμον, 451D9); the aorist is indeed inceptive but does not mean get into a fight but discover a discrepancy between their views. Actual contention arises only after they assert that each other are saying something incorrectly or unclearly. Only then do they take umbrage, the shift in their mood (χαλεπαίνουσι) pre-empting them from going back and "defining their terms" but leading them further apart and to impute ill motives to each other (κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται). Socrates is describing the devolution of a conversation in order to justify his suggestion that they start by defining their terms, which parties to a discussion seldom do and indeed certain types of demagoguery and rhetoric must avoid doing. Dodds is therefore wrong (*ad loc.*, 213) to say of Socrates's "little lecture" on dialectic that "its first rule is that you must think impersonally and keep your temper," as though Socrates were merely interested in convivial confabulation.
- 342 The accusatives φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας (D4) reveal that this circumstantial participial phrase is an exegesis of κατὰ φθόνον τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν (Stallb. correcting Hirschig, who emended them to nominative as brought across in the tr. of Cary). With the plurals (including plural ἑαυτῶν), Socrates brooks some syntactical awkwardness (Sommer acutely observes that ἑαυτῶν is alternately objective and subjective and Deuschle-Cron adduce *Cic. de fin.* 3.2.8 [*Quod cum accidisset ut alter alterum nec opinato videremus ...*] for the shift from singular to plural) in order to avoid blaming the breakdown on either party as having cast the first stone, since he is more interested in stressing that the breakdown is due to their joint failure at the preliminary but difficult task of defining the investigandum (C5-7).
- 343 The phrase λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες (D6), with its {A, a<sub>1</sub>, a<sub>2</sub>} structure, now replaces the similarly structured triad above that described their encounter when it was still dialogical (διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάζοντες, C7). The needless athetization by Hirschig Schanz Ovink both ignores and spoils the parallelism.
- 344 τοὺς παρόντας (D7): At the same time that he clarifies once again the rules of dialectical inquiry, Socrates refers to Gorgias's audience, whom Gorgias must always view as potential clients if not existing customers. If the conversation is to continue it will need to be truly dialectical – Gorgias will have to tell the truth about what he teaches – else he will lose their respect. It is almost inconceivable that Gorgias can or would meet this challenge, and so Socrates will allow him to save face by pulling out (458B2-3), at the expense however of admitting that he would do so because he would rather not be disabused of false beliefs (458A2-B2). Gorgias then claims he would of course rather be so disabused, but defers to his audience's mood (again τῶν παρόντων, 458B6) in hopes they have had enough. The very contrary is the case in the eyes of both his potential critic and his admirer (458C3-D4) and so finally he acquiesces to continue since Socrates has left him only shame (in the face of the audience, that is) for doing otherwise (458D7).
- 345 The repetition of σφῶν αὐτῶν (D7-8), present in all mss. has been condemned as redundant, with the first deleted by Sauppe Dodds Theiler Cantarin and the second by Cobet. But the repetition indicates a turn from the fate of the parties that are speaking to the situation of the parties that are listening (including of course the auditors of this conversation), emphasizing that they too have a fate worth considering – what Gorgias will solicitously allude to below as τὸ τῶν παρόντων (458B5-6). For the sentiment cf. *II Timothy* 2:14.
- 346 τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα (E1): Socrates again retorts Gorgias's language (cf. 456D1, D4, D8; 457A3, B2), noticed by Schmelzer.
- 347 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ (E2): With the pronouns Socrates emphasizes that the general problem might be at work in their own case. With πάνυ in οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα ... οὐδὲ σύμφωνα he gently broaches criticizing what Gorgias has said (i.e., μὴ φάναί ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς; cf. D2-3).
- 348 οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα ... οὐδὲ σύμφωνα (E2): ἀκόλουθα having to do with consecutivity of the argument (*X. Anab.* 2.4.19) and σύμφωνα the internal consistency of its ideas (e.g., 461A2, 482B), so that Deuschle-Cron and Helmbold translate, "do not follow from and are not consistent with."
- 349 οὖν (E3), "proceeding to a new stage in the march of thought" (Denniston, 426), though not inferential: cf. 458A1 below, *Prot.* 314C5, *Th.* 143B8; *Ar. Thesm.* 67. With ὑπολάβης Socrates now alludes to next stage in the devolution described above, where misunderstanding the motive of the critic leads to defensiveness.

διελέγγειν<sup>350</sup> σε, μή με ὑπολάβης οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα<sup>351</sup> λέγειν τοῦ καταφανῆς γενέσθαι,<sup>352</sup> ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. [458] ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ<sup>353</sup> τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν περὶ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτῶην·<sup>354</sup> εἰ δὲ μή, ἐφῶν ἂν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἶ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων εἶ τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι,<sup>355</sup> οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἠγοῦμαι, ὅσῳ περ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου<sup>356</sup> ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα [b] ψευδῆς περὶ ὧν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὧν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἔαν, ἐῷμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ φημί μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶον σὺ ὑφηγῆ· ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν<sup>357</sup> ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων.<sup>358</sup> πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν,

- 350 διελέγγειν (E3) is, surprisingly, an *hapax* in Plato and perhaps a coinage (it appears rarely afterwards: Arist. fig. 94 (p.94.15 Rose), Polyb. 7.3.3, Luc. *Deor. Conc.* 2.8). With *διά* (investigate point-by-point, Mistriotes – not “conclude” a refutation, *pace* Irwin: that would be *ἐξελέγγειν* [cf. nn. 716, 750, 799]), Socrates is acknowledging the impression that Gorgias might form, once he begins, that he is attacking him relentlessly and therefore personally, whereas it is the *λόγος* itself that deserves, and moreover needs, the scrupulously elenctic treatment he has in mind.
- 351 φιλονικοῦντα (E4): The verb, variously constructed (it was absolute, above: D4), always denotes a rivalry between persons. The putative metaphor of a “rivalry with the goal,” as though the goal were the enemy to conquer (e.g., Woolsey, “zeal for debate ... directed towards the subject;” Croiset, “*soucieux ... d’éclaircir la question elle-même*,” “competing to understand,” Irwin; “eagerness,” Zeyl; “*ardeur*,” Canto; and Nichols’s “from love of victory, not in regard to the subject’s becoming manifest, but in regard to you,” and cf. Dalfen Erler), is absent in the uses I have seen (*Lach.* 194A8 is not an exception: cf. my n. *ad loc.*). Its various constructions accommodate in various ways the stakes over which the parties are contending, usually introduced with *πρὸς* + acc., for which cf. *Lach.* 194A8; *Phlb.* 14B5, 50B6; *Prot.* 336E1; *Rep.* 338A7, and for the broader usage, where as here the value of the stakes is meant to redeem the contentiousness (so-called “healthy competition”), cf. 505E4, *Leg.* 731A2. Lamb’s “contentiously neglecting the point and its clarification and merely attacking you” almost gets the sense, at the expense of translating the participle twice; Allen’s “suspect me of contentiousness, of not speaking toward the issue and its clarification but toward you” is better; Piettre’s “*cherche à avoir le dessus dans la discussion, sans viser la question pour la rendre plus clair, mais en te visant toi*,” is best: these reveal the haltingness in Socrates’s word order. To translate φιλονικοῦντα twice with an homonymy in English (e.g. “not from jealousy for the discovery of truth but from jealousy of you,” Jowett [ed.4, *teste* Dodds]) is a solution only in appearance. W.Headlam athetized φιλονικοῦντα, against all mss., as a marginal comment brought forward from above and subsequently intruding into the text, but it is only its position that is awkward. We may just as well accept it as an interruptive exegesis of οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα that almost confers onto the μή clause a binary construction (cf. 460A1-2 and n.). Feix prints φιλονικοῦντα (and φιλονικοῦντας at D4) without ms. authority and incorrectly glosses it “*streiten*” saying its etymon is φιλεῖν τὸ νεῖκος (and Heidbüchel agrees), but this alternate form (-νεικ for -νικ), when found, means what φιλονικεῖν means (cf. *Rep.* 581B2 where it is virtually identified with φιλοτιμία, and cf. LSJ s.v. φιλόνομος, *sub fin.*).
- 352 τοῦ καταφανῆς γενέσθαι (E5): An absolute infinitival “genitive of purpose” (*sc.* τὸ πρᾶγμα): cf. *Leg.* 876E3; Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.3.9; T. 1.4, 1.23.5; D. 18.107, and 19.76 without infinitive; Smyth §1408 and *AGPS* 47.21.2. Even though the ἔνεκα in the τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα question above (E1) is still in the air, this finally answers it. The gen. τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι at 509D4-5 is an objective gen. with δύναμιν (*pace* Stallb.), defining the power rather than specifying the purpose for acquiring it.
- 353 εἰ ... καὶ σὺ εἶ (458A1): Once again (cf. 453A8-C5) Socrates does not advocate a method so much as confess his own pattern of behavior (cf. ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, 453B1) and gives his purpose in following it, hoping or presuming (ἀξιώ, 453B3) that Gorgias might be a person who behaves that way. In the present case he adds, however, that in case Gorgias is not like him, he will stop talking with him (A1-2, B1-3).
- 354 διερωτῶην (A2) picks up the less idiomatic *διά* prefixed to διελέγγειν.
- 355 λέγοι (A4): One may see in the shift from indicative λέγω to optative λέγοι an increment of solicitousness in Socrates’s willingness to see his own error as likely and that of another as merely conceivable (Cope Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schmelzer Lamb[tr.] Helmbold[tr.] Dalfen[tr.] Heidbüchel). In a similar vein (*per* Mistriotes) he places being refuted before refuting (A5). Likewise, just above he used the indicative in the protasis (εἶ, A1) to presume that Gorgias was a person like himself. The tr. of Croiset freely substitutes a noun for the verb here and thus fails to bring across this shift. Chambry and Hamilton lose the distinction by replacing third singulars in different moods with third plurals in the indicative.
- 356 κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου (A7): Surely it is unclear how the putative topic, as it has been presented so far, could be the worst of all possible things about which to be in error: Socrates is adopting a mantic tone we recognize from his *Apology* – but this is no warrant for watering down what he says, with Hamilton, who translates “very bad trouble.”
- 357 χρῆν (B5) is read in all the major mss. (BTPF, *legg. edd.* : χρῆ NFlorZbY, *legg.* Schanz Sauppe) and is moreover the *lectio difficilior*. It resembles the philosophical imperfect. With μέντοι rather than δέ after μέν, Gorgias again (cf. 456C7) changes the subject (δέ would merely move on to the next point).
- 358 τὸ τῶν παρόντων (B5-6): It helps the Greekless reader to know that with τῶν παρόντων Gorgias uses the same term for the audience as Socrates had just used (e.g., *die Anwesenden*, Dalfen) in connection with the displeasure an audience feels when the parties they are listening to decline into slander (*pace* Croiset, Chambry, Hamilton).



[c] ἦν διαλεγόμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρῆ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μὴ τινὰς αὐτῶν κατέχομεν<sup>359</sup>  
βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

ΧΑΙ. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου,<sup>360</sup> ᾧ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν  
ἀνδρῶν βουλομένων ἀκούειν ἕάν τι λέγητε.<sup>361</sup> ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο  
τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγομένων ἀφεμένω  
προϋργαίτερον τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πράττειν.<sup>362</sup> [d]

ΚΑΛ. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ᾧ Χαιρεφῶν, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις  
παραγενόμενος<sup>363</sup> οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πρόποτε ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κὰν τὴν  
ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν  
ἐπαγγεῖλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν<sup>364</sup> ὅτι τις βούλεται. [e] ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί,<sup>365</sup> διαλέγου<sup>366</sup> τε  
καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει.

- 359 Reading κατέχομεν (C2) with Bpt (and Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriones Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Dodds Theiler Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler), as the *lectio difficilior*, rather than the subjunctive of TF which was accepted by Routh Ast Bekker Stallb. Thompson Sommer Hirschig Sauppe. It is a present circumstance, not some future one, that Gorgias warns against, and for this the indicative is permitted (*pace* Stallb.: cf. *Lach.*196C2; *Lys.*216C2, 218D3; *Phdo.*84E3; *Th.*145C1) though not required (*H.Maj.*300D3, *Phdrs.*260A6). The schol. is right to say Gorgias is begging off (we know the excuse from Polus's use of it for butting in, at 448A7-8): Woolsey has been taken in by his *consistent* politeness later in the dialogue to think Gorgias is *only* being polite, but we know from Gorgias's long speech that he wants to stimulate a desire to study with him (though with the same stroke shielding what that desire is).
- 360 τοῦ μὲν θορύβου (C3): ἀκούειν here takes the gen. rather than the acc. of what is heard (compare *Rep.*366C3, 450B4, 488A1), but then the construction squints, since he means you can "hear" they want it from the noise they are making. Still, we do not need to go so far as to think it a genitive of cause (Smyth §1405), as Olymp. seems to do (50.15). Beck cites Th. Magister noting that θορυβός can also be ἐπι μεγίστου ἐπαίνου (178.18 R), as here.
- 361 ἕάν τι λέγητε (C4-5): The deferential "if you please" construction with subjunctive used in polite (persuasive) request: cf. 464B2, 505D4; *Lach.*179E6; *Rep.*358B1 (and my n. *ad loc.*) and B7, 427D3-4, 432C2, 455B1-2, 474C5-6 (Smyth §§2672 and 2354), as a forensic advocate says, "If it please the court." Jowett and Croiset, understanding it as merely an index of their eagerness (≈"in hopes you will speak"), do not translate it. Lamb Apelt Helmbold Irwin Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols "whatever you say" (*vel sim.*) treat ἕάν with subj as if it were ὅτι plus ἄν with optative; Dalfen imagines (*contra*, cf. Smyth §2672) it is an indirect question – "they are eager to hear whether you have anything to say" – but then the θορυβός would not have been voicing the acclamation Chaerephon's opening remark presupposes. Allen translates, "if you have anything to say they want to hear it" (cf. Erler: *wenn ihr etwas sagt*), but they want to hear them speak whether they speak or not, as the word order suggests.
- 362 For the sentiment cf. *Phdrs.*227B9-11. In truth, σχολή cannot compete with ἀσχολία on any grounds they would both value, since the former is an end in itself whereas the latter is never more than a means to an end (ἀσχολοῦμεν ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, as Aristotle said). Chaerephon bears witness to the distinction by associating quantity with the one and quality with the other. Indeed this will be the distinction with which this section of the conversation will conclude (467C5-468C1). Chaerephon *prays* (not just asserts, *pace* Erler) that he would always have the good sense to drop whatever he is doing no matter how "productive" it might seem to him, when he might participate in something so inherently worthwhile: he prays because he is not sure he would not be distracted (hence Croiset's self-deprecating translation "*exigences impérieuses de mes affaires*"). What is at stake, we may infer, is the status of his soul, alluded to by Socrates above (A8-B1), care for which always seems postponable in the world where time is money. That he should adduce the criterion of leisure is consistent with his having detained Socrates in the agora and made him late for Gorgias's scheduled performance. Feix and Heidbüchel cite no parallels to support their claim that προϋργαίτερον can mean "*dringender*" (nor does Apelt [tr.] for *unaufschliebbarem Pflicht*).
- 363 παραγενόμενος (D2): With καὶ αὐτὸς Callicles compares his wide experience of speeches with the wide experience of conversations Socrates had attributed to Gorgias, above (457C4-5), so that in saying he has never enjoyed a conversation so much as the present one, he then concludes by asking them to spend the entire day in dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι, D4: at 458E1 Gorgias shows he noticed he used the term). The distinction between display speech and dialogue had slipped by Callicles the last time he spoke (447C5-8: cf. n. 132) but now he has learned what it is – and so his remark is tantamount to saying he has never witnessed such a successful *dialogue*. Olymp.'s criticism (50.18-22, accepted by Erler, *ad loc.*) that he cares about the *dulce* (ἦσθην) whereas Chaerephon as φιλόσοφος cares about the *utile* (ὠφέλιμον) is too puritanical. The φιλόσοφος is not interested in the ὠφέλιμον because he is φιλόσοφος but because the φιλόσοφος asks what is truly ὠφέλιμον, as Chaerephon has just done with the word προϋργαίτερον. Some have alleged Callicles' interest has been piqued by the fact that Gorgias's speech turned the conversation toward politics, but (1) the characterization is not particularly true, and (2) his own comparison would then have to mean this conversation is more *political* than any he has ever heard, which is hardly likely for the very reason they allege it. Moreover, the politician never has all day to spend (τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην). Different though Callicles and Chaerephon likely are, they both desire the dialogue to continue.
- 364 ἐρωτᾶν (D8): ἀποκρίνεσθαι would have been the more natural expression for Gorgias to have used (as above, 448A1-2), but athetization of ἐρωτᾶν ... βούλεται, with Badham Schanz (cf. Hirschig), is both too radical and too broad. An ἐπάγγελμα, as an announcement, does include a connotation of command (Sauppe aptly cites *Lach.*189B2), whence we have ἐκέλευε at 447C6 and 462A8; moreover, Gorgias knows that to acquiesce in Socrates's request will involve answering questions (though Socrates always depicts dialogue as reciprocation of the roles of question and answer) and here wishes to assimilate Socrates's proposal with a request from his usual audience – whence his reference to the onlookers.

ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω<sup>367</sup> ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γὰρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς<sup>368</sup> λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φησὶ ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι, ἐὰν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ [459] πείθοντα;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ<sup>369</sup> ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

ΓΟΡ. καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;<sup>370</sup> οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.

ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;<sup>371</sup>

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ [b] γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἱατρός γε ὢν· ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός<sup>372</sup> γε δήπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρός ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. δῆλον ὅτι.

365 Reading τουτοισί (E1) with Par and all edd. since Ast1819 (τούτοισι W : τούτοισιν BT : καὶ τούτοις F). Gorgias flatters the onlookers with deictic iota and claims he will continue in order to avoid shame in their eyes (so also Protagoras at *Prot.*352C8-D3) and only at their behest (schol. P [Stallb.], Mistriotes), not for the sake of the logos – as Polus acknowledges in his defense (461B4-6). But cf. n. 344.

366 διαλέγου (E1): Gorgias refers back to Socrates's invitation to enter into dialogue with him (διαλεγόμεθα, B2) and to Callicles's expression of interest in dialogue *per se* (n.363, *supra*); but with the second singular, he now speaks of dialogue as something only Socrates is doing, placing an onus upon him to produce something that will please the audience; but at the same time, in his next remark, ἐρώτα ὅτι βούλει, repeated from just above, he indicates that such questions, dialectical or not, will be “answered” according to the manner of his profession: i.e., they will be *dealt with*.

367 θαυμάζω (E3): Always ambiguous as to approbation or condemnation. Gorgias may well think Socrates is amazed by his claims rather than puzzled, as we shall see below.

368 ὀρθῶς (E4): Socrates now countenances that by alleging Gorgias's incorrectness (cf. ὀρθῶς above, 457D2), he himself may be threatening the continuation of the conversation. Again it is the shared method rather than an allocation of blame that concerns him.

369 Reading ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ or ἐλεγές τοι νῦν δὴ (459A1) with B<sup>2</sup>P and Woolsey Jahn Kratz Thompson Hirschig Schanz Mistriotes Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Cantarín Erler Heidbüchel (rather than τοῖνον δὴ TW *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Schleiermacher [Denn du sagtest sogar] Ast Bekker Stallb. Sommer Theiler). Bekker and Stallb. expresses the wish they could find τοι νῦν in the mss.!

370 τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν (A4): μὴ, as below (B2), indicates the designation is conditional (with Jahn: not general as opposed to specific, *pace* Woolsey and Kratz: the cases with οὐ below are no less general), laying out Gorgias's assumption that the crowd is *eo ipso* ignorant. Socrates is pointing out in part that Gorgias is not saying what he means. Once the assumption has been revealed and accepted, οὐ may replace them, as below (οὐκ εἰδῶς ... ἐν οὐκ εἰδοσιν, B3-4) and above (457C2-3: cf. n. 333).

371 “Dialectical” γίγνεται (A7), of what has evolved or come to be in the argument, as Gorgias will use it below (C3). Compare 478D7, 496B1, 497A4, 497D5, 502C6 (with n.), 512D5; *Lys.*219B7; *Rep.*409E2; *Symp.*181A4; *Th.*186E12. On this and related “dialectical” idioms cf. my n. to *Rep.*334A10.

372 ὁ μὴ ἱατρός (B2): Again the fact that an assumption is being made, is made explicit with μὴ.



ΣΩ. ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἦ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει<sup>373</sup> ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. τοῦτο ἐνταυθὰ γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας<sup>374</sup> τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν<sup>375</sup> εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν [c] δέ τινα πειθοῦς ἠύρηκέναι<sup>376</sup> ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι<sup>377</sup> τῶν εἰδότων.

ΓΟΡ. οὐκοῦν<sup>378</sup> πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;<sup>379</sup>

ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται<sup>380</sup> ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων δι' αὐτὸ τὸ<sup>381</sup> οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκευόμεθα, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον<sup>382</sup> ἦ· νῦν δὲ τόδε<sup>383</sup>

373 συμβαίνει (B5) is not just “*ce qui arrive*” (Croiset) but, like γίγνεται above, denotes logical entailment, as at 461B8, 479C5-6, 480E3, 495B5, 496E5, 498E10-11, 499B1, 508B3-4; *Lys.*213B8, 217A1; *Phdo.*74A2, 80B1, 92B4-5; *Phlb.*35C3; *Polit.*261E4; *Rep.*339A2, 502C5 (with my n. *ad loc.*); *Soph.*223B6.

374 With ἄσασας (B7) Socrates is virtually quoting the claim Gorgias made at the beginning of his long speech (456A8), which Gorgias himself reiterated within the speech with his multiple uses of ὀπισθοῦν (456C2-6).

375 Read personifying αὐτὴν (B8) with all mss., against the doubts of Cobet, who found “orator and oratory” a distasteful repetition, and dropped “oratory” because a subsequent personification of oratory was more of a stretch than keeping “orator,” the alternative he left himself with, and thus was compelled to read αὐτόν instead (*Mnem.*3[1875]120-1]. We shall see more of this sort of thing from Cobet as we proceed! To the contrary, the personification brings the assertions Socrates is making closer to being about oratory and its δύναμις, which is the proper target of the conversation (456A5, 460A1-2). As to Beck’s worry that the subject of the next infinitive is the orator rather than oratory, the switching back constitutes a chiasm.

376 μηχανὴν δὲ τινα πειθοῦς ἠύρηκέναι (B8-C1): The expression recalls the notion of a πειθοῦς δημιουργός (453A2), another personification, and gingerly (with τινὰ) takes it one step further with the flashier language of a wondrous device (μηχανή). This language is appropriate for describing the δύναμις δαίμονια that Socrates had sensed all along (456A5). ἠύρηκέναι is just the word for such a striking mechanism, invoking such breakthroughs as the discovery of fire. Chambry’s tr. *manière* is much too weak; Hamilton’s “discovered a knack” loses the sense of unaccountable magic. Cf. n. 238. Dodds, adopting what he imagines to be Plato/Socrates’s point of view, says that Socrates has in this series of questions “reduced” Gorgias’s claim for oratory (p.215), but it can also be taken that he has praised it to the skies, and this is what evokes Gorgias’s reply, as if to say, “Yes Socrates: as you see it is truly a bonanza.”

377 μᾶλλον εἰδέναι (C2): Waterfield takes issue with Socrates attributing this position to Gorgias: “strictly, Gorgias has not said” that the crowd believes the orator knows more than the expert, only that they are persuaded by him. As often the commentator is distracted by his own astuteness, an astuteness superior to that of the interlocutor. The underlying δύναμις or power of oratory still remains hidden, but all indications are exactly that it is the man and not his arguments that make the orator credible to the crowd. Cf. nn. 299, 430. Gorgias is doing everything in his power to prove this is the case by his own example – and that is the drama we are witnessing.

378 Retaining οὐκοῦν (C3) with all the manuscripts. Denniston (and Dodds Allen Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols) would change to οὐκ οὐκ thinking Gorgias’s question is trying to gainsay Socrates’s previous assertion (or divert it: Dalfen), but to the contrary he has *inferred* from Socrates’s line of questions that the “superhuman power” of oratory is just now dawning on him – that Socrates has finally drunk the juice (whence, correctly, “*Il est donc très facile...*” Piettre; “*Macht das denn die Dinge leichter ...*” Dalfen). Consult the excellent page in *AGPS* 69.51.1 (2.1402) on οὐκοῦν. As often the commentators find themselves as contending with what Socrates is “trying to say,” rather than witnessing Socrates and somebody else talking to each other. The construction is “binary” in Riddell’s type B.a (§213) – compare Polus’s use of the same figure, in the same connection, at 462C8.

379 δημιουργῶν (C5): For the idea cf. *Phlb.*58A7-B2. In defense of his teaching (quite different from revealing its nature) Gorgias now reverts to the language of his praise speech, and thereby to its theme, that (regardless of its inherent worth) oratory subjugates all the other “specialties” to itself (μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι is a litotes, *pace* Allen, and does not mean “still get the better” *pace* Waterfield). As Mistrisotes pertinently notes, ὁ σοφιστὴς πάντοτε ἀποβλέπει πρὸς τὸν ἔπαινον ἢ τὸν ψόγον τοῦ ῥήτορος.

380 ἐλαττοῦται (C6): The primary meaning here is to lose in oratorical διαγωνίζεσθαι, though of course there is the under-meaning of inherent inferiority, according to which even though “succeeding,” he may come off worse than the others, and though failing may come out better (a possibility Gorgias surely does not countenance). Socrates exploits this play of meanings in describing the widely neglected “good father” of the aristocratic city in *Rep.* Bk. VIII, 549CD, who ἐθέλει ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὥστε πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν (contrast the outlook of his wife a few lines later, C9). Allen’s tr. “whether or not the orator is inferior to others” gets the under-meaning only; Canto’s *plus ou moins fort* gets the primary meaning only.

381 Reading δι’ αὐτὸ τὸ (C7) with NFlor *testibus* Ast Cantarin (n.b., Ficinus tr. *ob hanc unam facultatem*) rather than διὰ τὸ in all other mss. (read by all edd.). The variant disappears from all apparatuses after Bekker’s until Cantarin’s.

382 Reading πρὸς λόγον (C8) with ZN *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistrisotes Schmelzer Croiset Feix Dodds Cantarin Heidbüchel (πρὸς λόγου BTP as well as F (*testibus* Dodds Cantarin), *legg.* edd. : πρὸ λόγου Olymp.). The construction with the genitive λόγου is unexampled until Philo, and despite Thompson’s constructive argument from the analogous expression πρὸς τρόπον (*Phdrs.*252D6), the expression πρὸς λόγον is a virtual catch-phrase in the dialogues: *Prot.*343D1, 344A4-5, 351E4-5; *Phlb.*33C1, 42E1; *Thit.*188A4 (cf. πρὸς ἔπος, *Euthyd.*295C6, *Phlb.*18D6). αὐτίκα (C7), with Deuschle-Cron, defers the topic indefinitely, as does εἰς αὐτοῖς, elsewhere (e.g., 447C3, *Prot.*357B6, *al.*).

383 τόδε (C8) is “first person” denoting what interests Socrates, in contrast to what interested Gorgias (expressed by second person οὕτως, C7), the ability despite ignorance – that is, the ῥαστώνη of the art.

πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα [d] τυγχάνει περι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν<sup>384</sup> οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορικὸς ὡς περι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περι τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ<sup>385</sup> μὲν οὐκ εἰδῶς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχροὺν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περι αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος<sup>386</sup> ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσιν [e] μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; ἢ ἀνάγκη<sup>387</sup> εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σέ<sup>388</sup> τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον<sup>389</sup> —ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι<sup>390</sup> οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν<sup>391</sup> οὐχ οἷός τε ἔση αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῆ<sup>392</sup> περι τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία;<sup>393</sup> [460] καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς<sup>394</sup> εἰπέ τις ποθ' ἢ δύναμις ἐστίν.

- 384 τὸ δίκαιον ... τὸ καλὸν ... τὸ ἀγαθόν (D1-2): These three categories (and their opposites) constitute the Socratic μέγιστα (cf. *Rep.* 451A7 and my n. *ad loc.*). Moreover the triad may well conventionally correspond to the different goals of the three types of oratory (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1358A36-9A6 and Hermias in *Phdrs.* 219.11-14 Couvreur) a distinction which (*pace* Quintilian) in all likelihood antedates Aristotle, giving Socrates's question still more point. Being traditional, the three μέγιστα are amenable to a decorated presentation, such that here the adjectives receive the article but later the article is allowed to drop out (compare 474D1-2, *Crito* 47C9-10, *Euthyph.* 7D1-2, *Leg.* 896D5-7, *Phdo.* 75C11-D1), and the negative is made to alternate with the positive like fretwork (cf. *Crito* 47C9-10, *Leg.* 896D5-6, *Phdrs.* 277D10-E1). Note moreover how easily the order and presentation might be varied, as immediately below, where negative uniformly follows positive (D4-5: cf. *Polit.* 295E4-5, *Rep.* 493B8-C1, *Thet.* 172A1-2). Such features are often not brought across in translations (e.g., here, Schleiermacher), but are important in their way. For instance such flexibility of expression suggests that it will serve no purpose, for the understanding of the present argument, to quibble over the difference between knowing τὸ ἀγαθόν (etc.) and knowing τί ἀγαθόν (etc.).
- 385 αὐτὰ (D4) is something more than ταῦτα (e.g., *les choses mêmes*, Croiset).
- 386 μεμηχανημένος (D5), corresponding to μηχανήν ... ἠύρηκέναι (B9-C1). The perfect (again) imagines ὁ ῥητορικὸς to be a master ("il possède un secret de persuasion," Croiset).
- 387 ἀνάγκη (E1), corresponding to οὐδὲν δεῖ (B9). I take it that the "necessity" here (like the requirement forgone there) refers to what is essential to the ῥητορικὸς by definition. Cope's impersonal translation, "Or is this knowledge absolutely required," leaves out the connection; Jowett positively errs with "Or must the pupil know" for it is the teacher to whom Socrates here refers. The student comes next.
- 388 παρὰ σέ (E2): Socrates now shifts from impersonal ῥητορικὸς (D2) to Gorgias as ῥητορικὸς (σέ, continued by σύ, E3 [and there confirmed with the appositive, "as the teacher"]; and σόν, E4; and ποιήσεις, E5; and ἔση, E7). He had spoken in the third person above so as not to be asking Gorgias whether he, as Gorgias, was ignorant of the important thing, but only whether he as ῥητορικὸς can be. For the interim, at least, Socrates acquiesces in Gorgias's identification of himself as both a ῥητορικὸς and a ῥήτωρ (cf. 449A2-8).
- 389 οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον (E4): He doesn't teach it not because he is ignorant of the good and unable to (as Croiset's *metier* unguardedly suggests), but only because it is not his job. The explanation (γὰρ) continues and corroborates the present assumption that the teacher as such does know (ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, E1).
- 390 καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (E6): That the appearance of knowing the good would include or imply the appearance of being good is meant by Socrates to illustrate the level of credulity that is satisfied by appearance, and is not due to a putative belief of "Plato" or "Socrates" that knowing "logically implies" or is a "sufficient condition" for being virtuous (*pace* Irwin, *ad loc.*). To the contrary Socrates is in effect suggesting how the teacher will enable the student to seem to know without teaching him the knowledge, namely, by acting like a "good guy." See further 460B7 and n. 399.
- 391 τὸ παράπαν (E6): In this case, knowledge of the μέγιστα is somehow fundamentally prerequisite to teaching the art, as knowing the alphabet is prerequisite to spelling.
- 392 ἐὰν μὴ προειδῆ (E7): The subjunctive anticipates the eventual prerequisite.
- 393 Socrates (C6-E8) has postponed (with αὐτίκα: cf. n. 382) to respond to Gorgias's distracting sales pitch and promise that the orator will win out with ease, in order to focus on the question whether the "important things" are part of Gorgias's curriculum, and he gives him a wide spectrum of choices: (1) the oratorical expert (i.e., teacher) will be just as ignorant of these as he is of medicine, but nonetheless be able to persuade the ignorant mass that he does know them (C8-E1); or (2) he does by definition of his trade know them but it is not part of his (i.e., "your") job to teach them, though if his (i.e., "your") student arrives ignorant of them he will enable him to seem to know them and seem to be good (E1-6); or (3) you will not be able even to begin teaching oratory unless the student already knows them. In short, knowledge of the good will never be part of the lesson, either because (1) the teacher does not know it, or because (2) it is not your job to teach it, or because (3) you cannot do your job unless the student already knows it.
- 394 ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ τις ποθ' ἢ δύναμις ἐστίν (460A1-2): Socrates refers back to Gorgias's expression at 455D6-7 (σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν) with characteristic accuracy but avoiding the mockery that literal repetition might introduce, by means of a complex but clear "binary" structure (according to the terminology of Riddell at §§204-230). In this case a complex complement (δύναμις ῥητορικῆς) is shared by both the circumstantial participle and the governing indicative: the genitive within the participial phrase (ῥητορικῆς) is proleptic, awaiting the accusative that is in hyperbaton (δύναμιν); together they constitute the complement of both verbals. Indefinite τί ποτε brings forward both σαφῶς and ἅπασαν. On the genitive used in oaths asking for divine aid (πρὸς Διός) as opposed to the accusative in asseveration (e.g., 458D1, 463D6), cf. my n. to *Rep.* 574C6. Therewith Socrates emphasizes even more his hope for a "revelation." It is only the δύναμις Socrates asks him to reveal, and the δύναμις is not (*pace* Croiset) the "nature" or "proper virtue" of oratory, nor (*pace* Lamb) its "function" (cf. nn. 128, 293).

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχη μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεσθαι.<sup>395</sup>

ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ<sup>396</sup> καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη<sup>397</sup> αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

[b]

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκῶς τεκτονικός,<sup>398</sup> ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός; καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκῶς ἕκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷον ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;

ΓΟΡ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκῶς δίκαιος;

ΓΟΡ. πάντως δήπου.<sup>399</sup>

- 395 I will read μαθήσεσθαι from F and Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast (1819) Coraes (μαθήσεται BTPf Olymp.[λ], *legg.* edd.) until (with Heindorf and Thompson) I see a case of casual, parenthetical οἶμαι (cf. 457B5 and 457A4 [cf. ]) propped up by μὲν and/or ἐγὼ, as here. Considering what is at stake, and the elaborate and careful formulation of Socrates's question, as well as his climactic request for a revelation, Gorgias's answer (A3-4) is *longe accommodatior ... sophistae confidentiae* even with the infinitive construction (*pace* Stallb.), and slovenly also (cf. Olymp 54.24-31): it is a disappointing apocalypse, which Socrates, moreover, quickly interrupts (see next note). Gorgias disregards the alternatives and modalities (*pace* Hamilton he does not say "he shall have to teach" the values), and simply imagines that the knowledge comes neither before nor after but somewhere along the way ("καὶ ταῦτα" = ὡς ἐν παρέργῳ Olymp. *ibid.*). Of course the answer implicitly chooses the alternative that the ῥητορικός by definition (and therefore Gorgias, too) does know justice and the good (cf. nn. 387 and 388), lest he could not teach it – a matter he presumes and skirts at the same time, with confident solitary μὲν. For the indicative after "parenthetical" οἶμαι (*vel sim.*), usually initial, cf. 457B5, 483B4 (with nn. 321, 328, and 1090); *Lys.*206C9, 218E2; *Rep.*340D5 and 7, 465A10, 473D6 (δοκῶ), 507D4, 566E6, 608D7; *Soph.*231D2 (δοκῶ). Jowett's modal "have to learn it" is absent from the text.
- 396 ἔχε δὴ (A5), given the sequel (καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις), cannot be only *inhibendi* (Heindorf Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson) nor *mo,entis* (Stallb.) but includes *adhortandi* (Ast: cf. *souviens-t'en bien*, Sommer) as it appears always to be when absolute. Cf. *Crat.*435E6, *Ion* 535B1, *Lach.*198B2, *Prot.*349E1, *Rep.*353B14, *Th.*186B2. Chambry's "il suffit" mistakes it for ἐξαρκεῖ (as used at 503A5, *Euthyd.*294C6, *H.Maj.*302B5). Yet still it interrupts and cuts Gorgias off. Perhaps, Socrates intuitively, his μὲν (A3) will not have been *solitarium*.
- 397 ἀνάγκη (A6): The necessity that the student has learned it either before or after relies upon a prior necessity that he knows it at all, which itself is implied by his having becoming a ῥητορικός under Gorgias's tutelage: this is the basis for Socrates's inference, as he stresses with ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν (A5).
- 398 τεκτονικός (B2): Socrates predicates the adjective (τεκτονικός) rather than the noun (τέκτων) of the τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκῶς, and so also with the subsequent cases (μουσικός, ἱατρικός). To denote a professional uniformly with the adjective in -ικός is very common and natural in Greek, while conversely it is so rare in English that a translation cannot easily show the parallelism by which Socrates is inferring from one's having learned (μεμαθηκῶς) the substantivized neuter plural (δίκαια), that one may be designated by the adjectival masculine singular (δίκαιος). To assume that Socrates is implicitly relying upon his own paradoxical belief that knowledge is virtue is utterly belied by the explicitly formal character of the argument, and surely helps us not at all in accounting for Gorgias's vociferous acceptance of it (on which see next note).
- 399 πάντως δήπου (B7): With πάντως ("most undoubtedly," Cope) any tone of doubt in the word δήπου is replaced by a tone of presumption (*pace* Jahn). The modern commentator-referees (starting with Hirschig, more vociferous than the usual philologist, and then continued with some deft surfing among positions by Dodds [p.218-9]) disagree with Socrates's analogy (Waterfield says that "actually, it does not follow at all," though "actually" it indubitably "follows" for Gorgias, but he ignores this), and should therefore disagree even more with Gorgias's complacent asseveration of its validity but instead minimize the significance of his response as well as the analogical argumentation that appears to have elicited it, in order to see behind all this a prior and here-suppressed belief of Socrates or Plato, with whom the commentators are presumably more eager to disagree than Gorgias is (so also Hamilton, Canto). But it is Gorgias's vociferous agreement that needs to be interpreted. Irwin asks, at least, why he agrees but then argues it is not clear what he has agreed to and runs through several possibilities, while surely it was clear to Gorgias since he agreed without reservation. Dodds seeks to dampen πάντως δήπου down to "accepting it without a qualm" by identifying Socrates's inference as a background belief among the Greeks, strange to moderns, that virtue like competence includes knowledge. But even if Gorgias shares background beliefs with other Greeks, he never complacently repeats them because he is always performing *ex tempore*. We have already seen that for him knowledge ("content") is trumped (ῥαστώνη) by the sheer device the orator learns from his teacher ("form:" μηχανή, 459B8: cf. 459D5-6). As such he will presumably welcome the argument Socrates has made not because he finds it valid (what inherent worth could validity have, in his eyes?) but because it might serve to persuade the masses to be coddled into believing that both he and his orators are

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει.<sup>400</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ναί. [c]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη<sup>401</sup> τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον<sup>402</sup> βούλεσθαι<sup>403</sup> δίκαια πράττειν;

ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὃ γε δίκαιος<sup>404</sup> ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. οὐ φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων<sup>405</sup> ὀλίγω πρότερον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς [d] παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν<sup>406</sup> ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῆ πυκτικῆ χρῆται τε καὶ

moral (cf. 459E6 and n. 390, *supra*), a belief that is just as prerequisite to the perceived value of his lessons as the belief that his teachings are not immoral is prerequisite to his being allowed to enter the cities in which he peddles them – which latter belief he sought at great length to buttress in his long speech, above (456C6-457C3: cf. n. 335). Olymp. does present a conversion of the argument (that *mutatis mutandis* knowledge of injustice would make a man want to be unjust: 57.13-17), but not to provide Gorgias with a defense (as Thompson suggests), since Gorgias does not need to defend himself against a charge of illogic but only to convince his audience to pay for his services. Again the prejudice against oratorical instruction lurks beneath the surface in much of what he says.

400 δίκαιά που πράττει (B9): που (echoing Gorgias's δῆπου) indicates that Socrates presents the assertion as true on its surface.

401 ἀνάγκη (C1): 'Can we infer?' This "necessary" inference concatenates (*clauditur*, Quint. 2.15.27), into a symperasma, (1) the necessity that the student knows the just (A6), (2) *Gorgias's* belief that the knowledge surely makes him just (B7), and (3) his justness being tantamount to a conscious choice to act justly (B9). Ast's excision against all mss. of τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι and of δὲ in C1 (a version of which was adopted by many subsequent edd.), fails to trace the syllogism Socrates is constructing, the implication of which is that, according to Gorgias himself, no trained orator will misuse the power of oratory, a misuse that Gorgias had countenanced as so possible that he felt pressed to exonerate the teacher of being blamed for its occurrence. Subsequent emendations and athetizations (by Bekker Ast Woolsey Hirschig Thompson Schanz Christ Hermann Lodge Sauppe Croiset Lamb Apelt Helmbold Feix Dodds Chambry Hamilton Zeyl Waterfield Heibüchel) against the overwhelming unanimity of the mss. (which is accepted by Heindorf Coraes Stallb. Deuschle-Cron Burnet Irwin Allen Canto Cantarin Dalfen Erler), which is also faithfully reproduced in Quintilian's quotation of the passage, only spoil the argument which had almost completely been understood and defended a long time ago by Stallb.

402 τὸν δὲ δίκαιον (C1-2): Theiler needlessly emends to ὄντα δίκαιον, which only obscures the symperastic or "syllogistic" structure called for by ἀνάγκη.

403 Reading βούλεσθαι (C2), which is absent from two minor mss. (Aug O1 *teste* Cantarin). It was omitted by Routh Bekker and Schleiermacher, but restored by Heindorf and Stallb. and then kept by subsequent edd. The variant is not mentioned in the modern app.critt. (save Cantarin, of course) which are littered instead with emendations. The verb (continued in C3 and C5 below) is stronger than ἐθέλειν, for it adds purpose to willingness: and it was the margin of arbitrary power (456B6 and n. 304 *ad loc.*) that Gorgias's art would confer upon his student to bring about his own purposes that was meant to attract him to study with Gorgias.

404 ὃ γε δίκαιος (C3): If there was any uncertainty hinted at by Gorgias's γε in φαίνεται γε, Socrates's γε here cancels it.

405 μέμνησαι ... λέγων (C7): The participle stands for a temporal clause, as at *Charm.*156A8 (Deuschle-Cron, Mistriotes).

406 ἐγκαλεῖν... ἐκβάλλειν (D1): Gorgias had twice said μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (456E2, 457B6-7) and then elaborated upon it (457C). Socrates maintains the connective and the plural πόλεων (on which see n. 334), but varies the first verb (τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν). Note that the association of verbs with heteroclitic complements is tolerated (ἐκβάλλειν c.acc.).



ἀδικῆ,<sup>407</sup> ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ<sup>408</sup> ἔὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῆ ῥητορικῆ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ<sup>409</sup> τῷ  
διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδ' ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως,<sup>410</sup> ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ  
ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ<sup>411</sup> τῆ ῥητορικῆ; ἐρρήθη<sup>412</sup> ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. νῦν [e] δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται,<sup>413</sup> ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ἄν<sup>414</sup> ποτε  
ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις<sup>415</sup> ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ  
λόγους εἶη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἢ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον<sup>416</sup> ὡς οὐδέποτε ἄν εἶη ἡ  
ῥητορικὴ ἀδικὸν πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ'<sup>417</sup> αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ

- 407 Reading πικτικῆ χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῆ (D2) with BTP and Stallb. Jahn Kratz Thompson Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Sauppe Croiset Lamb Feix Dodds Theiler Cantarin Heidbüchel (πικτικῆ χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῆ F *testibus* Dodds Cantarin, present as a γρ. in Stephanus [*sed* πικτικῆ χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδίκως χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῆ F *teste* Burnet, *legg.* Burnet Irwin Erler]: πικτικῆ μὴ καλῶς χρῆται καὶ ἀδικῆ ΖΖα<sup>2</sup>Υ, *legg.* Heindorf Ast Bekker Beck Cary[tr.] Cope[tr.] Hirschig Helmbold[tr.]: πικτικῆ μὴ καλῶς χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῆ, *legg.* Routh Schleiermacher[tr.] Sommer: πικτικῆ κακῶς χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῆ Par<sup>2</sup>f [Burnet notes καλῶς superscr. in F, but Dodds and Cantarin correct him saying it is κακῶς that is there). τε καὶ here links, but does not (*pace* Jahn, Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sauppe Ovink Feix Dodds Hamilton Canto) “pair up” or make an hendiadys out of the two anticipated conditions. Rather, they are separate: he acts artfully (emphasized by the double reference to the art) and he does an injustice (cf. Lamb’s “not merely use but an unfair use”). For καὶ and τε καὶ linking ground and inference in this way, cf. 523A6, 525B5; *Phdo.*58B3; *Phdrs.*254A2; *Rep.*334D3, 335B4, 391D1-2 and my n. *ad Rep.*330D7. It is only in the sequel that the two conditions are telescoped into a single expression (τῆ ῥητορικῆ ἀδίκως χρῆται, D3-4), *pace* Jahn. The alternative reading from F (whether with τε or γε) is attractive. Plato *does* employ three-step lists of this sort with a middle term by which to bridge is the first to the third, which lists I call “metabatic” – e.g., *Leg.*634A3-4, 704D6-7; *Tim.*82B6-7; cf. my notes and collections of passages at *Rep.*382B2-3 and 397A6, to which now add *Lach.*197B5-6; *Leg.*641A1-2, 782A5-B1, 837C6-7, 855B7-8, 892B3-4, 917A4-6; *Lys.*215D3-4; *Polit.*293B5-6, 307B9-10; *Prot.*348D2-3; *Rep.*423E6-7, 444A4-5, 445A7-8, 499B2, 547B3-4, 549A5-7, 552E5-6, 598C2, 609C6-7, 610B1-3; *Symp.*192A4-5, 211A8-B1; *Th.*164A6-7; *Tim.*88B4 – but (1) the logic of the list given by F is not as characteristically fine, and (2) the reading could too easily be accounted for as an intruding *marginale* of just the sort shown in f.
- 408 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ (D3): Perhaps the ζ is here added to οὕτω before consonant for the sake of euphony with ὡσαύτως. Cf. n. 2133.
- 409 μὴ (D4) represents a change of construction after οὐ δεῖ, and in particular requires us to supply a leading verb that takes a negative command.
- 410 ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως (D4-5): Socrates varies still further (cf. n. 406, *supra*) the language he is quoting (ἐξελαύνειν for ἐκβάλλειν and singular πόλεως for plural πολέων).
- 411 οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ (D5): At the same time that Socrates brings forward the expression οὐκ ὀρθῶς from 457C2 he reverses the order of the description from above (D2), in a “chiasm of before and after” (cf. n. 1768). The notion that the skill is used suggests polish and control, and even ὀρθότης: there is a lurking contradiction in the notion of doing something incorrectly with astuteness.
- 412 ἐρρήθη (D6): Perhaps the verb acknowledges that these assertions were proffered in continuous oratory as opposed to being answers in a dialectical conversation (cf. n. 414, *just below*) – so at least did Phaedrus take the verb at *Phdrs.*260A1: cf. my n. *ad loc.*
- 413 φαίνεται (E1) is “dialectical”: see next note.
- 414 ἄν ... ἀδικήσας (E1-2): To treat the participle as if it were an optative in order to justify the presence of ἄν is harmless, as long as the fact that a participle was here used rather than an infinitive (which would have elicited the same “explanation”) is kept in mind. The potential construction implied by ἄν brings forward the mode of necessity (“would never,” Hamilton Zeyl: to take ἀδικήσας as representing an irreal apodosis [*could never*] is too strong, and is ruled out by οὐδέποτε ἄν εἶη at E6, below), and the aorist tense of the participle does not represent prior time (*pace* Jowett Hamilton) but presents the essentialist aorist aspect. The participial construction makes φαίνεται “dialectical” (for which cf. my nn. to *Rep.*334A10 and *Lach.*193D2), i.e., portraying what the argument has *brought into view*, so that does not “*equivaut à*” the optative construction (Sommer). Gorgias repeats φαίνεται only, in his response, and thereby leaves ambiguous whether he agrees that it is plainly so (*sc.* the participle) or now asserts that it only seems to be so. The distinction is lost in Cope’s tr. (in which Socrates’s assertion “it appears” is answered by Gorgias’s “It does”) as well as in Croiset’s gratuitously free “*Je ne puis le nier.*”
- 415 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ... λόγοις (E2-3): With πρώτοις Socrates distinguishes the strictly dialectical exchanges between them from Gorgias’s subsequent “oration” to which the dialectic led.
- 416 ὑπέλαβον (E6), what he assumed Gorgias meant (not his own assumption, *pace* Irwin p.128), keeping open the possibility that he assumed incorrectly rather than that Gorgias misspoke (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω, 458E4-5; cf. also 457E4).
- 417 ὃ γε (E7): γε “causal” on the basis of the argument above, as αἰεὶ indicates. With neuter ὃ, though its true antecedent is the subject not the predicate (as again at 462E8, 463A2 and 463B3, *pace* Sauppe), Socrates again prefers the gender of the predicate over that of the subject since the burden of his criticism will be exactly that the noun presupposed by the feminine adjective ῥητορικῆ (namely, τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη) is presupposed without warrant, given the nature of oratory.

ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγεσθαι ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ [461] τῆ ῥητορικῆ κὰν ἀδίκως χρῶτο, οὔτω<sup>418</sup> θαυμάσας καὶ ἠγησάμενος οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα<sup>419</sup> ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἠγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἶη<sup>420</sup> διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν χαίρειν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων<sup>421</sup> ὄραξ δὴ<sup>422</sup> καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι πάλιν αὖ<sup>423</sup> ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν<sup>424</sup> ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῆ ῥητορικῆ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν.<sup>425</sup> ταῦτα οὖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν [b] κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγησιν συνουσία<sup>426</sup> ἐστὶν ὥστε ἰκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

- 418 οὔτω (461A1) goes with θαυμάσας (after οὐδέποτε, E6), not (semi-redundantly) with the entire apodosis (*pace* Ast). θαυμάσας now brings forward his initial remark at 458E3, and shows that the sense all along was not admiration but surprised confusion (cf. n. *ad loc.*).
- 419 With τὰ λεγόμενα (A2), Socrates depersonalizes and thereby defuses blame (Jowett’s “the inconsistency into which you had fallen” is quite wrong). It of course refers to what *Gorgias* was saying, but in a dialogical situation, just whose opinion is being tested is irrelevant: all that is relevant is who is answerer and who is questioner and that they reach agreement.
- 420 εἶη (A4): ἄν is not omitted (*pace* Heindorf). The optative represents ἐστὶ in secondary sequence (the original speech as portrayed is εἰ κέρδος ἠγοῖο εἶναι ... ἄξιον ἐστι διαλέγεσθαι (with Ast Stallb.). In fact Socrates had there used a hortatory subjunctive (διαλεγόμεθα, 458B2) rather than ἄξιόν ἐστι (let alone ἄξιον ἂν εἶη), while εἰ κέρδος ἠγοῖο here represents εἰ ... σὺ φῆς, there (458B1-2). Socrates is employing the sequence of moods to emphasize that the discrepant positions were taken at different times in the conversation.
- 421 ἐπισκοπουμένων (A5): For Socrates’s use of this term for the further investigation that his elenchus always entails, cf. my n. to *Lach.* 197E3.
- 422 ὄραξ (A5) points back to the “perceptual” participial construction, φαίνεται ... ἀδικήσας (460E1-2).
- 423 Reading πάλιν αὖ (A5) from F (*legg.* Apelt[tr.] Helmbold[tr.] Dodds Chambry[“*au contraire*”] Irwin Zeyl Waterfield[“*opposite conclusion*”] Nichols[“once again”]), as helpfully more explicit and more accurate than the bare αὖ of BTWP (*legg.* Routh Ast Bekker Beck Thompson Schanz[*sine noto*] Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset[*sine noto*] Lamb Theiler Cantarín Erler Heidbüchel). The variant was known to Routh (from the second *editio Basileensis*, and as a γρ. in Steph.); Heindorf was the first to adopt it, reversing the order (αὖ πάλιν) and citing parallels in the dialogues. Ast (1823), however, rejected the variant as too weakly supported, contending also that πάλιν αὖ tends to mean simply “again” whereas it is αὖ πάλιν that almost always indicates a return to a previous position. But, like “again” in English, αὖ even by itself always *entertains* going back to a heading and starting over again. The two words in tandem, whichever the order, create an emphasis that asks the mind to *notice* that the ὁμολογία here is a return to the previous position. This is perhaps why the combination is particularly common in pointing up a contradiction, as Dodds notes, comparing *Prot.* 318E1, *Rep.* 507B6.
- 424 τὸν ῥητορικόν (A6), replacing ῥήτωρ just above (460E8), incorporates the idea that the ῥήτωρ has become ῥητορικόν by virtue of learning ῥητορικῆ, a study that according to the recent argument included training in justice in case the student arrived not knowing it, so that by the end of the training he “necessarily” knows it. Designating him with the adjective instead of the noun emphasizes that his use of the skill will not be unjust exactly because he himself will not be. Of course Socrates is assuming that if he knows justice he will not be willing (ἐθέλειν) to act unjustly, and even will necessarily be unwilling to act unjustly.
- 425 ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι ... καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν (A6-7): In this case καὶ means “*i.e.*” not “or” (as in Schleiermacher, Jowett). The unjust use of the art is pre-empted by his preparation in the study of justice (as distinct from his study of the art), which in itself makes him just. The order of the two assertions is borrowed from 460C1-2.
- 426 συνουσία (B1): His use of this metaphor for dialectical scrutiny is meant to recall his use of it at 457D1, and thereby to remind Gorgias that resolving these issues is just as important for their success as it will be difficult; and in the spirit of that passage he is again offering Gorgias an excuse for bowing out. Socrates’s solicitous concern for Gorgias’s willingness to go on, at every turn, is unique in the dialogues, and goes far beyond his usual deference to the interlocutor, though in the same direction. I believe he knows that Gorgias has no business engaging in real dialogue but must appear credible and reasonable nevertheless. Socrates is essentially shaming him into continuing just as long as possible, for Gorgias must keep up appearances just as much as he must avoid confessing what his teaching truly consists in; Socrates’s goal can only be to reveal to his fellow Athenians what it is that Gorgias is selling. Polus, aware of Gorgias’s problem as a fellow professional, now gets him off the hook by intervening. What is taken by the commentators as gentlemanliness in Gorgias and impetuosity in Polus accordingly evince their respective brands of professional strategy; and when finally Callicles comes onto the stage, Socrates will face the opposite problem, of an interlocutor without a portfolio whose candor leaves him high and dry. Where Gorgias deftly succeeds to hide, Callicles will leave himself nowhere to escape to.



ΠΩΛ. τί δαί,<sup>427</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις<sup>428</sup> ὥσπερ  
 νῦν λέγεις; ἢ<sup>429</sup> οἶει—ὅτι Γοργίας ἠσχύνθη<sup>430</sup> σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν  
 ἄνδρα<sup>431</sup> μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ,<sup>432</sup> καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ  
 ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ’ αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξειν, ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως<sup>433</sup> τῆς ὁμολογίας  
 ἐναντίον τι<sup>434</sup> συνέβη ἐν τοῖς [c] λόγοις—τοῦτο<sup>435</sup> δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν<sup>436</sup> ἐπὶ  
 τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα<sup>437</sup>—ἐπεὶ<sup>438</sup> τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν<sup>439</sup> ἐπίστασθαι

- 427 Reading τί δαί (B3) restored to the text by Ast Bekker Rückert and Stallb. from BTW<sup>2</sup> (τί δέ WF Olymp[λ], *legg. edd.*), and subsequently read by Kratz Thompson Sommer Hirschig and *AGPS* 64.5.3.A. This is the sort of language we should expect from Polus (cf. n. 126). He feigns indignation (Mistriotes) that Socrates should be trying to attack the great man and imputes ill motives to him despite Socrates’s consistent attempts to prevent any such impression from forming. Indeed this small speech should and must be viewed as a deployment of his oratorical devices – which is the basis for Socrates reiterating the charge of *μακρολογία* against him (D6-7: cf. 449B6).
- 428 οὕτω καὶ σὺ δοξάζεις (B3-4): Schleiermacher Ast Stallb. Mistriotes Schmelzer Lodge (and Denniston 326-7) take καὶ to be impatiently proleptic with δοξάζεις rather than σὺ, and take it to mean “Do you *really* believe (δοξάζεις) that?”, with οὕτω = ‘what you have just said.’ But as usual with καὶ, which is inherently proleptic, the bell has already been rung and it *cannot but* be taken with σὺ. Among those that take it this way, Thompson’s “Do even you think – not to speak of your audience,” makes no sense since Socrates has no audience. Kratz, also taking it with σὺ, interprets “*wie die Anderen*” i.e., “*die ungebildeten Leute*,” but Polus does not say this much and instead of clarifying to whom he might be alluding, he takes a new tack with ἢ οἶει; moreover if Polus *had* said more along Kratz’s lines, he would have undermined his own profession as teacher for portraying the orators as having failed to command the thought of these “*ungebildeten*.” Mistriotes is not quite right to say that οἱ πολλοὶ have a high opinion of oratory and that only the philosophers have the wits to criticize them: rather, οἱ πολλοὶ – then as now – fear, admire, and despise oratory: the definitive description is given in *Rep.* Bk. VI on the θρέμμα (493A6-C8). Furthermore as Deuschle-Cron and Mistriotes notice, there is in all strictness no antecedent to οὕτω since Socrates has not yet expressed his opinion about oratory, but at most has only suggested one. Sauppe does take καὶ with σὺ and fills in that Gorgias has been forced only by Socrates’s *elenchus* into asserting the orator is just, an absurdity that neither he *nor Socrates* believes (‘even you do not believe what you are forcing him to say’), but Socrates has not forced upon Gorgias a paradoxical view – rather, he has left him with a dilemma. I suggest that οὕτω has its derogatory “rhetorical” meaning, expressing impatience as if to an unidentified third party (as οὗτος at 467B1 and n. 241; cf. *Rep.* 506B5 and my n. *ad loc.*), and that δοξάζεις, which should hardly mean “*really* believe,” is climactically *derogatory*: “So you, too, are of *that* opinion?” The “opinion” in question, unspoken and unspeakable because true, which moreover has continually influenced everything Polus and Gorgias have been saying in defense of oratorical teaching, is the prejudice against it that these teachers face in every city they visit (cf. 456E2, 457B7 and nn. 399, 335, 165), namely that it is deceptive and mendacious trickery. It suffices that Socrates should even broach the outlook (let alone advance it) that he (but still, not it) must be “taken out” by Polus, and this is the why and the how and the what of what Polus goes on to do.
- 429 ἢ (B4), which I read with F and P *teste* Cantarin (ἢ BT : καὶ W), introduces not an alternative position for him to take but challenges his assent to an alternative (on which use cf. n. 1407).
- 430 ἠσχύνθη (B5), with infinitive προσομολογήσαι and redundant μὴ, means not that he was ashamed to make the supplementary concession that a real orator has a decent understanding of justice and the other basic values, but that he *would have been ashamed* to make the supplementary concession if he had. In a *private* conversation with Socrates, Gorgias’s student Meno expresses admiration that Gorgias never claimed to teach virtue and indeed derided others for professing this when what mattered was to make men clever at speaking (95C1-4). For Gorgias to have a worry about the personal morality of the orator is also to countenance his own culpability as an accomplice in magnifying his client’s evil designs, so he must *be thought to believe* he is good lest his own personal morality come into question and he be liable to expulsion. Personal probity – more exactly the appearance of it – must be assumed. We must keep in mind that Gorgias’s persuasion relies most heavily on πίστις, trust in the speaker, and hardly at all on the propositional value of his argumentation and the argumentation he teaches (it is always the *man* he envisions the audience preferring or choosing, not the man’s *argument*: 452E1-8; 455A4[πιστικός], 455B2-C2, E2-3; 456A2-3, B4-5, B8-C6; 459A2-B5, C3-7, E6: cf. nn. 271, 299). Seeing Gorgias dodge the question of the orator’s morality, whether by demurral or derision, provides the prospective student with cover for paying his high fees at the same time that it gives him a model for the behavior he may himself emulate on the βῆμα.
- 431 τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα (B5): ἄνδρα is not otiose, and is meant to correct Socrates’s merely technical use of ῥητορικόν above (A6: cf. n. 424). Polus is invoking the image of the prominent and highly respected politician he and Gorgias want their audience to think they will enable them to become, and thus to ridicule Socrates for impugning their upstanding decency as scurrilous and contemptible; but he does so exactly because he is fully conscious that it is quite contemptible that neither he nor Gorgias nor their prospective students feel any compunction trading power for cash and cash for power.
- 432 τὰ δίκαια ... καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ (B6): While it is true that Socrates had in passing brought in all three of these “μέγιστα” as something we rely upon a good politician to understand (459D1-2: cf. n. 384), the *dialectical* gravamen of the argument from which Polus means to rescue Gorgias concerns justice only (460A5-461B2). By recalling the triad Polus means to deflect attention away from the dialectical focus of Socrates’s challenge (the orator’s primary topic is political policy, and according to the argument so far the primary criterion of policy was justice), and at the same time to turn Socrates into a preposterous logic-chopper ready to pull the rug out from under the “better people.”
- 433 ἴσως (B8): Not *ni fallor* or *sine dubio* with συνέβη (Ast Cary Woolsey [Cope tr. “I daresay some slight inconsistency” – so also Thompson Chambry] Deuschle-Cron Jowett Allen Zeyl Canto). Rather, by its position it expresses skepticism (with Lodge) as to whether Gorgias’s remark was truly a ὁμολογία (in Socrates’s strict dialectical sense) rather than something he was just shamed into conceding (cf. 471D9, 482D2-3; cf. n. 801), and points back to skeptical οἶει (B4).
- 434 ἐναντίον τι συνέβη (B8): Polus isolates Socrates’s logical language (cf. 459B5) in order to characterize him as hyperlogical in the sequel – as if a contradiction might not be a contradiction – without actually saying so much (cf. n. 436, just below).
- 435 I read τοῦτο (C1) only, with BTPF (and Findeisen Ast[1832] Christ: Ficinus tr. *Hoc tu quidem nimium studiose captas*; Helmbold tr. “That’s a thing you like to do”), rather than τοῦθ’ ὃ (with fZbY) or τοῦτο ὃ (from Par<sup>2</sup> f), one or the other of which is accepted by most edd. without comment (cf. Schleiermacher, *woran eben du deine Freude hast*). To cite parallels for the idiom (= *id quod*, Heindorf Stallb.) does not overcome the superior testimony for the former but only weakens what claim the latter would have as *difficilior*. When Callicles recalls this passage at 482D, the charge that Socrates takes delight in teasing out contradictions is again given an independent clause rather than merely being tucked in,

τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξουσιν; —ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλή<sup>440</sup> ἀγροικία ἐστὶν<sup>441</sup> τοὺς λόγους.<sup>442</sup>

ΣΩ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε,<sup>443</sup> ἀλλά τοι<sup>444</sup> ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς,<sup>445</sup> ἵνα ἐπειδὴν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε<sup>446</sup> ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις.<sup>447</sup> καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ [d] Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλώμεθα, σὺ παρῶν ἐπανόρθου<sup>448</sup>— δίκαιος δ' εἶ<sup>449</sup>—καὶ

- though tucking it in is completely consistent with Polus's gruff manner. The *ad hominem* attack (ἀγαπή), ignoring the logos, again stands in strong contrast with the solicitous deference Socrates had hitherto shown toward Gorgias for the sake of the logos (Deuschle-Cron).
- 436 ἀγαγόν (C1) is reported by Cantarín from all mss. except Par (which has ἄγον), and is read by edd. Its tense implies the pleasure comes from the leading. ἄγον was read by Routh Heindorf (thinking it is meant to describe a habit of Socrates's) Ast, but has not been included in the *app. critt.* of edd. since Schanz, until Cantarín. The verbal metaphor of "leading" the interlocutor "toward" something underlies the noun ἐπαγωγή. Cf. 482E3, 489B5.
- 437 τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα (C1-2): The plural and even the use of a neuter verbal-noun are derogatory, and the demonstrative, because anarthrous, conveys disapproval without requiring Polus to articulate what he is faulting (again at C4: compare his allusive use of οὕτω above). "Eine Bestimmung der Art dieser Fragen verschweigt Polos weislich," Deuschle-Cron. Jowett destroys his rhetoric by over-translating, "your captious questions." Although all the questions the likes of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus will ask are captious and strategic, the term ἐρώτημα does not yet have the elenctic meaning, in that dialogue or elsewhere in Plato, that it will soon have in Arist. (e.g., *An.Pr.* 64A36, *Top.* 158A7 and 27: nor does Plato yet use the term ἐρωτηματίζειν [Arist. *Top. passim*]); instead Plato uses the descriptive periphrasis ἄφρατα ἐρωτᾶν (*Euthyd.* 276E5, *Th.* 165B8). For the derogatory neuter plural, cf. ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων, *Phdr.* 249D1 and my n. *ad loc.* Polus is pointing to a distinction between questioning and holding forth, as inferior and superior types of λόγοι, respectively.
- 438 ἐπεὶ (C2), often with γε, can introduce a gratuitously derogatory remark as if it were a justification for what is being said, when in fact it serves only as a justification for saying it – as at 483D6, *Rep.* 346A1, 358C6, 471C8; cf. *Lach.* 200A1 (with ny n. *ad loc.*), and Smyth §2380.
- 439 αὐτὸν (C2) is an adjective not a pronoun and means "of himself in turn," not "(even) Gorgias" (*pace* Helmbold). Polus's rhetorical question "Who would deny he has any concept of fairness?" only means "One needs not assert it," justifying in the end Gorgias silently taking virtue for granted.
- 440 πολλή ἀγροικία (C4), proleptic for emphasis, pushes τοὺς λόγους to the end. Compare the rhetoric of Gorgias's expression, πολλή ῥαστώνη – the conventional pairing of quality and quantity used with bluffing redundancy. Deuschle-Cron notes that it is Polus, rather, who shows a lack of παιδεία in his very manner.
- 441 τοὺς λόγους (C4): ἄγειν is again absolute (repeated from above, C1) and τοὺς λόγους (repeated from ἐν τοῖς λόγοις above) is an accusative of respect. The world of eloquence soars high above such quibbles.
- 442 The "speech" (B3-C4) is an onslaught using well-worn bluffs and dodges (cf. Stallb.126-7). The various *supplenda* proffered by the editors (collected by Woolsey and by Cope *ad loc.*) are in a way an index of the success with which Polus's technique is operating upon the commentators themselves, techniques by which he requires his auditor to repair his expression by thinking his thoughts. Woolsey and many later commentators are too generous in saying, "Polus is so eager that he cannot end his sentence grammatically but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings" (*vel sim.*) – for his "eagerness" is insincere.
- 443 ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε (C5): Deuschle-Cron contrast Socrates's (ironically) complimentary manner with Polus's derogatory one. The vocative is used in initial position when the speaker directs a remark to a new interlocutor (exx. collected in my n. to *Lach.* 181B5), but also within a conversation already ongoing to arrest the interlocutor's attention for a special, often personal, remark (cf. 448C4, 471E2, 481C5 [answered by 482C4], 517B2, and most importantly in the remark with which Socrates ends the dialogue, 527E7). Since Polus has interrupted, we may say that both motives (an acknowledgement of the new interlocutor and a monitory remark) are operant here.
- 444 ἀλλά τοι (C5) is read by edd. from BTW (*ἀλλά τι F feste* Cantarín, read by the doubting Thompson): the collocation is indeed striking and dubious for its sudden combination of dismissal and intimation. It is used to add a point that trends against but is not meant to gainsay what has just been said: cf. *Rep.* 474A6, 497A1.
- 445 Reading ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς (C6), with F t, and read by all edd. except for Schanz and Sauppe (ἐτέρους υἱεῖς BTWY : ἐταίρους υἱεῖς NFlor : ἐταίρους *scr.* Schanz, followed by Sauppe). It is not "friends and sons" (with all translators), for companions get old, too: rather, ἐταίρους is appositional and καὶ, if we read it, is intensive ("sons as companions") since the sequel needs the friends in question to be younger than "us." Schanz's athetization of υἱεῖς (rather than ἐταίρους) goes in exactly the wrong direction. Canto forces the text to say what it has to by adding a word to the Greek (!): "nos fils et nos jeunes collègues."
- 446 ἵνα ... ἐπανορθοῖτε (C6-7): If the purpose is truly that of the "we" and of "our acquisition" of young persons as friends, then the subjunctive ἐπανορθοῖτε should be read, with F (*legg.* Heindorf Ast Bekker Rückert Jahn Sommer Schanz Mistriotes Lodge Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Theiler Cantarín Erler Heidbüchel); but if Socrates means (with some irony) to be attributing a mere intention to the eager youths (cf. εἰ ... βούλει, ὅσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, 462A2-3 below) then, with Stallb. (and Routh Thompson Sauppe Dodds), the optative of BTPY is appropriate (Stallb. *ad Rep.* 410C: "recte optativus ponitur ... obi nihil nisi merum alicuius consilium animique cogitatio ex eius ipsius mente significatur"; Hermann *ad S. El.* 57: (var.) "finis quem quis in mente habet significatur non etiam illud fieri hoc quod ille cogitat"; cf. *S. OC* 170 (var.), *E. IT* 1210, *Hec.* 11). Ast accepts Stallb.'s defense of an optative in primary sequence but then argues for the subj. on the basis of his own interpretation of the passage; but the optative is both the *lectio difficilior* and has the superior witness, and so it should be read and should then (*pace* Ast) be taken as the basis for the interpretation.
- 447 καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις (C8): The joke is that a young man is surely well suited to do the former but just as surely ill suited to do the latter for his elder.
- 448 ἐπανόρθου (D1): The metaphor is used of rectifying an argument very often in the dialogues: *Euthyph.* 9D2; *Lach.* 200B4; *Polit.* 276E6; *Rep.* 361A2; *Symp.* 180D2; *Th.* 146C5, 167E7.
- 449 δίκαιος δ' εἶ (D2), by dint of his more vigorous youth. For the expression cf. 521A6, *Crat.* 428A5, *Lach.* 180E1.

ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὠμολογημένων εἶ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὠμολογησθαι, ἀναθέσθαι<sup>450</sup>  
ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλη, ἔάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης.

ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. τὴν μακρολογίαν,<sup>451</sup> ᾧ Πῶλε, ἦν καθέρξης,<sup>452</sup> ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας  
χρῆσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. τί δαί;<sup>453</sup> οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι; [e]

ΣΩ. δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ᾧ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος,<sup>454</sup> οὗ τῆς  
Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος  
ἀτυχήσῃς. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθετος τοι<sup>455</sup> σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος<sup>456</sup> καὶ<sup>457</sup> μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ  
ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται [462] μοι  
ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἶ τι<sup>458</sup> κήδη τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ  
ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ

- 450 ἀναθέσθαι (D3) *sc.* σὲ, with Ficinus Woolsey Jowett (*pace* Stallb. Cope Thompson Hamilton Irwin Zeyl Waterfield). Woolsey cites frg.51 from Cic. *Hort.* that is pertinent regardless whether Cic. is imitating this passage: here as there the metaphor of moving the piece on the board (*calculus reducere*) requires that it is Polus and not Socrates that moves it because, while Socrates might be willing that the agreements reached should be altered, it is incumbent upon him who wants a piece moved to decide where it should be moved to. Though σοι at *Hipparchus* 229E3-4 (ἐθέλω σοι ἀναθέσθαι ὃ τι βούλει) shows that another construction is possible, the dative (*pace* Thompson) is absent here; closer instead is the passage at *Prot.*354E8, where σὲ must be supplied as the subject of the infinitive. Cf. 462A3.
- 451 τὴν μακρολογίαν (D6): Polus had been silent since performing his fancy preamble at 448C; Socrates immediately characterizes his present interruption as a second attempt at such a performance. Of course it is not the sheer length that he criticized there, or here, but the quantity of words in the numerator measured against its relevance as an answer in the denominator – which in the present case is close to zero. Socrates's first complaint after Polus's initial performance was that it was not an answer to the question (448D5); second that it was oratory rather than discussion (D9-10); and third that it told the ποῖον rather than the τί (E6-7). It was only when he turned to Gorgias that Socrates characterized Polus's performance as too long (449B6): he introduced the notion of length only after he had defined the criteria of relevance. Gorgias immediately understood, saying some questions do need long answers (B9-10) but then dropped the notion of relevance (the denominator) to claim that even these he could shorten (i.e. reduce the numerator) more than anyone else (C7-8). Since then the discrepancy between oratory and dialogue had been played out in terms of what a question is and what an answer is, but now we have had an *interruption*. A new threat against dialogue has appeared, and so the methodological question is raised anew. In his interruption Polus asserts that Socrates has led them away from one kind of λόγος and into another, which he characterizes as τιαυτὰ ἐρωτήματα (461C1-2) and claims evince Socrates's lack of sophistication in the realm of λόγοι (C4). Elsewhere this complaint against Socrates will be characterized as a sort of συμκρολογία (*H.Maj.*304B4: cf. συμκρὸν παραγόμενοι, *Rep.*487B) or ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι (Thrasymachus at *Rep.*340E2) and is derogated as illiberal (*H.Maj.*301B2-6, *Th.*184C1-5). Socrates now replies by treating the λόγος between Gorgias and himself as still intact even if it has taken a wrong step, and invites Polus to participate as a dialectical partner by remedying that wrong step (D1-3), instead of employing μακρολογία.
- 452 καθέρξης (D6): The metaphor is more likely that of the ἔρκος ὀδόντων than of damming a flow (*pace* Deuschle-Cron). Hence Croiset's "tenir en bride."
- 453 Reading τί δαί (D8) with ZZa *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Ast Stallb. Rückert Woolsey Kratz Thompson Sommer Mistriotes (τί δέ TWP, *legg.* edd. : τί δὴ F Olymp.[λ]), feigning indignation again (cf.B3). See also Denniston, 263.
- 454 ἀφικόμενος (E2): Polus, too, is a Sicilian, expecting somehow to enjoy, even at a private meeting, the freedom of speech vouchsafed in Athens not only to its citizens but also to its metics and even to its slaves (Ps.-Xen. *Ath.Pol.*1.12; D. 9.3) – but not to a ξένο! Socrates alludes to the fact that it is exactly this maximal παρρησία afforded by Athens, in combination with her pre-eminence in the Delian League, that has created a market for this foreigner's services as a "ρήτωρ," a market so much stronger than the market back in Acragas, not to mention the danger of being scapegoated among the people one lives with if one teaches only some of them. Conspicuous in contrast to the rights and interests of Polus are those of Athens which is providing him a forum for his teaching.
- 455 ἀλλὰ ἀντίθετος τοι (E3-4): All the mss. have ἀλλὰ but are discrepant about τοι (reading τό or τι); since Ast (1823) the edd. unanimously accept τοι. Dodds leaves his usually full apparatus empty and prints ἀλλ' ἀντίθετος τοι, spacing it as a quote, because this is what he finds in a fragment of Crates (frag.15 [1.134 Kock]: ἀλλ' ἀντίθετος τοι; ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὰ πάμπαν | τὰ θερμά λουτρά πρῶτον ἄξω τοῖς ἔμοις | ...). He (followed by Waterfield Erler) wants Plato/Socrates to be quoting it, so he needs to elide the -α of ἀλλὰ so that it will scan. But the expression is more likely a by-word meaning "on the other hand," appropriated for his comedy by Crates from the *Umgangssprache*, rather than a phrase created by Crates appropriated in quotation for no reason by Plato.
- 456 λέγοντος (E4): By using the genitive absolute in place of a regular protasis Socrates avoids to decide the "modality" of his criticism of Polus: the present participle can stand for an hypothesis irreal (imperfect indic.), actual (present indic.), or ideal (present optative). By the time he reaches the alternative hypothesis (κήδη, 462A1) he has let the cat out of the bag and can explicitly use the indicative.
- 457 καὶ (E4) is exegetical: by now μακρολογία has come to be a name for monologue instead of dialogue.
- 458 εἶ τι (462A1): τι, as enclitic, is mild and almost otiose – it does not indignantly mean "if you care at all" (*pace* Lamb Helmbold Hamilton Irwin Zeyl Waterfield). Polus had chastised Socrates for an abuse of λόγοι (ἀγροικία τοῦς λόγους, 461C4), and now Socrates mildly infers (with τι) that if he means what he said and truly cares, it is incumbent upon him to correct what he found abusive.

μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου.<sup>459</sup>  
φήσ γὰρ δῆπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἄπερ<sup>460</sup> Γοργίας· ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος<sup>461</sup> ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [b]

ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα.<sup>462</sup> καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναί, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ<sup>463</sup> Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. ἄρα ἐρωτᾶς ἦντινα τέχνην<sup>464</sup> φημί εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Πῶλε, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθῆ<sup>465</sup> εἰρησθαι.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί<sup>466</sup> σοὶ δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

459 ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου (A4-5): Again Socrates is scrupulous about the order, inviting Polus to refute before being refuted (and to question before being questioned, A3-4), just as before he had imagined *himself* being refuted before refuting (458A3-4). With this pair along with the other two (ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος and ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας), all linked with τε καί, he stresses the difference between macrological monology and dialectical dialogue.

460 ἄπερ Γοργίας (A5-6) sc. ἐπίσταται not ἐπίστασθαί φησι, *pace* Irwin.

461 ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι (A9): The expression continues the ambiguity as to whether the claim and the pretense are a matter of knowing answers or being able to acquit oneself with something ἱκανόν for the questioner (cf. καινόν n. 138, and nn. 165, 174, 366), but by now we also know that Socrates's questions will be real questions and the answers will need to really answer them (cf. n. 364).

462 ταῦτα (B3) can hardly mean the former (i.e., ἐρωτᾶν), nor does it at *Rep.*370A5 (cf. my n. *ad loc.*) – especially not in the plural – *pace* Helmbold. Polus tells his audience to ask him whatever *they* want (ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται) him to demonstrate about; Socrates has just told Polus to play whichever dialectical role *he* wants (ὁπότερον βούλει): it is a choice between two kinds of λόγος – macrological with a passive audience or a two-way conversation – and Polus acknowledges this by agreeing to adopt Socrates's way. As often, the key to construing the demonstrative is to consider its “person,” here second, referring to Polus's interlocutor, Socrates. For other cases where the response takes up the remote rather than the proximate alternative without warning, cf. *H.Maj.*293E11, *Phdo.*79B6, *Rep.*341B4.

463 ἐπειδὴ (B4): Both the charge and the inference are unjustified: It was Polus, not Socrates, that judged Gorgias at a loss at 461B3, which is why he interrupted before Gorgias could reveal he had no answer; nor is the inference justified that Socrates, from so judging, should himself know something (cf. ἐπεὶ at 461C2 with n. *ad loc.* [the putatively causal connection does not come across in Jowett's tr.]). Gorgias is not able to answer merely because he asked him hard questions – though this impression is often formed by Socrates's unsuccessful answerers that he does have answers. Similarly, Laches has no warrant to hope Nicias would have an answer about courage (199E13-200A3) merely because he had said Laches did not (where again note ἐπειδὴ, 200A1). In truth, Polus is not asking for a definition nor even challenging Socrates to define it (after all if anyone knows what it is, it would be Polus, its practitioner!), but only challenging him to acquit himself successfully against whatever onslaught of questions he, Polus, might be able to devise. To act this way is exactly to display his oratorical ability, in the viewing of the small and attentive audience.

464 τέχνην (B6): On the noun implicit in the adjective ῥητορικῆ, cf. 448D9 and n. *ad loc.* As Mistrisotes and Heidbüchel notice, Polus had asked not τί εἶναι but τίνα (sc. τέχνην) εἶναι (i.e., not What? [*quid*: so mistranslated by Schleiermacher {*was*} Cope Jowett Apelt {*wofür*} Helmbold Chambry {*ce qu'elle est*} Hamilton Allen Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Dalfen] – but Which? [*quam*: Routh Ast Irwin]). The *schol. Arethae* (*apud* Greene, 470) is wrong to say his question is ambiguous for asking either for the species or the genus. It *presumes* an answer to the question of its genus – i.e., whether it is an art – and asks another question that presumed a yes answer (*Which art is it?*) – thus in a sense it is asking two questions. Asking questions can be harder than answering them!

465 τάληθῆ (B9): It is his reluctance to offend that this expresses, not a truth claim (*pace* Cope, here and at 462E6): compare, with Jahn, an expression like ὡς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρησθαι (*Prot.*309A4).

466 ἀλλὰ τί (B10): Yes, that (using the neuter) is properly the first question. Athetization of ἢ ῥητορικῆ (with Theiler following Beck) against all mss. requires us to believe too much.



ΣΩ. πρᾶγμα<sup>467</sup> ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι [c] ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνω.<sup>468</sup>

ΠΩΛ. τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.<sup>469</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.<sup>470</sup>

ΠΩΛ. τίνας ἐμπειρία;

ΣΩ. χάριτός τινος<sup>471</sup> καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. οὐκοῦν<sup>472</sup> καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπτυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι φημι [d] αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς εἰ οὐ καλή<sup>473</sup> μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

- 467 πρᾶγμα (B11): Socrates had used this evasive term for oratory just above, 460E7, to side-step characterizing oratory as art or knowledge. The sense of the ensuing relative clause is either that this πρᾶγμα (i.e., this ἐμπειρία) made oratory artful (I supply αὐτὴν referring to ῥητορικὴ in the previous line) or that it brought art into being (Lamb Irwin Waterfield Nichols Dalfen, comparing 448C6: ἐ. ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην) – not that Polus claims to have made the πρᾶγμα into an art (*pace* Jowett Croiset Apelt Dodds Allen Canto Piettre Erler). In the end this characterization of oratory will serve only as a “passing note” for Socrates, for the ἐμπειρία he has in mind, once it is spelled out as producing gratification and pleasure (462C7-E5), will serve essentially as the *definiens* of and transition to *κολακεία* – but before they can get that far, the presumption of its being an art, built into the very use of the feminine adjective to name it, needs to be debunked.
- 468 ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνω (C1): ὃ is adverbial. Socrates refers not to a book he has recently read, but to the “revelation” Polus vouchsafed to him above (cf. n. 156 and Olymp.66.4 [n.b., ἐγνωμεν], 67.15-16). Compare Socrates’s quick sensitivity to recitations from memory posing as *ex tempore* speech early in his encounter with Phaedrus (*Phdrs.*228D1-E2, with my nn. *ad loc.*). ὃ φῆς σὺ (B11, mss.), as opposed to ὃ σὺ φης (found in ms.P), indicates that Socrates is using Polus as a witness for his own thesis (cf. Olymp.85.20-24 and n. 638, *infra*). Out of ἐμπειρία came all τέχνη, Polus claimed (ἐκ, 448C5), and therefore oratory, too; but Socrates calls the mother barren. Polus “does not understand” because his “assertion” there was mere preamble (*pace* Dodds).
- 469 ἐμπειρίαν (C3): The term denotes experience but here is pressed into a pregnant use and denotes the result of experience, namely *familiarity*, a notion entirely dependent upon the assertion of Polus as to the origin of oratorical prowess in his manual (whence Socrates’s intervening comment [B11-C1] which would otherwise not qualify as πρὸς λόγον, as he put it above [459C8]). Hence, *peritia quaedam* (Routh: cf. the Roman formula *dicendi peritus*) and *Geschicklichkeit* (Schleiermacher), *savoir-faire* (Canto Piettre). Socrates has found a feminine noun so that ῥητορικὴ still can be ῥητορικὴ (so also τριβή [463B4 below]). Irwin Allen Waterfield translate it “knack” which will leave the reader in the dark as to the relation of this passage to Polus’s speech, where they had translated it “experience.” With τινὰ Socrates is *referring* to Polus’s word but admits, or warns, that he is giving it an altered sense.
- 470 εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις (C5): Jowett takes Socrates to be saying “unless I misunderstood your treatise,” but nothing in his remark points back; Helmbold translates, “unless you have some other term to suggest,” but this is not what λέγεις meant at C2, to which Socrates here refers. Instead it is a rather vigorous retort to Polus’s τί τοῦτο λέγεις above, as a means to obtain dialectical agreement (Chambry, “*si tu n’as rien à m’objecter*”: cf. Hamilton Allen). He demurs to flatly posit his own judgment in case Polus disagrees with it, just as he had promised above (ἀναθέσθαι [sc. σε: cf. n. 450] ὅτι ἂν σὺ βοῦλη), for the sake of keeping the conversation going. Moreover Socrates defers to the expert, even if self-appointed, Cf., with Dodds, *Rep.*430B4-5 where he is asking permission for positing (τίθεμαι) something, and *H.Maj.*291A2.
- 471 τινος (C7) indicates Socrates is groping for how to express his meaning, and καὶ ἡδονῆς, in exegesis, makes a further stab. It is exactly this vagueness or uncertainty that Polus should next ask about, if he is to play questioner aright.
- 472 Reading οὐκοῦν (C8), with all mss., since Socrates’s two portrayals of the “question” below show that Polus expects a yes answer, unqualified: he is not trying to force Socrates to admit it but takes him as admitting it (cf. next note). Hence Canto’s “*Tu vois! Même toi, tu penses...*”. Most importantly he is not asking the next question required by the dialectical development but hoping to win the conversation by proving oratory praiseworthy. Not unlike Gorgias, who used the same construction at 459C3-5, Polus is quick to praise the teaching of oratory (and where necessary to defend it) rather than discuss its nature, so that his question whether it isn’t a fine thing followed by an approbatory description of oratory, comes immediately after the announcement it is pleasing, disregarding that it might not be an art. Irwin’s worry about what Polus means by καλόν is irrelevant to Polus. His condescending term ἀνθρώποις indicates he is concerned only to advertise the power of oratory over the masses rather than trying to identify the pleasing or the glad with the fine, though Socrates does, playfully at least, take him to be asserting so much just below (D5-7). The identification becomes thematically central in the sequel, when he addresses him directly at 465A1-2, because in the end the only claim to fineness that is by then left to oratory is that it is pleasing, which indeed Socrates there denies. Croiset’s *se rendre agréable* is an over-translation of χαρίζεσθαι.
- 473 εἰ οὐ καλή (D1): With this interpretation of Polus’s question (and again, at 463C3), Socrates reveals that he takes Polus to be assuming his assent, and that it is not truly a question. Dodds prints οὐκ οὖν and Sauppe οὐκ οὖν (vs. οὐκοῦν in the mss.) because they think Polus is being argumentative, as Dodds (following Denniston) thought Gorgias’s was being at 459C3 and likewise emended οὐκοῦν into οὐκ οὖν there. Cf. 466E3 and n. 594 *ad loc.*

ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ<sup>474</sup> πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς εἶναι;

ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς<sup>475</sup> τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρὸν τί μοι χάρισασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀσοποιία<sup>476</sup> εἴ τίς<sup>477</sup> μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη<sup>478</sup> ὀσοποιία;

ΣΩ. οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.<sup>479</sup>

ΣΩ. φημί δὴ,<sup>480</sup> ἐμπειρία τις.

ΠΩΛ. τίνοσ;<sup>481</sup> φάθι.

ΣΩ. φημί δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς [e] ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. ταῦτὸν δ'<sup>482</sup> ἐστὶν ὀσοποιία καὶ ῥητορικὴ;

ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν<sup>483</sup> ἐπιτηδεύσεως<sup>484</sup> μόριον.

- 474 οὐ γὰρ (D3): For this kind of remark in γάρ, not truly a question, where the speaker foists an absurdity upon his interlocutor that must have obtained else he would not have said what he just said, cf. Polus above at 448E5, 469B10; Nicias at *Lach.*185C2; Thrasymachus at *Rep.*337D6, 338D3, 340D1, 344E4 (he is an expert at this use!); and Denniston, 75-80. Socrates had just done this to Polus (C10-D2), though without γάρ.
- 475 τιμᾶς (D5): Socrates infers this from Polus's use of καλόν above. For the special semantic connection between καλόν and τιμᾶν, cf. nn. 848 and 1336 and 2173.
- 476 ὀσοποιία (D8) is here not just "cooking" as it is usually translated (*coquinaria* [Ficinus Routh]; cookery [Jowett Lamb Helmbold Dodds Hamilton Irwin Waterfield Nichols]; *la cuisine* [Croiset Chambry Canto Piettre]; *kochen* [Dalfen]), but an art of fine or delicate cuisine (whence *opsoniorum apparatus* [Ast]; *Kochkunst* [Apelt Erler], "pastry-cooking" [Allen Zeyl]) – just as ὄψος is food beyond basic fare – a garnish, or maybe even a flavoring (the paradigmatic passage is *Rep.*372C2-E1, on which cf. my nn. *ad loc.*).
- 477 Read εἴ τις ... τέχνη (D8) with BTW and Routh, a much more pertinent and fair request than ἦ τις ... τέχνη (FPar<sup>2</sup> and Ficinus, read by all edd.) or read ἦ τις ... τέχνη τις (Y), with which feminine pronouns Socrates would be leading him in the same wrong direction Polus had himself taken above.
- 478 τίς τέχνη (D9): Polus makes the same mistake as before (τίνα B5) even though Socrates had just suggested a way to avoid doing so with εἴ τις.
- 479 The attribution of these lines (D9-E1) that is unanimous in the mss. is printed in Burnet and followed here. Hirschig suggested, but did not print, an alternative distribution, to-wit: Soc. οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι. – Pol. φημί δὴ. – Soc. Ἐμπειρία τις. τίνοσ; φάθι. – Pol. φημί δὴ. – Soc. χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε, which was accepted and printed by Schanz Christ Sauppe Dodds Theiler Allen Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Cantarín Erler. It was Dodds who first noted corroboration of Hirschig's theory in Olymp. (on ἀλλὰ τί φάθι Olympiodorus comments: τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔστι τοῦτο λέγοντος, 67.28). The redistribution makes φάθι mean "Say it!" – i.e., Socrates is commanding Polus to repeat the words of his questions, so as to mean "Ask it!" – and the requires φῆμι to mean, "I do say (those words)" – i.e., "I do ask it." This is quite a semantic strain for φάναι, which essentially means to assert or say yes to a proposition, though in the case of *Ar. Eq.*23 (*cit.* Hirschig) we do have a single instance of it, though in a linguistically comical passage. The redistribution fairly requires us to read τίνοσ; at D11, if it is to be Socrates's question, and conversely, to read τίς at D11 (with Burnet and Cantarín alone) fairly makes the re-attribution impossible. See next two notes.
- 480 φημί δὴ (D11): With these programmatic reiterations (φάθι / φημί δὴ), Polus is challenging Socrates but Socrates is unperturbedly receiving and answering his questions in a manner that is dialectically appropriate and calm (Mistriotes, following Deuschle-Cron: ἐν τῷ ῥήματι τοῦτω (sc. "φάθι") ἀποεικονίζεται εἰδός τι ἀγανακτήσεως τοῦ νεανίου, ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης πειράται νά πραύνη διὰ τῆς φράσεως "φημί δὴ").
- 481 Reading τίνοσ; (D11), on the weak testimony as a *marginale* of F only, with all edd. except for Burnet and Cantarín who read the unanimous τίς of BTPFY. The consensus of the scholars, contrary to the testimony of the mss. receives support from the way Polus had asked the same question above (τίνοσ; ἐμπειρία, C6). If Burnet is right, the traditional distribution of the questions and answers is probably necessary since the question is not quite correctly put and should not as such belong to Socrates.
- 482 Reading δ' (E2) on the superior testimony of BTP (and Routh Heindorf Stallb.[1861] Ast Woolsey Hermann Kratz Schanz Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Feix : cf. δὲ in W) rather than the weakly attested *faciliores* ἄρ' from J (read by Bekker Cary Jahn Sommer Jowett Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarín Erler), or ἄρ' from F (*leg. Cope ut vid.*), or ἄρα from Olymp. (Mistriotes prints δὴ, *coni.* Heindorf Deuschle-Cron). For the general use of δέ in questions cf. Ast *ad loc.*; for its use where the question for irony's sake does not contain an interrogative cf. 467B8 (with n. 611) and (with Denniston, 177) E. *Herac.*968. *Ar. Ra.*103. Polus's ironic tone is identical to that of his γάρ just above (D4) and at 448E5 (cf. n. 166), and elicits an emphatic response from Socrates.
- 483 μὲν (E3), first restored to the text by Stallb. (BTW *teste* Cantarín : om. PF) and read by edd. except for Bekker. It is classed by Denniston (378) as μὲν with ἀλλά, pointing up a contrast with what precedes rather than what follows (so also *AGPS* 69.35.1.D), but this is only because Polus interrupts to pounce upon his use of ἐπιτήδης before Socrates can give his δέ clause.
- 484 ἐπιτηδεύσεως (E3), another term, like πράγμα (cf. 460E7, 462B11 and n. 467: *πραγματεία* will also so serve, as at 517D1) used to side-step characterizing oratory as a τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη, this time feminine representing the essentialistic abstractness of a category: contrast Socrates's use of the concrete verbal noun just below (ἐπιτήδευμα, E8) for vagueness.



ΠΩΛ. τίνας λέγεις ταύτης;

ΣΩ. μὴ ἀγροικότερον<sup>485</sup> ἢ τὸ ἀληθές<sup>486</sup> εἶπειν· ὀκνῶ γὰρ Γοργίου ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηται με διακωμωδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτο<sup>487</sup> ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἣν Γοργίας [463] ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα—καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανές ἐγένετο<sup>488</sup> τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται—ὁ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μῦθον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.<sup>489</sup>

ΓΟΡ. τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ·<sup>490</sup> μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθῆς.

ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας<sup>491</sup> καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν<sup>492</sup> τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ [b] ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον<sup>493</sup> κολακείαν.<sup>494</sup> ταύτης<sup>495</sup> μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως

485 ἀγροικότερον (E6): The comparative of this adjective is idiomatic (cf. 486C2, 509A1; *Apol.*32D2; *Euthyd.*283E2; and cf. Ast on the idiom, *ad Prot.*310B5), but clearly Socrates's remark refers back to Polus's use of the positive grade above (461A4), when Polus criticized Socrates's questioning of Gorgias. Cf.n.490, *infra*.

486 τὸ ἀληθές εἶπειν (E6): Again a matter of candor, not a "truth claim" (*pace* Hamilton Allen Waterfield Nichols Dalfen). Cf. B8-9.

487 τοῦτο (E8) does not point forward (*pace* Dodds) but toward what Polus already has been told by Socrates; and Socrates's uncertainty does not indicate that "Plato" might have another "rhetoric" in mind which he will take up in the *Phaedrus* (*pace* Dodds): Socrates only means to shrink from spelling out what he has been saying all along, and worries, according to his own sense of what makes discussions derail, that saying what he thinks might ruin the inquiry.

488 οὐδὲν καταφανές ἐγένετο (463A2): With καταφανές Socrates refers to the goal he had enunciated at 457E5 (τοῦ καταφανέος γενέσθαι). Jowett's "nothing appeared of what he thought" is too strong and misses the back reference. Since then they had become diverted from the full "revelation" of oratory (455D7, 456A7) by Gorgias's lengthy defense against the charge of its injustice (more exactly, against his own vulnerability to the charge), because it was ungainly. Even then Socrates had suggested that clearing up the question of its justice might result in the full revelation (460A1) – though by now it is clear that the great news Gorgias has for his clients is that πειθῶ can trump everything, and can even supersede or control beliefs about τὰ μέγιστα. Socrates now begins to take the initiative to show why.

489 τῶν καλῶν (A4), answering Polus's second question (οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ, 462C8-9), after all. It is now not oratory (*pace* Helmbold) but the "πράγμα" (ἐπιτήδευμα [A6])? "activity"? cf. n. 484, *supra*, of which oratory is according to him a part, that Socrates will now describe, as Gorgias's genitive, τίνας (A5), shows. Zeyl's interpretation of τινός and οὐδένοος ("part of some business that isn't admirable at all") seems impossible.

490 εἰπέ (A5): Gorgias's aorist is climactic (and so is αἰσχυνθῆς if we read it [αἰσχυνθείς F<sup>2</sup> *coniecerat* Heindorf]) after Polus's two present imperatives above (462D10, D11), and his ἐμὲ is emphatic. Though Gorgias may, according to Polus, have been shamed by Socrates's tactlessness (ἀγροικία) into asserting he does know and teach justice (461C2-4), Socrates is not, according to Gorgias, to be shamed into withholding his true opinion about Gorgias's art for fear of the charge of still greater tactlessness (ἀγροικότερον).

491 ψυχῆς ... στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας (A7): The essentially derogatory idea and expression (with Erler) are close to what Isocrates *desiderates* in the potential orator, at *Soph.* 17: ψυχῆς ἀνδρικής καὶ δοξαστικῆς. The question of influence between them is something Plato scrupulously masks, as we see in the way he ends the *Phaedrus*: he prefers dialogues with the dead. Croiset's "douée d'imagination" for στοχαστικῆς is inaccurate. Dodds very aptly cites στοχαζόμενοι for illumination (*Lach.*178B2: cf. my n. *ad loc.*), and Canto cites *Phdrs.*260AC for an example of stochastic argumentation. See also next note.

492 προσομιλεῖν (B8): Often derogatory, denoting success at "getting along by going along," and condescending to a lower level. Cf. *Phdrs.*250E5; *Rep.*494A8, 603B1; *Soph.*222E5.

493 τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτοῦ (A8-B1): Lit. "I call the chief aspect of it flattery" – a pregnant expression ready to be resolved into the logical language of species and genus or the dialectical language of whole and part (*viz.* μόρια B2), thus: "Its *genus* I call pandering." The same noun-plus-genitive construction can still be used to express a much looser idea, as at 472C8-9, below.

494 For κολακεία (B1), "pandering" (Hamilton) is a better tr. than the more usual "flattery." Socrates is sailing very close to the wind at this point: κολακεία in the Greek imagination and usage denotes a far more devious and deviant behavior than "flattery" does in English, and an unscrupulous salesmanship of just the sort Gorgias and Polus are engaged in (ὁ τοῦ ἡδῶς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος ... ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γένηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων is Aristotle's characterization of the κόλαξ: *EN* 1127A7-10, *cit.* Dodds). Indeed, pandering is the aspect both of Gorgias's and Polus's manner of teaching and what it teaches a man to do, namely, in the way they endeavor to disown it at the same time as promising it (as we encountered between the lines in Polus's interruption at 461B3-C4: cf. nn.430, 431). We should expect Socrates, likewise, to bring this up and somehow insulate his interlocutors from it, for as long as possible, with a single stroke: in a way this has been the action of the dialogue so far. His personification of κολακευτική in his criticism of it below (464C5-D3) is a step in this direction (just as the personification of ῥητορικὴ was, at 459B7-C2). To accuse public figures of κολακεία is not of course original with Socrates: We have Eupolis's *Kolakes* (dated BC 421) and Aristophanes's depiction of Cleon in *Knights* (*Eq.*424), etc. (Dalfen).

495 ταύτης (B1): One may argue that the asyndeton is mitigated by the use of the (backward pointing) demonstrative, but more is involved, for the genitive is also proleptic and thus points forward, as well (so again at B4). A similar asyndeton follows at 464B3. What is happening in both places is essentially dihaeresis, of which the broadest use and representation in the Platonic corpus of course occurs in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*. In the definitional summaries of the *Sophist*, we encounter what might be called a grammar or style for expressing a dihaeresis, (223B1-7, 224C9-D2, 224E1-4, 226A1-4), where the Stranger simply lists the elements "on the right" in a downward (or upward) chain, one after the other, the steps done with partitive genitives and exegetical appositions alone, the barest of syntactical arrangements requiring the listener to recognize *merely on the basis of grammar and semantics* the logical dependencies of parts and wholes with almost no direction or support from the syntax. Socrates freely employs apposition here as well (463B6, 464C2-3). A further "desyntactification" of the expression takes place with the "blind" juxtaposition of the genitive absolute (464B3, B5-6, C3-5), again suspending the meaning from semantics alone, in the same spirit as the dividing Stranger. More on this as we go along.

πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μῦρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὁ<sup>496</sup> δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη ἄλλ’ ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.<sup>497</sup> ταύτης μῦριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν,<sup>498</sup> τέτταρα ταῦτα μῦρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν.<sup>499</sup> εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γὰρ [c] πω πέπυσται ὅποιόν<sup>500</sup> φημι ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μῦριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὁ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ<sup>501</sup> εἰ οὐ καλὸν<sup>502</sup> ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν<sup>503</sup> ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι<sup>504</sup> ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε·<sup>505</sup> ἀλλ’ εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα ὅποιον μῦριον τῆς κολακείας φημι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι<sup>506</sup> ὅποιον μῦριον. [d]

ΣΩ. ἄρ’ οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκρινάμενου;<sup>507</sup> ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον.<sup>508</sup>

- 496 ὁ (B3): Again Socrates prefers the neuter so as not to coddle the presumption it is a τέχνη: cf. E6, 465D7, and 460E7 (with n. *ad loc.*). By bringing ὀψοποιική back up he is revealing to the polite Gorgias the thought behind and motive for bringing it up suddenly in the halting back and forth with Polus, just above.
- 497 ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή (B4): τριβή elaborates ἐμπειρία with derogatory concreteness. Both words are feminine so that Socrates can still use the usual feminine adjectives (ῥητορικὴ and the other three) in the sequel. For the expression cf. ἄτεχνος at *Leg.* 938A3-4 and *Phdr.* 260E5, and τινὶ at *Phlb.* 55E6 (where note also the role of αἰσθησις: cf. 464C5).
- 498 σοφιστικὴν (B6): Socrates commits something of an *obscurum per obscurius*. On the face of it we know even less what σοφιστικὴ might be than ῥητορικὴ: in the latter case, at least, we have been talking about ῥήτορες all along (cf. Dalfen, 247-8). It is, however, the *array* of pursuits – though their interrelation is left completely unclear by the order in which he here presents them – that will illuminate the ἐπιτήδευμα of Gorgias and its δύναμις. Hamilton translates “popular lecturing” without a footnote, a designation that begs more questions than it answers since (1) the so-called sophists are not all “popular lecturers” (witness Euthydemus and his brother), and (2) does “popular” then mean sub-academic? But where are the *academic* lectures? This “translation” runs aground at 519C3 (cf. n. 2082): will Hamilton also call the dialogue Plato calls Σοφιστής *The Popular Lecturer*? Canto likewise proffers a claim about it without substantiation (n.39 on p.322). In the end we learn from Socrates that it is unclear to the sophists and to everybody else what sophistic is (465C5-7), a problem that requires Plato to write the *Sophist*, and even to commit his “parricide” of Parmenides.
- 499 πράγμασιν (B6): There is no way for us to know at this point what these four πράγματα are, but Coraes Stallb. Sommer take it upon themselves to tell us, solely on the basis of the sequel (Kratz makes a different sort of guess), and thereby blunt our recognition that Socrates does *not* tell us here (as well as bypassing the complicated path by which in the sequel a result is reached: D3-464B1), but instead interrupts his orderly laying-out of things to revert to the breakdown with Polus (B7-C5). Polus predictably will not ask him what he means, as Socrates immediately complains, so we ourselves are forced to create and then maintain a logical slot that will be filled later – in other words, to hold the question in mind, unanswered. Such “place-holding” is another feature of the “spatial logic” of the dihaeretic matrix, in which the dialectical process by which the division is achieved collapses, once it is achieved, into a snapshot almost meaningless in itself.
- 500 ὅποιον (C1), not τί or ὅ τι, here and below (C7), meaning not just Which? but What sort of? – as noticed by Cope. Socrates thus prepares the ground for the loose place-holder of an answer he is about to give, which will gradually be filled in once the basic groundwork is laid (cf. nn. 508 and 523). He is building a raft in the water.
- 501 ἐπανερωτᾷ (C3): With the prefix ἐπί Socrates indicates that the question Polus now asked was in essence a follow-up question (cf. n. 211), even though he did not yet have an answer to the first one (οὐ ... πω πέπυσται, B7-C1).
- 502 εἰ οὐ καλὸν (C3): With οὐ, Socrates reasserts his interpretation of Polus’s “question” as a challenge for his assent (cf. εἰ οὐ καλή [462D1] and n. 473). Polus had once again (at 462C8-9) gone on to the issue of the *quale* (praise and blame) rather than first reaching a consensus as to what they were talking about (the *quid*), as he had at the beginning (448E5). Note that there, Socrates used the language of τίς and ποῖός τις to characterize Polus’s shift from what it is to whether it is praiseworthy (448E6-7) – a distinction commentators tend instead to characterize in logical terms (essence and accident, etc.: cf. n. 169). But this time Socrates uses ὅποιον (C1) not for the value-characterization (indeed rather than characterizing Polus’s question he simply repeats his interpretation of it [οὐ καλόν]), but for the “part” or kind with the whole or general category.
- 503 εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν (C4): Socrates, upon countenancing to answer, finally reformulates Polus’s challenge as a real question.
- 504 Reading ὅτι ἐστίν (C5) with BTPF (over ὅ ἐστίν, Aristides): The indefinite form is common in cases where a question is being quoted instead of asked (as immediately below, ὅποιον [C7, C8]: on this cf. n. 136), but it is also a feature of Socrates’s dialectic to insist on focussing upon “the thing itself,” and for this he often uses the indefinite in a sense parallel to τί ποτε (e.g., *Lach.* 185B10, 190A4).
- 505 ὦ Πῶλε (C6): Vocative indicating change of addressee (cf. *Lach.* 180B7, 181D7, 183C1, *al.*; and my n. *ad Lach.* 181B5). Note οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, justifying one’s own behavior, as opposed δίκαιον δέ, admonishing another about his behavior (cf. 461D2 and n. *ad loc.*). The other two μέγιστα are waiting in the wings (D4-5, below).
- 506 Reading καὶ ἀπόκριναι (C8), another gratuitous athetization by Theiler (against all mss. and Aristides *Or.* 2.22 [2.6.15 Dindorf]), this time following Cobet and Sauppe (cf. 462B10). The redundancy characterizes Polus as willful and controlling (cf. 462B3 and 467B4).
- 507 ἀποκρινάμενου (D1) *sc.* μου. For the genitive from whom one learns cf. *Phlb.* 51C6; *A. Pr.* 701, *S. OR* 575.
- 508 πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον (D2): The double genitive is a surprise, the notion of an image of a part is unprepared, and what noun we are to supply with the feminine adjective is not as obvious as the expression seems to presume. These are the reasons Socrates wondered if Polus would understand. Socrates wants to present his thesis dialogically, needing Polus to answer questions along the way so that he might reach his

ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;<sup>509</sup>

ΣΩ. αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε—τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ<sup>510</sup> καλῶ—ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότε ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΓΟΡ. μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι<sup>511</sup> ὅτι λέγεις. [e]

ΣΩ. εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γὰρ πω σαφές<sup>512</sup> λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ ὄδε<sup>513</sup> νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὄξυς.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ’ εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.<sup>514</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὄδε [464] ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;<sup>515</sup>

conclusion, but Polus only wants to refute him, so that he will take each dialectical question as a Socratic thesis to be attacked rather than a step toward a conclusion. Thus, Socrates (as we shall see) here jumps to the end and leaves all of us in the dust! Context supports only that we supply *κολακείας* with *πολιτικῆς* (C1, τῆς *κολακείας* μόριον; C7, ὅποιον μόριον τῆς *κολακείας*), which in turn leaves us in the dark as to what Socrates means. The fact that it will become clear later does not remove the puzzlement here (cf. n. 499). The notion of *τέχνη* comes only later (464B3-4). When this characterization came to be quoted in later authors (as *πειθοῦς δημιουργός* [453A2] also came to be: cf. n. 245), they supplied *ἐπιστήμης* (*vel sim.*) instead of *κολακείας*, and oratory’s connection with politics was separated from its connection with pandering by the use of an *apponition*: e.g., Luc. *Bis Acc.*34 (*πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον, κολακείας τὸ τέταρτον*) and Quint. 2.15.25 (*civilitatis particulae simulacrum et quartam partem adulationis*), and Ammianus Marcellinus 1.30 (*πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον, κολακείας τὸ τέταρτον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον*, at which point oratory, which should have been taken to be the image of a *political* part of pandering (as opposed to *ὄψοποιία, κομμωτικὴ, and σοφιστικὴ*, mentioned above) is reformulated as the image of a *pandering* part of politics (as opposed to the legislative and dikastic parts, brought up and identified in the interim). Likewise the four *πράγματα* Socrates had allusively mentioned above (*ἐπὶ τέτταρσιν πράγμασι* [B6], and cf. n. 499) will be replaced by only two *πράγματα*, body and soul (*ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ / ἐπὶ σώματι* [n.b., *πραγμάτοιιν*, 464B4]), each then theoretically subdivided in terms of remedying them and sustaining them, yielding four aims (rather than *πράγματα*). Still and again the terminology is evolving, by at once revising and building upon itself.

509 καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν (D3): Socrates’s μόριον τῆς *κολακείας* τὴν ῥητορικὴν was completely unclear, as he will presently admit (E1-2), but Polus, since he has waited for it, now feels he has the right, whether he understood it or not, to jump to the “value question,” which for him is nothing but a grounds for praising his profession. He wants to know whether to agree or disagree with Socrates so that he can know whether to disapprove and combat the answer, or receive it favorably and praise it. He has no interest at all in learning what Socrates means, as Socrates foresaw. For this, the more circumspect and polished mediation of Gorgias will be necessary.

510 τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ (D4): With this Socrates points to, and shoe-horns in, one more step in the argument that Polus’s importunate question about admirability leaps over: not only does the ποῖον depend categorically upon the τί, but also the one ποῖον (“admirable”) depends upon another ποῖον (“good”)! Note that with ὡς ἤδη εἰδότε he consciously acknowledges that in answering Polus’s peremptory question he has left out the steps that lead to it: the discussion keeps getting ahead of itself!

511 συνίημι (D7), specifically describes his difficulty as an inability to “construe,” or “put together” Socrates’s dihaeretic phrase – i.e., to think the logical relations lurking within the dense concatenation of dependent genitives, *πολιτικῆς* (*sc. κολακείας*) *μορίου εἰδῶλον* – for which reason he again quotes it *ipsisimis verbis*, below (E4). Gorgias rescues Polus by corroborating his confusion with a sort of *argumentum a fortiori*: even he, the master, does not understand; but Socrates blames his own obscurity on Polus’s interruptiveness. For ἀλλά spelling out the grounds for using an oath, compare with Sauppe 481B10, *Crat.*423C1, *Phlb.*36A4. Waterfield misleadingly translates συνίημι with “understand what you are getting at,” as if Gorgias is echoing Socrates’s εἰδότε ἃ λέγω above, which he incorrectly translated “as if you knew what I was getting at,” while what Socrates there meant was that in giving the ποῖον he was acting as if Polus already knew the τί.

512 οὐδὲν ... πω σαφές (E1): In responding that Gorgias surely deserves clarification since he has not yet spoken clearly (*σαφές*), Socrates isolates the other deficiency he had mentioned (besides τὸ ὀρθῶς: cf.457D2 and n. 368) due to which conversation might founder, namely, a deficiency in τὸ σαφές (cf. 457D3).

513 Πῶλος ... ὄδε (E2): The anarthrous demonstrative calls attention to the pun Polus = colt. For ὄξυς of a horse cf. Hdt. 5.9.2, X. *Hipp.*1.13; for ὄξυς of quick wits cf. *Apol.*39B3; *Rep.*503C2, 526B5-9, *al.*; and for ὄξυς of youths, T. 6.12.2. By hereby eliciting a sympathetic response from Gorgias (τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, E3), Socrates gains a new interlocutor to play answerer for him.

514 τοῦτον μὲν ἔα (E3): Gorgias has the rank to dismiss Polus in this way, and Socrates agrees to, with the promise of returning to conversing with him once he has had a chance to present his position and give Gorgias the clear account he craves. So it is now Gorgias that he will engage in dialectical conversation, with a promising reversion to the dialectical and dihaeretic manner begun at 463A6-B6. Though no dialectician, Gorgias must at least act polite and allow Socrates to go step by step – and the plot thickens since it is after all Gorgias’s understanding and agreement about the oratorical that we really need. Once his account has become crystal clear, Polus will intervene again (466A4-5) and we shall immediately see how necessary the change of interlocutors had been, and that Socrates was prescient in saying just now that Polus would “refute” him. See n. 564.

515 καλεῖς τι (464A1): Herewith, the peculiar but habitual language with which Socrates begins dialectical scrutiny (e.g., 495C3-4; *Meno* 75E1, 88A7; *Phdo.* 74A9-12, 103C11; *Prot.*358D5; cf. also *Phdo.*, 64C2, 65D4; *Parm.*147D; *Soph.*218C; *al.*; portrayed importantly differently by Xenophon [e.g., *Mem.* 2.2.1, 4.2.22]). We gather the ensuing will not only be dihaeretically dialectical (privileging the τί over the ποῖον) but pragmatically so in the sense of an orderly procedure of question and answer; moreover the development is based upon a new beginning having to do not with the professional claims of Gorgias and Polus but that reaches way back to the basic facts and exigencies of life, where the teaching of Gorgias will ultimately find its proper place.

ΓΟΡ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὔσαν δ' οὔ; οἶον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὔ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθητοί τις ὅτι οὐκ εὔ ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος ἢ<sup>516</sup> ἰατρος τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

ΓΟΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅτι<sup>517</sup> ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὔ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, [b] ἔχει<sup>518</sup> δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.<sup>519</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι,<sup>520</sup> σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντων τοῖν πραγμάτων<sup>521</sup> δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν<sup>522</sup> ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν<sup>523</sup> καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως<sup>524</sup> ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος

516 Reading ἄλλος ἢ (A6) with BTPF (and Routh Heindorf Bekker Stallb. Ast Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sommer Hirschig Schanz Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Croiset [*sine noto*] Zimmermann Feix) on authority far superior to that of the reading of Aristides (ἄλλ' ἢ), which was accepted by Thompson Sauppe Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler Heibüchel.

517 Reading ὅτι (A8) with BTP and Ficinus (*legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Bekker Stallb. Deuschle-Cron Schanz Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Sauppe Croiset [*sine noto*] Zimmermann Feix), rather than ὃ with F Aristides (*legg.* Thompson Hirschig Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler Heibüchel).

518 Note singular ἔχει (B1) with plural subject understood (τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ), and that the indicative ousts the parallel infinitive: “The second member of the relative clause is emancipated from the control of the relative,” says Dodds, citing *Meno* 77E1, *Rep.*533D4.

519 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον (B1) is an idiomatically compressed expression and later a skeptical trope. The sense is not that the better appearance does not indicate the thing is any better off, but that it indicates “nothing, neither way.” Cf., in *Rep.*340B4 (with my n. *ad loc.*), 454E1, 487C3-4, 538D9; *Lach.*195C1.

520 ἐὰν δύνωμαι (B2) The “if you please” subjunctive (here analogously deferential “if I am able”), for which cf. n. 361. The virtually proleptic placement of (properly) enclitic σοὶ strengthens the effect even further: Gorgias, as opposed to Polus, can be presumed to act politely. With σαφέστερον Socrates promises he will satisfy Gorgias’s request from above (463D6-E5: *n.b.* σαφές, E1).

521 πραγμάτων (B3) seems brought forward from 463B6, where the noun’s meaning was left obscure (cf. n. 499); this suggestion is then corroborated syntactically by the ensuing construction with ἐπὶ in the next sentence (ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ: cf. ἐπὶ ... πράγμασιν above, 463B6). Helmbold presumes a correspondence of practices with the πράγματα announced above and then interprets the genitive construction as a causal genitive absolute (“since this natural duality exists I assume there are to arts”) but by the same token πραγμάτων may well be an objective genitive and the participle circumstantial, which comes almost to the same thing (“of these things the arts are two since they are two”).

522 Reading τὴν μὲν (B3-4) with BTP (*legg.* edd.) rather than καὶ τὴν μὲν with F (*legg.* Bekker Hirschig) or τὴν μὲν οὖν (Aristides). At first it seems an appositive to τέχνας, and then we imagine that asyndeton is mitigated by the forward-looking announcement, λέγω. For asyndeta with early μὲν cf. with Stallb. *Leg.*867A3, 957A3; *Phdo.*91C7; *Prot.*338C1-2), but apposition and asyndeton are essentially equivalent within a dihaeretic presentation in that its content consists in a series of unconnected eidetic foci or “dots” (cf. n. 495).

523 πολιτικὴν (B4): We cannot but assume he is actually looking back to the first word in his concatenated expression πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον: to bring in the political within the newly established context of body and soul has no other warrant (Deuschle-Cron try to establish one by referring to Protagoras’s expression πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ [at *Prot.*322E] but that expression is there a virtual coinage for the sake of the Protagoras’s myth). We must wait and see: in the event, somatic pandering will serve as a more palpable analogon for introducing the less palpable psychic (only a child would fail to understand it: D6-7). With its prospective inking that oratory will be a part of pandering to the *soul*, along with its back-references, Socrates’s argument alternately runs ahead of itself and catches up with itself from behind! The division that follows must be an imitation (or is imitated by) Isocrates’s division in *Antid.*180-185, precedence between the two authors being uncertain (cf.n.363).

524 I take οὕτως (B5) as pointing (back) to the fact that he *did* have a single name for the psychic art (with Olymp.72.4-12; *eodem modo*, Findeisen, Jahn) – namely πολιτικὴ – not in its idiomatic sense of “*statim*,” or “*auf der Stelle*” (*pace* edd. and tr.). In either case, dismissing the question of a name only indicates that such a name would be needless, which indirectly indicates that having a single name for the psychic was needful: cf. prev. note.



θεραπείας<sup>525</sup> δύο μόρια<sup>526</sup> λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν<sup>527</sup> τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῆ ἰατρικῆ τὴν δικαιοσύνην.<sup>528</sup> [c] ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἑκάτεροι<sup>529</sup> τούτων, ἢ τε ἰατρικὴ τῆ γυμναστικῆ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆ νομοθετικῆ· ὁμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἀλλήλων. τετάρων δὲ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον<sup>530</sup> θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν,<sup>531</sup> ἡ κολακευτικὴ<sup>532</sup> αἰσθομένη<sup>533</sup> —οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη—τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῶσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται [d] εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδου, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου

- 525 τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας (B5-6): Is the genitive partitive with μόρια (and οὔσης concessive), or is οὔσης a genitive absolute (cf. B3)? And: does it matter? His denial of having a name means this phrase isn't a name. What is it then? In what will become standard logical language, the phrase presents the genus (θεράπεια) and the differentia (τοῦ σώματος), in lieu of the species. Note that θεράπεια, naming the genus of the two τέχνηαι, is new: the dihaeretic movement has proceeded horizontally (from soul across to body) and then vertically (downward to the parts, because he had no name for the bodily species), but now leaps upward, for in the course of apologizing for his lacking that name he names a genus!
- 526 μόρια (B6): μόριον being the second term of the concatenation, all that is needed now is the notion of an εἶδωλον, and this anticipation will be fulfilled in the next step (C3-E2: *n.b. προσποιεῖται εἶναι*, C7-D1).
- 527 With ἀντὶ μὲν (B7), along with ἀντίστροφον, Socrates introduces improvised terminology by which to revise the dihaeretic movement from the vertical back to the horizontal. When he said the care for the soul was the political we did not know it would be divided downward in two; the serendipity of his lacking a single name for the bodily care, in turn, forced him downward but now allows him to go back across. What will end up being a logically static array of terms is being reached in an aleatory way: note how we might feel an urge to reach for pencil and paper and draw a schema!
- 528 Reading δικαιοσύνην (B8) here and at C2 and at 465C3, with the far superior attestation of BTPY Aristides and *schol. vet. (iustitiam*, Quint. 2.15.25), accepted by edd., rather than δικαστικὴν (F Olymp.[76.19, *al.*] Procl. in *Alcib.*272.7-8, *legg.* Ast[1819] Schleiermacher [*Rechtspflege*] Bekker Hirschig Pietre[tr."l'art judiciaire"] in all three passages), although δικαστικὴ ("the judicial," Cary – though he translates it "justice" at 465C) is the meaning (as Ast [1832] and others argue). In fact, that word is used for it below at 520B3 (so that δικαστικὴ at *proleg.Hermog.* §9 [*Rhet.Gr.*4.22.15 Walz] has no testamentary value for the present passage). As Dalfen notes (243), the form of the term breaks the mold (in -ικὴ) exhibited by the other seven activities. A narrowly considered forensic talent or knack or art like δικαστικὴ might, *qua* talent, be a more appropriate analogon to ἰατρικὴ, but ἰατρικὴ is a science whereas the behavior of the jurors and advocates is not governed by science. A semantic overlap, however, between forensic considerations (δικαστικά) and the consideration of justice (δίκαια) is exactly what enabled Socrates, back at 454B7, to infer from Gorgias's etymological figure that orators deal not only in forensics but justice (cf. *n ad loc.* and cf. 478A4-7). That we do not have experts in justice or virtue as we do in medicine is not merely a deficiency, nor is it a fault of Socrates's argument that we should not. To the contrary, Socrates constantly adduces the existence of doctors as a paradigm illustrating both the necessity and the motivation for loving and pursuing wisdom. To refer to δικαιοσύνη as a τέχνη is not beyond its semantic range: cf. *Rep.*332D2 (where, moreover, it is once again compared with ἰατρικὴ) and Plut. *Mor.*550A (ἡ περὶ ψυχὴν ἰατρία, δίκη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, probably quoting our passage).
- 529 ἑκάτεροι (C2) posits alternate (ἑκάτερ-) pluralities (-αι) – in particular, two pairs. With περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ (C1) the previous construction of a τέχνη ἐπι τινι from B4 and earlier is abandoned, for the moment at least.
- 530 πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον (C4), *sc. ἔχειν (habita optimi ratione curent*, Routh). The phrase is the superlative of εἶ ἔχειν brought forward from above; and what had been named, in passing, as the genus of both the bodily and psychic arts (namely θεράπεια), is now continued with a participle (θεραπευουσῶν) and spelled out with the phrase in πρὸς. The choice of βέλτιστον (as the superlative for εἶ) rather than the equally possible ἄριστον or κρᾶτιστον is worth noting, as we shall see.
- 531 τετάρων ... τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν (C3-5): What is the construction of these two genitive phrases? They recall the construction of B3, which itself was ambiguous as to whether the genitive was objective or absolute (cf. n. 521); and so a presumption of ambiguity is brought forward, waiting to be disambiguated in the immediate sequel. But see next note.
- 532 ἡ κολακευτικὴ (C5), a satirical coinage required by the dialectic (cf. ὑφαντικώτατον, 490D7; and γεωργικώτατον at *Rep.*412C7; and compare of course the divisions in the *Sophist*). It brings forward κολακεία from 463B1, replaced with feminine adjective to support the analogy that is being drawn with real arts, echoing the intervening adjectives in -ικὴ, accumulating since 464B4. We are called upon to "understand" a feminine noun, as at 463D2, and here as there we have insufficient grounds to decide what it might be (e.g., ἐμπειρία? τριβή? τέχνη? ἐπιτήδευσις? cf. 463B1-4). Is this a defect or a virtue in the presentation?
- 533 αἰσθομένη (C5) continues the syntactical obscurity! Might it govern τούτων from before (a rather rare use of the genitive [cf. n. 2076 and Smyth §1367] – so do I take it), making its participles circumstantial as opposed to absolute (as above, B3 and B5-6)? Might it even govern the participles of τούτων in "perceptual" indirect discourse (Smyth §2112a)? As in both the previous cases the quantity denoted in the opening genitive construction is being compared with quantity in the subsequent nominative construction (δυσὶν/δύο B3; μᾶζ/δύο B5-6; τετάρων/τέτραχα here): again the activity of dihaeresis obviates or even replaces the need for syntactical articulation! In the end the syntax doesn't matter! The participle immediately *personifies* κολακευτικὴ (Mr Morrissey), completely in line with the characterization of the kolakic art of oratory as an attribute of a certain kind of soul (463A7-8): again it makes a canny guess (στοχασαμένη, C6: cf. nn. 491, 494) but is not τεχνικόν. Cope translates, "the art of pandering takes note, and I don't say with full knowledge but by a shrewd guess ... ." Croiset's "*un conjecture* instinctive" introduces an idea foreign to Plato. As to the tense, the aorist αἰσθομένη (F Aristides, *legg.* edd.) is preferable to the present (αἰσθανομένη BTPY *leg.* Routh) because it is sited better with the subsequent aorist participles.

οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ<sup>534</sup> θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν<sup>535</sup> καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖν<sup>536</sup> πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἢ ὀσοποικὴν ὑποδέδυκεν, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀσοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρόν, ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις<sup>537</sup> ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπάει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ [e] πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀσοποιός, λιμῶ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν<sup>538</sup> τὸν ἰατρόν. κολακείαν<sup>539</sup> μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρὸν φημι [465] εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πῶλε—τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω<sup>540</sup>—ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου·<sup>541</sup> τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν<sup>542</sup> οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ'

- 534 τῷ ... ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ (D2): ἀεὶ in the “distributive” sense, to depict the stochastic and empirical opportunism that is the instrument of κολακευτική, having no concern at all for bodily εὐεξία (φροντίζων taking genitive; οὐδὲν adverbial).
- 535 Θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν (D2): A striking usage, exploiting a sound play on the expected term, θεραπεύει. ἄνοιαν has been taken both as the result “captured” or achieved, or the prey upon which the result would be achieved: pandering may seek to *establish* ἄνοια (result: *den Umverstand zu fangen*, Schleiermacher; *imperitiam multitudinem fallere ac decipere studet*, Stallb.) or it may seek to *capture* the already-present ἄνοια of fools (object: *opinionem imprudentium captat*, Apul. [*de dogm. Plat. 2.9*]; *incautam illaqueat mentem*, Ficinus; *captat amentiam*, Ast; “captivate the unwary,” Woolsey). Jahn tries for both: “*sie macht Jagd auf den Unverstand und täuscht ihn*” μθηρεύεσθαι (the “self-serving” middle amply illustrated by Ast, as opposed to Aristides’s active) stands in as a craven version of πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον (*sc. βλέπειν*) and of τοῦ βελτίστου φροντίζων from above, which designated a sought-after *good* result. Therefore I prefer the former interpretation. Heusde’s emendation to εὐνοιαν (*Specimen*, 87-88) relies on the expression of a passage from Lucian that is saying something must less trenchant.
- 536 Reading δοκεῖν (D3-4) with B<sup>2</sup>F Aristides (*qui mox ἀξίαν*), *legg*. Routh Dodds (δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία BTP, *legg*. all others). According to the stemmata of Dodds and Cantarin, agreement of B<sup>2</sup> with F strongly suggests their reading is that of the archetype. The “natural” result with infinitive (ἀξία remaining nominative in agreement with leading subject) stems from its unremitting and opportunistic search for the path of least resistance through pleasure (τῷ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ = *durch das jedesmal angenehmst*, Schleiermacher – though *n.b.* Aristides does not read ἀεὶ). The infinitive construction is repeated below, 465B5-6 (cf. n. 547, *infra*). Still and again Socrates avoids the determination of a feminine noun.
- 537 ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὕτως ἀνοήτοις (D6): Socrates’s preliminary example of children believing the ὀσοποιός opens the door to the example of men as foolish as children believing his advice on nutrition more than they believe the doctor’s; but with διαγωνίζεσθαι (D5), envisioning without warning a controversy, the example now becomes reminiscent of the οὐκ εἰδότες that were persuaded by Gorgias’s ῥητορικός that he is more trustworthy than the doctor (at 459A1-C2). The substitution here of οὕτως ἀνοήτοις for οὐκ εἰδότες reveals a disrespect of the ῥητορικός for his audience that had there been attenuated by Socrates: it is another example of Socrates’s indirect or gradual method (cf. n. 494). Irwin’s remark that grown-ups generally know better than to be fooled by cooks (followed by Waterfield) has the virtue of being true, but sheds no light on the text; moreover an ὀσοποιός is not just a cook (cf. n. 476). As for Waterfield’s allegation that “Plato” too readily identifies pleasurable food with evil, cf. the careful and moderated treatment of the problem of ὄψος at *Rep.* 559B1 (with my nn. *ad loc.* and *ad* 559B8), perfectly analogous with what Eryximachus the physician is made to say about ὀσοποιική at *Symp.* 187E. Dodds (*ad loc.*; cf. also Dalfen, 245) is a little wrong to say Socrates is parodying the position of Gorgias since it is Gorgias he is talking to. His method is doubly indirect, for though he is talking to Gorgias and though it describes exactly how an ignorant audience will put their trust in an ignorant purveyor of pleasure, not because he knows anything but because he pleases them and so they trust him to be knowledgeable, it implies *mutatis mutandis* exactly what he demurs to characterize as Gorgias’s μηχανὴ πειθοῦς – but he has already covered himself for doing this by saying what he had in mind is not, as far as he knows, the oratory Gorgias is actually up to (462E8-463A1), so that he feels free to speak his mind. See also next note. Richards’s worry that ἐπάει below needs a comparative forgets that ἐπάειν means to “have a clue” (cf. my n. *ad Phdrs.* 268C4) whence it is usually negated with οὐδὲν (cf. *kein Ahnung haben* in German)
- 538 λιμῶ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν (E1), reminiscent, in its hyperbolic exaggeration, of the metaphor Gorgias had used in exactly this same connection, *mutatis mutandis* (456B8-C1), which only later he explained as τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι (457B2). It is Gorgias’s *explanation* that underlies Socrates’s new metaphor: not only will the orator win on the occasion Gorgias envisions, but the doctor will lose all his business and be ruined forever. That his ruin should here be hyperbolically depicted as a loss of the very nutrition over which he is properly the master is analogous to the remark Gorgias had made about another expert that the orator will outdo, the χρηματιστής, who, he said, would still χρηματίζεσθαι but would himself be deprived of the money he makes since it would go to the orator (ἄλλω ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος οὐχ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν ... , 452E6-7). Socrates has trained his sights on these passages unabashedly, if indirectly, as Gorgias invited him to do at 463A5, and now comes over to Gorgias’s side in describing his brother-panderer as a winner in comparison to the others as losers.
- 539 κολακείαν (E2): The analogy with arts having been drawn (cf. n. 532) to the disadvantage of “the panderic” as an impostor, he can dispense with the hypothesis and call a spade a spade as he had at the outset (463B1): pandering plain and simple. The neuter αὐτό is derogatory (like πρᾶγμα here and there) and recalls the neuters that had been required in the back and forth with Polus (462B10 and D10 with nn. 466, 477).
- 540 πρὸς σὲ λέγω (465A1): Socrates turns to Polus, not out of deference to Gorgias (*pace* Heindorf Ast Stallb. Sommer Mistriotes), but because the basis has finally been laid for answering what Polus importunately asked at 463D3. Cf. also n. 472, *supra*. The emphasis is on ἄνευ. The back reference is continued with Socrates’s next argument (A2-6), which explains what had elicited that question from Polus, namely the assertion that oratory is not a τέχνη (462B8-C9). Thus it will be to Polus that he grants a chance to reply, just below (ἔθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, A7: cf. n. 545), though Polus will remain silent. It is not his entire characterization of oratory that Socrates aims at Polus with these words (Dalfen *ad loc.*, 245), but only his answer to Polus’s then premature question whether it is αἰσχρὸν.
- 541 ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου (A2) does not modify τοῦ ἡδέος, but continues the idea of οὐδὲν φροντίζει above (464D1), and modifies στοχάζεται, which continues the idea of φθηρεύεται (464D2).
- 542 I acquiesce in reading αὐτὴν (A2) with the superior testimony of BTP Aristides Olymp., and Ficinus, accepted by edd., rather than insisting upon the strictly more correct αὐτὸ (reported *in marg.* by Steph. and by Bekker from J, and adopted by him and Ast Heindorf<sup>2</sup>) or αὐτοῦ (F). Socrates has indeed used the neuter very recently (464E2), and will do so again below (A4: and cf. n. 496) but he does not need be consistent in doing so. The pronoun is attracted into the gender of the adjacent predicate (compare Smyth §2502e). For ἀλλά “eliminating” a negative and thus by double negation introducing a positive, cf. Denniston, 1.



ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα<sup>543</sup> ᾧ προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει<sup>544</sup> ὅποι' ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ἦ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα·

τούτων δὲ περὶ εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν<sup>545</sup> λόγον . . . [b]

τῇ μὲν οὖν<sup>546</sup> ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀυσοποικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτικὴ, κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος,<sup>547</sup> σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ αἰσθήσει<sup>548</sup>

543 λόγον οὐδένα (A3), antecedent to instrumental dative ᾧ (C4). Note the emphatic rather than methodological articulation of the claim. For the expression cf. with Ast, *Rep.* 475C1, 493C3-4, an expression which does (with Stallb. Cope) shade toward or include the sense, λόγον διδοῖναι ἔχειν (cf. *Rep.* 499C3, 544A4), though there is need to add δοῦναι to the text (*pace* Theiler). πρᾶγμα again imports derogatory vagueness (cf. 460E7, 462B11).

544 Reading ᾧ προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει (A4) with all major mss. and Philodemus, accepted by Routh Burnet Croiset Theiler Irwin (“by which it applies the things it applies”) Zeyl Erler Heidbüchel (ᾧ προσφέρει only, in JQ Aristides : ὧν προσφέρει Doxopatris Cornarius Ficinus [*eorum quam affert*], *legg.* Heindorf Beck Coraes Bekker Cary Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Sauppe Ovink Lamb Zimmermann Cantarin Feix : ἢ προσφέρει Aristidis ms. E<sup>d</sup>, *legg.* Ast[1832] Stallb. Woolsey Hirschig Schanz Mistriones : ᾧ προσφέρει <ἦ> ἢ προσφέρει *coni.* Dodds accepted by Allen Nichols). Perfectly tolerable sense can be made of the well-attested readings, which Dodds finds too clumsy to be true but which I find clear (his own emendation, on the other hand, adds ἦ on the basis of what is said later in the dialogue [501A], leaving us with a sentence unclear until we get there!). Out of a suspicion of dittography (though hear a doctor use the anaphora at *Symp.* 187E2!), edd. have offered conjectures that are each defensible only because translatable and giving tolerable sense. Dittography however goes both ways: the omission of the repeated verb in the two minor Paris mss. can more easily be accounted for than its repetition in the best mss. Croiset’s suggestion *ad loc.*, followed by Erler, that ᾧ = τούτῳ ᾧ, referring to the person to whom the practice offers what it offers, introduces the alien question of that subject’s reasons for allowing the practice to be performed on himself. The lack of a λόγος κατὰ φύσιν for the προσφερόμενα continues the comparison of pandering with the medical art (since προσφέρειν is a medical term) and advances the idea of γνῶσις versus αἰσθησις (464C5-6 above), which itself continues the primary distinction, δοκεῖν / εἶναι (from 464A3-4), and is then instantiated by the list of προσφερόμενα used by κομμωτικῇ (B4-5), which pander to the gamut of superficial αἰσθησις (again: the reading of BTP at B4, below) rather than ministering to the inner nature of the subject (cf. n. 548, *infra*).

545 ὑποσχεῖν λόγον (A7), to “take under scrutiny” his λόγος (cf. *Prot.* 338D5, X. *Mem.* 4.4.9). Socrates formally invites Polus to “refute” (i.e., to question him), as he anticipated he might want to do at 453E6-464A1, the invitation especially appropriate since Socrates has held forth relatively long (as he notes below, B6-7) – but in limiting the invitation to a rational dispute (ὑποσχεῖν λόγον) he seeks to preempt or divert him from blustering. Polus’s silence and non-response, as again Plato requires us to recognize (cf. nn. 132, 135), is therefore deafening. The majority of editors do well to add a paragraph break, though they may merely be retaining a traditional chapter break (no break in Cary Cope Lamb): Dalfen (246) prints no break but *comments* there could be a break except that Polus does not step in (cf. n. 639, *infra*) and thus leaves Socrates to go on. Polus, we learn, will interrupt when he is not called upon but will not answer when he is. He speaks only when he thinks it is to his advantage to do so.

546 With μὲν οὖν (B1) and ὥσπερ λέγω, Socrates resumes, dihaeretically, where he left off (at 464E2), and now speaks as if he hadn’t stopped, so that he does not need to re-address Gorgias by name – and so it is Gorgias that he is addressing with this hugely disparaging description of the κολακεία (he will turn back to Polus at D4). With ὥσπερ λέγω he announces that he is bringing forward the four parts of what he has now earned to right to call κολακεία, the parts he had suddenly listed at the beginning of his answer to Gorgias (463B1-6). Again the argument is alternately ahead of and behind itself! The sweeping use of the “sloppy” present of λέγω (cf. n. 195), embodies the fact that with all its “prolepsis and hyperbaton,” the argument Socrates is constructing will ultimately constitute a simultaneous, synoptic whole, as he stresses at the end (συχρόν λόγον ἀποτέτακα, 465E3) while at the same time it was a διήγησις (E6).

547 Reading κακοῦργός τε καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος (B3-4), BTPF Philodemus and Burnet (κακοῦργος τε οὕσα καὶ κτλ. YF<sup>2</sup> is read by many edd. : <ἦ> κακοῦργος τε καὶ κτλ. *coni.* Dodds). The sense is not affected, and neither attested reading is unacceptable (*pace* Dodds). By κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον we were instructed to compare what is being said about gymnastic (and cosmetics) with what was said about medicine (and delicacies). Now we are launched into a sentence that resembles in structure and content the general statement that introduced that topic (464D2-3), consisting of an instrumental dative (σχήμασιν κτλ ~ τῷ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ) plus compounded indicative (θηρᾶται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾶ, done here with the string of nominatives characterizing the subject) followed by infinitival ὥστε clause (ὥστε ποιεῖν κτλ ~ ὥστε δοκεῖν). By repeating the syntactic structure Socrates, as often, buys himself an opportunity to give color to what in the first instance had to be expressed in more abstract or general terms. It is one of his favorite inductive techniques. The present stream of four adjectives therefore should be seen in light of τῷ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρᾶται ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾶ.

548 Reading σχήμασιν καὶ χρώμασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ αἰσθήσει (B4), with BTPY, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Kratz Mistriones Schmelzer Cantarin (λειότησι Esc. E2 E3, *legg.* Woolsey Jahn Thompson Sommer Hirschig Jowett[“enamels”] : ἐσθήσι F, *legg.* Bekker Stallb. Jahn Thompson Jowett Sauppe Burnet Croiset[*par un vernis superficiel et par des étoffes*] Helmbold[polish and fine garments] Dodds Chambry[*le poli, les vêtements*] Nichols Dalfen[*Glätte und Kleidern*] Heidbüchel Erler : ἐσθήτι Aristides and Schleiermacher : ἐσθήσει *scr.* Coraes, *legg.* Stallb. Woolsey Cope[“polish and dress”] Deuschle-Cron Sommer Hirschig Schanz Hermann Lodge Lamb Apelt[*Glätte und Kleiderpracht*] Zimmermann Feix Zeyl : ἀνθήσει Ast : ὀσμῆσει Theiler). The list instantiates τῷ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ as it would *appear* (cf. αἰσθομένη, 464C5) in the field of bodily adornment (κομμωτικῇ). Commentators have long vied to interpret and emend according to their guesses as to the *reference* of the four terms (*Bedeutung*): notably the use of flat καὶ throughout (τε after σχήμασιν is read in Par<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarin [and in Steph.], printed without comment by Routh Coraes Heindorf Beck) gives us no hint of their grouping or hierarchy (cf. n. 937). For instance, Ast takes σχήμασιν as *gestibus*, as does Schmelzer who then sets off the second and third terms with dashes as if they were expegetical to this and interprets αἰσθήσει as the false impression these *gestes* cause in the observer! The extreme cases are Allen, “padding and makeup and polish and clothes”; Canto, “*de talons et de postiches, de fards, d’épilations et de vêtements*”; and Piettre, “*le maintien, le fard, le lissage de la peau, le vêtement.*” But if we take the words first, and primarily, in their sense (*Sinn*), as of course we always do at first, they preemptively reveal the structure A<sub>1</sub> A<sub>2</sub> B C, since the dyad σχήμα/χρῶμα is the standard way to refer to the visual realm, as art historians do with line and color in painting (noticed by Dalfen; cf. my n. to *Rep.* 373B6); this opening dyad leaves the last two items as a pair *de facto* and so we look for their relationship *de jure*. λειότητι, whether it refers to depilatories (Dodds) or body ointments or glazes (edd.), evokes the sense of touch; and though ἐσθήσει surely belongs to κομμωτικῇ and

ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους<sup>549</sup> τοῦ οἰκείου<sup>550</sup> τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν.<sup>551</sup> ἴν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι —ἤδη γὰρ [c] ἂν ἴσως<sup>552</sup> ἀκολουθήσῃς—ὅτι κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὀσοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε<sup>553</sup> ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ<sup>554</sup> πρὸς νομοθετικὴν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὀσοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.<sup>555</sup> ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω,<sup>556</sup> διέστηκε<sup>557</sup> μὲν οὕτω φύσει, ἅτε δ' ἐγγυς

- would immediately bring forward the conceit of the pandering arts donning the apparel of their noble correlates (464D4), the far better attested αἰσθήσει would more serviceably generalize the sampling of the senses of sight, done by the first two, and touch, done by the third (Routh Heindorf), three of the five bodily senses from which taste and smell should of course be excluded as falling within the province of ὀσοποιία. Most importantly αἰσθήσει brings forward the initial derogation of pandering as merely αἰσθημένη (464C5), alluded to above at A3-4 (cf. n. 544). For examples of a list opened by a dyad of cases and then closed by a generalizing item as if on the same rank (i.e., without generalizing πᾶς or ὅλος or ἄλλα, *vel sim.*), cf. 479A2-3, 500C5-7; *Crto* 47B1-2 (ἐπαίνω καὶ ψόγω καὶ δόξῃ); *Leg.* 645D7 and E1-2, 716B4-5.
- 549 ἐφελκομένους (B5): For the anarthrous participle presuming an understood indefinite pronoun, as here, cf., in the plural as here, 519B5, *Crat.* 438B3, *Meno* 90E1, *Phdo.* 63D8, *Polit.* 273E6, *Rep.* 604C8, *Symp.* 198D5; and in the singular, 463D1, 522E3; *Crat.* 389C4, 430E4 and 9; *Rep.* 604D2; *Soph.* 231C1, 244C8; *Symp.* 217E5.
- 550 For the use of ἀλλότριον and οἰκεῖον of the personal body (B5-6) cf. *Leg.* 797E5, *Phdrs.* 239D1-2, *Rep.* 556D4.
- 551 τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν (B6): Their ἀμέλεια is an instance or aspect of the ἄνοια that κολακεία “hunts down” and deludes (464D2). Socrates abruptly shifts to the accusative plural ἐφελκομένους to depict the weakness of mind that κολακεία exploits (Mr Morrissey). Implicit in Socrates’s assertion is the background idea that γυμναστικὴ fosters not only health but beauty, for which cf. 452B6 (cf. 451E4).
- 552 ἴσως (C1) expressing not uncertainty but casual presumption, as at 461B8. Formulation in the form of a matrix or relations is the natural and necessary outcome of the dihaeretic development!
- 553 Reading ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὀσοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε (C1-2 with BTPY. These words are absent from W and F, and from Aristides (*Or.* 2.22 [2.9.1 Dindorf]), but are included in the text of Stephanus (where section C begins just after the word μᾶλλον and is therefore equal in length with the next [section D] even though it includes these words), and they are translated by Ficinus. Dodds notes that the agreement of P and BT suggests they were present in the archetype. Thompson was the first editor to athetize them (followed by Sauppe Lamb Helmbold), on the grounds that μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε might be an editor’s recommendation for an alternate reading which the that editor then quotes, *in margine*, all this subsequently imported into a text that in turn became the common ancestor of BT and P. After Thompson, Burnet *deleted* the words (followed by Theiler Irwin Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler). Thompson’s argument is unlikely, and only possible. *Unlikely*: How many of the words after μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε constitute the recommended, alternative text, according to Thompson? It would need to be everything down to C5 (ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν *alter* ... δικαιοσύνην), at which point the original text would re-commence; but in that case the original text (...ἀκολουθήσῃς ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὀσοποικὴ πρὸς ἰατρικὴν· ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω ...) would have made so little sense that the putative editor would not have presented a mere alternative (μᾶλλον) but a correction. The fact that the omission of these words is just tolerable (“Aristides retains all that the terms necessary for Socrates’s purpose,” says Th.) makes his guess *possible* but only *supports* it if their omission is an improvement of the text. For this Thompson makes no argument, and so his emendation is just a curiosity. The first to object to the deletion was Lodge, who took μᾶλλον ὧδε to be Socrates replacing his first pass at drawing the analogy with a better second one (citing 449A2 as parallel); but the parallel is imperfect since that is a correction whereas this, as Lodge himself says, is a matter of greater pertinence: why, then, introduce the less pertinent (which in fact Sauppe condemns as *zwecklos*)? We need an overall interpretation of the whole passage in order to decide whether the words ought or ought not to be there. I take the words in question to go with ἤδη ἀκολουθήσῃς as articulating what Socrates presumes his interlocutor already understands, and μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε to be introducing his own next point (μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε is similarly used at *Lys.* 214E5). It has been the manner of this whole passage to unfold the eight-term analogy in a step-wise manner: the raft is being constructed in the water. First, the two true somatics are “horizontally” paired with the two true psychics (464A1-C5) – i.e., in terms of maintenance on the left and remedy on the right – and then the two pairs of four true activities are “vertically” paired with four others in general terms – with the authentic one above and the imitation below (C5-D3). The vertical component of the formulation is then instantiated, first by the case of somatic iatrics above against somatic delicacies below (D3-465A7) and then by the case of somatic gymnastics above and somatic cosmetic below (465B1-B6). Along the way these partial comparisons provide berths for articulating more and more concretely the nature of the horizontal and vertical relationships, and it is these comparative elements or dimensions that will end up “defining” oratory. The target of the whole analogy is the psychic imitations, and in particular oratory as one of them, onto which the horizontal and vertical elements of the analogy are now in the conclusion brought to bear (C3-D6). The present sentence (B6-C3) apologizes for the gradualness of the presentation (ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶ) and now redresses that fault by abbreviating the horizontal and vertical relations of the four somatic activities with a schematic or “geometric” ratio (with the words Thompson athetizes), which then enables Socrates to present his conclusion (with μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε) in the shortest of ways, with a schematic formulation of the four psychic activities governed by the same horizontal and vertical principles as just presented for the somatic activities. Dodds (226) and Irwin (133) correctly see in this extended use of proportions a harbinger of Plato’s interest in dialectical dihaeresis in the later dialogues, as if he wasn’t already; but they call it “systematic classification,” which I find incorrect mainly for three reasons: (1) the simultaneous use of horizontal and vertical division completely undermines systematicity; (2) where the ultimate *definiendum* in dihaeresis becomes the congeries of the kinds that lead to it, in the present case the other elements in the proportions, including those in the “brother” tree, are *foil* for the target idea (see next note); and (3) even the deployment of dihaeresis in the *Sophist* tolerates a certain looseness and unsystematic agility, such as we find for instance in (a) the first summary at *Soph.* 223B (heavily emended by scholars because *unsystematic*, but defended by M. Dixsaut, *Le Sophiste* [Paris Vrin 2022], *ad loc.*), and (b) the surprising reversal of standard order (from top down to bottom up) in the last summary there (268CD). Dodd’s subsequent criticism of the inadequacy of the argument as a dihaeresis (227) is therefore an *ignoratio elenchi*. Meanwhile the “method” is closely akin to “arguments from similars” such as we see early as well as late in the Platonic corpus (*Leg.* 898A8-B8; *Phdo.* 78C1-80C1; *Rep.* 401A1-8, 486D7-11; *Tim.* 28Aff, 51D3-2B5), and to the continuous analogy of the Line in the *Republic* (507B2ff).
- 554 σοφιστικὴ (C2): Lodge would prefer that Plato make sophistic the pretender to “philosophy” rather than to legislation, but in Socrates’s argument legislation was already on the table and he has something far more complex in mind. The purpose of his entire speech is to “define” oratory by contrasting it with other therapies and pretend-therapies. The case of legislation (and its pretender, sophistic) is mere foil for the target case,

ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ<sup>558</sup> καὶ περὶ ταῦτα<sup>559</sup> σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς<sup>560</sup> οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι<sup>561</sup> ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι [d] ἐπεστάτει, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε ὀσοποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἄν πολὺ<sup>562</sup> ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πῶλε<sup>563</sup> – σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος<sup>564</sup> – ὁμοῦ ἄν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄντων τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀσοποικῶν.<sup>565</sup> ὁ μὲν οὖν<sup>566</sup> ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι,

adjudication (which Socrates persists in calling “justice”) and its pretender, oratory; and indeed the somatic therapies (and their respective pretenders) were mere foil for these psychic ones. Socrates acknowledges his extensive use of foil by apologizing for μακρολογία (B6-7), but in fact he extends this indirect and inductive method by use of the very technique he presents as a short-cut. Just as foil sets something in relief by denying its identity with something else without having to articulate the criterion explicitly, so does a proportion ἀνά λόγον set something into relief against and in relation with something else, without articulating the λόγος. The eight-term proportion leaves us to contemplate oratory as something of a sweetener of an adjudication that should be remedial even if it must be bitter, alongside and in distinction with sophistic as giving the outer seemliness of lawfulness rather than requiring the rigorous askesis that makes lawfulness truly beautiful.

- 555 Again reading δικαιοσύνην (C3): cf. n. 528.
- 556 ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω (C3-4): With περ Socrates is focussing his back-reference upon his remark at 464C1-3, where the arts these pandering imitate were also said to overlap because they are “about the same thing” (these about body and those about soul), but are “by nature” distinct: the perfect διέστηκε emphasizes this distinction between extension and intension, another basic aspect and tool of dihaeresis. On the present tense λέγω, cf. n. 546.
- 557 διέστηκε (C4): With the singular he treats them as neuter things, even though their names are feminine (πράγματα: cf. most recently, A6)! So also with ὄντων rather than οὓσων (*ibid.*), he uses the singulars κατεθεωρεῖτο and διεκρίνετο (D1-2), and ὁ and ἐκεῖνο (D7-E1). Note also the chiasm of before and after: διέστηκε μὲν ... ἄτε δ' ἐγγύς ὄντων here, varying ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν ... ὁμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν above (464C1-3), when the idea was introduced.
- 558 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ (C5): This essentially spatial assertion is hard to construe: it is a “proleptic” setting up of the Anaxagorean allusion below, taking us halfway to the ὁμοῦ ἄν πάντα. For this semantic technique, which I call “proleptic skewing,” cf. the use of πονηρία at 477B5 (with n. 903), the extended comparisons at 518C-519A, 521E3-522C2, 523Bff, and *Phdrs.* 250A2, 256A6; *Rep.* 400E2-3, 402B5, 408E2-5, 492A7, 508B3, 585A3, 590E2-3, 601E1 as explained by my nn. *ad locc.*
- 559 Gorgias, though he professes to teach ῥητορικὴ, is not a ῥήτωρ as the flow of the argument required him to claim (449A7-8) but a sophist (*Olymp.* 76.6-7). More particularly (as we have seen all along) he will use oratorical techniques of pandering in order to sell his services as an oratory teacher. The motive and justification for Socrates’s original question, ὅστις ἐστίν (447D1), is herewith revealed.
- 560 ὅτι χρήσονται ... αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς (C6): The point is brought across most directly by translating “what to call themselves” (with Sommer). Ficinus: *nec utilitatem respiciunt aliquam quam vel pro se ipsis vel pro aliis sequantur unquam* // Findleisen: *cum ipsos tum alios fugit, quid inter eos sit discriminis* // Heindorf: *neque aut ipsi sciunt quo sint loco habendi, pro sophistis an rhetoribus, neque ceteri homines* (comparing 520A). Dodds correctly clarifies ἑαυτοῖς as not each other but themselves. Cf. also schol. Areth. *ad εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ* (Greene, 472). The hegemony of soul is needed for διάκρισις; if soul is being operated upon (as by sophistry or oratory) there remains no objective διακρίνω τ. A very similar argument is made in the *Rep.* Bk.III: whereas it serves the physician to have experienced being sick, it does not serve the judge to have experienced being unjust (408C5-9E2).
- 561 ἄλλοι (C6) in its adverbial use, meaning *ceteri*: “the world at large” (Lamb) or “everyone else” (Allen), not just *alii* (“the other men,” Jowett Croiset Apelt) – that is, their clients. The point is that those who pay for their services do not really know what, besides success, they are getting.
- 562 πολὺ (D4): “widespread” as at *Soph.* 256E5, *Leg.* 633B6; or understand ῥῆμα with τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου (D3-4), whence πολὺ = *crebro* as at *Rep.* 562C3. The special relevance of the Anaxagorean πάντα ὁμοῦ is that for Anaxagoras it is νοῦς (represented here by ψυχὴ ἐπιστατοῦσα, C7-D1) that intervened to separate things out (διεκρίνετο, C2), for διακρίνειν is a term of Anaxagoras’s (DK59 B5[2.35.8], B10[2.38.9, 2.39.3], B17[2.41.2]).
- 563 φίλε Πῶλε (D4): The alliterative address (even more alliterative than λῶστε Πῶλε, 467B11, *q.v.*) in connection with Anaxagoras’s πάντα ὁμοῦ, suggests that Polus’s habitual penchant (*n.b.* ἔμπειρος) for homoioteleuton is a sort of senseless likening of things different. See next n.
- 564 ἔμπειρος (D5): Given Polus’s account of oratory as deriving from ἐμπειρία (448C4-9, alluded to just above at 462C3) to use this term of Polus himself cannot be innocent. As suggested by Canto (*ad loc.*), Socrates refers to Polus’s rhetorical “knack” for mixing up arguments (not doctrines, *pace* Dalfen, 249), which he does without being aware of it or understanding it, whether by interrupting (461B3-C4) or by confusing prior with posterior questions (448D8-E7, 462C8-D4, 463B7-C5, 463D4-5) or genus and species (462E2 and again just below, 466A4-5). By means of this critique of Polus, Socrates, who had been addressing Gorgias, can now once again turn to Polus, thereby making him the person upon whom it is incumbent to respond, and he will respond in his typically captious way (466A4-5). It is hard to imagine what Gorgias would have or could have said in reply to this thorough condemnation of the oratorical art he professes to teach, if Socrates had asked him to, or had left it for him to do. Once again Socrates protects him to keep the conversation going; and once again Plato requires us to notice the Gorgianic silence.
- 565 τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀσοποικῶν (D6): The list’s structure (A τε καὶ B καὶ C), by treating the three items as coordinate, illustrates the confusion the sentence is warning about, for the first two are synonyms (subjective and objective, Deuschle-Cron, comparing *Polit.* 295D5-6) and the last is left without a synonym (e.g., ἡδέων). Erler gets it with “*Medizinisches, Gesundheitsförderndes und Kulinarisches wäre nicht geschieden.*” P.P.Dobree’s “improvement” of the text (*secl. ὑγιεινῶν καὶ adv. v.1*[London 1883]129), accepted by Hamilton, and Richards’s further attempt to improve upon it (cf. n. 338), are uncalled-for. Various efforts have been made to *translate* rationality and balance into the list starting with Cope’s “things sanitary and wholesome and the cook’s sauces and condiments:” such a balancing elaboration of ὀσοποικῶν with a pair of instances might be tolerated as a translator’s poetic license, but this and other improvements (compare Croiset Helmbold Irwin Allen Zeyl Pietre Dalfen) nearly require that the definite article had been repeated before the third term (indeed, Dodds in his *ap.crit.* suggested adding one). Canto, interesting and truer to the text but at the expense of sense, translates, *on ne pourrait ... pas distinguer la médecine ni de la sante ni de la cuisine.* For an intentionally “illogical” list in “metaphysical indifference” cf. *Phdo.* 78D10-E2), or in satire 490C8-9, Eryximachus at *Symp.* 183A4-7, 186A3-7 and 188A5-6, and Alcibiades inebriated, at *Symp.* 219C3-5.

ἀκήκοας<sup>567</sup> ἀντίστροφον [e] ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκεῖνο<sup>568</sup> ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔδῶν μακροῦς λόγου<sup>569</sup> λέγειν αὐτὸς συχρὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν· λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάνθανες,<sup>570</sup> οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν οἶός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγῆσεως. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ [466] ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ.<sup>571</sup> καὶ νῦν ταύτη τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

ΠΩΛ. τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἢ ῥητορική;

ΣΩ. κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον.<sup>572</sup> ἀλλ' οὐ μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις πρεσβύτης γενόμενος;<sup>573</sup>

- 566 μὲν οὖν (D7): Inferential οὖν announces the close of this long speech. Its subsequent uses (E2, E3, E6) are identified by Olympiodorus as the Attic σχῆμα ἀμέριστον of repetition (77.13-21), but the last one (E6) does get an answering δέ (466A2), and as Deuschle-Cron notice, the third one is non-inferential since the ground for saying ἄξιον is given afterwards with γάρ at E4 (*n.b.*, Olympiodorus does mention ἄξιον μέντοι as a variant he has seen but rejects it out of hand) and therefore attribute to that μὲν the old emphatic meaning it had when it was μὴν (so also Lodge). Cf. Denniston 472, 359; and cf. 466B8 with n. 581, *infra*.
- 567 ἀκήκοας (D7): It is noteworthy that the enigmatic language of Socrates's original three-term "definition" of oratory (πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον, 463D2) – enigmatic as to which feminine noun to understand with πολιτική and what an εἰδῶλον could be – has been superseded. In here saying it is the ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ he has telescoped the entire dihaeretic scheme into a *different* three-term definition. But we can spell it out for him: oratory is the kolakic εἰδῶλον of the justice-μόριον of the πολιτικῆς art, itself the psychic part of θεραπεία. If we would mimic the dihaeretic syntax of the *Sophist*, we might write, in the descending form, θεραπείας ψυχῆς μορίου πολιτικῆς δικαιοσύνης εἰδῶλον κολακευτικόν; or in the ascending, εἰδῶλον κολακευτικόν τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης μορίου τῆς πολιτικῆς, ψυχῆς θεραπείας – where, as we have come to expect, appositive genitives cannot be distinguished from partitive ones *except by the mind* (cf. nn. 495, 522, 525, 533).
- 568 ἐκεῖνο (E1): Places the analogon, ὀψοποιία, into a past or remote background so as to locate Socrates's notion of oratory in the foreground, as the *investigandum*. Apologizing for his long narrative by promising he will allow Polus also to answer at length in case he himself fails as questioner the way Polus had, but asking he be allowed to play dialectical questioner in case he can succeed at it (E4-466A2), Socrates now requests that Polus carry on the investigation, dialectically if he can – i.e., by cross-examining his answer (466A2-3) – as he had promised he would at 463E6-464A1.
- 569 μακροῦς λόγου (E2): Socrates uses the plural because he admonished Polus against makrologia twice (461D6-7, 448D1-449A2).
- 570 ἐμάνθανες (E5): imperfect of citation, as are ἦσθα and ἐδέου just below. Socrates is referring directly to the moment he introduced his puzzling concatenation (463D1: *n.b.*, μάθεις) which, by now we see, expressed the conclusion he would have reached if Polus had been a patient dialectical interlocutor. Despite not knowing what the concatenation meant, Polus asked the wrong question about it (οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι ... οἶός τ' ἦσθα, E5-6: for the expression cf. *Phdo.* 95B1, *Th.* 165B7-8, and cf. *H.Maj.* 299B5, *Lach.* 194C7-9) because he did care to understand, as Socrates knew (463D1, 463B7, 462C10), but merely sought captiously to caricature (462C4, E2) or co-opt Socrates's reply to his own benefit (462C8-9, 463D3-5).
- 571 δίκαιον γάρ (466A2), of an allowance to himself: cf. 463C6 and n. *ad loc.*
- 572 κολακεία is, in truth, such a junky thing to call oratory that Socrates's insistence that Polus recognize just what *species* of junk he has in mind is almost comic. That Polus should not care to do so (surely it is not, *pace* Dalfen [251-2], a matter of his actually forgetting!) might be compared to the Young Socrates thinking mud unworthy of theorization (*Parm.* 130C5-D4). Waterfield criticizes Socrates's correction on the grounds that to say oratory is pandering already allows the interpretation that Polus is predicating genus of species; but Polus's remark is another ridiculing caricature, not a sincere interpretation: "Ah! so now you identify oratory with pandering (whereas before you had identified it with fine cuisine: 462E2)." This is a mere passing note leading to Polus's next "question" (Does the public think oratory is mere pandering?), which of course is not a question but an assertion disguising itself as one (as Socrates notices, B1-2), to the effect that the true nature of oratory makes no difference since people are duped by it. Polus has no interest in proving, nor does he believe, that oratory is "good" – but only seeks to motivate his audience to pay him to teach them a bag of tricks (cf. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν [455C5], regarding *Gorgias*'s students), such as the one that he is deploying at this very moment. The academic commentator should keep in mind that the conversation is between two people neither of whom is very much like himself, one person who has higher standards than the academic ones and better reasons to be talking, and the other who has lower standards than the academic and all-too-human reasons for talking.
- 573 τί τάχα δράσεις (A7-8): For τάχα modal in prose vs. temporal in poetry (Routh, *pace* Jahn and Cope) cf. n.203 and Kratz, *Anhang, ad hoc loc.* I read πρεσβύτης γενόμενος (from ms.ZZaNFlo and the early edd. *teste* Cantarin) with Routh Schleiermacher Ast Canto. Only if τάχα is taken temporally do these two words become suspicious (whether as redundant or as a marginal gloss); but if taken modally – the usual prose usage – they become almost necessary. Socrates had praised Polus for his youth as a corrective to the old man who falters, not only in deed but in word (461C6); now conversely he chastises him for failing to remember though he is young. For δράσεις, Stallb. usefully cites *Soph.* 261B7.



ΠΩΛ. ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι<sup>574</sup> φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι<sup>575</sup> οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;<sup>576</sup> [b]

ΣΩ. ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν<sup>577</sup> λέγεις;

ΠΩΛ. ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι<sup>578</sup> ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

ΠΩΛ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι;<sup>579</sup> οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται<sup>580</sup> ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ<sup>581</sup> λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει<sup>582</sup> δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

- 574 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι (A9): The plural here (and in B4) represents the attitude of *Realpolitik* as if it were based on empirical survey of concrete cities (Thrasymachus uses the same plural at *Rep.*338D7-9A4). In truth it is such pseudo-realism that numbs the moral sense. Another service Gorgias and Polus render to their students is to enable them to lose their scruples.
- 575 νομίζεσθαι (A10): With Schleiermacher Heindorf Ast Stallb. Cary Woolsey Jahn Mistriotes Lodge Croiset Erler (*pace* Routh Coraes Helmbold Hamilton Piettre) I take φαῦλοι, not κόλακες, to be predicate (cf. tr.Ficinus: *quemadmodum adulatores contemni*). Contrast Socrates's clever reuse below (B3). ὡς restricts the point of view and motive to that of the νομίζοντες. Polus wants to commit Socrates to saying oratory is pandering in order to reduce him to saying that the unquestionably influential statesmen do not deserve their reputation (he is not just buying time, *pace* Dalfen). Socrates complicates the matter by calling into question the criterion by which they are admired.
- 576 οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες (A10): Not "the good orators" as opposed to incompetent ones (a characterization Kratz criticized as illogical): the adjective is added idiomatically to acknowledge the worth of the public servant, sometimes superciliously as here (*ἀγαθοὶ hat er untergeschoben*, Deuschle-Cron: cf. *Symp.*215E4-5, *Apol.*22D6, *Euthyphr.*6C1, and Calicles's use at 503C1, imitated by Socrates at 515C7). Polus is trying to impugn Socrates's radical position for flouting the conventional outlook, upon which his own livelihood depends.
- 577 λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν (B1): ἀρχή is to be taken rather literally in the sense of a rhetorical preamble, as Kratz saw ("the beginning of an exposition," Helmbold). Socrates is referring to what we may call "a rhetorical question" with which to launch (ἀρχή) a discourse, an alternative to the technique of the initiatory priamel that Polus used the first time he "took the floor" (448C and cf. n. 180). Polus's "question" presumes a thesis he wishes to foist upon Socrates as empirically absurd, that the ὄχλος actually views the orators that succeed in swaying their opinions as mere panders. The "argument" Socrates sees lurking beneath his question is that the very fact that the public does not, proves that the pandering is working and therefore moots the question whether it is the right thing for a "good" orator to do. Dodds states that Polus's question is changing the subject "from the professional teachers of rhetoric to their pupils" – from the power of oratory to the topic of oratory's students – but the latter is hardly a topic, while the former continues to be, and besides there is no "topic" until the two interlocutors agree to one. Polus is praising oratory's power and ability utterly to hoodwink the ὄχλος. Olympiodorus (81.15-17) ingeniously argues that Socrates detects intentional ambiguity in Polus's words: his ἄρα might just as well be ἄρα.
- 578 νομίζεσθαι (B3) only now, in clever retort, means *clarum et illustrem haberi* (Viger, *Idiot.*5.8.15, p.218) For the negative – "not even to be taken into consideration" i.e., "to be given no weight" – cf. *Rep.*372D7, 419A9; Ar. *Nub.*962; Luc. *Hermot.*24. With a semantic strain Socrates again ups the ante.
- 579 οὐ νομίζεσθαι (B4), continuing Socrates's absolute use. Croiset's "*passer inaperçus*" is too strong and loses the echo.
- 580 δύνανται (B4): We are back to the great buzzword (cf. 460A2, 456A5, and n. 293), as Erler recognizes, though *Macht* is different from *Wirkung*: δύναμις had up to now been a magical force; now in Polus's mouth, force or *Macht*, measured quantitatively (μέγιστον), is a franker (*starker*, Heidbüchel) expression for the same. Of course Polus is ready to leave aside (and, we may now guess, to avoid) a discussion of the nature of the oratorical teaching in order to defend it or praise it. With his silence he had virtually stipulated Socrates's derogatory description of it as nefarious and harmful pandering; when he tried to ridicule (rather than refute) the position, Socrates ups the ante by challenging the grounds for admiring the statesmen, and now Polus ridicules his challenge by reminding Socrates of the sweeping power he and Gorgias promise to provide their students, recognizing that such arbitrary power is indubitably envied as long as one can hide from himself or others the underhanded means by which one exerts it. Commentary (*cit.* Waterfield *ad loc.*) about whether the subsequent argument fails or succeeds to prove the paradoxical positions Socrates assumes in order to stop Polus in his tracks, belongs to a different discussion from the one Plato has written for us. Polus does not believe that having unrestricted power is good (*pace* Dalfen, 252), but that his prospective clients will. Such a belief, moreover, is a neurosis (at best a *Wunsch*: cf. Dalfen, 252-6) to be healed even at great length (as for instance in the case of Glaucon through Books II through IX of *Rep.*) not a policy position or political theory to be refuted. As such, "*für sein Diskussion mit Polos hat (Sokrates) genug erreicht*" (Dalfen 263).
- 581 I read ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ (B8), the *coni.* of Heindorf (followed by Beck Ast Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schanz Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Sauppe Feix Dodds Theiler Cantarin), or ἀλλὰ μὴν *coni.* Burnet and found *in marg.* Steph. and perhaps the Escorial *teste* Cantarin (followed by Croiset Lamb [cf. Denniston, 344] Heidbüchel Erler), rather than ἀλλὰ μὴν δὴ with the mss. (*leg.* Coraes). Kratz simply considers μὲν = μὴν and cites *Rep.*459C1 (with μὲν) and *Euthyphr.*6E9 (with μὴν) as parallels to the sense here (so also Lodge). Almost nothing is at stake as to the sense: cf. Denniston 343-4. Gorgias had already presumed that the promise of power was a sufficient sales pitch for his wares, though he couched the claim in an attenuated way with an expression that has in fact confused many commentators (αἰτίων ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας ... ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν, 452D6-7: cf. n. 233).
- 582 ἐν τῇ πόλει (B9): Socrates does not buy in to Polus's empirical plural but with the singular speaks essentialistically. With τοίνυν he announces he is answering what came before, bringing forward all the previous expressions, so as to close this brief round (ἐλάχιστον / μέγιστον; μοι δοκοῦσιν / δοκοῦσιν σοι; δύνασθαι retaining the vagueness of δύνανται; and ῥήτορες / οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες acknowledging Polus's loaded term). He succeeds to contradict what Polus is saying even though the crucial term remains undefined. The contradiction complete and closed, Polus must try a new tack.

ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι,<sup>583</sup> ἀποκτείνουσιν<sup>584</sup> τε [c] ὄν ἄν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὄν ἄν δοκῆ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι,<sup>585</sup> ὃ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου ὧν λέγεις πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμην σαυτοῦ ἀποφαίνῃ, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.<sup>586</sup>

ΣΩ. εἶεν,<sup>587</sup> ὃ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐχί<sup>588</sup> ἀποκτείνουσιν [d] οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἄν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελεύουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων<sup>589</sup> ὄν ἄν δοκῆ αὐτοῖς;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

- 583 οἱ τύραννοι (B11): Polus hereby lets drop that tyrants are the model, and even the sales pitch, for the “power” of the orator that the oratorical δύναμις would confer: *die ungezügelte, uneinshränkable Willkür* (Erler) – the same power, indeed, that Gorgias had more edifyingly called “freedom” though even that consisted merely in weakening and ruling over others in the polis (cf. 452D6-8 and E4-8 with n.). The power of the orator may in Polus’s imagination (or in his sales pitch) be of the same order as that of a tyrant but surely it is not of the same nature politically: noticing this, Socrates keeps the orator and the tyrant separate in his ensuing questions by continually *tagging on* the second to the first (τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους, 466D7; οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι, 467A2-3; οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι, 467A8) except that at the end of the whole argument he reverses the order according to the usual chiasm of before and after (εἶτε τύραννος ὧν εἶτε ῥήτωρ, 468D2-3).
- 584 ἀποκτείνουσιν (B11): Though its basic meaning is to kill, it also serves as the normal term for judicially sanctioned execution, with the result that the verb’s subject may be the sentencing judge or jurors, or the citizenship at large (508D3; *Apol.*30C6 and E1, 38C; *Crito* 48C5; *Phdo.*58B6, *Rep.*557A3; Antiphon 5.92: *n.b.* at *Apol.*39C4 Socrates can say to his jurors, who have voted for his execution, ἀπεκτόνατε), or even the accuser at law (*Apol.*30D5, *Andoc.* 4.37, X. *HG* 2.3.21, T. 6.61.4). As elsewhere, the passive is supplied by ἀποθανεῖν (= “be condemned to death”), as at 486B3. Of course it is this legal sense that Polus actually has in mind though his rhetoric exploits the ambiguity. Punishments are commonly exemplified with the triad death (ἀποκτείνειν and θάνατος), exile (ἐκβάλλειν, φυγή [480D2], ἐξελεύουσιν [466D2]), and the abridgment of rights (ἀτιμία: *Apol.*30D1-2, *Prot.*325B4-C4); in addition there is the pecuniary fine, as here (ἀφελέσθαι χρήματα, ζημία [480D1]), and imprisonment (δήσαντα at 468E9 [cf. δεσμός, 480D1]) and beating (πληγαί 480C8, for which cf. *Th.*176D8, *Leg.*855B5-C6, 890C4-5, 949C6-7 [perhaps for children, cf. *Leg.*932B7, *Prot.*325D7]). It is noteworthy that Socrates’s names for the punishments (480C8-D3) are nominal instead of verbal like Polus’s, and important to remember – when Polus imagines his tyrannical orator virtually able to perform the punishments with his own hands – that the so-called Heliastic oath was sworn yearly, to promise to mete out punishments *according to the law* (an idea of the oath can be got from D. 24.149-51). It is such institutional complications that the skill hawked by Gorgias and Polus is meant to facilitate cutting through. In the hands of their orator what is *de jure* democratic will become tyrannical *de facto* – and this is why Polus’s sales pitch associates the able orator with a tyrant, a pitch Gorgias was better at leaving to the imagination (cf. 452D5-E8 with nn. 233, 241, 243).
- 585 μέντοι (C3) is asseverative along with νῆ τὸν κύνα. As to its lateness, it is postponed by the oath (compare ἄλλά at 463D6, *Ar. Nub.*652, X. *Cyrup.*1.4.19): after that it comes as early as it can (Thompson). The asseveration apologizes for his need to repeat the uncertainty he expressed at B1.
- 586 ἄλλ' ἔγωγε (C6) dismisses instead of answering Socrates’s continued allegation that Polus is not really asking. “*Du hörst doch, ich frage dich,*” tr. Apelt.
- 587 ἔπειτα (C7) plays tit for tat, somewhat peeved (cf. εἶτα at *Apol.*28B3, *Crito* 43B1, *Prot.*309A6, cit. Jahn), and ὃ φιλῆ is supercilious. It is a statement (with Ast[1819] Jowett Apelt Chambry Hamilton Allen Canto Dalfen), not a question (all others).
- 588 Reading ἢ οὐχί (C9), Burnet’s paleographically easy emendation of majuscule EI, *legg.* Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler (εἰ ὅτι BTW : εἰ οὐχί F, *legg.* Hermann Kratz Deuschle-Cron Lamb : ὅτι PY) so that we are not compelled on slim evidence to read the colorless *facilior* ὅτι from PY (with all other edd.). Kratz makes tolerable sense of F’s εἰ οὐχί: although it forces ἔλεγες to mean “ask,” Socrates has been complaining all along that Polus has been making statements with his questions.
- 589 ἐκ τῶν πόλεων (D2), reverting to Polus’s formulation in the plural, here and below, because quoting him. As usual Socrates’s quotation is accurate (repeating the variation of βούλεσθαι with δοκεῖν) without being slavish (partial switching from singular to plural and replacing ἐκβάλλειν with ἐξελεύουσιν).



ΣΩ. λέγω τοίνυν σοι ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ<sup>590</sup> ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γέ<sup>591</sup> σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημί γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον,<sup>592</sup> ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν [e] γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον<sup>593</sup> εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. οὐκουν<sup>594</sup> τοῦτο ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΣΩ. οὐχ, ὡς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.<sup>595</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημί μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν<sup>596</sup>—οὐ σύ γε,<sup>597</sup> ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩΛ. φημί γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα<sup>598</sup> εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ<sup>599</sup> τοῦτο καλεῖς σὺ<sup>600</sup> μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε.

590 Preserving τὰ (D5) with overwhelming mss. support (BTWF Stob., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Ast Bekker Stallb.[unaware of the variant, *ut vid.*] Woolsey Jahn[who notes δύο is predicate] Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Hermann Croiset[*sine noto*] Lamb Feix Dodds Theiler Erler : om. ΦS2 *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Hirschig Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe). Lacking τὰ includes ἐρωτήματα in the predicate with δύο ("That thing you said [ταῦτα] is two questions"), but if the point of the remark is to say that one thing is two the plural ταῦτα serving as singular subject because neuter, but agreeing in form with the plural ἐρωτήματα hardly brings the point across. Easier, with Cope and Cary, "These questions of yours (ταῦτα τὰ ἐρωτήματα) are two" (*sc.* though you think them one), or Jowett's "Here there are two questions." Polus used βούλεται τις and δοκεῖν τινί interchangeably (in the binary construction of B11-C2, which Socrates here at C9-D3 brought forward) and therefore thinks his question is a single question, but since for Socrates the two verbs are not equivalent or bi-conditional Polus has asked two questions, one about their judgment and another about their plan.

591 γε (D6) = "yes, and more ..." (Denniston, 157).

592 σμικρότατον (D8): Jahn asserts that as a rule the sigmatic form of μικρός is used whenever the word before it ends with a vowel.

593 βέλτιστον (E2): Socrates now spells out what idiomatically remains implicit in the construction with δοκεῖν.

594 Reading οὐκουν (E3) with Denniston or οὐκ οὖν (from B) with Hermann Sauppe Feix Dodds[*sine noto*] Cantarín rather than οὐκοῦν (from TPWF) to keep this a question that challenges for a positive answer (with Schleiermacher [474], Mistriotes) – but on the whole matter of οὐκοῦν and οὐκουν see the extraordinary note at *AGPS* 69.51.0. τοῦτο, as often, points to the proximate or latter case, here the μέντοι clause, which (with Lodge) is the correlate of δύνασθαι μὲν and is worded in such a way as to force Polus to ask this question.

595 Πῶλος (E4): Findeisen was misled into attributing this line to Gorgias, but Socrates occasion refers to his interlocutor in the third person or by his proper name. Cf. "not if I know my Phaedrus" *vel sim.* cf. 467A8-10, 482B5, 495D3-E1. The effect is usually to bring home to the interlocutor that he will or has contradicted himself, by attributing the contradictory assertion to an avatar of himself. Cf. 482B5-6 and the important example of αὐτῷ at *Rep.* 588B6 (with my n. *ad loc.*). The further use by Socrates below (467A9) takes things a step further.

596 Reading μὰ τὸν (E6) from all mss. (μὰ τὸν κύνα Stob.): The expression is found at *Ar. Ran.* 1374, where the schol. claims the pious ellipsis of the god's name is common among the ἀρχαῖοι (cf. *Olymp.* 81.22-3) and that the ellipsis is found in Plato. Thurot (*apud* Sommer) attributes the elision to Socrates's hasty impatience to make his point. On ἔφης (φῆς Baiter), cf. n. 1472.

597 οὐ σύ γε (E6): Socrates continues to identify Polus with his opinion, to match Polus against Polus.

598 δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα (E10): The syntax of the dative between δοκῇ and βέλτιστα courts an ambiguity that had been avoided above (αὐτοῖς βέλτιστον εἶναι, E2).

599 καὶ τοῦτο (E10) points to the inclusion of the last stipulation.

600 Reading καλεῖς σὺ (E10-11), with F and Stob., retrieved from obscurity by Heindorf (and then accepted by Burnet Dodds Theiler Cantarín Erler), rather than bare καλεῖς with BTPYW, read by Routh Ast Beck Coraes Bekker Stallb.(*sine noto*) Woolsey Schanz(*sine noto*) Christ Hermann Croiset Lamb Feix Heidbüchel. The personal affirmation of Polus has (since E4) become a theme in this phase of the elenchus.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις<sup>601</sup> τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ [467] τέχνην<sup>602</sup> τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο<sup>603</sup> κεκτήσονται, ἢ δὲ<sup>604</sup> δυνάμεις ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ φῆς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ<sup>605</sup> ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι· ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο<sup>606</sup> ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῆ ὑπὸ Πώλου<sup>607</sup> ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται; [b]

ΠΩΛ. οὗτος<sup>608</sup> ἀνὴρ ...

ΣΩ. οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ὁμολόγησιν ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;<sup>609</sup>

ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν<sup>610</sup> ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οὖν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. οὐ φημι.

ΠΩΛ. ποιοῦντες δὲ<sup>611</sup> ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

601 ἀποδείξεις (E13): It is not only a matter of Greek using the future indicative as an imperative (Ast *ad Prot.*310A2, citing τί οὐ περιμενεῖς *Symp. init.*, and ἀφήσεις at 175A11; E. *Med.*878, *Andr.*1209-10), but also that by this means Socrates can *ask* whether Polus will do what he must for the sake of the argument rather than *tell* him to do so, hewing thereby more closely to the dialectical roles of questioner and answerer. Thus he continues with future ἐάσεις, encouraging him with a “most vivid” future condition!

602 καὶ τέχνην (E13-467A1) now links the previous question, whether oratory is an art, to the current question, whether the orators are thoughtful enough to judge what is truly good for them. The linkage does not assert a logical dependency of the one on the other (*pace* Waterfield) – though the possibilities here are intriguing, both ways – but merely serves as a reminder that in addition to their current disagreement they had not achieved agreement on the previous question, either. Socrates implicitly assumes that if oratory is only κολακεία it is insufficiently mindful, on the basis of his remarks at 464C5-465A7, in response to which Polus held his silence (cf. n. 545) – and so it is this that Polus must refute (*ἐξελέγξας*, 467A1).

603 τοῦτο (A3) is “second person.”

604 Reading ἢ δὲ (A4) with BTPF and Routh, Heindorf<sup>2</sup>[1929] Bekker Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Schanz Mistriotes Lodge Burnet Croiset Dodds (εἰ δὲ x Stob. Ficinus[*si quidem*...]: εἰ δὴ Heindorf<sup>1</sup>[1905] Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Cope[“if indeed”] Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Hermann Sauppe Lamb Helmbold Feix Theiler Heidbüchel : ἢ δὴ *coni.*Ast). Kratz(*Anhang, ad loc.*) Deuschle-Cron Dodds defend the logical order of this strongly attested reading.

605 καὶ σὺ (A5): καὶ indicates that Polus accepts this assertion of Socrates’s, just as the word order ὡς σὺ φῆς in the previous clause indicated that Socrates did not accept the assertion of Polus that power is *eo ipso* good.

606 μέγα δύναιντο (A8) again quotes his formula from E3 (cf. E6).

607 Polus’s *realist*-empirical claim (cf. n. 574) is now made to depend upon the empirical fate of his claim under the *mental* test of dialectic.

608 οὗτος ἀνὴρ (B1): Anarthrous οὗτος in exasperation (“*Cette espèce d’individu!*” Canto; “*Dieser Kerl...*,” Erler). The exclamation is addressed to nobody in particular (“Listen to the fellow!” Allen): cf. 489B7 (with *schol. vet. ad loc.*), 505C3, and οὕτω at 461B3 (with n. *ad loc.*); *Prot.*310B5; and *Rep.*506B5 with my n. *ad loc.* Also (with Kratz) οὗτος at *Euthyd.*296A1 and *Ar. Nub.*492 (with deictic iota); and ὅδε ἀνὴρ at *S. OR* 1160 (reading the mss). The scholiast’s idea that Socrates interrupts before Polus completes his remark (e.g., with τί πάσχει), accepted by Hamilton Zeyl Canto Pietre Waterfield, misses that the idiom was already complete with the insouciant omission of the article before ἀνὴρ (*pace* Sauppe who flatly asserts that the omission does not occur in Attic prose and prints ἀνὴρ here and at 489B7 and 505C3). Indeed a confused and exasperated *pause* by Polus is more likely what gives way to Socrates’s following rejoinder (“*Sokrates lässt ihn ins Leere laufen,*” Dalfen).

609 Reading τούτου πρόσθεν (B4) with all mss. and Stob. (accepted by Routh Ast Beck Stallb. Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schmelzer Hermann Lodge Feix), as being in character for Polus, against deletion by Schleiermacher (who was followed by Heindorf Bekker Cope Thompson Hirschig Jowett Schanz Sauppe Ovink Burnet Croiset Lamb Helmbold Dodds Theiler[who drops βέλτιστα εἶναι along with it] Chambry Canto Cantarin). He can hardly believe his ears (and neither should we!) and in fact is mounting a refutation by assembling Socrates’s answers.

610 Taking καὶ (B5) with νῦν not γάρ (Stallb).

611 Reading the logically imperfect expression ποιοῦντες δὲ (B8) with BTPW (*legg. edd.*), over the more correct but less well attested omission of δὲ in FY and Stob. (*legg.* Heindorf Beck Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler). Cf. also n. 482. The discrepancy among the mss. in itself gives no justification for Richards to emend the δὲ of one of them into γε (cf. n. 338). Polus uses the participle in order to attach the assertion

ΣΩ. φημί.<sup>612</sup>

ΠΩΛ. σχέτλια<sup>613</sup> λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. μὴ κατηγορεῖ,<sup>614</sup> ὃ λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε [c] κατὰ σέ·<sup>615</sup> ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ<sup>616</sup> ὅτι λέγεις.<sup>617</sup>

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο<sup>618</sup> οὗ ἕνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἶον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν τοῦτο βούλεσθαι ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ<sup>619</sup> ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἕνεκα πίνουσιν;

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι τὸ [d] ὑγιαίνειν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλεοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε (τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ

ποιοῦσιν ἂ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς as closely as possible to ποιοῦσιν ἂ βούλονται, but still needs to add the adversative connective and in doing so portrays the participle as coordinate with the indicative above: he is still sputtering.

612 φημί (B9): Socrates as answerer is the model of proper dialectical brachylogy, as at B7 and above (cf. n. 480).

613 σχέτλια (B10) is already indignant enough than to need the γε from Olymp. Stob., absent in all mss. (but printed by Heindorf Beck Ast Thompson Sommer Sauppe Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler). I leave it out, with Routh Bekker Stallb. Jahn Kratz Schanz Místriotes Schmelzer Lodge Croiset[sine noto] Feix. Polus again has lost control of his tongue (cf. n. 442). It does not occur to him that ποιεῖν ἂ δοκεῖ τι and ποιεῖν ἂ βούλεται τις can have different meanings and so he thinks Socrates is insisting on both thesis and antithesis. Místriotes formulates his problem as an inability to make a philosophical distinction between means and ends, but it would be a little closer to the truth to say that he wishes his audience to see the tyrannical wielding of power as an end in itself. With an analogous shortsightedness, Gorgias had suggested that ruling others was tantamount to being free (452D5-8: cf. nn. 233 and 234). It is not that these two sophists cannot distinguish means from ends but that they want their clients not to do so, and want them instead to believe that what they will provide them with is an end in itself when it is not. Similarly, Polus placed the ποῖον before the ὅ τι not because he was unable to distinguish essence from accident (448E2-7: cf. n. 169) but because he is only interested that his wares be embraced as good no matter what their inner nature.

614 Reading κατηγορεῖ (B11) with all mss., Olymp., Stob., and most editors (κατηγορεῖ scr. Naber [Mnemos. n.s.36, {1908}254], legg. Cope Burnet Dodds Theiler Chambray Hamilton Irwin Allen Waterfield Cantarin Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler), in the usage we see again at 489B3. Croiset and Lamb print κατηγορεῖ but tr. “*Ne sois pas amer*” and “*Spare the invective.*” Heindorf remarks, “*Facile veniat in mentem κατηγορεῖ sed alterum potius videtur.*” Though κατηγορεῖ may fit what Polus has just said better (Dodds), for Socrates to accuse his dialectical partner of bad-mouthing can only force the conversation to decline. Conversely κατηγορεῖ fits better with what Socrates himself goes on to say. He astutely notices Polus moving away from dialectics to forensics and tries to call him back: the alternative to playing questioner is to play answerer, but Polus continues to show himself unable to play questioner (466B1, 466C3-5, 466D5, whence I reject Richards’s conjecture that Socrates says ἐθέλεις for ἔχεις: the question is not whether he will but whether he can); and even his willingness to “answer” (ἀλλὰ ἐθέλω) hides a question (ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ, “so that I might even glimpse what the Hell are you saying”).

615 ὃ λῶστε Πῶλε (B11): “peerless Polus” (Hamilton). We may take it (with Philostratus, *Vit.Soph.* 1.13) that he is (again? cf. n. 563) mimicking Polus’s penchant for homoioteleuton and pariosis revealed in his manual.

616 ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ (C3): καὶ points up that Polus echoes Socrates’s ἵνα clause (B11-12) in retort, with pariosis (nine syllables each).

617 ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅ τι λέγεις (C3): Socrates had given Polus the choice to “answer” in the manner of Gorgias or to ask (462B1-2); Polus chose to ask but proved awkward and unable to ascertain what Socrates thought by asking (462B3-463D1, 466A4-467C2), and so now paradoxically he proposes to learn what Socrates thinks by *answering!* Conversely, Thrasymachus tells Socrates if he truly wants to learn what justice is he should give his own answer rather than ask questions (*Rep.* 336C2-6), but then immediately bars a large spectrum of answers because they are not his kind of answer, namely, an answer of his own which he then cannot resist to reveal (337D1-2). For both of them, answers are not steps along a path of inquiry leading to further questions, but performances that terminate conversation and lead to applause (*Euthyd.* 276B7, *Prot.* 334C7 and *Rep.* 338C2-3 [with B6 above]; compare Thrasymachus ready to “walk out” like a bathman after pouring out his ῥῆσις [344D1-3]). For such an interlocutor, conversely, good questions would be challenges that threaten to stymie or thwart a successful performance. A great “answerer” like Gorgias, however, has enough experience in the matter (ἐμπειρία) as never to be stymied or thwarted (on which cf. οὐδὲν κατῶν [448A2-3] with n. *ad loc.*).

618 ἐκεῖνο (C6) of the notionally “remote” but also temporally prior antecedent (for the purpose preceded the action), announcing that the antecedent has not been expressed but can readily be imagined as the governing force or overarching idea behind what is being put before the eyes with τοῦτο. Socrates continues the distinction between the demonstratives at C8-9, D2-4, D7. Cf. *Lach.* 184A7 (with my n. *ad loc.*), 185D6, 186B4 (with my n.), 193D6; *Phdrs.* 234B2, 253A3; *Rep.* 345D7, 401C4, *al.* Once the distinction drawn this way has served its purpose, he varies the way he draws it (468B8-C1: cf. n. 633). Waterfield again intervenes to note that we *do* in a sense want the thing we do not want (the means) since it will bring on that we want (the end) – a *distinguo* again irrelevant to the argument between Socrates and Polus (unless of course Polus himself brings it up, which of course he will not).

619 καὶ ἀλγεῖν (C9): The καὶ is illative: despite the benefit to health, taking drugs is painful and visiting doctors is formidable. Cf. n. 297, 478C2, and n. 875. Also *Polit.* 293B2-3.

κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν;) ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι οὐ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν, πλουτεῖν·<sup>620</sup> πλούτου<sup>621</sup> γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν.

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τις τι πράττη ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο [e] οὐ ἔνεκα πράττει;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀγαθὸν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

ΠΩΛ. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη,<sup>622</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν<sup>623</sup> μὲν σοφίαν<sup>624</sup> τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ<sup>625</sup> δὲ τάναντία τούτων;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ μῆτε ἀγαθὰ μῆτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, [468] ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν,<sup>626</sup> καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα<sup>627</sup> καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα<sup>628</sup> καλεῖς τὰ μῆτε ἀγαθὰ μῆτε κακὰ;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

ΠΩΛ. τὰ [b] μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

620 πλουτεῖν (D5): With this second example we have the very common pairing of health and wealth as values to pursue (451E3-5; cf. 517D-518A, 523C5-6; *Alc. I* 104A4-C1; *Charm.*157B7-8; *Euthyd.*280B8-D7; *Lach.*192E1-3A2; *Leg.* 631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4, 715B8-C2, 716A5-6; *Meno* 78C6; *Phdo.*64D8-E1; *Prot.*354B3-5; *Rep.*443E3-4, 445A6-8, 491C1-4, 494C5-7; *Th.*174D3-5A5; and *n.b.* the Aristophanic term πλουθυγεία [!] *Eq.*1091, *Vesp.*677, *Av.*731). The pair is so often adduced as dialectical foil for the goods of soul (see for instance *Leg.*660E2-5, 715B8-C2) that we may and should anticipate that these will next appear, as they do (cf. 459A1-459E1, 503C4-D3, 514A5-515B4, etc.). Cf. n. 2200.

621 πλούτου (D5) is read by all mss., Olymp., Stob., and almost all edd. Coraes read τούτου on the evidence of one ms. of Stobaeus 4.4.31 (the Paris.1985 *teste* Gaisford), supported by Ficinus's tr. (*harum enim gratia navigant*) – the reading is only welcome (*vix abstinui quin in textum receperim*, Heindorf). Cobet excised πλούτου ... πλέουσιν as distasteful (*Mnem.*3[1875]123), though it is present in all mss. and in Stob., and was followed in this by Schanz Ovink and, predictably, Theiler.

622 πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (E3), *sc.* οὐδὲν εἶναι (Heindorf: Ficinus tr. *nihil omnino*). The strong asseveration (ἀνάγκη) stresses as usual a logical truth (cf. my n. to *Rep.*333D9) even to the point of eclipsing the (obvious) negative particle (so Buttman, Mistrisotes) and requiring Socrates to shift to the infinitive.

623 Reading ἀγαθὸν (E4) with all mss. and edd. (ἀγαθὰ Stob. followed by Findeisen): Socrates's remark is still influenced by the categorical distinction, ἀγαθὸν / κακόν (E2).

624 σοφίαν (E4): Here is instanced the third category we had anticipated.

625 κακὰ (E5): By now Socrates has adjusted to the plural syntax of illustrative exemplification (cf. n. 623).

626 πλεῖν (468A2) is in fact the best example of an ἀδιάφορον (*pace* Robin) since according to 467D1-5 it is surely not good in itself. But this in no way implies it is bad: that is the whole point.

627 λίθους καὶ ξύλα (A2): The pairing is proverbial, its significance uncertain: perhaps here building materials.

628 ἄλλ' ἄττα (A3): This suggests that Socrates conceives his list to be somehow exhaustive or complete. He presents two categories: verbs and nouns – acts and things.

ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι,<sup>629</sup> καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν,<sup>630</sup> καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα,<sup>631</sup> οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;<sup>632</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιούσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες.

ΠΩΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα<sup>633</sup> βούλεσθαι, [c] ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν<sup>634</sup> βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως,<sup>635</sup> ἄλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾗ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα

629 οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι (B2) is meant to gloss ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: the good in prospect is better than the current state of affairs. Cf. ἄμεινον below (B6, 470B2). For βέλτιον nearing the sense of ὠφέλιμον cf. *Phdo.* 115A7 (Mistriotes). But οἰόμενοι introduces the possibility that the actor may be wrong in his assessment of the result he will reach: this is continued below at B6 and reaches a climax at D3.

630 I read εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν (B5) from BTWY, with Heindorf Bekker Schanz Burnet[*sine noto*] Croiset Dodds[*sine noto*] Theiler Cantarín (εἴ τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν ed. Bas.2 *teste* Bekker Stallb. Sommer Hirschig : εἴ τινα ἀποκτείνουμεν PF, *legg.* Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schmelzer Hermann Lamb Feix : εἴ τινα καὶ Παρ [*teste* Bekker] : ὅταν τιν' ἀποκτείνουμεν J : an ἀποκτείνουμεν? Stallb.). *N.b.*, Ficinus has *si quos occidimus*. Mistriotes justifies the indicative (in distinction from the subjunctive used just above (βαδίζομεν, B2) on the grounds that surely we will do some walking (we may anticipate that, whence the subjunctive), whereas killing someone is entertained on a purely hypothetical basis (so also D1-3 below). At the same time, however, the value or disvalue of these putatively neutral acts, which will be said to rely upon the doer's purpose, is now immeasurably more consequential (whence μή, B6: see note below). Socrates uses the first plural here (B1-C7) not to refer to people in general, nor to a public policy they share (Polus after all is a foreigner), but because in the dialectical context he and Polus are the only people they can or need to speak for. On the other hand, Polus's vaunt about the tyrant places no incumbency on him to consider rationally what he is doing. In fact, for Polus the index of his power is in fact its arbitrariness. But the intervening analysis has now enabled Socrates and Polus to put themselves in the place of the mindless tyrant mindfully. We are hastening toward a crisis, brought to its culmination a few lines below.

631 ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα (B5-6). The order of the items is now allowed to vary from what Polus had originally said and Socrates had hitherto scrupulously repeated (466D1-2, 466C1-2).

632 ἢ μή (B6): The negative of the infinitive in indirect discourse is "retained" from the direct form – therefore, it is regularly οὐ. But if the verb of speech is emphatic in its assertion, or includes "a wish that the utterance may hold good" (Smyth §2723, 2725), or "preference or depreciation, as when οἴεσθαι implies that a man has made up his mind between two alternatives" (W.G. Rutherford, *First Greek Syntax* §328), then οὐ may be replaced by μή, as here. After all, much more is at stake in this οἴσις of the doer, relative to the cases above.

633 ἐκεῖνα (B9): His point now having been grasped by Polus, Socrates uses the plural as opposed to the singular of the "remote demonstrative" (ἐκεῖνα / ἐκεῖνο) to do the work that he had done with the singulars of the "proximate" as opposed to the "remote" antecedent (τοῦτο / ἐκεῖνο: cf. n.618), thus freeing the idea from its expression. Polus's emphatic response μάλιστα (C1) reveals that he immediately understood the shift in the pronouns.

634 σφάττειν (C2): The recognized methods of legal execution (ἀποκτείνειν) were throwing a man into the βάραθρον, nailing him somehow him on a board (ἀποτυμμανισμός), and by the time of the Thirty administering hemlock (cf. Bonner and Smith, ch.10): throat-cutting (the sort of thing you would do with a ἐγχειρίδιον [cf.469D1]) was not among them. Socrates now substitutes a gory murderous act for the vaguer legal term for execution, because it has now been revealed that the point of Polus's sputtering advocacy of oratorical skill at 466B11-C2, and the true motive he wishes to arouse in his audience, is the mindless impulse to unbridled power in one's city (indeed we might call it a power "purely arbitrary" but then Socrates would have to challenge our use of *that* term!). And once he is paid and discharges his "lessons," Polus will go off to another city. Similarly Gorgias had dangled the image of his client *enslaving* his fellow citizens (452D5-E8), and we see another case of the same thing with Thrasymachus in *Rep.* Bk.I. Polus does not "hold" in any reflective way, *pace* Waterfield, that a life with political power is better than one without it: he is relying on his audience to be dazzled by the image of the strong man who has no need to reflect. Nor (*pace* Waterfield) was it incumbent upon Socrates to prove that an orator was not actually able to kill somebody. The entire point of his refutation is to reveal the fatuity of Polus's suggestion of a man suddenly catapulted to the top of the heap – the suddenness of which is expressed by ἀπλῶς οὕτως (cf. τοιοῦτος and ταύτη, D7-E1 below [and n. 648 *ad loc.*] – all second person demonstratives referring to Polus's conception). The notion of competition and the idea that the only goal is to win rather than lose in a zero-sum game, is implicit in everything Gorgias and Polus say.

635 βουλόμεθα ... ἀπλῶς οὕτως (C2-3): ἀπλῶς οὕτως means not *sine ulla exceptione* (Heindorf), nor *temere* (Findeisen Croiset) but *unbedingt* (Ast), *ita ut nihil aliud respiciamus* (Stallb.), "thus in themselves considered" (Woolsey), "not the simple actions themselves" (Helmbold) – i.e., that βουλόμεθα is not a complete description of what is happening (Sauppe's parallel from *Symp.* 183D3-6 and Jahn's from *Prot.* 351C7 are quite apt). Cope's "merely in the abstract" mistakes the uninstantiated for the non-contingent; Sommer's "*sans intérêt, pour le plaisir de le faire*" assumes an idea not present. As for the reason these adverbs are there at all, cf. *prev. note*.

πράττειν αὐτά,<sup>636</sup> βλαβερά δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ<sup>637</sup> βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῆς  
σύ,<sup>638</sup> τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ.  
... ἦ γάρ;<sup>639</sup> ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ;

636 αὐτά (C4) = “them, given what they are.” Cf. 501B6; *Soph.*225C7, 252D6-7, 256B6.

637 τὰ ἀγαθὰ (C5): This “categorical” use of the article is best not translated here. The plural now replaces the singular. Again the expression is varied while the idea is the same.

638 Reading ὡς φῆς σύ (C5-6), “as you agree,” with mss. and edd., not ὡς σὺ φῆς (ΦΞ1 *teste* Cantarín). Olympiodorus (85.20-24) says that ὡς σὺ φῆς means “as you *but not I* assert.” Cf. n. 605 and n. 708, *infra*. The interjection draws attention to the fact that what Polus βούλεται (βουλόμεθα, C4-6) and what δοκεῖ αὐτῷ (ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, C7), flatly opposes what he thought the tyrant wanted and what he thought δοκεῖ αὐτῷ: the crisis has reached its climax and now Polus has nothing to say.

639 ἦ γάρ; (C7): This extra question requires us to recognize that Polus sits silent and is not answering. The next extra question (see next note) requires us to realize he does not respond to this first one. Compare his silence at 465A7 (n.545 *ad loc.*).



... τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;<sup>640</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ. [d]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ<sup>641</sup> ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως<sup>642</sup> ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ρήτωρ,<sup>643</sup> οἴομενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ,<sup>644</sup> τυγχάνει δὲ<sup>645</sup> ὄν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ<sup>646</sup> αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα;

... τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη;

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ'<sup>647</sup> οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος [e] μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ,<sup>648</sup> εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν.

- 640 τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνη; (C7): By giving Socrates an asyndeton Plato indicates Polus's silence (cf. D6). His hesitation to speak is not because he is "beginning to feel concern for his fondly cherished view and bold statements" (Lodge), for Polus cherishes only money, clients, influence, celebrity. Not victory but the appearance of it, not truth but the credit of others, not knowledge but the ῥαστώνη of succeeding without it. His agreeing will be tactical, we should imagine, and imagine that he will recuperate or strive again not to have but to appear to have the upper hand, as soon as he can. Athetization due to its repetition below at D6 (Deuschle-Cron Theiler) is gratuitous and unjustified. Dalfen usefully reviews moments of silence in the dialogues, *ad loc.* (262).
- 641 εἴπερ (D1): With περ Socrates nails down the agreement he has just extracted from Polus: "if we can rely on the assertion that..." So also D5.
- 642 ἐκ πόλεως (D2): The "categorical" singular once again – even the article is omitted – rather than the empirical plural, since the *essential* point is being made (cf. nn. 574, 589).
- 643 εἴτε τύραννος ... εἴτε ρήτωρ (D2-3): Once again (cf. n. 583) Polus's model notion of the tyrant is included alongside the true *investigandum* (the ρήτωρ), but here the order is reversed in a chiasm of before and after. The point has been made and the argument is being brought to a close.
- 644 Reading reflexive αὐτῷ (D3), reported by Ast(1832) as a suggestion of Beck (*Plat. Op. Steph.* [Leipzig 1816] 3.525), Cantarin now reporting αὐτῷ from ms.N. Hirschig was first to print it, pointing for support to ἡμῖν at B6 (on the person of which cf. n. 630), instead of the non-reflexive αὐτῷ present in the mss. and read by Routh Heindorf Coraes Ast[1819] Bekker Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Cantarin (*n.b.*, Stallb.'s report *ad loc.*, "*sic optimi et plurimi libri*," pertains only to the word σὺ order αμ.ε.αυτῷ *versus* ε.αυτῷ.αμ.[the latter found only in E and the early edd. *teste* Cantarin]). Beck's emendation was adopted by Stallb. Deuschle-Cron Kratz Mistriotes Christ Sauppe. In the next line, Socrates reverts to αὐτῷ, which is the formula of Polus, who along with Gorgias is scrupulous both to mention and to attenuate the reference to self-interest. It is, has been, and must be their strategy to arouse ambition in the audience of their prospective clients but at the same time to provide them a certain "deniability." Therefore they describe the orator in the third person and to leave it to the prospective client's conscience to conceive of himself becoming one, out of a blatant disregard for all his neighbors. Compare Gorgias's expression αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις at 452D6-8, where the attenuation was enough to mislead many interpreters, and cf. nn. 233, 234, 241, 243, 305, 582. The brunt of Socrates's present argument is that even if a given individual decides to become a "somebody" by becoming an orator, he will continue to be only himself.
- 645 τυγχάνει δὲ (D3-4), a dispositive instance for illustrating that the sense of τυγχάνειν is not a matter of random chance but of distinct and irreducible fact, the ineluctable experience of which humans invented "chance" to bring under some kind of notional control with a name.
- 646 ἃ δοκεῖ (D4): The verb is brought forward from 467B6-8 (and before), where Socrates used it in paradoxical contra-distinction from βούλεσθαι (as here, D5).
- 647 ἀλλά (D6), in answer, used to accept a request by dismissing all objections, to obey an imperative by forgoing to resist, or as here to agree despite having disagreed. Cf. *Lach.* 181D1, 181D8, 182D6, 184C9, 190D2 among a thousand others.
- 648 ταύτῃ (E1): Referring not to Athens, of course (that would be τῆδε [Stallb. Sauppe Dodds, *et al.*: e.g., 469E1, 513B1, 517A2, 521C8]); nor does it mean "his" city (*sa*, Chambry) but neither do we need to supply ὁδῶ *vel sim.* (with Routh and Heindorf), nor soften it with *de ea urbe in qua talia facere liceat* τῷ τοιοῦτῳ (Schleiermacher: the problem is not in the nature of the city allowing it, but in the consciousness of the orator being described) or ἀπλῶς περὶ οἰασθήποτε πόλεως (Coraes). Nor does the demonstrative merely point to their own discussion (the city they have now succeeded to envision *sic* Stallb. Cary Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Lodge Heidbüchel Erler). Ast (1832) comes closest by saying it is *derogatory* (cf. n. 241). With this "second person" demonstrative (referring to his interlocutor's conception, as at 452E6, 472C2) Socrates is now canceling Polus's lurid image of what "actually" happens (which he had expressed in the plural only for emphasis: cf. 466A9 and n. 574): cf. οὕτως at C3 (and n. 634) and even τοιοῦτος here (D7). Socrates had never bought in the "intimidating" plural: cf. nn. 582, 642. Cf. n. 634 on σφάττειν at 468C2. Chambry's and Canto's *dans sa ville* simply takes a different tack than Socrates had.

ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,<sup>649</sup> λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

ΠΩΛ. ὡς δὴ σύ,<sup>650</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ<sup>651</sup> σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς<sup>652</sup> ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δῆσαντα.<sup>653</sup>

ΣΩ. δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

- 649 ἔλεγον (E3), an imperfect of reference again, referring to the time of 466D8-E2. Polus agrees with Socrates's conclusion and in doing so is disallowed from presuming that having arbitrary power is in itself admirable or even desirable. There is no evidence that Polus believes this is the case; it is only a sales-pitch pandering to conventional notions of success that are only functioning to hide feelings of envy, just as Thrasymachus advanced his cheeky "claim" that might makes right in *Rep.* Bk.I in order to incite students to study with him. Irwin's sudden shift into a painstaking analytical mode in his treatment of this back and forth (138-146), by treating both men's remarks as propositional *Stellungnahmen*, sheds no light at all on what the interlocutors are trying to do by what they are saying, nor why and how, but replaces this with an argument among scholars who talk to each other for entirely different reasons and according to entirely different protocols.
- 650 Cynical ὡς δὴ σύ (E6): For the idiom in ὡς δὴ, cf. 499B6 (Callicles), *Euthyd.*293D4, *Prot.*342C2, *Rep.*337C2 (Thrasymachus); *A. Ag.*1633; *E. Phoen.*873, *And.*235, *Hel.*1038, *Alc.*537, 1014. It is no more "causal" than *ἐπεὶ γε* (*pace* Cron), for it imputes a motive not a cause, the unstated motive of the interlocutor, σὺ. Therewith, Polus sidesteps acknowledging the agreement they have reached by turning *ad hominem* (compare Callicles at 499B6-8 and Thrasymachus at *Rep.*343A3-4) and thereby he thwarts the dialogue from reaching formal completion in agreement (Mistriotes). Irwin is not convinced by Socrates's argument but Polus is, and this is all that matters to the dialogue. In his attempt to avoid agreeing, Polus digs a deeper hole for himself, just as Gorgias had when he suggested considering the opinion of the audience at 458B4, for now he accuses Socrates of believing but denying the idea his own sales pitch relies upon his customers to believe and hope for, a hope he and Gorgias must not mention but must stimulate so as to secure contracts for their services: one's hope of becoming the master of others, which Gorgias broached at 452D5-8 as being the μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. What ultimately underlies this belief and hope is the all too human error that the measure of one's own worth is his standing among others rather than his own integrity (as Socrates will stress at the end of the dialogue: cf. *ἔν* at 522C7ff., 526D5-E1), an error that always threatens the veneration of justice (since if we are equal according to justice, we are "nobody") and always makes power attractive (even though we do not know what to do with it) as long as the others will be "done to." In bringing this underlying motive and belief closer to the surface, Polus is gambling that his audience will embrace the erroneous view and quietly champion him for ridiculing Socrates (one wants to admit that one feels envy least of all to oneself!). The gamble is that as this sentiment comes closer to the surface it also becomes more vulnerable to the Socratic elenchus, and thereby opens the possibility that the audience will come to be ashamed for being in the market to purchase his and Gorgias's services. He is "doubling down" or "shooting the moon." The real drama of the ensuing argument will be to see which way this gamble plays out, and yet as far as we know at this point the only witness to that question will be ourselves since the onlookers in all likelihood will remain silent, just as the jurors in 399 BC voted in silence. Dodd's observation (237-8) that Polus is invoking the lowest moral standard whereas Socrates is invoking the highest has nothing to do with the present intentions of the speakers and is therefore irrelevant. Dalfen and others obscure and depersonalize the relation between Socrates and Polus by imagining that Polus's championing of the strong man is acceptable in a "shame culture."
- 651 δοκεῖ (E7): Polus taunts Socrates by scrupulously using the term Socrates's argument still allowed him (again at E8 and 469A9) in order to accuse him of mendacity and evasiveness. Irwin finds Polus's pandering remark "fair" (since a person might in fact envy an incompetent tyrant) though Polus is not trying to be fair, and he finds that in adducing envy Polus is "following a traditional pattern of Greek moral thought since Homer" (but this simply confuses admiration with envy and therefore shows that Irwin does not care why Polus is saying what he says but only whether it is defensible in a game of argument and counter argument that neither Polus nor Socrates is playing). In the previous phase of the conversation Polus tried to ridicule Socrates's dialectical manner (to criticize which was his excuse for interrupting: 461B3-C4, esp. B7-C4) with captious pseudo-dialectical inferences (462C4, C8-9, E2, 463D3), until Gorgias had to intervene and quiet him so that he himself could at least hear what Socrates thought of oratory (463D6-464A1). Thereafter Polus tried the pseudo-dialectic again (466A4-5) but in the face of Socrates's quick complaint (466A6-8) swiftly shifted gears to "play the envy card" involving the power-man for the first time (466A9-C2). But Socrates had enough dialectical momentum to keep him answering responsibly until, in the end, when a disadvantageous conclusion was being reached by the dialectic, he began to delay answering (468C7-8, D6), and now has finally changed the subject by accusing Socrates of himself not believing what he was proving. This accusation (1) exonerates him from conceding defeat, (2) opens a new frontal attack upon Socrates, and most importantly, (3) initiates a new offensive to be fought, this time out of his own arsenal.
- 652 ζηλοῖς (E8): In order to accuse Socrates of *always* feeling envy when he sees a strong man in action, Polus shifts from potential optative (ideal) to the more vivid present indicative (the -t- optative is indeed found in contract verbs as an alternative to the optative in -η-, but rarely in the singular, probably because in the singular it would be indistinguishable from the indicative: cf. Smyth §393) with a subjunctive protasis (unnoticed by Cary Jowett Croiset Lamb Helmbold Chambry Allen Zeyl Canto Nichols Pietre Dalfen – whereas Schleiermacher translated both with the indicative). Compare the envy young Glaucon reveals at the very thought of the virtuous man, and the punishments he accordingly envisions for him, at *Rep.*361E3ff (and my nn. *ad loc.*).
- 653 δῆσαντα (E9): A new third item, replacing ἐκβάλλειν (D2, C2, B5; 466D2 [ἐξελαύνουσιν], C1-2), meaning to put in prison (δεσμοτήριον). Polus cannot resist the climactic concreteness of this verb nor the more vivid *representatio* gotten with ἴδης and the participial construction with snapshot aorists (Hamilton's "at the sight of..." is just right). Lamb's "observed to have put to death" and Irwin's "that someone has killed..." wrongly translate the participles as "indirect discourse" rather than perceptual (Smyth §2112), as do Schleiermacher Cope Apelt Helmbold Dalfen, thereby losing the vividness by forcing the event witnessed into the past. Note that Polus formulates a challenge to Socrates's sincerity by loading him up with two questions in parallel (οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο / οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς), as if they came to the same thing, exactly as he had at 466B11-C2. There he had said too much, in the sense that Socrates could drive a wedge between the two (by a *distinguo* of δοκεῖν and βούλεσθαι), but this time too much in the sense that his second question reveals what he conceives to be the true motive for his prospective students' desire to study with him. It is not, for instance, to have the opportunity to govern well (becoming a tyrant is quite the opposite of what an Athenian is meant to do) but because, he imagines, they want to be winners instead of losers, to be the envied instead of the enviers – as his next remark shows (469A1-2). By foisting this attitude upon Socrates he means to arouse it in the onlookers while attributing it to someone other than himself.

[469] ΠΩΛ. ὁπότερ<sup>654</sup> ἂν ποιῆ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτός<sup>655</sup> ἔστιν;

ΣΩ. εὐφήμει,<sup>656</sup> ὦ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. τί δή;<sup>657</sup>

ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ χρή οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε<sup>658</sup> τοὺς ἀθλίους,<sup>659</sup> ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. τί δαί;<sup>660</sup> οὔτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων;<sup>661</sup>

ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΠΩΛ. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνουσιν ὃν ἂν δόξη αὐτῷ,<sup>662</sup> δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς,<sup>663</sup> ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός;

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.<sup>664</sup>

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι<sup>665</sup> ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι; [b]

ΣΩ. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε<sup>666</sup> πρὸς τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

654 ὁπότερα (469A1) is adverbial. Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 157 (and schol. *ad loc.*), and ἀμφοτέρα at 477D3.

655 Reading ζηλωτός (A1), originally conjectured by Ast and later confirmed by ZbAugO1. The nominative appears in the paraphrase of Olympiodorus (86.17-19) and it is read by Ast(1832) Cary Jowett Schanz Christ Sauppe Croiset Apelt Hamilton Theiler Chambry Zeyl Piettre, instead of ζηλωτόν (BTPYF Stob., *legg.* edd.). The impersonal construction is not incapable of a personal interpretation (Lodge, citing *Leg.* 730C6), but there is little chance that Polus would forgo any opportunity to depict the strongman in action as vividly as possible.

656 εὐφήμει (A2): Cf. *Prot.* 330D7, *Rep.* 329C2, *Euthyd.* 301A7 – usually of an impiety. Socrates is showing his aversion not to what Polus is saying but to his lurid motive for saying it. The series of questions that follow (A6-C4) show that Polus is so preoccupied with the interpersonal relationships of winner and loser so that he does not perceive that Socrates is thinking of the inner man, which for Socrates, as we shall see, is the criterion of the most important question in life, who is happy and who is not (472C6-D1).

657 τί δή (A3): “Just *why?*” as at 470A4.

658 οὔτε ... οὔτε (A4): The connectives studiously leave unclear the relation between these two terms (or groups they represent) but relation there must be, for the grounds for the first term are analytic (one *cannot* not envy the unenviable) – the “should” of the matter must come from the moral inappropriateness, condemned by εὐφήμει, of envying those whom only moral blindness would fail to see are in fact destitute. This becomes clear below (A10). Therefore “and” (Piettre) is probably better than “or” (*pace* Irwin Allen Waterfield Nichols).

659 ἀθλίους (A5): The key to understanding the subsequent exchange is that whereas ἄθλιος denotes wretchedness (being destitute, lost, ruined) it can also be used as a derogatory slur, of a “loser.” Polus is preoccupied with winners and losers and for him an ἄθλιος is a loser, but for Socrates it denotes a person who is so badly off that he is on the border of losing his dignity as a man. There is a related problem with the adjectives μακάριος (on which cf. n. 783) and ἐλεινός, pitiable, another of those words that have a negative denotation but in addition a derogatory usage (as also *τάλας*), by which the user can make an indirect claim of his own stature or worth by being so large hearted as to pity his inferior. Many have said, “But for the grace of God there go I,” but only few of these will have reviewed whether they can claim to deserve the divine favor they implicitly accord to themselves in saying it. In English, “wretch” can also be a term of abuse as well as a descriptor eliciting true pity, and so it is probably the most serviceable translation, though one must vary the tone for the two interlocutors. Though ἄθλιος does function as the denotative opposite of εὐδαιμόμων, Waterfield’s “unhappy” will be misleading since it cannot be used derogatorily, whereas “hapless” would almost do. Richards suggests adding εὐδαιμονίζεω in order to make this passage parallel to 473C7, ignoring that there it is Polus who is speaking.

660 Reading τί δαί (A6) with B<sup>2</sup> and Stob. (*libri SM*), *legg.* Bekker Stallb Ast[1832]Woolsey Kratz Hirschig Thompson Sommer, expressing *increased* surprise after δή, A3 (τί δέ BTF Stob[*liber A*], *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Hermann Jahn Deuschle-Cron Schanz Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Feix Theiler Dodds[*sine noto*] Cantarín Heidbüchel Erler : τί δή Mistriotes).

661 Reading τῶν with ἀνθρώπων (A7) from BTP, *legg.* edd. To omit the article, with F (*leg.* Beck), may better suit Polus’s abrupt style (cf. n. 746), *pace* Kratz and Lodge who cite the “epexegetical” exception to the rule that prefers its absence (Smyth §2536), but that rule does not apply here. Sauppe supplies a valid parallel for its inclusion (*Rep.* 477C4): with the article, ἀνθρώπων has eminent enough syntactical rank that we must *sc.* ἀνθρώπους as the subject of ἔχειν rather than taking the verb impersonally, which would lose the emphasis Polus is seeking. His question evinces the very moral blindness Socrates just condemned. This continued failure of communication between them provides the occasion, and indeed the content, for the ensuing section.

662 αὐτῷ (A9): Croiset unguardedly translates ὃν ἂν δόξη αὐτῷ with *faire perir qu’ il vous plaît* (contrast his *qu’ il lui plairait* for 468E8 above), in order to render the generality of ὃν ἂν δόξη; but Polus’s articulation of the person in power never takes on such a personal cast (see n. 698, *infra*).

663 δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς (A9-10): For Polus it is the vision of power exercised, free of any moral coloring and even accidentally good, that counts. His present example only instantiates his claim above (A1) that it doesn’t matter whether the power-man acts justly or unjustly.

664 ζηλωτός (A10): Socrates correctly prefers the personal construction (cf. n. 655), but Waterfield continues with his translation of the neuter from above (“in an enviable position”) as he also does at B3-4.

665 ἄρτι (A12): Again the distinction Socrates is suggesting simply does not register for Polus.

666 Reading γε (B2) with WF Stob., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hirschig Thompson Sommer Schanz Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel Erler (δὲ BTP, *legg.* Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schmelzer Lamb Feix). Hermann’s preference for the stronger adversative only dilutes the asseveration of subsequent δέ (τὸν δὲ δικαίως).

ΠΩΛ. ἦ που<sup>667</sup> ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων<sup>668</sup> ἀδίκως ἐλείνός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. ἦττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἦττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

ΠΩΛ. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. οὕτως,<sup>669</sup> ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὄν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. ἦ γὰρ<sup>670</sup> τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον;

ΣΩ. ἦκιστα γε.<sup>671</sup>

ΠΩΛ. σὺ<sup>672</sup> ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; [c]

ΣΩ. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε<sup>673</sup> οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι,<sup>674</sup> ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα<sup>675</sup> τυραννεῖν<sup>676</sup> οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ,<sup>677</sup> ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινόντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι<sup>678</sup> κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ<sup>679</sup> δόξαν.

667 ἦ που (B3), on which cf. 448A4.

668 ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως (B3): The active is commonly used for the passive in Greek and so Polus can tell a little joke – as if the one who was killed unjustly, acted unjustly. His question ushers Socrates into taking what he thinks will be seen as a still more ridiculous position.

669 οὕτως (B8), going toe-to-toe with Polus's challenging πῶς δῆτα (ὡς goes with οὕτως, not μέγιστον [Sommer]).

670 ἦ γὰρ (B10), like που in his question just above (B3), adds an ironic tone to bring his audience along with him as he strings Socrates along. For such γὰρ in question, cf. 448E5 with my n.

671 ἦκιστα (B11): Socrates is as calm and unaffected as Polus is ironic, and as sure of his paradox as Polus is incredulous.

672 σὺ ἄρα (B12): The pronoun is emphatic. Polus is back to foisting what he thinks will be a ridiculous position onto Socrates – as he did at 468E6 and at 461B3.

673 ἔγωγε (C1): Socrates explicitly elects for himself the exact contrary of the desire Polus is trying implicitly to flatter and arouse against him in his audience, the desire that makes justice consist of helping friends and harming enemies.

674 ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι (C2): Hirschig (followed by Theiler) suggested adding ἢ before ἀδικεῖν (easily omitted after εἶη) in order to distinguish this phrase from subsequent ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν, where ἢ has the meaning “than” rather than “or;” and Cobet clipped the subsequent phrase (*secl.* ἢ ἀδικεῖν, as “*frigidissime*” *Mnem.* 3 {1875} 124 though present in all mss. and Stob.) for similar reasons. But the difference between the meanings of ἢ is less strong in Greek than in their German or English translations (else they would not be covered by the same monosyllable). Indeed, Plato's formulation *exploits* the similarity of the two phrases by fashioning them into a “chiasm of before and after.”

675 With repeated σὺ ἄρα (C3, cf. B12), Polus again imitates himself in questioning (cf. n. 670). With ἂν δέξαιο he reverts to the language with which he opened this line of questioning (468E6).

676 τυραννεῖν (C3): Polus breaks down and uses the verb. Do not translate it as if he had said τύραννος εἶναι (*pace* Schleiermacher Ast[1819] Cary Jowett Chambry Hamilton Irwin Allen Zeyl) or γίγνεσθαι τύραννος (*pace* Helmbold: this would have been done with the inceptive aorist τυραννήσαι). Instead we need a periphrasis such as “accept despotic power” (Cope), *exercer la tyrannie* (Croiset), *le pouvoir d'un tyran* (Canto), “ruling as a tyrant” (Nichols), *als Tyrann zu herrschen* (Dalfen).

677 Reading αὐτῷ (C6), with all mss., as at E7 (against Sauppe and Theiler[*sine noto*], who emend to the reflexive αὐτῷ by dint of Hirschig's emendation at 468D3), for now it is again Polus's formula (cf. n. 644). The emendation does represent more accurately what Polus wants his prospective clients to *think*, but he and Gorgias are always careful to *understate* this motive. Hence αὐτῷ is correct here and in E7 just as it was at 468D4, whereas at 468D3, Hirschig's emendation to αὐτῷ is correct. Again, Croiset's *vous*, Waterfield's “you,” and Piettre's *nous* are inappropriate at C7 (cf. n. 662).

678 ἀποκτεινόντι ... πράττοντι (C6-7): Polus's ὅπερ ἄρτι (*sc.* ἔλεγον) is not only a retort of Socrates's ὅπερ ἐγώ (C4), but also invites comparison to what he said at 468E6-9. In place of σοι, since Polus was there accusing Socrates, the construction is allowed to be impersonal; ἐν τῇ πόλει, the civic pre-eminence, is retained; ὅτι δοκεῖ is more emphatically generalized with ὅταν δοκῇ; he reproduces his vivid participial construction (ἀποκτεινόντι, etc.) when plainer syntax calls for infinitives in apposition to ποιεῖν; and finally he lets loose with the notion that he can carry off not just judicial punishments but “whatever he sees fit” (πάντα πράττοντι).

679 Reading αὐτοῦ (C7) with T and edd., or ἐαντοῦ with F. The αὐτοῦ of BW (*legg.* Hermann Kratz Jahn Burnet[*sine noto*] Dodds[*sine noto*] Feix Erlor), regardless of the problem of reflexivity noted above, would properly stand in predicate position. Cf. n. 1637.

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε,<sup>680</sup> ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ.<sup>681</sup> [d] εἰ γὰρ<sup>682</sup> ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλῃς ἐγγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ ὅτι “ὦ Πῶλε,<sup>683</sup> ἐμοὶ δύναμις τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία<sup>684</sup> ἄρτι προσγένονεν· ἐάν γε ἄρα<sup>685</sup> ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὄρᾳς αὐτίκα<sup>686</sup> μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξῃ<sup>687</sup> οὗτος ὄν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινὰ δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγῶς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον<sup>688</sup> ἔσται—οὕτω [e] μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει,”<sup>689</sup> εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιτο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθεῖν οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἦντιν’ ἂν σοι δοκῇ,<sup>690</sup> καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις<sup>691</sup>

680 ὦ μακάριε (C8): Vocative in initial position is rare and indicates the speaker is rather overcome by a visceral reaction to what the person he addresses has just said: cf. 448C4, 471E2, 473E6 and my n. to *Lach.* 181B5. The address means, in Polus’s language, the opposite of ἄθλιος (cf. n. 646). Polus *needs* to know what Socrates thinks a tyrant does if he wants to know why Socrates would not want to act that way; however, he is *not interested* in knowing Socrates’s reasons but only in stopping this more and more naked and embarrassing exposure of the visceral feeling in the onlookers that would motivate them to hire him – namely, to become “winners” over the others as “losers.” So he exploits an opportunity to present the image of the freewheeling power-man again.

681 Reading τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ (C8) with the mss. and most edd. Cantarin reports τοῦ λόγου from V2 (which Bekker reports as τῷ λόγῳ) and cites the Olym. paraphrase ἐλάβου μου τοῦ λόγου; and Cornarius *coni.* τῶν λόγων, *legg.* Coraes Heindorf. Whether we read dative or genitive, with the etymological figure (λέγοντος ... τῷ λόγῳ – *me sermocinante sermone corripere*, Routh Stallb.), Socrates enjoins Polus to argue with what he is arguing, or is about to argue (*sic* Schleiermacher, *was ich dir jetzt sagen will, das nimm doch recht vor*; Jowett, “when I have my say, do reply to me”; Chambry *laisse-moi parler; tu me critiqueras à ton tour*) – in short to play the questioner in a dialectical conversation where it is Socrates that is the answerer (hence ἐμοῦ λέγοντος [C8], retorting ἐγὼ γε τοῦτο λέγω [C5], with Mistrisotes), for he has been asked a question. Since the beginning of this section (468E6ff), in lieu of formally acquiescing in the conclusion that tyrants are powerless to do what they want, Polus’s remarks have attacked what he presumes, or feigns to presume, to be Socrates’s hidden belief. Finally (C4) Socrates has suggested he has a different notion of tyrannical power from Polus, one that would imply a different attitude about the tyrant’s enviability, but Polus replies, in belligerent and perfectly irrelevant defense, that “what he (himself) says,” his own notion of tyrannical behavior, has not changed, an entirely irrelevant response. With Kratz and Deuschle-Cron, τῷ λόγῳ refers back, loosely, to Polus’s λέγω at C5, and τῷ is possessive. Budé suggested (*Comm. Ling. Gr.* [1548]280), *reprehende si potes quae dico* – i.e., “If it is to be an argument-fight, wait for me to be arguing something” (similarly Heindorf Croiset). Socrates is converting the oratorical (forensic) opponent into a dialectical counterpart. Ast (1819) *coni.* τὸν λόγον (“*me hoc dicentem redargue dum*”), which is not quite necessary. ἐπιλαβεῖσθαι is therefore almost a technical term of dialectical interrogation (506B8; *Rep.* 490C11, 605A8; *Th.* 184C4); Hirschig Christ Theiler Dodds athetize τῷ λόγῳ. Coraes and Heindorf print τῶν λόγων (*sine notis*) which makes λόγων the complement of ἐπιλαβεῖσθαι, spoiling the logic of the figure: the dative of the mss. is its instrument and its genitive complement is Socrates, as arguer. Cf. the expression at 506B8 where, in an exactly opposite situation, Socrates invites Callicles at least to interrupt him, if he is unwilling to argue with him (ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου). Zeyl’s “I’ll put you a case and you criticize it” is close. Socrates will say that for him the tyrannical behavior Polus has in mind is tantamount to the behavior of a madman with a knife, and then rather than allow Polus to respond will invent an imaginary objector in order to give Polus a spectrum of behaviors within which to locate his tyrannical man.

682 γάρ (D1) is “grammatical,” introducing what Socrates is trying to argue (λέγοντος, C8).

683 ὦ Πῶλε (D2): Here the vocative is used initially in order to make clear to the reader who, in this fictional conversation, is being addressed – as again below at E2 (cf. nn. 135, 443, 1025).

684 καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία (D2-3), an exegesis of δύναμις, which τις had allowed to be vague (as at 462C7).

685 ἄρα (D3), with Sauppe and Dodds, adds an appropriate tone of impulsive velleity to the speaker’s remarks (emphasizing ἐάν ἐμοὶ δοξῇ), continuing to depict the visceral attraction of “tyranny.” ἐμοὶ is emphatic. Dodds reports, for the first time, ἐάν γε ἄρα from F (ἐάν γάρ ἄρα BTW, *legg.* all prev. edd.: ἐάν E *teste* Cantarin), and I follow him in reading that, finding the locution γάρ ἄρα awkward and questionable.

686 αὐτίκα μάλα (D4), repeated below (D6-7) redundantly expressing the willfulness of the resolution.

687 Reading τεθνήξει (D5) with BTP (Ἀττικῶς, schol. Ar.), *legg.* edd. (τεθνήξεται FP<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Routh Coraes) as the *lectio difficilior*, the (later) deponent form being contemporary with (later) editors.

688 διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται (D7): Socrates uses the “chiasm of before and after” in his first and third examples (cf. τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει, D5), and anaphora for the second (καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγῶς ἔσται, D6): either way he is depicting failure of any obstruction to the decision of the tyrant. Again there are three examples, starting with killing, but then we get silly and feckless alternatives (cutting one’s cloak has to do with the fact it is a knife he has but that weapon is ill suited to bashing a man’s head in). The rhetoric Socrates uses is the sort of thing Polus would teach (Mistrisotes), and he will show us a sample of it very soon (471A4-D2: cf. n. 746); the emotion expressed is what Polus relies on soliciting in prospective clients (and we must compare Gorgias’s tricolon crescendo at 452E4-8); but the speaker is a madman (and this is exactly and only Socrates’s criticism of the sheer exercise of power: that the man might as well be mad). Socrates likewise parodied Gorgias’s rhetoric in praise of oratory at 464E1 (cf. n. 538).

689 τῆδε (E1): The “first person” pronoun, here in the mouth of the tyrant-fool, corresponds exactly to Socrates’s use of the second person pronoun ταύτη, above, for the city that his interlocutor Polus there had in mind (468E1 and cf. n. 648 *ad loc.*).

690 Reading ἦντιν’ ἂν σοι δοκῇ (E4) with PWY, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast [1819] Coraes Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hirschig Thompson Sommer Schanz Lodge Sauppe Croiset (ἦντινα σοι δοκοῖ F, *legg.* Ast Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistrisotes Schmelzer Burnet Feix Theiler Dodds Cantarin Heibüchel Erler: ἦντιν’ ἂν σοι δοκοῖ BTP<sup>2</sup>). The more vivid subjunctive construction better expresses the braggart’s impulsiveness. Socrates has Polus criticize the shortsightedness of the fool he has just impersonated with a reply that does use the second person, to chastise him (contrast Polus’s scrupulously impersonal expressions: 468E8, 469A9, C6, C7 and n. 698). Note Polus’s imitation of the madman’s passive (ἐμπρησθεῖν) but not the perfect tense, describing the result of the madman’s will.

691 Omitting αἰ (E5) with all mss. (and Routh Heindorf Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistrisotes Lodge Sauppe Theiler Dodds Cantarin). It was printed by Ast (1819), following Coraes, merely on the advice of an *obiter dictum* of G. Schaefer in his ed. of *Ap. Rhod.* 2.164 (Leipzig 1813). Schaefer justifies a deletion of αἰ on the argument that a copyist might insert a second αἰ in dittography of a αἰ immediately before, but then goes on to say, *Vicissim in Plat. Gorg.* (sc. 469E5) *leg. καὶ αἰ τριήρεις*, without himself giving a reason it is needed. By dint of



καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια.” ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ.<sup>692</sup> ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;<sup>693</sup>

ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

[470] ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι’ ὅτι μέμφη τὴν τοιαύτην<sup>694</sup> δύναμιν;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τί δῆ;

... λέγε.<sup>695</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα<sup>696</sup> ζημιουῖσθαι ἔστιν.

this mere *obiter dictum*, Hermann Jahn Hirschig Thompson Schmelzer Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Heidbüchel Erler have since read it, with only Croiset and Lamb even referencing Schaefer. Ast(1832) later changed his mind and removed it, seeing that it was “absent from all mss.” In case one think insertion is necessary because of the change of gender, Mistriotes cites *Phdo*.111C1-2 (καὶ τὸν γε ἦλιον καὶ σελήνην ...), as a counterexample (but the article may there be added in order to give an early berth to γε: see instead *Leg*.645D7, 863E6-8; *Phlb*.28E3-5; *Symp*.207E2-3), but to adduce this phenomenon stirs up the further issue of *why* the article is not repeated, which in turn raises the question of its sporadic use in general: (1) With first item only: *Gorg*.450D6-7, 479A2 (cf.n. 948), 480C7 (cf.n. 997), 484A4-5 (cf.n.1124), 508E1-4; *Alc. I* 117A8-10; *Apol*.23B5-6 (var.); *Euthyd*.298D4; *Leg*.634A3-4, 645D7, 645E1-2, 733E1-2, 863E6-8, 896D6-7; *Meno* 79A4-5; *Phdo*.75C11-D1; *Phlb*.28E3-5; *Polit*.258E8-9, 284E4-5, 295E4-5; *Prot*.312B1-2, 329C4-5; *Rep*.353D4-5, 537A9-10; *Symp*.186E4-7A1, 188A3-4, 207D8-E1, E2-3 – (2) Last only: *Leg*.669B2-3; *Phdo*.110D4-5; *Phlb*.45E6, 64C8; *Polit*.297C1; *Rep*.395D3, 613C5; *Symp*.179B5; *Tht*.172B3; *Tim*.64C4 – (3) First and last: *Leg*.728D8-E1, 837C6-7; *Rep*.452B8-C2, 545A2-4 – (4) All but last: *Gorg*.488C6, 498C2-3; *Leg*.723D2-3, 765E5-6A1; *Phlb*.21A14-B1; *Rep*.440C9, 582C5-6 – (5) Other: *Gorg*.459D1-2; *Leg*.741A7-8; *Phlb*.11B4-8, 24E7-5A1; *Rep*.438C1-4; *Symp*.202E8; *Tht*.202A2-5 [cf. Campb. ad *loc.*]. In addition to these cases there are others where (6) the article is added to an item – first middle or last – merely in order to establish attributive or predicate position (*Crat*.410C6-8; *Leg*.776D8-E1, 783A6-7, 789D5-7; *Phlb*.25A7-8; *Polit*.257A7, 292C6-8, 299B3-4; *Rep*.501B2, 608A5; *Symp*.191A8-B1; *Thg*.124D8-9, and cf. *Crat*.424A8-9, *X.Mem*.1.1.19), and that I take to be the case here. Absent the second article, Ἀθηναῖον stands in attributive position with both nouns, contrasting them with boats not only public but private also. Close parallels are τὸν ... καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα just below (470E9-10), τὰς τῶν σίτων τροφὰς καὶ ποτῶν (*Leg*.789D5-6) and τὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν σχέσιν καὶ ἕπτων ὀρήσεις (*Rep*.452C1-2). Cantarin notes that Olymp. has τὸς τριήρεις (90.25-6), but his abbreviated paraphrase leaves out the straddling genitive that led to its omission in Plato: it is not an echo, and thus does not indicate what he read. Stallb.’s Kratz’s and Lodge’s special pleading for the single article τὰ on the basis that harbors and their ships constitute a sort of hendiadys, and the parallels they adduce (*Rep*.423E6-7; T. 1.143.5, 2.13.1; but not Lodge’s D. 2.9) are perhaps true (*n.b.*, not all “With first item only” examples listed above are of this sort), but they are unneeded since the text reported unanimously in the mss. does not need special pleading. There is no justification for Allen’s “the dockyards of Athens and the fleet.”

692 Reading αὐτῷ (E7) with all mss. and edd. against Sauppe’s αὐτῷ. Again it is Polus’s formula (cf. nn. 644, 699).

693 ἢ δοκεῖ σοι (E7): Schmelzer senses a certain derision in Socrates asking Polus this question right after he has unremittingly depicted the madman doing ἅπερ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ (D3-4, D5, E4, E7). Compare Socrates’s use at 468C6-7 (cf. n. 638).

694 τοιαύτην (470A1): Socrates asks Polus what he finds wrong, but only after he himself has imagined both the dagger-wielding madman and Polus’s objection to him (E2-6). The objection Socrates imagines is that under his first scenario (οὕτω μὲν) all men would have great power, for the dagger-wielder is tantamount to an arson who is then described with lavishing particularization including a new field of examples that call for an explanation. Compared with the dagger-wielder, the arson (1) commits property damage on a large scale rather than a personal assault on a single individual, (2) acts stealthily for all we know (the dagger-wielder will expose his concealed weapon: ὑπὸ μάλης can be used as a synecdoche), and (3) damages not just private but public property (noticed by Piettre). Socrates then infers from the Polus-objector’s remarks that merely doing what one chooses is not μέγα δύνασθαι – i.e., that μέγα δύνασθαι is a more specific kind of doing what one chooses. These points suggest that both the dagger-wielder and the Polus-objector Socrates impersonates value μέγα δύνασθαι for making its possessor (1) *greater than his fellows* (cf. n. 650) even if only one at a time, and (2) visible *in their own eyes* for they see him wielding it, and yet (3) not open to the charge of civic irresponsibility or criminality. Polus’s *civilly sanctioned* abuses of individuals, publicly visible, are in Socrates’s case replaced by the madman’s vision of personal assault and battery in strikingly specific and graphic forms, but then in the case of the Polus-objector with faceless private and institutional property damage, expressed in vague and unspecific plurals and perhaps conducted in secret. But notice in the dagger-wielder’s expression that he does not say he will commit the assault himself: he uses the passive (D5-7), as though thinking his thought in itself achieves the outcome, whereas the arson will presumably sneak around and set the fires himself. Socrates is sure Polus will agree with the objector rather than the madman but requires him to say why. His reason, delivered only after a pause, is only that his μέγα δυνάμενος, who is supposed to be a “winner,” will end up being punished, which is exactly the opposite of inflicting punishments. We are left to infer that his image of power is fully as personal as the fool’s but that the personal damage Polus would inflict is conceived to be sanctioned by the robes of authority and will be exempt from public criticism. The reason is, it is exactly and only donning these robes that his teachings will enable his clients to do: the little knife the madman wields is for Polus the orator’s tongue.

695 τί δῆ; λέγε (A4): The idle back-and-forth (A3-4) as well as Socrates’s δῆ and his asyndeton in λέγε, suggests that Polus is unsure how to answer. There are many things he could say but will not say, in order to conceal what his students would need to conceal in choosing to study with him.

696 τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα (A5) is vague. We soon learn, after he pauses to think (note asyndeton at λέγε), that Polus means (with Schleiermacher, *wer so zu Werke geht* as opposed to Jowett’s “not such doing as this”) that the fault is not in what he does (that would be τοῦτο or ταῦτα) but in the way (οὕτω) he contrives to pull it off. But we must imagine that *what* he does, in the second instance of burning houses, etc., is also *unattractive* to Polus. Also we learn that with οὕτω at 469E8 we were meant to supply ποιεῖν (E7) not ὡς λέγεις, *vel sim*. It is against Polus’s interests for this important distinction to be drawn, but Socrates makes it crystal clear below (δικαίως ... ταῦτα ποιεῖν, C2) without insisting upon it. Dodds’s objection that perhaps he will elude the police anyway is irrelevant: Polus does not say he will be caught but that he will be punished: the point can only be that the power the orator wields he wields legally and under the cover of legality: he gets *others* punished.



ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ζημιουῖσθαι οὐ κακόν;<sup>697</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι<sup>698</sup> πάλιν αὖ<sup>699</sup> σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπεται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν,<sup>700</sup> ἀγαθὸν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή,<sup>701</sup> κακὸν καὶ μικρὸν δύνασθαι.<sup>702</sup> [b] σκεψώμεθα δὲ<sup>703</sup> καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι<sup>704</sup> ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε μὲν ἄμεινον<sup>705</sup> εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτείνουσαι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν<sup>706</sup> δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. πότε οὖν<sup>707</sup> φῆς σὺ<sup>708</sup> ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα<sup>709</sup> ποιεῖν; εἰπέ τίνα ὄρον ὀρίζη.<sup>710</sup>

ΠΩΛ. σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκρισαι ταῦτό<sup>711</sup> τοῦτο. [c]

697 οὐ κακόν (A7): Socrates expects a yes answer: the point is to get it on record so that he can draw his next inference.

698 Reading τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι (A9) with all mss. and most edd., and taking it as a *nominativus pendens* (cf. A12, *infra*), with Mistriotes (who compares *Th.* 173D4-5 and *X. Oec.* 1.14), rather than as ‘both subject and predicate’ (Stallb. Sommer), and rather than athetizing, with Thompson (followed by Sauppe Burnet Lamb Helmbold Theiler Dodds Irwin Waterfield Cantarin Dalfen Heidbüchel). Richards again piggy-backs a conjecture onto a conjecture (cf. n. 338), filling Thompson’s deletion with an addition (τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ). Despite the mild anacoluthon that ensues (in particular, τε ... καὶ linking the subordinate ἀγαθὸν εἶναι with the [inferred] ordinate clause, τοῦτο ἐστὶν [Jahn]), if this phrase were absent, πάλιν αὖ would be too early to have its effect. Lodge nicely describes the anacoluthon as “a question which is lost in an affirmation.”

699 With πάλιν αὖ (A9) Socrates asserts that Polus has reverted to (πάλιν), and therefore brought forward (αὖ), his position that μέγα δύνασθαι is μέγα δύνασθαι only if good for ὁ δυνάμενος (*pace* Apelt, who thinks πάλιν αὖ indicates Polus has reversed his original “position” [466B] according to which μέγα δύνασθαι is unqualifiedly good, and now has agreed that it is only qualifiedly good). Socrates’s point is that to revert to ἃ δοκεῖ (properly stressed by Allen) re-raises whether the outcome will be ἃ βούλεται – i.e., whether it is beneficial, good, better.

700 ὠφελίμως πράττειν (A10-11) can mean to “act beneficially” as well as to “come off benefitted” in the same way that εὖ πράττειν can mean to “do good” as well as to “come off well.” Here as well as with ἄμεινον εἶναι (B2-C3) Socrates leaves open the question to whom the benefit accrues, and even *what* is better off.

701 εἰ δὲ μή (A12) following ἐὰν μὲν is usual when a second verb is omitted. Ast(1832) compares 481A7, *Phlb.* 16D4; *Prot.* 311D4, 325D6; *Rep.* 360E3, 401E1, 403C1, 434D5; *Symp.* 185D7; *Th.* 209A3. Also 504C6.

702 Reading δύνασθαι *alter* (A12), with all mss. (and edd.) against the deletion of Thompson (cf. n. 661).

703 Reading δὲ (B1) with BTP Olymp. (*legg.* edd.) rather than δὴ with F (*leg.* Routh). With the “first person” pronoun τόδε and with καὶ, Socrates indicates that he wants to move beyond (καὶ) the picture Polus has reverted to (πάλιν αὖ), toward his own question (τόδε), which is the same question that had led to his distinction between δοκεῖν and βούλεσθαι above: the greatness of the act depends on the value of the outcome.

704 Reading ἄλλο τι only (B1) with TPWF (*teste* Cantarin) and most edd. (ἄλλ’ ὅτι B : ἄλλο τι ἢ ZN *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Hermann Jahn Mistriotes Schmelzer Heidbüchel).

705 ἄμεινον (B2) again corresponds to thinking the thing a good thing to do (ἀγαθόν), in prospect of doing it: cf. 468B2 and B6, and n. 629. The comparative describes the anticipated *improvement*.

706 τοῦτο μὲν ... ὁμολογεῖται (B6-7): Socrates begins to give the conversation a dialectical structure, accumulating ὁμολογίαι (thus, this is not a question but a question answered, *pace* Jowett) so as to find through question and answer where the ἀμφισβήτησις lies (as he described the method to Gorgias at 457C5-D5). The μὲν looks backward to prepare a contrast between what they have agreed to and what they next need to ask, given that agreement. Because it looks backward, it is answered (B9) by οὖν rather than δέ.

707 Reading πότε οὖν (B9), with F (and all edd.) rather than πότερον (despite the testimony of the other branch represented by the unanimity of BTPF<sup>2</sup> and tr.Ficinus[*utrum igitur et quo pacto*]), as the *lectio difficilior*, confirmed by the Socrates’s temporal formulations both before and after (B1-4, C2-3).

708 Reading the φῆς σὺ (B9) in F (though correcting the spelling to φῆς) over the σὺ φῆς in BTPf (the misspelling in F is explained away on paleographic grounds). The order σὺ φῆς would presume too strong a contrast between Polus’s opinion and Socrates’s (cf. n. 638). In the face of Polus’s assault, Socrates is trying to get him on record holding a position that could be tested.

709 Reading ταῦτα (B9) with BTP and all edd. The ταῦτό τοῦτο of F was ignored in app.critt. until Dodds and Cantarin.

710 τίνα ὄρον ὀρίζη (B10): Cf. Olymp. οὐχ ὀρισμὸν λέγει ἀλλὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ διορισμὸν (94.17).

711 Reading ταῦτό (B11) with all mss. (*legg.* Routh Bekker Beck Stallb. Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Lodge Feix Heidbüchel). Ast had read αὐτό (*olim*, 1819), comparing Schleierm. tr. *beantworte doch eben dieses*, but then reverted to ταῦτό with mss. (in 1832) citing *Prot.* 334C1-2 as parallel and finally reaching the sense, *wenn du fragst so kannst du es also antworten* (so also Jowett: “you should answer as well as ask that question”). I go further and say “That’s your question, why don’t you answer it?” because of τόδε at B1 (cf. n. 703) – *ironice*, with Beck. Croiset reads αὐτό (and attributes it to Ast, ignoring his change of mind); Schanz Sauppe Burnet Lamb Theiler Dodds Cantarin Erler athetize; Heindorf would athetize or emend to αὐτὸς (citing 504C4 and *H.Maj.* 285D4); Coraes suggests σεαυτῷ (depicting Polus as desperate and angry, as Callicles is at 505D8-9, when he says ἀποκρινόμενος σεαυτῷ), but Stallb. notes that the work done by

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν<sup>712</sup> φημί, ὃ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν,<sup>713</sup> ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.<sup>714</sup>

ΠΩΛ. χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξει, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν<sup>715</sup> ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδί χάριν ἔξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐξελέγξῃς<sup>716</sup> καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα<sup>717</sup> εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.<sup>718</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς [d] πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρόωγν γεγονότα ταῦτα<sup>719</sup> ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξει<sup>720</sup> ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδείξει ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον<sup>721</sup> τὸν Περδίκκου ὀρᾶς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;<sup>722</sup>

both these emendations has already been done by emphatic σύ. Olymp. (94.19-20) provides no evidence of what he read, but infers that Polus suggests that Socrates should answer because has no answer himself; yet it is clear from the foregoing that Polus does have something of an answer: his criterion was whether the evildoer gets caught and has to pay the penalty (A5-6), in which case the outcome of his exercise of arbitrary power (i.e., μέγα δύνασθαι) would be deleterious (470A10-11). Even if he does have a positive theory of life he would best leave it to his clients to decide their own: he will only equip them to get their way. He does not want to own up to that utterly scurrilous attitude (to do so is the distinct strategy of a Thrasymachus), though everything he is doing is meant to stoke it up in the onlookers. Irwin, scrupulous in bringing extra arguments of his own against what Socrates is saying to Polus, carries not over worrying why Polus does this.

712 Reading μὲν τοίνυν (C1) with TPFY (and all edd.) versus μέντοι νῦν of B, in retort to σὺ μὲν οὖν. For ἐγὼ with μὲν *solitarium*, cf. 454D3.

713 ἀκούειν (C2): It is not hearing that Polus wants, but not being answerer. In the language of dialectic however, ἀκούειν and λέγειν could very well be equivalent to ἐρωτᾶν and ἀποκρίνεσθαι (cf. *Leg.* 625A7, *Prot.* 310A1). Socrates is treating his request not as expressing a preference (*pace* Cope) but as requesting a favor (on ἥδιον and the characteristically periphrastic and indirect expression employing the dative cf. n. 161 and my n. *ad Lach.* 187C1) but for the purposes of *joint* dialectic search it is a small favor, since it doesn't matter which partner plays answerer and which questioner.

714 ἄμεινον, κάκιον (C3): The upshot of what Socrates is saying is that the action is μέγα δύνασθαι only when it is a just action, for μέγα δύνασθαι depends upon the ὀφελίμως of the πράττειν, and that has been brought forward, through ἀγαθόν (A11) and ἄμεινον (B2), to ἄμεινον at B9. There is some irony in the fact that Polus rejected the image of the man with the knife because he would be breaking the law to get his way whereas his orator would get his way through just and legal means.

715 ἐλέγξειεν (C5): Polus's slur means that Socrates's thesis is childish and naïve (from the vantage of *Realpolitik*), so that ἐλέγξειεν does not mean refute but "disagree" and "naysay," though Socrates of course gives it its dialectical meaning.

716 Reading ἐξελέγξῃς (C7), with F Steph., read by earlier editors Routh Findeisen Ast (1819) Coraes (ἐλέγξῃς BTPW, *legg.* edd.). Bekker, lacking F and finding ἐξελέγξῃς in Stephanus only, adopted ἐλέγξῃς citing 15 mss.; Ast (1832, p.180) then adopted it, citing 21 mss. and Stallb. and Buttman in its support, and dubbing ἐξελέγξῃς a *vulgata scriptura*. The variant ἐξελέγξῃς was then absent from all editions until Dodds and then Cantarín, alone, reported it from F, which along with its appearance in Steph. accords it at least equal standing. Socrates here dangles before Polus the prospect of defeating him (aorist ἐξελέγξαι, which as such would entail his release from nonsense), in order to encourage him to continue trying to refute him (ἐλέγχειν [C8] on which see note below). For the distinction cf. for example *Apol.* 19A1 (ἐξελέγχειν ~ disabuse) versus 18D5-7 and 21C1 (ἐλέγχειν ~ examine, interview).

717 ἄνδρα (C8), in its "sympathetic" use. Cf. my *Lach.* 194C2, *Rep.* 361B6-7 and n. *ad loc.* The sense of sympathy and common purpose was broached just above by Socrates's easy acquiescence in playing answerer if it would please Polus.

718 ἔλεγχε (C8): Socrates now shifts to a conative, durative present (after the "aspectual" aorists of C4, C5, C7).

719 τὸ γὰρ χθὲς καὶ πρόωγν γεγονότα ταῦτα (D1) means "recent notorious events," the temporal reference sending commentators who want to fix a putative "dramatic date" down the rosy path (Archelaus acceded to the throne in 413 but the πέρυσσι βουλευεῖν Socrates refers to, *pari passu*, at 473E7, should be referring to the trial of the generals at Arginusae [cf. n. *ad loc.*], implying a dramatic date of 405). Plato seems to thwart the desire and attempt to historicize the discussions he makes up, in order to protect the greater truth they evoke as fiction (in a similar vein Socrates will defuse Polus's use of ὀρᾶς, below, by taking it literally!). In the present case I take it that both Polus's and Socrates's claims of recentness (along with Polus's imputation of notoriety by his repeated use of οὔτος [D1, D5: cf. Smyth §1254]) embody the encomiastic trope of the fresh *exemplum* (*lebendig Gegenbeweis*, Kratz; *lebhaftes Interesse*, Deuschle-Cron). Cf. n. 722. Mistrisotes also notes the suggestion that the happy unjust man is common enough to find nearby. Polus's ταῦτα strengthens the assertion that the news is ready to hand (cf. τοῦτον, D5) – and Socrates notices the forced idiom in his response.

720 ἐξελέγξαι (D2): For dialectical purposes the prefix is gratuitous, for the ἔλεγχος is a challenge and its success is predicated upon the person whose thesis is being tested agreeing that his thesis has become untenable, or else quitting the conversation. But Polus has heard Socrates's use of it above and has taken the bait. With his subsequent καὶ ἀποδείξει, parallel to Socrates's καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς above, he speaks as if proving the opposite of an answerer's answer constituted a refutation of the answer. Though he opted for the role of questioner instead of answerer, he is again only willing to express his own thought (cf. 469C5-7) and thereby he now forces Socrates back into the role of questioner.

721 τοῦτον (D5): The encomiastic demonstrative casts Archelaus as somebody already known to Socrates, but knowing somebody means to Socrates something more than knowing his reputation. οὔτος may be used in derogation (e.g., 494E4; *Crito* 45A8; *Crat.* 423C4; *Lach.* 182D8, 195C9; *Phdrs.* 273B3) but surely that is not Polus's intention here (*pace* Dodds)! For the encomiastic or approbative use cf. 472B1, 502B1, 503C2; *Phdo.* 69C4; *Rep.* 544C3.

ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γὰρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.<sup>723</sup> [e]

ΠΩΛ. τί δέ;<sup>724</sup> συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν<sup>725</sup> οὐ γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

ΣΩ. μὰ Δί' οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα<sup>726</sup> γινώσκεις φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.<sup>727</sup>

ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ·<sup>728</sup> οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.<sup>729</sup>

ΠΩΛ. τί δαί;<sup>730</sup> ἐν τούτῳ<sup>731</sup> ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

- 722 ὄραξ ὄντα (D5-6): ὄραξ is not really a catachresis (*pace* Olymp.95.4-6), despite Socrates's correction (ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε): Polus intends to force assent as if he were adducing an indubitably self-evident fact (as opposed to "ancient history," C9-D3); Socrates counters him by taking him literally. Polus's dismissal of "ancient history" is an encomiastic trope (with Dalfen): οὐδὲν δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν is meant to be foil for introducing a case dispositive because current. *ικανά* is likewise encomiastic, of a piece with the metaphor of a quiver full of arrows. Jowett's "you see *that* Archelaus is now ruler" (so also Lamb Helmbold Canto Nichols Dalfen) treats the participle as indirect discourse, but Socrates takes it as reporting a sight (for the distinction cf. Smyth §2112). For ὄραξ introducing an exemplum, cf. Gorgias's move at 456A2 and, with Dodds, Antiphanes Comicus frg.231 [2.113 Kock]; E. Ba.337, Or.588; S. Ant.712.
- 723 οὐκ οἶδα (D9): The metaphor is not otiose: Socrates has not seen him nor been with him. Nor is the allusion to a συνουσία with Socrates otiose. He continues to deflate (Mistriotes) what Polus portrays as first hand evidence; and with the use of ἀνὴρ ("of fellow-feeling": cf. n. 717) he conceptually strips Archelaus of his regalia. In very fact no Athenian can be presumed to have seen Archelaus – he is merely famous (and infamous), and for Polus he serves merely as a rhetorical *exemplum* (as we see below with his reference to the Great King, E4-5). In a moment Socrates backs off on the byplay (E6) by allowing οἶδα to mean "know."
- 724 Reading τί δέ (E1) from BPWF, *legg.* Hermann Stallb. Jahn Deuschle-Cron Schanz Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Theiler Dodds Cantarin Heidbüchel (τί δαί T and Stob., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast Coraes Bekker Woolsey Kratz Hirschig Thompson Sommer Mistriotes [*omnes sine notis*] – *Quoi donc?* Chambry).
- 725 αὐτόθεν (E1): Cf. *Lach.* 183C3, *Phlb.* 53B10, and Ar. *Eq.* 330 for the expression, which is tantamount to the claim, "*res ipsa loquitur*," used of the ready example (e.g., "at once," Irwin; "right off," Allen; *vel sim.*) – but here, the affect is indignant. As an oratorical type Polus finds it preposterous that his *exempla* should not be accepted *prima facie*. The real reason he is indignant is that he cannot spell out the injustice of the winner-orator any more explicitly without being expelled from the conversation. For the spatial metaphor compare πόθεν at 471D8 and n. 752. We must keep in mind that his true audience is not Socrates but the others. Ast(1832) argues himself into too narrow an interpretation of the term, "from the very fact that he is ruling" (ὄραξ ἄρχοντα, D5-6), so also Thompson: Polus ignored the fact Socrates had not seen him ruling but expected him to think him "happy" regardless. Moreover, Socrates already knew that and more about Archelaus – in particular his accession to power. Heindorf's special epistemological interpretation of the term ("*per te ipse*"), and Lodge's "intuitively" and Helmbold's "instinctively" are likewise too abstruse for Polus's purposes. Sommer's *sans te deplacer* (i.e. without yourself going there: similarly Mistriotes, "ἐξ Αθηνῶν"; Croiset, *sans sortir d'ici*, also Feix Hamilton "from this distance") is ingenious but the expression is too impersonal to have that sense. Jowett unaccountably introduces an indefinite subject for the second person verbs: anybody would know. Chambry tr. *autrement*, as if he read ἄλλοθεν.
- 726 τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα (E4), i.e. the King of Persia, proverbially envied for his happiness (cf. 524E3, *Apol.* 40D8, *Euthyd.* 274A6-7): the fact that the individual can be referred to in such general terms is an index of his serviceability as an *exemplum*, but unfortunately for Polus there is no infamous tale of his injustice. It helps that the paradigm of enviability is far, far away.
- 727 ὄντα (E5) = *that* he is happy, not *whether* (*pace* Jowett): Polus repeats the participial construction from above to force a comparison, as if the King were also a palpable *exemplum* (as a commonplace) but now the participle *is* "in indirect discourse." Jowett again (cf. n. 722) translates out Polus's imputation of palpability ("you do not know whether..."). Polus now seeks to "refute" Socrates by means of adducing an unexceptionable counter-example (Mistriotes).
- 728 ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ (E6): Speaking *honestly* (cf. 462B9, E6), not with knowledge of truth. The distinction is not otiose in this context, for Polus is accusing Socrates of lying about his own beliefs. Cf. n. 761.
- 729 παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης (E5-6): Genitives of the sphere dependent upon ἔχει. For the compound expression with genitive and adverb, cf. 451C9, 507D2, *Phlb.* 62A7, *Prot.* 321C4-5, *Rep.* 389C5-6; my n. *ad Rep.* 485B1-2; and *AGPS* 47.10.5. Irwin wonders what Socrates means by παιδεία but does not fault Polus for presuming that the mere dangle of the Great King should have ended the question of the unjust man being happy. As Polus ups the ante with his bigger *exemplum*, Socrates refines and intensifies what his kind of συνουσία might reveal.
- 730 Reading τί δαί (E8) from J *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Heindorf Bekker Buttman Ast Kratz Hirschig Thompson Jowett[*ut vid.*] Mistriotes (τί δέ mss., *legg.* Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sommer Schanz Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Feix Dodds Cantarin Heidbüchel). Editors since Mistriotes ignored the variant up until Cantarin. Polus's sputtering indignation can only mount.
- 731 τούτῳ (E8): The schol. and tr. read Polus's use of the singular back into the interpretation of παιδεία ... καὶ δικαιοσύνη and try to make it an hendiadys (hence schol., παιδεία ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τροφή, δικαιοσύνη ἢ τελέα; cf. Helmbold's "his education and his attitude toward justice" which likewise makes the latter the product of the former) but there is no indication Socrates thinks of them as such. Rather, Polus's singular is insouciant and derogatory, as if to say "OK, he's educated and just – what does that get him?" My own sense of Socrates's remark is that παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει is a virtual catch-phrase but he adds δικαιοσύνη since this aspect of Archelaus's character is what is relevant in the context. Irwin worries whether Polus is asking if virtue depends on or consists in these, but Polus does not care about this distinction.

ΣΩ. ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὃ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν<sup>732</sup> ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα<sup>733</sup> εὐδαιμόνα εἶναι φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

[471] ΠΩΛ. ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός<sup>734</sup> ἐστὶν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. εἶπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ<sup>735</sup> πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ὧ<sup>736</sup> γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἢ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκήτη καὶ ἦν<sup>737</sup> εὐδαιμόνων κατὰ<sup>738</sup> τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ<sup>739</sup> τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· [b] ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἦν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβάλων εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος<sup>740</sup> γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον [c] ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπτέτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη

732 Reading καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν (E9-10) with all mss. and the earlier editors (and Burnet Cantarín Erlér). The pair is usually a mere approbation, like “decent” in English, and therefore comes to be written in crasis, but in his use of it here Socrates theorizes it (compare *Symp.* 202D-3D and *Leg.* 697B), and comes close to alluding to τὰ μέγιστα, the third item (δίκαιον) being in the air by dint of παιδείας ... καὶ δικαιοσύνης above. It seems he is laying a range of terms for future use. Schanz (*Plat. Opera* 2.1, *proleg.* §1 – cf. his *Nov. Comm.* 95-6) took the idiom for granted and therefore allowed himself to print the idiomatic crasis, καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν because this is “the usual”; in my view Socrates’s remark is *unusual*. Schanz’s sheer assumption that it isn’t has had wide influence, having been picked up by many future edd. (Lodge Croiset[tr. *bien élevés*] Lamb Apelt Zimmermann Feix Theiler Dodds Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Piettre Heidbüchel). The dogmatic explicitness of adjacent ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα, the unexampled mention at all of women, and the subtended contraries ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν (noticed by Dodds despite his following Schanz, and rendered well by Dalfen), are all of a piece with the fuller expression. Irwin Zeyl Canto Waterfield[“true goodness”] and Piettre read the crasis even though they note Socrates is interested in the distinction between the two terms rather than the blurrier combined sense!

Because we all believe morality is good but differ to the point of controversy as to what it truly is, moral discussions are by nature suasive and at the same time contentious. Thus we need a term for the topic that is both approbatory and non-specific (note indeed how καλός τε κάγαθός is used as a genus or blanket term for the virtues, at 515A5-6 [and n. 1976] and at X. *Mem.* 3.9.5, and cf. Zeyl. p.34, n.18), so as to frame a debate about the topic without prejudice (even beyond moral controversies: e.g., 518C4). I believe this is the use Plato makes of the idiom in almost every case, and this is the reason Socrates will use it so many times in his closing dissertation (506C5-end), where he is bringing two very different views of morality into confrontation with each other in a virtual monologue (see 507C3; 511B4; 514A1; 515A6, E13; 518B1, C4; 526A7-B1, 527D1-2; cf. n. 1792). It is used similarly in the argument between Socrates and Anytus in the *Meno* (92E4, E7; 93A3, C7; 95A7; 96B2); compare also *Apol.* 21D4 downgraded to πολλά καὶ κατὰ at 22D2 for the craftsmen.

733 καὶ γυναικα (E10): A stunning addition, defusing Polus’s seductive image of the “big man in politics,” *pace* Deuschle-Cron Lodge Ovink and others, who wander off from the context and call it a backhanded allusion to a doctrine of the “School of Gorgias” according to which the virtues of a man and of a woman, and therefore the sources of their happiness, are different – for which they refer as evidence the fancy display-answer that Meno gives Socrates at *Meno* 71E-72A. But that “answer,” which incidentally resembles Polus’s “answer” at 448C in both style and irrelevancy, craves differences only to have more to display and should hardly be taken as an expression of doctrine. Irwin notes the *Meno* passage to say that Socrates there denies the virtue of a man and a woman are different, as humans, but he ignores the striking addition here. Canto’s *tout être (homme ou femme) doté d’une bonne nature*, taking καὶ γυναικα to mean “even if a woman,” likewise deflates Polus’s point.

734 οὗτός (471A1), again, of the *exemplum* (cf. D5). Thus Waterfield: “my man Archelaus.” It is a statement not a question: for Polus it is an absurdity that Archelaus should be ἄθλιος since for Polus an ἄθλιος is a “loser” (cf. 469A6-10).

735 Reading ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ (A4) with BTPF (ἀλλὰ μὴν δὴ ZN Olymp.). Polus launches his discourse with a paradoxon.

736 ὧ γε (A4): The pronominal construction was noticed by Mistrisotes (ἡ ἀναφορικὴ ἀντωνυμία ταῦθα ἰσοδυναμεῖ πρὸς δεικτικὴν καὶ αἰτιολογικὸν σύνδεσμον). Is this a “hymn” (! – Mistrisotes later uses the term, *ad* 476B1) or a description? Cf. ὅς γε, B1. The discourse will have the form of an ἐπίδειξις.

737 Reading ἦν (A8) only, with BTP, *legg.* edd. (ἦν ἂν F, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes), ἂν not needing to be repeated in the clipped style of Polus. See *AGPS* 54.3.11 for examples.

738 Omitting γε (A8) after κατὰ, with mss. and edd. (γε Par, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Bekker Hirschig[*sine argumento*] Sommer). It better suits the satirical irony of Polus’s remark not to express the reservation he actually feels. “*si on raisonne comme toi*” (Canto) is a little too heavy-handed. Compare B6-7 below.

739 The more abrupt ἐπεὶ (A9) of BTP (*legg.* edd.) is far preferable to F’s ἐπειδὴ as (again) characteristic of Polus’s abrupt manner (cf. 473E5, 474B7). Irwin comically raises the cavil that the underlying Socratic position that Polus is satirizing would need to hold that unjust behavior always entails unhappiness in order for Polus to have valid grounds for satirizing it in this way.

740 ἀθλιώτατος (B7) = superlatively miserable because having committed superlatively unjust deeds, in accord with Socrates’s postulate that the unjust man is miserable. Again at C6-7.



εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοῦς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίζας<sup>741</sup> πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι<sup>742</sup> νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἡδικηκῶς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ<sup>743</sup> ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ [d] ἀρξάμενος<sup>744</sup> δέξαιτ' ἂν<sup>745</sup> ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.<sup>746</sup>

ΣΩ. καὶ<sup>747</sup> κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὃ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπήνεσα<sup>748</sup> ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι,<sup>749</sup> τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ὃ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε,<sup>750</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἶει, ἐξελέγημαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων<sup>751</sup> τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν,<sup>752</sup> ὡγαθέ; καὶ μὴν<sup>753</sup> οὐδὲν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ<sup>754</sup> ὧν σὺ φής. [e]

- 741 ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίζας (C4): To die of drowning (as by asphyxiation) is supplied by the passive of ἀποπνίγω, but the active means to choke, of course. Here by a mild metonymy it designates Archelaus's goal in throwing the boy into the well: the water would do the choking for him. The slightly strained diction creates a play on the prepositions so as to pick up the pair of participles that tell what he should have done (ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοῦς) at the same time that it sets up the lie he will tell the boy's mother (ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν), which resembles the truth by keeping the prepositions and changing only the verbs.
- 742 τοιγάρτοι (C6) sarcastically introduces an absurdity inferred with perfect logic from the equally absurd premise, that οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι (C2-3).
- 743 καὶ (C8) is noticed by Socrates who repeats it below (D3). Polus's irony would be spoiled if he had asserted the true contrary, that *any* Athenian would rather be anybody but Archelaus, for then he could not single out Socrates.
- 744 ἀρξάμενος (D1): The personal construction where English would use an adverb or prepositional phrase (e.g., ἐν ἀρχῇ) is common in Greek (Smyth §1042): cf. *Leg.* 661B7; *Rep.* 366E2, 498C8 and compare πρῶτός εἰμι. Lamb's periphrastic "I daresay some Athenians could be found who would join you" and Allen's "perhaps there is any Athenian" lose the derisive thrust of Polus's remark.
- 745 δέξαιτ' ἂν (D1): Polus comes full circle by reverting to his opening terminology (468E6). With these words he virtually calls for a vote of the Athenian deme – or at least those present for this conversation – not only as if to win the γνώμη (Mistriotes Ovink) but also to isolate Socrates in their eyes, and thereby to intimidate him (as Feix notices).
- 746 Polus's speech (A4-D2) deploys a style we may pause to characterize. It opens with a paradoxon (πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος); the subsequent essentially proleptic relative clauses suggest the form of a hymn; together these moves announce that it is an encomium. The relative clauses create a pattern of "subordinate insubordination," in which syntactically subordinate rank is given to the narrative itself (A4-6, B1-5, B7-C2, C4) while the ordinate construction alternatively continues the irony of affirming Socrates's principle (A6-8, A9-B1, B6-7, C2-4, C4) and presenting at each stage Archelaus's crowning unjust deed (B5-6, C5-6). Swift and irony are both achieved in this way; it is swift and vigorous in its *narratio* (semi-stop with quasi-connective γε at A4 and at B1), its appositives with and without article, its ecphrastic stringing together of participles ("the piling up of participles depicting the piling up of guilt," says Kratz: Lodge is surely wrong to think they express Polus's *own* tumultuous feelings), and its use of τοιγάρτοι (C6). The purpose of the speech is to isolate and ridicule Socrates in the eyes of the onlookers, exactly for his *lack of moral unscrupulousity* (A7-8, A9, B6-7, C2-4, C6-D2): we must watch for the point at which his rhetoric crosses the line from ridiculing an individual to inciting a mob to lynch him.
- 747 καὶ (D3): The immediate effect of this opening καὶ is to mock Polus's use at C8; soon enough it will become corresponsive, when the second one appears at D5.
- 748 Reading ἐπήνεσα (D4), with all mss. and Olymp. It would indeed be strange that Socrates should use the word to introduce both a compliment and a criticism, and is therefore doubted by Cobet and Schanz and muted by Jowett's "a rhetorician *rather than* a reasoner" (Christ's emendation of σε ἐπήνεσα to ἐπετίμησα is baseless and seems useless). But the continuation of the construction of ἐπήνεσα is enough impeded by δέ that adding a second governing verb (as Cope did in his tr.) would be pedantic. Compare the similarly imperfect parallelism in the linking done with τε ... καὶ, at 470A11; and the parallel from Thuc. (8.50.5) adduced by Gercke *apud* Sauppe: ἀποστέλλει αὐθις πρὸς τὸν Ἀστυόχον τὰ τε πρότερα μωμόμενος, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐκρύφθη, καὶ (*sc. λέγων*) νῦν ὅτι ὄλον τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐτοῖμος εἶη.
- 749 πεπαιδεῦσθαι (D4). Socrates is referring to his remark at 448D1-3, where he used the much more appropriate παρασκευάσθαι of Polus's oratorical apparatus, rather than πεπαιδεῦσθαι as here. Irwin astutely notices and explains the change as a reference to their spat above over the value of upbringing (παιδεία, 470E6-8): he has not been brought up in what matters, namely dialectic – a nice point if dialectic could be viewed as part of παιδεία. Polus is crass and impolite before undialectical.
- 750 ἐξελέγξειε (D6): Polus's term from above (470D2), which for him (again) means "defeat" rather than "test" (the distinction is lost by Jowett Lamb Apelt Irwin Allen Nichols Piettre). Socrates soon corrects his usage for dialectical purposes (E2, ff): he cannot be "utterly refuted" until he has been refuted – i.e., has agreed with the propositions in the argument that has been brought against him (D8-9) and that they entail the contrary of his position.
- 751 φάσκων (D7): The iterative form is derogatory, as if Socrates's thesis were a mere mouthing, as Polus is about to assert it is.
- 752 πόθεν (D8): Socrates's challenge answers Polus's challenge, οὐκ αὐτόθεν (470E1)!
- 753 καὶ μὴν (D8) is asseverative (*und auch fürwahr*, Kratz), not adversative (*pace* Cope Deuschle-Cron Dodds): see next note.
- 754 οὐδὲν ... ὁμολογῶ (D8-9): Again the term of art from the dialectical vocabulary: cf. 470B7 and n. That his non-agreement entails that Polus has not "defeated" his argument, as Socrates here maintains, does not follow, of course: it is only if we take ἐλέγχειν in the Socratic, dialectical sense that he has not been refuted, for dialectical elenchus requires the answerer's agreement at *every* step. Jowett's "I cannot admit a word you are saying" or Hamilton's "admit the force of anything you have said" (*sim.* Waterfield) treat οὐδὲν as a mere superlative or exaggeration and fail to bring this across, but Apelt's *Von deine Behauptungen gebe ich dir keine einzig zu* does succeed, as do Helmbold's "I don't acknowledge as valid a single one of your premises" and Irwin's "I agree with you on none...", commenting that "the elenchus requires refutation of the individual interlocutor." See also Dalfen's note, 276-7.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ<sup>755</sup> σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε,<sup>756</sup> ῥητορικῶς γὰρ<sup>757</sup> με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι<sup>758</sup> ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχονται καὶ εὐδοκίμους,<sup>759</sup> ὁ δὲ τάναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχεται ἢ μηδένα.<sup>760</sup> οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν [472] ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖ τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι.<sup>761</sup> καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα<sup>762</sup> Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλη κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλη,<sup>763</sup> Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, Ἀριστοκράτης [b] ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου<sup>764</sup> τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία<sup>765</sup> ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦντινα ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθάδε<sup>766</sup> ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἶς ὧν οὐχ

- 755 ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε (E1): Another hypologically causal ἐπεὶ ... γε (cf. n. 438, 461C2, 474B7) not explaining why Socrates is unwilling but giving Polus's grounds for asserting he is unwilling: "You deny it only because you are unwilling to admit it." To allege this, Polus must take, or feign to take, ὁμολογῶ to mean not "agree" but "grant" (which he did at 461B8: cf. n. 433). He is accusing Socrates of withholding his assent merely to avoid confessing what he truly thinks. Glaucon was similarly certain that the Ring of Gyges was an irresistible concept (*Rep.*360B4-5).
- 756 ὦ μακάριε (E2): again the initial vocative, again signaling him a "winner" (cf. 469C8). As before and elsewhere (cf. n. 558) the placement indicates that something like a point of order is being raised – as in English to open a response by saying, "I have to say that..."
- 757 γὰρ (E2) explains the raising of the register (not why Socrates is unwilling [*pace* Jowett] nor why he does not agree [*pace* Kratz]).
- 758 ἐλέγχειν (E3): The brunt of Socrates's remark is that what they are doing is not an elenchus (whence he uses the term "correctly" three times).
- 759 πολλοὺς ... καὶ εὐδοκίμους (E5-6): Not more and better (quantitative), but denoting overwhelming variety (qualitative). Who are the many witnesses Socrates is referring to?
- 760 ἕνα τινὰ ... ἢ μηδένα (E6-7): It is not merely the idiomatic throwaway remark, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδέν (e.g., *Apol.*17B7, *Hdt.* 3.140.2, *X. Cyrop.*7.5.45), *pace* Ast Jahn Lodge: the one (ἕνα) witness for Socrates's position is Socrates himself, but Polus has now alleged that even Socrates does not believe what he claims (E1) – which leaves nobody (μηδένα). Jahn and Mistrisotes astutely note (*pace* Deuschle-Cron) that just as ἕνα contrasts with πολλοὺς, τινὰ contrasts with εὐδοκίμους.
- 761 πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι (472A1-2) answers πολλοὺς ... καὶ εὐδοκίμους (E5-6). In a flash Socrates gainsays all the credentials for oratorical victory he had attributed to Polus just above, by counterposing the claim of truth. The redoubtably many εὐδοκίμοι (truly upstanding) Polus aims to win over are downgraded to a pitiable many δοκούντες εἶναί τι (*seeming* somebodies); and the individual witness they might influence (τις, A1), who corresponds to Socrates as the one man Polus must defeat (471E6), becomes a person cowed into abandoning his conscience by the establishment – for it is *lying* that Polus has just implied Socrates has done (471E1), as if he were ashamed to admit his own underlying envy of the powerful man. But all Socrates has done so far is disagree with Polus, and whether his own assertion is a lie will ultimately depend upon the measure of its truth, since, if it is true that the unjust man is unhappy, there is no underlying envy for him that Socrates would be lying about.
- 762 Reading συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα (A3): Heusde long ago (*Spec. Crit.* 88) ingeniously emended the ταῦτα in all mss. known to him into ταῦτά, on the basis of the idiom as used for instance at *Rep.*432A4 and *Charm.*154D6, and Stallb. accepted this (adding the attestation of Lau<sup>2</sup>); but Ast (1832) reverted to ταῦτα as better attested and justified on the analogy of its common use, explicit or understood, with συμφάναι (500D10-E1; *Prot.*330D5, 332C3, 357B5; *Th.*143C3; *Soph.*247A7; *Symp.*200D6, *al.*), and was followed in this by Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sommer Schanz Mistrisotes Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Croiset Lodge Zimmermann and Feix. But Hirschig Thompson Christ Burnet Theiler Dodds Nichols Heidbüchel Erler have since brought back ταῦτά, with no new argument; Dodds's apparatus was empty; but Cantarin now reports it, and reads it, from P. But little is at stake: what matters is that the gratuitous generalization, including even foreigners, gives the onlookers themselves no place to hide. It is they, Socrates now suggests in retort, that Polus might make unwilling to tell their true belief, not Socrates. Socrates is on to Polus's demagoguery and he is trying to keep the onlookers from being drawn into the vortex.
- 763 ἐὰν μὲν βούλη (A5): For εἰ βούλει in enumerations (as below, A7, B2) and in priamels, suggesting an *embarras de richesse*, cf. *Phdrs.*230C1 and my n. *ad loc.*, *H. Maj.*295D5, *Meno* 71E (four times!), *Prot.*320A3, *Thg.*129A1, and *Rep.*344A2 with my n. *ad loc.*
- 764 Reading Πυθίου *sc.* ἱερῶ (B1) from F, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Woolsey Thompson Schanz Lodge (who cites T. 6.54.6) Croiset (citing *I.G.*1.189) Sauppe Burnet Lamb Theiler Dodds (citing Isaeus 5.41) Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler, cf. ἐν Διονύσου D.21.8 – (Πυθοῖ BTWY f, *legg.* Ast["*fortasse* Πυθίῳ" with Beck] Bekker Stallb. [citing *Alc.* I 129A3 for the dative] Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Sommer Mistrisotes Schmelzer Feix). Distinguish expressions like εἰς Ἀγάθου and εἰς Ἄιδου (= *chez*).
- 765 ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία (B2): Attributive Περικλέους "draws" predicative ὅλος into the attributive position (*AGPS* 50.11.20, citing similia with predicative demonstratives and πᾶς; *Apol.*25B6, *Lys.*217D7, *Phlb.*22D1, 50B3; *Rep.*510A6, *al.*). Cf also Gildersleeve §§669-674 and n. 2316.
- 766 Reading ἐνθάδε (B3) with BTF, *legg.* Routh Bekker Stallb. Kratz Hirschig Schanz Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds (*sine noto*) Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler (ἄλλων P : ἐνθένδε E3, *legg.* Ast Coraes Heindorf Beck Woolsey Hermann Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Mistrisotes Schmelzer Zimmermann Feix [but ἐνθάδε in his *Komm.*, p.19] Theiler). Heindorf chose the more weakly attested ἐνθένδε by dint of *similia*: *Crat.*403D8, *Leg.*889A1; *Ar. Av.*1168, *Plut.*228, to which Ast added *Phdo.*107E2; Woolsey preferred it as being under their influence of ἐκλέξασθαι, but the adverb is of course governed by τῶν, which is partitive, not the verb ("of those out of here" is nonsense). I prefer ἐνθάδε because he is addressing a man from outside Athens about the Pericleans he might encounter in the city *he has come to*. The variant ἐνθένδε has disappeared from modern apparatuses save that of Cantarin.



ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις,<sup>767</sup> ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατ' ἐμοῦ<sup>768</sup> παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.<sup>769</sup> ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν<sup>770</sup> ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα<sup>771</sup> περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν [c] ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὧν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους<sup>772</sup> χαίρειν ἔἴς.<sup>773</sup> ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις<sup>774</sup> τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἶει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.<sup>775</sup> παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψόμεθα εἴ τι

- 767 ἀναγκάζεις (B4) *can* mean “persuade with necessities” (ἀποδεικτικαῖς πίστεσιν πείθειν, schol.; *beweisen*, Schleiermacher) – a sense recognized by Ast (*Lex.* 1.139; “*convincis*” tr., 1819): cf. 480C5; *Symp.* 223D6 (and *προσαναγκάζειν*, *Symp.* 223D3); *Tht.* 196B10 and most importantly *Rep.* 472C8-9 and 610C8-9, where ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι is seen to govern behavior and action; cf. also *Tht.* 162E4-5. And yet this “logical” sense is only at the edge of the verb’s semantic field. The plain meaning is that Socrates is not being forced, that he still has a choice. He is not only “remembering something stronger than τὰ εἰκότα” (with Heindorf), but also is not moved by the implicit threat of being lynched by a mob. The belief Polus wants to “demolish” (in the eyes of the onlookers, after all) is something Socrates will not lightly give up, and now he can aver that his mind has not been swayed from his belief by the likes of Polus’s threat. His easy listing of well-reputed men is given sobering pause by mentioning the monuments they erected for themselves as gifts to the polis to steady their reputation among future generations they would never meet. The point is that Socrates does not fear them, and this is the feeling that οὐκ ἀναγκάζεις is describing. In short he is protesting Polus’s accusation, above, that he is unwilling to confess his true attitude (οὐκ ἐθέλεις): to the contrary, he is unwilling to acquiesce in Polus’s threatening method. His use of the term here sets up a re-use at the end of his conversation with Polus, at 480C5.
- 768 κατ' ἐμοῦ (B5): Not against his opinion but *himself*. Now Socrates explicitly accuses Polus of trying to turn the onlookers (none other than these are the πολλοί in question: cf. n. 822) against him so as to dispatch him – with the lustful arbitrariness of the tyrant (see next note). To call them ψευδομάρτυρες requires that they be lying, not merely misinformed – i.e., that they do not believe that the unjust and unpunished man is or can be happy, but are willing to perjure themselves.
- 769 ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (B5-6): The sense of this far-flung metaphor is hung on its first word, ἐκβάλλειν, one of the three harms by which the tyrant’s power had been measured, above, alongside killing and extracting a fine and imprisoning (cf. 466B11-C2, C9-D3, 468D1-2, E8-9), with οὐσία being used as in forensic contexts for one’s assets [486C1, *Andoc.* 1.74]. Immediately we must supply Socrates’s canny suggestion that Polus’s use of oratory is for himself analogous to the exercise of tyrannical power, which all along has been the brunt of his sales-pitch. Hence he will in some analogous sense kill, banish, or disenfranchise whomever he wishes. The analogy then affords Socrates the opportunity to assert what in his own mind would harm him, which he strains to do within the language of the analogy by envisioning an “exile” from his own true *Lebenswelt*, which he gropingly but heroically describes with the striding and triumphant hendiadys, τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (“rhetorical hendiadys,” Riddell, §324). ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας denotes ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὰ χρήματα without failing also to suggest ἀποκτείνειν. As Polus becomes more indecent and aggressive and harsh, Socrates becomes more penetrating, more perspicuous, more cold. The impulse for this heightening of the stakes was Polus’s entirely groundless accusation that Socrates is not telling the truth, the truth inside him, his truth (E1).
- 770 αὐτόν (B7): Socrates stresses that in dialectic he will not only be calling on only one witness, but that the witness will be the same person as the advocate for the other side. Compare μόνος below, C2.
- 771 μάρτυρα ... ὁμολογοῦντα (B7): For this move, by which Socrates turns the orator’s witness (μάρτυρ) into a dialectical answerer (ὁμολογῶν), Olympiodorus astutely compares *Alc.* 1 114E. The perfect (πεπεράνθαι, B8) after future vivid protasis is more vivid than a future form would be: Gildersleeve (§234) cites *Hipp.* 231D3, *Andoc.* 1.146 (οἴχεται), *E. Or.* 304-5 (οἰχόμεσθα), *S. OR* 1166; and Smyth (§1950) compares X. *Anab.* 1.8.12 (κἂν τοῦτο νικῶμεν πάνθ' ἡμῖν πεποιήται) and (at §2326) Beaumont-Fletcher’s “If I shall have an answer no directlier, I am gone.” Emendation spoils the emphasis (*pace* Hirschig, Richards piggy-backing).
- 772 τούτους (C2): Mistrisotes compares the use of οὗτος at 452E6, and now we can add the universally misunderstood use of ταύτη at 468E1 (cf. n. 648). The antecedent is properly the “everybody” of A3 (because of πάντας here) but cannot be prevented from including the witnesses of this conversation, who, I keep insisting, are those Polus takes to be his real audience.
- 773 This section of Socrates’s response (B6-C2), in which he compares forensic with dialectical elenchus, is brought to a close by a dense and refined chiasmic structure (protasis/apodosis || apodosis/protasis || ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ ... παράσχωμαι / οἶμαι ... μοι πεπεράνθαι || οἶμαι ... σοί [sc. πεπεράνθαι] / ἂν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ) containing a smaller chiasm within (αὐτόν / ἕνα ὄντα || εἰς ὧν / μόνος) which together emphasize that all that matters is the two of them and their back-and-forth (ἐγὼ ... σε, B6 / ἐγὼ σοί, C1) in a dialectical conversation. Between the two limbs of the chiasm is inserted περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦ (B8-C1), which resolves the contrast between περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις (A2) and περὶ ὧν λέγω (B7-8) by putting the logos as unconditionally in charge (as subject) and configuring the two conversants (who had been subjects) as equal participants in it.
- 774 Reading τις (C3) with BTP and edd. (τίς ὁ F). The enclitic is adverbial in force, obviating Cobet’s call to replace it with εἰς on the grounds it is paleographically easy (*Mnem.* n.s. 2[1874]125), leading Richards to *add* εἰς to τις, which undermined Cobet’s reasoning but then enabled him to piggy-back the further suggestion of reading εἰς instead of τις above, at 472A1 (! cf. n. 338). Jahn helpfully compares δαμονία τις, 456A5. Indefinite enclitics want to come early (cf. n. 887), and this is the earliest it can come in this clause – but as enclitic it must pay a syntactic mortgage of agreeing with the word before it – hence it is τις rather than τι. Likewise εἴ τι just below, where τι in truth modifies διόισουσιν. Cf. 504A1 and n. 1671. With μὲν οὖν this first limb looks back over what Socrates has said so far (471E1-B6) to concede that the oratorical is in a sense a refutation over against his own kind – setting up the proposal to compare them.
- 775 ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι (C4) *sc.* ἐλέγχου (or τρόπον ἐλέγχου) εἶνα – the relative pronoun varying the relative adverb (ὡς, C3), *pace* Routh (tr. *quam ego contra probo*).

διοίσουσιν<sup>776</sup> ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει<sup>777</sup> περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν<sup>778</sup> οὐ πάνυ  
 σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι<sup>779</sup> ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε  
 αἰσχιστον·<sup>780</sup> τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἢ γινώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων  
 ἐστὶν καὶ [d] ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα<sup>781</sup> πρῶτον,<sup>782</sup> περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῆ οἶόν τε  
 εἶναι μακάριον<sup>783</sup> ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα,<sup>784</sup> εἶπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν  
 ἡγῆ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι<sup>785</sup> ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα,<sup>786</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

- 776 εἶ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων (C5-6) is “whether they (somehow) differ” not “whether they differ at all” (*pace* Cary). Cf. 462A1 and note.
- 777 Reading καὶ γὰρ καὶ (C6) with F, *legg.* Coraes Heindorf Hirschig Burnet Theiler Cantarín Erler (καὶ γὰρ BTP, *legg.* Routh Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Schanz Mistriotes Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds Heidbüchel). Ast’s argument (1832) against καὶ γὰρ καὶ – that in καὶ γὰρ καὶ the second καὶ means *etiam* to emphasize the word that comes next – is an argument *for* it: the fact (τυγχάνει) that what they are talking about is more important than the talk they have had so far cannot be emphasized too much. Dodds imagines he hears Plato “warn[ing] the reader that the matter now at issue is ... the fundamental question of human happiness,” but in fact Socrates is warning Polus’s potential clients in the audience.
- 778 ἀμφισβητοῦμεν (C6): They hold differing different views; but Polus is committed to winning even if he does not hold a different view. The distinction between having discrepant opinions and fighting about it must therefore be preserved. Cf. 457D1 and n. 341. Socrates dignifies Polus with actually holding an opinion (even if it would be a “*ventre à terre*” morality, as Dodds believes) in order to bring the discussion into dialectical clarity.
- 779 σχεδόν τι (C7), with Mistriotes, does not weaken the assertion but claims Socrates’s sincerity in averring it. For the quasi-deferential use of τι cf. 453A1 (and n. 244), 458C4-5, 462A1.
- 780 εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον (C7-8): τε ... τε is far preferable to τε καὶ since the linked terms are compound contradictories and do enough semantically not to need syntactic emphasis. Note postponement of second τε. That the topic is so important Socrates had emphatically averred to Gorgias, above (458A9-B1), without there or here saying why. It is also the question, as we now see, that he so strongly upbraided Polus for disregarding when Polus said, “What does it matter whether the orator-tyrant is acting justly or unjustly?” (469A2).
- 781 αὐτίκα (D1): Basically temporal (and therefore not a synonym of οἶον, *pace plurium*), metaphorically used of the *ready immediacy* of the example, and therefore echoing Polus’s vaunt, ἐχθές καὶ πρόην (470D1) about his *exemplum*, which wonderfully was the same man! Cf. πόθεν echoing αὐτόθεν (n. 752).
- 782 πρῶτον (D1) is not to be athetized as if merely a marginal exegesis of αὐτίκα (*pace* Hirschig Christ). Socrates announces that he is laying out the first point of disagreement (Lodge): cf. ἐν μὲν, D6 – whence he calls the point he raises at 476A3 τὸ δεύτερον (*pace* Lamb, who takes πρῶτον with αὐτίκα: “to start at once with the point...,” whereas Chambry’s *tout d’abord* gets it). Asyndeton in introducing an illustration or example is common (cf. n. 171).
- 783 μακάριον (D2) is εὐδαίμονα with an affected punch (for this reason he replaces it with εὐδαίμονα just below, the punch already landed, for the sake of expressing the underlying *substance* of Polus’s position [its δίανοια], *pace* Irwin). The adjective is typically preferred when the happiness being considered is an object of envy (cf. *Rep.*344B7 [Thrasymachus: cf. my n.]; 358A3, and 419A9 [Adeimantus], 571A3, 591D8 [with my n.]), or *ironice* when it is being overestimated (e.g. *Rep.*353E12, 354A10), just as ἄθλιος often bears an affect of derision or *Schadenfreude* rather than of commiseration or sympathy (cf. n. 659 and *Rep.*344A6, 354A4, 360D4, 380B2 [and my n.]). The ambivalence of both terms provides a medium in which the ἀμφισβήτημα of Socrates and Polus can become explicit (this started at 469A1 [cf. n. 659], and before). Once the ambiguity is resolved, Polus’s “winner” (externally enviable) may well turn out to be a loser (internally unhappy), and vice-versa. Polus’s poster boy for oratorical success is conceived in a snapshot worsting others with impunity in any way that pops into his head: he has not thought as much as Irwin has about this image, and certainly would not distinguish, as Irwin does and says he does, between the exercise of power just or unjust and the material rewards for doing so, between means and ends. Polus is only selling the prospect of power, not a vision of happiness: explicitly to claim the latter would immediately expose his incompetence at living a happy life.
- 784 ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα (D2-3), again used at E4-5. The need for the distinction is not clear but will become so. We encountered it in passing at 456E4 (cf. n.) and in the peroration of Polus on Archelaus where he sums up the story by saying Archelaus is ἡδικοκῶς (471C6).
- 785 Reading ἄλλο τι (D4) with F, *legg.* edd. (ἀλλ’ ὅτι BTPW : ἄλλο τι ἢ B<sup>2</sup>ZZa *teste* Cantarín). Routh: *ni aliud quid dicas, te ita sentire statuamus*, comparing the constr. at 495C1: ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; For ἄλλο τι elliptical for εἰ μὴ ἄλλο τι δοκεῖ σοι, cf. *Rep.*369D7, and not representing a question (cf. Hoogeveen, *Doct.Part.*, 605), and 467D6, 471D5, 475D1. Schleiermacher tr. “*nicht wahr ...?*”
- 786 διανοώμεθα (D4): “take to be the meaning,” i.e., the δίανοια (taking ὡς + genitive absolute as its complement, as at *Phdo.*94E2-6, *Rep.*470E1-2; *X. Anab.* 1.8.10 [var.: cit. Stallb.]; *S. Ai.*281). The plural refers only to Socrates and Polus and constitutes the first step in dialectical investigation: to make clear and agree about what we are investigating. The juxtaposition of the first plural representing Socrates and Polus against the singular participle representing Polus, which has to be put into the genitive absolute, emphasizes syntactically the division between the interest of the individual party holding his own belief, and the common interest of the dialectical partners.

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὲ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἔν μὲν τουτὶ<sup>787</sup> ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἄρ’<sup>788</sup> ἂν τυγχάνη δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;<sup>789</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἥκιστα γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ’ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. [e]

ΣΩ. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἄρα<sup>790</sup> μὴ τυγχάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται;

ΠΩΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. κατὰ δὲ γε<sup>791</sup> τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὃ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος<sup>792</sup> πάντως<sup>793</sup> μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι<sup>794</sup> ἐὰν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας<sup>795</sup> ἀδικῶν, ἤττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

[473] ΠΩΛ. ἄτοπα γε,<sup>796</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.

787 ἐν μὲν τουτὶ (D6): Once again Socrates attempts to give the conversation dialectical structure (cf.470B6-7) – emphasized here with a hand gesture (τουτὶ) – and he carefully continues doing this through 473B11.

788 Reading notably late ἄρ’ (D7), with PW and all edd. except Routh and Findeisen, who read ἄρ’ from B (F has ἄρα *teste* Cantarín). Beck (*Plat.Op.Steph.*[Leipzig1816]3.328) avoided the lateness by repunctuating: ἀδικῶν εὐδαίμων ἔσται· ἄρ’(sc. εὐδαίμων) ... , but that is not the way Socrates talks. Interrogative ἄρα tends to come first, but can come later. In all the cases of late occurrence cited by Denniston, except for this one (pp.48-9), it comes after a single word or complex phrase which is allowed to establish itself, whether as the subject of the question (467E7, *Phlb.*27C1) or its predicate (*Prot.*358C4; *Lys.* fr.11), before the indication is given that a question is being asked (to which add 476A7-8). In the present case it comes after not just a phrase but a clause, an apodosis (ἔσται) whose truth is being called into question by a subsequent protasis – which is, after all, with Deuschle-Cron and Thompson, what the question hinges on.

789 δίκης καὶ τιμωρίας (D8): An hendiadys for the function of punishment: the former (= κόλασις) is for teaching the ἀδικῶν a lesson; the latter for the making reparation for the ἀδικούμενος (cf. 523B3 with n. 2193, and Arist. *Rhet.*1.10.17, 1369B), but it is not only for him. To the extent that Polus’s emulous ideal of power consists in nothing more than mastery of the other fellow (cf. nn. 634, 650, 680 [contrasting 469D3-7 with E3-6], 808), an attitude he shares with Gorgias (for which cf. nn. 233, 235, 240), it is the latter that he is particularly eager as well as particularly amused to avoid; and by the same token the punishments he will envision as particularly fearsome (473B12-D1) are carried out in public view. On the other hand, think of the damage he is willing to inflict upon his inner self by embracing evil, merely because it is invisible to others! It is this dimension, the subjective corollary to the objective order of “gods and men,” that is reserved to the gods to avenge. Dodds (*ad* E6) correctly sees that Socrates is broaching a more complex sense of paying the penalty than Polus so far sees. τιμωρία is referred to below as δίκη ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων (E7); the matter will be taken up in the closing myth (cf. nn. 2248, 2253).

790 ἄρα (E1), inferential, now replaces ἄρα interrogative, above (D7), to express the chosen answer.

791 Reading γε (E4) with BTP (and all edd.) over its omission in F, on analogy with the use of δὲ γε introducing the second premise of a syllogism so as to set into contrast Socrates’s second opinion against that of Polus, after ἐν μὲν (D6) – used similarly below (473A2, B3, B6).

792 ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος (E4-5) representing the act and its sequela with the τε καὶ of cause and effect. Cf. D2-3. The distinction was also in the air at 456E4 to very different effect: cf. n. 316.

793 Reading πάντως (E5), with Stob. (*Anth.*4.40.26 [5.596 Wachsmuth]) and edd., instead of ἀπάντων with BTP as well as F (as Dodds and Cantarín report). Cf. (with Stallb.) *Euthyd.*292C7(var: ms.T), *Leg.*731C8, *Phlb.*39E10.

794 Reading μέντοι (E5) with F Stob (*legg.* edd.) rather than μὲν τοίνυν BTPY (*leg.* Routh). μέντοι rather than δὲ, after μὲν, emphasizes its clause as not only stronger than the (typically conceded) first one, but so much so that it may obviate the need to bring it up – a use insufficiently emphasized by Denniston, who by the way ignores the special effect gotten by introducing a μὲν clause only to reject it (pp.404-5). Cf. 456C7, 458B5, 480E1; *Rep.*375D10.

795 ἐὰν μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας (E5-6) spells out what was expressed compactly above with τε καὶ (τυγχάνη δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας, D7-8), and then is further spelled out in the next line by διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. The “adventitious” connotation of τυγχάνειν, alluding to things beyond human devising, is meant to leave room for the divine punishment of the afterlife (n.789) and the entire phrase is a chiasm. The expression is not “awkward” (Dodds) but transitional, like a passing note. Dodds is right to say that Socrates is broaching the notion that punishment has an active as well as a passive side to it (cf. n. 895). Neither expression needs to be emended (*pace* Hirschig Theiler).

796 γε (473A1): Socrates has elicited the reaction (*AGPS* identifies an “exclamatory” γε, 69.15.1) he has intended to elicit by making their disagreement crystal clear. Jahn hears an echo of Socrates’s ῥητορικῶς ... ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγγειν (471E2). ἄτοπα says the things he is saying are “unplaceable” – strange, foreign, inconceivable, kooky (cf. *Leg.*658A6-C9 where an ἄστοπον ἐρώτημα [C4] is unanswerable because ἄστοπον). The common translation, “absurd,” is too weak, suggesting only what is indefensible with argument.

ΣΩ. πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ταῦτ' ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ<sup>797</sup> σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἂ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον<sup>798</sup> ἐγὼ που ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγὼ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθη<sup>799</sup> ὑπὸ σοῦ.

ΠΩΛ. ναὶ μὰ Δία. [b]

ΣΩ. ὡς σύ οἶει,<sup>800</sup> ὃ Πῶλε.

ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος.

ΣΩ. ἴσως.<sup>801</sup> σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δέ γε<sup>802</sup> αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἦττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;<sup>803</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.<sup>804</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐ δῆτα, ὃ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

797 φίλον γάρ (A3): The topic of friendship was introduced above at 470C1-8, as Mistriones and Sauppe notice, here invoked by Socrates in connection with asserting that they are searching together, as he will reiterate in the immediate sequel. Heindorf's explanation (followed by other edd.), *amicorum enim dissensio facillime tollitur*, is a pabulum that hardly justifies the expression. Cf. ὃ φίλε, 479D7. Perhaps with this, and with ὃ ἑταῖρε, Socrates is claiming that it is simple candor that accounts for his surprising statement of purpose.

798 εἶπον (A4), rarely taking infinitival construction, casts the assertion into the role of an object (Lodge) – i.e., less a quotation than a propositional content (AGPS 65.1.4).

799 ἐξελέγχθη (A10): Socrates scrupulously repeats the forensically appropriate but dialectically incorrect term (cf. 471D6 and n. 750): Zeyl translates “refuted” with scare quotes added, a good solution. Polus, Socrates is saying, might have defeated him but did not *eo ipso* refute him (!). The term however elicits from Polus a little clucking that interrupts the final setting-out of their positions side by side.

800 I omit γε (B1) with BTP, with Routh Schanz Lodge Sauppe Dodds, as being belligerent (γε FY, *legg.* edd.): Socrates wants to clarify rather than champion his disagreement (as an ἐλέγχων); but Polus is exactly the opposite (as an ἐξελέγχων).

801 Attributing ἴσως (B3) to Socrates with F (only, *teste* Cantarín), *legg.* Prinsterer [*Prosopogr. Plat.* 107] Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Helmbold Theiler Dodds Chambry Hamilton [“We shall see”] Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols Piettre Cantarín Dalfen Erler (attrib. to Polus by all other mss., *legg.* all other edd.). Heindorf (*olim*) suggested deletion and Schanz followed. For ἴσως used in dismissal without denoting acquiescence cf. 461B8, 515D8, 522A8 (with n.), 527A3. If attributed to Polus, it is an indignant and ironical litotes, for which cf. 522A8, *Lach.* 196C6 (ἐγὼ δ' ἴσως ἰκανῶς πέπυσμαι), and *Rep.* 339B1 (σμικρά γε ἴσως προσθήκη); but Prinsterer (*Prosopogr. Plat.* [Lyon 1823] 106-7) might be right to say those parallels suggest the expression here should be ψευδῆ γε ἴσως οἰόμενος (*vel sim.*). If attributed to Socrates, Plato is emphasizing Socrates's attempt to set out the difference of opinion step by step and dispassionately, for their joint scrutiny. Thereupon defusing the byplay, he immediately returns to the enumeration of points with δέ γε.

802 Again reading γε (B6), as above (A2), with F, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Cantarín Erler (om. BTP, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Bekker [F *non notans*] Stallb. [*sine nota*] Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schanz Mistriones Schmelzer Lodge Lamb Zimmermann Feix Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel). The collocation δέ γε is again used immediately after the personal pronoun (as at B3, and cf. after πειράσομαι, at A2) to stress the ἀμφισβητήσις.

803 ἐλέγχειν (B7) = “challenge in dialogue” rather than “refute” (found in many translations), which only misleads here. Next, Polus again substitutes ἐξελέγχειν (B9) and Socrates retorts that truth cannot be “demolished” (for I believe that his ἐλέγχεται at B11 means ἐξελέγχεται, dropping the prefix according to the I.E. rule). Irwin translates all three verbs with “refute” (as do Allen Nichols Piettre Dalfen [*widerlegen*]), thus losing the thread, and adds a complicated note (so also Dalfen). Waterfield translates the third with “prove wrong” after translating the other two “refute” (even the second) and adds a note to explain what he is making Socrates mean.

804 ἔτι ... χαλεπώτερον (B8), an ironical litotes: “harder to demolish” when the last one was so “hard to refute” that a child could do so (470C4-5). Polus continues his claim that this second thesis of Socrates's is virtual nonsense (ἄτοπα, A1).



ΠΩΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν<sup>805</sup> ἄνθρωπος ληφθῆ τυραννίδι [c] ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται<sup>806</sup> καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκᾶται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδῶν<sup>807</sup> παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῆ ἢ καταπιττωθῆ,<sup>808</sup> οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγῶν τύραννος καταστῆ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται,<sup>809</sup> ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος<sup>810</sup> ὑπὸ τῶν [d] πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων<sup>811</sup> ζῆνων; ταῦτα λέγεις<sup>812</sup> ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

ΣΩ. μορμολύττη αὖ,<sup>813</sup> ὃ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου.<sup>814</sup> ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων<sup>815</sup> τυραννίδι, εἶπες;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

- 805 Reading ἀδικῶν (B12) with all mss. (and edd.), against the deletion of Dobree (*Adversaria*, 1.153, followed by Schanz). It is corroborated by the parallel participial construction of the alternative outcome, below (ἐὰν διαφυγῶν τύραννος, C5-6). Findeisen had conjectured ἀδίκως (accepted by Theiler), reading it backward from D5, but cf. n. 815. Polus uses bare ληφθεὶς (without prefix) for dramatic effect, as well as the homoioteleuta in -ας (Deuschle-Cron); the sequel employs the same heaping rapidity as his speech about Archelaus (471A4-C6).
- 806 ἐκτέμνηται (C1) = *execrare, castrare*: *Euthyph.* 6A3, *X. Cyrop.* 5.2.28. Cf. *Symp.* 195C4 (Ast).
- 807 ἐπιδῶν (C4): *sc.* λωβηθέντας. The construction is *ad sensum*: αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς suggests καὶ ἄλλοι (λωβηθέντες), but with καὶ ἐπιδῶν they become objects of his view (λωβηθέντας) so as to extenuate his own punishment.
- 808 στρεβλῶται ... καταπιττωθῆ (C1-5): On καταπιττωθῆ Thompson cites Heraclides Ponticus. fr. 50 Wehrli, *apud* Athen. 12.524 to show it means burning alive – in pitch. In contrast to the standard list of judicial punishments he had used before (466B11-C1, 467C6-7), Polus now presents a vivid and rabid description (note the καί’s) of a nightmare of barbaric torture and execution, along the same lines as *Rep.* 361E4-2A2 (cf. detailed analysis in my n. *ad loc.*), designed to shock and scandalize (whence Socrates says μορμολύττη, D3). Socrates had illustrated the underlying lure of this kind of rhetoric with σφάττειν at 468C2 (cf. n. 634). Ast and Stallb. argue whether the eyes are burned out or cut out, but only Schmelzer wonders how the victim later *looks on* as his family is tortured. Cope obliterates the contradiction by mistranslating the second καὶ in C2 with “or.” Chambry waxes poetic: “*on le met en croix, on l’enduit de poix, et on le brûle tout vif.*” It is important to keep in mind that when and where such elaborate punishments have been conducted, it is done in public view.
- 809 βούληται (C7): In unconscious fealty to the lustful image he has drawn so vividly, Polus *forgets* (Irwin) or ironically *abandons* (Schmelzer) the distinction he had earlier observed (468E3-5) between βούλεσθαι and δοκεῖν; and recklessly emphasizes, rather than judiciously skirting, the feeling of envy that he hopes, with his image of the tyrant, to arouse in his audience (Gorgias the “gentleman” was more judicious: cf. 456B6, C2; 457B1). Polus will forget something else he had agreed to, below (475A3: cf. n. 857).
- 810 εὐδαιμονιζόμενος (C7), placed so close to εὐδαιμονέστερος, reveals Polus’s unconscious argument. The power-man is “happy-ized” – turned into a happy man – by the envy people feel for him! Just as Polus’s definition of an ἄθλιος is a “loser” regardless of his moral condition (469A1), his definition of the happy man is the “winner” regardless of what is going on inside him. We begin to appreciate the way Socrates framed the “greatest question” (472C8-D1), not as failing or succeeding to define happiness, but as being ignorant as to who is happy and who is not. Dalfen is disappointed that the intervening conversation has not changed Polus’s “standpoint,” but feeling envy is not a standpoint.
- 811 ἄλλων (D1) “adverbial” – as at 447C3, 480D4; *Apol.* 36B8; *Leg.* 789D6; *Phdo.* 110E5; *Symp.* 191B1, etc. (alternatively, appositional: Gildersleeve §599, *AGPS* 50.4.11). That foreigners should be moved by a mere description, is what Polus found incredible in Socrates’s uncertainty about Archelaus’s “happiness.” Again the emphasis is placed upon how he is admired, even by those he masters, to the extent that Polus can say that his being εὐδαιμονιζόμενος (C7) is tantamount to his *being* εὐδαίμων (Deuschle-Cron, Lodge). Thrasymachus, who was trying to incite the same feeling in his audience at the home of Cephalus, expressed the same mob sentiment (*Rep.* 344C1-2) and referred also to the opinion of foreigners who have hearsay only. The mediator of desire always wields greater power when he is remote, for the same reason that a prophet is never loved in his own country. That it is a good thing for the object of envy to be far, far away, consult n. 726.
- 812 ταῦτα λέγεις (D1) is triumphant (Deuschle-Cron, Lodge), for ταῦτα is “second-person” (Mistriotes), as if Socrates’s thesis were “demolished” (ἐξ-ελέγχειν) by its mere recitation. Socrates responds to the language of this challenge before the discussion is over (ταῦτ’ ἦν, 479E6).
- 813 μορμολύττη αὖ (D3): In asserting that Polus means to *scare* him (not just trying to “make his flesh creep,” *pace* Lamb and Allen, as an “appeal to public opinion” *pace* Irwin), Socrates is inferring that Polus is *threatening* him for his *lack of unscrupulosity*, and is again (cf. n. 768) stirring up the crowd *against* him (Socrates used μορμολύττεσθαι in exactly the same connection at *Crito* 46C4, after the mob had condemned him to an execution far less glamorous and visible but no less lethal: there Socrates dismissed their threatening wrath with derogatory plurals [δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ... καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις, 46C5-6], whereas Polus here indulges in as gory a description as he can muster [C1-5]). The punishments are no more fearsome than luridly attractive, as Leontius reminds us at *Rep.* 439E (*pace* Sauppe, saying Polus wants *durch Schreckbilder [Sokrates] zum Nachgeben bewegen*). It depends on whether you identify with the victim or the onlooking mob. Until the later works of René Girard, the question could be swept under the rug by theologians and anthropologists, not to mention “moral philosophy.” Glaucon, too, was moved to deliver himself of such a speech (n.808), out of envy for the goodness of his imaginary good man. Socrates’s αὖ is proleptic with καὶ οὐκ: ‘Now, in turn, you raise a bogey-man, again not refuting’ (followed up by ἄλλο αὖ below, E2) *pace* Mistriotes, who thinks this a *second* bogey-man after the implicit threat of the mob raised above (cf. Schleiermacher, *schreckst du mich* wieder; Apelt, wieder ... *zu machen*) – but that case is covered next, with ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου.
- 814 ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου (D4) athetized by Ast only, *sine noto* (ἀντὶ τοῦ μάρτυρας προσεκαλοῦ, schol. Areth.).
- 815 ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων (D5): By glossing the vaguely circumstantial participle (ἀδικῶν, B12) with the adverb, Socrates turns to the propositional content of Polus’s lurid description – for Polus himself stipulated that the plotting was unjust – so as to return to the point he carefully set up for scrutiny (472D1-473B11: his refinement is lost in Jowett who inaccurately brings forward the *ipsissima verba*; Hirschig misguidedly allows the shift to cast doubt upon the authenticity of the previous expression). Polus on the other hand thinks that by describing the punishment in horrific detail he has obviated the need for scrutiny of the underlying proposition that being punished for unjust behavior is better than getting off scot-free – as he did at the beginning of this phase of the conversation (469A9-10: cf. n. 663).



ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην<sup>816</sup>—δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίον εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν [e] οὐκ ἂν εἶη—ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι<sup>817</sup> ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυραννεύσας.

... τί τοῦτο,<sup>818</sup> ὦ Πῶλε; γελαῖς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἶπη, καταγελαῖν, ἐλέγχειν<sup>819</sup> δὲ μή;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ οἶει ἐξεληλέγχθαι,<sup>820</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα<sup>821</sup> λέγῃς ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τίνα τουτωνί.<sup>822</sup>

ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε,<sup>823</sup> οὐκ εἰμι τῶν πολιτικῶν,<sup>824</sup> καὶ πέρυσι βουλευεῖν λαχῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπισηφίζειν, [474] γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπισηφίζειν.<sup>825</sup> μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπισηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις

- 816 Reading ὁ διδοὺς δίκην (D9) with F, *legg.* Deuschle-Cron Lodge Burnet Croiset Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel Erler (ὁ διδοὺς BTPY : ὁ δίκην διδοὺς Steph. *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Bekker Woolsey Kratz Hirschig Thompson Sommer Mistriones Christ Sauppe : ὁ δίκην δοὺς *coni.* H.Schmidt [*Beitr.z. Erklärung Pl.Dial.* {Wittenburg 1874} 178] followed by Schanz : ὁ ἀλοῦς *coni.* Winckelmann [*Act.Soc.Gr.Leips.* 2.18], *legg.* Hermann Jahn Schmelzer Feix).
- 817 μέντοι (E1), as often, not only opposes the foregoing μέν-clause but cancels the premise on which it is based (cf. n. 794, *supra*), namely, the notion of degrees of happiness among the destitute, which Socrates had held up for tentative scrutiny with the two μέν's above (D7, D9). His warrant for the cancellation is a logical distinction between the contrary and the contradictory, which he is content to leave implicit. Compare the use above, in a similar connection (472E5), with n. *ad loc.*
- 818 τί τοῦτο; (E2): It is best to insert a paragraph break before this (Helmbold places a dash), to indicate an unmarked dramatic pause (note asyndeton), with Routh Allen Dalfen (*pace* Burnet); and punctuate before γελαῖς (with Heindorf), lest τοῦτο be taken as its object accusative. Cope, seeing no words, decides that Polus has merely “smiled.” The important thing to recognize is that whatever it is Polus does, whether gesture or sound, it is addressed to the audience looking on – from whom we likewise hear nothing. To cite the passage in Arist. *Rhet.* 3.18, where Gorgias advocates laughing in response to the serious opponent and seriousness in response to the amusing one, as if Polus were exhibiting Gorgianic technique, is less important than to recognize that Polus's desire to win is the sort of thing that leads to a lynching.
- 819 ἐλέγχειν (E3) is (again) to test, attack, cross-examine, challenge, not “disprove” *pace* Lamb (again at 474A4). The alternative Socrates desires is that his belief be tested through dialectical challenge not that it, or he himself, be defeated. That is ἐξελέγχειν, though for Polus the latter is merely a more intense expression for achieving a defeat.
- 820 ἐξεληλέγχθαι (E4): Polus reverts to the forensic term, emphatic in the perfect, despite Socrates's continual corrections (D3, D4, E2-3): the distinction in terms is commonly missed in translations (Croiset, Apelt, Helmbold Chambry).
- 821 τοιαῦτα (E4), rather than ταῦτα, is derogatory (cf. 461C1-2 and n. 437) but also a generalization. Kratz notices the “present general” formulation in subjunctive as if this were something every orator knows and must guard against, and compares the use of the trope at 496E4-6. Mistriones astutely notes that a *substantival* pronoun (ὃ) refers back to *qualitative* antecedent, and compares τοιαῦθ' at E. *Supp.* 736.
- 822 τουτωνί (E5): With his deictic nod to the audience, accompanied by a flattering gesture, Polus confirms what had been implicit above, that his witnesses against Socrates are just the audience to this conversation, whom he sees, and cares only to see, as prospective clients. Socrates simply takes him to be suggesting polling as a fourth method of elenchus, after witnesses, intimidation, and ridicule; and now interprets his gesture as an oratorical maneuver, calling upon the assemblymen or the jurors to weigh in (Mistriones) – which motivates Socrates' next remark.
- 823 ὦ Πῶλε (E6): ‘Polus, please!’ – initial vocative once again! (cf. nn. 756, 680; and 443, 155).
- 824 οὐκ εἰμι τῶν πολιτικῶν (E6): Though a πολίτης he is not one of the πολιτικοί. The latter is a class of men who regularly and notoriously deliver speeches in assembly and council, and argue cases in the court – in short, the ῥήτορες. Socrates here characterizes them as familiar with legal procedure but who they really are are those Xenophon, in describing the event Socrates is about to allude to, calls οἱ δυνατοί (cf. next note). “δύναμις” like “competence” and “astuteness” in English, is a two-edged term; indeed δύναμις has played the gravamen in almost all the arguments Socrates has had throughout this dialogue (447C2, 452E6-7, 456A5, 460A1-2, 466B4, 470A9-B4 with nn. *ad locc.*). If, under the dialectical scrutiny of Socrates, Polus's claims of “competence” and “δύναμις” fail to express themselves adequately in reasoned argument, he is ready to resort to other means; for Socrates, on the other hand, once the dialectic has done its job he can replace Polus's vaunting designation with the more pertinent term, χρεία (480A2).
- 825 γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην ἐπισηφίζειν (474A1): A hysteron-proteron where the laughter is introduced before its cause, following instead the order of thought (cf. with Riddell §308 *Apol.* 19D2, 32B6; *Phdo.* 80C3, 87C9, 100B2; *Th.* 162B4-5 – as in the interestingly similar parallel at *Rep.* 392D8 (γελοῖος ... διδάσκαλος ... καὶ ἀσαφής, laughter occurring before the reason becomes conscious): the repetition of ἐπισηφίζειν is part of the joke, not an erroneous “adscript” (*pace* Richards). The famous incident is described rather differently elsewhere: Socrates was unable to call the illegal vote, not out of incompetence but because he was unwilling, as presiding officer on that day, to break the law (*Apol.* 32B1-C2; X. *H.G.* 1.7, *Mem.* 1.1.18, 4.4.2 – *pace* Athen. 5.217E, who remembers the less extraordinary idea, οὐκ ἠδύναμην); and the mob opposed him not with laughter but threats (κελευδόντων καὶ βοώντων, *Apol.* 32B8; ὀργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπειλούντων, X. *Mem. ibid.*: to carp over historical details betrays insensitivity to the reasons for Socrates's self-effacing misdescription of the event). Similarly, here, it is foreign to dialectical conversation to put something to a vote; and Polus's laughter is nothing other than sardonic: Where is the line between ridicule and persecution to be drawn, and Who will be the one to draw it? Again, Socrates is rising to the challenge with each intensification in the register of Polus's rhetoric (cf. nn. 703, 769).

τούτων<sup>826</sup> βελτίω ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ,<sup>827</sup> ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἶναι.<sup>828</sup> ἐγὼ γὰρ ὧν ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτὸν<sup>829</sup> πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ἦ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῷ χαίρειν, καὶ ἓνα ἐπισηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ **[b]** πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι.<sup>830</sup> ὅρα οὖν εἰ ἐθελήσεις<sup>831</sup> ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι<sup>832</sup> ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ<sup>833</sup> δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἢ γεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι.

ΠΩΛ. ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ<sup>834</sup> σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

ΠΩΛ. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὐτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς. **[c]**

ΣΩ. ... οὐκ οὐκ ἀποκρινῆ;<sup>835</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἐρεῖς.<sup>836</sup>

ΣΩ. λέγε δὴ μοι, ἴν' εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἠρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε,<sup>837</sup> κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

826 τούτων (A3). The plural is not otiose: Socrates is keeping count of Polus's methods of refutation (calling witnesses, intimidating the opponent, ridiculing the opponent, and putting the matter to a vote).

827 Reading ἔλεγον ἐγὼ (A3) with P or ἔλεγον with F (ἐγὼ ἔλεγον all other mss., *legg. edd.*): placing ἐγὼ first is inappropriately emphatic. Socrates is referring back to 472C4-5 (Heindorf); and then, with πείρασαι (A4), moves forward to 473A2-3 and πειράσομαι ... καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι...

828 Omitting δεῖν (A5) with F (δεῖν BTPF, *legg. edd.*). With bare εἶναι Socrates is pointing back to his *previous* expression at 472C4, but Thompson insists on keeping δεῖν here because it will be used later! Cf. Ast in n. 891. οἷον is masculine agreeing with ἔλεγχον.

829 αὐτὸν (A6): for pronominal or adjectival αὐτός used to "pick out the most vital thing" (*AGPS* 51.5.5) in this way, cf. *Charm.*166B3 (adj.), *Rep.*362D5 (pronom.).

830 οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι (B1): Polling a man is here made by Socrates a phase of the dialectical process (he the single person polled), identical to calling him as witness: it is to ask him play ἀποκρινόμενος, again a suggestion to turn oratorical procedures into dialogical. Lamb's "I have *not* a word to say" takes the δὲ in οὐδέ as intensive but in doing so has to drop the notion of dialogue, which is the key to the whole passage, since it is impossible to dialogue with many at once. Instead, I take οὐδέ to mean "and not." To forgo calling anyone but the interlocutor as witness is to dialogue, and so is forgoing to poll anyone else: these forgoings are in themselves tantamount to not dialoguing with anyone else.

831 ἐθελήσεις (B1): Polus has by now avoided to submit to dialogue, in four different ways (cf. n. 826). With the future indicative Socrates impatiently asks whether he will *ever* give in. The future is an emphatic way of requesting that he do so now (cf. Smyth §1918), just asking someone in the past tense why they *didn't* do something, can be tantamount to requesting that they finally *do* it. (for which cf. τί οὐχί ... ἔφρασας, 503B2-3, and Smyth §1936).

832 διδόναι (B2): For bare διδόναι ἔλεγχον in the sense of giving place for or submitting to an elenchus cf. *Apol.*39C7; in the present case, however, the effect of παρά- is carried forward from παράδος (A4) according to the Indo-European rule.

833 γὰρ (B2) is programmatic. With this first question he lays down the gauntlet and the elenchus must begin. In asserting that all mankind would agree with him that acting unjustly is worse than undergoing it, Socrates is not provocatively daring Polus to disagree but speaks sincerely, and in effect forces his interlocutor and ourselves to look into our conscience for the sense of τὸ κακόν according to which the statement is true.

834 ἐπεὶ (B7) in its illogical causal sense, again (cf. 471E1 and n. 755) presenting the speaker's subjective ground for an assertion as if it were an objective cause. The assertion is his denial that he and the others would accept suffering injustice instead of doing it: he leaves out denying that Socrates would do so, the third term in Socrates's assertion, emphatic for being put first. ἐπεὶ then means, "I put it that way (i.e., I leave you out of the list) since you (alone among men) *would* accept being mistreated rather than mistreating." δέξαιτο ἂν echoes his *ad hominem* uses twice above (471D1, 468E6).

835 Reading οὐκ οὐκ ἀποκρινῆ (C1) with Burnet Theiler Dodds Cantarín Dalfen Erler, rather than οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινῆ (per all other edd.): The back and forth (B2-10), irrelevantly re-raising others playing witness and being polled, becomes more and more clipped, and has now reached maximally truncated expression. All that remains is to see whether Polus will stop this and start dialoguing by playing answerer (cf. n. 831 on ἐθελήσεις).

836 ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι (C2): For a second time Polus acquiesces to play answerer in order to find out what Socrates's answer will be (cf. 467C3-4 and n. 617) – not in order to vent his own opinion nor to test his own opinion (as Socrates invited him to, B1-2), and least of all to participate in a joint search for truth (i.e., consensus), according to which the role of questioner and answerer are ultimately indifferent and interchangeable – but rather, in all likelihood, to elicit from Socrates something else he can ridicule, betraying his eagerness with ἐπιθυμῶ (Deuschle-Cron). In his very election to answer, however, dialectic may begin!

837 ὦ Πῶλε (C5): Socrates imitates himself asking a first question – again the emphasis on dialectic as a form.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δῆ;<sup>838</sup> αἴσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;  
... ἀποκρίνου.<sup>839</sup>

ΠΩΛ. τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἶπερ<sup>840</sup> αἴσχιον.

ΠΩΛ. ἥκιστα γε.<sup>841</sup>

- 838 Reading τί δὲ δῆ (C7) with BWPF (τί δαι δῆ T *teste* Cantarín). Edd. before Stallb. (Routh Heindorf Coraes Bekker) read τί δαι δῆ, *sine notis*; Stallb. was first to question their unsupported unanimity and to read τί δὲ δῆ, instead, citing BT and “most” mss. (followed by edd.) – *n.b.*, Schanz’s report of δαι from T had, until Cantarín, gone uncorroborated. With δῆ Socrates emphasizes the question, Will Polus go so far as to say that men not only prefer to do injustice over undergoing it, and also say that doing it is less shameful than undergoing it?
- 839 ἀποκρίνου (C8): Socrates’s emphasis in δῆ has, we must infer, given Polus pause (cf. 468D6, 468C7: note asyndeton). Why does he pause? We might well have a sense of why if we had paused to imagine in what sense of τὸ κακόν all men would agree it is κάκιον to commit than to undergo injustice (cf. n. 833).
- 840 εἶπερ (C9): With Routh Ast Stallb. Hirschig Jowett Thompson Croiset Irwin Allen Zeyl Erler, I take Socrates’s remark to be a question, in accordance with proper dialectical procedure (*pace* Heindorf Coraes Bekker Deuschle-Cron Hermann Schanz Sauppe Lamb Burnet Apelt Helmbold Dodds Chambry Cantarín, who take it as an assertion). περ is regularly added to signal reliance on a ὁμολογία that is about to entail a refutation, as here (cf. 468D1, D5, E1; *Lach.* 194D4, 197C6), or any other dialectically significant conclusion (cf. *Phdrs.* 257B7, 261E2; *Rep.* 381B9, 456C1, 524A8, 541A8, 597E6). Socrates suggests that if for Polus αἴσχιον does imply κάκιον, he is already refuted since he just asserted that ἀδικεῖν is κάκιον; Polus repulses the suggestion with emphatic ἥκιστα γε (“Not at all! Not at all!” Helmbold).
- 841 ἥκιστα γε (C9): We do not know what it is that Polus is vociferously denying, whether it is the predication of κάκιον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, or the inference from the one predicate (αἴσχιον) to the other (κάκιον) that entails that predication – let alone why he is denying it. He may even be denying the inference from the one predicate to the other only in order to block the conclusion. We need to infer the answer from what Plato has given us so far, else the conversation loses dramatic validity (on which see below). Flatly to assert, therefore, as Dodds for instance does, that Polus is a proponent of the “shame culture” (pp. 243, 249, 11), on the grounds that that outlook might underlie the answer he gives, is only an *obscurum per obscurius*; but then Dodds compounds his error, for not only does he attribute a doctrine to the character as consciously and intentionally held by him, on the slim basis of a single answer of his that may after all be nothing but an evasion, but he then goes on immediately to attribute to the man a general attitude and motivation that characterizes him ethically, as if this were the man’s motivation for holding the doctrine he has attributed to him. Thus on p.245, he makes Polus the proponent of a “*ventre à terre* morality” but a few pages later (249) makes him the proponent of a “shame culture” morality (cf. 243, 11), in addition to calling him muddled (249) and stupid and slow-witted (255), as the occasion demands, whereas in fact all that is true is that Polus is trying to capture clients and is saying whatever will motivate them to hire him. I tarry to describe the problem because Dodds is the first commentator in the sequence of *Gorgias* commentators to make this kind of error systematically, which has since become almost normal in the interpretation of this (and other) dialogues. This manner of interpretation affords the interpreter the opportunity to make high-sounding pronouncements and savvy allusions (like Dodds’s anthropological reference to “shame” and “guilt” cultures and his Roussevian or Sallustian and indeed Platonic metaphor for immorality [cf. *Rep.* 586AB]), but worse, it gains some appearance of legitimacy and even profundity by flattering the reader into thinking that in reading the dialogue he is confronting great ideas or perennial questions rather than just idiosyncratic, self-serving, neurotic, and insignificant individuals like himself. In truth, however, it is the heart and soul of Socrates’s work on this planet – and Plato’s motivation to commemorate that work by inventing the dialogue form – to discover and reveal how the rational element within the soul of such individuals as ourselves can redeem them from such petty insignificance, in a manner strikingly analogous to the way that a person can get some grip on his own foibles through the more modern talking-cure of psychotherapy. As for what Plato has given us, it is the easily overlooked pause before Polus answered Socrates’s question, at C8. The pause suggests that Polus was reluctant to say what he really thought and says the opposite instead. He *does* believe that being dealt injustice is the experience of a shameful loser, and that dealing it out is the mark of an admirable “winner” – But No! not quite! He wants to foment that sentiment in his audience so that they will hire him, but is ashamed to articulate the sentiment explicitly lest they become embarrassed to do so (this is the same motive he himself attributed to Gorgias for hesitating to answer at 461A7-B4). So he says the opposite of the sentiment he wants to foment in his audience in order to seem morally scrupulous instead. Compare the very close parallel in Socrates’s conversation with Gorgias, which in fact evinced a similar misunderstanding from commentators (n.399). Gorgias’ and Polus’s use of language to stimulate their audience and to hide rather than express their desire to make money is the most constant theme throughout the dialogue so far: cf. nn. 233, 243, 251, 284, 296, 304, 316, 335, 344, 359, 426, 428, 430, 442, 463, 494, 509, 572, 580, 583, 613, 630, 634, 640, 644, 649, 650, 651, 652, 656, 661, 662, 695, 696, 711, 731, 746 761, 769, 809, 813. Irwin, identifying statements with propositions, immediately converts Polus’s statement that ἀδικεῖν is αἴσχιον ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι into the proposition that δίκαια πράττειν is κάλλιον ἢ ἀδικεῖν, in order to streamline his “position” into “justice is ... καλόν ... while injustice is ... ἀγαθόν ...” But Polus is not adopting a position. He is only managing his audience as best he can (it is no accident that what δίκαια πράττειν consists in does not become a subject in this dialogue); moreover, at 476B1-2, Socrates treats Irwin’s converted proposition as needing not only a renewed ὁμολογία from Polus but its own separate justification (ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν).

ΣΩ. μανθάνω<sup>842</sup> οὐ [d] ταῦτόν ἡγή σὺ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε<sup>843</sup> καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ<sup>844</sup> τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶον καὶ<sup>845</sup> σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα<sup>846</sup> καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων<sup>847</sup> καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλὰ;<sup>848</sup> οἶον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο,<sup>849</sup> ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους; [e]

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔχω.

- 842 With μανθάνω (C9), essentially intransitive, Socrates asserts that he now “gets” what had underlain his interlocutor’s previous remarks, as if he had not yet understood them (*pace* Jowett who has it introducing a question). In his previous question (or statement) he had assumed (or feigned to have assumed) that anybody would think the good and the fine as well as the shameful and the bad to be co-extensive, and therefore could not understand how Polus could think undergoing injustice not to be bad if he thought it shameful. For the idiom, “Now I get it”, cf. 447D6, 450C3, 465E5, 474C9, 488C1, 490D7; and *Lach.* 189E8, *Phdrs.* 257E7, *Rep.* 372E2 with my nn. *ad locc.*; also *Euthyphr.* 3B5, 9B6, 13D7; *Phdo.* 117C1; *Phdrs.* 263A5; *Phlb.* 16A6; *Rep.* 332A11, 351B6, 511B1; *Ar. Av.* 1456-61, 1529; *Lys.* 1008; *Ran.* 65, 195, 1444-5. Has Socrates given Polus a means to block the conclusion (which Polus eagerly *adopts* with his οὐ δῆτα), or has he truly located a “settled belief” (ἡγεῖσθαι) of his (which Polus emphatically *acknowledges* with οὐ δῆτα)? In either case, whether Socrates has either forced Polus to go out on a limb (as I believe and as he forced Glaucōn to do with a similar use of μανθάνω at *Rep.* 372E2) or has revealed his true attitude, we must be content not to know at this moment. In any case, Socrates has isolated the question that can allow orderly dialectical inquiry to continue.
- 843 τε (D1) goes not with the first καὶ but the second, linking the two pairs to each other (Kratz). Thus Hirschig’s busy emendation, adding τε after κακόν, is unneeded. Note the chiasm used to present opposites, for which cf. my n. to *Rep.* 349C11-D1, something often left out in translation (as by Jowett Croiset Helmbold Hamilton Allen Waterfield Piettre): this formulation has the effect of treating the two identifications Polus is denying as essentially one belief. The subject is ταῦτόν; the adjectives are predicates. The belief (ἡγεῖσθαι) Socrates attributes to Polus, that neither the good and the fine nor the shameful and the bad are coextensive, is stronger than that all good things are fine (and bad ugly) as Socrates averred at 463D, and that all fine things are good (and ugly bad), which is all that Socrates was relying on to make the inference in his previous question.
- 844 Reading τί δὲ (D3), first read by Stallb., with mss. BTPF and edd., over τί δαί (the reading of Esc. *teste* Cantarin and Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Bekker: cf. n. 838). The emphasis of δαί is out of place, unless we read the ensuing epagoge as envisioning its own denial.
- 845 καὶ σώματα (D3): “Corresponsive” καὶ is often added to the first item in a list to warn or announce that the list is long or exhaustive – e.g., 452E1-4, 508B5-6, 511E2; *Euthyphr.* 12B5-6; *H.Maj.* 292D1-3; *Lach.* 197B5-6 [after introductory πολλοῖς]; *Prot.* 325A5, 343A1-5 [exhaustive]; *Rep.* 561A7-8; and so after πάντα οἶον, as here, cf. *H.Min.* 374D8-9. Distinguish this use from copulative initial καὶ introducing *further* examples (e.g., *Euthyd.* 279A8-B2, *H.Min.* 374E6, *Prot.* 360B4) and initial καὶ γάρ (*Rep.* 344B3-5).
- 846 Reading καὶ σχήματα (D4) with BTP (and edd.) over its omission (F Olymp. 105.29). The pair is commonly used to designate the class of visibles (cf. 465B4 and n.). Helmbold needlessly blunts the pairing by translating “bodies and colors, figures and sounds and pursuits.”
- 847 ἀποβλέπων εἰς (D5) here means referring to or consulting a criterion, a meaning somewhat different from the noetic gaze off toward the εἶδος, which it is elsewhere denotes.
- 848 καλὰ (D5): The emphasis with which Socrates asked his question at C7 indicated he was there thinking of the αἰσχρόν as the shameful rather than the ugly, which in itself implied that when καλόν was adduced as its contrary (D1, for which cf. 459D4-5; *Crito* 47C10; *Euthyphr.* 7D2; *Phdo.* 70E2-3, 90A7; *Prot.* 332C3-4), it denoted the fine in the sense of the admirable. In the present list, however, the opening items presume an esthetic sense for καλόν – a presumption then attenuated by ἐπιτηδεύματα (a similar step is taken at *Symp.* 210C3 and *H.Maj.* 298B2, where the step is a *jump*). The ambiguity evinced by these examples is then *adopted* in the ensuing pair of criteria for what is καλόν and what κάλλος is (D5-E1), either its usefulness (which rather shades it toward admirability) or its pleasantness (shading it toward but not limiting it to esthetic beauty: *n.b.* θεωρεῖσθαι is here not only visual: cf. *Symp. ibid.*). These criteria do not constitute Platonic doctrine (*pace* Dodds and others), nor represent a transitional point in a putative development of Platonic doctrine that in itself makes little sense (*pace* Canto), but merely exemplify the semantic range of the terms involved as they are used (ἐκάστοτε, D5, may be said to be “empirical”), a range again at play, in a similar constellation, at *H.Maj.* 298AB and *Symp.* 210AD, 211CD), so as then to exploit that range for present dialectical purposes. In the *Symposium* there is an ascent from the καλόν as ἡδύ to the καλόν as ὠφέλιμον, at which point the ἡδύ comes to be looked down upon (*ibid.*): a caterpillar becomes a butterfly. The acceptability of the two criteria in itself reveals an homonymy that could not survive the sort of analysis elsewhere carried out by Hippias and Socrates; Polus on the other hand is unconcerned about a lurking fallacy of equivocation, but approves the formulation!
- 849 πρὸς τοῦτο (D7) *sc.* καλόν εἶναι, with Heindorf.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα<sup>850</sup> ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν  
τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;<sup>851</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν<sup>852</sup> πάντα ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τὰ γε<sup>853</sup> κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα<sup>854</sup> οὐ δῆπου ἐκτὸς  
τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλά,<sup>855</sup> τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

[475] ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων<sup>856</sup> κάλλος ὡσαύτως;

- 850 Reading καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα (E2) with BTP (and edd.) rather than χρώματα καὶ σχήματα with F. Assuming the reading of BTP above (D4), reversing the order of the terms there given constitutes, along with ἡδονή / ὠφελία, a “chiasm of before and after”: presentation before the principle is reached vs. application in the aftermath. The presence of σχήματα here cannot safely be taken to imply it was present above: to elaborate or add illustrative instances as the point is being made or when it has been made (which is what we have if we read F in both passages), is a distinct feature of Socrates’s dialectical manner (as for instance just below [E6], in the addition of νόμοι and of μαθήματα to ἐπιτηδεύματα at 474E6 and 475A1; compare also *Charm.* 168E9-10; *Crito* 47B9-10 [note the new item is introduced with γε ~”for that matter”]; *Leg.* 720E2-3; *Lys.* 220A1-6; *Phdo.* 96D8-E1; *Phlb.* 21D9-10; *Polit.* 293B5-6; *Prot.* 356C5-8; *Rep.* 333B8 [with my n. *ad loc.*], 340D2-7, 475B11-C8, 475E1[τεχνυδρίων]).
- 851 προσαγορεύεις (E3), more logically formal and explicit than καλεῖν (D5), but closer to it than to λέγειν at D6, which really denotes thinking rather than speech behavior.
- 852 μουσικὴν (E4), without warning or apology, in this gratuitous generalization of a single item in the list, might cover only the “musical” arts of the Muses (not dance or history, for instance); or it might be a free generalization meaning “art” – as at *Polit.* 307A8-B1 (cf. *Leg.* 658A7, 949A2; *Meno* 94B4-6; *Rep.* 335C9ff, 373B6-7, 410Cff). Casual ambiguity, where harmless in passing, is another feature of Socrates’s dialectical manner (cf. my notes *ad Rep.* 382D11, 455E6-6A5, and 573C9).
- 853 καὶ μὴν ... γε (E5): Mistrisotes asserts the collocation καὶ μὴν effects transition to a new category of cases, but its specific force is asseverative. Polus has agreed about the other items in the list above; with καὶ μὴν Socrates arrogates a warrant (strengthened by δῆπου, E6) to move on and press his point relative to the item still left over (this is the force of γε).
- 854 τὸ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα (E5-6): The shift to the target case is done with an unusual combination of density and grace. With τὸ Socrates reiterates the proleptic strategy he has used thrice above (τὰ καλὰ πάντα, D3; τὰ σώματα τὰ καλά, D5-6; E4-5), but this buys him a berth to introduce the remaining item of the list (ἐπιτηδεύματα) in an entirely new light. Instead of a bare repetition of that term, we have τὸ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. On its first mention (D4) ἐπιτηδεύματα had been entirely general (behaviors? practices?); but by sandwiching in τοὺς νόμους, under the protection of κατὰ and the repetitions of the definite article, Socrates slips in a claim that νόμοι are somehow related to the ἐπιτηδεύματα mentioned above, and thereby brings them into the realm of lawful behavior (a similar association is indeed introduced at *H.Maj.* 298AB [cf. 294C9, 295D5] and *Symp.* 210C, in a very similar dialectical context [cf. also *Leg.* 793D1], but given the absence of any such association at *Euthyd.* 307B4, and *Leg.* 770D2-4 [which leaps to much greater generalization], and given the range of ἐπιτηδεύσεις entertained below at 501D7ff, we are barred from treating the association as habitual in the manner of a background list). The conceptual looseness needed for associating νόμος and ἐπιτήδευμα was prepared for by the use of the parallel prepositional phrase in κατὰ just above, to generalize φωναί. Another fine detail is that κατὰ had been used differently above (D6, D7): the shift was made possible because in the interim he varied that expression with διὰ (E2, E3). The insertion of the new item, τοὺς νόμους, before the expected item rather than after it is an instance of “reverse καί” by which a specification is imported before the expected term, as if merely exegetical (for which cf. *Rep.* 343C6 and 359A3 with my nn. *ad locc.*).
- 855 Reading τὰ καλὰ (E7), from BTFP, *legg.* edd. (*om.* Y[*teste* Croiset] W : καλὰ V, *legg.* Findeisen Thompson). It stands in postponed “second” attributive position with τὰ ... κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; or to put it the other way, the latter are proleptic. The exact same ordering tactic was used with the first example, τὰ σώματα, above (*viz.*, τὰ σώματα τὰ καλά: D5-6). I accept Stallb.’s justification of τοῦ in the reading τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα: it is appositive to τούτων as τὰ καλὰ is appositive to τὰ γε κατὰ ... ἐπιτηδεύματα (τοῦ ἢ PWF, *legg.* edd. : ἢ BY, *legg.* Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Schmelzer Lodge Croiset : τοῦ T, *leg.* Routh) as essentially appositive to τούτων: for the shift to singular cf. *Leg.* 816E3-4.
- 856 τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων (475A1): This item was not listed at the beginning (474D3-4), though it is close or at least related to ἐπιτηδεύματα (cf. *Lach.* 179D7 and my n. *ad loc.*; *Leg.* 770D2-4, 831C8; *Prot.* 327A3-4, *Rep.* 560B8-9, *Tim.* 87B7 and compare the expressions at *Lach.* 181C8 and *Rep.* 527B1). For Socrates to add an example as the argument proceeds and evolves is not uncommon; it is perfectly natural, and dialectically valid because always correctible. The most general way of describing his manner in doing so is “cumulative illustration” (Campbell, *Rep.* 2.259), a technique of moving through exemplary material at an accelerated rate just before drawing the conclusion (e.g., *Rep.* 438B4-C4, 507C1-5), including generalization or lavishing particularization of the last item (e.g., *Phdo.* 70E6-1A10; *Phlb.* 21D9-10, and cf. 524D3 with n. *ad loc.*). Sometimes the last minute addition actually begins a transition to something new, as here, where the casual addition of a new item moves the interlocutor to volunteer a generalization (see next note); or as when the addition of γυμναστικής at *Leg.* 720E2-3 begins to free us from the paradigm of the doctor so that we can move on to that of the lawgiver; or as when the elaboration of the conclusion elicits a transitional objection from the interlocutor, at *Rep.* 475B11-C8. Compare also the addition of sleeping and waking to the other pairs of opposites at *Phdo.* 71C1-2, and at *Charm.* 161D-2A the re-instantiation of the principle reached with new examples that usher in the next step of the argument. For instances of clinching the point with an accelerating last minute addition of exemplary material even after the conclusion is reached, cf. *Charm.* 168E9f; *Crito* 47B9-10 (eating and drinking added [with γε]); *Lach.* 193AC (a single non-military example); *Leg.* 658A7 (ἱπικόν added to imitate the indiscriminateness of the contest maker), 716D2-3 (but note mss.); *Lys.* 220A1-6; *Phdo.* 64D (clothes), 96D8-E1; *Polit.* 284E4-5, 293B5-6 (εἶτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες); *Prot.* 332B6-C8 (where adding τῆ φωνῆ clinches the point by disambiguating the last example), 356C5-8 (adding acoustics);



ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζη,<sup>857</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῆ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ<sup>858</sup>  
ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ κακῶ;<sup>859</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.<sup>860</sup>

ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν<sup>861</sup> θάτερον κάλλιον ἦ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοις ἢ  
ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἡδονῆ ἢ ὠφελία ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.<sup>862</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ [b] ἕτερον αἴσχιον ἦ, ἦτοι λύπη ἢ κακῶ<sup>863</sup>  
ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη;<sup>864</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ,<sup>865</sup> πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγεσ  
τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. ἔλεγον.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ<sup>866</sup> αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἦτοι λυπηρότερον ἔστιν  
καὶ λύπη ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἶη ἢ κακῶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ<sup>867</sup> τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

*Rep.*340D2-7 (γραμματιστής), 475E1 (τεχνυδρίων added after harder parallels are excluded). Cf. again n. 850.

857 νῦν ὀρίζη (A3): It is only now that we see what Polus is thinking. He points back to the last time Socrates drew a distinction, at 470B9-C3, between tyrannical treatments that are beneficial because they are just as opposed to being deleterious because unjust, which he ridiculed. The present distinction on the other hand he praises (indeed it is his first compliment of the afternoon!), and γε (A2) points up an uncharacteristically amicable little pun in his remark καὶ καλῶς ὀρίζη ... ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν. It is not (*pace* Deuschle-Cron) that he is finally catching on to the enjoyable orderliness of dialectic (citing also his subsequent responsiveness as answerer [A5-E6]), but that he is relieved that Socrates has given him a real basis for separating the καλόν (admirable) from the ἀγαθόν, a basis he lacked but needed, above, when he demurred to say that being done an injustice is more shameful than dealing it out and therefore had to refuse that the ugly is part of the bad. The onlooker however can hardly fail to remember the distinction between the pleasurable and the worthwhile Socrates had used, to draw the great analogy between bodily and psychic arts and their counterfeits, according to which oratory (and the orator) provides pleasure whereas its counterpart juristic or justice (and the juror), looking off to the useful, provides the remedy (464C3-E1). The analysis of the καλόν into the pleasurable or the useful or both rings no other bells, despite the commentators' attempt to provide it with a background or pedigree from elsewhere in the dialogues.

858 ἀγαθῶ (A3): Polus substitutes ἀγαθός for ὠφέλιμος (474E3, E7) and for χρήσιμος (474D7) in Socrates's argument, but βλαβώτερον is all that he had taken κάκιον to mean above (at C5), so there is no shift in his position, as the commentators say, though there is a shift in the terminology. The substitution does imply that all ἀγαθά, qua ὠφέλιμα or χρήσιμα, are καλά, but not that all καλά are ἀγαθά, nor that the κάλλιον is ἄμεινον, nor inversely that the αἴσχιον is κάκιον, which is what he is pressed by his evasion to oppose. What pleases him about the new distinction is that it adds another kind of καλά besides the beneficial ones, those that are pleasurable; and to the ugly ones those that are painful whether they are deleterious or not, so that αἴσχιον does not imply κάκιον or βλαβερώτερον. It is exactly because he now has τὸ ἡδύ to hang his hat on that he is willing to abandon drawing some improvised distinction between the ἀγαθόν and the ὠφέλιμον. In the end, this will not avail him.

859 κακῶ (A5): Socrates formalistically follows suit with Polus's use of ἀγαθῶ above, designating the opposite of what he had called ὠφέλιμον as being κακόν rather than as being βλαβερώτερον.

860 With ἀνάγκη (A5), Polus indicates that he accepts Socrates's inference on the purely logical sense of ἐναντίον.

861 δυοῖν καλοῖν (A5): The use of the dual is brought forward from 473D9 where a comparison of two unhappy men was broached and it was said that neither could be happier than the other since both were unhappy. The back reference suggests that the peculiar logic of that statement will be brought forward here.

862 ἀμφοτέροις (A7) is neuter. It is noteworthy that the feminine gender is forgone (cf. 477D3), perhaps to echo ἀμφοτέροις from the previous line.

863 Hirschig's addition of ἢ ἀμφοτέροις here (B1), as suggested by Kratz and accepted by Thompson Schanz Mistriotes Sauppe Apelt Theiler, is slavish and unneeded after the point was twice made above. Besides, having only one of the attributes is sufficient to warrant the designation; having both is allowed and yet adds nothing. Unfortunately Mistriotes at this point identifies the exactness of dialectic (ὁ Πλάτων εἶναι ἀκριβέστατος ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ) with systematic exhaustiveness of expression. Thinking, dialectic, is alive not mechanical: cf. for example nn. 850, 856.

864 With ἀνάγκη (B2) Socrates, here and below (B8), continues the modality of logical necessity Polus himself had inferred from Socrates's use of ἐναντίον (A4). ἀνάγκη may be viewed as a predicative noun (*AGPS* 61.7.5.B), like διαφορά at 484C7.

865 φέρε δὴ (B3) marks the transition back to the main question (Deuschle-Cron).

866 εἴπερ (B5): For its function in dialectical exchange cf. n. 641.

867 καὶ (B8) extends the logical necessity impinging on the predicates to the subjects of which they are predicated.

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. πρῶτον [c] μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.<sup>868</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι<sup>869</sup> ὑπερβάλλοι.

ΠΩΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.<sup>870</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τῷ κακῷ.

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. [d]

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὠμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ<sup>871</sup> αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε<sup>872</sup> κάκιον ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.

868 οὐδαμῶς ... τοῦτό γε (C3): With this remark, Polus vociferously unburdens his audience from worrying about feeling *pangs of conscience* upon wrongdoing, by imagining for them that he, their representative in the conversation with Socrates, would feel none.

869 ἔτι (C5): Its position suggests it means not “furthermore” (*amplius*, Routh) but that the alternative is *no longer* available (*nicht mehr*, Schleiermacher; *iam ... non*, Ast). Cope pertinently remarks that ἔτι in this negative sentence corresponds to the use of ἤδη in positive sentences. The detour by which a third alternative is invented (it is gratuitous: cf. n. 863) conveys the methodical formalism of the *eliminatio* and therefore its irreversibility.

870 φαίνεται (C6): Understand it as taking participial construction.

871 Reading χρόνῳ (D2) with all mss. (and most edd.) rather than Findeisen’s emendation to λόγῳ or Cron’s athetization, which Schanz found attractive and Christ and Theiler accepted. Heindorf Beck Sauppe compare *Phdo.*117D3 (again with the imperfect): Ἀπολλόδορος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων. Dodds correctly restricts its reference to καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὠμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν. Deuschle-Cron point out that Polus has appointed himself as their spokesman, but with emphatic σοῦ (retaining accent) Socrates stresses that the dialectic needs only *his* agreement.

872 δέ γε (D4) of the second premiss, to be held in mind simultaneously (cf. n. 791).

ΣΩ. δέξαιτο ἂν<sup>873</sup> οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤττον;  
... μὴ ὄκνει<sup>874</sup> ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήση·<sup>875</sup> ἀλλὰ  
γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων<sup>876</sup> ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ [e] φάθι ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων;

ΠΩΛ. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε<sup>877</sup> τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,<sup>878</sup> ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς  
ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν<sup>879</sup> μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ὄρᾳς οὖν,<sup>880</sup> ὃ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι  
οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ  
ἐξαρκεῖς εἰς ὧν [476] μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν,<sup>881</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον  
ἐπισηφίζων<sup>882</sup> τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ  
περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον<sup>883</sup> ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα  
μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾧου, ἢ μεῖζον τὸ μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾧμην.

873 δέξαιτο ἂν (D4): Because an optative in the question presumes an optative in the answer, “the speaker virtually answers himself” (Gildersleeve §445). Socrates is now turning Polus’s taunting challenge (468E6, 471D1, 474B7) back against him. Polus notices and hesitates.

874 μὴ ὄκνει (D5-6): Note the asyndeton: we must assume that Polus is again slow to answer (with Mistriones).

875 With βλαβήσει (D6) Socrates returns Polus’s play on the term καλόν, above (A3). Polus will not be harmed by conceding the point but he may feel pain, as when one goes to the doctor (D7) for benefit even though painful. The αἰσχρὸν is αἰσχρὸν either λύπη or κακῶ (= βλάβη), but in the present case Polus’s having to admit he has been shamefully refuted is both embarrassing and disadvantageous to his own bottom line.

876 For παρέχων (D7) without reflexive complement, cf. 456B4, 480D1; *Rep.* 411A5 (Thompson suggests we compare παραδοῦναι at *Phdr.* 250E4). For γενναίως expressing noble contempt, as toward the pain of medical treatment, cf. 467C9 and n. 619: it means not “with sincerity” [Waterfield] but with *daring* (contrast ὡσπερ ἀνεί παῖς, 479A9), often used also to muster one’s participation in dialectical investigation, as here and at *H. Min.* 366E3; *Lach.* 196B1; *Phlb.* 55C6; *Th.* 146C3, 166C2.

877 γε (E3) is causal. In conceding that all men would agree with Socrates, Polus takes himself beyond witnesses (473E4-5) and counting heads, and identifies the *argument* as the cause of what men would think. Thus the agreement of one man *to a logos* – his own agreement, for instance – counts as proof for all, as Socrates immediately infers, until the others object. The commentators do object, finding it fallacious, but what “others” (A2) think is of no consequence to the conversation, the very point Socrates next makes. In his conversation with Socrates, Polus will no longer use the others to support an opinion he no longer holds. He does here use the second person demonstrative τοῦτον, but Cope’s “as you put the case now” is too personal, since Socrates can say ἡμῖν just below (476A2). It is rather with his σοι at 480E2 that Polus shows explicit signs of making the argument belong to Socrates only (cf. n. 1001, *ad loc.*). With ἀλλά in answer he dismisses any justification for delay in answering (cf. 468D6), and in this answers Socrates’s μὴ ὄκνει.

878 ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἔλεγον (E3), as at 468E3, drawing the conclusion in a way that refers back (with the imperfect) to the moment when Polus vociferously objected.

879 δέξαιτ' ἂν (E5) again repeats Polus’s challenging term, almost pedantically emphasized by repetition of ἂν (Mistriones) which appears not only with the verb but also with emphatic words (Sauppe). Contrast the less emphatic expression at the beginning of the argument (474B7).

880 ὄρᾳς οὖν (E7): There is no tone of derision here (*pace* Stallb.) but a reminiscence of Polus using this verb to challenge assent to his own *exemplum*, at 470D5. Contrast ὄρᾳς in asyndeton (491B5, 510A11; *Apol.* 24D7; *H. Min.* 372A6; *Meno* 80E1). Prolepsis of the participial phrase (it is not an hyperbaton of ὅτι) is made the more striking by the initial position of the nominative ὁ ἔλεγχος, as if Socrates suddenly remembers his own proposal to compare his kind of elenchus to that of Polus (472C4-6), his sense of recall expressed by his use of παραβαλλόμενος (the idea of taking turns had been reiterated at 474B1-2, but without verbal back-reference). Passive substituting for active (παραβαλλόντες, 472C4) gives a sense of before-and-after; substitution of aorist with present pays homage to the process in between.

881 ἐξαρκεῖς ... καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν (E9-476A1): For ἐξαρκεῖν with supplemental participle cf. (with LSJ) E. *Troad.* 653, Ar. *Eq.* 524, X. *Hier.* 7.12.

882 ἐπισηφίζων (A1), a circumstantial participle of the means used. He can ignore the others in his polling, regardless of their numbers, since for dialectical purposes he needs only poll his single partner. Polus has now resigned being the self-appointed spokesman for the onlookers!

883 τὸ δεύτερον (A3): Socrates gives ordinal designation because the elenchi are long and complicated but also because they are completely paradoxical (cf. n. 782). The two ἀμφισβητήσιμα were set out at 472E4-7; the first, whether committing injustice is worse than suffering it, has now been resolved (473B3-475E6); now we will examine the second, whether paying the penalty for doing so is better than not (476A7-479E9).

σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῆδε· τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα<sup>884</sup> τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. [b]

ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν λέγειν ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλά ἐστίν, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἶπέ.<sup>885</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος;

ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν<sup>886</sup> ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;<sup>887</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα<sup>888</sup> τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ [c] τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστὶν οἷον ἂν τὸ τύπτον ποιῆ;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει<sup>889</sup> τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς,<sup>890</sup> οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κᾶη;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

884 ἄρα (A8) is postponed, as above (A4) and at 467E7, not so much for “throwing emphasis on the words that precede it” (Dodds) as by way of allowing the subject to be identified or isolated before asking a question about it (cf. 470A9).

885 γε (B1): Again Polus has no choice but to agree that all δίκαια are to be deemed καλά (which now means they are ἀγαθὰ / χρήσιμα even if not ἠδέα), in order, as before (474C7-8), to cover up for his clients their ill motives in hiring him. Socrates’s καὶ διασκεψάμενος, warning the interlocutor to be careful about his answer, has a dramatic effect for the reader analogous to that of the interlocutor pausing to answer.

886 With τὸ ποιοῦν (B6) Socrates shifts from the (personal) masculine (τις, B4) to a neuter and reaches an entirely abstract formulation of the question, both parties to the process now being expressed in the neuter (cf. πάσχον, B4).

887 ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι (B7): A striking example of the tendency of the enclitic to come early in its clause rather than after the word to which it is the semantic / syntactic complement (cf. B4 above). Cf. 464B2, *Lach.*196C3-4, *Rep.*380D8 (and my nn. *ad locc.*).

888 σφόδρα (B8): The adverb has no specific meaning but only a force: to intensify the meaning of the verb it modifies – so that σφόδρα ὀρίζεσθαι is to define with extreme accuracy whereas σφόδρα κολάζειν is to punish with extreme severity.

889 κάει (C3): We do not yet know, but will when we read τέμνειν, that Socrates is talking about the medical procedure. LSJ notes the terms are often paired and also volunteers the assertion that the order is almost invariably τέμνειν / κάειν (e.g. *Olymp.*115.29). Thus compare, in Plato, 456B4, 480C6-7, 521E8; *Crat.*387A1-B10; *Polit.*293B2-3; *Prot.*354A5-6 (διὰ καύσεων τε καὶ τομών ...); *Rep.*426B1-2 (καύσεις / τομαί); *Tim.*64D7-8.

890 ἀλγεινῶς (C5): For this strikingly specific adverb after maximally general σφόδρα, compare the progression from σφόδρα to ταχὺ in connection with τύπτειν, above (B8). With ἀλγεινῶς, moreover, we are led to recognize that κάειν refers to medical treatment. ἄλγος is localized physical pain such as caused by an injury or a medical treatment (cf. *Polit.*293B2-3). Now that τέμνειν is determined to be medical in its meaning, the outward size of the cut (μέγα), and its depth (βαθύ) in the body can be associated with its painfulness.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τι,<sup>891</sup> ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται γὰρ τι.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ βαθὺ τὸ τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν,<sup>892</sup> τοιοῦτον [d] τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει,<sup>893</sup>

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. συλλήβδην<sup>894</sup> δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιῶν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

ΠΩΛ. ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖν;

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη,<sup>895</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τίνος ποιῶντος;

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων [e] δικαίως κολάζει;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. δίκαια.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει;

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὠμολόγηται;<sup>896</sup>

891 Reading far better attested τι (C7), from BTWPF *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Ast Bekker (*sine noto*) Burnet Hamilton Heidbüchel Erler (τις Stob.4.1.149 [= 2.93.11 Wachsmuth] Ficinus[tr. *similiter si quis secat*], *legg.* all other edd.). Irwin and Dalfen read τι but make it subject – for the sake of parallelism! Parallelism in dialectical questions is never necessary, though sometimes advisable (the idea must be given form but not be confined to the frame of the examples; the twin shoals of the aleatory and the systematic must ever be navigated to keep thinking alive); yet Ast, reading the neuter because of its superior testimony, doubts the masculine above at C4. The neuter (object) convenes well with the immediate sequel, in which at first the *objects* are compared.

892 ἢ ἀλγεινόν (C8): The interruption of τὸ τμήμα helps indicate that the three attributes are logically of the form A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, B, for which cf. *Crito* 47B1-2, *Leg.*669E6-7, 732E4-5, 897B7-8, 927E6-7, 932E3; *Menex.*249B5-6; *Phdrs.*247C6-7; *Prot.*348D3, *Rep.*537E9-8A2, 560B8-9.

893 With this step (C8-D1) Socrates appears to be asking whether the arrow goes both ways: whether the passion is also evidence for the action.

894 συλλήβδην (D2) refers (*pace* Kratz Feix) to the gathering together of the specific cases under a generalized expression or term, as here (with ποιεῖν/πάσχειν) and at 477C3-4, 484D6, 508E4; *Leg.*957E2-3; *Phdo.*70D9; *Prot.*325A2; *Rep.*344B1, 585B13-C1; *Tht.*147D8 – just as it may denote the streamlining or abbreviation of an extended expression into a formula (as at *Leg.*728A5; *Meno* 76A6 [συλλαβῶν], *Soph.*218C6 [συλλαβεῖν], *Symp.*206A11).

895 Reading ἀνάγκη (D6) with all mss. (*ἀνάγκη coni.* Richards, accepted by Dodds [who finds ellipsis of εἶναι awkward] and printed by Cantarín). That it is *necessarily* so is an overstatement in a context where ἀνάγκη has continually been used to denote logical truth (C4, B7-8, B4, cf. also the previous argument at 475A5, B2, B8). That the verb διδόναι is active already suggests it is not *logically* true; but Polus does not notice. His overstatement reveals his inner feeling, as did his reply οὐδαμῶς τοῦτο γε with asseverative vocative at 475C3. What Polus means is that no man would freely choose punishment. Thus he also finds it easy to answer whether there must also be an agent punishing him (πῶς γὰρ οὐ; D7-8). Socrates's argument will finally discover that one will “actively” pursue punishment (cf. ἔκοντα ... ὡς τάχιστα δόσε δίκην ... σπεύδοντα ... , 480A7-B1) – that the agent who leads the patient to the dispenser of justice, as to the doctor, will be the patient himself. This comes into view verbally with the use of the middle voice, at 478C4ff (cf. n. 930).

896 ὠμολόγηται (E4): With που, the perfect (in contrast with the imperfect of back-reference) emphasizes that this proposition was agreed to somehow outside of the sequence of the argument (Socrates is referring to B1-3) and acknowledges that adducing it here is a bit of an



ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

[477] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπερ καλά, ἀγαθά;<sup>897</sup> ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ὠφελεῖται ἄρα;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρα ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω<sup>898</sup> τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἶπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

ΠΩΛ. εἰκός γε.<sup>899</sup>

ΣΩ. κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται [b] κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου<sup>900</sup> κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾶς<sup>901</sup> ἢ πενίαν;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν.

ΣΩ. τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;<sup>902</sup>

interruption. Thus, with subsequent τούτων (E4) Socrates reaches back through it to the distinctions drawn between the two people, without apology.

897 ἀγαθὰ (477A1): The proof is quickly appended with γὰρ (A1-2). If καλά, then either χρήσιμα (i.e., ἀγαθὰ) or ἡδέα or both; presumably the punishment is not pleasurable; so the καλά δίκαια must be ἀγαθὰ (i.e., χρήσιμα). By a roundabout path, the three μέγιστα (n.384 and nn. 218, 505, 510) are all brought together. The passive ὠφελεῖται (A3) then serves as the equivalent of ἀγαθὰ πάσχειν.

898 ἄρα ἤνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω (A5) is an echo of 469C4, measuring how far we have come. Surely this time Polus will not interrupt but wait. There is a telescoping attraction in τὴν ὠφελίαν: the sense is, ἄρα ὠφελεῖται τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἶναι? Riddell (§196) compares *Soph.*246C6: ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας = ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὃ τίθενται τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι; cf. also *Phdo.*78D1, ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι. Cf. 469A7 and n. 661.

899 εἰκός γε (A7): I take the γε to be grudging. Dodds asserts that Socrates here assumes without proof “the remedial theory of punishment,” but Socrates is only asking for Polus’s agreement to a question whose answer is suitably obvious within the dialectical context: given the traditional tripartition of goods (those of wealth, body, and soul, called into play immediately below), the benefit that will likely accrue (βέλτιον γίγνεσθαι: cf. n. 629) from just punishment (as ἀγαθὰ πάσχειν), which itself will likely be corporeal or pecuniary, could only be psychic. But Dodds preoccupies himself with the presupposition that Socrates and Plato are trying to prove something *extra argumentum* (pp.234-5) and then disputes whether they have succeeded to; his confusion of the fiction with the world it resembles and the world he lives in is further complicated by the fact that he himself does not believe “the remedial theory” he presumes they are advocating – as he reveals below with his reference to social workers who testify that punishment of their clients only increases their clients’ resentment of law rather than remedying their souls, but this phenomenon is exactly the sort of thing Socrates has in mind with his remark further on, that the remedy must be applied quickly lest the sick soul over time become ὑπουλος and ἀνίατος (480B2).

900 ἀνθρώπου (B2): Olymp. explains the specification as setting up the κακία ψυχῆς to be the κακία of the *human* ψυχή (114.17-20) but it also sets up the κακία σώματος (even more presumably that of the *human* σῶμα).

901 ἐνορᾶς (B2): For ὁρᾶν introducing *exempla* cf. n. 880 and 470D5, where it was used by Polus.

902 τὰ τοιαῦτα (B5) is a throwaway, since the goods of the body are regularly exemplified with exactly this triad: health, beauty and strength (e.g., *Leg.*631B6-D1; *Meno* 87E6-7; *Phlb.*26B5-6; *Rep.*444D13-E2 [substituting εὐεξία for ἰσχύς but then presenting ἀσθενία as the opposite of εὐεξία], 591C8, 618A8-B1; *Cic. Acad.*1.19-21, *al.*), or of any two of these: health/beauty (452A4-B7, *Euthyd.*279A8-B1, *Leg.*661A5-B4), beauty/strength (*Leg.*646B9-10; *Prot.*354B3-5; *Rep.*491C1-4, 494C5-7) or health/strength (450A1-7 [again εὐεξία for ἰσχύς in connection with

ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν<sup>903</sup> ἡγῆ τινα εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;<sup>904</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν χρημάτων [c] καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν;<sup>905</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

ΠΩΛ. πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;<sup>906</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ὦδι·<sup>907</sup> ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστὸν ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφοτέρα αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.<sup>908</sup>

ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα.

γυμναστική], *Crito* 47A13-B3). Of course the entire category can on occasion be represented by a single good, whether health (467E4, *Meno* 78C6), beauty (*Charm.* 157E7-8A1), or strength (*Rep.* 432A4-6, *Phlb.* 48E1-9A2[stature]). Cf. n. 620. In the context of the argument about *κολακεία* it was of course the dyad of health and beauty that was relevant, as being the work of the *ιατρός* and the *παιδοτρῖβης* imitated by the delicatessen and the cosmetician, respectively.

903 πονηρίαν (B5) replaces the more general κακία from above and then immediately is read back into them (B8-C2). It can be used of a derogated or burdensome condition of things other than the soul (cf. esp. *Rep.* 408D12 and 609A6-11A3, again in contexts where the state of soul is being compared to that of organic bodies), though its sense of moral corruption is in some sense primary, as we see at the other end of the argument (478D5). I call this common semantic technique of Socrates – using a word that seems out of place but is soon justified – “proleptic skewing:” cf. n. 558; compare “passing notes” in music.

904 τὰ τοιαῦτα (B7-8) is used in parallel with its throwaway use above (B4-5). Note that here as there three items are listed, the first interrupted by a verb and then two others added, plus τὰ τοιαῦτα. The representation of the psychic good is usually and consistently done with four virtues, not three, namely δικαιοσύνη, σοφία, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία (cf. *Leg.* 631B6-D1, *Symp.* 196B5-7B9; cf. my n. to *Rep.* 331A4), consistently enough to support the famous *eliminatio* in *Rep.* Bk.IV (and *n.b.* λείπεται, *Symp.* 196D5). Sometimes all four are represented by only one to suit the context (*pace* Irwin [161] who expects theoretical justification for what is merely emphasis), thus justice here at C2 and at *Leg.* 957E2-3, or σωφροσύνη at *Phlb.* 26B7, or wisdom at 467E4 and at *Rep.* 432A4-6 – or they are called ἀρετή in general (e.g., *Charm.* 157E7-8A1, *Phlb.* 48E1-9A2). Such flexibility in usage does not presuppose the “unity of virtues” (*pace* Irwin): indeed, only the most severe speculative analysis can entirely divorce the virtues from one another. The present passage lists three opposites, with ἀμαθία representing σοφία and the fourth left out (as the list at D4-5 shows, *pace* Canto). Irwin, wanting a complete set, suggests that ἀμαθία might represent both σωφροσύνη and σοφία, and though in its plainest sense ἀμαθία is the opposite of σοφία, it can indeed appear as the opposite of either: of σοφία at *Prot.* 359B2-4, *Th.* 176C4-5 and of σωφροσύνη at *Leg.* 649D5-7 – and note that even ἄφρων can be the opposite of σοφία, as at 505B2-3 [cf. 515A5-7]), but to say that it can be either is not the same thing as saying it can be both at the same time: the settled and casual habit of listing the parts relies on an abhorrence of homonymy (unless as Irwin does not fail to notice, “Socrates presupposes his view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue”). To list only three here strengthens the dialectical parallelism with the triadic exemplification of bodily values above, and leaving out σωφροσύνη (rather than σοφία) holds in reserve the role of σωφροσύνη in κολάζεσθαι, below (with Kratz Mistrisotes Sauppe; cf. n. 776). Irwin’s insistence that Plato’s, Socrates’s, and Polus’s language be analytically correct fits poorly with its conversational character, by the same token that his own analytically purified language, needing by its nature ciphers and cardinals and proper names for propositions, fits poorly with real thinking.

905 πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν (C2): For the tripartition of goods, explicitly laid out as it is here or operating implicitly in the background, cf. 503E-504B, 511D1-2; *Leg.* 697B2-6, 870A8-B6; *Phdrs.* 239A2-40A8; *Rep.* 591BE; *Symp.* 205D4-5. The person of εἰρηκας as well as its tense (rather than λέγομεν, *vel sim.*), insist on putting Polus on record as listing these three basenesses.

906 κακίστη (C5): The path of proof is analogous to that used above for the positive grade of the inverse (i.e., that the καλὰ are ἀγαθὰ, A1-2): there we needed only to exclude pleasure, and here we need only exclude pain.

907 ὦδι (C6) suggests that the question πῶς ὦ Σώκρατες λέγεις; was a little surprised or exasperated: cf. the exchange at 469B7-8.

908 ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν (C8): At 475A8-B2.

ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ [d] ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν;

ΠΩΛ. ὠμολόγηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι, ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον<sup>909</sup> τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέρα;<sup>910</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.<sup>911</sup>

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον<sup>912</sup> καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.<sup>913</sup>

ΣΩ. ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ<sup>914</sup> ὑπερβάλλουσα [e] τᾶλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος.

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἶη τῶν ὄντων.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

- 909 The less popular but better attested reading, ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι, ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον (D2) with BTPF *teste* Cantarin (*legg.* Ficinus[tr.] Steph. Coraes Christ), is not impossible and is more elegant than F: ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον (*legg.* edd.). It merely uses the participial expression in a different way from its use above (475B6-7, 475B1-2, 475A6-7): here, ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον is not causal so as to justify the predicate αἴσχιστον, but exegetical to ἀνιαρότατον so as to draw out its noun to prepare for the parallel with βλάβη. Still, Dodds rejects this elegant *variatio* on the grounds that it would “destroy” the parallel (a circular argument: see next n.), and that it “reduces” this exegesis to “an otiose repetition” of ἀνιαρότατον. As to the reading of the end of the phrase, ἀνία is here substituting for λύπη, so that adding ἢ λύπη to βλάβη, with BTWPF (om. F Stob.), is redundant.
- 910 Reading ἀμφοτέρα (D3) with all mss. and Stob. (and all edd. except Heindorf Thompson Hirschig), virtually adverbial (cf. 469A1 [, 524C2, *Lach.* 187A3, and cf. ὁπότερα, 469A and n. 654). Varying the expression of the parallels and analogies of thought advances the induction by freeing the thought from slavish verbal formulation, as the imperfectly parallel expression of the second alternative (with dative βλάβη alone and not adjective also) has just now done. Hirschig’s emendation to dative ἀμφοτέροις (called for by Heindorf *ad loc.*) is both unneeded and inappropriate (see also the neuter ἀμφοτέροις at 475A7 and ἀμφοτέρα at 478B6, neuter rather than feminine). It is a learned excess of the great philologists of the 19th century to promulgate their knowledge of proper Greek usage by requiring Plato’s characters to speak grammatically uniform rather than conversational Greek. See, further, n. 2222.
- 911 ἀνάγκη (D3): It follows from the “definition” previously agreed.
- 912 ἀκόλαστον (D5) is now added as the fourth type of psychic baseness, representing the opposite of the virtue σωφροσύνη (cf. *Phdo.* 68E3, 69A4), the one cardinal virtue not mentioned in the sampling done above with the three others (B7: cf. n. 904). In the interim, δικαιοσύνη has stood in for the group (C2, C3, C9). ἀκόλαστον of course echoes κολάζειν, already thematic in this passage as the “action” of which διδόναι δικήν is the “passion.” For a similar trimming of the list of virtues in order to avoid a short-circuit in moral argumentation cf. *Lach.* 198A8-9 (with my n. *ad loc.*) and 190D3 (with my n.); but by the same token once the inner workings of the argument have been constructed it can be brought to the surface with still greater relevance (so, below, E5).
- 913 ἀπὸ τούτων γε (D6): For ἀπὸ taking as its object that out of which an inference can be drawn, cf. *Lys.* 204E6, *Phdrs.* 230B8, *Rep.* 549A4-5, and D. 2.27. Apelt interprets Polus’s stipulation to indicate that by now he is ready for *anything* to happen in this conversation, but Polus is referring exactly and only to 475B8-C3 (where ἀλγεῖν was last used, in connection denying that ἀδικεῖν is as painful as ἀδικεῖσθαι). Hamilton’s “Nothing in our discussion leads me to think so” is too weak, therefore. In any event Socrates immediately makes sure that Polus takes responsibility for his answer (E2), just as he had been sure that he accepted responsibility for the list of evils above (εἴρηκας, C1).
- 914 θαυμασίῳ (D7) and ὑπερφυεῖ (D6) are warranted not by the *eliminatio* (C6-D5), as Dodds seems to assume Socrates thinks, but by the earlier decision that an ill condition of soul is far more shameful and worse than an ill condition of wealth or body (B1-C5). The point deserves to be stressed since inward psychic effects are perforce being overlooked and ignored by the man who is making the argument that Polus is here making (cf. n. 868). There is some irony in the fact that Socrates can now use θαυμάσιος and ὑπερφυεῖς of the evil he condemns in a speculatively justified way after Polus had used these terms merely for rhetorical effect, to satirize Socrates’ outlook (471A9, 467B10): this is of a piece with several other more or less gratuitous back-references that invert Polus’s earlier allegations and catcalls (cf. nn. 898, 880, 810, 780, 750). Do not, with Cobet (as if *frigidissime bis dicitur* [*Mnem.* 3 {1875} 127]), delete. Theiler needlessly suggests deletion of κακῷ (which he finds allowable on the presumption that θαυμάσιος is sometimes (*nonnumquam*) two-terminus, but LSJ cites only one case and it is not Platonic [*Luc. Im.* 19]). Hamilton wrongly and without warrant associates the two adjectives with ἀλγηδόνι as well as with βλάβη and κακῷ.

ΣΩ. ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία<sup>915</sup> καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακὸν ἐστίν;

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;

[478] ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. τίς δὲ πονηρίας<sup>916</sup> καὶ ἀδικίας<sup>917</sup> εἰ μὴ οὕτως<sup>918</sup> εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν<sup>919</sup> καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;

ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας;<sup>920</sup>

ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις.<sup>921</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;

ΠΩΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;

- 915 ἀκολασία (E5) is now given prominence equal to that of ἀδικία, the leading theme of the passage, to allude to the art that redresses the baseness of soul, namely, κόλασις – an allusion continued below by introducing the term ἀκολασταίνοντας (478A4). Note how the generalizing third item in the list (ἡ ἄλλη πονηρία) continues the emphasis on the genus of viciousness (rather than its species), calling in turn for the singular verb and predicate (μέγιστον ... κακὸν ἐστίν).
- 916 πονηρίας (478A1): Here the primary or focal sense of πονηρία as moral or psychic badness is presumed, so that the specification τῆς ψυχῆς (477E5) can fall away: cf. 477B5 where it was introduced as parallel with κακία (477B2, B3). καὶ πονηρίας is therefore valid and should not be excised (*pace* Sauppe).
- 917 τίς (A1): Socrates now goes far beyond the original scope of his elenchus, and beyond justifying the conscientious recognition that virtue is the true basis for happiness, to ask a question whose answer nobody knows but everyone needs to know: how to become so. Apelt points up the transition with a lengthened translation of Polus's φαίνεται (E6): *Allem Anschein nach*. The language of a τέχνη ἀπαλλάττουσα is abnormal, but recalls that the verb was used above at 477A7 and A8.
- 918 “Second person” οὕτως (A2) means “as you are,” for which cf. *Rep.*584B2 and my n. *ad loc.* (Helmbold's “when the question is put this way” [cf. Hamilton] is an invention made unnecessary by the idiom, and to take it as pointing back to the other two answers [Canto: *comme cela*] only begs the question). It serves as a virtual connective, so there is no warrant to assume that Polus has once again paused (*pace* Mistrisotes Lodge Dodds Dalfen). Indeed, Socrates often asks a difficult question so as to then immediately backfill in order to make it answerable, thus maintaining his role as questioner and with it the structure of dialectical search – as for instance, already in this dialogue, 447D1, 449D1-2, 453D7-8, 467C5-7, 476B5-6, 477A8-B1; also 486D2-7 with n. 1192 and 495E8-9 with n. 1457. Indeed, sometimes the question is virtually unanswerable without the exegesis, as at *Lach.*185B6-E2; *Leg.*668D1-3, 686C7-7A1; *Lys.*217C4-D1; *Phdo.*65B1; *Prot.*311B5; *Rep.*507CD. Cf. n. 2267. Dalfen is right to stress how important the minor pauses can be in Plato (*ad loc.*) – perhaps more so in this dialogue than any other; and this is all the more reason to notice where Plato has put them!
- 919 ἄγομεν (A2) is vague enough to assume a semantically more specific and more appropriate meaning in the parallel to which it makes the segue: another proleptic skew (cf. n. 903) and another suggestion (cf. n. 915).
- 920 Reading καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας (A4) with BTP and all edd. (τοὺς καὶ F : καὶ Z Stob.). As a descriptor of unjust persons, ἀκολασταίνοντας alludes to the opposite of the second of the four virtues, σωφροσύνη, but is conveniently akin to the verb κολάζειν which has been used in connection with another virtue, justice, in connection with the penalty for unjust behavior (476A7-8, D8-9, etc.) and so it further corroborates the suggestion released by ἄγειν that Socrates is asking about judges (Helmbold's idiosyncratic tr. “unprincipled” throughout the passage loses the connection). Subaltern relations between the cardinal virtues are many and characteristically work through hinge terms (σωφροσύνη [ἀκολασία] ἀδικία: here, and at 505B2, *Leg.*733E5-6, 734D2-4 // σωφροσύνη [ἄφρον, φρόνησις] σοφία at 515A5-7, *Leg.*630B6-7, 906A7-8 // σωφροσύνη [ἀφροσύνη] δευλία at *Euthyd.*281C6-7). The reading of F (τοὺς καὶ ἀκολασταίνοντας) is intriguing. It could almost mean “persons who are being unjust, the ones that is who are also unbridled – i.e., have not been restrained by punishment,” as if Socrates were stipulating that the unjust persons in question had not yet been arrested. But there seems to be no case of ἀκολασταίνειν meaning “to be unpunished.”
- 921 λέγεις (A5): I agree with Routh Ast1819(who incidentally deletes λέγεις with its question mark, *sine noto*) Stallb. Jowett and Apelt, that Polus's remark is not a question, but a guess at Socrates's meaning (*pace* all other edd.): he simply acknowledges that he has grasped Socrates's verbal suggestion with ἄγειν, and this enables Socrates to move directly to his next question (A5-6). The idea was of course broached in the argument about pandering (464B8).

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή.

ΣΩ. χρηματιστική μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, [b] ἰατρική δὲ νόσου, δίκη<sup>922</sup> δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.<sup>923</sup>

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ὧν λέγεις;<sup>924</sup>

ΠΩΛ. τίνων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης.

ΠΩΛ. πολὺ διαφέρει,<sup>925</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἦτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι<sup>926</sup> ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. [c] ναί.

- 922 δίκη (B1): Forensic justice or the virtue δικαιοσύνη? The ambiguity or overlap was tolerated during the conversation with Gorgias, also, where Gorgias's concentration on the forensic or dikastic application of oratory enabled Socrates to ask him whether he teaches the virtue (454B5-7 and following: cf. n. 260; cf. also δικαιοσύνη used for δικανική later in that discussion, at 464B8 and n. 528). At the present moment Polus champions δίκη as far the greatest *profession*, alongside moneymaking and doctoring, just as Gorgias did on occasion (452E1-8, 456B1-C2).
- 923 ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας (B1): The pairing brings forward τοὺς ἀδικούντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας (A4) and ἀδικία ... ἀκολασία (477E5), in a characteristic chiasm of before and after.
- 924 Reading ὧν λέγεις (B3) with all mss. and Stob., *legg.* Sommer Chambry (all that is against it is that it is not tr. in Ficinus [Croiset's *del.* Ficinus is an incorrect description], and its non-inclusion in a lemma of Olymp.[115.14]); it means, "of the ones you have identified." Socrates requires Polus to be the sponsor of these remedies (compare his use of εἴρηκας of the basenesses they remedy, at 477C1, and ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, 477E2). Compare his pre-emption of Callicles at 504C4ff. He had asked about the ugliest affliction (αἰσχιστόν) above (477C1) and now wants Polus to decide which art is the finest (κάλλιστον) of those he named in answer to the questions about the goods of wealth, health and virtue. In the previous question Socrates had specified that it was the πονηρίαί (not wealth, body, and soul) that he was asking about (C3); this time he leaves out a specification (with bare τούτων) so that Polus asks whether it is the remedies or the remedial activities he is asking about. κάλλιστον (B3) sets up the inference, from the opposing parallel in αἰσχίστη (477C3), that δίκη is the implied answer; accordingly, Polus here as there answers πολὺ (B5: cf. 477C4). His subsequent question means "Which set?", asking to clarify whether Socrates is asking about the respites or the arts that bring them about (whether he is actually unsure or trying to evade Socrates is unclear; there is no warrant to say he is confused [Dalfen]). Kratz was the first to accept the mss. (cf. his *Anhang*), followed by Sommer (*sine noto*), but then later (*Correspondenzbl.* 15.124) Kratz attributed these words to Polus and deleted the subsequent words up to δίκης (B4), which left the following: SOC. – τί δὲ τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν / POL. – ὧν λέγεις; πολὺ διαφέρει, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. Findeisen had emended the text to ὧν λέγω (Routh did report seeing ὧν λέγω in a Bodleian ms., confirmed by no subsequent editor), and was followed by Stallb. Mistriotes Schmelzer on the grounds that the λέγω convened with the subsequent question of Polus (λέγεις), but it convenes no better than ὧν λέγεις does. The words are omitted or athetized by all the other edd.
- 925 πολὺ διαφέρει (B5): This answer follows from the higher importance given to psychic matters at 477C2-4 (and therefore 477D5-2) – indeed κάλλιστον here is nothing but the correlate of αἰσχιστόν there, fairly forcing Polus's answer, and he complies by echoing his own πολὺ from there (477C4) – but it is also true (with Schmelzer Lodge Dodds) that Polus might think the oratorical profession (including δικαστική) is more important than that of the doctor or the moneymaker, as Gorgias had (452E1-8) – or, again to be more exact, he is taking the opportunity to claim this in order to advertise his services.
- 926 τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι (B7), if passive, means "undergoing medical treatment" (often painful) – not "being healed" (*pace* Jowett) the denotation of which is very different and is something not obviously painful but probably pleasant. Heidbüchel takes it as middle, foreshadowing ὑπομεινῶν (C2), and he may be right (cf. n. 930, *infra*).



ΣΩ. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται,<sup>927</sup> ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.<sup>928</sup>

ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος<sup>929</sup> ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος,<sup>930</sup> ἢ μηδὲ<sup>931</sup> κάμων τὴν<sup>932</sup> ἀρχήν;

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμων.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν<sup>933</sup> εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτήσις.

ΠΩΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα. [d]

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντων κακὸν εἶτ' ἐν σώματι εἶτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος<sup>934</sup> καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην δίδοναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆ ἦν,<sup>935</sup> πονηρίας;

- 927 Reading ἀπαλλάττεται (C1), with all mss. Given the voice, however, the plural was expected, continuing ἰατρευόμενοι from above (*n.b.*, *liberantur*, Ficinus); but subsequent ὑγιῆ (or ὑγιεῖ) presupposes a singular subject for ὑπομεῖναι. Findeisen's emendation to ἀπάλλαττει (*sc.* τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι, B7, as subject) removes the first problem (and probably calls for ὑγιῆ in the next line) but Heindorf (followed by Stallb. Jahn) justifies the singular with *exx.* of such a shift from plural for a class ("indefinite," Woolsey) to the singular denoting a single member of it being selected paradigmatically for further clarification of the class: *Leg.* 670A7; *Prot.* 319D5, 324A7, 334C4; *Rep.* 496C7 – cf. also *Phdo.* 62D6 and see the *exx.* from both prose and tragedy at *AGPS* 61.4.1.
- 928 Reading καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι (C2) with BTPF and Stob., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Sommer Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Theiler Dodds [*sine noto*] Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler. The (strictly correct) dative is found in J (καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι), complementary to the leading construction in λυσιτελεῖ, and is read by Heindorf Ast (1819) Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Mistrisotes Schmelzer Lodge. For the attraction to the proximate construction, however, cf. *Rep.* 414A2-3, *Crito* 51D4. In either case do not athetize, with Morstadt and Schanz: without this, which Lodge finds to be an addition "unnecessary and even illogical," the pain is abided without profit. The καὶ is illative (cf. 451E1, 478D6-7, 478E3, and 480C7 with n. 997).
- 929 εὐδαιμονέστατος (C3): Socrates now (and up to 480A1) turns to the topic of happiness, following an order we often see, an order the reverse of that in which they arose – for the question of happiness was the motivation for deciding the two questions about doing and suffering injustice (472C6-E7). Likewise, the order of inquiry is often the opposite of the order of proof. Cf. nn. 977, 1768. The superlative is needed because Socrates is comparing degrees of happiness with the utter lack of it; conversely he uses the comparative below (D1) because there are only two terms (*pace* Richards). 365D
- 930 ἰατρευόμενος (C4) *middle* with Canto (*qui se fait soigner*), to bring forward the choice just advocated, and short-circuiting the active/passive model with active but passive ὑπομεῖναι. The middle is repeated at D2 and E3, and finally thematized at 480A6-B2. Cf. nn. 912, 926.
- 931 μηδέ (C4), conditional (as in Polus's answer at C5, echoed at C6 and used again in the next sequence, D3 and D4).
- 932 Reading τὴν ἀρχὴν (C4) with F, *legg.* Coraes Heindorf Beck Ast (1832) Dodds (ἀρχὴν BTW Stob., *legg.* Routh Bekker Ast (1812) Beck Stallb. Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Thompson Hirschig Schanz Mistrisotes Hermann Lodge Sauppe Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Theiler Erler). The enormous note of Lennep on this adverbial accusative idiom (*ad Phalar. Epist.* 16, pp. 82a-85b [Groningen 1777] = pp. 94-98 in ed. 2 [Leipzig 1823]) argues that the sense is *omnino* with or without the article (cf. LSJ *s.v.*, 1.1.c); the semantic connection with *ab initio* is natural (compare the use of ἀρχαῖος at 518C7 with n.) but this expression is never narrowly temporal. It is almost always used to strengthen a negation (-) rather than an assertion (+). Hermann *ad Viger* 3.3.8 (p. 591) presents a collection by Reitz (to which I add) including passages with the article (Andoc. 3.20+, D. 23.93-, H. 4.25.1 {*alii mss.*}-, *Isoc. Antid.* 272+, *Luc. Bis Acc.* 25-, *Rhet. Praec.* 8+, *Dionys.* 5- *Par.* 28- [*al.*], *Symp.* 812 [ὥστε οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν περιῶσθαι ἠξίου]-, T. 6.56-, X. *Oec.* 2.11-, 8.2-) and without (Aesch. 3.117-, Antiphon 5.73-; H. 1.9.1+, 1.193.3-, 3.39.4-, H. 4.25.1 {*alii mss.*, *legg. edd.*}-; S. *Ant.* 92-, *El.* 439-, *Phil.* 1239-; Philol. frg. B3 [D-K]-, X. *Symp.* 1.15-). Plato's usage is always in a negative context, and apart from this passage includes the article seven times (just below at 478C6-, *Ap.* 29C1-3-, *Amat.* 133B9-, *Leg.* 762D7-, *Lys.* 215B4-, *Phlb.* 63E1-, *Th.* 185D8-), and omits it only in spurious works (*Ax.* 365D8-, 370A4-, *Demod.* 381D4+). Jebb's assertion (*ad Ant.* 92) that including article is "usual" in positive sentences and omitting it usual in negatives is borne out by this collection (3 positive with, 1 positive without // 14 negative with, 8 negative without). Nothing is at stake as to the sense: with Dodds, using the article seems to be Plato's way; and the rhythm is far better including it.
- 933 ἦν (C5): The tense refers to something that was true all along, throughout the dialectical process, but was never stated or recognized as such. Cf. 508B8; *Phdo.* 68C1; *Phdrs.* 227B2, 230A7; *Rep.* 436C1; Gildersleeve §220.
- 934 ἰατρευόμενος (D2) again seems middle, as above (C4), and again at D2 and D3 – as ἀπαλλαττόμενος here may be (and at E2 and E5 also) – but Socrates's expression is (perhaps studiously) indeterminate.
- 935 ἦν (D5) is an imperfect of citation (cf. n. 570) referring to 477E4-B5. This imperfect is part of the language of dialectic (*Lach.* 193D4, 199C4; 1.193N *Rep.* 350C7 and my n. *ad loc.*), rather than the so-called "philosophical imperfect" (*pace* Dodds), which asserts something as true in the present with the added modality that it was always true (the classic instance being Aristotle's expression τί ἦν εἶναι) of which we just had an

ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει<sup>936</sup> γάρ που και δικαιότερους ποιεί και ιατρική γίνεται<sup>937</sup>  
πονηρίας ή δίκη.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο [e]  
μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.<sup>938</sup>

ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. δεύτερος δέ που<sup>939</sup> ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.<sup>940</sup>

ΣΩ. οὗτος δ' ἦν<sup>941</sup> ὁ νοουθετούμενός τε και ἐπιπληττόμενος<sup>942</sup> και δίκην διδούς.

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κάκιστα ἄρα ζῆ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν<sup>943</sup> και μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.<sup>944</sup>

instance at C5.

- 936 σωφρονίζει (D6): again placed first as if the cause of the return to a just state of soul – the connection with the adjacent virtue of temperance through its connection with κόλασις now still more explicit (compare B1, A4, and n. 920), perhaps to bring to the surface the idea that the true moral sanction for punishment is not the *lex talionis* (cf. 480E6-7), which after all is only one step away from justice being “helping your friends and harming your enemies.” In the absence of both the subject (ή δίκη, postponed to the end) and the direct object (though δικαιότερους modifies it, whatever it is), and the etymological semantics of σωφρονίζειν and δικαιότερους, Socrates’s wording creates for itself an opportunity to emphasize the two virtues that he is arguing are being restored by διδόναι δίκην.
- 937 και ιατρική γίνεται (D6-7): και is illative, γίνεται is “dialectical” (cf. n. 371), the use of the metaphor without apology (reversed, again without apology, below: 479A7-8), and the extreme hyperbaton of the subject are all striking. Though both και’s are progressive, the first one is additive and the second logical. For adjacent και’s in a list “looking like one another” but used with varying force, cf. 465B3-5, 469E4-6, 497C7; *Apol.*28A8; *Charm.*156D1-3; *Crit.*107C3-4; *Phdrs.*229B7-9; *Rep.*444A4-5, 598D4-5; *Th.*164A6; *Tim.*82B1-2 (and Stallb. *ad loc.*).
- 938 ἐφάνη (E1): “Dialectical” φαίνεσθαι, of what has come into view (*sc.* ὄν) through the dialectical process of question and answer. For a lengthy discussion and documentation of its use in Plato see my n. to *Rep.*334A10.
- 939 Reading δέ που (E2) with F M *teste* Cantarin and the lemma in Olymp., *legg.* Routh Schleiernmacher(tr.) Kratz Burnet Croiset Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarin Erlor, originally defended by Keck (*Fleckeis.Jahrb.* 80.419). δήπου is read by BTWY E1 Ξ1 M2 Stob., *legg.* Bekker Woolsey Hermann Jahn Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Sommer Schanz Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Feix, but a δέ is called for by μὲν (D8): δέ δήπου is indeed found in E1<sup>2</sup> Ξ1<sup>2</sup> and in the early editions (Ald., Bas., Steph.), and was read by Heindorf Stallb. Ast Mistrisotes Christ.
- 940 εοικεν (E2): Polus’s answers agree not only with Socrates’s assertions but with the modality he gives them (εοικεν answering που; δῆλον answering ἐφάνη).
- 941 ἦν (E3): Another imperfect of citation, referring to 477A2-8 from which the present remark is being inferred.
- 942 νοουθετούμενός τε και ἐπιπληττόμενος (E3) probably *middle*, with Canto (*celui qui se soumet aux reproches, aux châtements*), continuing the notion broached above, and now setting up a contrast with the middle διαπράζεται below (E7). The verbs further specify the tempering component (introduced with the vaguer but etymologically transparent term σωφρονίζει above, D6: compare E7-479A1 below); and then the ensuing και δίκην διδούς categorizes these tempering components as constituents of “paying the penalty” whose active voice now comes freshly alive (cf. 477D6). It is added with generalizing-illative και, whence Stallb. suggests illative μηδέ below at 479A1, in place of merely connective μήτε, after κολάζεσθαι, to conclude the negative version of the list – *pace* Mistrisotes and Lodge, who see the list as a moving from less painful to more painful penalties. Waterfield mutes the verbal voice by translating the participles with abstract nouns (“censure, criticism and punishment”).
- 943 Reading ἀδικίαν (E4) with all mss., *legg.* edd. (*om.* Stob. [*Anth.* 4.1.149 = Wachsmuth 2.96.24], *legg.* Burnet Lamb Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarin Erlor). If one has had a κακόν τι in body or soul he is not perfectly happy, but is less happy if it has not been removed; having the evil in the soul rather than body is a still unhappier state; the κακόν of the soul has been designated compendiously with ἀδικία since 477C3 (*pace* Thompson, whence Dobree’s emendation [*Animadv.*1.153] to κακίαν, which he accepts lest Socrates beg the question, is unneeded; as is Christ’s emendation of κακίαν in D8 to ἀδικίαν). Therefore he who has been infected with injustice (in his soul) but has not been remedied is living the worst life of all.
- 944 φαίνεται (E5): It is unclear whether to take this in the weak or strong sense: the question is important as to whether Polus is trying to resist the *sumperasma*.

ΣΩ. οὗκοῦν οὗτος<sup>945</sup> τυγχάνει ὢν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξῃται<sup>946</sup> ὥστε μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι [479] μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην δίδοναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι<sup>947</sup> καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;<sup>948</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε.

ΣΩ. σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὃ ἄριστε,<sup>949</sup> τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ δίδοναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων<sup>950</sup> τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φοβούμενος ὥσπερ ἀνεὶ παῖς<sup>951</sup> τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι [b] ἀλγεινόν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω;

ΠΩΛ. ἔμοιγε.<sup>952</sup>

- 945 οὗτος τυγάνει ὢν (E6): About the third man, Socrates repeats the move he had made just above about the second (οὗτος δ' ἦν ...), but whereas there he pointed backward to a type of person described in the dialectic (ἦν, E3: cf. n. 941, *supra*) he now surprises Polus by pointing to a man Polus had described several pages ago, indeed at the head of the current dialectical wave, namely Archelaus, who served as Polus's putatively dispositive and superlative example of an unjust man that was nevertheless happy: the tables have turned and now he is seen to be superlatively and dispositively miserable.
- 946 διαπράξῃται (E7) is regularly used of bad or underhanded conduct: cf. *Rep.*337E1, 360A7, 576A2 (and my n. *ad loc.*); *Symp.*181B5; – including sexual exploitation (*Phdrs.*234A3, 256C4-5; *X.Symp.*4.18 ). χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία asserts the presence within of the motive for what up to then might have been merely external acts (τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν) that might otherwise have been repented: by dint of its presence the individual now contrives by hook or crook (δια-) to avoid the penalty.
- 947 παρεσκευάσθαι (479A2): The denotation of the verb and its tense is that Archelaus is “fully equipped”: Socrates's choice of the verb eloquently encapsulates Polus's admiration for Archelaus as based upon the sort of thing you could see from the outside (cf. ὄραξ, 470D5 with n.). Socrates's response there – that he would need not to look at Archelaus but talk with him in order to know whether he was happy, now achieves its full meaning.
- 948 τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας (A2-3): This stunning list introduces the term δυναστής, unprecedented in this conversation and indeed in itself rare. It appears at 525D4-5 in a specialized list of rulers, but in the present case it functions as a generalization (*pace* Nichols) – which comes across in a translation like “potentate” or Waterfield's “leader” (though this is not adequately *realpolitisch*), or Dalfen's *Machthaber* (a convenience of German!) – but not the etymologically proximate “dynast” of Irwin, which is too specific: best perhaps is Piettre's periphrastic *hommes de pouvoir*. For a list capped by a generalizing item itself not modified with the like of πᾶς or ἄλλοι, cf. n. 548, *sub fin.* (ἄλλοι here goes with all three terms: see below). Socrates represents Polus's argument above in derogatory caricature, poured together under the single article: ‘orators who according to your ἐπάγγελμα are like tyrants because of their power.’ ἄλλοι initially has the force of generalizing from Archelaus as the paradigmatic instance of a tyrant but with a simultaneous dismissive force it gives berth to the articulation of the amalgam of roles Polus really had in mind when he first raised Archelaus, and by being in attributive position goes on to modify all three nouns. For simultaneously dismissive and generalizing ἄλλοι of this kind cf. esp. *Rep.*373A2-4 but also *Apol.*36B7-9; *Phdrs.*240A3, 267C6-7, 268B2; *Rep.*529E1-2 (not dismissive), 554D3, 610B1-2 (with my n. *ad loc.*); *Symp.*211E1-4. The paradigmatic instance of a single article inviting us to combine the items listed, might be *Polit.*258E8-9, where afterwards it is asked, θήσομεν εἰς ἓν; For other lists introduced by an article that is not repeated, cf. 450D6-7, 484A4-5, 508E1-4; *Alc. I* 117A8-10; *Crito* 47C9-10; *Euthyd.*298D4; *Euthyphr.*7D1-2; *Leg.*645D7, 645E1-2, 727C4-5, 733E1-2, 863E6-8, 885D5-7, 896D5-7; *Meno* 79A4-5; *Phdo.*79D-3, 111C1-2; *Phlb.*11B5-6, 21A14-B1; *Polit.*284E4-5, 295E4-5; *Prot.*312B1-2, 329C4-5, 357A7-B1; *Rep.*353D4-5, 501B2, 537A9-10; *Symp.*186E4-7A1, 207D8-E1. For the parallel phenomenon of the governing *preposition* not being repeated, cf. *Crit.*114E10; *Leg.*718A6-8, 777E3-4, 828B4-5, 830C9-D1, 957E2-3; *Rep.*433D2-4; *Symp.*192A4-5, 211D3-4; *Th.*152D7, 172B2-3; *Tim.*55D7-8, 84D1-2. Cf. also *Th.*171E5-6; and Riddell, *Digest* §237a (pp.219-20).
- 949 ὃ ἄριστε (A4): An instance of the adjectival vocative Socrates habitually uses to express his feelings about how the conversation is going, here his pleasure at the success of the dialectic. Cf. 515A1 and 5 and nn. 1972, 2021; *Rep.*348E5 and 522B3, with my nn. *ad loc.*
- 950 ἀμαρτημάτων (A8): The essentially moral language applied to the body (including the metaphor, δίδοναι δίκην τοῖς ἰατροῖς) are terminological “slips to weld” the analogy between bodily νόσος and psychic πονηρία. For specific uses of this sort of semantic slipping, cf. n. 1035, 479A5-7, 522A1/B7 (with n. 2169); *Lach.*192A6; *Leg.*641B1-3 (παιδαγωγεῖν transitional); *Phdo.*80B4-5/81A6 (πλάνη), 89D6-8; *Phlb.*29A10-11 (πνεῦμα / ἀήρ); *Rep.*433D1, 433E12 (ἔξις), 435E4-6A1 (vs. 436A9-10), 538E5, 552C3, 561C4; and for extended uses, as in the present passage, cf. 502CD, 503E-504C, 507E-508A; *Leg.*734E-5A6 (fabric), 797E-798B; *Rep.*428D-9A, 433-5, 444C5-E6. For a general treatment of such “slips to weld” see my n. to *Rep.*400E2-3.
- 951 Reading ὥσπερ ἀνεὶ παῖς (A9) with BTP (ὥσπερ ἂν εἶποις F Stob. : ὥσπερ ἂν εἶποις Y): Socrates now brings in the quasi-witness of a child, as Polus had (470C4-5). φοβούμενος moreover recalls the μορμολύττη of 473D3 (Mistriotes). Heidbüchel reminds us of a distinction: ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ = *als ob* / ὥσπερ ἀνεὶ = *so wie*.
- 952 ἔμοιγε (B2): With γε Polus seems aware the argument is taking him to a place that would lack majority support.

ΣΩ. ἀγνοῶν γε,<sup>953</sup> ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ<sup>954</sup> σώματος.  
 κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὠμολογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην  
 φεύγοντες,<sup>955</sup> ὧ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς<sup>956</sup>  
 ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὄσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος<sup>957</sup> μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν,  
 ἀλλὰ σαθρᾶ καὶ ἀδίκῳ [c] καὶ ἀνοσίῳ,<sup>958</sup> ὅθεν καὶ<sup>959</sup> πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ  
 διδόναι μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ

- 953 Reading γε (B3) from BTP Stob., *legg.* all edd. (δὲ F), in idiomatic asyndeton adding a stipulation in the same breath (“ignorant all along of the fact that”). Cf. *Crat.*385C12, 435A5; *Tht.*208B4; and *AGPS* 69.15.1. Contrast ποιούντες δὲ, 467B8 (where Richards *cont.* γε, on the force of a passage like this one).
- 954 ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ (B3): A “straddling hendiadys” akin to the “slip to weld,” combining with καὶ the metaphor and its corollary as if they were one and the same. The technique is used several times in *Rep.* Bk.IV where the analogy between state and soul is being annealed (435ff), and in Bk.V 444C-5B, where as here a proportion body : health :: soul : justice (cf. also Bk.X 609A3-4) is being assembled. It can designate a speaker’s blind spot or it can become the gravamen of the discussion. Cf. 496B5; *Rep.*391D6 and 442B2-3 with my nn., 565E6; *Leg.*684E8, 747A1-2, 886D8 (vs.D6); *Polit.*283C11-D1, 292A8. In *Symp.*, Eryximachus, overextends his φύσις-argument with such straddlings: 186C2 (ἀγαθοῖς ... καὶ ὑγιοῦσι), 187C3-4 (ἔρωτα καὶ ὁμόνοιαν), 188A4 (ἁρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν). See also τὸ ἀκόλαστον ... καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, 493B2.
- 955 φεύγοντες (B5) has the forensic sense (Heindorf): note the conative present. Socrates begins to broach the notion that the best self-defense would be to forgo a forensic defense (480B7-481B5).
- 956 πρὸς τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς (B6-7): The dialectical purpose of the two criteria for τὸ καλόν (cf. n. 848) now comes into view. One had thought that paying the penalty was not καλόν, not because he was ignorant of τὸ καλόν, but because although one saw it did not meet the criterion of pleasure he was blind to the fact that it met the criterion of benefit.
- 957 μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος (B7-8), a genitive of comparison *semantically* coordinate with ψυχῇ, its partner, which itself is proleptically dative (ὕγιεῖ ψυχῇ) because of συνοικεῖν (in English “with” needs to be repeated with “body” but not in Greek: the prolepsis is not a “blunder,” *pace* Cope). The ensuing datives σαθρᾶ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ then attempt to fill out the analogy with the “partner,” body, by means of the transitional term, σαθρᾶ, primarily physical and commonly the antonym of ὑγίης, but possessing a long “moral history” as well (P. N.8.34, Hdt. 6.109.5; E. *Supp.*1064), which effects a transition to ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, the most common way to designate ἀρετὴ with a pair of terms (see next n.). For the appalling “phenomenological” metaphor of sharing one’s household with sin (for as Deuschle-Cron strikingly say, the image severs a man’s personal I from his soul), cf. *Rep.*367A4 and 577A6 (with my n. *ad loc.*). The self that thinks can, through dialectical ascent, be brought to view the part of himself that is rational as though it were separate, without it thereby becoming so. This happens at the climactic moment of the *Republic* when Socrates has Glaucon look at the compounded beast that is man and to espy within it the smallest part, itself a man (588B1-9A4: cf. my nn. *ad* 588B6 and 588D11-E1) – a stunning moment since Glaucon some hours earlier had imagined that little man being invisible to the outer world, in his story about Gyges, and therefore able to pursue his desires shamelessly. Glaucon has been brought around to see that invisible inner man from the outside, through thinking. Dalfen helpfully notes the presence of the metaphor in Sophocles (*Trach.*1055, *El.*784f, *OR* 1205f, *Ph.*1168, *OC* 1133f and 1238).
- 958 ἀλλὰ σαθρᾶ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ (B7-8): The idea and the expression of it were complete once the dative ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ resolved the proleptic genitive of comparison ὑγιοῦς σώματος, but now in an access of indignation (which Hamilton, at the expense of a wild departure from the text, translates “an unhealthy, rotten, wicked, impure soul”), the metaphoric extension of disease from body to soul receives striking specification by the physical and often organic term, σαθρᾶ (cf. 493E8, *Euthyph.*5C1, *Leg.*736E7; Ar. *Nub.*317; *Plut.*814: *verdorbenes faule Fleisch*, Deuschle-Cron), which is then spelled out in abstract terms that are specific to soul, ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ, a doublet for the virtue of justice representing men’s relations to men and to the gods, which often stands for virtue in general (for which cf. 472E7, 507A8-9; and *Rep.*331A4 with my n. *ad loc.*; *Meno* 78D4; *Phdo.*75C9-D2; *Phlb.*39E10-11; *Rep.*458D8-E2, 461A4, 463D5, 479A5-8, 496D9-E1, 610B6 (cf. 615B7), and cf. 391A1-2; *Tht.*172A1-2 (cf. 172B2-3). Compare also the speech of Protagoras, *Prot.*322C7 (δίκη καὶ αἰδώς), Hes. *WD* 192, Tyrt. 12.39f (=Theogn. 937f), and Theogn. 291-2.
- As for a list of the form [A καὶ B<sup>1</sup> καὶ B<sup>2</sup>] – i.e., an initial term, “A” (here a metaphor or image) explained by a doublet of germane properties (B<sup>1</sup> and B<sup>2</sup>), cf. 457D6, *Leg.*776D8-E1, 777B5-6; *Rep.*528A4-5 [λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι]. In such a case the first καὶ means *id est*, and the second links the pair; in other cases two specifics might be followed by a third term that generalizes them (e.g., *Polit.*301D2-3, *Rep.*444A4-5, *Tim.*82B2). Conversely, a general term might be followed by two specifics (e.g., *Leg.*803E1-2: θύοντα καὶ ἄδοντα καὶ ὀρχοῦμενον; also 933A2-3; *Soph.*260C8-9 [where εἰκόνων and φαντασίας are species]; at *Phdrs.*229B7-9 we have χαριέντα ... καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ, and then a fourth term is then inferred from these: καὶ ἐπιτήδεια). But sometimes a third item might be added without warning, in exegesis to the second term only, though the uniform καὶ’s make it seem to be the middle element of a triad – e.g., *Rep.*598D4-5: ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη καὶ μίμνις. It is noteworthy in all these cases that flat καὶ may be used to link all three, inviting and indeed forcing the mind to sort things out solely on the basis of the semantics of the three terms. For this rhetorical “strategy” cf. the example at 465B3-4 and 465B4-5, Callicles at 485E1 and 492C4-5, and n. 936). Allen’s “rotted by injustice and impiety” is excellent; Waterfield’s “unsound, immoral, and unjust” misses the structure and just says something else.
- 959 ὅθεν καὶ (C1): καὶ after a relative tends to elevate the syntactically subordinate clause to semantically ordinate status, thus continuing the piling-on of derogatory elaboration. See next note.



φίλους<sup>960</sup> καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὤσιν<sup>961</sup> ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν·<sup>962</sup> εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς<sup>963</sup> ἀληθῆ  
ὠμολογήκαμεν, ὃ Πῶλε, ἄρ' αἰσθάνη τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ βούλει  
συλλογισώμεθα αὐτά;

ΠΩΛ. εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.<sup>964</sup>

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει<sup>965</sup> μέγιστον κακὸν ἢ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ [d] ἀδικεῖν;

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην δίδοναι;

ΠΩΛ. κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. τὸ δέ γε μὴ δίδοναι ἐμμογή<sup>966</sup> τοῦ κακοῦ;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

- 960 καὶ φίλους (C3): At this moment the influence of the καὶ that had come with χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι begins to shrink its regime back to the object, χρήματα, since this second καὶ adds φίλους, which would be a second object for παρασκευαζόμενοι; but then immediately we have another καὶ that introduces a second verbal construction (ὅπως ἂν) that would presumably be coordinate with the participle that had governed those objects. Our presumption with καὶ, as a proclitic, is that it is introducing a logically coordinate or correlative item, but there are of course several other uses (e.g., expegetic, illative, emphatic). Among these there is an essentially conversational usage that adds an item or items with an urgency or breathlessness (whether indignant, triumphant, impatient, excited, or satirical), that may or may not deign to worry about logical order. Cf. 465B3-4 and 4-5, 473B12-D2, 484A3-5, 485E1, 486D1, 494E5, 507E6-8A3, 525AD (*passim*), 527BE (*passim*); *Alc. I* 122C4-8; *Charm.* 156D1-3, 161E12-13; *Crat.* 408D6-E1; *Crito* 51A7-C1; *Leg.* 669C8-D2, 734D7 (“triumphant exuberance,” England), 839A7-B1, 885D5-7, 892B3-4, 942B4-5; *Phdo.* 66D5-6; *Prot.* 324C6; *Rep.* 344A7-9, 360B7-C3, 402C2-4, 433D2-3, 568D5-6, 573A5-6; and n. 1066 on Callicles’s own use of such καί’s.
- 961 ὅπως ἂν ὤσιν (C3): The second item (or the third, depending on whether we count καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους as one item or two) in the spelling out of πᾶν ποιῶσιν is, as we expected earlier, an object clause not quite parallel with the participial construction, though καί, which because of the syntactic shift was not needed, seems to assert that it is.
- 962 καὶ ὅπως ἂν ὤσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν (C3-4): A shocking surprise at the end of an excited list, broaching the hitherto suppressed object of oratorical skill, telling exactly what it is that Polus and Gorgias are peddling and what their prospective clients, including the Athenian auditors here present, are deciding whether or not to buy; and thereby laying a foundation for the question about the usefulness of oratory that Socrates adds after the dialectical scrutiny of the two disagreements between himself and Polus is completed (480A1-481B5).
- 963 ἡμεῖς (C4): The nominative pronoun, because unnecessary, is emphatic. Socrates is distinguishing Polus from “his” imaginary men – those Socrates had referred to with οἱτοὶ (*vel sim.*).
- 964 Reading σοί γε ἄλλως (C7) with BTPWF E3 L Olymp.[λ], *legg.* Dodds Cantarin (μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως YE3<sup>2</sup>L<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh[*nisi tibi quidem aliter videatur*] Heindorf Beck Ast[*nisi quid tibi videtur secus*] Coraes Bekker Stallb. Cary[unless...] Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Sommer Mistriotes Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Lamb Helmbold Feix). Schanz had conjectured σοί γε without ἄλλως (*Nov. Comm.* 90), which Burnet later reported and printed as the reading of F (so read by Croiset Apelt Zimmermann Theiler Chambry Irwin Allen Canto Pietre Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler). But Dodds insisted that F reads σοί γε ἄλλως, along with BTPW (followed in this by Cantarin), and adopted it as meaning, ‘Go ahead if it seems right to you anyway’ – a “formula of grudging acquiescence” quite appropriate to the context, and comparable to the grudging acquiescence of 480E1-2 (cf. n. 1001). His interpretation was adopted by Zeyl. The tone and affect of Waterfield’s “Summarize them by all means if you feel like it” (compare Nichols) is unclear, but they appear to be reading ἄλλως. For ἄλλως in this sense cf. *H. Min.* 367D5 (ignoring Bekker’s deletion), *Rep.* 495B2, Hdt. 8.30.2 (*gratia* Dodds) and Olympiodorus’s attempt at clarification *ad loc.*, εἰ δοκεῖ σοὶ καὶ ἄλλως συλλογίσασθαι (116.19-23). As elsewhere the recalcitrant interlocutor evades admitting he has been refuted by stipulating that his “Yes” is granting a favor (cf. 513E1, εἰ βούλει; 514A4, εἰ σοὶ ἥδιον; 516A4, ἵνα σοὶ χαρισώμαι), rather than truly agreeing, (compare Thrasymachus at the end of *Rep.* Bk.1). Note that Polus now answers Socrates’s βούλεσθαι (C5) with δοκεῖν (C7), as if the distinction Socrates had insisted upon a few moments ago, and which there, at least, he was scrupulous to observe (cf. n. 651), has finally come into play for himself! If anything, Polus does not *want* the conclusion to be drawn, especially since Socrates has finally brought home the relevance of what they are saying about justice (which for Polus is a topic of no interest at all) to the operation of oratory (C3-4), but Socrates has good *reason* to do so, for the sake of making the argument clear and moving on to the most important question, happiness.
- 965 συμβαίνει (C8): This “upshot” – for that is what συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου means – will presently be revised and not left as the final result (D4). We need a way to mitigate this problem. Stallb.’s suggestion at D5 (see below) fixes it at the cost of emendation; Hamilton leaves space for a still greater evil by translating μέγιστον at C8 with “very great;” but Dodds resolves the problem by seeing that doing injustice is μέγιστον measured against the κακά of body and wealth (disease and poverty). For the appearance of illogic compare Socrates’s original statement of the idea at 472E4-7. For the personal use of συμβαίνειν (for which as for the impersonal we must supply εἶναι) cf. *Alc. I* 130C3, *Crat.* 398E1, *Leg.* 671C1, *Parm.* 134B1 – often used to stress that the implication is unforeseen – a point missed in Ast’s long disquisition on the verb, *ad loc.* Cf. also my n. to *Rep.* 502C5.
- 966 ἐμμογή τοῦ κακοῦ (D3): The genitive is quasi-objective, forced upon ἐμμογή by the parallel of the ablative genitive with ἀπαλλαγὴ. The sense is that not paying the penalty constitutes staying within the regime of the evil as opposed to being released from it.



ΣΩ. δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν·<sup>967</sup> τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.<sup>968</sup>

ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ<sup>969</sup> περὶ τούτου, ὃ φίλε,<sup>970</sup> ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα [e] δίκην οὐδεμίαν δίδοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τὸναντίον οἰόμενος, εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισοῦν<sup>971</sup> μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν<sup>972</sup> ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ δίδοντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ'<sup>973</sup> ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

ΠΩΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἔλέγετο;<sup>974</sup>

ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.<sup>975</sup>

967 Reading τὸ ἀδικεῖν only (D5) with all mss. and all edd. except Stallb. (*coni.* τὸ ἀδικεῖν δίκην δίδοντα) and Hirschig (*coni.* τὸ ἀδικοῦντα δίδοναι δίκην), the latter followed by Schanz, attempting to add, for Socrates, the stipulation that the evildoer has paid the penalty; but Socrates wants to move from the evildoer *per se* to the evildoer that goes on not to do so – so that the worst, which is Polus's best, can come last. The following phrase, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην, might have been Polus's *praise* of Archelaus! The new idea that going scot-free is even worse requires the perspective of the ἐμνομή, which is not a given. Hence at 509B2-3 the paradoxical idea is put this way: καὶ ἐτι τούτου μείζον, μέγιστον ὄντος, εἰ οἷόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην. The distinction between ὁ ἀδικῶν and ὁ ἀδικός has finally been brought into play (cf. n. 792). But the true precedent and motive for this idea is to oppose the sarcastic affect of Polus's concluding sentence on Archelaus, τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκώς ... ἀθλιώτατος ... ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, 471C6-7, on which cf. n. 742.

968 πέφυκεν (D6) suddenly adds a strong modality we have not seen above, correcting the “way of the world” and the conventional acceptance of the opposite position.

969 Reading οὖν οὐ (D7) with FY, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Ast Bekker Woolsey Hirschig Sommer Burnet Croiset Dodds Chambry Nichols Cantarín Dalfen Erlar (οὖν BTP, *legg.* Stallb. Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistriotes Christ Lodge Sauppe Lamb Feix Canto Heidbüchel).

970 ὃ φίλε (D7): The affect here expressed is that their disagreement has been removed for them through the friendly work of dialectic (cf. nn. 949, 797), which recalls Socrates's request, at the beginning of this round, that Polus be so *friendly* to him as to disabuse him, by means of dialectic, of his own folly (470C7), which he has in fact just done for Polus! ἠμφεσβητήσαμεν here means to “be of” differing opinions, not to dispute (*pace* Irwin: cf. 457D1 and n. 341).

971 ὅστισοῦν (E2): Socrates now perfects a categorical response to Polus's oratorical reliance upon an *exemplum* at 470DE (cf. nn. 720, 721, 722, 723, 725, 727) by moving to the principle – continued by ἀεὶ (E4).

972 προσήκειν (E3): The expression emphasizes that it is from the internal logic of relations among the axiological properties that this predicate will apply to him: it elaborates the modality introduced by πέφυκεν above (Dodds: it “both asserts the connection and implies its rightness”). Once again Socrates is turning one of Polus's own terms back on him in a use against the meaning he gave it (cf. 471A4).

973 οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν (E6): Mistriotes astutely notices that Socrates herewith perfects an answer to Polus's challenge, ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον, 473D1-2 (cf. n. 812): still another turning of the tables.

974 ἐλέγετο (E8): Socrates drops ὑπ' ἐμοῦ (E6) and, with the impersonal passives, perfects the clarification that dialect is indifferent as to the *by whom*, but is concerned only with the *what* that is argued.

975 φαίνεται (E9): Not only does Polus agree with Socrates (C7-D6). He also no longer agrees with his own initial position (D7-E9). Socrates was able to carry through two elenchi with him (474C4-479E9) because their subject was not oratory or injustice (the subjects Polus must gingerly defend) but the interrelation (rat's nest?) of epideictic value-predicates – good, admirable, beneficial, and their contraries or contradictories – considered in themselves and in isolation from those subjects (indeed, the ποῖα as secondary [448E6-7, 462C10-D2] have become primary τίνα!). As Cope noticed early on (tr., p.46 n.1), these elenchi have included, as we have seen, several steps that rely upon unstated premises, equivocations, presumed analogies, and even nothing more than the configurations of items in lists, including a new list of the meanings of καλόν, to which steps Polus agreed with little or no hesitation. Each logical peccadillo can be reformulated as a semantic technique (cf. nn. 903, 920, 948, 950, 954, 958, 960). The syllogistic result of these agreements about the predicates, when applied to the subjects of oratory and injustice, constitutes a huge and perhaps total devaluation of the instruction Polus has come to Athens to sell (480A1-481B5). One reader will liken the paradox Socrates foists upon Polus, that undergoing is better than doing injustice, to a Stoic position – irrelevantly (*pace* Thompson); another reader may well identify several points at which Polus's agreement about the predicates and their relations might justifiably have been withheld, with the result that these results would not have come about (Irwin, Waterfield); when Polus nevertheless agrees, as if to his own detriment, the reader might go further and, posing as the defender of Polus or even of the truth, accuse Socrates, or worse, Plato, of ill-intent and conscious deception – unless of course he goes so far as to accuse Plato of failing to see the weak points that he himself has seen. But the immediate application of the paradox Socrates chooses, and the results of his elenchus in concert with Polus, are all that matters to the drama, which is exposing the teaching of Gorgias and Polus as inappropriate to and corrosive of democracy, a regime where tyrants and tyrannical types (τύραννοι καὶ ῥήτορες καὶ δυνάσται, 479A2-3) are not welcome. The logic by which the agreements are reached needs neither to be valid nor to be reproducible in some other context or some ideal meta-conversation, but to the contrary needs only engage the thought of the interlocutor and the silent audience standing by, in such a way as to achieve his (and their) agreement within the perspective of his (and their) own thinking (esp. visible at 475C3 and 476D6-7, agreements which Socrates has just now given him an extra opportunity to rescind). Polus neither has nor desires to have a rational defense of oratory but only to sell it – he trades in trust and belief and above all seductive obscurantism, not teaching (cf.

[480] ΣΩ. εἶεν·<sup>976</sup> εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὃ Πῶλε, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία<sup>977</sup> ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν<sup>978</sup> ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν ἂν κήδηται, αὐτὸν<sup>979</sup> ἐκόντα ἰέναι ἐκεῖσε<sup>980</sup> ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἱατρὸν,<sup>981</sup> [b] σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγγρονισθῆν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὑπουλον<sup>982</sup> τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν,<sup>983</sup> ὃ Πῶλε, εἶπερ<sup>984</sup> τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις<sup>985</sup> οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή;

454C7-E2 for the distinction) – as his method of elenchus (i.e., defeat) by cajolery, threat, ridicule and demagoguery (470C-473E) has shown. He may agree so as not to appear captious, or may disagree so as to appear fearless, or may agree out of shame, as he told Socrates Gorgias had done and probably did himself when he declared that doing injustice is αἰσχρὸν (474C7-8). Socrates's most fearsome and beloved conversational skill is not logic-chopping but recognizing the interlocutor's values in the way he behaves and speaks, and then luring them up to the surface, as motives and bases for argumentation, with the result that the interlocutor's emotional commitments lead him, and expose him, to as much truth and self-scrutiny as he can sustain, and usually more – all to his happy amazement, stunned surprise, fearful resistance, or truculent resentment. Indeed, if anything it was to Polus's benefit, not his detriment as some analytic commentators would say, that he has here agreed with Socrates. If the analytic reader wishes to think of himself as a would-be interlocutor for Socrates, he would do well first to ask himself whether Socrates would take the trouble of talking with him at all, and if so why, or – what comes perhaps to the same – whether Plato would see fit to memorialize such a conversation with a dialogue.

- 976 εἶεν (480A1): By this "clearing of the voice" Socrates makes a transition beyond the program of resolving the two ἀμφισβήσιμα, to the prior question that initiated the entire discussion, the δύναμις of oratory – the ability, that is, that one would pay Polus or Gorgias to confer onto oneself. With δὴ he expresses his reliance on Polus's agreement as casually, and as insincerely, as Polus granted it (again at A2).
- 977 μεγάλη χρεία (A2) now brings forward the prior question of the δύναμις δαίμονια of oratory (456A5). Qualitative δαίμονια has been scaled down to quantitative μεγάλη (sacrificed to French idiom in Piettre's *belle utilité*) which echoes the intervening notion of the orator's putative μέγα δύνασθαι that Gorgias and Polus have argued is conveyed upon him by the art; and δύναμις – empowerment, prerogative – has been brought into the world of moral prudence by χρεία, which connotes needful utility, because the exploration of the putative value of extroverted power exercised at the expense of others, active over passive, has proven it to be an illusion and provided the occasion to discover the pre-eminent need to keep one's inner soul healthy through introverted action upon oneself. By asking whether it is "great," he proposes to measure it against the health of the soul, in the context of which the blind seeker after power through oratory or other means (479A2-3) becomes ridiculous, and the extroverted uses of such power can now become an object for satire (B7-481B1). All this is irretrievable in Waterfield's tr., "what *particular use* is rhetoric?" Dalfen correctly notes that χρεία can mean need (*Bedarf*) as well as usefulness (*Nutzen*), but these are two sides of one coin, the one to protect against the bad and the other to acquire the good. The important thing is that unlike δύναμις, χρεία operates in a world of value. Once again Socrates moves forward to the question that came before (cf. nn. 929, 945, 947, 951, 967, 970-973, *supra*).
- 978 ἱκανὸν κακὸν (A4): Not a paradox and needing no emendation against unanimous mss. (*pace* Cobet, Kleist, Christ). It is true that ἱκανός can be used in understatement and litotes (for which cf. *Phlb.* 52D8[mss.BT]; Antiphon 2.2.6, 2.2.2]; Ar. *Pax* 354; and its favorite use by Callicles, *infra*), both in quality (good for bad) and quantity (enough for too much), expressing rueful and moderate sound-mindedness (*ein grosses Übel*, Schleiermacher), but here Socrates uses the term merely to retain a berth for the excessively bad condition of the person whose injustice goes uncurd through paying the penalty. Hence with Canto, "le malheur qu'on en a est déjà assez grand." I do not understand Allen's expression, "and thus get sufficiency of evil."
- 979 αὐτόν (A7): Repeated in parallel with A3. The antecedent of the pronoun is identical to the (indeterminate) subject of ἀδικήσῃ. Cf. 469C6 and D7, and *AGPS* 61.4.6.
- 980 ἐκεῖσε (A7), a place well-known: indeed, Socrates left Polus to guess it (478A5) and now reminds him of the analogy that led him to it there.
- 981 ὥσπερ πρὸς ἱατρὸν (A8): Now it is Socrates that is the speaker whose role is to persuade the patient to accept the ministrations of the doctor! Cf. C5-D6 below.
- 982 ὑπουλον (B2) strengthens σαθρῶ from 479B8: the sickness penetrates into the body (Deuschle-Cron): cf. 524C6 and E5. The metaphor is quoted by Plut. (*QP*, 1000C). ἐγγρονισθῆν means not that the disease "becomes chronic" (Irwin Allen Canto Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel) but that time passes before it is treated so that it becomes worse (chronic disease is a much broader concept). The participle is causal.
- 983 Reading λέγομεν (B2) with WPF (= *quid putamus?* – *quaerentis*), *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast (1832) Stallb. Woolsey Sommer Schanz Burnet Apelt Theiler Dodds Irwin Allen Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel Cantarin Erlar (λέγομεν [= *quomodo dicamus?* *quid dicturi sumus?* – *deliberantis*] BT, *legg.* Schleiermacher[tr.] Coraes Bekker Cary Hermann Jahn Kratz Cope Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Mistriotes Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Lamb Feix). For this indicative, adding "passion" (*AGPS* 53.1.9, 54.1.3), cf. 455A8, 513C3; *Euthyph.* 10D1; *H.Maj.* 303A1; *Leg.* 649A6; *Phdo.* 75B2, 79B12; *Rep.* 373D5 (*sed λέγομεν* ms.A), 377E5, 530D9 (*sed ποιῶμεν* F); *Tht.* 161D2 (*sed λέγομεν* BTW), 182C11; *Epin.* 980B7.
- 984 εἶπερ (B3): *περ* in itself proves Buttmann's contention (*apud* Schleiermacher) that these words go with what precedes and not the sequel (*pace* Heindorf Richards).
- 985 ἐκείνοις (B4): The "remote" demonstrative reinforces τὰ πρότερον (B3). The elenchi (ἐκεῖνα) imply a new criterion of behavior (ταῦτα) that goes against the usual assumptions of self-interest as winning oratorical success. This new orientation will in turn have implications for the value of oratory in one's life. Once the new criterion of life is shown to devalue oratory, Polus will wish not to have accepted it and in fact can be expected to drop it since he has no stake in any theory of justice or the good or of beauty (the μέγιστα) but in only selling his services. Socrates has broached the fateful challenge to oratory already (480A1-2), but before drawing the inference in full dress he lays out the implications of the elenchi for living, one after the other (A2-5; A6-B2), bearing on the two points he painstakingly set out as their points of disagreement (472D1-473B7). Finally he asks for Polus's agreement that the new criteria are indeed the implication of the elenchi (B2-5: cf. 479C4-6).

ΠΩΛ. τί γὰρ δὴ<sup>986</sup> φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐπὶ<sup>987</sup> μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος<sup>988</sup> ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ μὴ εἶ<sup>989</sup> τις [c] ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ<sup>990</sup> τοῦναντίον—κατηγορεῖν δεῖν<sup>991</sup> μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ,<sup>992</sup> ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκειῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν αἰεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν,<sup>993</sup> καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι<sup>994</sup> ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ<sup>995</sup> αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα εὖ καὶ<sup>996</sup> ἀνδρείως ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῶ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ

- 986 τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; (B6): γὰρ assentient, emphasized by δὴ, and the question is merely rhetorical: “What, given all that, *are* we say (*sc.* about oratory)?” Commentators (Routh Ast Stallb. Cary Cron Schmelzer) supply ἄλλο and take the expression to be looking backward, answering λέγομεν and expressing agreement (and, for Schmelzer, embarrassment): *Quid enim aliud dicendem, quaeso* Routh; *qui aliter iudicemus, Socrate?* Ast[1819], citing *Crito* 50C2 and *Rep.*332C4. Their parallels (justifying the absence of ἄλλο) are, however, faulty, for they have ἢ and ἀλλά (cf. instead L.Bos, *Ellipses Gr.* [London 1825] 17). With Schleiermacher (*Was wollten wir auch sagen!*), I take the remark to be looking forward to the only thing Polus cares about, the momentarily postponed evaluation of oratory, as Socrates’s words at the end of what he has to say indicate (φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε; D6-7). Either way we take it, Polus continues simply to play sounding board to Socrates, as he has done since 479C7.
- 987 ἐπὶ (B7) means “for the purpose of” (Cope) not “as a means to” (Thompson): oratory *would be useful* as a means to persuading the jury, but to employ it for that end would be *useless* since that end is worthless. Helmbold opts for something like the latter (“When a man defends...” etc.) and makes a hash of the paragraph.
- 988 πατρίδος (B8): For this *figura etymologica* cf. *Lach.*181A8-B1. Socrates briefly alludes to the other branches of oratory other than the forensic (Lodge) as if to include them by loose implication.
- 989 εἰ μὴ εἰ (B9): The redundant εἰ (for which cf. *Alc. I* 122B7, *Lach.*196A6, *Rep.*581D2, *Symp.*205E6) evinces how εἰ μὴ has coalesced into a single word like English “unless.”
- 990 Reading ἐπὶ (C1) with BTPf and all edd. except Deuschle, who followed the doubts of Findeisen and Heindorf, and Lodge and Sauppe who followed him and read ἐπεὶ from F. Nothing stands against the phrase being adverbial (*pace* Deuschle who deleted it), with Schleiermacher Stallb. Cary (Thompson notes similar prepositional formulations in εἰς [*Soph.*221A2], κατὰ [*Tim.*36D4], and well as ἐξ ἐναντίας [*Phdo.*113C5, *al.*]). Ficinus *nisi quis iudicet contra oportere rhetorica uti ...* is not evidence against ἐπὶ. It is indeed equivalent to τοῦναντίον as used below (E5), but ἐπὶ is here brought forward from ἐπὶ μὲν at B7 above. The opposition referred to is not between useful and useless but defending (ἀπολογεῖσθαι, B7) and prosecuting (κατηγορεῖν).
- 991 δεῖν (C1) is dependent upon ὑπολάβοι, with Routh (*nisi quis existimarit contra oportere accusare...*) Cary Cope Jowett Helmbold Chambry (*pace* Findeisen Heindorf Ast Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriones Apelt Feix Irwin Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel, who *sc.* χρήσιμον εἶναι, taking κατηγορεῖν δεῖν as expegetical, and Wecklein Theiler who, believing this, see fit to delete δεῖν; and *pace* Burnet and Erler, who place a dash). Socrates is bringing forward the oppositeness between Polus’s view and his own (τοῦναντίον, 479E1). The options are to abandon oratorical study as harmful if it perpetuates the disease of justice, which is in fact the standard use for it (the use Polus and Gorgias are selling) – to this much Socrates and Polus are already committed – or, contrary to all precedent, to employ it in a new way (where only a notional τις is posited as agreeing, who represents the view Socrates and Polus have reached).
- 992 μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτοῦ (C1-2): The language recalls Polus’s taunting ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος (471C8-D1), according to which Socrates would needs be the first to avoid becoming Archelaus, for now Archelaus would now be the first person to spurn being Archelaus.
- 993 καὶ τῶν οἰκειῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν αἰεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν (C2-3): Dodds imagines that with the vaguer term τῶν οἰκειῶν Socrates means to leave out advocating the prosecution of one’s parents and fatherland, who were explicitly enumerated just above, but the emphasis of corresponsive καὶ ... καὶ and the unstinting generalization ὃς ἂν leave out nothing at all. To include them, Dodds says, followed by Canto, would contradict what Socrates says elsewhere, citing *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, and *Ep.*7 (though he acknowledges that Socrates’s case here is airtight). But the argument for filial piety at *Crito* 50E-51C is made by the Laws, who are not Socrates, not Plato, not philosophers, and cannot participate in dialogue; Socrates’s remark at *Euthyphr.*4E does countenance a justification for prosecuting one’s father, namely, ἐπιστήμη (E4-5): the only hesitation is whether Euthyphro has it; and *Ep.*7.331BD, even if not a forgery, provides the criterion operating in both those passages, for it describes how Plato treats people whom he cannot take seriously since they will not engage in dialogue. Meanwhile, Plato is not forcing Socrates to say something that will jibe with what he has had him say elsewhere, but having him draw a conclusion that is satirical in the great tradition of the spoudaiogeloios, in order to drive Polus beyond the pale.
- 994 ἀποκρύπτεσθαι (C3): Thompson notes the middle can be transitive but the important point is that the middle is here used to criticize not the act but the intention.
- 995 Reading δὲ καὶ (C5) with BTWPf, *legg.* Routh Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Mistriones Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Lamb Feix as better attested (τε F, *legg.* Burnet Theiler Canto Heidbüchel Erler : τε καὶ *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Ast Coraes Bekker Stallb. Hirschig Woolsey Sommer Schanz Croiset Dodds Cantarín). Several edd. but (*n.b.*) no ms. reads τε καί. We have not a τε καί of cause and effect (*pace* Ast1832), but rather δὲ plus καί, the καὶ doubled with ἄλλους, as again below (καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων..., D3-4).
- 996 Reading μύσαντα εὖ καὶ (C6) with F, *legg.* Ast[1832] Hirschig Burnet Theiler Dodds Zeyl Nichols Piettre Cantarín Erler (μύσαντα καὶ BTPYW, *legg.* Routh Schleier. [fr.] Heindorf Beck Ast[1819] Coraes Bekker[*sine noto*] Stallb. Cary Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Cope Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schanz Mistriones Schmelzer Lodge Sauppe Croiset Lamb Feix Chambry Dalfen Heidbüchel). The Greek says “shutting your eyes” where we might say “facing the music” or “gritting your teeth” (whence Naber thinks to add μὴ before μύσαντα [*Obs.crit.* {1862}7], which incidentally requires him to replace μὴ with μηδὲν at C7) – but Socrates is not envisioning the Stoic Sage, as Stallb. claims: it is more like looking away while the doctor cuts (Olymp.120.8-11). Richards helpfully cites [Aristides] 25.34: ἀπαλήσαντας εἰς καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον μύσαντας φέρειν (2.81.21-2 Keil = 1.810.19 Dindorf; the proverb is absent from *CPG*. Stallb. reads μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως and glosses out the metaphor with “*patienter et fortiter.*” Ast and Dodds object to Stallb.’s linking of conditional participle with adverb as parallel modifiers of παρέχειν and read the pair of adverbs (εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως) with μύσαντα (*oculis bene et fortiter clausis*); but Deuschle-Cron cites Krüger, *Gr.Sprachl.*59.2.3 (*ibid.* *AGPS*), which cites several cases from Attic prose and poetry of adverb coordinated with adjective (incl. καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, *Phdo.*79D8). The pairing εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως seems an pleonasm of the *Umgangssprache*, a bit like “well and good” in English (cf. not

καλὸν<sup>997</sup> διώκοντα, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκῶς [d] ἦ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα,<sup>998</sup> αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ<sup>999</sup> ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.<sup>1000</sup> φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὃ Πῶλε; [e]

ΠΩΛ. ἄτοπα μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι<sup>1001</sup> ὁμολογεῖται.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ κάκεῖνα<sup>1002</sup> λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

ΠΩΛ. ναί, τοῦτό γε<sup>1003</sup> οὕτως ἔχει.

only 521A7; *Crat.*440D4; *Leg.*648C3, 855A4; *Th.*157D4 but also *Ar. Vesp.*153, *Thesm.*656) and moreover makes the exhortation more rhetorical and persuasive, besides convening nicely with ampliative ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν in the next line. By a marvelous serendipity Socrates's orator is doing just what Gorgias bragged of doing – persuading the patient to obey the doctor (456B1-5) – but this “orator” knows the true levers governing health and sickness of soul: instead of the doctor disappearing (456B8), the patient closes his eyes.

997 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν (C7): The single article and the order suggests that καὶ is illative (for what is ἀγαθόν is καλόν), and the immediate reference to pain (τὸ ἀλγεινόν) again stresses that there are two very different criteria for τὸ καλόν, while only one is sufficient.

998 ἀποθνήσκοντα (D3): Socrates now gives his own list of judicial punishments, beginning with a new one (πληγαί) and then looking back to include (and thereby answer) all the others that Polus had brought up in this phase of the argument as examples of the orator-tyrant's power, now listing them in ascending order of graveness (cf. n. 584): the great difference is that we will willingly be undergoing them rather than arbitrarily inflicting them upon others.

999 Reading οἰκείων καὶ (D4) with BTPW Ficinus and edd. (οἰκείων μὴ φειδόμενον ἀλλ' εἰ F : οἰκείων ΖΝ : οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φειδόμενον Ζ<sup>2</sup>ZaY and the early editions, *legg.*Ast Coraes Beck).

1000 Reading ἀδικίας (D6), with BTF with all edd. (*om.* PW). The climactic hyperbaton echoes the hyperbaton of ἡ δίκη at 478D7, and should be kept, with the support of both major families (F and BT).

1001 Reading σοι (E2): with all mss. and most editors (it is absent from tr. Ficinus), deleted by Hirschig. Woolsey and Jahn try to minimize it (“*I am willing to own it to you that...*”) in order to avoid athetizing it (with Coraes Heindorf, while Cary Chambry Hamilton Allen Canto leave it untranslated), but Polus gives the word too much emphasis for that, placing it in parallel with ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, as if to broach a new ἀμοιβήτης between them (reinforced by ἴσως, esp. if we tr. it *haud dubie*, with Ast): *um das Zugeständnis abzuschwächen and möglichst dem Sokrates zuzuschieben* (Ovink). Cope and Helmbold over-translate the pronoun with “but still perhaps you *do* find it in agreement with what you have said before:” the dative is not agential in a *present* passive construction (though in that connection note that Dodds reports but does not read ὁμολογεῖται as a correction in Par, calls σοι an ethical dative, and glosses, “you make it agree” – and this is how Nichols translates). Lamb's “with what *was said* before” is more accurate: Polus hints at resisting only the logic of the entailment (ὁμολογεῖται) since he has agreed to all that had been said before (τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν). With μέντοι answering μὲν (on which cf. nn. 307, 794) and σοι he is saying, “It seems wrong to me but regardless (μέντοι), maybe you (σοι) win,” granting that *Socrates* might be right regardless of his own opinion but not granting that he is compelled to agree. Irwin's “Well I think it's absurd, Socrates; but no doubt you find that it agrees with what was said before,” (similarly Zeyl Waterfield Pietre) is the closest. For Polus the *absurdity* is enough to disqualify the assertion and to warrant his dismissing it: lawyers are not going to start taking themselves to court tomorrow. He used the term ἄτοπα at the beginning of the treatment of the two questions (473A1), and now simply reverts to it at the end. We had a hint of such feckless acquiescence at 479C7, in the sense as restored by Dodds (cf. n. 964); Socrates anticipated this reaction (cf. nn. 985 and 986; and cf. n. 877) and in his next remark closes the door on it once again. Dalfen takes Polus to mean that as an oratorical teacher he of course cannot accept the conclusion; Socrates's reply says the two of them, as thinking persons, have to. There is very little wiggle room for Polus still to continue in the conversation without being totally repudiated (“ἐξελεχθεῖς” as he might put it), and he doesn't.

1002 Reading κάκεῖνα (E3) with all mss. and most edd., instead of Hirschig's busy emendation to ῥεῖνα (accepted by Schanz). The καὶ is correlative (Dodds: “Denial of the consequent involves denying the antecedent *also*”) whence Chambry's *ou bien ou bien*. For λύειν ≈ *tollere* cf. *Prot.*333A1, *Rep.*437A9. The more “remote” ἐκεῖνα is again used to refer to the elenchi about the axiological predicates as belonging to a “previous” phase of the discussion (cf. B3-5 and n. 985) – which Polus *did* buy into, despite his use of σοι just above. Socrates responds to Polus's personalized formulation (μοι / σοι) with impersonal necessity (*pace* Helmbold, “our previous findings”). But he is not quite finished being outlandish.

1003 γε (E4) = “that much at least,” as if to uncouple the inference from the grounds, but the inference was all that was left for Polus to contend with (at least he has dropped the personal pronouns), and we know which way he will go once he is done abiding the conversation. Rather than pounce on him Socrates prefers next to pile Pelion onto Ossa: besides harming your friends by advocating their guilt you must help your enemies by defending them and their friends, in such a way as to deny them the amelioration of punishment. Polus's interruption (ἄτοπα, E1ff) has the dramatic effect of setting this upcoming converse into still greater relief.



ΣΩ. τούναντίον<sup>1004</sup> δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἰ ἄρα δεῖ<sup>1005</sup> τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρόν εἴτε ὄντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ<sup>1006</sup> ἐχθροῦ—τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον<sup>1007</sup>—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῆ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον, καὶ [481] πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα,<sup>1008</sup> ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ<sup>1009</sup> δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάντε χρυσίον ἡρπακῶς<sup>1010</sup> ἦ<sup>1011</sup> πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται<sup>1012</sup> καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως,<sup>1013</sup> ἐάντε αὖ<sup>1014</sup> θανάτου ἄξια ἡδίκηκῶς ἦ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὢν, εἰ δὲ μή,<sup>1015</sup> ὅπως ὡς [b] πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὢν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῶ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη

- 1004 τούναντίον (E5), as soon as it is spelled out by ἐχθρόν, re-invokes the political realm served by Polus's profession, the realm of allies and enemies – for we have just heard about the allies (φίλων, C3). To help friends has come to mean, just above, to *prosecute* them; to harm enemies will now come to mean *protecting* them from punishment. The standard forensic alliances – the very glue of Athenian politics – are being turned inside out! The force of ἡ ὄντινοῦν is generalizing, to suggest but not insist upon the idea that the enemy is who one would naturally want to harm (Canto's *inconnu* is therefore inappropriate, and Waterfield's "an enemy for instance" is fine).
- 1005 εἰ ἄρα δεῖ (E5): ἄρα has the force of *accepting the premise as a novel idea*. Socrates is not inferring from his argument that it is incumbent upon his reformed individual to harm his enemy, but is seeing a fresh application for the conventional notion that proper behavior consists of loyalty to one's club, and "helping friends and harming enemies."
- 1006 τοῦ (E7) indicates this ἐχθρός is the same as the one above.
- 1007 εὐλαβητέον (E7): Buttman *apud* Woolsey explains that if one's enemy has harmed him, one must allow him to be punished in order to protect oneself from further abuse from the enemy either because the punishment might remove him or might reform him. Socrates briefly alluded to this axiomatic but theoretically uninteresting ingredient of personal involvement and self-interest at 469A11 and 469C1, as Dalfen noticed. The purpose of singling out this case and making it the sole exception is to set into greater relief the ignoring altogether of the outlook from which the underlying and conventionally accepted definition of enemy and friend, as well as of justice, derive – for it is exactly and only the desire for revenge that animates that outlook, and self-preservation is only a moralistic posture in which it cloaks itself. Routh and Cope are therefore wrong to see irony in Socrates's stipulation: it is rather the shocking explosion of self-serving moralism by the light of reason that we are witnessing.
- 1008 πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα (481A1): The ensuing object clause (ὅπως μὴ) echoes the construction at 479C3, so that πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα (the means to prevent the unjust enemy from coming to justice), should be taken as a variant of χρήματα παρασκευασόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν πιθανώτατοι ὄσιν (the means the unjust man prevents himself – his own worse enemy? – from coming to justice). For πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα referring to machinations within a democratic political scene (as the variant at 479C2-4 corroborates), cf. 522C1 and *Phdrs.* 273E5 and *Rep.* 564D9 and my nn. *ad locc.* With this inference the collapse of the usual political power-struggle is final and complete.
- 1009 Reading δῶ (A3) with F and corr. of T, *legg.* Ast Bekker Heindorf<sup>2</sup> (as a *coni.* of Findeisen) Stallb. (citing F and t) and all subsequent edd. (δῶη B, *legg.* Routh Coraes : δῶη PT : δῶη Y). This ὅπως ἂν clause is identical in force to the ὅπως clause without ἂν above, and all the verbs are subjunctive: an optative is out of place.
- 1010 ἡρπακῶς (A3): Cary (tr.) adds "from us," neither stated nor implied by the text.
- 1011 Reading ἦ (A3) *after* ἡρπακῶς with YZaE3, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Sommer Mistriotes Schmelzer Sauppe Lamb Feix, rather than reading the major mss. (from which it is absent) and then inserting it *before* ἡρπακῶς, with Schanz Lodge Burnet Croiset Theiler Dodds Heidbüchel Erler, as being paleographically easier. The position after the participle is repeated in the parallel alternative below (ἐάντε ... ἡδίκηκῶς ἦ, A6), where the parallelism is emphasized by αὖ (if we read it: see note below).
- 1012 Reading ἀναλίσκηται (A4) with BTWFY, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Sommer Mistriotes Schmelzer (*sine notis*) Feix – if lexically possible (ἀναλίσκη τε W<sup>2</sup>P<sup>2</sup> : ἀναλίσκη corr. Dindorf [from the *Theo. Ling. Gr.*], *legg.* Coraes Thompson Schanz Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Theiler Dodds Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler).
- 1013 ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως (A5): Once again the polar doublet (cf. 479B8-C1 with n. 958, and 472E7, 523B2).
- 1014 Reading αὖ (A5) with FY, *legg.* Heindorf Coraes Ast Woolsey Sommer Burnet Croiset Theiler Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler (*om.* BTP, *legg.* Routh Bekker Stallb. Hermann Jahn Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Thompson Mistriotes Lodge Sauppe Lamb Feix Dodds).
- 1015 εἰ δὲ μή (A7), again, without ἂν. Cf. n. 701; note also shift from final subjunctives to final future indicatives (A6-B1, for which cf. *AGPS* 54.8.6.F).



τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἢ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν τις χρεία,<sup>1016</sup> ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῆ ἐφάνη οὔσα.

ΚΑΛ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν,<sup>1017</sup> σπουδάζει ταῦτα<sup>1018</sup> Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.<sup>1019</sup>

1016 ἢ χρεία (B3): Sauppe and others notice, with a certain irrelevance, that the “usefulness” of oratory to defend the innocent is here overlooked, but it was not overlooked by Socrates (nor for that matter by Plato): it *had not come up* in the conversation before the present one (ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν), he says. If anything it was incumbent upon Gorgias to mention this high and just power of the art but he only insisted that his teaching was not intended to encourage or lead to a misuse (456A7-457C3); his main point was to highlight the power it gives the orator (keeping the light under something of a bushel) not the good it enables him to do. Instead the greatness of it has constantly been its δῶναμις, and only here has this dazzlement been replaced with χρεία (480A2, cf. nn. 977 and 987). In all likelihood the uses just now retailed, and in particular using it to hasten and ensure one’s own healing from an unjust condition of soul, are greater than defending the innocent, anyway, since illness in the soul of one guilty man is worse than any unjust treatment of another who is innocent. Dodds imagines that Polus is too dazed to notice this putative omission, himself, and then notes that “Plato” mentions it later in the dialogue (504D5) but that “Plato” here wants it suppressed for effect – all this following from his own failure to recognize the sense of χρεία. Irwin does notice but mitigates the problem by saying that such a use would be less important to those who think being done injustice is preferable to doing it, than to those who think the opposite, but the former is who Socrates as well as Polus (to the extent that he agrees with him) have become, by dint of the conversation; and it is only they who make the assertion. Obviously the test of being able to persuade somebody of anything you want is to be able to persuade them not to believe what they see before their own eyes; and nobody knows more clearly he has committed an injustice than the guilty party: thus, he would be eager to hire a Gorgianic advocate.

1017 ὦ Χαιρεφῶν (B6): Callicles takes the floor by *interrupting* the conversation between Polus and Socrates, before Polus can respond to Socrates’s long paradoxical statement, which exonerates Polus from the embarrassment of answering it since he is committed by the argument to agree. He addresses a question to neither partner in the discussion but exploits the presence of Chaerephon, instead, who can be relied upon to know Socrates’s ways; and it is not a question but a deflating wise-crack. This is the same tactic Polus had used to exonerate Gorgias from answering, at 461B3-4 (“...do you really believe this?”).

1018 ταῦτα (B6): *sc. λέγοντα*: cf. n. 1021 *infra*.

1019 οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν (B9): Chaerephon catches Callicles at his game and exploits the opportunity to use his own language against him (from 447C5), *pace* Dodds who is unsure whether the echo is intentional.

ΚΑΛ. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπιθυμῶ.<sup>1020</sup> εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, [c] πότερόν σε φῶμεν<sup>1021</sup> νυνὶ<sup>1022</sup> σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων<sup>1023</sup> καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν,<sup>1024</sup> ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίτικεις,<sup>1025</sup> εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ<sup>1026</sup> τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπασχεν πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι,<sup>1027</sup> οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον [d] ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ’ ἐννοήσας ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ

1020 ἀλλ’ ἐπιθυμῶ (B10): Though this impatient ἀλλά is idiomatic after imprecation (463D6, *Alc. I* 110C1, *Crat.* 423C1; *Ar. Nub.* 652 [Stallb.] and n. 511), Callicles will reveal a distinct habit to use it elsewhere as well. Denniston will call it assentient (16-22, citing this passage at 16) in the sense that it does not introduce a contrary or take logical exception, but rather moves forward. Callicles will continually move forward and reject his interlocutor, Socrates, with a single stroke, in an insouciant contrarian manner, especially when he is championing his own position, rather than directly answer Socrates’s questions. For instances in the next pages, cf. 488B7, D4; 489A7; 489E9; 490A6; 491C6, E6; 492C3; 494B1; 496D5; 498D1; 505C1, Compare his habitual use of ἀλλ’ οἶμαι as an interjection (483B4 and n. 1090 *ad loc.*). He has a similarly imperious habit in his use of καί, on which cf. n. 1066, *infra*.

1021 Reading φῶμεν (C1) with the mss. and Olympiodorus’s lemma (*sc. λέγειν*), *legg.* Routh Ast Bekker Coraes Beck Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Zimmermann Feix (θῶμεν *coni.* Madvig [*Adv.Crit.* 1.410], *legg.* Sauppe Stender Schanz Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Hamilton Irwin Canto Waterfield Nichols Cantarin Dalfen Heidbüchel Erlrer).

Madvig objected to φάναι with participle as “not being Greek.” Sauppe adopts Madvig’s θῶμεν, citing two passages that only prove that the participle is possible with τιθέναι: (1) *Apol.* 27C10: τίθημι σε ὁμολογούντα (but what called for τιθέναι in that context rather than φάναι was that the opponent would not answer: [ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνη, *ibid.*], requiring Socrates to posit an answer for him, whereas in *Gorg.* Socrates is present and ready, and will answer); and (2) Aristides *Or.* 3.623 (Dindorf 2.384), where Socrates is addressed as follows: ὄρα μὴ παίζοντα μᾶλλον τιθῆ σέ τις ἢ σπουδάζοντα καὶ φιλονεικοῦντα (where the τις, as an imaginary third person is eo ipso absent, and would, like the unanswered Socrates in the *Apology*, have no choice but posit a conclusion (a thesis) on his own lights – again not the case in the *Gorgias*). While the alternatives of seriousness and play in the Aristides might constitute a reminiscence of the present passage in *Gorg.* where however we only find φῶμεν, its construction in τις may just as well make it a reminiscence of the construction from the *Apology* where in addition we find θῶμεν. Dodd’s assertion, in favor of θῶμεν, that the Aristides passage is “evidently” a reminiscence of the *Gorgias*, probably inspired by Cobet’s *satis igitur apparet* (*Mnem.* 3[1875]130), is evasively ambiguous.

Olymp. (123.17-19, where the lemma has φῶμεν) testifies that some mss. do not have φῶμεν, against whose presence with the participial construction he claims no offense (and *n.b.* he mentions no ms. that has θῶμεν: cf. n. 1045); and he allows that φῶμεν is not even needed: presumably he would accept εἰπέ ... πότερόν σε σπουδάζοντα, κτλ, as a valid construction (!). Kratz alone has asked the important question, Why use the participle instead of the infinitive? and answers that the force of the participle is to describe *how* a person is acting rather than *what* he does (which would be expressed with infinitive), which illuminates our passage: indeed this was the force of his question when he asked the first time by omitting λέγειν (B4-5). Callicles is trying to dismiss what Socrates is saying by impugning his manner or motive. The passage from Krüger (56.7.3: *ibid.* AGPS) cited in defense of the participial construction by Deuschle-Cron (1873), accepts the participial complement with φάναι (though citing this passage only) and with other verbs “of saying or thinking,” but leaves out the question why, with the catchall statement that the participle is more “vivid” (“factual accuracy”: AGPS); moreover, all the passages Krüger/AGPS cite might also understand εἶναι *vel sim.* Note that in either case, Callicles’s use of the first plural (as opposed to the formulation with τις in the passage from Aristides) immediately arrogates to himself the role of spokesman for all present, so as further to marginalize Socrates. This is the first of many times we will witness Callicles bullying normal syntactics, as well as semantics, too eager as he is to say what he wants to say (cf. n. 1148).

1022 Reading νυνὶ (C1) with BTP and edd. (νῦν F), the particle accompanied with a hand gesture. Callicles is pointing at the two long paragraphs Socrates has just delivered. The paradoxical is that they state the opposite: ἀνατετραμμένος (C3) continues this notion and denotes that our way of life would be turned upside down (not just “subverted” *pace* Cary).

1023 τῶν ἀνθρώπων (C3) is appositive to the personal pronoun in hyperbaton (cf. 459E3 σὺ ... ὁ διδάσκαλος, and *Ar. Plut.* 500, ὡς μὲν γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ βίος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δέκεται), expanding the scope of Callicles’s spokesmanship from those immediately present (the “we” of φῶμεν) to all mankind; yet soon we will see that he hardly views himself as a mere ἄνθρωπος. His claim is a piece of supercilious demagoguery for the sake of the onlookers, analogous to that of the do-gooder demagogue who is forever telling us what “we” must do. For the metaphor of inversion, cf. *Rep.* 442B3.

1024 πράττομεν (C4): For the shift from potential optative to indicative or vice-versa, “giving the warmth of personal conviction” (Gildersleeve §444), cf. *Hdt.* 9.111.5, *Andoc.* 1.4 (οἰρήσομαι), *Ar. Ach.* 403, D. 21.189; or visa-versa, *Phlb.* 16B5-7, T. 3.13.6, D. 21.191.

1025 ὦ Καλλίτικεις (C5): The initial position of the vocative, like the terminal, is unusual except for the “pragmatic” function of turning from one interlocutor to another (e.g., 447D9, 463C6, and even 469D2), and already announces Socrates’s apprehension, tinged with condescension, that the discussion will not go well – and Callicles will respond in kind (482C4). Compare the terminal use at 469A2, 490C6, and the case with which this conversation will ominously end: 527E7. This non-pragmatic use is relatively common in this contentious dialogue: 448C4, 461C5, 469C8, 471E2, 473E6, and 517B2; as in the contentious *Euthydemus* (275D3 answered by 277D4, 288B4, 305B4, 307A3). Elsewhere compare *Charm.* 163D1; *Crito* 46B1; *H.Maj.* 304B7; *H.Min.* 369B8 answered by D1, 373B6; *Ion* 541C7; *Leg.* 630D2, 634C5, 637B7, 673B5, 686D7, 708E1; *Lys.* 204B5-6; *Meno* 70A5, 79E7, 94E3 and 95A2; *Phdrs.* 228A5, 274E7 (correcting Theuth: cf. E4); *Prot.* 328D8, 334C8, 335D6; *Rep.* 329E1 (where Soc. has told us his motive in advance: D7-E1), 336E2 (where again we get the motive: 336D5-E2), 344D6, 378E7, 450D5, 473E6, 499D10; *Symp.* 218D7.

1026 Reading ἦ (C6) on the overwhelming testimony of BTF, with no editor (ἦ B : om. Themistius [*de an.* 104.3 Heinze Aldina], followed by all edd.). Heindorf (and Coraes) suggested adding (or understanding) ὄν after τὸ αὐτό. With or without ἦ, the ἄλλο τι must be accusative of respect; decent sense can be gotten either way (though without ἦ is smoother). Still this is no warrant for changing the text: Thompson somehow thinks its presence “inverts” the meaning, but translate, “some undergoing it for one thing and others for another thing or for the same.” Note that Socrates contrives, *pari passu* with Callicles, to become another kind of spokesman for mankind (*n.b.*, ἀνθρώποις, C5, left out of Croiset’s tr. and blunted in Lamb’s), not to marginalize Callicles as he had Socrates, but to include him, in fact only him, at the present moment. Of course Socrates’s πάθος φιλοσοφίας is quite ἴδιον and Callicles love of fame among men all too common: his addition of boys for each of them is what makes Socrates’s assertion at all conceivable, even though the addition is manifestly irrelevant to the subjects they are talking about: Socrates’s devotion

σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἐκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ δυοῖν,<sup>1028</sup> τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάστοτε,<sup>1029</sup> καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὃ τι ἂν φῆ<sup>1030</sup> σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῆ ἔχειν,<sup>1031</sup> οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω [e] καὶ κάτω<sup>1032</sup> μεταβαλλομένου· ἐν τε τῆ<sup>1033</sup> ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ<sup>1034</sup> Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῆ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἃ ἐκεῖνος<sup>1035</sup> βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμάσιν<sup>1036</sup> τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τις σου λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπα<sup>1037</sup> ἐστίν, ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθῆ λέγειν,<sup>1038</sup> ὅτι εἰ μὴ τις παύσει<sup>1039</sup> τὰ [482] σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων

to philosophy and Callicles's to political influence. The addition of the boys therefore shows that Socrates means to try but also that failure is inevitable. Dodds (*ad loc.*) mistakes Socrates's ironic parallel as a sincere attempt to "find common ground in order to make Callicles understand his passion for truth." Perilampes's son was named Demos. Therefore with Stallb. read TPF ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων, below (E2), instead of ὁ δῆμος Ἀθηναίων with B, meant to disambiguate.

- 1027 ἴδιον ... ἢ ... οἱ ἄλλοι (C7): Other inherently comparative adjectives and adverbs with which Plato uses comparative ἢ include διπλοῦς, πολλακάσιος, διαφερόντως, ἄνομοιός, ἐνάντιος (as above, C4), and τις (Riddell §173).
- 1028 Reading δυοῖν (D4) with BTPF, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Burnet Lamb Dodds Irwin Waterfield Nichols Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler (*om.* Y, followed by Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hermann Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schanz Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Apelt Helmbold Feix Theiler Chambry Hamilton Allen Zeyl Canto Pietre Dalfen). The asymmetry it introduces between the μὲν and δέ constructions is fully justified (*pace* Stallb., "perinepte intrusum") by the fact that Callicles's two beloveds have the same name, a revelation for which δυοῖν prepares.
- 1029 ἐκάστοτε (D6): on any occasion, "when the occasion arises" – not every occasion, again at E6 (*pace* Lamb, Helmbold Chambry). The superlative implicit in the word does not generalize but to the contrary isolates the individual case.
- 1030 Reading ὃ τι ἂν φῆ (D6) with F, *legg.* Sauppe Schanz Stender Croiset Burnet Dodds Theiler Cantarin (ὃτι ὅπως ἂν φῆ BY : ὃτι ὅπως ἂν ἀντιφῆ TP, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck : ὃτι ἂν τι φῆ Y [*teste* Croiset] : ὃτι ὅπως ἂν φῆ *coni.* Bekker, *legg.* Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Mistriotis Schmelzer Lamb Feix : ὃτι ἂν ἀντιφῆ Ast : ὃτι secl. Hirschig), construing the indirect discourse to be participial with perceptual αἰσθάνομαι. With both relatives we have a straddling construction (Mistriotis, against which Hirschig objected), akin to the "lilies of the field how they grow," for which cf. Apol.37B7-8 and Thuc.4.37 (reading ὃτι).
- 1031 καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῆ ἔχειν (D7): What does this clause add to the previous? Hamilton leaves it out; "what your beloved says however he says it," says Allen; "what he says and what he claims is so," Zeyl. "say or believe," Waterfield – myself: "what they say and how they feel about it."
- 1032 ἄνω καὶ κάτω (D7-E1): We might just notice that as Socrates according to Callicles has flipped the world of οἱ ἄνθρωποι upside down (C3), Callicles according to Socrates flips *himself* upside down for Demos and his deme (cf. n. 1050, *infra*). Lamb's horizontal "from side to side," Apelt's and Erler's *hin und her*, Helmbold's and Allen's and Zeyl's "back and forth" and Hamilton's and Irwin's "this way and that" are too weak. Waterfield's "chop and change" replaces the idea of the Greek with opaque forty-year old local slang, as the Brits often do. To the extent the reaction is involuntary we should view μεταβαλλόμενος as passive rather than middle!
- 1033 Reading ἐν τε τῆ (E1) with BTPF, *legg.* edd., on superior attestation (ἐν τε γὰρ τῆ Y *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Bekker Coraes Beck Ast Sommer Hirschig). There are a few instances of τε connecting sentences in Plato (e.g., *Leg.*757D1, 773A7; *Tim.*57A7, 68B5), but here as elsewhere we have asyndeton introducing a direct illustration of the point presently made (cf. 483C1 and n. 1096, *infra*) as evinced by the fact that without the editors' punctuation the exemplification would be seamless: only later (at λέγεις, E3) would we learn the sentence is "run on." As to τε, ἐν τε τῆ ἐκκλησίᾳ is correlative with καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν below (E3), pairing the cases that illustrate the pair of beloveds mentioned in the sentence just before.
- 1034 Reading ὁ with TPF (*om.* B), the "second" attributive position used to disambiguate (Stallb.).
- 1035 ἐκεῖνος (E3): Socrates elevates the reference with ἐκεῖνος because he is acknowledging Callicles's point of view from the inside (he shares the pathos of eros with him!) as does his gratuitous appositive, τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον, in referring to Callicles's other beloved (*pace* Sauppe who finds it redundant and suspects interpolation). βούλεσθαι, of the deme, replaces φάται used of Demos (D6, D7). The new term straddles fact (their policy) and metaphor (their desire) by bringing in the etymon βουλ-. For such "straddling" terms and even conscious equivocation for the sake of welding the analogy, or welding of concrete fact with the meaning for which it is a metaphor, cf. nn. 950, 954, 2166, and ὑγιές at 479A5-7; παιδαγωγεῖν [~ ἄρχειν] (*Leg.*641B1,2); πλάνη (*Phdo.*81A6); πλείστον (*Rep.*442A6); αἰτιάσθαι (*Rep.*489B4-5); οἰκεία (*Rep.*538E5); ἴσον (*Rep.*561C4), χαριστέροισι (*Rep.*605B6), ἀναγκάζεται (*Rep.*610C8) with my nn. *ad locc.*; and also my nn. *ad Rep.*391D6 and *Rep.*552C3.
- 1036 Reading βουλευμάσιν (E5) with BT, *legg.* edd. (βουλευμάσιν PWF : βουλήμασιν E3 Steph. Ficinus[*voluntati*] Aldine, *legg.* Routh Hirschig Thompson). Routh prefers βουλήμασιν as more consonant with βούλεσθαι at E3, and so it is, but the purpose of the doublet βουλευμάσιν τε καὶ λόγοις is to cover, chiasmically, the doublet of beloveds: Demos son of Pyrilampes who speaks (φῆ, D6, D7 ~ λόγοις) and the demos of the Athenians counsel him with their wants (βούλεται, E3 ~ βουλευμάσιν). It is βούλεται that was inaccurate, but only because a pun on βουλεύεται. The pairing of λόγοις and βουλεύματα at X. *Cyrop.*6.1.40 is therefore entirely irrelevant.
- 1037 ἄτοπα (E7): Mr Morrissey asks what would be unexpected or out of place or strange (i.e., ἄτοπον) in what Callicles would be made by his beloved to say? From what was said above, it would be that he flip-flopped or contradicted himself (μεταβάλλεσθαι, E1, E3) – but that is not what ἄτοπον means. As we shall presently see the word, like a passing note, is not quite in tune but effects a transition to a new key.
- 1038 τάληθῆ λέγειν (E8): To speak candidly: cf. 462B9 and E6, 470E6.
- 1039 Reading παύσει (E8) with BTPW *teste* Cantarin and edd. (παύσει F *teste* Cantarin, *leg.*Routh : παύσει *coni.* Findeisen). Given the coming parallel, there is no warrant for subj. or optative nor for a different tense: see next note.

τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ παύση<sup>1040</sup> ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν<sup>1041</sup> καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ  
 χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαυμάζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω,<sup>1042</sup> ἀλλὰ τὴν  
 φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε,<sup>1043</sup> ἄ<sup>1044</sup>  
 νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ ἦττον ἔμπληκτος·<sup>1045</sup> ὁ μὲν  
 γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων,<sup>1046</sup> ἢ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ<sup>1047</sup> [b] τῶν  
 αὐτῶν, λέγει δὲ ἄ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ<sup>1048</sup> καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἢ οὖν  
 ἐκείνην<sup>1049</sup> ἐξέλεγξον,<sup>1050</sup> ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην  
 μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν  
 Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,<sup>1051</sup> ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν  
 ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον<sup>1052</sup> εἶναι

- 1040 Reading παύση (482A1) with PWF *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Coraes Burnet Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler (παύσει BT *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd.). A shift to the middle is needed for the sense, and employing this form of the middle future (in -η rather than -ει) makes the shift more obvious. The contrast in modality between the “most vivid” condition and the “ideal” condition in which it is couched could not be more striking: the power of eros over the erotic man is irresistible; and we can infer from this that what one feels eros for is perhaps the most important force in determining his person as well as his difference from others.
- 1041 τοίνυν (A2) is here as elsewhere used to move to the relevant application of a principle that was itself inferred from a case (Denniston, 577). Socrates surely does speak as φιλοσοφία dictates when he is talking with Alcibiades, as we see at the end of the *Symposium* – but there is no way for Callicles to know this: Plato is talking to us!
- 1042 μὴ θαυμάζει ὅτι ταῦτα λέγω (A3), echoing the so-called ἄτοπα Callicles might be forced to say (481E7) by his respective beloved, refers now to what Socrates in fact was forced to say by his beloved, philosophy. Callicles’s opening volley, above, was that the conclusions Socrates reached with Polus turn the world upside down: *that* is what ἄτοπον means, and what its imperfect use above (n.1037) was leading to. All that is left is for Socrates to deconstruct Callicles’s feigned θαυμάζειν.
- 1043 ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε (A5): Socrates so refers to Callicles, due to their common pathos of eros (Mistriotis).
- 1044 Reading ἄ οὐ (A5) with BF, *legg.* Routh Bekker Lodge Burnet Lamb Theiler Irwin Allen Heidbüchel Erler, with the support of both families of mss. (ἀεὶ ἄ TPWY f Olymp [123.22-3 λ and σ] Ficinus, *legg.* edd.). That she *always* says what Callicles has heard *only this one time* may well be true (as Olymp. volunteers, comparing 490E9-11), but for Socrates to say so distracts from his point at this moment, namely, that it is she and not Alcibiades who said it.
- 1045 Reading ἔμπληκτος (A6) with the mss. and edd. (ἐκβλητος γρ. B2 γρ. W2 Olymp. λ). Olympiodorus says both readings are found in his books (124.5). Socrates explains below. Stallb. cites *Lys.* 214D1; E. *Troiad.* 1205; S. *Ai.* 1358 to illustrate the sense.
- 1046 Κλεινίειος ... ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων (A6-7): For the “genitive of characteristic” with εἶναι in which the characteristic rather than the person is in the genitive, as here, cf. §316.5 in the excellent classification of Aug. Matthiae *Gr. Gr.* [Leipzig 1835], and Kühner’s §273.C. Compare Eng. “he is of the same opinion” (for which in Greek cf. Hdt. 2.148.2; T. 1.113.2, 3.70.6; X. *HG* 2.4.36; D. 18.296, 25.88) or compare the phrase “he is a man of God”. Cf. also P. P. 3.108 (γνόντα ... οἷας εἰμὲν αἴσας); S. *OC.* 144; Hdt. 1.107.2, 5.92.ζ.4; and *AGPS* notes this genitive can suggest “obsession, ideology, or indelible character” (47.6.10.A).
- 1047 Reading ἀεὶ (A7) with edd. though among the mss. it appears only in ZaYx2 *teste* Cantarin and Olymp. π. (εἶ F : om. BTP). It is translated by Ficinus (*semper*), and fills out the contrast with ἄλλοτε ἄλλων. That Alcibiades’s dictates vary from time to time whereas φιλοσοφία’s never do (as opposed to the case of Callicles’s two Demos’s) and yet that Socrates always says the same thing, together imply that he ignores the dictates of Alcibiades, and this therefore vitiates the only parallel remaining between their loves (cf. n. 1026)! Dodds (259) misinterprets ἀεὶ to mean she “requires consistency” of Socrates and that he must “follow the logos wherever it leads” (260) – metaphors imported from other dialogues but alien to the present erotic context: he has a very easy time because his beloved does not make him flip-flop.
- 1048 παρήσθα δέ (B1): With his second δέ clause Socrates inserts a parenthetical contrast with θαυμάζεις (Deuschle-Cron), as though Socrates had said καίπερ πάρων (Waterfield places a period between and takes παρήσθα with the sequel rather than a comment on the forgoing). I do not find this use of δέ to introduce a parenthetical or subordinate clause in Denniston; cf. 483A8. For the ellipsis of a substantive complement for παρήσθα, “supplied” by the preceding relative (ἄ), Riddell (§235) cites as parallels *Menex.* 243C7, *Phdo.* 65A5; *Symp.* 200D9-10, 201B1-2.  
 What *philosophia* made Socrates conclude in dialogue with Polus *now* shocks Callicles (νῦν, B1) though he was present for the argumentation and joint agreements (τοῖς λεγομένοις; note durative present tense) that led up to the conclusion. Croiset (*ces discours que tu viens d’assister* – so also Chambry Canto) and Lamb and Hamilton and Irwin (with “and”) omit the contrast. The idea is not that he could have interrupted before (with Piettre, *tu as assisté, en personne, à ce qu’elle pouvait dire*), but that he treats a carping attack on the very outcome of the argument as sufficient to bring the whole thing down. His shock, that is, is a fake. Similarly, in response to Socrates’s large system of real and sham arts of body and soul (463E3-466A3), Polus ignored the whole argument to carp at a single aspect of it quoted out of context that he might attack as paradoxical – that the highly feared orator whom the audience present is ready to hire him to turn them into, is according to Socrates a mere pander (466A4-5); and Socrates’s first reply is, “No, I argued (εἶπον, 466A6) he is only a certain *kind* of pander, or do you not remember (A7)?” Polus’s feigning not to remember is a correlate to Callicles here expressing shock.
- 1049 ἐκείνην (B2): The remote demonstrative for his beloved, as he had used for Callicles’s beloved (481E3).
- 1050 ἐξέλεγξον (B2): Polus’s term, used by Socrates at 471D6 and again at 506C1. Rather than express shock at the outcome (regarding the proper use of oratory) Callicles must answer the λεγόμενα, the arguments that led to it, and in particular (ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον points [forward] to this, not to A4, *pace* Canto) whether to do injustice and avoid punishment are the worst things for a man (B3-4); but as long as he agrees with all the steps of an argument but suddenly rejects what follows from them only because paradoxical – unacceptable to the deme – he will never cease flip-flopping. In other words it will be Callicles himself rather than normal life that will be turned upside down by his beloved, and “he will never agree with himself.” Dodds mistakes Socrates to be making a general and moralistic warning that Callicles’s words and his actions will not jibe (that he will be “torn by internal conflict,” 260) as opposed to being μεταβαλλόμενος.
- 1051 Reading Καλλικλῆς (B5) with TWPf Olymp. (124.20-21: λ and σ), with edd. (Καλλικλεῖ B).



ἀνάρμοστόν<sup>1053</sup> τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην,<sup>1054</sup> [c] καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ’ ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα<sup>1055</sup> ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῶ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς<sup>1056</sup> νεανιεύεσθαι<sup>1057</sup> ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος<sup>1058</sup> ὦν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς<sup>1059</sup> ταῦτόν παθόντος<sup>1060</sup> Πώλου πάθος ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγορεῖ πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ’ αὐτόν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν [d] βουλόμενος

1052 οἶμαι ... κρεῖττον (B7-8) is not just *melius existime* (*pace* Ast 1832) but “more winning,” of the better tactic, or course of action, or technique (for the idiom in κράτιστον cf. 522D3, *Phdrs.*228C6, *Euthyph.*5A3, etc.; and cf. *Phdrs.*272B2 with my n. *ad loc.*). For the “renewal” of the comparative by μᾶλλον (C2) cf. 487B2, *Phdo.*79E4, X. *Anab.*4.6.11 and Riddell §166.

1053 Reading ἀνάρμοστον (B8), with the mss., *legg.* Beck Ast[1832] Sauppe Burnet Theiler Heidbüchel Erler, which receives immediate exegesis by the infinitive διαφωνεῖν pre-empting the need for second εἶναι (Heusde’s emendation to ἀναρμοστεῖν [*Spec. Crit.* 92, 1803], accepted by Heindorf Ast[1819] and edd., is obviated by the close connection of the τε, denoting cause and effect: cf. 503E8). μοι is an ethical dative with ἀνάρμοστον τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν. The shift from adjective (for the state) to verb (for the resultant event) is repeated in the analogon below (C2-3) – missed by edd. – with εἶναι there included for fullness and closure. διαφωνεῖν is continued from just above, to excuse the metaphor (or explain the analogy). The alternative technique is to repeat the previous term as a foothold for metabasis to the new term, introduced also by καί. Canto’s. *il vaut mieux jouer faux sur une lyre mal accordée* (reading ἀνάρμοστον with the mss. but also making Socrates, not the lyre, the subject of διαφωνεῖν) then runs aground in the sequel (*mal diriger un chœur que je pourrais diriger*), having to invent a second verb for Socrates to be subject of and χορὸν to be the object of (i.e., *mal diriger*) rather than its being an accusative subject parallel with λύραν (similarly Waterfield who simply abandons the construction of the Greek).

1054 ᾧ χορηγοίην (B8) functions as an ideal *protasis* (*pace* Thompson, who wants ἄν with χορηγοίην) introduced as an afterthought to preempt any inference that in using the metaphor of harmony Socrates envisions actually being awarded a χορηγία. Richards then piggy-backs the comment that he misses ἄν with the infinitives before ᾧ χορηγοίην (but the cat is already out of the bag). This led Dodds to justify the optative as an exception to the sequence of moods (after present tense οἶμαι), citing *GMT* §255, depriving it thereby of its ideal force.

1055 ἓνα ὄντα (C2): It is impossible not to feel, at first, a contrast with πλείστοις ἀνθρώποις, but because of the immediate sequel the sense that he is unified with himself (in contrast with the two Callicles’s imagined above) takes over. With πλείστοις ἀνθρώποις Socrates faces straight on Callicles’s opening attack on him, namely, that his argument inverts the life of all mankind (ἡμῶν ... τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 481C3: cf. n. 1023), by turning the telescope around on him: Callicles, though one man, will by his love of opinion always be μεταβαλλόμενος ἄνω κάτω.

1056 Reading δοκεῖς only (C4) with BTP and edd. (δοκεῖς μοι F Olymp.[λ], *legg.* Heindorf Beck Ast[1819] Coraes Sommer Dodds Chambry Canto Nichols Piettre). The initial vocative, answering that of Socrates (C5), already throws down the gauntlet. Callicles has no reason to limit the negative impression as being only his own, since he adduces it as a criticism; and besides, as we shall see, he tends to think the world is as he sees it. Croiset does not print μοι but translates it: *tu m’as l’air de...* (as do Chambry and Canto).

1057 νεανιεύεσθαι (C4): Regardless of its etymology this verb, like the English verb “kidding,” seldom connotes youthfulness in the subject (*pace* Nichols Piettre). Plut. *Mor.*788F is an exception within his corpus: elsewhere he uses it to mean indulging in pranks (162B), flaunting virtuosity (679B, 1009B, 1077F: cf. *Phdrs.*235A6), and – closest to the present passage – his quotation of Colotes’s use of the very verb to describe Socrates feigning ignorance in his dialectical questioning (1118C: cf. 82B). Callicles means to add superciliousness to his earlier charge of παίζειν (481C1). Callicles understands himself to be improving upon Polus’s interruption and criticism of Socrates at 461B3-C4 (νεανιεύεσθαι redoes ἀγροικία there, 461C4), including an imitation of Polus’s breathless narration of the previous conversation, again blending description with criticism. It is surely true that Socrates is “talking for effect” as Dodds puts it, but surely not for its effect upon the audience: neither his present speech about love (481C5-482C3) nor his extended paradoxical inference about the value of oratory (480A1-481B5), which Callicles feigned to be unable to take seriously, were playing to any crowd. Callicles’s charge of demagoguery and his subsequent explanation of it are first of all an attempt to act as if those speeches never even occurred, and go off on a new tangent by the vehicle of his distinction between φύσις and νόμος. Compare my comment on his first use of ἀλλά, above (n.1020). **XXX 527C6 might control locally**

1058 δημηγόρος (C5): The term has not been used so far – only the “professional” term, ῥήτωρ – but its denotation is very close to it (cf. 502D2 and n. *ad loc.*, where Plato coins the verb ῥητορεύειν). With ὡς ἀληθῶς Callicles announces his primary thesis: he uses the slur to set up the verb δημηγορεῖν, and then explains what he means by this (καὶ νῦν). The δῆμος the term refers to as Socrates’s putative audience is the gathered onlookers, as we shall presently see (Canto’s tr. *comme si tu étais en train d’haranguer le peuple entier*, seems to miss this: cf.487B4-5). According to Callicles, Socrates has taken advantage of what he presumes the onlookers’ reaction will be, in order to silence his interlocutors. Stallb.’s attempt to soften matters with the explication (citing *Prot.*336B1-3) that δημηγορεῖν is the opposite of διαλέγεσθαι is true for Socrates but not for Callicles, as we learned on the first page (cf. n. 132). Jowett’s tr., “running riot in the argument,” and Lamb’s “roistering recklessly,” Canto’s “avoir l’air d’un jeune chien fou” are wild stabs in the dark.

1059 καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς (C5): Despite νῦν, ταῦτα, and the present tense, Callicles is again (as at 481B6-C4) referring to what Socrates said to Polus, as if the intervening speech on love, though addressed to him, had not happened. Allen’s “You play the orator now because Polus got got himself in the same fix...” (vel sim. in Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Piettre) makes a hash of it by creating a “now” after Polus got in a fix, and that could only be the time of Socrates’s present speech on love; but the ensuing charge of demagoguery has nothing to do with that speech, nor is it a “popular speech” (Nichols). Callicles’s ταῦτα is awkwardly an internal accusative and the genitive absolute is awkwardly its antecedent. The important thing to ask is, Who is the public in view of whom Callicles accuses Socrates to be speaking? It can only be those present, and only to their minds that he is accusing Socrates to be playing. He is accusing Socrates of forcing these visitors to prevaricate, in order to get new clients, and thus accusing these visitors with prevaricating indeed!

1060 ταῦτόν παθόντος (C5-6): There is dramatic irony in Callicles finding Polus and Gorgias being subjected to the same πάθος (shame), immediately after Socrates had adduced in his speech the notion that he and Callicles were subject to the same πάθος (eros) – including even the rather solecistic expression πρὸς τινα παθεῖν (C6: cf. 481E3), a speech which in fact he contrives to ignore. The connection is lost in Croiset’s tr. (*le même accident*) and Lamb’s (“plight”).



μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι<sup>1061</sup> αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνηθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων,<sup>1062</sup> ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ φαίη—διὰ δὴ<sup>1063</sup> ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν—καὶ σου κατέγελα,<sup>1064</sup> ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖν<sup>1065</sup> ὀρθῶς, τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἔπαθεν. καὶ<sup>1066</sup> ἔγωγε κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄγμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ [e] ταύτης γὰρ αὖ<sup>1067</sup> τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη,<sup>1068</sup> αἰσχυνηθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει<sup>1069</sup> εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι,<sup>1070</sup> ᾧ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλὰ,<sup>1071</sup> νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ<sup>1072</sup> ταῦτα

1061 Reading διδάξοι (D1) with BVatGJ *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast(1819) Bekker Coraes Sauppe Thompson Sommer Schanz Lodge Burnet (*sine noto!*) Croiset (*sine noto!*) Lamb Theiler Chambry Cantarín Erler (διδάξει E2 E3 Za N Flor. *teste* Cantarín Steph., *legg.* Routh Beck Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Stender Feix). Stallb. wrongly assumes that the apodosis (here in the form of a question, “Whether he would...”) cannot be adjusted to reflect secondary sequence unless the protasis (ἐὰν ἀφίκηται ... , C7-8) has been. The shift is postponed to emphasize the crucial moment in the inquiry and de-emphasize the supposition that the student might arrive, so as to emphasize what Gorgias would say in case he did.

1062 διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων (D2-3). Olympiodorus correctly asserts that it is not just the opprobrium of mankind in general but also that of those listening (τοὺς παρεστώτας, 125.14). Callicles’s ἀνθρώπων is mildly derogatory (cf. nn. 1084, 1091, 1142, 1335, *infra*). They would be bothered if he refused to teach (μὴ σὺ ἀδερσεντ), not if he said he couldn’t (*pace* Irwin).

1063 δὴ (D3), in its relatively rare connective use (“numerous” by the time of Plato, says Denniston, 236-240), is sometimes temporal (*Lys.* 207B4, *Symp.* 222C1) and sometimes logical (*Euthyd.* 275B2, *Phdr.* 239A7, 245C7): It represents Callicles’s interpretation of Polus’s ἴσως at (461B8: cf. n. *ad loc.*).

1064 Reading κατέγελα (D5) with F Ficinus (*tunc ... irrisit*), *coniecerat* Cornarius (*Platonis Op.* [1561], *Ecloga Sexta*, p.514), accepted by edd. (καταγέλων BTPF, *legg.* Beck Burnet Lamb Heidbüchel Erler). An infinitive describing Polus’s closing derisive remark (461C3-4) is an impossible jolt after the infinitives in indirect discourse telling what he had been saying (ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς, an adverbial infinitive interjection [which according to Stallb. *ad loc.*, never takes an infinitive] thrown in as an afterthought, can hardly be imagined to be governing it). To the contrary, κατὰ picks up the κατὰ in the imperfect with which Callicles opened his narration of what Polus said (κατηγόρει, C6). Also I read ὡς γ’ ἐμοί suggested by Hirschig (*legg.* Deuschle-Cron Thompson) in place of ὡς γέ μοι (mss., *legg.* edd.). The point of τότε is that Callicles thought Polus correct then, for the same reasons (κατ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο) he thinks him incorrect now. οὐκ ἄγμαι likewise correlates with κατέγελα as the more gentle reaction.

1065 ὡς ... δοκεῖν (D5-6): This absolute infinitive construction may be done with or without ὡς: Hdt. 2.124.4; S. *El.* 411, *OR* 82; *Meno* 81A8.

1066 καὶ (D7): Callicles bullies with his use of καὶ, just as he does with ἀλλά (n. 1020). Once he gets going he might use it to move hastily to his next point, brooking no pause, rather than using a connective that would take the trouble to announce or at least suggest to his interlocutor its logical relation to what came before (cf. 482D7, 483B1-3, C4; 484A1, A6; 485B4 and B7; 489C6; and cf. the byplay at 490A1-5 vs. A7-8 and at 505C3-4 vs. C5-6, with nn. *ad loc.*) – for which reason I will call it “asyndetic καὶ.” It is as if he were using his interlocutor’s attention as a mere springboard or a footing to push off against, for making his next assertion. Similarly, he uses striding καὶ to list items in triumphant corroboration or illustration of his meaning (cf. 483D3-4 [tolerating illogic for stridency]; 484A3-4, A4-5, D2-7; 485B6-7, C1-2, E1; 486D1; 490A7-8, C8-9; 491A1-3; 492C4-5). These two phenomena overlap when the syntactically copulative use of καὶ, as in a list, is in sense actually making an argument (483B6-C1, 483C7, 485C3-6: cf. nn. *ad loc.*). The καὶ that introduces an imperative (or μὴ plus aor. subj.) is a separate idiom, as at 486A4; 489A1, D7; 492D5; 494B7; 494C6; 500B5. For a wider account of this use of καὶ, see n. 960.

1067 αὖ (E1), meaning that by the same reluctance Gorgias, too, had been ensnared.

1068 συμποδισθεὶς ... ἐπεστομίσθη (E1-2): No lack of color: With Huit, there is a double metaphor, of the sacrificial victim having his feet tied together before being led to slaughter (cf. *Olymp.* 128.2-3), and then of the horse gagged by pull of the bit in his mouth.

1069 ἃ ἐνόει (E2): Callicles refers to what Polus had in mind not as his opinion (a *placitum*) but what he experiences as if by direct sensation (νοεῖν). There is some irony in the fact that Callicles blames Socrates for forcing Polus not to say what what was in his mind, when it was Polus that claimed the same of Socrates (471E1).

1070 τῷ ὄντι (E3): Callicles is corroborating Polus’s criticism, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα, 461C1-2 (which he himself repeats at C3-4), but replaces the charge of ἀγροικία, aimed at Socrates himself, with φορτικὰ aimed at the content of his argumentation, and then explains the motive of φορτικὰ with καὶ δημηγορικά. What is demagogical in Callicles’s description of Socrates’s intentions is the exploitation of what can be anticipated to be the crowd’s opinion to deter the interlocutor from expressing his true views in public but thus to lure him into self-contradiction.

1071 καλὰ (E5): What are these καλὰ that are not really καλὰ? The foregoing does not make it clear: Callicles forces us to guess, and the easiest though least popular guess is the interpretation of Piettre, *tu nous remènes à ce genre d’insupportable ficelles de démagogues*: “Selon la nature, ce n’est pas beau, mais ça l’est selon la loi:” i.e., that Socrates has used the trick of arguing φύσις / νόμος (καλὸν being a mere place-holder) which is somehow demagogic and sophistic (as he goes on to say: E5-483A4). And yet if we wait still longer we shall see that the sense of καλὸν here is meant as the opposite of αἰσχρὸν when αἰσχρὸν enters Callicles’s argument two lines later, at 483A6, for in arguing that undergoing injustice is less ugly than committing it Socrates can be said to be arguing the contrapositive, that undergoing injustice is καλὸν, which as we shall see is unthinkable for Callicles. Here again, as with his use of δημηγορεῖν, Callicles requires us to connect the dots for him. Suffering injustice, we learn below, is by nature uglier than doing it; but Socrates, we are to infer, had argued the opposite, that it is κάλλιον (though not in so many words) – and yet as he will next say this is only true νόμῳ not φύσει. Callicles’s proleptic strategy, forcing us to make his own argument if we are to understand what he is saying at all, camouflages the fact that it is he, not Socrates, that is introducing and exploiting τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν, the corrosive distinction between νόμος and φύσις.

1072 ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δέ (E5): τὰ πολλὰ ends up being an adverb (as postponement of δέ began to suggest) unrelated to ταῦτα, the antecedent of which ends up being ἢ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. Again the subject is postponed. Though at first ὡς seems to mean ἐπεὶ, it turns out to have the sense it has in such phrases as ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (cf. *Leg.* 952D8): postponement of δέ is therefore of Denniston’s third type (p. 186). Waterfield’s “invariably” is unjustified.

ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος· ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται [483] καὶ μὴ  
τολμᾷ λέγειν ἄπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται<sup>1073</sup> ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν<sup>1074</sup>  
κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγῃ, κατὰ<sup>1075</sup> φύσιν  
ὑπερωτῶν,<sup>1076</sup> ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως,<sup>1077</sup> τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ  
ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πόλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον<sup>1078</sup>  
ἐδιώκαθες<sup>1079</sup> κατὰ φύσιν.<sup>1080</sup> φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν<sup>1081</sup> αἴσχιον ἐστὶν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ  
ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ [b] γὰρ ἀνδρὸς<sup>1082</sup> τοῦτό γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ

- 1073 ἀναγκάζεται (483A1): The contradiction, though he feels it within himself, is according to Callicles derived from the two contradictory “realms” he is bearing witness to, φύσις and νόμος, which here refer merely to what he thinks he knows (νοεῖν again, cf. 482E2) versus what he knows to be the prejudice of the audience. He may fall silent, but if he speaks he will say the opposite of what he knows: λέγειν only means speak, and with ἐναντία sc. οἷς νοεῖ.
- 1074 τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν (A2), interposing an accusation, in proleptic apposition (cf. Riddell §15, *Leg.* 647A9, S. *Ant.* 404, Antiphon 5.5, T. 3.12), with derogatory τοῦτο (cf. 452E6, 468E1, 473E4, 497E8 and n. 241), within the relative clause he already committed himself to. He is not accusing Socrates of discovering it on his own, *pace* Chambry Hamilton Irwin Zeyl, Waterfield – for he has just said it is a common demagogic trick – but only of having mastered it. Playing φύσις against νόμος is recognized as a sophistic topic by Aristotle at *SE* 12 (173A7-18), who uses the present passage as a paradigm.
- 1075 Reading bare κατὰ twice (A3), with BTWP and edd. (τὰ κατὰ bis F : κατὰ ... τὰ κατὰ Y Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck). Callicles varies his vague expression in the dative (482E4-5, to which he will revert at A7-8) with an equally vague adverbial prepositional phrase.
- 1076 ὑπερωτῶν (A4) is an *hapax* – another innovation or peculiarity of Callicles’s vocabulary. ὑπό suggests (but does not allege) underhanded subtlety. He means that the question is tacitly aimed at τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. For the sense cf. 489B5, ἐπὶ νόμον ἄγων, and the technical term *Suggestivfrage*.
- 1077 τὰ τῆς φύσεως (A4): Callicles now employs still another construction, shifting in midstream, the former construction in κατὰ perhaps more correct and this one quite loose. The idea of “nature and convention” is new to the conversation and the shift of construction is insouciant because inconstruable past a certain point: are the natural things a different set of things from the conventional things (as τὰ τῆς φύσεως and τὰ τοῦ νόμου suggest)? If so, why do they have the same name (e.g., δίκαιον, αἴσχιον)? Or are they two “respects” or points of view in which or from which the same things are seen, but seen differently (as the initial dative construction [482E5] and the present construction in κατὰ [A3] suggest)? On the one hand Callicles is being consistent (adopting syntactical parallelism for the two categories) but on the other inconsistent (since each time he is changing the construction, and the sense of the three constructions is not the same). For Socrates the distinction between two justs, or two beauties, or two uglies, would only lead him to ask which, if either, is ugly, beauty, or just, for only along this path would one find the truth (which Callicles taunts him for being interested in: E4) – namely, in what things are, by recognizing that τὸ καλὸν is καλὸν not τῆ φύσει or τῷ νόμῳ, but τῷ καλῷ, and so on *mutatis mutandis* with the rest. Callicles’s distinction detaches these things (terms) from their own meaning (their intension), and turns them into labels of approbation or disapprobation whether it be in service to the opinion of the radical individual (an opinion he claims he *knows* to be true as if it is a fact, i.e., it is φύσει) or the convened opinion of the many (τὸ νόμῳ which they know to be false but advocate for their self-interest as they see it), and thus he disables the terms from mediating a search for truth, a search for what is what. All these terms are interchangeable for Callicles – for him, the position of the strong man cannot fail to be καλὸν, δίκαιον, νόμιμον, ισχυρότερον, ἀνδρεῖον, φρόνιμον, ἱκανόν. In short, the analysis by φύσις and νόμος restricts discourse to the ποῖον rather than the τί.
- 1078 Reading αἴσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον (A6) with F (*sed* αἴσχρον *pro* αἴσχιον *legens*) T *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (νόμον [*solum*] BPW *teste* Cantarín, *leg.* Routh). Riemann conjectured λόγον (for νόμον), *legg.* Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Chambry Irwin Canto Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler. The bare genitive Πόλου lacks a construction if not taken with the participle; with the participle τὸ κατὰ νόμον becomes its object and αἴσχιον the predicate thereof; and initial Πόλου turns out to be balanced by initial σύ. With τὸν νόμον Callicles loosely invents still another way to express his distinction, which Riemann (*Rev.Philologie* n.s.8 [1884] 102) despaired of understanding (citing Schanz, ed. 1881): his emendation into λόγον (accepted by several editors), though a more correct articulation of Callicles’s meaning (i.e., attacking the argument for convention as opposed to attacking convention), is unjustified, for it is as much an argument against it as for it.
- 1079 ἐδιώκαθες (A7): In diction, this *lectio difficilior* (ἐδιώκες FB<sup>2</sup>T<sup>2</sup>W<sup>2</sup>) is again exceptional. διώκαθαι is used twice elsewhere in Plato, once of prosecuting (*Euthyphr.* 15D6) and once of chasing down a deer (*Rep.* 375A6). In both cases it means to “attack” not merely to “follow up” (*pace* Dodds), requiring us to read νόμον rather than λόγον (see previous note). Callicles had used διώκειν of Socrates just above, in a similar but different sense (pursuing truth [as a goal], 482E4): again his language insouciantly suggests and reveals its own inaccuracy. Does Callicles notice? Does he care?
- 1080 Reading κατὰ φύσιν (A7) with BW and edd. (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν P : om. T, *legg.* Heusde Routh, conjecturing Πόλου τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αἴσχιον λέγοντος σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες). Now Callicles varies the expression from saying *something* that is “conventional” (τὸ κατὰ νόμον) to saying something “naturally” (κατὰ φύσιν).
- 1081 Reading πᾶν αἴσχιον (A7) with TP *teste* Cantarín (παναἴσχιον BPW *teste* Cantarín : πᾶσιν αἴσχιον Stallb.). The mss. are intact and the sense is “it is entirely more ugly”: τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι is the subject (against the deletion of L.I.Rückert, [*Ex Plat. Dial. Maioribus Capita Selecta* {Leipzig 1827} 53] and Dobree [*Adv.* v.1 {London 1883} 129], *leg.* Theiler. Reading also ἀδικεῖσθαι with the mss. (*secl.* Rückert Dobree Cobet [*Mnem.* 3 {1875} 131] Theiler : (οἶον) ἀδικεῖσθαι *coni.* Heindorf Dodds [cf. Ficinus *quale*] : *lacunam ante* ἀδικεῖσθαι *statuit* Cobet Schanz). Callicles again begins with his conclusion, and fills out his premise (ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον) first, telling us what he is talking about second (cf. 492C6-8). Note that his expression acknowledges the inference Socrates suggested to Polus at 474C8-9, that κακός and αἴσχος are co-extensive (here taking it the other way). Steph. noted a lacuna before τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι which Woolsey, taking πᾶν as subject, suggested to fill with οἶον (which was added in the Bipont ed., was printed by Dodds, and was accepted by Nichols) so as to make τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι an instance of πᾶν (*vetente* Stallb.), but Woolsey also tolerated taking it as appositive, as did Kratz. Richards conjectures πού for πᾶν as if paleographically likely because Heindorf conjectured πού for πολὺ at 488E2 (yes, you read that right). It is without any special warrant that Callicles asserts that ἀδικεῖσθαι is entirely shameful because bad, but saying so amplifies the importance of the distinction he is presuming between φύσις and νόμος (cf. Kratz, *Anhang ad loc.*, p. 164).
- 1082 ἀνδρός (B1): Callicles’s first use of the noun in its charged sense, in contrast with ἄνθρωπος or ἄνθρωποι, here densely as a “genitive of characteristic.” Socrates had used this genitive of characteristic just above, 482A7-B1, but Callicles now makes of it a bold litotes, denoting a relation that is deeply, and simply, and unarguably *natural*. Zeyl tr. “No man *would put up with* suffering what’s just” imports a subjective

ἀδικεῖσθαι,<sup>1083</sup> ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου<sup>1084</sup> τινὸς ᾧ κρεῖττόν<sup>1085</sup> ἔστιν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις<sup>1086</sup> ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακίζόμενος<sup>1087</sup> μὴ οἷός τ' ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν<sup>1088</sup> μηδὲ ἄλλω οὐδ' ἂν κήδηται.<sup>1089</sup> ἀλλ' οἴμαι<sup>1090</sup> οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι<sup>1091</sup> εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί.<sup>1092</sup> πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς [c] ψόγους ψέγουσιν.<sup>1093</sup> ἐκφοβοῦντες<sup>1094</sup> τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους<sup>1095</sup> τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν,<sup>1096</sup> ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν<sup>1097</sup> ὡς αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι

willfulness that is foreign to the genitive, as does Erler's *sich Unrecht zufügen lassen gehört nicht zu einem Mann*, which says both more and less than Callicles's genitive. Hamilton's translation repays the many words he uses to depict the force of the single word ἀνδρός: "The experience of being wronged *does not happen to anyone who calls himself a man*" – except that it moves in the direction of reducing nature to happenstance. Callicles's bold assertion means to depict the nature of things (though on the face of it it is simply untrue), and presently Nature herself will be his witness (C8). Stallb. detracts from Callicles's point by citing the definition of a the ἀρετὴ ἀνδρός given by Meno (Meno 71E), which presents a similar description of political prowess, for the description is commonplace so that its repetition is hardly noteworthy, and more importantly the Meno passage is meant to distinguish a virtue of a male from a woman's whereas here Callicles wants political prowess to be the very φύσις of a (real) man in the absence of which he devolves not into a woman but an enslaved man (ἀνδραπόδου, B2).

- 1083 τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι (B1): Callicles would have us believe that having this thing happen to oneself is, to his sense, so despicable that the very word for it sits uneasily in his mouth – hence the awkwardness; and it is by his repetition of the term that he effects his otherwise illogical transition from criticizing Socrates's putative demagoguery over to presenting his own brave vision of the strong man, exploiting his distinction between φύσις and νόμος now in a second way, from candid belief versus convended euphemism to strength versus enacted law. We can hardly keep up with him.
- 1084 ἀνδραπόδου (B2): He chooses this word over δοῦλος in to make a sound play against ἀνδρός (B1) signalled by τινός, but also to stress the process by which the slave became a slave. The slave, that is, is a loser. Compare Gorgias's expression δοῦλον ἔξεις (452E5-6), rather striking coming from him though now we have an inkling why Callicles became his client!
- 1085 κρεῖττον (B2), of the "winning" course of action (cf. n. 1052), and therefore bitingly ironic. It is easy not to notice that Callicles's extreme assertions are responding to Socrates's remarks above, about the ἔσχατον κακῶν (here, death: there, committing injustice unpunished: 482B3-4), about what would be κρεῖττον (482B7ff), and finally about one's relation to oneself (αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, B3-4: cf. ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ, 482C2) – but his remarks are only a counter-swipe, not a refutation.
- 1086 ὅστις (B2), compound indefinite, answers indefinite τινός: Cf. 486D4, n. 170, and Smyth §2508.
- 1087 ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακίζόμενος (B3): Callicles is simply remolding the legal and moral behaviors, ἀδικεῖν / ἀδικεῖσθαι, into the shenanigans of politics, including public mudslinging (not "being trampled in the mud," *pace* Nichols).
- 1088 βοηθεῖν (B4), of the help owed to allies and friends (e.g., *Rep.* 368B).
- 1089 οὐδ' ἂν κήδηται (B4), reading οὐδ' with BPWF and edd. (T has ᾧ), echoes the expression of Socrates at 480A6-7 (which he spells out at B8), and alludes to the political connections that constitute a man's "friends" as opposed to his "enemies" (*pace* Croiset, *ceux qu'il aime*) in the conventional rat-race for political standing, revealing that ἀνδράποδον was an exaggeration. Again we must connect the dots: in his highly escalated statement that the man who undergoes injustice rather than committing it would be better off dead than alive, Callicles is taking a swipe at Socrates's assertion above that the opposite is ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν (482B4).
- 1090 ἀλλ' οἴμαι (B4): ἀλλά, with interjected οἴμαι (since οἴμαι does not disturb the syntax of *oratio recta*) dismisses his own topic to insert another, and thus like the use of καὶ noted above (n. 1066) can be dubbed "asyndetic" (cf. 483E1, 485A3, 492A3): it means "I'll have you know," not "*je suis sur*" (Canto). For contrarian ἀλλά cf. n. 1020; for the interjected οἴμαι without ἀλλά compare 483C8, 484A2 and E1, and Gorgias's uses at 460A3-4, 457B5, 457A4 noticed by Socrates at 457C4. For the "argumentative" force of ἀλλά compare the exchange between Callicles and Gorgias at 497B4-11. On Callicles use of καὶ for ἀλλά cf. n. 1066. Callicles's "view" of lawful society disqualifies him to be called a "gentleman" (*pace* Dodds, pp. 13, 260); it is not a theory of "the origin of law in a 'social contract'" (Dodds, 266), since existing laws such as those handed down by Solon could subsequently be altered by a given demos along the lines Callicles describes; rather it is a delusory view of the world around him, as consisting not of a minority of "strong" men versus a large majority of "weaklings" but of all against one, who by default, as we gradually learn, turns out to be Callicles as he imagines himself, the one strong man, strong at providing for the fulfilment of only his own desires.
- 1091 ἄνθρωποι (B5) after ἀνὴρ above brings along with it a derogatory evaluation of the lawmakers, who are in a democracy nothing but the citizens. The definite article with all three nominatives again, consciously or unconsciously, escapes determining what is subject and what is predicate: are they lawmakers because weak, or weak because lawmakers? The question is then mooted by the third substantive article, οἱ πολλοί. Name-calling, which for Callicles counts as an assertion, places the slur in the predicate position, unless for variation it designates the subject of the assertion: it hardly matters which. *AGPS* shows the limits of its own empirical approach in elevating this insouciance to the level of an idiom (50.4.14.B).
- 1092 καὶ οἱ πολλοί (B5): καὶ is abrupt (cf. 482E3, 483B3) here meaning *id est*: He accepts the awkwardness of expression because he wants to characterize the majority as the weak before he acknowledges their majority, which in a democracy is the basis of their legal hegemony (Mistriotis). Hamilton's tr. with relative clause ("who form the majority of mankind") misses the political sense and loses the trick.
- 1093 νόμους / ἐπαίνους / ψόγους (B6-C1): This is the first instance of Callicles's favored use of a triad (cf. E4-6, 484A3-4, 484D2-7, 485B4-5, 485B6-7, 485C1-2, 485C4-6, 485C6-8, 485D4-E1, 485E1, 486A1-3, 486D1, 492B8, 492C4-5, 492C6-8), whether approbative or derogatory, on which more later. The three terms here do not constitute or represent a traditional triad or division: the combination is unexampled elsewhere. It is unexampled because it contains in embryo the exceptional outlook of Callicles, that laws merely represent the self-serving velleities and lies of the majority who make them, in a democracy, which as velleities express themselves in praise and blame (cf. 484D1-7 and 484E3-485A3, and the similarly unexampled lists below, at 484A4-5 and 492B8). The list therefore broaches an argument without having to make it, and in the event sets out the program for the ensuing remarks, which work through the three terms in the reverse order of a chiasm: ψόγος (C3-5), ἐπαίνος (C5-6), νόμος (C6-8). Lists may jar the flow of discourse by juxtaposing items not conventionally associated, calling then for some explanation: cf. 470E6-11 (and n. 733), 484A3-6, 508A1-2; *Leg.* 817C2-3 (where the *probandum* is connected to the warrant), *Phdo.* 80C4-5 (the last term belongs to soul not body), *Phdrs.* 248D3-4 (and my n. *ad loc.*), *Phlb.* 12C8-D4 (where the entire argument relies upon jingles), *Rep.* 351C8-9 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 563E10-4A1 (and my note); *Th.* 176C3-4, 175E2-6A2.



γὰρ οἶμαι αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον<sup>1098</sup> ἔχωσιν φαυλότεροι ὄντες. διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχροὺν λέγεται,<sup>1099</sup> τὸ πλεόν ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ<sup>1100</sup> ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἢ δέ γε<sup>1101</sup> οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει [d] αὐτό,<sup>1102</sup> ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω<sup>1103</sup> τοῦ χειρόνος πλεόν ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου, δηλοῖ<sup>1104</sup> δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις<sup>1105</sup> καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὄλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν,<sup>1106</sup> ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται,<sup>1107</sup> τὸν κρεῖττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν.<sup>1108</sup> ἐπεὶ<sup>1109</sup> ποίῳ δικάῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν

- 1094 Reading ἐκφοβούντες alone (C1) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (ἐκφοβούντες τε YZa and the early editions *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Ast Bekker Sauppe Thompson Sommer). Synthesis with τε is not unexampled in Plato (cf. n. 1033); in the absence of τε, however, the asyndeton broaches the idea that the ensuing sentences are an exegesis of the triadic list that has come before (see prev. n. and again n. 1033, *supra*), as does punctuating with a colon, as here. The prefix means not to “frighten them away” (*pace* Nichols) but frighten them out of holding to the way they see themselves (cf. E4ff.).
- 1095 ἐρωμενεστέρους (C1): The word choice (after the language of δύναμις used up until now) stresses a natural and animal sort of strength or vigorosity, immediately giving way to the term the context calls for (δυνατούς) and which Callicles needs to appropriate for his purposes: this time the revising term comes before instead of after the καί. He continues with it below at D2.
- 1096 πλεόν ἔχειν (C2, C3, C7) is not only a matter of *possessing more*, but a synecdoche for being in a better *condition* overall (πλεόν may even be taken adverbially!). The key notion, and the reason it is a derogatory term (as πλεονεξία), is the unstated notion that one gets to be in a better position *at the expense of others*, a notion we saw to be implicit in Gorgias’s idea of freedom (cf. nn. 233, 239, 284, 335, 583). This presumption of a zero-sum game becomes nakedly clear in Callicles’s vision of the young lion who enslaves those who tried to enslave him (483E4-484B1), and the subsequent story about Heracles according to which what belongs to the weak many belongs by nature to the strong one (484C1-3). Contrast Socrates’s unpacking of the synecdoche at 489B1-C7.
- 1097 Reading λέγουσιν (C3) with the mss. and edd. (*pace* Hermann who deletes): the verb begins the chiasmic run-through of the triad, representing the first type of *talk* (νόμος-αἰσχροὺν). It means what it meant at A2 and what καλοῦσιν means below at C8: They do not think what they are saying is true (cf. n. 1093). His chiasm of before and after (in αἰσχροὺν / δίκαιον) treats his assertion as already established in the very assertion of it.
- 1098 τὸ ἴσον (C5): The term (along with ἰσονομία and ἰσότης) is an ideological watchword of democracy: cf. *Rep.*558C5 (ἰσότητά τινα), 561B2 (ἴσον δὴ τι), 563B8; *Leg.*756E-8A; *Menex.*239A2-3; *Hdt.* 3.80.6; *E. Suppl.*429-441, *Phoen.*535-48; *T.* 6.38.5-9.2; as was πλεονεκεῖν a watchword for political advantage. Callicles’s overused parenthetical οἶμαι (cf. n. 1090) is here snide.
- 1099 τοῦτο ... λέγεται (C6): τοῦτο points neither backward nor forward: if backward, the ensuing exegesis is unnecessary; if forward to the exegesis it becomes otiose for the same reason. It is another instance of Callicles controlling his audience’s attention by disabling it, paralyzing it, forcing it to wait until he is finished. The passive and impersonal λέγεται replacing λέγουσιν portrays rather than asserting that their argument (λέγουσιν) has become the prevalent outlook (λέγεται).
- 1100 With καί (C7), λέγεται (which denotes an argument) devolves into καλοῦσιν (which is merely name-calling, praise and blame). Justice is for them merely an approbatory label. Before the articular infinitive is it the notion that is unjust (ἄδικον, adjective); after, the act (αὐτό) becomes a crime (ἀδικεῖν, verb).
- 1101 δέ γε (C8): φύσις δέ answers νόμῳ μὲν (C6) but the added γε emphasizes the stepping up of the claim from lying talk (καλοῦσιν, summarizing in effect the triadic description of the world of νόμος [B4-C8]) to plain fact (ἀποφαίνει) – in no way weakened by another infix and merely asseverative οἶμαι: cf. B4. Once he has “established” that the many are lying, it becomes incumbent upon him to tell us what the truth is. φύσις, nominative subject, is *hypostatized* by αὐτή, in contrast with notional νόμος, which above had been a mere dative of respect. For the stepping up cf. δέ γε at 448A6. For parenthetical οἶμαι, Callicles’s favorite asseverative, inserted even between article and noun or preposition and object, for which cf. *Rep.*568C2 (Stallb.), 564A7; *D.* 20.3 and 54.38 (Heindorf): in these cases it feels like an enclitic with a little swagger. Compare τοι.
- 1102 Surely ἀποφαίνει αὐτό (C8-D1) is to be read from the overwhelming testimony of BTPF, *legg.* Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Burnet Lamb Feix Dodds Irwin Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler (ἀποφαίνει ἂν Y : ἀποφαίνει αὐ V, *legg.* Heindorf Ast Bekker Sauppe Thompson Cope Schanz Stender Croiset Zimmermann Theiler Piettre : ἀποφαίνοι ἂν XE<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarín Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck), representing Callicles’s *superbia* (Stallb.). It fulfills the indignation against human law expressed in the δέ clause by γε, and is another gratuitous pronoun to arrest and control the attention, parallel to demonstrative τοῦτο (C6) but capping it with a stand-alone pronoun (αὐτό): “the fact.” Kratz compares *Charm.*166B7, *Lys.*204A9 (reading mss.BT: cf. Stallb. *ad loc.*), *Rep.*362D5 – see also *Lys.*218B8. This claim of plain factuality (“*montrer*” *ce qui est, mais ne “démontrer” rien*, Piettre) is the objective correlate to the subjective claim of immediate apprehension betokened by νοεῖν, above (A1 and 482E2). This brute sense of self-grounding fact is all that is left for δίκαιον to denote, both here (D1) and at 491D1. Contrary to the assertion of Dodds (266), Callicles’s use of the term δίκαιον in this way does not gainsay but supports Shorey’s assertion (*What Plato Said*, 154) that his speech is “the most eloquent statement of the immoralist’s case in European literature.”
- 1103 ἀμείνω (D1) broadly represents ἀγαθόν, from among the μέγιστα (καλόν, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον), but immediately is transmogrified (by mere καί) into δυνατώτερον, with which it has nothing to do. Stallb. describes Callicles as *dicendi fervore abreptus*; Cron notes an *absichtlich verwischten*. His fervor to praise subdues in him the denotation of the words he uses as mere. As he takes it upon himself to be a spokesman for nature and tell us what (he thinks) the truth is, he becomes totally unaware that the way he is telling us reveals to us why he thinks what he thinks.
- 1104 δηλοῖ (D2): Though an impersonal construction is possible (*manifestum est* – Ast Stallb. Jahn [citing parallels] Deuschle-Cron Thompson Huit Lamb Apelt Feix Dodds Nichols and *AGPS* 52.2.12.B) it is natural (with Schleiermacher Heindorf Bekker Kratz Jowett Croiset Helmbold Zeyl Piettre Dalfen Erler) to continue with the personification of φύσις, especially since δηλοῖ is again, as Piettre might say, *plus montrer que démontrer*. Woolsey understands ταῦτα as subject.
- 1105 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις (D3): Callicles’s proleptic manner determines that ἄλλοις here is adverbial: the animals are foil, setting the context for the human section of the animal order, since the whole point is that “nature” is true and convention a lie. Cron notes a heightening of tone as if a high moral were being pronounced.
- 1106 ἐν ὄλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν (D4): The pairing attempts to weaken or suppress the idea that cities exist νόμῳ (*whole* cities have different laws from each other) rather than φύσει, so as to confine cities as a plurality within the order of natural genesis; at the same time both cities and

Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ [e] ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι<sup>1110</sup> τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ’ οἶμαι<sup>1111</sup> οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου<sup>1112</sup> ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε<sup>1113</sup> τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως<sup>1114</sup> κατὰ τοῦτον ὄν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα, πλάττοντες<sup>1115</sup> τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπάδοντές<sup>1116</sup> τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα<sup>1117</sup> [484] λέγοντες<sup>1118</sup> ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρῆ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν<sup>1119</sup> καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι φύσιν ἰκανὴν<sup>1120</sup> γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ,<sup>1121</sup> πάντα ταῦτα

races (γένεσι means races, not families [*pace* Schmelzer{89} and Croiset] as the unequally felicitous exx. of Xerxes and Darius have in common [Dodds]) mask the individuality of ἀνθρώποι (Mistriotis, Lodge). That man is basically an animal, weaker or stronger, is the most controversial premise of Callicles’s fantasy and he must suppress it at all costs.

- 1107 κέκριται (D5): Notice the anaphora of ὅτι οὕτω: he explains *πολλαχοῦ* before he explains οὕτω. The perfect tense, and choice of this verb over *νεόμισται* (Mistriotis), used indeed by Socrates at 520E4, attempt to suppress the inherently political character of the process by which a judgment or decision would be reached.
- 1108 καὶ πλέον ἔχεν (D6): What for Callicles is either an illative or exegetical καὶ reveals what he thinks ruling is, as well as his utter ignorance of what it truly is – compare D2 and B5 above. It is a perfect example of “reverse καί,” where the new and inferred idea is placed before the already present one (cf. 474E6 and n. 854). Contrast reverse kai of already present effect and underlying cause, e.g. *διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος* at *Apol.*28A7-8.
- 1109 ἐπεὶ (D6): The abrupt use we saw with Polus (cf. 461C2, 471A9 and E1, 473E5, 474B7). ποῖω δικάω does not here, as elsewhere, constitute a rhetorical question expressing denial, but literally asks whether the kind is φύσει or νόμω (Hermann Mistriotis Ovinik), which he presently shall answer.
- 1110 ἂν τις ἔχοι (E1): The mild anacoluthon due to the omission of the relative, though par for the course in Callicles’s abrupt manner, provides idiomatic swiftness in this formula of dismissal (cf. *Apol.*41C1-4; *Leg.*944B2-3; *Phdo.*70E4, 73D10, 94B10; *Soph.*226B9; D. 21.15). Cf. Riddell, *Digest* §257.
- 1111 ἀλλ’ οἶμαι (E1): Again Callicles moves to his next point by brashly (*zuversichtlich*, Cron) throwing away the previous one. Kratz associates ἀλλά with the sequel instead, and thus appends the explanation that the ensuing sentence is intended to fill a hiatus set up by the absence of an answer to the previous question.
- 1112 Reading τὴν τοῦ δικαίου (E2) with the mss. and edd., defended with particular acuity by Ast (*dell.* Schleiermacher Bekker Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Sauppe Kratz Thompson Hirschig Jowett Schanz Stender Apelt Zimmermann Hamilton Cantarín), answering his question above (n.1109). Another shift in conception by Callicles: What is the sense of the genitive? “Nature” goes from a dimension or category to being a realm that includes some aspect of justice; and, conversely, law (E3-4) is now an aspect of nature or a realm within which there is nature (read τῆς in E3 with edd.). In lieu of defining his terms, Callicles employs syntactical parallelisms with different denotations, as if the parallelism were sufficient to constitute them. Instead, it commands. Cf. n. 1077, *supra*.
- 1113 κατὰ νόμον γε (E3): With γε and his apostrophe to Zeus, Callicles acknowledges, but does not justify, that he has appropriated the category of νόμος, too, for his own use – and has broached the idea that it is interchangeable with δίκαιον if only we can keep up with him – as the citation from Pindar (νόμος, 484B4) will soon show.
- 1114 ἴσως (E3), in condescending understatement as 461B8, 465C1, 480E2, and climactically at 527A3; *Phdrs.*233E5, *al.* (cf. n. 801).
- 1115 πλάττοντες (E4): Punctuate with a comma before, for there is no connective (*pace* Stallb. Huit Mistriotis Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Dodds Theiler Zeyl Nichols Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler, who place a colon before and create asyndeton [Allen introducing a paragraph break], in defense of which Thompson cites asyndeton at *Prot.*325C5: ἐκ παιδῶν μικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι); but *do* punctuate (*pace* Heindorf Coraes Bekker Woolsey Thompson Sommer Stender), to make it clear that πλάττοντες is *not* a comment upon preceding τιθέμεθα, as Kratz Thompson Hirschig allege (astutely citing its use at *Leg.*712B2 but forced thereby to call the sequel an explicative asyndeton) – also Jowett. Rather, the νόμοι are the means we use to mold the natural best. It introduces and frames the sequel (with Ast 1832). Callicles “runs on” into an ephrastic pastiche of participles (a style more competently deployed by Polus: cf. 471A3-D2 and nn. *ad loc.*). The words as preserved in the mss. do not warrant emendation (such as Hermann’s athetization of τιθέμεθα, followed by Sauppe Deuschle-Cron Schanz Lodge Feix) merely because slovenly (*oratio plane non cohaereat*, as Heindorf says; and Kratz, *nicht zu leugnende Härte*): rather, the style is characteristic of, and moreover is meant to characterize, the speaker.
- 1116 Leaving out καὶ before κατεπάδοντες (E6) with mss. and all edd. since Stallb. (καὶ κατεπάδοντες E *teste* Cantarín Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast Bekker).
- 1117 καταδουλούμεθα (E6): The metaphor is reminiscent of the metaphor he used for verbal entrapment at 482E1 (συμποδισθεῖς), on which cf. n. 1068. Callicles is sailing very close to the wind at this point since it is exactly such “enslavement” of the audience by means of intoxicating language that his hero, Gorgias, has come to democratic Athens to teach, and he is paying to learn (cf. 452D6 and n. *ad loc.*, n. *ad* 452E9, and 502D9-503A1 with n. *ad loc.*, and n. 1084).
- 1118 Reading λέγοντες (484A1) with the mss. and edd. (against Cobet’s athetization [*Mnem.*3{1875}133] who thinks the ὡς clause after it is the antecedent of the τοῦτον at 483E4 pointing forward – a rather severe hyperbaton given the distraction of the colorful metaphoric participles in between). Callicles repeats the term from 483C3. There is λόγος / ἔργον behind what he is saying, and ironically his language reveals that for all his bluster about power and natural inborn gifts, he believes in the power of words to mystify and seduce and hypnotize men, the heart of the Gorgianic teaching. The flurry of participles, echoed in the counter-statement below (A3-4), which qualify and add color along the way without making exposed and therefore falsifiable assertions, is reminiscent of the technique Polus adopted in describing Archelaus (471AD), though he pressed it into very different service.
- 1119 τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (A1): The admirable and the just: i.e. what they praise and sanction as just.
- 1120 φύσιν ἰκανὴν ... ἔχων (A2-3): Note that the ensuing participles describing the behaviors for which his nature is “adequate” (A3-5), are not infinitives complementary to ἰκανὴν (though one could easily tr. that way, e.g., Piettre: *doué d’une nature assez puissante pour secourir ...*), but participles. We are forced to see these abilities as due to nothing but “adequacy,” Callicles’s favorite litotes which we shall see over and over (cf. nn. 1167, 1348), and which Socrates will ultimately turn back upon him (nn. 1251, 1395, 1439, 1900).



ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών,<sup>1122</sup> καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα<sup>1123</sup>  
καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας,<sup>1124</sup> ἐπαναστὰς  
ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος,<sup>1125</sup> καὶ ἐνταῦθα [b] ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως  
δίκαιον.<sup>1126</sup> δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος<sup>1127</sup> ἄπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι<sup>1128</sup> ἐν τῷ  
ἄσματι<sup>1129</sup> ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι

- 1121 ἀνὴρ (A3): Not merely *einer* (*pace* Ast), nor in the sympathetic sense, “fellow” (cf. n. 717 and *Rep.*372C3, 361B6-7 with my nn. *ad loc.*; *Polit.*259A6, *X.Hiero* 8.5), but – again – in the quasi-predicative use (whence Schleiermacher’s periphrasis, *wenn einer ... zum Manne wird*, doing full justice to the word order): somebody who is a real man. The protasis is heavy with admonitory threat: οἶμοι is an understatement. The man Callicles has in mind has more φύσις than normal: Is he more an animal than the others – or are they less a man than he? The subjunctive is hot with anticipation (*pace* Jowett’s “If there were a man...,” as if it were an optative). The description of one real man arising in the midst of conspiring weaklings that surround him, despite the “superb rhetorical vigour” that for Dodds smacks of “a religious revelation” (he is especially moved by the aorists), would more soberly be described as an insane hallucination. Moreover, it tells us as little about the mental psychology of Plato (despite the scurrilous insinuations of Dodds *et al.*, *ibid.*, cf. his p.14) as the depiction of Creon in the *Antigone* tells us about Sophocles.
- 1122 καὶ διαφυγών (A4) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. (καὶ διαφυγών καὶ E3 S2 Y V [*silet* Cantarín!], *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast[1819] Coraes Bekker : διαφυγών *secl.* Naber [*Obs.crit.*{1862}7] *legg.* Schanz Theiler : καὶ διαφυγών *secl.* Morstadt [*Emend.*5]).
- 1123 Reading γράμματα (A4) with mss. and edd. (περιάμματα *coni.* Valckenaer : πλάσματα *coni.* Cobet : ἀγρεύματα *coni.* Theiler : γοητεύματα *coni.* Richards). None of the editors’ improvements have been accepted by others; γράμματα, with Heindorf, means written proclamations or legal memoranda: cf. *Leg.*858E4; *Polit.*293B3, 295C8; *al.*
- 1124 τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας (A4-5): The list is exceptional, in form and content, as are the three participles above (κατεπάδοντες, γοητεύοντες, λέγοντες), which it reiterates in a “chiasm of before and after,” that narrates the defeat of our measures, trampled upon step by step by the coming Great Man: νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας generalizes the three items, for νόμος is his theme. Initial τὰ ἡμέτερα is meant to go with all four nouns, but terminal τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας goes only with the generalizing last. For a single definite article understood with a plurality of subsequent nouns cf. n. 948; despite its governance being allowed to extend over all the nouns, the final of these receives a special qualification localized to itself by the article τοὺς: for as soon as Callicles mentions νόμος he cannot resist but contrast it with φύσις. Perhaps a similar correspondence is intended for the other triad of participles (ἀποσεισάμενος, διαρρήξας, διαφυγών: cf. Lodge, 141b). Cic. *Brut.*60.217 does connect *veneficiis et cantionibus*.
- 1125 ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος (A6): Climactically, after his *anticipatory* subjunctive protasis, extenuated by his string of participles (3-4) and the extensive list of the shackles (4-5), Callicles’s hero shows forth to be “our despot,” in the aorist, as does Callicles’s interpretation of his epochal significance (τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον!) (The despot he fantasizes about is himself, our Callicles, whom history, however, has neither seen fit nor required to remember). The aorist is more than “gnomic” (*pace* AGPS 53.10.2B) and even more than the category of aorists articulated by Kühner-Gerth 2.166 [§386.11], “*wenn der Redende ein zukünftiges Ereignis als bereits geschehen darstellt*” (for which cf. *Rep.*406D5 with my n. *ad loc.*), for it is an *index of Callicles’s impatience with reality that he sees ein zukünftiges Ereignis als bereits geschehen*, stressing (imaginary) actuality over against the bland generality of the present (Cron). Translators have failed to reproduce the force of it: some (Schleiermacher, Woodhead, Irwin, Allen Waterfield Nichols Erler) make the apodosis begin with the participles, and then are left to translate the aorist of the apodosis with the present or future; or most inappropriately turn the sentence into a “future less vivid” or “ideal” condition (Cary). ὁ δοῦλος looks back to καταδουλούμεθα with derision and cancels any justification for reading the minority variant, ὑμέτερα, before γράμματα, at A4 (E2 E3 Steph., *leg.* Routh): the subjective sense of the possessive pronoun ἡμέτερος metamorphoses into the objective. The epiphany of Thrasymachus’s tyrannical hero likewise consisted in a petty criminal we despise suddenly being converted into the strong man to whom we wake up to find ourselves enslaved (cf. *Rep.*344B5-C2: Croiset’s and Piettre’s *se dresser en maître devant nous* should be *sur nous*; and Canto’s *nous apparaissait comme un maître* should be *notre maître*; Erler translates, *erweist sich als Herr*, having already spent ἡμέτερος on δοῦλος). Compare also the transformative eventuality Polus imagines at 473C5-D1, and the career of Archelaus he narrates a bit earlier, who began as a slave and ended up a tyrant (471A4-D2). We would do well to put a paragraph break (with Croiset Helmbold Allen Piettre) after this sentence: what follows from Pindar is for Callicles merely an exemplum.
- 1126 τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον (B1): Not actually much different, for Callicles, from ἡ τοῦ δίκαιου φύσις (483E2), as it was not above (cf. 483E2 with E3). Indeed, φύσις, νόμος, and τὸ δίκαιον have for him all collapsed into one.
- 1127 δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος (B1): The καὶ appears to be formulaic in citation of literary witness and corroborative etymologies. Cf. n. 2266 and my note to *Rep.*400B1. It approaches δὴ in meaning (*sic* Denniston 317, 320); translate with “our.” For καὶ introducing literary references cf. *Rep.*404B10 and Shorey *ad loc.* (Loeb 1.267 note f), 407C7; *Leg.*706D3; *Phdo.*65B3 (Burnet’s worries *ad loc.* are unfounded); *Phdrs.*240C1-2; *Tim.*72A6; and Arist. *An.Pr.*65B16; *de Caelo* 279B30; *EE* 1218A36, 1332A8; *EN* 1096A3; *Met.*989A10, 1076A39-B1, 1076B39-1077A1. For its use with etymologies, cf. Arist. *HA* 492A22; *EN* 1103A17, 1112A16-17).
- 1128 ἐνδείκνυσθαι (B2) “is used of all kinds of practical proof; ἀποδεικνύειν of demonstration” (Lodge).
- 1129 ἐν τῷ ἄσματι (B2): Here is the version of Bowra (f.152: cf. 169 Snell, 187 Turyn):

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς  
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων  
ἄγει δίκαιόν τὸ βιαιότατον  
ὑπερτάτη χειρὶ. τεκμαίρομαι  
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος· ἐπεὶ Γαρύνα βόας  
Κυκλωπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος  
ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἔλασεν

Herakles’s tenth Labor, at the behest of Eurystheus, was to fetch the oxen of Geryon, who upon receiving them from him sacrificed them to Hera. Herakles not only took them without paying but slew their guardians and their owner; his return to Eurystheus was plagued with difficulties along the way; in the end, he profited not at all. Moreover his laborious fealty to Eurystheus was his attempt to expiate his violent murder of his wife and children, as if justice in his opinion consisted not in the exercise of his native strength but in paying the penalty.

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς  
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·<sup>1130</sup>

οὗτος<sup>1131</sup> δὲ δῆ, φησὶν

ἄγει βιαίῳ τὸ δικαιοῦτατον<sup>1132</sup>  
ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ· τεκμαίρομαι  
ἔργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ... ἀπριάτας ...

λέγει οὕτω πως—τὸ γὰρ ἄσµα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι—λέγει δ' ὅτι οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε  
δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς βοῦς, [c] ὡς<sup>1133</sup> τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει,  
καὶ βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτιονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν  
χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.<sup>1134</sup>

Lodge and Croiset note, relevantly, that we do not have the context for this passage from Pindar: the temptation of course is to imagine the most edifying one.

1130 θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων (B5) spells out πάντων: Pindar's point, according to Callicles, is that the law that is king is not just the law of men (subj. gen.) but of the whole cosmos (obj. gen.) – the law, one might say, of nature (hence Hesychius's testimony [s.v. νόμος]: νόμος πάντων ἢ βασιλεὺς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν: Boeckh's guess that κατὰ φύσιν, and Ast's that the more poetical φύσει, had dropped out here are obviated by this point). It is in order to emphasize that Pindar's "law over mortals and immortals" is his own "justice of nature" (B1) that Callicles breaks off, though the poem goes on. Helmbold's "convention" for νόμος entirely misses Callicles's point.

1131 οὗτος (B6): He does not use the commendatory ἐκεῖνος. He interrupts his quotation to emphasize that it is this king-law he has just brought to mind (οὗτος) that Pindar is talking about (the one that rules as a νόμος over both men and gods), that ἄγει, etc.

1132 I read ἄγει βιαίῳ τὸ δικαιοῦτατον (B7) with BTWPF Ξ1 X<sup>2</sup> and Theiler, or ἄγει βιαίως τὸ δικαιοῦτατον QbEzA and the early editions, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Ast Bekker (βιαίῳ τὸ δικαιοῦτατον Ξ1<sup>2</sup> *leg.* Wilamowitz : βιαίως τὸ δίκαιον (~ *ius [agere] violenter*, Ficinus) : ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαίῳτατον Aristides *Or.* 2.226 [2.68-9 Dindorf] with schol. *ad loc.* [135-6 Frommel], and schol. *ad Nem.* 9.35 [Drachmann 3.154.15-17], *legg. edd.* : ἄγειν δικαιοῦ τὸ βιαίῳτατον *coni.* Croiset[REG{1921}125-8] followed by Pettrie). The later editors, starting with Stallb., ignore the mss. and read Aristides, because they infer from *Leg.* 714A1-2 that this, or a version of this (Croiset, *ibid.*), is what Plato thinks Pindar wrote, or that it is better poetry (Stallb.), even though it is our Callicles that quotes Pindar here (and the Athenian there, who may himself take liberties). Aristides is of course no witness for what Callicles "remembers" from Pindar: indeed Plato went to the trouble of letting Callicles's quote devolve into paraphrase (for if we may rely upon Aristides' testimony [*Or.*, *ibid.*], our only source for the sequel, he has forgotten two lines after ἐπεὶ). For ἐπίσταμαι (B10) meaning to know by heart, cf. *Prot.* 339B4-6.

If we accept Boeckh's reconstruction of the passage from Pindar (in defense of which cf. Appendix I), Callicles has changed not only the sense of the passage (Olymp. 129.12-19; Reiske, Valckenaer) but also the text, as Routh was first to assert (followed by Heindorf Beck Coraes Bekker). His memory (not Plato's, *pace* Wilamowitz, *PS* 2.95ff) has been fooled into a spoonerism – switching δικαίων τὸ βιαίῳτατον into βιαίῳ τὸ δικαιοῦτατον – overcome or dictated by what he wants the poem to say, and yet even the spoonerism is barely able to reach the meaning he wants. On the basis of the superlative he introduces, δικαιοῦτατον, he is arguing that the law of men and gods (i.e., the law of all nature, not just the self-serving γράμματα of the weak), which is the despotic king of all (as opposed to a flimsy law enacted democratically by a mere majority of men), carries out the most purely just of violent deeds with nothing to stop it. Misquotations, or quotations misused, are not unknown in Plato: it is just a question whether we notice them, and whether Plato is expecting too much in hoping we will. In the case of Glaucon's and Adeimantus's speeches in *Rep.* Bk.II (e.g., 367A7-8, 364C7-D2) their misquotations reveal a blindspot in their outlook (cf. my nn. *ad locc.*), just as here, the combination of careless insensitivity and highhanded abuse of the famous lines in Pindar perfectly characterizes the personality of Callicles, and in particular shows why, or how, he believes what he believes. For him the βιαίῳ and the δίκαιον are not only indistinguishable but not worth distinguishing.

1133 ὡς (C1) added to the participle removes the intent of these words or their meaning from the speaker, Callicles (*pace* Deuschle-Cron Zimmermann Waterfield), and transfers them to Pindar, who λέγει (and not to Heracles, *pace* Croiset Apelt Chambry Irwin, for Heracles's morals and theories are irrelevant to Pindar's argument for which his behavior is serving as a τέκμαρ: for his own part, Heracles was acting under orders from Eurystheus because he believed if anything that he needed expiation for the violent injuries he had committed). That Socrates takes Callicles to be attributing the belief to Pindar is confirmed at 488B3.

1134 τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων (C2-3): Presumably we are to supply τοῦ with εἶναι, and conceive of it as the "antecedent" of τούτου. Callicles then uses the bare genitive phrase, τοῦ βελτιονός τε καὶ κρείττονος, as the complement of εἶναι, as he did above (483B1,2), but here we might just say that this is a genitive of possession-by-nature and the other, after τὰ, a genitive of possession-by-convention; and he uses bare εἶναι to link subject to predicate: all that he really cares about is the shift from plural to singular. Why spell it out for him? Stephanus: *quae ad deteriores atque inferiores pertinent cedant meliori atque potentiori (sim. Routh); Schleiermacher: dass eben die Stiere und das gesammte Eigenthum der Schlechteren un Geringeren dem Besseren gebühre; Cary: "when the property of the worse and inferior belong to the better and superior" (losing Callicles's distinction between plural and singular, which means the world to him); Cope: "that cows or any other property of the inferior and weaker should belong to the superior and stronger" (again losing the numbers); Jowett: "possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior" (losing the numbers); Croiset: *sont la propriété de...* Allen gets the plural of the inferior men but leaves out the singular of the superior. Ast (1819) however leaves it as is: *bona peiorum atque inferiorum omnia esse melioris ac superioris.**

τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει,<sup>1135</sup> γνώση<sup>1136</sup> δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω<sup>1137</sup> ἔλθῃς ἐάσας ἡδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστίν, ὃ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.<sup>1138</sup> ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι [d] ἐστὶν ὧν χρῆ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κάγαθόν καὶ εὐδόκιμον<sup>1139</sup> ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα.<sup>1140</sup> καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων<sup>1141</sup> ἄπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὀμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων,<sup>1142</sup> καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίνονται.<sup>1143</sup> ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἷς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν [e] πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴν αὖ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας<sup>1144</sup> διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου·<sup>1145</sup> λαμπρός τέ ἐστιν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, “καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπίγεται,”

νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,  
 ἴν’ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὧν·

- 1135 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει (C4): With μὲν οὖν Callicles announces another transition (cf. 483A8-B1 with n. 1083). Dodds flatly asserts Callicles now turns to “the views recently expressed by Socrates,” which of course he should do, but what views are these? The assertion of Socrates on the table is that committing injustice and avoiding the penalty is the worst thing for a man (Socrates reminds him of this at 489A8-B1). Presumably what Callicles is asserting is “true” is that force, rather than the dictates of human laws, is the right and the just and the law – though he has merely asserted these things rather than showing them to be true. All he means by introducing “truth” is to provide himself the predicate he needs for accusing Socrates of ignorance (of the truth) – though Socrates has said his philosophy is a matter of eros; and rather than making clear what it is that Socrates does not know, he tells him what has so far prevented him from knowing it, namely, the very “philosophy” that he loves. By reaching “philosophy” he has his topic. He invites us to infer on his behalf that he is finally going to respond to what Socrates said about their different loves (481C5-482C3), which by rights was the first thing he should have responded to, since it is the only thing that had yet been addressed to him.
- 1136 γνώση (C4): The postponement of the vocative to the next sentence is rude.
- 1137 τὰ μείζω (C4-5) is surely vague, but just as surely quite another thing than what Socrates refers to as τὰ μέγιστα at *Apol.*22D7 (*pace* Deuschle-Cron), for there Socrates means what he always means by τὰ μέγιστα, namely, the good the fine and the just (cf. 487B5 and nn. 218, 384, 510; and my note *ad Rep.*451A7); whereas here τὰ μείζω means what it will always mean for Callicles, the arena (cf. τὰ μέσα, 485D5) in which *pleonexia* (another comparative concept) might be won (cf. *Menex.* 234A6) – just as Proxenus the Boeotian desired to become τὰ μέγιστα πρᾶτταν ἰκανός, and hired Gorgias to become so (*X. Anab.*2.6.16). Jowett’s dreamy “higher things” and Croiset’s *plus hautes études* hardly capture what Callicles means. For the admonitory future γνώση here trumping mere argumentation (“you’ll find out”), cf. 505C9 and Thrasymachus’s μαθήση at *Rep.*344A4.
- 1138 διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (C7-8): The tone is suddenly oracular (Lodge, citing Aristides’s advice that σεμνότης is achieved by the use of ὀνομαστικὰ λέξεις ἀντὶ ῥηματικῶν [Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.* 2.468], not to mention the absence of a verb: cf. *Rep.*617D6ff). Of course Socrates was deemed by the jury of Athens to be a διαφθορὰ τῶν νέων.
- 1139 Reading εὐδόκιμον (D2) with TWF and Gellius, *legg.* edd. (εὐδαίμων’ B). The καὶ is exegetical. καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός in the mouth of Callicles has little to do with τὸ καλόν nor τὸ ἀγαθόν, nor their amalgamation, but has devolved into a catchword for a respected citizen, someone who has secured the approval of the other καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί (H. Wankel *KALOS KAI AGATHOS* diss. Wurzburg 1961 [New York 1979] 120). The sense is captured well in Piettre’s tr. *beau et bon et bien considéré*; contrast Socrates’s resuscitation of their meanings at 470E9. In a dialectical investigation of virtue or happiness the phrase can function as a sort of stand-in for collecting phenomena without begging the question, as for instance 480C7, 490E6 (with n. 733); *Rep.*409A7, 581E-2A (with my n.).
- 1140 ἄνδρα (D2), though a noun, is almost a fourth adjective added at the very end (cf. n. 1120).
- 1141 τῶν νόμων (D2): A real mensch condemns human laws but holds knowledge of them in high regard – as a means to climb (Deuschle-Cron).
- 1142 τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων (D5-6): Does he have in mind men’s motivations and how to manipulate them (as the supercilious ἀνθρωπείων and the generalization with ἡθῶν suggest)? Or does he allude to the enjoyment of pleasures which, as we shall soon be told, only the strongest and most astute can achieve?
- 1143 ἄπειροι γίνονται (D6-7), repeated from above (D3), indicates that καὶ συλλήβδην is not what it first appeared to be, a generalized final item of the list. Instead, in the aftermath we see that syntactically at least, καὶ introduces a second sentence that restates with a generalization what the first sentence stated for several categories. The shift of construction is impossible without the ambivalence of καὶ, but is due to the insouciance of Callicles.
- 1144 ὑμετέρας (E2), a second plural, might include a glance over to Chaerephon, perhaps remembering why they were late for the lecture – or else to “classify” Socrates and his associates as a group (cf. τοὺς ἄλλους, 486A6), over against the gatherings of politicians and businessmen envisioned above (a prejudicial stereotyping that I think Socrates would not see fit to do. Cf. ὑμέτερος at 510E1 and my n. 1864).
- 1145 τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου (E3): The scholiast says it comes from the *Antiope*, in Zethus’s speech to Amphion (= frg.183 Nauck<sup>2</sup>). συμβαίνει ~ “jibes with.” Compare ἐνδείκνυσθαι, B2 with n. 1128.

[485] ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ἦ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λαιδορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ,<sup>1146</sup> εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι<sup>1147</sup> τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μὲν<sup>1148</sup> ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μεираκίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἐτι φιλοσοφῆ, καταγέλαστον, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα<sup>1149</sup> γίγνεται, καὶ<sup>1150</sup> ἔγωγε [b] ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας.<sup>1151</sup> ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ὃ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον,<sup>1152</sup> χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον<sup>1153</sup> καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικία, ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγόμενον παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρὸν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα<sup>1154</sup> εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾶ μου τὰ ὄτα καὶ μοι δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές<sup>1155</sup> τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ [c] ἀνδρὸς<sup>1156</sup> ἀκούση τις<sup>1157</sup> ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὄρᾳ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον.<sup>1158</sup> ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. περὶ νέῳ<sup>1159</sup> μὲν γὰρ μεираκίῳ ὄρῶν

- 1146 ἐπαινεῖ (485A2): The distinction between blame and praise, and between what men hold to be good and what bad, for Callicles – as for any name-caller – merely serve the man who does the praising and blaming, just as the laws merely serve those who make them, as he intimated above (483B6-8).
- 1147 ἀλλ' οἶμαι (A3) again (cf. 483E1, 483B4), departing from what he was saying, interrupting himself so that he can say what he wants to say next.
- 1148 φιλοσοφίας μὲν (A4): The genitive, with μὲν, immediately appears to be introducing an appositive that unpacks ἀμφοτέρων (setting up an anticipation of a contrast to political action [τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν, *vel sim.*]), and appears to be doing so long enough that there is no suspicion of anacoluthon (after μετασχεῖν), an illusion deftly sublated by the shift of construction at καλὸν μετέχειν, where we find ourselves required to supply ἐστι. The δὲ clause that follows then contrasts philosophy practiced at a young age with philosophy practiced at a mature age, instead of with politics. We might call it veiled asyndeton (or a run-on sentence!), but in any case is typical of Callicles's brutal abuse of his auditor's attention, by his insouciant syntax and semantics (cf. so far, nn. 1143, 1142, 1140, 1134, 1121, 1112, 1103, 1099, 1092, 1079, 1077, 1071, 1066, 1059, 1021). As to the rhetorical ploy of casting aspersions through comparison, which is Callicles's true motive here despite his claim of impartiality (A3-4), cf. Plut. *Mor.*57CE, who has this passage in mind.
- 1149 τὸ χρῆμα (A7): The name-calling (καλὸν and αἰσχρὸν with ἐστίν) gives way to the advent of a “thing” (τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται). This substantivization of his opinion then becomes “objective” enough to cause a πάθος in him (begun with πάσχω, B1, and then continued by verbs of perception and feeling: B3, B4, B6, C1, C2, C3, C4, D1). Callicles is not thinking of the theme of πάθος and παθήματα introduced by Socrates's first response to his interruption (481C5ff), but to the extent that *we* think of it, we may now reflect upon what it is that moves Callicles a little better than he is likely to do, since for him the substantivization serves merely as a warrant that his feelings are “objective.”
- 1150 καί (A7): His other particle of connection (cf. nn. 1090, 1066), willful and illogical in the same way as his ἀλλά (A3).
- 1151 Reading τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας (B2) with the mss. and edd., though none are happy about it. To add παίζοντας with καί makes little sense: ψελλιζῶ can be used of an infant's inability to articulate, but there is nothing playful about lisping – and so Morstadt[*Emend.*5], followed by Schanz Stender Theiler, deleted it (as well as the parallels καὶ παίζων [B3-4] and ἢ παίζοντα[C1], the latter kept by Schanz and Stender). Instead we should allow him another forced expression with καί (cf. nn. 1100, 1092, 1087, 1070): in his impatience he is getting ahead of himself. When an adult lisps (like a child) he would seem to be playing (as Callicles had initially accused Socrates of doing, 481C1), but play becomes a childish thing to be doing when the time for something important such as manly success) has arrived. Hirschig deletes ὃ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω (followed by Deuschle-Cron).
- 1152 ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον] *secl.* Cobet (*Mnem.*3[1875]134-5) : παῖζειν *pro* παίζων *coni.* Heindorf.
- 1153 ἐλευθέριον (B4): Lamb, “ingenuous”; Apelt, *unbefangen*, Helmbold “good breeding” (vs. below, servile origin). Below, Callicles will contrast the lisping child to an articulate one as servile (B7) and then will re-use the notion to clinch his analogy (C5); Croiset perhaps imagines too much in proposing *convenable à l'enfance* d'un homme libre, as below. But cf. n. 1155 just below. Waterfield simply leaves it out.
- 1154 χρῆμα (B6), picking up χρῆμα in A7 – contemptuous as often; contrast πρᾶγμα, below (D1).
- 1155 δουλοπρεπές (B7): Kratz notes the sense is *gezwungeln*; for Dalfen *dressiert* (whereas ἐλευθέριον above for him meant *natürlich* – and for Dalfen *ungezwungen*). Zimmermann (followed by Dodds) reaches for an allusion to slaves being taught to read articulately for their masters at an early age. To me it seems Callicles is saying it is as if the child has been robbed of his childhood by a cruel necessity he should only have to face once he grows up: “Let the child enjoy his childish nature; once he grows up (to a man [ἀνὴρ]) there'll be no time for that sort of thing.” The remark says more about what he thinks life is for, than it does about the child he imagines. We might compare and contrast the two pictures of the role played by philosophy in the course of life as Socrates presents them, at *Rep.*498AB. Waterfield's “degrading somehow” bespeaks his own uncertainty as to the meaning. The thrashing called for by an adult might be an indirect way of saying slavish.
- 1156 ἀνδρὸς (C1): The word is chosen only to establish contrast (in the δὲ clause) with the παιδίον of the μὲν clause (B2), and hasn't its approbatory sense. Any unwanted suggestion of that sense is removed by ἄνανδρον (C2) as soon as the age discrepancy has been established.
- 1157 ἀκούση τις (C1): Callicles moves from his first person witness to third in order to compare a commonsense view of an adult lisping nonsense with his own sense of an adult talking philosophy (C2-3). He needs someone else's view of the former in order to suggest that it is comparable with the latter.
- 1158 καταγέλαστον καὶ ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον (C1-2): The logic of the list is “metabatic” (cf. n. 407): He is ridiculous for acting unmanly (though grown up) and needs to be spanked (like a child) so as to grow up and act like a man. For this striding, confident use of καί cf. E1 below and Thrasymachus in *Rep.*344C5.
- 1159 Reading περὶ νέῳ (C3-4) with mss. and even Gellius (10.22.16) but no edd. (*παρὰ* E1 E2 Steph [*in tr.* Ficinus], *legg.* edd. : B originally has *περὶ* paroxytone). It is easier to countenance a stretch in the usage of *περὶ* plus dative than to think the major mss. wrong. With νέος Callicles alters the



φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ<sup>1160</sup> οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου [d] πράγματος·<sup>1161</sup> ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ.<sup>1162</sup> ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,<sup>1163</sup> κἂν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ᾖ, ἀνάδρω γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα<sup>1164</sup> τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητῆς<sup>1165</sup> τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνία τριῶν ἢ [e] τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα,<sup>1166</sup> ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἰκανὸν<sup>1167</sup> μηδέποτε φθέγγασθαι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὧ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς·<sup>1168</sup> κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίωνα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὔπερ ἐμνήσθην.<sup>1169</sup> καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ

distinction between child and grown man (and the awkward identification of infantile lisp and nonsense) with a distinction between a strapping lad and the older and wise man he will become (πρεσβύτερον, D1) if he is to account for anything; and yet we are to infer from the continuation of the distinction that philosophy in a young man is tantamount to lisp and goofing off.

1160 Reading καί only (C6), with BTP, *legg.* edd. (τινα εἶναι καὶ F, whose unsuitably flaccid repetition of τινα εἶναι from C5 may be due to scribal anablepsis).

1161 πράγματος (D1) is approbatory, in contrast with derogatory χρῆμα above (B6, A7).

1162 οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ (D3) a gratuitous announcement of the already understood subject: the main predication is in the second person demonstrative. Again he is *dicendi fervore abreptus* (cf. n. 1103).

1163 ἀνθρώπῳ (D4) again (cf. C6). Callicles now returns to his opening remarks on this topic (484C8-D2).

1164 τὰ μέσα (D5) – referred to above as τὰ μείζω (484C4-5) and then spelled out at 484D2-7: the laws and lawmaking, speech or eloquence in business negotiations and in addressing a public gathering, what men like and desire – what motivates them – and to put it all together the habits and ways of people. Huit compares Latin *strata viarum*. The diction is strong and spare, like ἰκανὴν at 484A2.

1165 The poet (D5-6) is Homer, and all that is directly quoted is the distinctly Homeric adjective. ἀριπρεπεῖς (the contracted accusative plural does not scan). Though γενέσθαι is used with it at *Iliad* 6.477, where Hector prays to the gods that his son Astyanax should become famous among the Trojans, the passage Callicles has in mind is 9.441: οὐδ’ ἀγορέων, ἴνα τ’ ἀνδρες ἀριπρεπεῖς τελέθουσι, as Callicles’s τὰς ἀγοράς ἐν αἷς indicates.

1166 ἐν γωνία ... ψιθυρίζοντα (E1): This echoic verb now stands in as a derogatory substitute for descriptive ψελλίζομενον, which became obsolete when Callicles shifted from παιδίον (B2) to μειράκιον (C4). Again his management of metaphor (as with παίζειν and ἐλεύθεριον/ἐλεύθερον above) is slovenly for the sake of being derogatory. What had been meaningless phonemes in a child are now words the general run of mankind does not or will not understand – so the use of the term is name-calling. Surely it is not a matter of their speaking too quietly to hear. Dodd’s remark that the philosopher whispers out of fear of speaking plainly in the hearing of the public seems to be looking in the wrong direction: what is the harm and what is obscure in the discussion of cobblers and doctors? Moreover, the image of whispering in a corner as imitated by Plutarch (*Mor.* 777B), Cicero (*de orat.* 1.13.56), and Themistius (2.30BC, 22.265BC, 28.341D), includes no sense of secrecy, but if anything a cowardly risk of failure in the hard light of the forum; and to the contrary these authors laud the importance for the politician to bring what they say into the public sphere.

Once again there is dramatic irony in what Callicles is saying: He depicts the philosopher whispering in the corner rather than like the politician holding forth in τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, while in fact Socrates, who is the only philosopher in the dialogue, spends all his time in the agora – indeed, too much, for that is why he arrived late (447A7-8) and missed the private séance, which *itself* took place “ἐνδόν” (447C7).

1167 Reading ἰκανὸν (E1) with the mss. and most edd. but emended by several. The climactic and dispositive manly action is assumed without apology or explanation to consist in standing up and getting heard in public, an assumption that Socrates is opposing at every turn throughout this dialogue, for the sake of his fellow citizens who are looking on and deciding whether to hire Gorgias; and it is expressed with an open-textured triad with repeated καὶ (and no τε) – for which compare 486D1. Findeisen could not accept the infinitive phrase in apposition to βῶναι with its strident triad but deleted καὶ before ἰκανόν, and took ἰκανόν as modifying the masc. subject of βῶναι and as governing φθέγγασθαι. Coraes’s emendation of ἰκανόν into καλόν (accepted by Schanz), Heindorf’s νεανικόν (accepted by Hermann Sauppe Jahn Deuschle-Cron Schmelzer Stender Lamb Apelt [tr. *keck*] Feix Heidbüchel), Mistriotis’s ἀνδρικόν, and Theiler’s καινόν (and whence came Irwin’s “powerful”? And Dalfen’s *kraftvolles*?) – and even Hamilton’s exegetical “adequate to the occasion” and Huit’s “*dont on puisse se contenter*” – all evince the editors’ loss of nerve and spoil Callicles’s opportunity to use his favorite litotes (cf. 484A2, 491B3, 492A1, used also by Thrasyarchus at *Rep.* 344C6 – *pace* Kratz who sees the term as *weder eine Klimax noch Antiklimax*), akin in its brevity to βίος in litotes at 486D1. Thus Routh’s tr. *gnavum*: it is not merely *quod alicui satisfiat* (Stallb.). Dodds finds the term approbatory enough to keep, in the sense of “rising to the heights of one’s opportunity,” citing this sense its use by Socrates at *Symp.* 177E4 and *Phlb.* 67A7 and by the Athenian at *Leg.* 642A4, deaf to its use by Callicles as a proud litotes elsewhere.

1168 Reading φιλικῶς (E2) with the mss. *legg.* edd. (καὶ φιλικῶς Fy Steph. and the early editions [*teste* Cantarin], *legg.* Routh Coraes Heindorf Beck) adds a calculative tone that undermines and perhaps even contradicts the sentiment being averred: Callicles is about to turn the corner and offer Socrates some “friendly advice” (*mit der herablassenden Miene des vornehmen Weltmanns*, Deuschle-Cron). The motif played a similar role at 473A3 and 470C1-8. Richards will not allow the contradictory tone and emends it away by conjecturing καὶ before φιλικῶς (the variant having been neglected or forgotten since the admonition of Ast [1832]), and cites Isocrates’s use of ἐπεικῶς *Antid.* 4: ἐπεικῶς ἔχην πρὸς ἅπαντας (where, however, it means all people find him decent rather than that he finds them so). Dodds sees no use for the “restriction” introduced by ἐπεικῶς and suggests we remove καὶ φιλικῶς as a gloss upon it, leaving ἐπεικῶς to have the meaning Richards had cited from Isocrates (which of course it had for all the edd. who had read καὶ φιλικῶς).

1169 οὔπερ ἐμνήσθην (E4), referring back to 484E3-7. The borrowing here (E6-486A3) is from Eur. *Antiope*, where Zethos advised Amphion to throw away his lyre and take up arms. Nauck (f. 185, *TGF*) reconstructed the passage, on the basis of both this passage in *Gorgias* (relying therefore on Callicles’s “memory”) and other ancient sources, as follows (see next note):



τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σέ λέγειν, οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὅτι  
 “Ἀμελεῖς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν  
 μειρακιώδει [486] τινὶ διατρέπεις<sup>1170</sup> μορφώματι, καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης<sup>1171</sup> βουλαῖσι  
 προσθεῖτ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις,<sup>1172</sup> οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου  
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο.” καίτοι,<sup>1173</sup> ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν  
 ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία<sup>1174</sup> γὰρ ἐρῶ τῆ σῆ—οὐκ αἰσχροὺν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ  
 σέ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας;<sup>1175</sup> νῦν γὰρ εἶ  
 τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι,<sup>1176</sup>

... ἀμελεῖς ὧν [σε φροντίζεις ἐχρῆν·]  
 ψυχῆς [ἔχων γὰρ] ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν  
 γυναικομίμω διατρέπεις μορφώματι  
 ... .. κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει  
 [ὀρθῶς] ὀμιλήσειας οὐτ' ἄλλων ὑπερ  
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο [τι].

1170 Reading διατρέπεις (486A1), conjectured, or at least written, by Grotius (*Excerpt. Trag. et Com.* [1626] 373), *legg.* Sauppe Schanz Burnet Croiset Zimmermann Theiler Heidbüchel Erler (διατρέπεις BTPF Olymp.[λ], *legg.* edd. : διαστρέφεις *coni.* Valckenaer [*Diatribē in Euripidis perditorum dramatum reliquias* (Leipzig {824} 73), *legg.* Lamb Dalfen). The extremely strong testimony for διατρέπεις is vitiated by the absence of a verbal form to govern the accusative φύσιν, in support of adding which (e.g., with a participle: λαχῶν H. Weil [*Sept. Trag. Eurip.* {1868} iv, n.2] read by Cantarín : ἔχων Beck “*vel sim.*” *contra* Valckenaer [*epist. mutuae ad Valken.* ed. Mahne {1832} 67]) there is an equally extreme *absence*. In principle it is therefore best to posit a paleographically easy misspelling of the universally attested διατρέπεις (of which the easiest is Grotius’s διατρέπεις) rather than to add a word entirely absent, which scholars have been tempted to do for two reasons: to exercise their ingenuity at repairing broken trimeters, and because of two vague references to Euripides using the noun μορφώματι, in Photius (*Bibl.* 333b2 Bekker) and Philostratus (*Vit. Ap.* 4.21 [1.131.13-15 Kaysers]), in the latter perhaps with διατρέπων. While these passages both cite Euripides as using μορφώματι *ipsissimo verbo* (i.e., in the dative), as Callicles’s quotation does, (1) neither of them mention the *Antiope*, which Callicles’s mention of Zethus and Amphion does; (2) both of them connect μορφώματι with the adjective γυναικομίμω, while Callicles connects it with μειρακιώδει; and (3) neither of them provide sufficient evidence that Euripides used διατρέπειν in connection with μορφώματι in the first place, the verb whose intransitivity has raised all the potholes. Euripides’s only use of this verb is in an oxymoron at *Alc.* 642 (διατρέπεις ἀψυχία), whereas here (with μειρακιώδει τινὶ ... μορφώματι) the oxymoron would be moronic without the oxy. Moreover, Photius and Philostratus in context are both talking about cross-dressing. Euripides comes to their minds not for the *Antiope* and the rivalry of the brothers, but because of Euripides’s description of Pentheus as ἐν γυναικομίμω στολᾷ at *Bacchae* 980, perhaps amalgamated in their memories with the picture Euripides earlier draws of him being shamed, γυναικόμορφον ἀγόμενον δι’ ἄστεως (*Bacch.* 855). I dismiss offhand the offhand remark of Olympiodorus, ὀρθῶς πῶς τοῦ Εὐριπίδου “γυναικώδει” εἰρηκτότος (a word Euripides did not use) αὐτὸς (*sc.* Callicles) “μειρακιώδει” εἶπεν (131.13-14). Beck’s argument against Valckenaer’s emendation, διαστρέφεις, by which the attempts to supply the text with a transitive participle was initiated (later expanded by Thompson *ad loc.* to include τρέφων, βλάστων, *vel sim.* – a spondee or an iamb will do), in fact presupposed Valckenaer’s prior adoption of γυναικομίμω from Philostratus, and therewith bypassed or overlooked the underlying and principal fact, which is that to add a word for which there is no evidence in any ms. is a far more violent emendation than to change a single letter in a word they all have – for which reason I accept the old emendation of Grotius (who ironically is also the only editor who reads, or prints, γυναικομίμω!).

1171 Reading δίκης (A1) with the mss. and edd. (δίκαις E Olymp.[λ]).

1172 Reading εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβοις (A2-3) with BTPF, *legg.* Croiset Burnet Erler (εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἀνάλαβοις F : εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάβης Γ2 E1 E2 Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes : εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις Aug O1 *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Ast Bekker Hermann Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Lamb Feix Zeyl Waterfield : εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάκοις *coni.* Bonitz [*Ztschr. österr. Gym.* {1857} 403], *legg.* Stallb. Sauppe Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Dodds Theiler Nichols Cantarín Heidbüchel). The reference of λαβεῖν is the all-important ability, in persuasion, of grasping the καίρος. The repetition of ἂν copies that of the last quip (A1-2); ἂν is then left out altogether in the subsequent clause with catalectic swiftness for closure (on which cf. ἀπὴ after ἀπαλλάττηται at 504E3 and my n. to *Rep.* 410C8-10).

1173 καίτοι (A4) promises a corrective to what he himself has just said, but instead introduces a reiteration of the corrective he is impressing upon Socrates (Sauppe, Ovink); and the subsequent καὶ in similar spirit adds an imperative, jerking the attention forward to the next thought rather than couching it with a postpositive. Cf. 485B5, 485A7.

1174 εὐνοία (A4) as above (485A2), though in this case the possessive personal adjective (σῆ) stands in for the objective genitive of the personal pronoun (τῆ ἑαυτοῦ) used there (cf. *Apol.* 20E3; H. II.19.333, *Od.* 11.202: for the adjective standing in for a *subjective* genitive, cf. 515B2); its “third attributive position” and postponement add focus. The profession of good will, which Dalfen takes seriously (*ad loc.*, 344; so also Dodds, 14), introduces a warning that Socrates would lose even his life in a trumped-up case brought against him – a warning too prophetic to be ignored and issued by the person who has just explained why he would vote against him in such a case, or bring the case for that matter, and who might just feel that such a man as Socrates, enslaved to his philosophic muse, would better be dead (483B2).

1175 τοὺς ... ἀεὶ ... ἐλαύνοντας (A6-7): ἀεὶ between article and participle has its distributive sense (Lodge). Cf. 493C6.

1176 Reading ἀπάγοι (A8) with BTPFY Philodemus, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Sauppe Sommer Schanz Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Dodds Cantarín Erler : ἀπαγάγοι V, *legg.* Bekker Ast Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Feix Theiler Heidbüchel), on the basis of its far superior attestation and Socrates’s back-reference to this passage with present tense ἄγη, at 527A1.

φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα,<sup>1177</sup> οἷσθ' ὅτι<sup>1178</sup> οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι [b] χρήσαιο<sup>1179</sup> σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' ἰλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ χασμῶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ,<sup>1180</sup> ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, “ἦτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα,”<sup>1181</sup> μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ [c] τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι<sup>1182</sup> πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρήσθαι,<sup>1183</sup> ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα<sup>1184</sup> μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου,<sup>1185</sup> “παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει,” καὶ ἄσκει ὀπόθεν “δόξεις φρονεῖν”, “ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα ἀφείς” – εἶτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι<sup>1186</sup> εἶτε φλυαρίας – “ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν

1177 ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα (A9) With Deuschle-Cron, the present represents the language of the charge (cf. “ἀδικεῖ ὁ Σωκράτης τοῦς νέους διαφθεῖρων” *vel sim.* – 519C6-7, *Apol.*19B4, 24B9; X. *Mem.*1.1.1) and does not need to be a perfect or an aorist (*pace* Stallb. Jahn Kratz).

1178 οἷσθ' ὅτι (A9): This phrase προῦποτίθησι τὴν ἀναγνώρισιν τῆς ἀληθείας παρ' ἐκείνου μεθ' οὗ διαλέγεται (Mistriotis). Analogous in English is the apostrophe, “Face it!”

1179 The optatives ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ (A9-B1) and ὅτι εἴποις (B1-2), represent deliberative subjunctives attracted into the optative by their dependency on optatives referring to the future (Smyth §2677c; *GMT* §186; *AGPS* 54.7.0.A).

1180 μοχθηροῦ (B3): For all his faults this horrible person would need be a competent orator, misusing his skill of course.

1181 The provenance of the quotation, and those below (C4-8) is again the *Antiope*, reconstructed by Nauck on the basis of this passage only, as follows (= f.186, *TGF*), with the Platonic apparatus:

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἔστιν εἴ τις εὐφυῆ

λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα;

ἦτις BF *teste* Cantarin : εἴ τις TWPY || εὐφυῆ BTW : εὐφυεῖ F : εὐφυᾶ Y

1182 With *περυσυλᾶσθαι* (C1), Callicles has forgotten his construction (Cron, Zimmermann). Beck and Stallb. followed by Woolsey Jahn Kratz Lodge, tries to help him by construing it with ἔθηκε; the previous infinitives were dependent upon δυνάμενον, itself grafted onto the noun φῶτα so as to continue beyond the quotation from the *Antiope* (*pace* Valckenaer *apud* Nauck, who guessed Euripides's next line was μήτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον γ' ἐπαρκέσαι), but now the infinitive takes on a life of its own, continued by ζῆν (C2), “as if ὥστε had come before” (Deuschle).

1183 εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρήσθαι (C2-3): Half of Plato's uses of this adjective, excluding its use to describe vegetables (*Leg.*844D8, 845B1), place it in this phrase, in which the (apologetic) comparative appears to be integral (462E6, 509A1; *Apol.*32D2, *Euthyd.*283E2, *Rep.*361E1 [ἀγροικότερος, referred back to at 613E1 with the positive grade]; and cf. *Amat.*136E5). The denotations “rustic, rude, boorish” (LSJ: for which cf. *Leg.*880A4; *Thet.*146A6-B2, 174D8) fit the etymology of the adjective far better than its uses – in this expression, at least (even outside this formula, the laborious sophistication of those who produce etiological interpretations of myths is hardly rude and boorish [ἀγροικός at *Phdrs.*229E3], and at *Rep.*411A3 and *Symp.*218B6, ἀγροικός is the opposite of σώφρων [not ἀστεῖος], and at *Crit.*107A3 it is expegetical to φιλότιμος), for it is not boorish and rude to speak the truth (*Gorg.*462E6), nor to aver adamant moral certainty (*Gorg.*509A1). Burnet's comment on the formula (*ad Apol.*32D) is best, that it expresses a momentary “disregard for euphemism,” apologizing for the lower register of the *diction* the speaker has adopted – which explains all cases of the idiom (including *Phdrs.*268D6 where consider E1-2: *μελαγχολᾶς*). Most interesting, however, is that Socrates will remark, at 508D1-2, that Callicles's use of ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτειν here, is a νεανικόν of his logos, just a moment before he uses the ἀγροικότερον apology for his own part (509A1), eschewing euphemisms to stress his disagreement with Callicles's warning that he must fear unjust treatment, disagreeing since he is bound “by adamant chains” – a material metaphor for logical and psychic compulsion – to his belief that undergoing injustice is better than committing it.

1184 ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα (C3): “*alapat alicui infligere palma expansa*” says Stallb. Cf. Eustat. *apud* Coraes and schol. *ad loc.* It is meant to be a high insult, but it is perhaps more. Cf. 527A3, D. 21.72 and 147. The point is that the ἄτιμος loses standing to prosecute those who wrong him (cf. *Lys.* 6.24), as Socrates quotes it at 508C8ff. Irwin's colloquial “push one's face in” and Waterfield's “smash in the face” are ἀγροικότερον but not accurate.

1185 Callicles resumes (C4-8) quoting the *Antiope*. Here is Nauck's reconstruction (=f.188, *TGF*), this time from several sources:

. . . ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ·

παῦσαι μελωδῶν, πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν

ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ' αἶεθε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,

σκάπτων, ἄρων γῆν, ποιμνίους ἐπιστατῶν,

ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα,

ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

εὐμουσία (an *hapax* in classical Greek) is a metonymy Zethos is made to invent in order to taunt his musical brother, just as Callicles's inventions of ἐλέγχων for μελωδῶν and πραγμάτων for πολεμίων, are meant to create a contrast between the “words” of philosophy (indeed squabbles: ἐλέγχων is metonymy for λόγων) and the “deeds” of the politician. The poetic language and Callicles's modifications of it are reminiscent of “Poetry's” condemnation of “Philosophy” at *Rep.*10.607BC.

1186 Reading εἶναι (C7) with mss. and edd. (*omm.* E1 E2, *secl.* Hirschig).

ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις”· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας<sup>1187</sup> ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ [d] ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ.<sup>1188</sup>

ΣΩ. εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον<sup>1189</sup> εὐρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων αἷ<sup>1190</sup> βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα<sup>1191</sup> ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν<sup>1192</sup> ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἥδη εὖ<sup>1193</sup> εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἰκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδὲν με<sup>1194</sup> δεῖ<sup>1195</sup> ἄλλης βασάνου; [e]

ΚΑΛ. πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐρῶ· νῦν<sup>1196</sup> οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαίῳ ἐντετυχηκῆναι.

ΚΑΛ. τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι, ἂ ἄν<sup>1197</sup> μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσεις περὶ ὧν ἢ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ<sup>1198</sup> δοξάζει, ταῦτ’ ἥδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ [487] ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανιεῖν ἰκανῶς ψυχῆς

1187 ἐλέγχοντας (C8) is anarthrous and therefore circumstantial. ταῦτα is derogatory, and μικρὰ is perhaps meant to close off the τὰ μείζω at the beginning of the section (484C4-5).

1188 καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ (D1), a triumphant triad in καὶ resembling that at 485E1, entirely missed by Jowett’s flaccid “the man of substance and honor, who is well to do.” Compare Thrasymachus’s triad at *Rep.* 344C5: καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ελευθερότερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον. Schol: βίος ὁ πλοῦτος, δόξα δὲ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐδοκίμησις. βίος means wealth (and the empty house was a metaphor for poverty, not loneliness, *pace* Helmbold).

1189 ἄσμενον (D3): *Sc.* εἶναι, with ἄν representing an imperfect in irreal apodosis, εὐρεῖν complementary, with *Huit*.

1190 Reading αἷ (D4) with E2, *legg.* Sauppe, who finds the stone doing the testing at Theophrastus, *περὶ λίθων* §4 (ἢ BTPf, *legg.* edd. : ἦ F : αἷς *coni.* Stallb. *legg.* Schanz Stender *Huit*). The plural αἷ (as well as Stallb.’s conjecture αἷς), with λίθων, gives a berth for the superlative ἀρίστην. The alternative, with all other mss., is to be left with a flaccid generalized plural “they” (some people or other) and a rather gratuitous superlative attribute for τινὰ, as an afterthought in hyperbaton.

1191 πρὸς ἣντινα (D4), compound indefinite following simple indefinite antecedent (τινὰ), again: cf. n. 1086. Its relative clause is “virtually coordinate,” as often (Smyth §2490), and as such continues the construction of the irreal apodosis with the imperfect: the omission of ἄν here is regular with ἔμελλον (Smyth §§2318, 2313).

1192 εἰ ὁμολογήσειεν (D5), representing ἐάν ὁμολογήσῃ, a future more vivid protasis moved into the optative under the force of the (ersatz because irreal) imperfect ἔμελλον, whose future infinitive complement supplies the future more vivid apodosis. With the lapidary structure we have an example of Socrates’s engaging habit of beginning with an unanswerable question (cf. n. 918). μοι, attracted to the beginning of its clause in the usual manner of the enclitic (cf. n. 774) is, in that position, free to be taken with ὁμολογήσειεν (implying that Socrates already *believes* the good result of the test: cf. δοξάζει, E6), or to be taken as an agental dative with perfect passive τεθεραπεῦσθαι. It should be taken with both: severally, they indicate his devotion to the *θεράπεια* ψυχῆς and his usual averral of ignorance, but together they explain his eagerness to find such a touchstone in Callicles.

1193 Reading ἥδη εὖ (D6) with F and I13, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Ast Bekker Hirschig Dodds Cantarín (εὖ BTWP, *legg.* Woolsey Stallb. Hermann Sauppe Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Jowett Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Theiler Heidbüchel Erler).

1194 Reading με (D7) with BTWF and Burnet Theiler Heidbüchel Erler (μοι P *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. : μ’ *coniecit seclisitque* Dodds). See next note.

1195 Reading δεῖ only (D7) with BTP, *legg.* Woolsey Stallb. Hermann Sauppe Deuschle-Cron Thompson Jowett Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Theiler Heidbüchel Erler (ἔτι δεῖ F, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Ast Bekker Sommer Hirschig Dodds Cantarín). Hiatus created by adding ἐτι suggests it invaded the text from the margin as an exegetical note (*pace* Dodds, who conjectures μ’, which itself presupposes presence of ἐτι, and then athetizes his conjecture, removing the grounds for reading ἐτι). What would the “other” βάσανος be (D7) that would be obviated by such a result? A trial? His threatened ἀπαγωγὴ (A8)? Cf. 487E3.

1196 Punctuating (E2) thus: ἐρῶ· νῦν οἶμαι with F, *legg.* Hermann Sauppe Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Jowett Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Apelt Zimmermann Helmbold Feix Theiler Irwin Cantarín Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler (ἐρῶ νῦν· οἶμαι with BTW, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Dodds Nichols). Heindorf compares 453B5 where the virtually demonstrative force of νῦν (≈ τόδε) mitigates asyndeton; but by the same token the future ἐρῶ calls for the νῦν that he is not moved to describe. νῦν indicates this is a conclusion Socrates has just now reached by dint of Callicles’s oration.

1197 Reading ἂ ἄν (E5) with E3<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Heindorf Coraes Ast Sommer (ἄν BTPF, *legg.* Routh Beck Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Lodge Zimmermann Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarín : ἄν *coni.* Bekker and Stallb., *legg.* Hermann Sauppe Woolsey Jahn Kratz Thompson Hirschig Schanz Schmelzer Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Theiler Erler), so as to provide an antecedent for ταῦτα. Compare the construction with which Socrates reverts to this point at E1-2 (cf. n. 1218).

1198 ἢ ἐμὴ ψυχῆ (E5-6): For this personification of soul cf. *H.Maj.* 296D8. He is opining he is all right.

πὲρι ὀρθῶς τε ζώσης<sup>1199</sup> καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα<sup>1200</sup> δεῖ ἔχειν ἂ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν<sup>1201</sup> καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω οἱ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἰοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ·<sup>1202</sup> ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὸ δὲ ξένω τώδε,<sup>1203</sup> Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῶ μὲν καὶ [b] φίλω ἐστὸν ἐμῶ,<sup>1204</sup> ἐνδεεστέρω δὲ παρρησίας καὶ αἰσχυνηροτέρω<sup>1205</sup> μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὃ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνῃς ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ<sup>1206</sup> ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν<sup>1207</sup> ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων.<sup>1208</sup> σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις ἂ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν· πεπαιδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ<sup>1209</sup> ἂν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὐνοῦς [c] – τίνι<sup>1210</sup> τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ

1199 ζώσης (487A1-2): With this we may say the scope of clauses represented by the circumstantial participle includes even the alternative indirect question.

1200 Reading τρία ἄρα (A2) with mss. BTPF Stob., *legg.* edd. (with Hirschig printing τριῖ ἄρα), rather than Thompson's emendation to τριῖ ἄττα (citing ἄττα with numbers, at *Rep.* 400A5, 445C6), or Deuschle's ἄμα. With Cron Mistriotis Lodge the particle indicates an access of certainty that craves no further proof, for with Sauppe he feigns just now to have realized this truth in his conversation with Callicles – as subsequent γάρ indicates. For the late position of (non-connective) ἄρα, which is usually the second word, Stallb. compares *Symp.* 177E7 and Dodds compares 519B7, 524D4 (cf. also *Prot.* 319A8, *Rep.* 358C5, and passages listed by Denniston at 41-2), but in the present case ἄρα is immediately postpositive within the clause it goes with (as at *Phlb.* 41C2), which leads to the ingenious suggestion of Kratz that it indicates Socrates suddenly recalls the proverb “all good things come in threes.”

1201 Reading εὐνοίαν (A3), though it appears only as a correction in S2, a correction Theiler interestingly guesses came from a scholar's reading Olympiodorus in the nearby Ξ1), *legg.* edd. (δόξαν BTPF Stob. Ficinus Stephanus). δόξαν does not do what is needed according to the subsequent exegesis of the triadic list, for the second term is explained with κήδεσθαί μου (A6) and φιλοὶ ὄντες (B1); moreover the second is then restated with εὐνοῦς (B7 and D4). Meanwhile, Olympiodorus paraphrases as if εὐνοίαν were present and δόξαν were not (133.7, 14, 22). Thus, even if Plato wrote δόξαν he should have written εὐνοίαν! Pace Heindorf the *schol. vet.*'s explanation – ὅτι τρία ἐστὶν οἷς κρίνεται ψυχῆ, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ὡς φρονίμου τε καὶ εὐνοῦ, παρρησία – suggests he read δόξα and sought to justify it (with Dodds), and moreover hardly succeeds, for the dative indicates he takes the three to be the judge's criteria rather than his credentials.

With this averral of Callicles's εὐνοῖα there is chilling irony, in the fact that Socrates should act as if he were so naive about Callicles's true attitude about him, just after Callicles has mouthed the claim of εὐνοῖα as his motive for warning Socrates that he could be judicially condemned to death (486A4), a verdict we shall presently learn he and his political cronies will have supported (C5-D2 and cf. n. 1213).

1202 ὥσπερ σύ (A5): Manifold ambiguity: σοφός might be bad or good; and ὥσπερ could go as well with μὴ as with σοφοί. The gesture is echoed at A6. Socrates will be more specific, i.e., will damn Callicles with even fainter praise, below, at B7.

1203 τώδε (A7): Socrates uses the first person demonstrative because he is thinking of these two as his previous interlocutors in comparison with his present one.

1204 ἐμῶ (B1): Again (as at 486A5) the possessive adjective represents an objective genitive: not “friends of mine” but “friendly to me.”

1205 Whether we read αἰσχυνηροτέρω (B1) with BTP or αἰσχυνηροτέρω with F does not matter to the sense. The only significance of such a pair of indifferent variants (compare B5 below, 489B6, and many instances *passim*) is that their distribution corroborates the stemmatics according to which BTP is a family over against F. For doubling a comparative with μᾶλλον, compare (with Heusde) *Euthyd.* 281D6-E1, *Leg.* 781A3, and n. 1052, Riddell §166, and many exx. at *AGPS* 47.7.5.

1206 διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ (B3): Socrates's oxymoron recalls Callicles remark at 482E6-3A21: ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν, but there his sense of shame defeated his daring whereas here it fomented it! The victim of the violence, in this case, is the truth concerning the most important things.

1207 πολλῶν (B4): The reference to the spectators is significant as an indication of their number but more importantly as alluding indirectly to the unstated fact that Polus and Gorgias were tailoring and also attenuating their remarks to maintain the prospect of being hired by them (πῶς γὰρ οὐ; – cf. n. 1062, *supra*). Their show of modesty or shame is therefore mere solicitation. That they are willing to contradict themselves in order to maintain their moral front (pointed up by the punning use of ἐναντίον) shows how little integrity and honesty they have for standing by their word, but also shows what integrity they are willing to sacrifice for the market. The only moral attributes they need to feign to possess are those their instruction might be criticized for teaching and enabling their clients to ignore (but themselves feign) – principally, *pleonexia*; and in the ways they are protecting their reputation from that accusation they are already instructing their students.

1208 τῶν μεγίστων (B5): Not just an hyperbole: he means the fine, the good, and the just – the very predicates that brought down the positions of Gorgias and Polus. It is characteristic of Socrates, as it is of the saints, always and seemingly without effort to hold the great problems and difficulties in sharp focus, equally at casual moments as perilous ones.

1209 πολλοί (B7), damning with faint praise, not only with οἱ πολλοί after Callicles's derogatory remarks about the majority (483B5-6, C7) but also with the use of ἱκανῶς in its literal sense, in comparison with Callicles's use in boastful understatement. That the many would think him wise would for Callicles be an index of his success as an orator (Mistriotis). By substituting πεπαιδευσαί for ἐπιστήμη and σοφία, above (A2, A4, A5, A7) Socrates playfully alludes to Callicles's criticism of continuing in φιλοσοφία beyond basic education (485A4: ὅσον παιδείας χάριν). There is an insouciance from the get-go in Socrates's treatment of Callicles that bespeaks a lack of respect for him, and stands in contrast with the way he barely raised the stakes with Gorgias and only gradually did so in his conversation with Polus.

1210 τίνι (C1): Socrates has only listed two of the three items but now interrupts himself to explain the second: therefore place a dash before τίνι instead of a stop. On the face of it he hardly needs to explain, since Callicles already asserted as much (486A4-5, and cf. 485E2-3), though in both those cases Callicles's averrals were rhetorical at best and probably insincere (cf. nn. 1168, 1174).



Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἄνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην τὸν Χολαργέα· καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα<sup>1211</sup> βουλευομένων<sup>1212</sup> μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἶη, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι [d] παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γινόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.<sup>1213</sup> ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα<sup>1214</sup> ἐμοὶ συμβουλευόντος ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἑταιροτάτοις, ἰκανόν μοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε<sup>1215</sup> οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμολογεῖ σοι.<sup>1216</sup> ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· [e] ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις<sup>1217</sup> ὁμολογήσης<sup>1218</sup> μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'<sup>1219</sup> ἤδη ἔσται ἰκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας<sup>1220</sup> σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὔτ' αἰσχύνης περιουσία,<sup>1221</sup> οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν

1211 Reading ἐπήκουσα (C5) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ὕπῃκουσα F Ξ2 Par C Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast[1819] Coraes Summer). The ὑπο- of furtiveness would be appropriate in the sense that Socrates's conviction would be stronger if the four of them were unaware of his presence, but (*pace* Heindorf) ὑπό with ἀκούω seems always to be the ὑπο- of subordination (whence ὑπακούω means to hearken to a command). ἐπί- on the other hand connotes that Socrates heard them talking and listened carefully.

1212 βουλευομένων (C5): Socrates would have preferred to be able to say *διαλεγόμενον!* For him it is another oxymoron (cf. B3 and n.), and begins to explain the strange expression, *κοινωνούς γεγονότας σοφίας*, above. Likewise ἐνίκα implies winning by majority vote rather than securing ὁμολογία (see next note).

1213 διαφθαρέντες (D2), echoing Callicles's use of *διαφθορά* at 484C7, and therefore stronger than “being corrupted,” as (for instance) the verb is used in the charge *διαφθείρει* τοῦς νέους, against Socrates. Indeed, with Deuschle-Cron, it is a comic picture, the four of them conceiving that elevating their consciousness through the practice of philosophy (C7) or the discipline of σοφία (C5) would have an effect on them of which they would be unconscious, as well as that though still young enough not to have been ruined by philosophy, they should precociously decide against it by some legislative procedure such as voting (ἐνίκα). That they should decide what to believe in this way reminds us of Callicles's attraction to political life; and that his friends should, also, reminds us of Socrates's speech on love: of course they agree, for they love politics! And so in the end it is again an irony lost on Callicles that Socrates should think him a friend because he is giving Socrates the advice he himself finds friendly, even though Socrates himself has other beloveds!

1214 Reading ταῦτα (D3) with BTP, *legg.* Routh Ast Coraes Bekker Stallb. Hermann Woolsey Jahn Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Feix (ταῦτα ταῦτ' [*sic*] F *teste* Cantarin : ταῦτα ex Ficinus *idem*, *legg.* Heindorf Sauppe Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Schanz[488A7 *citans*] Mistriotis Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Pietre Cantarin Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler). Heindorf printed ταῦτὰ on the basis of Ficinus's tr. *idem te mihi consilium dantem*, but as Routh saw, it is ἅπερ that led Ficinus to say *idem*.

1215 καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε (D5) ὅτι with καί as well as the omission of εἶ makes the clause straddle between the previous construction (τεκμήριον ... ὅτι) and the coming one in φῆς (which by itself would take an infinitive), a technique by which Socrates stresses the fact of Callicles's parrhesia over his averral of it.

1216 ὁμολογεῖ σοι (D6-7): That he is the sort as to speak frankly *and* that his speech corroborates it raises and leaves unanswered the question whether he is a parrhesiastic person in principle, or whether his advocacy of parrhesia is merely a character trait.

1217 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις (E1): This refers to discussion (which for Socrates is the dialogical or dialectical process), not to particular “arguments” (λόγοι). The plural envisions moments or steps in the discussion, thereby making the abstract concrete (cf. Smyth §1000, and 482C4, E2).

1218 ἐάν τι ... ὁμολογήσης (E1): ὁμολογεῖν is again constructed with an accusative picked up by the demonstrative, as at 486E5 (cf. n. 1197). τὶ expresses hope (not uncertainty, nor partial success, corroborative of the anticipatory subjunctive, despite its typically early placement as an enclitic (nn. 774, 887). “Anticipatory certainty” is continued with ἦδη and then taken a step further by the *past* irreal condition that follows (ἄν ... συνεχώρησας, E3-4), “already” looking back, by dint of the perfect, βεβασανισμένον. The looking back, denying any lack of wisdom or excess of shame, casts these issues as foil for his assertion of the second criterion, Callicles's good will, with an ideal optative, since this latter point is what he has just argued with his conceit about overhearing him (C1-D4).

1219 τοῦτο (E2): Socrates's metaphor that a soul might be golden (486D2-5) was immediately replaced by his opinion of what would make it so (486D5-6) – namely that it has been “therapized well” (καλῶς θεραπευῖσθαι) – and it is to this state of affairs, rather than the soul and its goldness, that the neuter demonstrative refers. That a *θεράπεια ψυχῆς* should be the leading imperative and criterion of a good life is presented by Socrates in the *Apology* as distinct from other more common goals, such as “success” in politics. And just as he had “specified” the metaphor of the soul's gold with his highly idiosyncratic idea of a *θεράπεια ψυχῆς*, he now “specifies” the metaphor of assay (βασανίζειν) with the similarly idiosyncratic but entirely Socratic notion of a probative dialectical ὁμολογία (note *τε καὶ* here emphasizing his concept of a joint dialectical search, and his use of ἰκανῶς in the special sense of dialectical sufficiency cf. *Phdo.*101E1; *Rep.* 344D7 (and my n. *ad loc.*), 435D7, 477A2, 523B1, 603D5). Thus, under the cover of his metaphors and his elaborate discussion of Callicles's competence to play the touchstone, Socrates has inserted his preferred object of study and his preferred method by which to study it (E9-488B1). He has converted Callicles's dispositive final blow into a dialectical beginning.

1220 συνεχώρησας (E4): His supposititious future perfect (βεβασανισμένον ... ἦδη ἔσται [E1-2]) leaves Socrates in the position of looking back on the alternative as impossible because its time had passed: hence the past unreal condition. But by the same token the future will likely be the same, whence the subsequent ideal optative *συχώρησας ἄν*.

1221 Reading *περιουσία* (E5) with F, *legg.* Thompson Sommer Hirschig Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Irwin Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Pietre Cantarin Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler (*παρουσία* BTPY and the early editions, *legg.* Hermann Sauppe Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Lamb[nicely translating, “access of modesty”] Feix) – another case of F coming to the rescue. Stallb. finding it “only” in x (= *Med.Laur.*85.7) as did Beck and Schanz, inferred that *παρουσία* (the spatial metaphor, presence) is being tolerated as an awkward opposite of ἐνδεία (as if a spatial absence due to quantitative lack) – followed in this by several other edd.



ἐμὲ συγχωρήσῃς ἄν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ ἢ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη<sup>1222</sup> ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων<sup>1223</sup> δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἢ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ᾧ σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπέτιμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί [488] ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον<sup>1224</sup> τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἐκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ’ ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ’ ἰκανῶς<sup>1225</sup> μοι ἐνδειξαι τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην<sup>1226</sup> ἂν αὐτό, καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτ’ ἀπράττοντα ἄπερ ὠμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἡγοῦ βλαῦκα εἶναι καὶ [b] μηκέτι ποτέ<sup>1227</sup> με νουθετήσης ὕστερον, ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον<sup>1228</sup> ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου;<sup>1229</sup> μὴ<sup>1230</sup> τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν<sup>1231</sup> λέγω.

- 1222 τῷ ὄντι ... ἤδη (E6): With this extra asseveration, and with ἤδη, Socrates refers back to his strong opening assertion (486E5-6: *n.b.*, ταῦτ’ ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ ἀλήθη) to announce that with the intervening illustration it has been shown to be true. It is crucial to remember that according to his notion of dialectic the very event of agreement is, as he goes on to say, the τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας (the genitive is objective): ὁμολογία transforms hypothesis into truth – today at least.
- 1223 πάντων (E7), not πασῶν. The neuter is partitive with subsequent τούτων, and καλλίστη refers back to the value of the inquiry (cf. *AGPS* 47.28.6): it will “yield a rich return” (Lodge), for it will remove the ἀμαθία that keeps Socrates from doing what he would surely want to do. Croiset’s “*tu m’a reproché l’objet de mes recherches*” is surely wrong (as are Helmbold, “the investigation for which you rebuked me” and Piettre, “la question ... *que tu m’a reproché de poser*): Callicles has not rebuked Socrates for a search but, as Socrates goes on to say, for what sort of man he is (ἄνδρα is Callicles’s loading term), what he practices, and how long, when young and old (Callicles objects not to philosophy but to doing it too long).
- 1224 κατὰ τὸν βίον (488A2): κατὰ envisions the course of his life, and continues his reference to Callicles’s advice when to do what.
- 1225 ἰκανῶς (A5), another reference to his criterion of “dialectical sufficiency” (cf. 487E2).
- 1226 Reading κτησαίμην (A6) with BTPF *et* Steph. *in marg.*, and edd. on superior evidence (αἰτησαίμην W : ἐργασαίμην E3 Steph. and the early edd. *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Coraes Heindorf[*vetente* Buttman] Beck).
- 1227 μηκέτι ποτε (B1): On the surface Socrates is asserting that failing to carry over the results of dialectical *homologia* into his life would render him a worthless person, but at the same time his request that Callicles give up on him if he fails to is double-edged, for just as surely as he will not in the end be agreeing to Callicles’s advice, he would prefer not to be subjected to the callous advocacy all over again, after today’s conversation with him, into which after all he did not even choose to enter. Compare his less subtle and less ironic threat simply to stop listening to Polus, at 461E5-462A1. μηδενός rather than οὐδενός under the continued imperatival force of μηκέτι (*AGPS* 67.8.2.B).
- 1228 Reading πλέον (B4) *coni.* Heindorf[“*haud dubie*”] *legg.* edd. (πλείων BTP : πλείω F). Stallb. in support adduces the verb πλεονεκτεῖν and 483C2, *Rep.* 349B3 and C1, and 549A7-9 as instances of πλέον ἔχειν as a fixed phrase.
- 1229 φαυλοτέρου (B5): In this last comparison, singular is paired with singular (cf. 483D1-2, D5); in the previous two (τὸν κρείττω τῶν ἡττόνων, τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων) it was the plural paired with the singular, often lost in translation, an instance of Socrates’s accuracy in quoting his interlocutor (cf. Callicles at 484C2-3). Likewise, with ἄγειν for pillaging as opposed to φέρειν (B3) he is remembering Callicles’s reference to βοῦς there, as well perhaps as its presence in the Pindar quote (484C1 – βία incidentally confirming βιαίων τὸ δικαιοτάτων). To finish off here by changing to the singular he removes the glamour of one man conquering many and reverts (chiastically) to the initial expression Callicles had used to express the idea on the level of principle (singular to singular, 483D1-2), which thereby makes the notion more amenable to dialectical examination.
- 1230 On μὴ (B5) quasi-interrogative with the indicative in a doubtful assertion, cf. Thompson *ad Meno* 89C5 (pp.163-6), Smyth §1772. ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι shows that if anything the question is here expecting a negative answer.
- 1231 καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν (B7): νῦν ended up calling for the present λέγω so that the first καὶ became redundant and the imperfect ἔλεγον obsolete. Things happen during sentences: there is no need to remove ἔλεγον with Schanz[*Spec. Crit.* 38] and Lodge. The emphasis of his declaration answers the doubt in Socrates’s μὴ, above, but with ἀλλά Callicles dismisses the very idea he would retract what he himself said, as if he were saying *ipse dixi*.

ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω; [c] οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγοις.<sup>1232</sup> πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους<sup>1233</sup> κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι<sup>1234</sup> τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους,<sup>1235</sup> οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς<sup>1236</sup> καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὡς τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον<sup>1237</sup> καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτόν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἤττω δὲ καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον<sup>1238</sup> δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς [d] ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;<sup>1239</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' <sup>1240</sup> ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους<sup>1241</sup> τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

1232 Reading λέγοις (C1), the true *difficilior*, with F, *legg.* Burnet Erler (*λέγεις* BTP, *legg.* edd.), by which Socrates emphasizes the unclarity of Callicles's remarks when he made them (the optative represents τί ποτε ἔλεγες as the “original discourse”), so as to have the warrant to bring them forward for scrutiny. Thus Callicles's boast that he “always” says the same thing is quite irrelevant for Socrates (*pace* Dodds), who probably believes it will soon be proved false. Dodd's argument that λέγεις is the *difficilior* because the editor would have done more thinking to imagine Socrates has taken Callicles's boast seriously (which is what Dodds thinks the present indicative denotes), confuses the *difficilior* with the *obscurior*. For μαθεῖν with genitive of person as source cf. 463D1, *Phlb.*51C6; S. *Ph.*370, 541, *OR* 545. μαθεῖν here has its nearly metaphoric meaning: to “hear” what somebody is saying, not to learn what somebody is teaching (cf. Ast *Lex. s.v.*, 2.277), i.e., to “get the message” (on which cf. n. 842).

1233 ἰσχυροτέρους (C2): ἰσχύς denotes primarily the physical strength of a man (indeed it is one of the three somatic goods alongside health and beauty: cf. n. 902); κράτος denotes a relative strength, somatic or otherwise, that leads to victory or overcoming the other. But immediately, and as with Polus, we are entering the realm of predicates which when considered in themselves are cut off from the context normally set by their subjects. Already we can anticipate that their epideictic use, for praise and blame, will fail to be consistent or intelligent insofar as they merely represent and express underlying desires and pleasures – all of which Callicles brought up as rudimentary measures and components of social competence (483B6-C1, 484D5-6, 485A1-4); and truly the problem goes all the way back to the beginning, the ποῖος (served by oratory) and the τίς (pursued by philosophy).

1234 ἀκροᾶσθαι (C2): The diction is striking. Listening is a natural metaphor for hearkening to and then obeying, but this is the only place Plato uses ἀκροᾶσθαι in this sense (contrast 499B4, where Callicles uses it of docility, which gets us only halfway there). In the cases when it means obey (e.g., T. 2.37.3, 3.27, 6.10; *Lys.* 20.9) there is usually a legal incumbency to do so, and often loyalty is involved (contrast *Ar. Av.*1228, ἀκροατέον ὑμῖν ἐν μέρει τῶν κραιττόνων, addressed insolently to the goddess Iris by a mortal who built a wall to keep her out). To use it of listening to those superior in bodily strength alone is therefore oxymoronic.

1235 τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους (C3): ἀσθενής now steps in, in place of ἤττων, as the proper opposite of ἰσχύς. Note the singular of the superior, the plural of the inferior (cf. n. 1229).

1236 Reading δοκεῖς (C3) with the mss. and edd. (*ἐδόκεις coni.* Coraes followed by Sauppe). It is the infinitive ἐνδείκνυσθαι that is an imperfect, an imperfect of citation.

1237 Reading καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον (C6) with F, *legg.* Burnet Theiler Erler (καὶ ἰσχυρότερον BTP, *legg.* edd.). The repeated article emphasizes that κρείττον and ἰσχυρότερον are synonyms coalescing in one “subject” (whence definite articles) over against βέλτιον as predicate. To say A and B are the same is not to say that B and A are the same. Either saying makes them interchangeable on the level of propositional content but in the saying neither makes them both subjects: therefore there is no need (*pace* Naber [*Mnem.*n.s.36{1928}260 and Dodds]) to add the article before βέλτιον, nor a need to delete ταῦτόν (*pace* Theiler). The ὡς phrase is an accusative absolute, as at 491A2-3.

1238 μοχθηρότερον (C9): μοχθηρός was used once before, by Callicles, at the edge of what he was trying to say (486B3). The sophist will introduce a kaleidoscope of value terms to decorate his regurgitation of what the many already believe, but Socrates will have a more pressing use to put them to, namely to focus on the real gravamen of the conversation in which he finds himself.

1239 καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον (D3): an unexpected addition, courting confusion and breaking symmetry, but not therefore unjustified (compare 465D6 and n. *ad loc.*): let's see if it *becomes* justified. With διόρισον he is asking for a *line between* (διά: compare διελού, 495C3, and note *ad loc.*). In a sense, of course, there must be a difference in the meaning of the different words, at least shades of meaning – in terms, that is, of their intension rather than their extension. This is why in this passage Socrates moves from the masculine plural nouns to the neuter singular substantivized adjectives (C2-3 vs. C6ff.).

1240 ἀλλά (D4): Callicles's usual highhanded manner: cf. n. 1020. Surely he does not think strength and nobility are the same thing but only that he would call the same man strong and noble, since for him these are compliments, not properties. σαφῶς λέγειν for him means merely to make a *stark* declaration (contrast 451E1, 463E1).

1241 καὶ τοὺς νόμους (D7): καί goes with the whole clause stressing the truth, the fact. Callicles's use of the singular and plural, continued by Socrates above (n. 1235), is coming back to haunt him.

ΣΩ. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα<sup>1242</sup> τὰ τῶν κρειπτόνων ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [e]

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν<sup>1243</sup> τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ<sup>1244</sup> κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρειπτόνων γε ὄντων;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν<sup>1245</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν [489] τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;<sup>1246</sup>

... ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;<sup>1247</sup> καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀλώση ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ<sup>1248</sup> αἰσχυρόμενος. νομίζουσιν ἢ οὐ<sup>1249</sup> οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλεον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

... μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις,<sup>1250</sup> ἴν', ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσης, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ<sup>1251</sup> ἀνδρὸς διαγνώναι ὁμολογηκός.

1242 νόμιμα (D9) replaces νόμοι (D6) and now needs English to bring across how, in Greek, the νόμος-words straddle the semantic range, in English, of “law” and of “convention,” in the sense that laws (νόμοι) in the democratic government represent a *convened* consensus (embody νόμιμα), because they express what the legislating citizens *believe* (νομίζω: E7). The contrast between φύσις and νόμος, to the extent that it makes sense at all, needs νόμος to represent “convention” not “law.”

1243 οὐκοῦν (E1): The absence of καί (*pace* Findeisen and Beck) emphasizes that τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων is not a second and independent fact about τὰ νόμιμα but, with οὐκοῦν, an inference – as the subsequent assertion with γὰρ is added to explain.

1244 Reading πολὺ (E2) with the mss., *legg. edd.* (*om.* Aug *coni.* Wilamowitz Heidbüchel Cantarín : που *coni.* Hermann, *legg.* Sauppe Jahn Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Croiset Zimmermann Feix Dodds Irwin Allen Waterfield Nichols Pietre Dalfen : πάλιν *coni.* Coraes). The editors emend because, with Stallb., they see no *logical* warrant for the assertion that the strong are “much more” noble, in a context where Socrates is merely identifying their extension. But it is as characteristic of Socrates to add irrelevancies in the midst of a syllogism, as for instance to ensure the interlocutor’s approval of his own previous statements before the fatal conclusion they entail comes into view, as it is to insert a “polite show of hesitation” in reminding his interlocutor of them (Dodds, arguing for ποῦ and citing 476E3 and *Meno* 75C4, among sixty others). Surely Callicles would aver this far sooner than averring that the noble are far stronger, even to the point of allowing nobility to drop out of the argument: it is only strength that is the good, for Callicles – strength that moots talk – and so he readily agrees. Cf. n. 1273.

1245 Reading ἄρ' οὖν only (E7) with the mss. *legg. edd.* (ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ZaY *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Ast Bekker Hirschig Thompson Jowett Allen Zeyl Nichols) which is more insistent on Callicles accepting the point... This goes with the re-asking.

1246 δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν / αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι (E7-489A1): It is only the former proposition that Callicles, at least, has directly accorded to “the many” (at 483C1-8), and that as such has been proven to be just not only νόμῳ but also φύσει on the present grounds that the many are the stronger φύσει. And yet the latter position also comes back on board, because Callicles’s rather less direct assertion, of which Socrates now reminds him (B2-6), that Socrates’s refutation of Polus relied upon this position (*n.b.* αἴσχιον, not κάκιον) as being true only νόμῳ and not φύσει (483A5-8), has also herewith collapsed. Zeyl’s tr. inadvertently confuses this point by placing ὡς ἄρτι σὺ ἔλεγες after the second. In the sequel (A8-B1) the two propositions are reversed according to the chiasm of before and after that is natural to careful thought.

1247 ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἢ οὐ (A1): The schol., comparing νομίζουσιν ἢ οὐ (A2) and μὴ φθόνει με ἀποκρίνεσθαι (A4), notes the extra pressure (ὄγκος) Socrates builds into his questions to Callicles, presumably to pin him down (cf. 490D2-3, 500D10-E1 and n. *ad loc.*); but more, given the asyndeton we are meant to infer that Callicles is delaying to answer, as he will do several times as their dialogue goes on. Here again we see the special rhetoric Plato has chosen to employ, in his choice to make this dialogue direct rather than narrated (cf. n. 1559).

1248 Reading αὖ (A2) with F, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Allen Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Cantarín Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler, strengthening σὺ (*om.* BTP, *edd.*). It deserves the strengthening because for Callicles the parrhesias, as opposed to the others, it will not be a shameful reluctance to voice his unexpressed inner notion, but shameful to continue averring the notion he has already expressed when we can foresee he will be shamed for what it entails.

1249 νομίζουσιν ἢ οὐ (A2): Another asyndeton: Callicles again delays to answer (again at A4).

1250 Reading only Καλλίκλεις (A5): The uniform absence from all mss. of ὦ with vocative, here (Heindorf asked *cur non?* and Hirschig Deuschle[but not Cron] Schanz Croiset Zimmermann Theiler subsequently printed it) adds admonitory urgency (Smyth §1284, Gildersleeve §20, Krüger, *Gr.Sprach.* 45.3.1~ *AGPS* 45.3.2), as does the imperative μὴ φθόνει (Deuschle-Cron and Mistriotis, noticing that Callicles hesitates to answer). Socrates needs him to answer not to refute him but to confirm his own opinion (βεβαιώσωμαι is middle, not passive: cf. *Rep.* 461E8). Dodds adduces Thompson’s note on *Meno* 98A4 regarding a general tendency of ὦ to drop out (Thompson, Appendix p.252), but there limits it to addresses “free of emotion”: to adduce that note for the present passage begs the question.

1251 ἱκάνου (A6) accords to Callicles his proud adjective (from 485E1), and ἀνὴρ gives him back his cherished noun. This is something of a taunt.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ [b] ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγη, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων,<sup>1253</sup> ἐὰν δὲ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

ΚΑΛ. οὐτοσί<sup>1254</sup> ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν.<sup>1255</sup> εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ<sup>1256</sup> τηλικούτος ὢν<sup>1257</sup> ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ [c] ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον<sup>1258</sup> τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἶει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω<sup>1259</sup> ὅτι ταυτόν<sup>1260</sup> φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἶει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῆ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν<sup>1261</sup> ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς

1252 Ἀλλ' οἷ γε πολλοί (A7): With ἀλλά, his favorite word for tugging the conversation his own way, he now grants the point: cf. 468D6 and 475E1, with nn. With γε he opens the door to saying the many are wrong in their belief, and denigrating them for this belief, as if that would invalidate Socrates's inference, though of course it would not.

1253 ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων (B5): Socrates hews close to the language Callicles used in accusing him (cf. 482E2-483A4), but varies it also (γνοὺς for κατανενοηκώς).

1254 οὐτοσί ἀνὴρ (B7), the anarthrous expression again, intensified with deictic iota. Callicles is reduced to the same sputtering frustration as Polus was, at 467B1 (*half verlegen, half boos*, Ovink). Compare the echo at the beginning of this section (481B6-7). οὗτος implies he glances at the audience for commiseration or support (ὄρα τὴν πρὸς ἑτέρους τοῦ λόγου ἀποστροφὴν, schol. *ad loc.*). Cf. n. 608. The “first person” pronoun ὄδε at *Iliad* 1.287 is a different matter (*pace* Cron), for it does not “apostrophize.” He continues the indignation with the asyndeton, εἰπέ μοι. His taking refuge in the audience is again transitional, as it was at the beginning of his remarks, and marks a new phase in the discussion – or more exactly a new attempt by Callicles to praise his ideal (as Socrates immediately remarks: C8).

1255 οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν (B7): With φλυαρῶν Callicles brings forward his remark at 486C7, but there is dramatic irony in his using also οὐ παύσεται, unintentionally recalling the language of Socrates's apology according to which he cannot stop saying what his beloved says (481E6-482A4). The ensuing asyndeton shows he is too angry to notice this.

1256 οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ (B8): It is more of the same sort of irony, lost on Callicles, that in using this idiom he should accuse Socrates of shame in the context of Polus' and Gorgias's mendacious reluctance to reveal their true feelings.

1257 τηλικούτος ὢν (B8): That he should have given up such “philosophical trivialities” by now reveals that Callicles recognizes Socrates's argument as philosophical. Whatever that meant to him before, he here demeans it as word-chasing; and the reason he demeans it for being merely verbal is that he recognizes it is more than that.

1258 ἔρμαιον (C1): Callicles also forgets Socrates's use of the metaphor of the ἔρμαιον at 486E3, unless he is accusing him of quite an elaborate trick on himself. Note that with ὀνόματα he exonerates himself from being criticized about knowing what he is talking about (the subject), and with ῥήματα from knowing what he is saying about it. Meanwhile it is his tendency to express his attitude with mere name-calling, a manner of expression that short-circuits predication, replaces the τίς with the ποῖος, and in a sense says nothing but “I like it” or “I hate it.” Socrates has made the mistake of taking his approbatory term, “strong,” literally: the winner of a contest among feckless men would *eo ipso* be, in Callicles's mind, the strongest, the noblest, the best.

1259 οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω (C2-3): The “sloppy present” (cf. 450A1 and n. 195). He hides the shift in his position by acting as though the past is the present (indeed, as Dodds remarks, he changes the meaning of both words!) by simply claiming consistency. Cf. n. 1231. But Socrates notices: καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοιάζω (B1).

1260 ταυτόν (C3): That being stronger men means nothing other than being nobler men (extensionally), is not logically equivalent to identifying stronger-ness with nobler-ness (intensionally): the identification not only substitutes the extensions of the predications (τὸ κρεῖττους εἶναι, τὸ βελτίους εἶναι) with the intensions of the predicates (τὸ κρεῖττον, τὸ βέλτιον), but also makes the attributes – i.e., the predicates considered as subject matters – intensionally identical, “two words for the same thing.” With οὐκ ἄλλο τί he had said that being in the group of the stronger means for him only that one is in the group of the nobler; but this does not imply that being nobler conversely consists in “nothing but” being stronger: otherwise the power of the democratic majority would make that majority nobler, and the strength of the slavish rabble he next mentions would make it noble. Does he recognize that he has asserted so much? Or is he upbraiding Socrates for failing to recognize that by strength he means something noble – i.e., praiseworthy, as his counterexample goes on to suggest?

1261 παντοδαπῶν (C5) is here derogatory, as at *H.Maj.* 282D1, *Leg.* 707B1, *Rep.* 408D2, but not just below (490B3). The pairing with δούλων is illogical since παντ- suggests generalization but δαπ- does not designate a genus – except that in Callicles's mind, evaluations – praise and blame – have appropriated the role that genera play in thinking.

ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ<sup>1262</sup> σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν,<sup>1263</sup> αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

ΣΩ. εἶεν, ὃ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. [d]

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὃ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω<sup>1264</sup> τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγή τοῦ ἐνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπε τί<sup>1265</sup> ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὃ θαυμάσιε πρῶτόν με προδίδασκε,<sup>1266</sup> ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω<sup>1267</sup> παρὰ σοῦ. [e]

ΚΑΛ. εἰρωνεύη, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. μὰ<sup>1268</sup> τὸν Ζῆθον, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδῆ<sup>1269</sup> εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἶπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

1262 Construing τῷ with ἰσχυρίσασθαι (C6), an articular infinitive, and σώματι as a bare dative of respect. The burden of Callicles's remark is to downgrade the "strength" of the majority, which has just refuted him, to a mere bodily strength. To construe the infinitive with ἀξίων (and τῷ with σώματι) makes bodily strength a virtue, which only weakens his point (*pace* Thompson Dodds Hamilton Waterfield). The aorist infinitive further demeans their strength as occasional rather than a permanent attribute.

1263 φῶσιν (C6) stands without an object (in all mss.) – but φάσιν can mean to say yes (Beck Sommer): translate "on their say-so." As elsewhere Callicles is rude: his "unstätete und schweifende Gebrauch ist ganz in Art der Sprechenden" F.W.v.Thiersch (*Gr.Gramm.*<sup>3</sup> [Leipzig 1826] 505). Improving his language ignores what we are learning he is from it. Heindorf's emendation of αὐτὰ into ἄττα, moving comma from before to after (accepted by Ast[1832] Hermann Sauppe Deuschle[but not Cron] Schanz Stender Lamb Feix Dodds Theiler Chambry Hamilton Zeyl Nichols Dalfen), is only an improvement (cf. Lodge, 286), as is Dodd's casual suggestion that in case αὐτὰ is read from the mss., one might add τὶ after οὗτοι.

1264 πάλαι τοπάζω (D1): Socrates turns back upon Callicles his own use of πάλαι plus present, just above (C3). Deuschle astutely accounts for Socrates's forbearance to ask earlier as due to the ground rules for successful dialogue he laid down in his conversation with Gorgias (453C1-4).

1265 τί (D6): This unanimously attested neuter singular (F has ὃ τι), here as above (τί ... τὸ κρεῖττον, D2), isolates the *element or idea* shared by the plurality of men spoken of by Callicles (C4-7) that deserve its name (cf. *AGPS* 61.8.0.A), despite Ficinus's tr., quos tandem *ais meliores esse* (τίνας *coni.* Routh, *legg.* Sauppe Schanz Ovink Stender). Compare imperfectly concordant neuter ὅπερ referring back to masculine τίνα at 448B5 (n.150); in all these cases the neuter might be representing either the notion or its ὄνομα beneath the surface (*pace* Sauppe, who states without argument that only the ὄνομα would call for the singular): cf. *Prot.*311E3, *Rep.*340D7. But what is really at issue is the distinction between the intension of a term (which naturally prefers the neuter singular) and the extension (which requires the plural) – a theme broached by the variation of expressions in the last lines (C2-4, D2). Hence, with tr., "what do you mean by the stronger?" Socrates's use of the article with the predicate ἰσχυροτέρους evinces his recognition that Callicles is talking extensionally.

1266 προδίδασκε (D7): Guessing at a sense for the prefix (present in all mss. but Zb) is the sport of finer exegetes (Jebb *ad S. Ai.* 163 cites the passage as meaning "gradually teach;" Dover *ad Ar. Nub.*476 guesses the prefix denotes only that being taught precedes application in action; Woolsey [*ad loc.*] calls it redundant since all teaching is a movement forward; Kratz says it can denote either the teacher's advance in his curriculum or the student's advance in knowledge; the schol. advises it is otiose [περιττεύει ἢ πρόθεσις ἀπτικῶς], and it is so, elsewhere: cf. *Euthyd.*302C3, *H.Maj.*291B1). Thompson's account I prefer, who citing *Leg.*643C4 argues that προδιδάσκειν is to teacher as προμανθάνειν is to student – that the prefix adds a reference to their interrelationship – which convenes nicely with Socrates's threat, ἀποφοιτήσω.

1267 ἀποφοιτήσω (D7): φοιτᾶν, to "come around" or "hang around" is a common metaphor for regularly attending, as an ἀκροατής, the lessons of a teacher. The conceit of this section is that Socrates is learning from Callicles, but now he threatens to cease his ἀκροάζεσθαι if Callicles keeps trying to strong-arm him (cf. δεῖ ἀκροάζεσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου, 488C2-3). It is perhaps because of this play on words that Callicles now accuses him of irony (E1).

1268 Reading μὰ (E2) with the mss. and edd. (οὐ μὰ Zb[γρ.] Hermogenes[*Rhet.Gr.*Spengel, 2.442] Olympiodorus [137.28], *legg.* Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Sommer Hirschig). Stallb. adduces the proof Bornemann (*X.Conviv.*[Leipzig 1824]107) gives *ad X. Symp.*4.7 (not 4.6): that μὰ in oaths always introduces a denial. If so, we should still accept the overwhelming testimony against οὐ μὰ and take the oath to be denying what came before, viz., that it is not Socrates but Callicles that should be accused of irony. In this case at least the meaning is unaffected. With Dodds, Socrates makes a sound play on the usual oath, μὰ τὸν Ζῆνα.

1269 νυνδῆ (E3): Socrates refers to Callicles's extensive quotation from Euripides' account of Zethus's advice to his brother, Amphion (485E3-486A3), and in particular the remark that he has a γενναία ψυχὴ (Olymp.137.30).



ΣΩ. ὀρᾶς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα<sup>1270</sup> λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους<sup>1271</sup> πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;<sup>1272</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.<sup>1273</sup>

[490] ΣΩ. πολλακίς ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων<sup>1274</sup> κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ<sup>1275</sup> πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν—καὶ οὐ ῥήματι<sup>1276</sup> θηρεύω—εἰ ὁ εἶς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ<sup>1277</sup> οἶμαι ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον<sup>1278</sup> καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων. [b]

1270 ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν (E6): Once again the interlocutor becomes guilty of what he has brought against Socrates. τοὺς ἀμείνους is so general as to mean almost nothing in a context where, as here, stronger and nobler are being distinguished. Indeed it serves only as a term of praise, and so the problem all along has come to a head and Socrates calls him on it with ὀνόματα λέγεις, which here means exactly what it means in our expression “calling people names:” the very definition of name-calling is saying A is B where the statement is meant to praise A or deprecate A but does not illuminate what A is – to say ποῖος without regard for the τί, something we have been witnessing all through the dialogue, whether as an artful tactic of persuasion in the cases of Polus and Gorgias or, in the case of Callicles, as the verbal behavior of a bully (cf. nn. 1233, 975, 169, 165). Praise is achieved by identifying those in class A with those in another admired class, B: the statement is (again) extensional rather than intensional, and thus the article goes with both subject and predicate. Socrates seeks to advance the analysis by suggesting another approbative – but this time specific, and therefore arguable – adjective: φρονιμώτεροι.

1271 καὶ κρείττους (E7): Though the dialectic has substituted βελτίους for κρείττους as what Callicles really meant by κρείττους (C2), Socrates now allows him to have his other approbative term back, in order to lay more focus and importance onto φρονιμωτέρους, with which he is proposing to replace both as the essential cause behind them.

1272 πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς (E7-8): With his plurals, Socrates (again) is asking whether the *extension* of the better and stronger men is identical with that of the smarter men. We might take it to mean something else, e.g., that what makes them better and stronger is that they are smarter (which is what Waterfield actually says in his translation) but this is not what the Greek says here. Such will however be said in Socrates's next question.

1273 καὶ σφόδρα γε (E9): To aver his assertion that they are the smarter he asserts they are very much smarter (compare Socrates's πολὺ at 488E2 and n. 1655), or asserts it ever more strongly (*und zwar ganz genau*, Dalfen): it almost comes to the same, for his assertion is only praise (cf. his use of σαφῶς at 488D4 and n. 1240). What for Callicles is an intensification of praise functions in the dialectic for Socrates as a statement of focussed intension. The joke becomes entirely explicit with ὑπαντικώτατον, at 490D7. Hence in the present passage Socrates rolls with the punches and hyperbolically proposes that Callicles's hero is smarter than thousands; and yet for those of Plato's readers that know Socrates cannot but recall his notion of hearkening to the one knower, the εἰς φρονῶν, rather than the overwhelming majority (e.g., *Crito* 47A13-B11, C11-D3, 48A5-7).

1274 φρονῶν / μὴ φρονούντων (490A1): Note that Socrates is not characterizing the persons with adjectives, but rather is hypothesizing their behavior with circumstantial participles (indeed, μὴ is conditional). Compare A3-4. On πολλακίς cf. n. 2237.

1275 καὶ τοῦτον / καὶ πλέον (A2, A3): Socrates exploits the vaguely illative force of καὶ: One's application of φρόνησις among persons who do not apply it entails (but does not cause) the necessity that he rule (ἄρχειν) and that those who do not do so be ruled, and the fact that he rules and they are ruled entails that he is better off (πλέον ἔχειν: literally, has more) than those who are ruled. For Callicles the entailments embody the operation of the δίκαιον φύσει and δεῖ means that the strong man is justified (as he explicitly says below, A7); but Socrates's καὶ's do not place such a burden onto the sense of δεῖ – only that cleverness among fools may inevitably lead to their being mastered and then ripped off. The difference is of course lost on Callicles. Callicles repeats this use of καὶ in his reply and perhaps remembers it again in retort, below (C8).

1276 Reading ῥήματι (A5) from BTPFY, *legg.* Hermann Jahn Schmelzer Burnet Lamb Feix Dodds Heibüchel Cantarin Erler only on the basis of its superior attestation (ῥήματα V Steph. *verba* Ficinus, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Bekker Coraes Ast Stallb. Sauppe Woolsey Kratz Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Lodge Stender: ῥήματι τὸ *coni.* Deuschle, *legg.* Thompson Croiset Zimmermann Theiler: ῥήματα *coni.* Badham [*Philol.* 10.729], *leg.* Schanz). For the absolute dative used to contrast the expression (ῥήματι) with the meaning (λόγος), cf. 450E5, *Rep.* 340D5, *Th.* 166D8, though Kratz is correct to object that θηρεύω (obviously a reference to Callicles's accusation, ὀνόματα θηρεύειν, above [489B8]) would do well to have a direct object, and ῥήματα would supply it; but the whole accusation was ὀνόματα θηρεύων ... ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτη. In my opinion Socrates is here referring to that passage compendiously.

1277 His γάρ (A6) indicates that Callicles's ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω is another present-past, for he is quoting himself. What he is saying is what he has been saying (as at 488B7, C2, C3).

1278 βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον (A7): Callicles has noticed the illative sequence in Socrates's remark, as he acknowledges with his extended articular infinitive phrase (A7-8); but note also that at the same time he has replaced Socrates's conditional participles with adjectives: the behaviors have become personal characteristics of the one and of the countless many. By the same token he has replaced Socrates's very specific characterizations and has reverted to his habit of approbative and derogatory name-calling (βελτίω, φαυλοτέρων). On the καὶ, cf. n. 1275: Waterfield over-translates, “better (that is, more clever).” Socrates's question above (489E7-8) may indeed be meant by Socrates to replace the vaguer notional amalgam of being “nobler and stronger” with the single and clearer notion of being, or acting, “smarter,” and might even mean to say the former is solely due to the latter, but he has not said as much, and Callicles is not the sort to reduce the dimensions of praise, and also may not see it that way. Indeed Socrates will himself re-adopt Callicles's notional amalgam along the way (B7). The fact that καὶ in Greek *may* be only epexegetical does not authorize Waterfield to put that thought into Callicles's head, especially when Callicles could have expressed such a thought explicitly.

ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ.<sup>1279</sup> τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὤμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθροοί,<sup>1280</sup> καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὤμεν δὲ παντοδαποί,<sup>1281</sup> οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δ' ἀσθενεῖς, εἷς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἰατρὸς ὢν, ἢ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ<sup>1282</sup> οὗτος, φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [c]

ΣΩ. ἢ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων<sup>1283</sup> πλέον ἡμῶν ἐκτέον<sup>1284</sup> αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἔστιν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον<sup>1285</sup> δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν τῷ δὲ<sup>1286</sup> ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρησθαι<sup>1287</sup> εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτικόν, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι,<sup>1288</sup> ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν,

- 1279 ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ (B1): Different from absolute ἔχε δὴ (cf. 460A5 and n. *ad loc.*), it means, ‘Stop so I can examine just that point (note νῦν) before you say something else’ – for Callicles has been moving around like a Proteus, though at the same time he claims he is saying the same thing all along (πάσαι). At the present moment, Socrates has stated what he thinks Callicles’s current position is (A1-5), and Callicles has accepted his statement of it by restating it (A6-8), though with significant modifications as noted above (see prev. n.). The former expression left room for the rulers to have privileges greater than the ruled *qua* ruled, but to the extent that he qualifies the ruled as inferior Callicles dictates to the intelligent ruler that he must have more than his inferiors. And yet intelligence will not provide itself with more because superior but because it would be intelligent to do so; and among the ruled there may be reason to accord more to one subject than another, as Socrates now shows (B1-E8).
- 1280 Reading ἀθροοί (B2), Burnet’s emendation accepted by Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler on suspicion that ἀνθρώποι and ἀθροοί are alternate readings (ἀνθρώποι F : ἀνθρώποι ὄντες f (*ut vid.*) : ἀθροο, ἄνθρωπο, BT[*teste* Burnet] : ἀθροοὶ ἀνθρώποι *legg* Routh Heindorf Beck Bekker Ast Stallb.[*sine notis*] Woolsey Sauppe Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Hirschig Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Croiset Zimmermann Feix Heidbüchel : ἀνθρώποι Hermann : ἀνθρώποι ἀθροοί PV). Olymp.(137.32-3), although he reads ἀθροοί, does not resolve the discrepancy. Burnet’s dubitation over the final iotas (and subscripts) should not (with edd.) be ignored but countenanced (with Dodds). The varied reports of the earlier form with rough breathing and the later form with smooth breathing, is indifferent. The adjective often appears in tandem with πολλοί to gather a plurality into a mass (cf. 501D3-4, *Rep.*492B5 with my n. *ad loc.*, and *Tim.*25D2; D. 21.131, τοσοῦτοις ἀθροοῖς at D. 21.132 and 135; X. *Anab.*5.2.1). Again Plato reminds us the audience is attentively present (cf.487B4-5).
- 1281 παντοδαποί (B3): Socrates borrows the derogatory term Callicles used just above (489C5) to bring forward (from A8) his own derogatory conception of the ἀρχόμενοι as φανλότεροι.
- 1282 Reading ἢ (B6) with edd. (ἢ F *teste* Cantarin). The ἀλλ’ ὅτι of W against the ἄλλο τι of the mss. before ἢ may be ignored. Bekker deleted ἢ here (“*omisi*”, *legg.* Ast Hirschig Thompson) and elsewhere, again without mss. authority (as at *Euthyph.*15C6, *H.Maj.*288C1, *Euthyd.*277B8). Stallb. faults him for this habit (“*nescio quo odio innocentis particulae inflammatus*”) and cites for its presence in the *Gorgias*, 455B4, 481C3, 496D6 (*q.v. infra*), 502C6. Omission of ἢ in the phrase is permitted by idiom (495C6; *Crat.*436E4; *Meno* 82C8 [cf. Thompson *ad loc.*], 84D8, 97A10; *Phdo.*79B1; *Prot.*353C4; *Symp.*200D6, 200E8, 201A9; *Th.*159C4), but retaining it is good logic and good Greek (*Euthyd.*277B8; *Meno* 82D1, 83B2, 87D2; *Phdo.*70C9, 106A1; *Th.*154E7). In fact, both are used in close adjacency. Cf. Ast, *Lex.Plat.* 1.107-8; Stallb. *ad Symp.* 200D6, Hermann *ad Viger*, 731. The interrogative formula expects a “yes” answer, with or without ἢ: e.g., *Meno* 82D1, 83B2 (*pace* Sauppe *ad* 496D6, where Dodds cites *Lys.*222D6, ἄλλο τι ἢ eliciting πάνυ γε).
- 1283 Reading τῶν σιτίων (C1) against Hirschig’s deletion (accepted by Theiler), as gratuitous speculation that ποτῶν from B2 should also be there, whereas τούτων would be sufficient alone.
- 1284 πλέον ... ἐκτέον (C1): the expression begins to straddle between πλεονεξία, which is to be better off than others, and literally “having more,” in its application to the illustrative example of the distribution of the food.
- 1285 With ἐκεῖνον (C2) Socrates brings forward Callicles’s vision of the single man that stands out among the myriads.
- 1286 Reading ἐν τῷ δὲ (C3) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. (ἐν δὲ τῷ W, *leg.* Beck : τῷ δὲ Sauppe[*ἐν delens*], *leg.* Dodds). I retain ἐν for the very reason Dodds deletes it, that it is indeed needful to distinguish the causal dative of the μέν clause’s infinitive from the dative of respect in the δέ clause’s infinitive, since μέν / δέ, especially with parallel articular infinitives, would tend to suppress it and then require the sentence to be read twice if not more. I think the ἐν was added not by a later editor but by Plato, with δέ after τῷ (according to both ms. families) according to the usual parallelism, now that ἐν had preempted confusion. It is not a matter of a rare placement of δέ but of adjustments in the parallelism of μέν / δέ.
- 1287 ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρησθαι (C3) = to waste it and gobble it down. With Lodge and Sauppe, κατὰ here denotes utter destruction or “using up” (*H. Iliad* 12.13; *Lys.* 19.22), not misuse, reinforcing the notion that food has to be eaten up. Food is not a permanent possession, and therefore having a larger portion is not a stable state of “being better off,” which however is the πλεονεξία Callicles has in mind. This is what underlies the expression, “You can’t have your cake and eat it, too”: the only value food has is in eating it before it spoils. It is also the reason people who want to be wealthier than others always need to have more money than they already have, in case they spend what they have on something. Socrates has sabotaged Callicles’s vision of being better off because of being ruler, by (1) showing that the φρόνημος is himself governed by his φρόνησις, and (2) introducing food so as to undercut πλέον ἔχειν for its short “shelf-life.” He plays a similar game with food at *Rep.* 338C6-D2.
- 1288 εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι (C4): Whereas his sovereign medical knowledge will distribute all the food properly, it will not *eo ipso* entitle him to the largest share for himself (according to Callicles’s formula of being “better off”) for the eating of it, disregarding the health consequences which for him as doctor would be foreseeable. The “just” amount is not simply more, but is the amount determined by his φρόνησις: i.e., the healthy amount. More would be unjust and might entail a gastronomic “penalty.”

πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;<sup>1289</sup>

... οὐχ οὕτως, ὠγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. τί δέ;<sup>1290</sup> περὶ σιτία, λέγεις, καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἰατροῦς καὶ φλυαρίας· [d] ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὐ<sup>1291</sup> τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίῳ λέγεις;

... φάθι ἢ μή;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίῳ πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. οὐ σιτίων γε<sup>1292</sup> οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. μανθάνω,<sup>1293</sup> ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ<sup>1294</sup> δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον<sup>1295</sup> μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα<sup>1296</sup> ἀμπεχόμενον περιέειναι;

ΚΑΛ. ποίων ἱματίων;<sup>1297</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν [e] φρονιμώτατον<sup>1298</sup> εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα<sup>1299</sup> ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν.

1289 ὦ Καλλίκλεις (C6): The vocative in terminal position, repeated with ὠγαθέ (*pace* Hirschig *id Callicli tribuens*), is striking. This, with the asyndeton, suggests some delay before Callicles answers. His answer breaks off the consecutivity of question and response, if it was not already broken off by the temporal pause.

1290 Reading τί δέ (C8) from YB<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarín (περὶ mss., *legg.* edd. : *secll.* Hirschig Thompson Dodds Theiler Allen Cantarín). The accusative with περὶ is uncommon (450A3, *Phdo.*109C1; *Isoc. Phil.*11; *X. Mem.*1.1.20) whereas omission of περὶ after λέγεις, repeated in fact at the end of the sentence, has a comic tone (cf. *Symp.*221E4-5) that suits Callicles's snide manner. Cf. E4 below.

1291 Reading οὐ (D2) with BF, *legg.* Burnet Dodds Allen Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Dalfen Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler (οὐν TWPf *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd.), picking up Callicles's οὐ in οὐ ταῦτα λέγω (Dodds). With φάθι ἢ μή we sense another pause (Mistriotis).

1292 οὐ σιτίων γε (D6) answers with asyndeton, indicating Callicles's rising impatience. Cobet's insertion of ἀλλ' before οὐ (suggested without supporting argument at *Mnem.*3[1875]137 and accepted by Croiset) provides syndesis and at the same time produces the impatient tone asyndeton would have, now with the impatience of a retort. But he failed to see that his ἀλλά undermines Callicles's precious derogatory γε. See next note.

1293 Μανθάνω (D7): This asyndetic idiom means "Aha! Now I see what you have in mind," after which the speaker moves directly to a statement of what he sees in the interlocutor's mind, or an inference from what that unexpressed idea would imply, in order to show that he has correctly seen what it is (cf. 474C9 and n. 842 *ad loc.*). So we must ask what in the sequel reveals to Socrates what he claims to see in Callicles's mind. It is not that besides the possession of food there is the possession of clothing – that is too obvious for μανθάνω – but rather the detail that Callicles's smart ruler must have smarter dress (if I may be allowed a pun Socrates might have used if he had had it in Greek): what Socrates infers from οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν, and in particular from its indignant γε, is that Callicles wants something beyond the bare necessities, namely, the envy of his inferiors, which he finds so precious.

1294 Reading καί (D7) with BTPf and edd. *om.* F.

1295 ὑφαντικώτατον (D7): For an analogous coinage required by the dialectic, cf. n. 532. The notion of a greater or finer intelligence deserving a greater or finer provision, carefully refuted by the medical example above but rejected out of hand by Callicles, is now reduced to absurdity by Socrates, while at the same time he pays homage to Callicles's desire to be envied.

1296 πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα (D8) is the superlative of the commendatory doublet of quantity and quality, πολλὰ καὶ καλά; but to apply the doublet adverbially to "being clothed" strains semantics to risible absurdity (again below, of shoes, μέγιστα καὶ πλεῖστα [E2], though a person can only wear two: cf. n. 1299, *infra*). Socrates again rises to the occasion, answering the charge of ridicule with higher satire very much on point: that the owner of these clothes should be *observed* owning and wearing them (implied by περιέειναι) is crucial to Callicles's pleonectic vanity.

1297 ποίων ἱματίων (D10): For the indignant or surprised use of ποῖος cf. 449E1; *Charm.*174B1 and 4; *Erast.*132B8; *Euthyd.*291A1, 304E7; *H.Maj.*285D2; *Ion* 536E6, 540B2; *Lach.*194D10; *Meno* 80D6; *Phlb.*63C8; *Rep.*330B1, 459B6; *Th.*180B8. Aristophanes has more than thirty – e.g., *Lys.*730, 971; *Nub.*367. Dodds cites two tragic examples: S. *Trach.*427 (exceptional in tragedy [Schneidewin *ad loc.*]) and E. *Hel.*567.

1298 Reading φρονιμώτατον (E1) with Fx, *legg.* edd. (φρονιμώτερον BTP, *legg.* Beck Stallb. Woolsey) because of subsequent βέλτιστον, and previous ὑφαντικώτατον (D7). Stepping up to the superlative is not warranted by the argument (the comparative has been used up until now) but it satirically invites Callicles's agreement because of the higher praise he wishes to accord to his dream man. Alternatively, the comparative would be logically warranted by adjacent πλεονεκτεῖν, immediately to be replaced by the less logical superlative, more agreeable to Callicles.

1299 μέγιστα ... πλεῖστα (E2-3): The steps are logical nonsense, or nonsensical logic. He breaks up the polar doublet into a binary construction that applies the one to the shoes and the other to wearing them, and the latter makes no sense – though the logic is almost impeccable. He is not quite suggesting that the cobbler wear a large number of shoes, as the translators literally bring it across. περιπατεῖν makes things still more vivid than περιέειναι – but again appropriately so – heightening satire: the shoemaker will be showing off his wares (Kratz).

ΚΑΛ. ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.<sup>1300</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε·<sup>1301</sup> οἷον γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περιγῆν φρόνιμον τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν,<sup>1302</sup> τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι<sup>1303</sup> εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

ΚΑΛ. ὡς<sup>1304</sup> ἀεὶ ταῦτά λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.<sup>1305</sup>

[491] ΚΑΛ. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς<sup>1306</sup> γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων<sup>1307</sup> καὶ ἱατροὺς οὐδὲν παύῃ, ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

1300 The reading ἔχων (E4), with BTPf and edd., which requires punctuating the line as two questions, is, though idiomatic, uncertain (λέγων is the reading of F). For the idiom in ἔχων cf. 497A8, *Euthyd.*295C10, *Phdrs.*236E6; *Ar. Av.*341, *Eccl.*853 and 1151, *Nub.*131 and 509, *Ran.*202 and 512 and 524; and for various opinions about how it means what it means cf. *Matth.Gr.Gr.* §567, Hermann *ad Viger* p. 777, and *AGPS* 56.86.4. Jahn notes it is almost always used of the second person, but Kratz notices first person singular at *Ar. Nub.*131 and *Eccl.*853; *AGPS* holds that it appears only with present and future indic. But perhaps Callicles is asking one question and λέγων is correct (Jowett: “What nonsense you are talking”), stretching the Aristophanic idiom of physical objects as the objects with λέγω so as to imitate his remark above (as emended, that is: σιτία λέγεις, C8-D1).

1301 τὰ τοιαῦτα / τὰ τοιάδε (E5): For the “second person” demonstrative pointing backward and “first person” forward cf. *Apol.*37A4-5 (οὐκ ἔστιν ... τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον); *Crat.*408D6-7; *Crito* 48B3-4; *Lach.*189E1-2; *Meno* 81D6-E1, 90C11-D1 (and St.George Stock *ad loc.*); *Rep.*423C6, 440D8. Mistriotis notes that the article is added to the demonstratives to indicate the distinction is between classes (for which cf. *Crat.*408D6-7, *Lach.*189E1-2). Canto suggests that by the transition Socrates is feeding Callicles’s pride by moving from humbler professions to the more patrician and more capitalized occupation of the farmer. Once even this is exhausted there is little else for Callicles to do but say what he means by the superior ones – it is politicians that achieve power – and yet this will collapse even faster.

1302 φρόνιμον τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν (E6): The triad now substitutes gratuitous καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν for gratuitous βέλτιστον. In itself it formulates a combination of intelligence with civic stature, which are the attributes of the man Callicles is interested in (cf.n.1139) – a man who is not a farmer, let alone a cobbler or a weaver, but a πολιτικός – but Socrates is transferring Callicles’s approbatory language to other walks of life in order to mockingly persuade him (cf. n. 1298), as Callicles will presently complain. And meanwhile such a policy would be economically intelligent (for which cf. 491B1-2, below).

1303 ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι (E7-8): Note the shift from plural to singular: a greater number of seeds put to a most efficient use of “seed” *per se*. πλείστῳ goes in sense with χρῆσθαι in hypallage, as when we say one “makes a good martini” in order to say he makes martinis well. With this, the doublet of πολλά καὶ καλά has been relocated from the product (shoes, cloak) to the means of producing it; and the advantage to himself is that larger yield brought by the multiplication of quantity of seeds and efficiency in their use – upon his own land.

1304 ὡς (E9) in mock wonder, again at 491E2, 521C3. Cf. *Rep.*414C8. Callicles continues with the “transitive” use of λέγω; Mr Morrissey suggests we take it adverbially, referring to Socrates’s usual epagogic way of talking. But see next n.

1305 καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν (E10-11): Socrates finally insists upon the distinction, introduced in passing by Callicles, between what one is talking about (ὀνόματα) and what he says about it (ῥήματα: cf. 489B7-C1 and n.), obscured in the interim by his continued use of comic language (namely, “transitive” λέγειν with thing: C8-E4), in which Socrates continually has avoided to acquiesce (D2-3, E5-8): for now he takes Callicles’s remark ταῦτά λέγεις (E9) to refer to the predication and says, “Yes, and about the same subjects.” Ovink notes always saying the same things about the same things is the distinguishing mark of science, and Apelt cites 482A7. The distinction is lost on Callicles, who continues indifferently with both uses of λέγειν in his retort (491A1-3). Note Socrates’s echoing use of the vocative for the sake of retort, as the argument heats up (cf.489E1-2). The often-cited exchange between Hippias and Socrates at X. *Mem.*4.4.6, where this comic use of λέγειν with objects plays no part, is more different than similar: there Socrates makes a joke that his positions do not vary whereas Hippias’s polymathy provides him with many positions. More similar is the remark that Alcibiades makes about Socrates at *Symp.*221E4-6, where again the comic use is present (ὄνους γὰρ κωνθηλίους λέγει ... καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται λέγειν).

1306 Reading ἀτεχνῶς (491A1) with TPWF and edd. (ἀτέχνως B). The perispomenon, meaning “utterly,” is far commoner than the more specific paroxytone (“artlessly,” here reported in B), for which LSJ gives only two examples (one of which is nearby: *Gorg.*501A4). Ast (*Lex.Plat.*) gives no instances of, and does not recognize, the latter. The forms are often confused with each other in mss. (as here and at 501A4).

1307 σκυτέας τε καὶ γναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων (A1-2): Callicles’s first two terms re-do in retrospective order Socrates’s examples of the σκυτόμομος and the ὑφαντικός (he leaps over over farming) and the third comes from nowhere; after these Callicles interrupts his derogatory list with λέγων and then brings back Socrates’s first and principal example, ἱατρούς. The leading motive of his opening triad is derogatory insouciance, not only in the substitution of the carder for the weaver, the tossing in of cooking, and the use of derogatory plurals, but also in the diction, choosing σκυτεύς for σκυτόμομος. Socrates’s regular word for the shoemaker is σκυτόμομος (just as the complementary occupation of the weaver is done with ὑφάντης or ὑφαντικός), with the single exception of *Rep.*601C where he uses the form σκυτεύς in an epagoge to rhyme with γναφεύς, with whom in the epagoge the shoemaker is being compared. There, the rhyme tailors the diction to the epagogic parallelism of the thought; here, conversely, Callicles has put rhyme over sense (σκυτέας τε καὶ γναφέας) so as to create a jingle and satirize Socrates’s use of examples from the lesser occupations, at the expense of using a very rare word (γναφέας: whether κν- or γν- is of no importance to the sense or tone), which represents ὑφαντικός with slovenly insouciance: in both cases he is derogating the craftsman by referring to his raw materials rather than what he does with them.



ΣΩ. οὐκ οὖν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων<sup>1308</sup> ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρονιμώτερος πλεον ἔχων  
δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος<sup>1309</sup> ἀνέξει οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω.<sup>1310</sup> πρῶτον μὲν<sup>1311</sup> τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν<sup>1312</sup> οὐ  
σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγεῖρους, ἀλλ' [b] οἱ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα  
φρόνιμοι<sup>1313</sup> ὧσιν, ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἂ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς  
ψυχῆς.

ΣΩ. ὄραξ,<sup>1314</sup> ὧ βέλτιστε Καλλίκελις, ὡς οὐ ταῦτά σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ  
ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς ἀεὶ ταῦτά λέγειν, καὶ μέμφοι μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ  
τοῦναντίον,<sup>1315</sup> ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταῦτά λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν τοὺς [c]

1308 Reading οὐκ οὖν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων (A4), revising the accentuation of the mss. (οὐκοῦν, accepted by edd.) to οὐκ οὖν, with Dodds, according to the advice of Denniston (430-433), since the emphasis is on *objecting*. The future, with οὐ, expresses impatience and therefore can have imperative force (cf. *Symp.* 172A5, 212D1; *Ar. Plut.* 440, *Eq.* 240, 1354; cf. Smyth §1918 [“to express urgency, warning, or irony”]), as can the aorist (cf. 503B3 and n. 1640). With περὶ τίνων (*sc. λέγων vel sim.* with Beck) Socrates responds to Callicles’s assertion he is *talking about* the wrong things (περὶ τούτων) by asking him, *in what area* his assertion is operant (with something of a strain in usage of περὶ: the acc. is to be expected: cf. *Lach.* 183A1-2, *πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*), in order to produce an echo in retort (retorts do tend to strain diction and syntax, with Cron and Mistrisotis, *pace* Kratz and Dodds), “You tell me, then: *about what* (περὶ τίνων) ...” and so we must read περὶ with all mss. (*teste* Cantarin) and almost all edd. (*del.* Hirschig, *legg.* Sauppe Thompson Allen), regardless of Hirschig’s defense of the deletion, as bringing forward the genitives of 490D6, D7, and D10 (though note that even that formulation was varied by an awkwardly abstract prepositional expression – εἰς ὑποδήματα, D11 – for which cf. 491B1) and regardless of Sauppe’s construction of the bare genitive with *πλεονεκτεῖ* (A5) and of Dodd’s emendation, περὶ τίνων· <τίνων>, accepted by Zeyl Nichols.

1309 ὑποβάλλοντος (A6): The root metaphor is the same as that of *προβάλλειν* (πρόβλημα): ὑπο- means the notion is being introduced covertly or is merely being suggested, in which case it is an echo of Callicles’s charge of *ὑπερωτῶν* (a *hapax*) at 483A4. The pattern of the epagoge is obverse in that Socrates usually sets out a series of examples in a matrix that conforms with *his own* abstract question, in order to make the abstract visible with instantiations, whereas here it is the abstract statement of *Callicles’s* position (φρονεῖν / ἄρχειν / πλεον ἔχειν: 490A1-4), that Socrates’s series of examples is experimentally interpreting. Rather than asking Callicles to specify his meaning as he did with *ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ* (490B1), Socrates buys himself a berth to suggest specifications all of which Callicles subsequently rejects. Is this futile divagation unique in the Platonic corpus?

1310 Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω (A7): His present tense λέγω plus πάλαι, covering present and past (cf. 489C2-3), constitute a riposte to Socrates’s idiomatic use of the future ἐρεῖς. He used this move above (cf. n. 1259) and, no less than there, what he claims to “be saying all along” again changes. Thompson argues there is consistency in Callicles’s underlying position continually missed by Socrates’s dialectical challenges, but it is only these challenges that finally force him to give up talking about the ποῖος – i.e., praising his underlying idea of the strong man – and finally revealing what that position actually is (the τίς), in all its nakedness, just below (491E5ff).

1311 πρῶτον μὲν (A7): With a certain *abundantia* of expression (Stallb.) Callicles plays the patient school marm with Socrates. With πρῶτον μὲν he insists he has already answered the question by acting as if there is a whole list of things he has already said, but as it turns out there is no δέ clause (not because Socrates interrupts, *pace* Sauppe: he may have thought he would go on, but soon enough has forgotten that and closes the paragraph with a chiasm, B2-4: ἀνδρεῖοι / ἱκανοί // μὴ ἀποκαμνωσί / μαλακίαν): instead he presents an elaborate statement that *varies* what he has said – though in all likelihood he now broaches something of what he has “meant” all along; and yet he does not answer the present question, which is what “more” the rulers should have. He now indifferently calls strength “bravery,” for him another term of praise, a misusage he takes the trouble to justify by opposing it to the opprobrium of a *μαλακία* τῆς ψυχῆς (for name-calling goes both ways: indeed it is either praise or blame but never assertion). Cope, on Callicles’s behalf, translates out the misusage to give Callicles’s “meaning” instead: for φρόνιμοι he puts “skill and ability”; for ἀνδρεῖοι he puts “energy and vigor.” This free replacement of his actual words with a meaning Cope sees beneath or above them then vitiates the possibility of dialectical examination even more than Callicles’s own free abundance of epideictic terms, about which Socrates, for whom such terms are most needful of clear definition, next complains (B5-C5).

1312 οἱ εἰσιν (A8): Callicles will first describe the subject (ὄνομα) and then what he predicates of it (ρήματα, or Socrates’s περὶ τίνων above) – the distinction Socrates will draw just below (ταῦτα [predicate] ... περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν [subject]).

1313 τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι (B1) by itself can and should, in Callicles’s mouth, mean what Meno means by ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν (Meno 71E7) and Alcibiades by δυναμένους ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει (*Alc. I* 125B9), which Dodds cites as dispositive parallels – namely an astute management of power that is probably self-serving; but the exegetical expansion ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο (*sc. ἡ πόλις*: B1-2), adding the claim of his being able to formulate good civic policy (εὖ οἰκοῖτο), is out of character for Callicles, and indeed out of his depth, since it requires not opportunistic astuteness but actual understanding. This was forced upon him by the previous discussion of φρόνησις, which for him will now be a mere passing note in order to reach ἀνδρεία (as Socrates will argue below, C2-4). The language is there to be seen in the Protagoras of the *Protagoras* (316C and 318E5-9A2) and is repeated by Socrates in an hour (520E3, cf. n. 2117). Note the difference between the indefinite relative ὄντινα used here in an “unasked” question (cf. n. 136) and the definite relative as used in the proleptic lilies of the field construction just above, with indicative (τοὺς κρείττους οἱ εἰσιν, A8). The surprise is suppressed in Hamilton’s ambiguous tr., “intelligence to know how political matters should be handled.” Up until now political astuteness for Callicles could only mean reaping the rewards of power (cf. 484D2-5), but in any case the claim will suddenly be abandoned, when he is done beating around the bush (εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, C4 *infra*) and tells us that both the intelligence and the courage he here adduces have, as their true function, ministering to one’s own desires (492A1-2: ὑπηρετεῖν δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν), presumably enabled to do so with the spoils of power.

1314 Ὅραξ (B5): Literally, “you (can) see”; but used in asyndeton as here it takes on a derisive tone (Stallb.).

1315 ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τοῦναντίον (B7): With edd. and tr. (except for Routh, Cron, and Helmbold, Chambry, Irwin, Allen, Canto Dalfen Erler) I take σοῦ and τοῦναντίον as the complements of κατηγορῶ (τι τινός), reaching back to that verb through the essentially concessive (Dodds) μὲν clause (the two verbs of that clause having analyzed it into φάναι and μέμφοσθαι), rather than taking genitive σοῦ as the complement of τοῦναντίον,



βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὠρίζου, αὐθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἦκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες<sup>1316</sup> ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι<sup>1317</sup> τίνας ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους<sup>1318</sup> καὶ εἰς ὄτι.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' εἰρηκά γε<sup>1319</sup> ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ [d] προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλεον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. τί δαί,<sup>1320</sup> αὐτῶν,<sup>1321</sup> ὧ ἑταῖρε;

ΚΑΛ. τί ἢ τι;<sup>1322</sup>

adverbial (i.e., “but I say [φημί] oppositely from you, that ...”). For the latter interpretation we would expect indirect discourse in the infinitive, not ὄτι. Moreover, we should take τοῦναντίον as a substantive that sets up the ὄτι clause (*pace* Sauppe).

- 1316 With τινες (C3) Socrates registers an objection to Callicles's use of ἀνδρεία as merely an approbatory synonym for ability (B2), suggesting any such identification needs a defense since knowing what virtue is makes a difference (cf. Krüger *Gr.Sprach.* 51.16.2 and *ibid.*, *AGPS*). Once again we run up against the problem of τίς and ποῖός τις. Cope and Allen misconstrue the force of the enclitic (translating, “a certain manliness and energy”; instead, it is “some kind of braver man” [Irwin]), as if Socrates himself were unsure what ἀνδρεῖοι means. Socrates's method of question and answer requires the parties to fix meanings, not merely deliver themselves of praise and blame. Sensitive to the presence of these terms, Olympiodorus (138.9-14) easily notices that behind Callicles's loose language and Socrates's objections, three of the cardinal virtues are lurking: σοφία (from φρόνιμοι), ἀνδρεία (from ἀνδρεῖοι), and σωφροσύνη (in the notion of self-mastery, which comes next [491D4-E1]). Such an insight, even if itself the product of hypertrophic hermeneutics of a neoplatonist, is entirely lost on Callicles, but also is made unavailable to the reader of Plato in Cope's translation.
- 1317 εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι (C4): For the idiom cf. ἀπαλλάξεις σαντὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων, *H.Maj.* 291B8; ἵνα ὄτι τάχιστα περὶ αὐτῶν λέγων ἀπαλλάττομαι, *Leg.* 800E6-7; ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὄμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, *Rep.* 357A1, εὐ ἐποίησάς με μάλα συγνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, *Th.* 185E5-6 – and ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας (Socrates to Polus), 470C7; and (with Dodds) E. *Cycl.* 600. ἀπαλλάττω is always positive, in the sense of being relieved of and even escaping (as at *Crat.* 425D7) something bothersome or burdensome or unadvisable, and therefore here insinuates that Callicles could relieve himself of the trouble of waffling and equivocating by delivering himself of a more direct statement of his views (which indeed he will: *παρησιαζόμενος*, E7). There is irony in the fact that his extensive evasions have required him to talk so long, where he had advised Socrates to relieve himself of staying with philosophy too long (485D2): clearly there are different ways to spend or waste time in logos. Socrates's ἀπαλλάγηθι of course indicates he believes Callicles has been holding something back, but Callicles's reply denies this suggestion.
- 1318 βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους (C5): Thus Socrates presents the *definiendum* (though for Callicles above, the *definiendum* was only οἱ κρείττους [A7-8]), and he expresses it here with a single article and τε καί, as he did above at C1, though in the interim he presented the two adjectives in reverse order, gave each an article and linked them with plain καί. He heard, and repeats, Callicles's rather affected use of εἰς (rather than bare accusative) at B1.
- 1319 ἀλλ' εἰρηκά γε (C6), with perfect tense, expresses even more impatience than ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω, above (A7). Callicles attempts to answer what ἀνδρεῖος means by restating the connection he made above between the φρόνησις to make good policy and the strength and resolve to carry it out, which he had called ἀνδρεία (A8-B4): his insouciance in using one article to cover both adjectives reveals he does not understand or care to understand that the very premise of the question he is answering is (for Socrates) that ἀνδρεία is a ἕτερόν τι from φρόνησις (C2-3). With τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων he avoids the problems his last assertion (τῶν φουλοτέρων) incurred (490A8: cf. n. 1279) – and yet it is exactly this that Socrates next probes. Note that in what he thinks is the completeness of his answer he has, unbeknownst to himself, (1) alluded to three of the four cardinal virtues; and (2) has used the genitive of superiority (τῶν πόλεων [D1] governed by ἄρχειν) alongside a genitive of comparison (τῶν ἄλλων, D2, governed by πλεον), before capping off the sentence with a genitive (ἀρχομένων) that resembles the former (because of ἄρχοντας) as well as the latter (because of the appositive parallelism).
- 1320 Reading δαί (D4) with T *teste* Cantarin (τί δὲ mss. and edd. : τί δέ; Stallb.) emphasizing a feigned surprise that ushers in a sequel of misunderstandings. The reading and attribution of the next lines has been argued over by many with no definitive resolution. It is enough to say that Socrates means to surprise Callicles by showing him his blind spot about ruling and being ruled (evinced and betokened by his ambiguous genitives). In the end what Socrates means to say becomes clear, after one or two questions, so that it is unnecessary to continue speculating on the text and attribution.
- 1321 Reading αὐτῶν (D4) with BTE and edd. (αὐτῶν WYPF Olymp.[λ]). On the face of it, the genitive should be a genitive of comparison (so, Chambry Allen Canto), as continuing the previous two, but might just be a genitive of rule (so Ast tr.[1819]: *quid? se ipsos intelligis regentes? sim.* Heindorf and edd.: cf. n. 1319); but it is unlikely a genitive of the sphere, with Zeyl Waterfield Nichols, (on which cf. 496E7 and n. 1469 *infra*). I attribute the ensuing words (see next n.) to Callicles, asking which of these Socrates intends; but however we choose to decipher the passage (cf. the review of Stallb. *ad loc.*, pp.225-7 and Kratz's *Anhang ad loc.*, pp.164-5), it is clear that Socrates has arrested Callicles's attention with an indecipherable question. As we have seen (nn. 1192, 918), Socrates often makes an intentionally obscure remark to buy time to introduce a new line of questions or a new way to approach the problem at hand: cf. 495E6-9, 498C6-8, *Lach.* 185B6-C4, 191E9-12; *Leg.* 668D1-3ff, 686C7-7A1; *Lys.* 217C4-D1, 218D9-10; *Phdrs.* 270A1-B10; *Prot.* 311B5; *Rep.* 341D10-E1, 352E1-3A11, 377A1-8, 380D1-7, 382A1-B5, 392C6-10, 412E5-9, 422A8-B2, 507C6-8 – not uncommonly with a perversely abbreviated (as here), or riddling, or sing-song question (and 447D1 [ὄστις ἐστίν], 486D9 [touchstone]; *Euthyph.* 10A2-4 [which always causes Plato's readers a double-take as does the παρήχησις at *Rep.* 375A2-3: γενναῖου σκύλακος / νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς; cf. my n. *ad loc.*], *Rep.* 459A1-5 [Glaucon's birds]). Compare also the Stranger at *Leg.* 646B, 686C7-7E9, 776B5-C5; and Diotima at *Symp.* 202B10-C2.
- 1322 I read τί ἢ τί (D4) from TWPF and the *schol. vet.*, with Heindorf and Theiler (the latter with mss. attributing it to Socrates [τί ἄρχων; τί ἀρχόμενος *interpretans*] followed by Piettre), but I attribute it to Callicles, with E3 Olymp. and the *schol. vet.*, followed by Heindorf Zeyl and Cantarin (τί ἢ τί VatEZb, *leg.* Beck *Calliclii att.* : τί ἢ τί B : τί; ἢ τί *coni.* Burnet *Socrati trib.*, *legg.* Croiset Apelt Zimmermann Helmbold Irwin Canto[*ut vid.*] Heidbüchel Erler : ἢ τί Stephanus [*Socrati trib.*], *legg.* Routh Kratz Mistriotis Schmelzer Allen : *secl.* Sauppe, *legg.* Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Hirschig Schanz Lodge Stender Lamb Hamilton Dalfen : ἦτοι [*Socrati trib.*] Findeisen : τί οἶα Hermann,

ΣΩ. ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;<sup>1323</sup>

ΚΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. ἓνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα<sup>1324</sup> ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ,<sup>1325</sup>  
αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς “ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα” λέγεις;

ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ποικίλον<sup>1326</sup> ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σῶφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν  
ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν [e] ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ<sup>1327</sup> τοὺς ἡλιθίους<sup>1328</sup> λέγεις τοὺς σῶφρονας. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;<sup>1329</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη<sup>1330</sup> ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο<sup>1331</sup> λέγω.

*Socrati trib., leg. Feix* : Τῆ τί *coni.* Wilamowitz [*Callicli trib. PS, 2.375*], *legg.* Dodds Waterfield[*ut vid.*] Nichols). In my reading, τί δαί; αὐτῶν is already one of Socrates’s intentionally obscure surprise questions and so uncertainty is inevitable. The schol. explains τί ἢ τί as Callicles asking Socrates to clarify his meaning by drawing a distinction. Burnet reports that Olymp. read ὅτι, but only by an inference from Olymp.’s exegesis, to wit: ὁ τοῖνον Καλλικλῆς οὐ νοεῖ τί αὐτῷ λέγει, ἀλλὰ φησιν, ὅτι ἢ τοῦτο ἀντί του λέγεις [D4]; πάλιν φησίν, ὅτι δεῖ ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν ἢ οὐ [= D4-5, ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους], καὶ πάλιν οὐ νοεῖ· εἶτα πάλιν ἐρωτᾷ [= D6] (138.17-19 ed. Norvin, where Norvin’s app. reports ἢ τί as a variant from Plato for the ἢ he reads from the mss. of Olymp. and compares Stallb. Burnet). The exegesis suggests that Olympiodorus read: Soc.– τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὃ ἐταίρε (with the lemma, or αὐτῶν) || Call.– ὅτι; πῶς λέγεις; || Soc.– ἓνα ἕκαστον λέγω ...

- 1323 I read ἄρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους (D4) with TWF, *legg.* edd. (ἀρχομένους B [ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀρχομένους *in marg.* rec. b, *apud* Burnet: cf. Schanz *Nov. Comm.* 165] : *secl.* Woolsey Cope Thompson Hirschig Schanz Lodge Lamb Hamilton : ἄρχοντας *coni.* Sauppe), and with edd. I attribute these words to Socrates (*pace* Beck Stallb. *Callicli tribuens*). But again it is indifferent: all will become clear presently. Erler spells out the ἢ τί question thus: *Beherrschen sie die Emotion oder werden sie von ihr beherrscht?*
- 1324 λέγω ... ἄρχοντα (D7): He is speaking of them as individuals ruling themselves (ἄρχοντα – a predicate but not a predication); he is not asserting that “every man is his own ruler” (ἄρχειν or ὅτι ἄρχει), *pace* Schleiermacher, Cary, Jowett, Helmbold Allen Canto Nichols Piettre Dalfen Erler. It is about this conception, not the truth of an assertion or a proposition, that Callicles next asks, employing again the construction with participle, and Socrates again replies with descriptive participles, not finite statements (D10-E1). For the construction cf. 490A1.
- 1325 τοῦτο ... οὐδὲν δεῖ (D7-8): For this construction with δεῖ (an acc.-inf. represented by neuter accusative τοῦτο rather than τούτου as genitive of lack) Stallb. compares *Th.* 184A8; *Ar. Eccl.* 298, *Ran.* 1368; and Dodds adds D. 10.15, E. *Suppl.* 594.
- 1326 ποικίλον (D10): Considering the uses of the verb ποικίλλειν at *Symp.* 218C1 or *Leg.* 863E6 (cf. X. *Mem.* 2.3.10), οὐδὲν ποικίλον might be not only a promise of clarity (as at *Crat.* 393D6, *Phlb.* 53E4, *Tim.* 59C5) but also a denial of obscurantism (cf. *Meno* 75E4-5, *Symp.* 182B1): Callicles is playing dumb, as Socrates’s answer goes on to show.
- 1327 ἡδὺς εἶ (E2): The remark is idiomatic (cf. *Euthyd.* 300A6, *Rep.* 337D6; and γλυκύς, *H.Maj.* 288B8) Cf. ἡδέως, *H.Maj.* 300C4; ἡδύ, *Th.* 209E7; ὦ ἡδίστε, *Rep.* 348C7; *suavis* Terence *Phormio* 3.2.63.
- 1328 τοὺς ἡλιθίους (E2): Given the article with both adjectives Callicles appears to be asserting that Socrates is simply identifying the two groups (for the article used with both subject and predicate cf. 491B8-C1, 492C6-7, *Lach.* 195E1, *Leg.* 633E3-6, *Th.* 145D7-8 and n. 1500); but again, λέγειν is, for him, praising and blaming, and for this kind of speaking, subject and predicate positions merely alternate as conduits of invective (or praise): cf. the multiple articles at 483B4-6 and n. 1091. He is “saying” that those who are moderate are “imbeciles” for being such: ‘The ones you are calling moderate, I call imbeciles.’ (Schleiermacher: *Die einfältigen nennst du die Besonnenen*). Name-calling is not predication. His use of the article is a faulty usage, but not something to explain away (*pace* Stallb. Woolsey Kratz): it is bad thinking. Callicles’s meaning, as he finally must admit with parrhesia, is that only a benighted fool would live an ascetic life rather than go into the arena and secure the means to garner the power to satisfy his desires.
- 1329 I read the οὐ with γάρ (E3), which is present in all mss. and Steph. (Serranus however tr. *Egónē? Nemo est qui ...*), but I attribute the words πῶς γάρ οὐ to Callicles (with the Aldine and the Basileensis *only*, *testibus* Routh Cantarín, *leg.* Bekker). Callicles wants to emphasize his surprising and deflating inference, and Socrates then (οὐδεὶς ...) rejects it as not only a complete misinterpretation but a perverse one as well, in which nobody who is trying to understand what he is saying would join. Routh was first to doubt οὐ (suggesting πῶς γάρ; οὐδεὶς ...), and it was subsequently omitted by Ast(1819) Schleiermacher and edd. Stallbaum was first both to maintain the attribution to Socrates and to read the οὐ (followed by Sauppe Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Schanz Mistriotis Lodge Stender Apelt Allen), arguing that just as Socrates had said above that his meaning was plain (οὐδὲν ποικίλον), he now asserts that nobody would understand him to be saying otherwise (*n.b.*, Stallb. and his followers conjecture οὐτῶ in place of οὐ τοῦτο, before λέγω). This requires Socrates to be saying the masses also think temperance is stupidity but it is only in Callicles’s sense of stupidity that they would think so. Heindorf despairs of any interpretation.
- 1330 οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη (E3): Socrates in saying this is helping Callicles make his point, for it is only he that has the cheek to make the scandalizing claim (παρρησιαζόμενος, E7) that the moderate are foolish for being moderate – as if it were a self-enslavement. Socrates continues the theme at 505C3-4.
- 1331 Reading οὐ τοῦτο (E3) with PFWY Alexander (*in Top.* 158.6 and 530.7 Wallies), *legg.* edd. (οὐτῶ [sic] B Vat : οὐτῶ *legg.* Stallb. Cary Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Jowett Schanz Mistriotis Lodge Stender Apelt : τοῦτο *coni.* Sauppe, *leg.* Hirschig). The issue is whether Socrates is denying he thinks the temperate are fools, or affirming that his notion of self-rule refers to the temperate, whom *Callicles* identifies with fools. The latter interpretation requires an overtranslation of Callicles’s subsequent πάνυ γε σφόδρα (e.g., Jowett’s “Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools...”).

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα,<sup>1332</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπεὶ<sup>1333</sup> πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων<sup>1334</sup> ὄψων;<sup>1335</sup> ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' <sup>1336</sup> ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν<sup>1337</sup> παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον<sup>1338</sup> τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕαν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι<sup>1339</sup> καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, [492] ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν<sup>1340</sup> δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οἶμαι<sup>1341</sup> τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ

- 1332 Reading σφόδρα, ὃ Σώκρατες (E5) with BTW and edd. (τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες, σφόδρα F). The reading of F would likely go better if οὐ τοῦτο is read at E3, but its word order and rhythm are uninterestingly awkward. Heindorf suggested τοῦτο σφόδρα, ὃ Σώκρατες.
- 1333 ἐπεὶ (E5): The particle leaves it unclear whether Callicles is presenting his grounds or his motive for saying what he is saying: A willful person tends to confuse these alternatives (cf. nn. 435, 755, 834). With cynical enthusiasm he agrees that Socrates describes the opinion of the many.
- 1334 δουλεύων (E6): That “freedom” is tantamount to the highest good was presumed by Gorgias, at 452D5-E8. But there, as here, freedom is thought of as nothing but being the subject rather than the object of ἄρχειν (cf. 452D6-7 and n. *ad loc.*) – i.e., nothing but ruling others. Does he think that happiness *consists in* ruling others, or that not being ruled by them is a necessary *condition* of it? Is not-to-be the object of the verb enough? Is ruling as good as being-ruled (i.e., enslaved) is bad? We may compare (with Deuschle) the position of Meno that Socrates describes at 86D6-7: σὺ σαυτοῦ οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν ἵνα δὴ ἐλευθερός ᾖς.
- 1335 ὄψων (E6): Callicles countenances the notion of ruling *oneself* as a borderline idea (that one is ruled is of course bad but if one is at the same time ruler, perhaps that is better!), and it is this borderline possibility that he rejects, for he identifies (ἄρχεσθαι passive) with (δουλεύειν, active) using the emphatic indefinite in -ὄν to include even *oneself* among those to whom anybody of sense would resist being enslaved: he has focussed on Socrates' notion of a part of the self that is not ruling but being ruled – the ἑαυτοῦ of D11 (*pace* Heindorf Thompson Hirschig Jowett Helmbold Irwin, who take ὄψων to be neuter and understand him to mean “enslaved to anything,” thinking perhaps of Callicles's subsequent remark, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ καὶ ψόγον (492B7-8) – so also Buttman who glosses *vel homini vel rei* – but even in that remark the emphasis is upon the *men* who make the laws). Callicles, like Thrasymachus (*Rep.* 344A6-C4) and the orator championed by Gorgias at 452E4-8, measures himself only by his domination of others. Hence he immediately proves his point that strength is good merely by arguing that οἱ πολλοὶ are weak (492A3-C3).
- 1336 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ... καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον (E7): The topic is justice: why add καλὸν and why put it first? Because he *approves* of what he is about to call just by nature; and he calls it δίκαιον for the same reason. His dismissive ἀλλά is characteristic; τοῦτο is not τόδε: it points *backward*, through Socrates's present challenge about self-mastery to what he had been saying before, as being what Socrates has already heard, but this time he proffers the ripest and most naked expression with ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω. νῦν implies that his previous argumentation – his criticism of Socrates's “philosophy,” his fine distinction between φύσις and νόμος, and his brotherly advice from Euripides – was less than sincere. Dodds in his interlarded summary (291-2) again (cf. his p. 267 and my n. 1120) tries to find kinship between Callicles and Plato in a “rejection of bourgeois values” – perversely, I think. For instance, Plato's ideal rule is “above the law,” as he puts it, only in the sense that intelligence can adjust a fixed formula (Dodds cites *Polit.* 296DE, etc.), but Callicles is not “above the law,” as Dodds puts it, but instead abolishes law because he is a law unto himself.
- 1337 ἐγὼ σοι νῦν (E7): νῦν and the juxtaposed personal pronouns shift the register (cf. 522C5). Callicles now broaches a candid statement of his belief. Similarly, Gorgias was driven by dialectical scrutiny to break into an epideixis of his art (456A7ff) – and Polus by dialectic was forced into his portrayal of Archelaus (471A4ff). Compare also Thrasymachus's *epideixis* in *Republic* Bk.I (343B1ff), likewise coming after aporetic dialectical sparring. There are two kinds of logos: dialectical logos “smokes out” doxic, which only oratory can adequately express, and also reveals it for what it is. There is here no “escalation” of his position (Waterfield): he is merely filling it out by revealing what the power is good for (cf. n. 1345); and from all that we have heard from him there is no surprise that his goal is as selfish as can be. And a *fortiori* there is no “escalation by Plato,” either (Waterfield, with scholars): as for “Plato,” what he has left for *us* to question is why a self-described hedonist would treasure the envy of others!
- 1338 τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον (E8): The term ὀρθόν is called into service by the parrhesiast when the usual value terms like καλὸν and ἀγαθόν seem too flaccid for his brave and bold notions. Cf. *Leg.* 890A8. The rhetoric is similar to Callicles's much-loved use of ἱκανός, which he again uses just below.
- 1339 εἶαν ὡς μεγίσταις εἶναι (492A1): Given εἶναι rather than γίγνεσθαι (*vel sim.*) this cannot mean to allow them to grow but only to be as large as they can be – i.e., to do nothing to reduce them. Callicles is contradicting the partisans of temperance who see virtue in keeping desires under control; and his subsequent words, to minister to the desires no matter how large they are, continues his gainsaying of those partisans, for they would advocate – in their own terms – *mastering* the desires rather than *being enslaved to* them (δουλεύειν), which Callicles now dresses up with ὑπηρετεῖν (which regularly denotes voluntary service to something one admires). His contentious motive is then continued by his assertion that their temperance is merely a front for their inability to “afford” them (a second immoralist “projection” that betrays their own sense of ἀκρασία as if it were the moralist who was ἄκρατος: e.g., *Rep.* 358E6; 359A7, B1-3). The immoralist often betrays the emptiness of his own position by revealing that it relies for its own self-understanding on the reality of what it denies or by projecting its own weakness onto its opposite – a reliance that verges on hypocrisy and recalls Jesus's puzzle whether Satan can throw out Satan.
- 1340 ὑπηρετεῖν (A1): The oxymoronic irony of playing the brave servant to one's desires of course broaches the very servitude Callicles thinks any man of sense would evade (as Kratz noticed; Dalfen blames it on Plato, calling it *eine feine sprachlich Bosheit Platons*: he fails to see it as Callicles's oxymoron). Croiset's and Chambry's *donner satisfaction*, like Hamilton's “satisfy,” translates the irony out; Canto's *assouvir* is better and Piettre's *mettre son intelligence et son courage a leur service* is best. Callicles uses the metaphor oxymoronically because he wishes cheekily to avow and exalt his personal pleasure, even above himself. This avowal is his parrhesia (491E7), but at the same time it leaves him a slave. By ἀνδρεία he means only insolence; by φρόνησις only force of mind (despite the respectable meanings he gave this pair of virtues just a moment ago: 491B1-2); still, we must not translate out the terms but leave his abuse of language on the surface – which in any case he will himself spell out, below.
- 1341 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι (A3): Again his jerking transition, unconsciously repeated from 491E6. οἶμαι is interjected (*sc. ἐστὶ, not εἶναι*), again in false diffidence. Callicles wishes to scandalize the many, to reduce them to envy – or champion in his own imagination the man who has more than they, which is just the other side of the coin. This is why it is important to notice his singulars and plurals, as at 484C2-3 (cf. n. 1134). In the original version they were inferior to the superior; in this case we learn that when it comes down to it, they are *unable* to serve Callicles's superior

δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην,<sup>1342</sup> ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ<sup>1343</sup> φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν<sup>1344</sup> ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρως ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην [b] καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.<sup>1345</sup> ἐπεὶ ὅσοις<sup>1346</sup> ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν<sup>1347</sup> ἡ βασιλέων ὑέσιν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῆ φύσει ἰκανοὺς<sup>1348</sup> ἐκπορίσασθαι<sup>1349</sup> ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν,<sup>1350</sup> τί<sup>1351</sup> τῆ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον<sup>1352</sup> εἶη σωφροσύνης καὶ

(ἀδυναμία, A5).

- 1342 (ψέγειν) δι' αἰσχύνην (A4): Callicles's enallage is slovenly for the sake of parallelism with δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν above and (ἐπαινεῖν) διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν below (διὰ + genitive would have been appropriate). It is not because they are ashamed that they condemn the strong man but because they envy him; their condemnation is meant to hide what they admire him for having and are ashamed of not having, themselves. Routh's attempt to improve upon the expression by punctuating before δι' αἰσχύνην (tr. *verecundiā impotentiam suam occultantes*), followed in this only by Heindorf Coraes Ast, thwarts Callicles's agenda.
- 1343 καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ (A5): δὴ, "and accordingly," indicates that their term instantiates their motive.
- 1344 ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν (A6) points forward to δουλούμενοι. Again Callicles hurtles ahead of himself in referring back to a rhetorical high-point in his initial statement of his position. Up until now he has depicted his previous assertions with bare relative or demonstrative only; the addition of ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν here indicates he is referring not just to a thesis but part of an extended presentation – namely, 483B4-C8 within his large speech (482C4-486D1).
- 1345 (ἐπαινεῖν) διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν (B1) is strictly parallel to (ψέγειν) δι' αἰσχύνην (A4), at the same time that it is the converse of δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν (A1-2), and therefore it is an oxymoron, following up the two-edged irony in their notion of shame. For Callicles's unconscious slovenliness of expression, compare the three genitives at 491D1-3 (and nn. 1319, 2267). What enables them to praise moderation is their store of unmanliness. Likewise it was by shaming (δι' αἰσχύνην, A4) that they condemned the naturally noble. He adds justice here (and below, B5) because he is consciously confessing that his present parrhesiastic argument was what underlay his less candid original one at 483A8-C8, where justice and injustice happened to be the topic.
- 1346 Read ὅσοις (B2) from F Steph.(γρ.), *legg.* Burnet Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler (θεοῖς BTPF : τοῖς θεοῖς T2 : δὲ οἷς W : γε οἷς f Yb2SEstL<sup>margin</sup>, *legg.* edd. : θ' οἷς Γ : οἷς γε *coni.* Heindorf). It is a good example of F coming to the rescue. Again Callicles's ἐπεὶ leaves unclear whether he presents his grounds or his motive (cf. 491E5 above) – he leaves us only the choice to listen or not. In the alternative of ἐκπορίζεσθαι Jahn sees an allusion to the story of Archelaus (470Dff).
- 1347 ὑπῆρξεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (B2): By the *figura etymologica* he now wants to depict this thing he has been praising with the labels of manliness, strength, nobility, freedom, goodness, virtue (and which his parrhesia is finally revealing to be nothing but an ability continuously to sate one's runaway desires) as a natural endowment, a "fact of nature." The verb goes with both categories of men (with Apelt Canto Nichols Piettre Erler, *pace* Deuschle followed by Lodge, taking it only with the heirs: τὴν φύσιν [for which cf. φύσιν ἰκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, 484A2] added to the second set of men only insists that their ability is as much in their nature as were the genes of the first ones), and it denotes something deeper than luck (*pace* Deuschle and Apelt). We are in the amoral chthonic mud Glaucón imagines when he quotes Aeschylus *Sept.*593-4 at *Rep.*362A8-B1:  
 βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,  
 ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλάσταιει βουλεύματα.
- 1348 ἰκανοὺς (B3) again (cf. n. 1120). He shifts from the dative required by the leading verb ὑπῆρξεν (rather than accusative with dependent εἶναι), to an accusative agreeing, more locally, with the second infinitive though it also is dependent upon ὑπῆρξεν. Woolsey compares 510E7-8 and S. *El.*962; see also (with Jahn) *Charm.*173B5-6, *Symp.*176D3-4; A. *Pr.*216-8.
- 1349 ἐκπορίζεσθαι (B3) imitates its use above at the expense of another awkward stretch of diction. To supply fulfillment to desires is hardly analogous to acquiring power (for oneself, understood).
- 1350 ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν (B3): The items are in the relation A, a<sup>1</sup>, a<sup>2</sup>: a general term embracing two specifics, which here correspond chiasmatically to the two kinds of men who inherit power by nature or achieve it by nature. For the form cf. 457D6; *Leg.*803E1-2, 933A2-3; *Meno* 75C8-9; *Phdo.*85E3-4; *Phlb.*17E4-5; *Polit.*262D3-4; *Rep.*411C3-4, 431B9-C3; *Soph.*260C8-9; and nn. 339, 958; the characterization of the first with τινά announces the epegetical form (cf. *Leg.*808D2-4, 933A2-3; *Lys.*216C7; *Rep.*459E5-6).
- 1351 Between δυναστεῖαν and τῆ ἀληθείᾳ (B4) BTPF read nothing and leave αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶη either a subject without predicate or predicate without subject. Some mss. provide the interrogative τί as subject, before τῆ (ZaYb<sup>2</sup>E2<sup>margin</sup>Lob<sup>margin</sup> and the early editions *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Stephanus Heindorf Beck Routh Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Hermann Sauppe Woolsey Jahn Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Sauppe Stender Zimmermann Feix *AGPS*[54.3.12A]), and it must be read. Some editors also supply ἄν there also, at the suggestion of Woolsey and (so printed by Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Erler), who suspected an original τί ἄν had been affected by the final letters of preceding δυναστεῖαν. Coraes was first to suggest adding ἄν after κάκιον, defended by Sauppe and Kratz with a paleographic argument about preceding κάκιον in uncials (Kratz, *Anhang*,165) and followed by Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Huit Stender Croiset Zimmermann. I follow Hermann Woolsey Thompson Feix in accepting the absence of ἄν from the mss. and, read only τί (Woolsey citing S. *Ant.*605). There are other exx. of the omission of ἄν in tragedy (cf. Jebb *ad Antig.*605, *ad Phil.*895, and *ad OC* 1418, and his App.C on *OC* 70; Sidgwick's App.1 to A. *Choephoroi* 80-81; Fraenkel *ad A. Ag.*620). As to the common objection that there are no good exx. of the omission in prose, A.Matthiae (*Gr.Gr.* §514.5) cites T. 1.50.1 (καταδύσειαν), 3.84.1 (δράσειαν); X. *Cyrop.* 3.2.1 (τεχνίσιαι), *Hiero* 11.13 (ἔχοις, v.l.); and Riddell (§66) cites *Euthyd.*299A1, *Leg.*777C6, *Phdo.*88C6 as optatives without ἄν "expressing simple possibility." See also Adam's list of the Platonic cases *ad Rep.*437B1, where the mss. are unanimous: *Alc.*1 132B5; *Phdo.*71C1, 109E3; *Euthyd.*291E6; *Rep.*516E4. Still, the persistent absence of ἄν with opt. in prose is a subject of controversy and subject to emendation in most of the alleged instances, as is the question of its omission with optative in direct questions – deemed doubtful by Dodds (*ad loc.*): cf. Thompson on *Meno* 97C (p.251). Compare comments of Stallb. *ad Lach.*190C1; *AGPS* goes uncharacteristically far in defending whole classes of such absence of ἄν against emendation (54.3.10-13 = 1.688-94). As to the sense of the passage, after adducing an empirical and historical claim with the aorist indicative, his question in the optative downgrades itself to mere guesswork: it would have been hard sledding after all for him to prove that temperance or justice in any ruler you could name had been a shameful and evil thing.



δικαιοσύνης<sup>1353</sup> τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο<sup>1354</sup> τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον;<sup>1355</sup> ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες [c] εἶψαν<sup>1356</sup> ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης,<sup>1357</sup> μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες<sup>1358</sup> ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν,<sup>1359</sup> ᾧ δ' ἔχει· τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία,<sup>1360</sup> ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχη, τοῦτ' <sup>1361</sup> ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία,<sup>1362</sup> τὰ δὲ

Alternatively, can it be that τί ... εἶη represents imperfect indicative τί ... ἦν drawn into optative by the aoristic frame of ὑπῆρξεν, stressing the point of view of the powerful men of history: “what was more shameful, in the eyes of those who reached the pinnacle of power, than...?” – with such a construction then repeated in οἷς ἐξὸν (sc. ἦν) ... ἐπαγάγοιντο?

1352 αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον (B4): Another insouciant pairing of epideictic axiological labels (cf. 491E7).

1353 Reading καὶ δικαιοσύνης (B5) from F, *legg.* Schleiermacher Burnet Lamb Helmbold Dodds Theiler Irwin Allen Canto Zeyl Dalfen Cantarin Erlar (*om.* BTP, *legg.* Bekker[*sine noto*] and edd.). Canto defends both nouns being cited by referring to their pairing in an extraneous passage from Rep. (438E-41D), but the real reason is that Callicles is continuing to reveal that his present argument, focussing on σωφροσύνη, was what truly underlay his original one about justice: cf. n. 1345. The parrhesia consists entirely in his confession that his only value is serving his own appetites: the rest of it he has said before.

1354 ἐπαγάγοιντο (B7): Does the optative represent the protasis for the apodosis τί ἂν εἶη, expressed in relative clause with οἷς (οἷς ἐξὸν = εἰ οὐτοὶ οἷς ἐξεστὶ)? Cf. Rep.466A1-2 for a similar abbreviation (the optative there is due to virtual secondary sequence after ἐπέπληξεν).

1355 τὸν τῶν πολλῶν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον (B7-8), a redo of his list above (483B6-C1), with λόγον replacing ἔπαινον, the substitution of a disyllabic achieving sophistical pariosis (Heindorf, Stallb.; cf. Schleiermacher: *Gesetz, Geschwätz und Gericht*). The list is metabatic (n. 407): the law expresses their claim (φασιν, A5) that condemns (ψέγουσιν, A4) the strong. Schanz athetizes καὶ λόγον (*Spec. Crit.*39) though it is present in all mss. and in Olymp.

1356 Reading εἶψαν (B8-C1) with all mss., *legg.* edd. (εἶεν *coni.* Hirschig, *legg.* Thompson Schanz Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Zimmermann Erlar). The longer forms of the optative of εἶναι are not unexampled in the best mss. of Plato. It is another name-calling utterance (on ἄθλιος see n. 1246, *infra*) – the perfect denoting a final and irreversible judgment consisting of nothing but blame, even though it is the majority's preoccupation with praise and blame that he has just condemned!

1357 Reading (C1) τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης with the mss. and edd. (τ. κ. τ. τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης F : τ. κ. τ. τῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης Φ : τούτου *pro* τοῦ *alterum coni.* D.Hissink [*Animadvers. crit. in Plat.* {Deventer1845}] and Richards, *legg.* Dodds Nichols). Once again Callicles subordinates the dialectical topic to his own purpose of praise and blame (cf. τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, above: 491E7). His provocative assertion (gratuitously softened by the emendation of Hissink and Richards, with τούτου derogatory) that nothing would be more ugly or evil than justice and temperance in such people (B4-5), now becomes an ironical and gratuitously snide assertion of the opposite, that justice and temperance are beautiful (καλόν, justified by αἴσχιον but standing for both negative adjectives). Even a positive term, once it is entirely detached from its true meaning, can become a slur in the mouth of a competent (ικανός) name-caller: *pulchra ista iustitia* (Ast); *dies schöne Gerechtigkeit und Besonnenheit* (Schleiermacher). Jahn, *ad loc.*, nobly recognizes that with this remark Callicles attains the heights Polus reached at 471A9 (θαυμασιῶς ὡς ἀθλιώτατος) and C2-3 (οὐκ ἐβουλήθη...) to which I would add B6-7: καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενέσθαι ... The inversion of value terms is also on a par with the inversion of the role of oratory with which Socrates concluded his debate with Polus (480B-481B), as this same Callicles noted (481C3-4). Jowett defangs Callicles's bite with “the reputation of justice and temperance,” and Irwin with “what virtue and justice call fine,” as if the two were subjective genitives, which the Greek cannot support without at least hinting at a verb. Cope Hamilton Canto Pietre translate τοῦ καλοῦ as if Callicles were referring to *Socrates's* opinion (“the ‘fairness’ as you call it,” “your fine righteousness...,” *ta fameuse beauté* Pietre), and though it is psychologically accurate for Callicles to blame Socrates for believing what he thinks he cannot believe on his own, and even more accurate to add with Pietre, *fameuse* (as if the world and Socrates were against him!), Socrates hasn't said this. Instead he is presuming we will compare his own opinion about τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλόν, which he announced at the beginning of this ῥῆσις (491E6-8ff.). Moreover, the personification, with ὑπὸ + gen., of a substantivized adjective denoting a personal attitude or quality is a striking reach.

1358 καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες (C3): The criticism is exactly the same as that voiced by Thrasymachus at Rep.343D6-E6 (though with μηδὲν πλέον directed primarily at the ideology of isonomia): not only that they should forgo to steal for themselves, but also they would suffer opprobrium for failing to steal for their friends. It is another commonplace of the immoralist's hypocrisy (cf. n. 1339) to minimize his immoralism by attributing the same to others. The indignantly confident καὶ ταῦτα is echoed by Adeimantus at the beginning of Rep. Bk.IV (419A3). On the syntax of καὶ ταῦτα cf. n. 2222.

1359 ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν (C4): Here we learn, only in the repetition from 482E4 of his taunt against Socrates and indirectly of course, that for Callicles individual acts and isolable facts, regardless of their description, constitute truth.

1360 τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία (C4-5): “Luxury, licentiousness, and liberty” (*sic* Lamb and Helmbold, alliterating). Jahn *ad loc.* recognizes that with the first two items of the list Callicles reveals the scope of his depraved understanding of the high and almost sacred value of ἐλευθερία. That he is an Athenian saying this, is the index of his ἀθλοιστής, in the Socratic sense at least. As for ἐπικουρία, it again registers the service required by the pursuit of pleasure (ὑπηρετεῖν, A2). Originally there were two elements: φρόνησις to formulate the policy goals and ἀνδρεία serving to pull it off in a civic setting (491B1-4). But by now these collapse into the wits and guts to pursue pleasure shamelessly (A1-2). But we might ask, who is the servant? Cope again spells out Callicles's meaning (“freedom to do as you please”) and loses the punch and paradox.

1361 τοῦτ' (C5): Cope and others “help” Callicles by translating τοῦτο as a plural (“these”). Callicles uses the singular not because he is referring only to ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχη (*pace* Woolsey: the stipulation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for what Callicles admires: cf. 491E8-492A3, 491C6-7, 491B1-4 and prev. n.) but because he sees those three things as one, just as he sees the subsequent pair – virtue and happiness – as one (whence τε καί). As to the number, singular or plural, it is not predication but identification he has in mind (indeed nothing he says is a predication: for him there are no reals that are the subjects, though his use of language indicates to us what they are or should be); and in the sequel comes all the rest, a plurality by default, which he will exclude no matter how it is styled; there also, the two definite articles defy distinguishing subject from predicate, for the same reason (cf. n. 1328, *supra*).



ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν<sup>1363</sup> τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων<sup>1364</sup>  
φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξία. [d]

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε,<sup>1365</sup> ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχη<sup>1366</sup> τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος·  
σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται<sup>1367</sup> μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.  
δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἴνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πῶς  
βιωτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ  
εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας<sup>1368</sup> πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἄλλοθεν<sup>1369</sup> γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν,  
καὶ [e] τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν;

ΚΑΛ. φημί ταῦτα ἐγώ.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται<sup>1370</sup> οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι.

1362 ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία (C5-6), after τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, is an echo of sophistic homoioteleuta, in which the assertion is corroborated by the fact that it rhymes. Apparently, in chiasm, the ἀρετὴ is the ability to fulfill and the εὐδαιμονία is the event of fulfilling. By dubbing the life of pleasure ἀρετὴ, Callicles does not indicate that he is a “hedonist” – a person who believes pleasure is good or the good – but only that he is addicted to pleasure.

1363 Reading ἐστὶν (C6) with mss. and edd. (ἄρα *coni.* Schanz : *del.* Deuschle). The articles with the two “predicate-appositives” (τὰ κ. and τὰ π. – *pace* Stallb., who deletes the first τὰ, and *pace* Heindorf deleting the second) treat them as notoriously despicable phenomena (ταῦτα *derogans*: cf. n. 721), and the anarthrous φλυαρία cancels them with a blanket dismissal. Callicles has achieved a rhetorical climax, as Socrates notices in his response. To illustrate Callicles’s total unconcern to distinguish subject and predicate we may compare a similar sentiment as more correctly presented by Euripides (*Cycl.*316-17):

ὁ πλοῦτος, ἀνθρώπισκε, τοῖς σοφοῖς θεός·  
τὰ δ' ἄλλα κόμποι καὶ λόγων εὐμορφία.

1364 ἀνθρώπων (C7): Place comma before it (with Heindorf Beck Routh Ast Coraes Bekker Stallb. Cary Woolsey Cope Thompson Hirschig Jowett) rather than after it (with edd.). The list of appositives lead to a climax achieved by the prolepsis of ἀνθρώπων (left out by Chambry). Perhaps Callicles said ἀξία (sic Tf *teste* Cantarin), not ἀξία (with BWPF), making καὶ illative, and that is what I read. Compare *leere Geschwätz der Leute und nichts werth* (Schleiermacher) and *nugae hominum ac nihili* (Ast).

1365 οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε (D1): The litotes accords a certain nobility to Callicles’s brutal frankness (“there is noble freedom in your way of approaching the argument,” Jowett), akin to the nobility of the inborn φύσις he attributed to “men of *this* sort,” above (B5), for now the true substance of Callicles’s position has shown forth naked and bold, and dispositive scrutiny becomes possible.

1366 ἐπεξέρχη (D1) means to “attack” not merely to “develop” (Lamb Dodds), “carry through” (Irwin), *exposer* (Canto), or “forge ahead” (Nichols): thus *Ausfall machen*, Schleiermacher. Allen’s legal metaphor (“you prosecute your case”) is good for importing *aggressive* thinking as is Dalfen’s *losgehen auf die Sache* (“let loose”). Socrates’s ensuing statement in γὰρ requires us to take τῷ λόγῳ as the object of ἐπεξερχεσθαι, for which compare ἐπιχειρῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ at 495C1 (*pace* Jahn Ovink Croiset Feix; and *pace* Kratz who takes it as absolute, citing Hdt. 3.54 and T. 1.62, with λόγῳ instrumental; and *pace* Thompson citing *Leg.*672A7, ἐπεξέλθοι λέγων): it is not Socrates that Callicles is attacking (*pace* Deuschle-Cron), nor the position of hoi polloi, but their joint treatment of the question (Helmbold’s “tackle the argument” is correct). For a close parallel compare the remark of Adeimantus that no one has adequately chased down the argument that justice is good for the soul and injustice bad on the level of essence (ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡς..., *Rep.*366E8), i.e., that conventional authorities have merely relied on considerations of expedience and public opprobrium. Here, Callicles’s aggressive parrhesia (cf. n. 1337) has likewise stripped away the veneer under which “the others” (D2: i.e., everyone other than himself) hide their true thoughts, and now, Socrates says, it has become incumbent upon him to pursue the underlying question that his stripping away of the veneer has brought to light: How we are to live? For Socrates’s insistence on the heightened incumbency of his interlocutor to continue, compare his remarks at 500B5-C8, and what he says to Thrasymachus, who upon polishing off his similarly parrhesiastic speech stands up to walk away like the bathman who has just poured the rinsing pail on his bather (*Rep.*344D6-E3).

1367 διανοοῦνται (D3): Socrates corrects Callicles’s νοεῖν, 483A1: cf. n. *ad loc.*

1368 With ἐῶντα ... αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας (D6-7), Socrates though quoting Callicles omits the verbal complement of εἶναι, which for him had been εἶναι (A1, on which cf. n. 1339 above).

1369 Reading ἄλλοθεν (D7) with BTWf, *legg.* Routh (“*aliunde alicunde*”), Beck, Ast (“*undecumque*”) – (ἀμόθεν F, *leg.* Heindorf : ἀμόθεν *coni.* Bekker, *legg.* Coraes and edd.), which emphasizes that he will derive the resources to slake his own appetites from those around him: compare emphatic πανταχόθεν in a similar context, at *Rep.*574A3. Either way, Allen’s “in any way” and Canto’s *par tous les moyens* and Waterfield’s “whatever it takes” are not spatial enough (setting up spatial παροῦσιν below, 493C6). Though the corruption of ἄλλοθεν into ἀμόθεν (and vice-versa) is very easy (ΛΛ~Μ) the sense with ἄλλοθεν is better: I daresay if ἀμόθεν had been transmitted these same editors would replace it with ἄλλοθεν: the expressions are equally indefinite. The failure of parallelism from μὲν to δέ, noted and forgiven by Stallb. Woolsey Kratz and *AGPS* 56.18.0.E (from verbal οὐ κολαστέον to infinitive ἐτοιμάζειν) has the positive function of indicating that *only* the μὲν clause describes πῶς βιωτέον (D5), the choice one must make, which implies that the “virtue” of ἐτοιμάζειν (δέ) is merely a condition of fulfilling that choice. τοῦτο, referring to ἐτοιμάζειν only, quotes Callicles’s blunt τοῦτο above (C5). ἐτοιμάζειν, ‘working at fulfilling,’ is conative (compare πειθεῖν after ποιητέον, at *Crito* 51B9-C1) – even though it may be true that for Callicles ἀκολασία in itself is a virtue since σωφροσύνη is a vice, it will be the prohibitive difficulty and indeed impossibility of performing this task that Callicles’s subsequent images will choose to illustrate.

1370 λέγονται (E3): The assertion is made by Soc. at X. *Mem.*1.6.10. Perhaps λέγονται here refers more generally to the attitude and lifestyle of a Diogenes but the sentiment became proverbial. With δεῖσθαι Socrates is skating on thin ice, for although Callicles would say the desires *deserve* to be fulfilled and that the desiring man *wants* to fulfill them, it would ruin his image to say that the desiring man *needs* to fulfill them. The semantic range of δεῖσθαι covers both, but in Socrates’s allusion to the ἀπάρκης it surely means *need*, not want, whereas in Callicles’s subsequent riposte about the rock or the corpse he has surely taken it to mean *want*.

ΚΑΛ. οἱ λίθοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἦσαν.<sup>1371</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινός<sup>1372</sup> ὁ βίος. οὐ γὰρ τι<sup>1373</sup> θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων<sup>1374</sup>—

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,  
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; ...

[493] καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως<sup>1375</sup> τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ<sup>1376</sup> του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὄν οἶον ἀναπειθεσθαι<sup>1377</sup> καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα<sup>1378</sup> τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ, ἴσως Σικελὸς τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων<sup>1379</sup> τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικόν<sup>1380</sup> ὠνόμασε<sup>1381</sup> πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμύητους, [b] τῶν δ' ἀμύητων<sup>1382</sup> τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ αἰ ἐπιθυμῖαι εἰσὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον

1371 At E5-6, I conjecture ἂν ... ἦσαν (ἂν ... εἰσὶν BTP : ἂν εἶεν F, *legg.* edd. [Ast “*erunt*” *vertens*!] : δὴ ... εἰσὶν *coni.* Schanz [Nov.Comm.51], *leg.* Lodge) as a paleographically easier correction of the best attested reading, but also for giving better sense. Callicles is not merely musing over the conceivable implication of Socrates’s premise, but denying that premise by adducing the consequence as something unreal and false. οὕτως then = εἰ οὕτως εἶχε.

1372 δεινός (E7): Socrates, remarking Callicles’s metaphorical use of death, now objects that if Callicles is correct, life itself is not what we think it is – the very charge Callicles had initially brought against *him* (481C3-4). If the temperate man is dead among the living, Callicles’s hero might be living among the dead, in the “life” fabled of Hades. Badham’s conjecture ὄν for unanimously attested ὡς at E7 (BTWF Stob., *legg.* Thompson Dodds Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Cantarin) is surely an improvement and receives early support from the paraphrase of Iamblichus (*Prot.*84.6-7 Pistelli: ὁρθῶς λέγονται ... ὡς τῶν ἀπεράντους ἐχόντων τὰς ἐπιθυμίας δεινός ὁ βίος), though Stob. quotes ὡς.

1373 Reading τι (E8) with BTPYV and Iamblichus (τοι F Stob. *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd.).

1374 λέγων (E9): Euripides frag.639, *TGF* (Nauck):

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,  
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται.

Socrates quotes only the first four words of the second line and punctuates them with a question mark.

1375 τῷ ὄντι ἴσως (493A1): Against Cobet’s athetization of ἴσως, though present in all mss., as inconsistent with τῷ ὄντι (*Mnem.*3[1875]137), ἴσως acknowledges the poet is unauthoritative, whereas τῷ ὄντι takes the assertion seriously (cf. *schol. vet. ad loc.*).

1376 Reading ἤδη γάρ (A1) with F Iamblichus (*Protr.*84.9) Stob.(4.53.36 = Wachsmuth 5.1109.25), *legg.* Burnet Dodds Theiler Irwin Canto Waterfield Dalfen Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler (ἤδη BTP, *legg.* Sauppe Schanz Lodge Stender Lamb : ὅπερ ἤδη Y and the early editions, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Beck Coraes Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Croiset Chambry : ἡ δὴ *coni.* Hermann and Badham, *legg.* Thompson Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schmelzer Feix). ἤδη expresses the simultaneity and therefore independence of the wise men’s tale from Euripides, the other “source”; and connective γάρ is “programmatically” (cf. 449C9, 469D1, 474B2, 503D6, 504C7) announcing he will launch into a narrative. It preempts the need that led the earlier critics to accept ὅπερ merely from Y as supplying the connection of a relative clause (on the idiom cf. Stallb. *ad loc.*), as well as Hermann’s paleographically conservative attempt to sacrifice ἤδη with ἡ δὴ in order to achieve an analogous syndesis.

1377 ἀναπειθεσθαι (A4), to be amenable to persuasion: for the sense cf. *Rep.*365E5. Cope’s “over-persuaded” (overcome by persuasion) is correct but obsolete English. The last soul that was tossed about ἄνω κάτω was of course Callicles’s, in service to his beloved demos (481D7-8); but now it appears that he loves the demos only because political “success” is the means to having the wherewithal to serve his mighty pleasures (492A1-2), and that these in turn will make him flip-flop not as a means to an end but as a final fate, an end “in itself.”

1378 καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα (A5): With the ἄρα of reported speech (as at B7 below: cf. Denniston 38-9), Socrates is continuing his report of what he heard: the wise man told him about the mythologizer, too.

1379 παράγων (A6), a semi-technical term for altering the spelling of a word, as used in the *Cratylus*: 398C8, 398D5, 400C9, 407C1, 416B8. Richards notices this is a second word-play, for soul, parallel to the word-play σώμα/σῆμα.

1380 Reading πιστικόν (A7) with BTP and Iamblichus and Stobaeus, *legg.* Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig (πειστικόν F, *legg.* edd.). The testimony for πιστικόν is superior but not dispositive; more controversial is the meaning of both the adjectives. With Fraenkel *ad A. Ag.*485 (2.241-2), I take them to depict a contrast. Indeed after πιθανόν, both πιστικόν and πειστικόν, if meant as synonyms, undermine and weaken the wordplay of πίθον, as Mr Morrissey notices. This place where the desires reside can both be trusted to desire (πιστικόν) but also to be fickle and variant (πιθανόν) as to what it desires. This is the sense of desire being reliably a beast, but unreliable for being a many-headed one (as e.g., *Rep.*588C7-10: θήριον ποίκιλον καὶ πολυκέφαλον ... καὶ δυνατόν μεταβάλλειν ...). By contrast, ἀπιστία in intelligence is a fault (C3: cf. n. 1389).

1381 ὠνόμασε (A7): This is the principal verb, though not the principal idea, of Socrates’s report of the Sicilian or Italian tale (A5-B3), which does all the rest with participles (μυθολογῶν, παράγων, ἀπεικασίας) and indirect discourse (εἶη, B2). μυθολογῶν characterizes the entire report as a fable; παράγων characterizes the fable as a symbolic parable; εἶη reports the principal assertion of the fable (optative after aorist ὠνόμασε), and ἀπεικασίας closes the report by interpreting the symbolic import of that assertion. Herodotus would perhaps have narrated this fable a different way – with λέξις εἰρομένη – but by choosing this ephrastic style, Socrates abruptly changes the pace of Callicles’s blustering stridency with something requiring reflection to understand and patience until the end, with its use of circumstantial participles maximizing the number of balls in the air and with the decentering “subordinate insubordination” (cf. nn. 340 and 746, *supra*) of ὠνόμασε. It is by accumulating this sort of cognitive substantiality that his parable might accrue meaning and force in the listener’s mind.

1382 Reading τῶν δὲ ἀμύητων (B1) BTPf, *legg.* edd. (τῶν δ' ἀνοήτων F Iamblichus Stob. Steph.(γρ.) Serranus(tr.), *legg.* Burnet Croiset Dodds Irwin Canto Waterman Pietre Cantarin : τῶν ἀμύητων *coni.* Madvig [*advers.*1.411], *leg.* Schanz : τῶν δὲ *coni.* Findeisen). Ficino translated with a pronoun (*Horum autem hanc animi partem*), allowing Findeisen to infer that he read neither, and thus to delete either word after τῶν δὲ; but even if τῶν

αὐτοῦ<sup>1383</sup> καὶ οὐ στεγανόν,<sup>1384</sup> ὡς τετρημένος εἶη πίθος διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τὸναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου—τὸ αἰδὲς δὴ λέγων—οὔτοι ἀθλιώτατοι εἶεν,<sup>1385</sup> οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ ἐτέρω τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ<sup>1386</sup> κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ [c] λέγων,<sup>1387</sup> τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι·<sup>1388</sup> τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι’ ἀπιστίαν<sup>1389</sup> τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ’ ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα,<sup>1390</sup> δηλοῖ μὴν<sup>1391</sup> ὃ ἐγὼ βούλομαι σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οἷός τε ᾧ,<sup>1392</sup> πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, καὶ<sup>1393</sup> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν<sup>1394</sup> ἰκανῶς<sup>1395</sup> καὶ ἐξαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον

could stand for τοῦτων, Ficino’s *horum* refers to the latter (ἀμύητους, which incidentally for Ficino is the *profanos atque damnatos!*), just as τοῦτων would have. Madvig, taking τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν as appositive to τοῦτο in B1 rather than as its predicate, construed τῶν ἀμύητων... ἀπεικάσας (B1-3) as an participial phrase explaining τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους (sc. ὠνόμασε) ἀμύητους; but conversely, the presence of δὲ in all mss. indicates the latter interpretation: it is epanaleptic, and the structure of the expression is “A ~ B; B (δέ) ~ C,” so that Ficino’s *horum* was a perfect stratagem.

Read ἀμύητων, but the real problem is with translating, as Schleiermacher complained in his note to παράγωγαν (‘mit dem Worte spielend’: *Freilich spielend, höchst mühselig aber für den Uebersetzer*, p.481): Socrates simply wants it both ways, as the ambiguity of μύω and the flat pairing of ἀκόλαστον ... καὶ οὐ στεγανόν (pairing idea and metaphor, on which cf. nn. 954, 1035) insist.

- 1383 Reading αὐτοῦ (B2) with mss. and edd., despite the objections of Heindorf (who replaces it with αὐτῆς and adds διὰ τὸ ἀκόλαστον, or saves it by supplying as theoretical antecedent τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), Sauppe (who also adds διὰ there but athetizes αὐτοῦ), Stender (simply deleting it, followed by Canto), and Dodds (adding συνεῖς before τὸ). The universally attested neuter *can* refer to ψυχῆς, for in the mythological mode the soul is a thing (though in a theoretical account its gender would surely be retained).
- 1384 With οὐ στεγανόν (B2) the mythologizer exploits still another word play, the etymology of μυέω = to close or shut (as of the eyes), which is the forgotten or dead metaphor underlying the notion of “being initiated.” The uninitiated are leaky.
- 1385 Reading ἀθλιώτατοι εἶεν (B5) from Stobaeus, *legg.* Hirschig Cobet Dodds Theiler Chambry Hamilton Irwin Nichols Dalfen Erler (ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν BTPf, *legg.* edd. [incl. Allen who tr. with future indicative, and Waterfield with “he produces evidence to suggest”]: ἀθλιώτατοι εἰσιν F Iamblichus). The potential optative, which would denote an inference of Socrates, is too weak to justify the admonitory interruption τὸναντίον ... σοί, and sits poorly with the subsequent reversion to the narrative with bare optative; the indicative of F is exempted from the former fault but even more guilty of the second. The adjective has both a sympathetic and a derisive or contemptuous use. In Socrates’s mouth it denotes the most hapless and badly off; here he is echoing the word but not the sense of Callicles’s use at 492B8. The ambivalence was a motif within Socrates’s conversation with Polus (469A5-B4; 471A1, A9, B7; 472D9, E5-6; 473D9): Polus’s story about Archelaus (471AD) refutes not that he was morally ruined (ἄθλιος<sup>Socrates</sup>) but that he was not a “loser” (ἄθλιος<sup>Polus</sup>).
- 1386 ἐτέρω τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ (B6): The introduction of a second perforated object (we presently learn it is likened to a sieve) begins to recrudescence the latent etymon of ἀμύητοι, which is the image we are given of the ἀνόητοι: yes, they are “uninitiated,” but they are also un-closed (from μύω). Their souls, as we are now told, are leaky – like a sieve.
- 1387 λέγει ... λέγων (B7-C1): As often in Plato’s dramas, a story is reported second- or even third-hand, pre-empting the auditor from deflecting its challenging message by impugning its authenticity (an evasion the very opposite of engaging in dialogue): thus he makes it as if it were a λόγος that spoke itself (cf. 523A1-2). Its only support will be the reminiscence it spurs in Callicles, and Plato’s reader.
- 1388 τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι (C1): The soul in itself now appears as a sieve that carries water to a place within itself. Though that place was likened to a storage jar, the jar and the sieve do not herewith take on the status of parts outside of parts, requiring soul to be both part and whole. Instead the tale now achieves its climax and goal by bringing the entity to which it has been addressed onto the stage: soul, which alone knew it could suffer from ἀνοησία and is now warned by the image of the sieve that the consequence of ἀνοησία is ἀπιστία and λήθη, which constitute loss of the ballast and contents of its identity.
- 1389 Reading ἀπιστίαν (C3) with the mss. and edd. (*pace* Schleiermacher who *coni.* ἀπληστίαν : Cobet athetized δ’ ... λήθην on his usual complaint of redundancy). This mindless soul does not trust, or it forgets, what it has seen. This stands in contrast with the δόξα of the appetites (A4): that they should find it as easy to fix upon their objects as to switch them out (cf. n. 1380) is not for Plato a paradox.
- 1390 ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα (C3-4), conceding (with μὲν) to use the term by which Polus categorically rejected Socrates’s theses about injustice and penalty (ἄτοπα, 480E1), but mitigating its force with the expressions ἐπεικῶς and ὑπὸ τι (with Krüger 42.5.1 it is a sort of tmesis for ὑπάτοπα τι; Riddell §131 compares ὑπὸ τι ἀσεβῆ, *Phdrs.*242D7). Hirschig following Cobet (*Mnem.*3[1875]138) brackets ἐπεικῶς.
- 1391 Reading δηλοῖ μὴν (C4) with T f Iamb. and edd. (δηλοῖ μὴν BP : δηλοῖ δὲ Wb<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarín): For μὴν rather than δὲ answering concessive μὲν with particular insistence: cf. Denniston, 335. There is a hiccup in the syntax, which disappears the moment it is noticed: ὃ at first appears to be the object of βούλομαι but then needs to be supplied with transitive ἐνδειξάμενος, which at that point becomes causal to βούλομαι and allows it to point forward to its infinitival object, πεῖσαι.
- 1392 ἐάν πως οἷός τε ᾧ (C4-5): Again the deferential “if you please” (here, “if I am able”) construction used in polite (persuasive) request: cf. n. 361.
- 1393 Reading καὶ ἀντί (C5) with V, *legg.* Heindorf Bekker Sommer Hirschig (ἀντί mss., *legg.* edd.).
- 1394 τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν (C6), in contrast with an ever-increasing number of remote (ἄλλοθεν, 492D7) objects needed so as to serve and supply ever-increasing desires (492A8, 492A1-3: I cannot agree with Schmelzer’s ingenious idea [110] that the ἀεὶ πάροντα are the “eternal things,” since ἀεὶ with article and participle is distributive [cf. 464D2 486A6-7]). Socrates is describing the state of a soul at peace with its surroundings, as depicted at *Rep.*399A5-C4 and 604B9-C3. Dodds astutely compares a phrase from Democritus 68B191: τοῖς παρεοῦσιν ἀσκέεσθαι, which on the whole conveys the sense that Socrates’s own remark is proverbial.
- 1395 ἰκανῶς (C7), the term Callicles used in a litotes of self-assured understatement, appropriated now by Socrates in its plain sense of approbation (492A1, 491B3, 485E1, 484A2, 483B6-C1; and cf. 486B6-C2 and D1), used lately of the man sufficient to feed the desires but now of the soul that “suffices” in itself, *without* desires.

ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον [d] πείθω τί σε καὶ μετατίθεσθαι<sup>1396</sup> εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων,<sup>1397</sup> ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα<sup>1398</sup> πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσῃ;

ΚΑΛ. τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον<sup>1399</sup> εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω<sup>1400</sup> ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου<sup>1401</sup> τῆ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδροῖν ἐκατέρω πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν καὶ τῷ μὲν [e] ἐτέρω ὑγιεῖς<sup>1402</sup> καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἴνου, ὁ δὲ μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ<sup>1403</sup> ἐκάστου τούτων εἶη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχетеύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τούτων<sup>1404</sup> ἠσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἐτέρω τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι εἶη,<sup>1405</sup> χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δὲ<sup>1406</sup> ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ [494] ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας·<sup>1407</sup> ἄρα τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου; πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω;

ΚΑΛ. οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν

1396 Reading μετατίθεσθαι (D1) with BTP, *legg.* Sauppe Deuschle Schanz Burnet Croiset Lamb Allen Cantarín Erler (μεταθέσαι F *teste* Cantarín : μετατίθεσαι E3Za and early editions, *legg.* edd.), bringing forward the infinitival construction from C5. καὶ envisions the factual outcome, as opposed to what Socrates had there been wanting to see (βούλομαι, *ibid.*).

1397 ἀκολάστων (D2) = “dissolute.” For Callicles the privative is approbatory but not for Socrates. If Callicles cares not about mere νόμος and talk, then we might as well give it the meaning it normally carries rather than try to find either a neutral or a positive translation.

1398 Reading Sauppe's swift emendation (*Epist. Crit.* 122[1841]) οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα (D2), *legg.* edd. (οὐδέν ἄλλα BTWFPPar : οὐδέν ἄλλ' ἂν καὶ P *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Routh Ast Bekker Coraes Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig : οὐδέν ἄλλὰ κἄν <sup>1398a</sup>). Burnet's and Dodds's apparatus fail to report the καὶ read in P.

1399 Reading ἀληθέστερον (D4) with BTP and edd. (ἀληθέστατον F Olymp.[λ]). Callicles's use of the perfect depersonalizes what for Socrates is a personal choice to be made by him: his answer takes on the form of a prediction rather than a confession.

1400 λέγω (D5): A deliberative subjunctive (with Sommer, *pace* Jowett), like ἐρωτῶ below at 494E2.

1401 ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου (D5-6): Only metaphorical: cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 527, and compare ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας, Plut. *Mor.* 710B, cf. “Longinus” 4.4. In fact, it is in the *sense* of Socrates' two images that they are related: the second draws an even more unattractive effect upon the soul, which follows from not being persuaded by the first, establishing thereby the grounds for dialectical investigation. The sameness has to do with the continuity of content, not some doxographic lineage; moreover to claim they are the same helps to apologize for their difference, for in this version Socrates enters more deeply into the self-delusion of Callicles's ἀκολασία.

1402 ὑγιεῖς (E1): The term often straddles between physical and moral meanings, as here (with perhaps its meaning at market – “sound goods” – coming to the fore, with Dodds): cf. likewise, σαθρός (479B8). Cf. nn. 957 and 1035.

1403 Reading καὶ χαλεπὰ (E2-3) with mss. and edd., against the excision of Morstadt (*Emend.z. Pl. Gorg.* [1866]5 – accepted by Theiler). Alongside σπάνια it is almost clear (that the streams flow rarely already suggests one faces the difficulty of knowing when to look for them – perhaps then “hard to find” with Irwin or “hard to come by” with Allen); in any case the sense is filled out by the ensuing exegesis (καὶ ... ἐκποριζόμενα). The notion is then repeated below without exegesis (E7). Morstadt guesses the first χαλεπὰ was an interpolated duplication of the second one, which then called for an editor to add καὶ before it.

1404 ἔνεκα τούτων (E5) = *quantum ad hoc attinet*, as at *Charm.* 158E4-5, *Rep.* 329B5, *Th.* 148D3, *al.* For ἠσυχίαν ἔχειν cf. *Crito* 48D5, *Prot.* 356E1.

1405 Reading εἶη after πορίζεσθαι (E7) from Iamblichus (*Protr.* 85.18 Pistelli) and F *testibus* Dodds Cantarín, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Dodds (*om.* BTW, *legg.* edd.).

1406 Reading ἀναγκάζοιτο δὲ (E9) from F *teste* Cantarín and Iambl., *legg.* Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Schmelzer Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Feix Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler (καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ZaYI<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Routh Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Sauppe Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistrionis : ἀναγκάζοιτο BTWP).

1407 ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας (494A1): ἢ = “or else” (*alioquin*), of the unattractive alternative (as at 501E11, 520B6; *Rep.* 490A2, 598E4; *Crat.* 426B2; *Lach.* 196E4; *Phdr.* 245D8, and my n. to *Rep.* 342B1) or as here of the *dire* alternative, not of the valid threat of the life-saving supplies being utterly depleted due to the difficulty of supply and leakage being maximal, but of the worry of the glutton stung by tyrannical eros that he might be deprived of it: hence the enervated tone and overstatement (ἐσχάτας λύπας being the correlate to Callicles's gluttonous ὡς μεγίστας, at 491E9), exactly parallel to the use at *Rep.* 574A3-4: ἢ μεγάλαις ὀδίσι τε καὶ ὀδύνας συνέχεσθαι.



[b] πληρωθῆ, <sup>1408</sup> μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν. <sup>1409</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέη, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπίον εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. χαραδρίου <sup>1410</sup> τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί <sup>1411</sup> μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [c]

ΣΩ. καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας <sup>1412</sup> ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα <sup>1413</sup> χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

1408 Reading πληρωθῆ (B1) *coni. Stallb., legg. Dodds Theiler Hamilton Allen Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Dalfen* (πληρώση BTPF, *legg. edd.* : πληρώσηται Y, *legg. Heindorf Beck Routh Coraes Croiset Canto*) on the paleographic grounds that it could easily be corrupted into πληρώση which, because awkwardly active, would then be corrected into πληρώσηται to match the voice of πληρωσαμένω. Allen Waterfield Nichols read the passive but replace the metaphor with its interpretation by making the man the subject and tr. “once he is satisfied” or “once he is filled up.” The rhetoric of the passive is that the ἀγγελία now become the subject, standing there full, across from the man who had “filled them up for himself” (ὁ πληρωσάμενος [A5] referring back to 493E4, described with a middle of self-interest) but who now feels nothing, neither pleasure (χαίροντα, of the inflow) nor pain (λυπούμενον). Callicles adds the latter to fill out the non-sensation of the rock with a polar doublet, but in doing so leaves it unclear whether the pain in question might be the difficulty of procuring the filling (ἐποχτετεύειν, 493E5), or the painful eventuality of being without pleasure (cannily overdrawn by Socrates above, with ἐσχάτας ... λύπας), unwittingly revealing his awareness that appetitive pain not only follows the cessation of pleasure (in the glutton’s view) but also precedes it, and that appetite is doomed to an endless Sisyphian reciprocation – as will soon be brought to light by the dialectic. The two participles (χαίροντα / λυπούμενον) could have been in the dative agreeing with the *comparandus* but yielded to the subject accusative in the infinitival description of the *comparans*, as elsewhere (cf. 492B2-3 and n.).

1409 ἐπιρρεῖν (B2): The sense is exactly that of Heraclitus (ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ, Diels-Kranz B12), one sensation flowing upon the last. Callicles’s notion of iterative stimulation is striking for its neurological accuracy.

1410 χαραδρίου (B6): I read it as a paroxytone (rather than the perispomenon of the mss.), and take it to be the diminutive of χαράδρα (cf. Strabo 16.4.13: Plato may well have coined the word here), an interpretation acknowledged by Olymp. (144.4-5) and rediscovered by Serranus *charadrii cuiusdam [id est barathri atque voraginis] vitam* (tr.) and Erasmus, who noticed the possibility of re-accentuation as I did (*Adages* 3688, *Socrates videtur sentire de voragine, in quam cum perpetuo decurrat aqua, numquam tamen expletur*), instead of being Ficinus’s strange *avis*, accepted by all edd. A χαραδριός is an infamously greedy bird; LSJ asserts s.v. that χαραδριοῦ βίον ζῆν is proverbial for a gluttonous life, citing this passage only (for a bit more evidence of the proverb, cf. *Corp. Paroem. Gr.* 1.462 [=Appendix 5.23] annot.); but the metaphor of a little fissure or gully in the rocks (standing in contrast to the metaphor of a rock at B7) is more pertinent to the context than a far-fetched and vague allusion to that bird. Cope Mistrionis Dalfen and Erler/Kobusch come close to the idea, by citing χαράδρα as the etymon of the bird’s name (since the bird “haunted the narrow rocky ravines which formed the beds of mountain torrents”), as does Irwin also, who translates with the coinage “torrent-bird;” and so does Allen taking it to be a curlew but (unprecedentedly) describing the bird as constantly straining water through its beak and ejecting it, which makes the χαραδριός a χαραδριον(!).

1411 καί (B7): Again the quasi-adversative use in heated repartee we have seen from Callicles: cf. 490A2,3 and nn. 1275, 1066. The question τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις indicates that Socrates is initiating dialectical scrutiny. His mention of πεινῆν shows that he did notice Callicles’s reference to pain (λυπούμενον, B1).

1412 ἀπάσας (C2): Socrates’s second example of desire (πίνειν) both suggests the whole category of desire but also recalls a third one that almost always fills out the exemplification with a triad, namely, τὰ φροδίσια (*Ep.* 7.326D2-3; *H. Maj.* 298E1; *Leg.* 782E1-3A4, 831D8-E2; *Phdo.* 64D3-6, 81B5-6; *Phdrs.* 238A6-C4; *Prot.* 353C6; *Rep.* 329A5-6, 389E1-2, 426A7-8, 436A11-B1). Callicles’s response in emphatic ἅπας rather than πᾶς (the word is absent from PW *teste* Cantarin and Ficino but read by edd.) not only implies that sexual desire is also included in his assertion and is perhaps what causes his excitement, but also gives Socrates dialectical warrant to look beyond the triad, as he will.

1413 Reading πληροῦντα (C3) with all mss., *legg. Ast Bekker Stallb. Sauppe Woolsey Thompson Sommer Huit Hirschig Burnet Heidbüchel Erler* (πληροῦν Stephanus [*explere* Ficinus] *legg. edd.*). The piling up of participles without syndesis, summarizing abruptly his parrhesiastic assertion at 491E8-492A3, suits Callicles’s imperious style at the expense of straining the bond between logic and syntax: the circumstantial participles must be supplied different modalities for his speaking to make sense. Stephanus “corrects” him by replacing πληροῦντα with πληροῦν; Cope “helps” him, again, at the cost of flaccid prolixity: “to have all the other desires and to be able by the enjoyment one feels in the satisfaction of them to lead a life of happiness,” saying in 26 words what Callicles said in 9. There are no “real Platonic parallels for the surprising accumulation of three asyndetic participles,” as Dodds complains, because there is nobody else quite like Callicles in Plato’s corpus of dramas. In fact, Socrates imitates his brash method in his next question (C6-7 – and again at 507E1-3).



ΣΩ. εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει<sup>1414</sup> γὰρ ὡσπερ ἦρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυνῆ.<sup>1415</sup>  
 δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ<sup>1416</sup> πρῶτον μὲν εἶπε εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ  
 κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνηῖσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον<sup>1417</sup>  
 εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. [d]

ΚΑΛ. ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος.<sup>1418</sup>

ΣΩ. τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίτικεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ  
 αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ.<sup>1419</sup>  
 ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. φημί τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἠδέως ἂν βιῶναι.<sup>1420</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ἠδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε. [e]

ΣΩ. πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶ<sup>1421</sup>—ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ;<sup>1422</sup> ὄρα, ὦ  
 Καλλίτικεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ,<sup>1423</sup> ἐάν τις σε τὰ ἐχόμενα<sup>1424</sup> τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ.

- 1414 διατέλει (C4): Cf. Callicles's reference to the "ability to carry their ideas through to the end" (ἱκανοὶ ὄντας ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, 491B3-4) embodies his notion of ἀνδρεία, which here means achieving satiation – 492A1-3, 492A7-8. ὡσπερ ἦρξω does not refer to what he has just said ("this is an excellent beginning," Waterfield), but to the boldness of his parrhesiastic speech, which began this phase of the discussion (at 491E5) – to which Socrates will again refer, below, as Callicles's πρώτους λόγους (495A7).
- 1415 With ἀπαισχυνῆ (C5) Socrates notes Callicles's willingness to include, and talk about, sexual desire, but his ἀπάσας had asked for more – and so Socrates himself hopes not to blanch (μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι).
- 1416 καὶ (C6): again Socrates lurches on to his next move. Cf. B7 above.
- 1417 διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον (C7-8): Socrates imitates Callicles's piling up of participles (C2-3), but not without varying the expression. δυνάμενον is redone with ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα, and for πληροῦντα (which had designated the achieving of what one desired by dint of his power to carry it through: originally ἐπιτελεῖν, of political initiatives [491B3], but then ἀποπιμπλάναι [492A2 = πλήρωσιν A8], of the appetites) he substitutes διατελεῖν (extending his joke from above, n. 1414, *supra*) but now adds τὸν βίον, giving that verb an entirely new meaning: Rather than achieving his goal to scratch, he is said to spend his (whole) life scratching.
- 1418 ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος (D1), reading ἀτεχνῶς with TW and edd. (ἀτέχνως B : ἀτεχνως P : ἄτεχνος F). The emphatic adverb reminds us that we have been here before. In response to Socrates's mention of scratching and to his joke on διατελεῖν, Callicles lodges what had been Polus's final charge against Socrates (ἀτοπία, 480E1), though in a different sense (with Dalfen, *er gehört nicht in einen Kreis feiner Leute*, 379), and then in addition reverts to his own opening charge against him (δημηγορία, 482C5: cf. n. 1059), as ἀτεχνῶς re-asserts. Olymp.(143.6-8) takes δημηγόρος to refer to Socrates's rudeness in mentioning scratching for pleasure, but it includes also the embarrassment Callicles is being forced into: the very fact that he reiterates his original charge against Socrates shows that he feels a blush coming on.
- 1419 ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἶ (D4): Socrates taunts Callicles to carry on the answering with the encomiastic term he himself had used to denote his strong man's carrying through with resolve to achieve his purpose (as the opposite of μαλακία ψυχῆς: 492B2-4): he is continuing his characterization of the new parrhesia of Callicles as being gutsy (492D1-2). The scholiast of course glosses ἀνδρεῖος with ἀναίδης.
- 1420 ἠδέως ἂν βιῶναι (D6): Note that εὐδαιμόνως has been substituted by ἠδέως and ζῆν by βιῶναι in what appears to be an evasion. Socrates is only interested in the first substitution, and immediately neutralizes it.
- 1421 Reading κνησιῶ (E1), conjectured by Bekker, *legg.* edd. (κνησιῶ mss., *leg.* Routh : κνησιῶ F : κνησιῶ *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Sauppe Schanz Lodge Stender Croiset : κνησιῶ *coni.* Coraes): The desiderative of κνάω is also an α-contract verb in all its known uses (as above, C7).
- 1422 ἐρωτῶ (E2) is a deliberative subjunctive, as also at 493D5. τί is enclitic, not interrogative, *pace* Irwin Zeyl Nichols. The question is not merely rhetorical (as Riddell takes it [§257] citing the throwaway question at *Apol.*20E1-2 as parallel): Socrates's admonition just above that Callicles not be ashamed to continue (D2-4) is not idle.
- 1423 Reading the future ἀποκρινεῖ (E2) with B, *legg.* Heindorf Ast Bekker Hermann Stallb. Jahn Kratz Schmelzer Schanz Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Feix (ἀποκρίναι T : ἀποκρινῆ P : ἀποκρίνη WF [*teste* Cantarin] Vind 1.6 [*teste* Ast 1832] : ἀποκρίνη V : ἀποκρινῆ E3ZaY *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler). A similar discrepancy among best mss. at 448A4: cf. n. 140 *ad loc.*
- 1424 Reading ἐχόμενα (E3) with the mss. and edd. (ἐπίμενα *coni.* Bekker : *del.* Schanz[*Nov. Comm.*91], *legg.* Lodge Croiset Theiler). ἐχόμενα and ἐπίμενα are regularly used to adduce epagogic parallels or the next thing in a series, the former taking the genitive of their genus (*Leg.*775D6-7, 811E1-4, 859E3-5; *Polit.*289A7; *Rep.*389E7; *Th.*145A8 [and, with Stallb. *ad loc.*, schol. *Ar. Plut.*195, Hdt. 1.120.3, Xen. *Oec.*6.1]), and the latter taking the dative for the cogeneric parallels or sequelae (*Phdr.*239D2; *Phlb.*34D8; *Rep.*406D5; *Th.*185D3; *Tim.*24C3, 30C2, 42B1). While the logical "connectedness" of ἐχεσθαι would require the genitive whereas logical "consecutivity" of ἐπεσθαι the dative, we have an exception at *Polit.*271B4 (ἐχόμενον BT : ἐπίμενον *coni.* Stallb.) so that Stallb. has insufficient warrant to emend that passage as well as to insist (with Deuschle-Cron and Huit) that ἐχόμενα here is absolute and the dative τούτοις is governed only by ἐφηξῆς. Schanz recognizes redundancy in the construction but fails to see that it is intentional, and so advocates deletion of one or the other. In the present case Socrates is making a pun, as Helmbold Chambry Allen see ("what if I ask you one after the other all the questions that logically follow?" – Chambry: *si l'on t'interrogeait sur tout ce qui rattache successivement...* – Allen "questioned about it all serially and in order"): the connectedness of the parts of the body will enable him to move ἐφηξῆς along the ἐχόμενα, with consecutive and therefore inexorable logic (provided by the dative τούτοις), from scratching the head down to the nether parts (κεφάλαιον is another pun) – and to make this pun work we need to tolerate the dative with ἐχόμενα, which

καὶ τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον,<sup>1425</sup> ὁ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος,<sup>1426</sup> οὗτος, οὐ<sup>1427</sup> δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄθλιος,<sup>1428</sup> ἢ τούτους<sup>1429</sup> τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται,<sup>1430</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων,<sup>1431</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους;

ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα,<sup>1432</sup> ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῆ ἀνέδην<sup>1433</sup> οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, [495] εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζεται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποια ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί,<sup>1434</sup> ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν<sup>1435</sup> λέγε πότερον φῆς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν,<sup>1436</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἴνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος<sup>1437</sup> ἦ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

after all is present in all mss.

- 1425 Reading κεφάλαιον (E4) with FYb and edd. (κεφαλαίων BTWP), an appositive adjectival noun without article (*pace* Buttman who added τὸ, followed by Woolsey Jahn Kratz Sauppe Dodds Theiler) because it is predicative, unusual only for its proleptic position. Appositives can be more attributive (cf. English “that” clauses) or more predicative (cf. English “which” clauses); cf. Matth. *Gr.Gr.* §433. For such anarthrous appositives cf. 507E3, Hdt. 3.80.6.
- 1426 ὁ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος (E4): This entire passage (from 494A6 to this point), provides physiological proof that κιναιδός, a word that occurs only here in extant classical literature apart from its use as a slur in Aeschines (1.181; 2.151; 3.167), denotes a male addicted to the pleasure of anal sex, for only the passive recipient is physiologically able to enjoy a continual onslaught (ἐπιρρεῖν, B2) of frictions. Socrates’s use of periphrasis moreover characterizes a proclivity for this pleasure as a feature that dominates such a person’s daily life; and his use of the plural indicates that the general public has a clear enough concept of such a life that they can group such persons together. We need no more to understand Callicles’s reaction.
- 1427 οὗτος, οὐ (E4): οὗτος derogatory (cf. n. 721) qualifying βίος: for this pleasure the blustering Callicles becomes the devoted servant (cf. n. 1802). Place the comma after, with Routh Coraes Sommer (location before was introduced by Hermann, and followed by edd. – whereas Heindorf Ast Mistriotis Bekker do not punctuate).
- 1428 δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄθλιος (E5): Socrates now borrows from Callicles the rhetoric of the striding and climactic triad in καὶ (cf. n. 1093): “beyond the pale in shame and utterly destitute.”
- 1429 Reading τούτους (E5) with the mss. and edd. (καὶ τούτους ZaY *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Schleiermacher Coraes Ast Bekker Hirschig Jowett Allen Waterfield). Socrates is focussing upon Callicles’s assertion that not only pleasure but happiness ensues from debauchery (cf. D6-7 and n. 1420).
- 1430 ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται (E6): What had been a proviso that one must have the courage or “sufficiency” to achieve his political initiatives 491B2-3, now devolves into adopting a special sexual technique so as to be able to receive a continual flow of the pleasure that is his highest desire and need.
- 1431 εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων (E7): Now Callicles is thrown back into himself, bringing Polus’s opening charge (461C1-2, C3-4), which he also had brought against Socrates at the start of this section (482E3-4), and again using the bluffingly self-evidentiary τοιαῦτα, which is no more articulate than οὗτος, the other second-person demonstrative both of them have been reduced to using (467B1, 489B7).
- 1432 For ἐνταῦθα (E9) instead of ἐνθάδε of motion toward, Stallb. cites *Th.* 187B2; H. *Od.* 16.204, X. *Cyrop.* 1.4.16, 7.1.34; *Anab.* 1.10.13; and of “mental motion,” as here, *Apol.* 36C4, *Alc.* 1 134D7, *Menex.* 248C6, *Rep.* 517C8.
- 1433 Reading ἀνέδην (E10) with BTW<sup>2</sup>Za *teste* Cantarin, and edd. The alternative reading ἀναίδην, though attested by both ms. families (PWF Steph., *leg.* Routh) is condemned by LSJ (*s.v.*) as a misspelling of ἀνέδην, from ἀνίημι (the adverb for ἀναιδῆς being ἀναιδῶς). And yet LSJ *s.v.* ἀνέδην (“freely, recklessly”) proposes a second, logical sense (“without more ado, simply, absolutely”) on the basis of this passage, where recklessness or even shamelessness is a notion not at all out of place! οὕτω with ἀνέδην = “as you so recklessly do” (cf. n. 1658). Socrates is referring to Callicles’s boast of parrhesia at 491E7 culminating in his naked and boundless advocacy for neurological stimulation, stripped even of its usual veneer as a critique of νόμος (A6-C3), in response to Socrates’s two patient and soulful attempts to move his conscience with the images of the leaky pots (492E7-494A5), and then in particular to Callicles’s gratuitous generalization with ἀπασας and the string of participles at C2-3 (cf. n. 1412), to which his generalization ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν directly responds. This is why he addresses him at this moment as γενναῖος (E9; cf. 492D1).
- 1434 Reading ὅποια ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί (495A1-2) with PF, *legg.* edd. (ὅποια αἰ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί BT, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Sommer : ὅποια αἰ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ αἰ κακαί W): He is asking to characterize which are good or bad, not to characterize the good and bad ones.
- 1435 ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν (A2): Socrates first blamed his ugly line of questioning on “that man (ἐκεῖνος) who so vociferously promotes that ugly thesis” – though it is the thesis of Callicles – and now with ἀλλά turns away from that man to tell Callicles there is still time to separate *himself* from that position. For the collocation used to similar effect compare, with Cron, *Crito* 44B6.
- 1436 εἶναι τι ... ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν (A3-4): Socrates now gives him something much weaker to agree to than the previous challenge to draw a line between good ones and bad ones. Here no generalized qualitative line needs be drawn (ὁπᾶια) between good and bad (ἀγαθαὶ / κακαί): only one instance needs be cited, and it needs only be a not good thing.
- 1437 Reading μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος (A5) with BTP and edd. (μὴ ὁμολογούμενος F Olymp.[λ : “γρ. καὶ ἀνομολογούμενος καὶ μὴ ὁμολογούμενος” 144.14]), taking ἀνομολογούμενος in the negative sense of inconsistency (ἀν- privative: cf. Arist. *An.Pr.* 48A21). Olymp. interprets both possible senses (Callicles either maintains the identity only to be consistent with himself [with ἀνομολογούμενος in the positive sense: ἀνα-], or maintains it only because it disagrees with Socrates [μὴ ὁμολογούμενος]). μοι favors the former. There is great dramatic irony in the fact that unbeknownst to himself he repeats the language with which Polus capitulated to Socrates at 480E1-2 (ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται).

ΣΩ. διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,<sup>1438</sup> καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ’ ἐμοῦ ἰκανῶς<sup>1439</sup> τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. [b]

ΚΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ σύ,<sup>1440</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὗτ’ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ.<sup>1441</sup> ἀλλ’, ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει<sup>1442</sup> μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως<sup>1443</sup> χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ<sup>1444</sup> καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.

ΚΑΛ. ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζη;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [c]

1438 τοὺς πρώτους λόγους (A7): The article is possessive. With Dodds, Socrates refers to the manner and the thesis with which Callicles initiated the present phase of the conversation, his parrhesiastic identification of ἡδὺ and ἀγαθόν (491E5-492C8), for which Socrates praised him a moment ago (ἦρξω, 494C4: cf. n. 1414), as digging down through the level of what people say to what they think. Whichever way we take ἀνομολογοῦμενος, Callicles renders moot an elenchus of his thesis, for an elenchus is directed not to the λεγόμενον but the προαίρεσις as Olymp. says at 145.2-4. The scholiast (followed by most edd. and trr.) says Socrates is referring to Callicles’s criticism of Polus and Gorgias ἐν οἷς ἐμέμπετο Γοργίαν καὶ Πῶλον ὡς παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα αὐτοῖς δι’ αἰσχρόνιν ἀποκρινόμενος, αὐτὸς δ’ ἐπηγγέλλετο παρρησιαζόμενος ἐρεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, but whereas his criticism of Polus and Gorgias was indeed presented at the very beginning of his conversation with Socrates (which is the scholiast’s understanding of πρώτους, i.e., 482CE, followed by Canto), the ἐπάγγελμα for parrhesia was made only recently, at 491E7 (indeed νῦν announces he is there changing his tune). Moreover, in here sticking with the parrhesiastic position he is not shrinking from a shameful advocacy at the expense of being refuted, but persevering in the shameful thesis in order to avoid being refuted. See next note.

1439 ἰκανῶς (A8), here again turned back upon Callicles: cf. 493C7 and n. By ἰκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις Socrates is comparing Callicles’s penetrating through (ἐπεξέρχεσθαι, 492D1) the self-serving talk of οἱ ἄλλοι so as to reach the real underlying questions (which he here characterizes approbatively as ἐξετάζειν τὰ ὄντα), with his taking refuge at present behind mere consistency rather than continuing with the adventure of searching for truth, characterizing Callicles’s taking refuge with διαφθείρεις τοὺς πρώτους λόγους (cf. *schol. vet. ad loc.*). His charge that he must say what he believes (as opposed to παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σεαυτῷ, A9) shows how far we have come from Callicles’s opening volley against Socrates for forcing men to say the contrary of what they really think (482E5-483A2).

1440 καὶ γὰρ σύ (B1) abruptly alleges that Socrates, too, is taking a position he does not truly believe (καί is the connective, not γάρ: cf. 467B5 and Denniston 109-110). Dodds refers us way back to 481B6 without comment, which is Callicles’s opening remark to Chaerephon impugning Socrates’s sincerity in what he had just argued about the purposes of oratory: but that reference is so remote it makes laughable an attempt to punch back with a quick retort, and besides Socrates had there roundly refuted that doubt with his speech on the loves. Instead, Callicles wonders whether Socrates’s true motive in bringing up the κίναδος was to shame him into agreeing, and whether he himself might be among the ἄλλοι who fear to speak as parrhesiastically as he (492D2-3, and cf. 494C5-6). This interpretation is confirmed below (B7) where Callicles echoes the present καὶ γὰρ σύ with ὡς σύ γε, referring to Socrates’s use of αἰνιχθέντα and αἰσχρόν in moral opprobrium at B3-4. In truth, of course, Socrates welcomed Callicles’s repudiation of public opinion as the very means by which their dialogue might penetrate to the level of underlying truth.

1441 οὔτε σύ (B3): Socrates retorts with pronominal abruptness to match Polus’s καὶ γὰρ σύ. See also B8 answering B7, there augmented with vocatives, tit for tat.

1442 ἄθρει (B3) admonishes the interlocutor to pay attention as opposed to mouthing assertions. It warns the interlocutor to “stop and think.” Cf. 497E1.

1443 πάντως (B4) refers back to Callicles’s voluntarily emphatic ἀπάσας at 494C2, which led him into his present difficulties: “at any price” (with Dodds Allen Canto) confuses the issue.

1444 Reading πολλὰ (B5) with the mss. and edd. (*delendum coni.* Sauppe [with καί = *sogar*], *leg.* Chambry : *κακά coni.* Hirschig, *leg.* Allen[tr. “disgusting and shameful”]). It is true that only one example of low behavior was adduced, but the case of the κίναδος was climactic: αἰνιχθέντα refers to the innovative interpretation of the κίναδος as the logically κεφάλαιον (494E4) maximization – though off-color – of Callicles’s desiderated ἐπιπρεῖν (494B2). Though the κίναδος is a single case, the plural threatens still more shameful things as if one needed more: hence the (predicative) expression πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, which is the usual formula for auxesis done by placing quantity and quality in tandem. A similarly immanent but vague broadening of the sense of prurient scratching is alluded to by ὅσα τοιαῦτα and by ταῦταις ἐπομένων at *Phlb.* 46A8 and B3, which is connected to a similar opprobrium (46B1) and is subsequently made to culminate in sexual orgasm (47A3-B7). Cf. Democritus 68B127. If this broadening is already alluded to by πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, then καὶ ἄλλὰ πολλὰ (which is not predicative to αἰνιχθέντα because of intervening συμβαίνοντα) suggests some further *category* of entailments beyond the (merely) embarrassing ones. Hamilton makes a hash of the Greek: “many shameful consequences besides those at which I have just hinted,” among other things conflating the two categories. The correct translation of course is Schleiermacher’s *denn dergleichen*.

ΣΩ. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ<sup>1445</sup> ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος;<sup>1446</sup>

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα.<sup>1447</sup>

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ,<sup>1448</sup> διελοῦ<sup>1449</sup> τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης;<sup>1450</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἔλεγον γάρ.

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον<sup>1451</sup> τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;

ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἠδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον; [d]

ΚΑΛ. ἕτερον δῆπου, ᾧ σοφώτατε σύ.<sup>1452</sup>

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐτέραν ἠδονῆς;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

- 1445 ἐπιχειρῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ (C1): Socrates brings forward the notion of ἐπεξεργεσθαι with a synonymous verb. The use of the aggressive verb with λόγῳ is the basis for the technical term ἐπιχείρημα denoting dialectical test and proof (Arist. *Top.*162A16). Again Socrates hopes to restore ἐξετάζειν and oust both moralistic shilly-shallying and unselfcritical parrhesia. We shall now see what serious investigation looks like. Jowett's "proceed with the argument" and Lamb's and Waterfield's "set about discussing," Apelt's *mit dem Satze verfahren*, Chambry's *discuter*, Allen's and Zeyl's "undertake the argument," Canto's *nous mettre à le discuter*, Dalfen's *das Thema angehen* and Erler's *untersuchen* are inadequately bland; instead, choose Helmbold's "attack the question" and Piettre's "*attaquons-nous à ce que tu dis.*"
- 1446 σπουδάζοντος (C1): In another reversal, Socrates now uses Callicles's opening wise-crack (σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει; 481B6-7), here not merely as a taunt but in a substantial connection (both this echo and the back-reference to ἐπεξεργεσθαι are lost by Croiset's *Il faut donc alors la discuter pour tout de bon*). We begin to see the same pattern as with Polus, whose rhetorical jabs were subsequently served back to him, one by one, in a way arising out of the argument itself.
- 1447 πάνυ γε σφόδρα (C2): By repeating this formula from the opening of his parrhesiastic speech (491E5), Callicles confirms that Socrates's ἐπιχειρῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ referred back to that passage.
- 1448 Reading οὕτω δοκεῖ (C3) with the mss. and edd. (σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ Ξ1 Steph. and the early editions, *legg.* Routh Coraes Hirschig Cope Jowett Zeyl Waterfield Dalfen). Translators should be careful not to add the personal reference in case they do not read σοι as for instance Lamb and Erler did. Without the pronoun it is a joint agreement (as in the expression ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ), which *mutatis mutandis* is essential to proper dialogue, continued by the formal and conciliatory conceit employed by both of them, soon below (D3-7).
- 1449 διελοῦ (C3) is not "resolve" (Thompson, Lamb), "determine" (Jowett Nichols), *répondre avec précision* (Croiset, Piettre), *genaue Auskunft geben* (Apelt), "clear up" (Helmbold), "solve" (Hamilton) or even "explain" (Woolsey, Cary, Chambry). *Explicare* however (which means more than explain) is adequate: cf. (Ast 1819), *distincte haec explica* (Heindorf), and even earlier *distingue* (Routh), *distinctius expone* (Stephanus) and now Cantarin *distinción*, with his note *ad loc.* (though Huit spoils the sense by subjectivizing: "*explique toi*"). Also adequate are Irwin's and Allen's and Zeyl's "distinguish," and Erler's *triff Unterscheidung*. Cf. Mistriotis: *πρόκειται περὶ χωρισμοῦ ἐννοιῶν*; and Dalfen *zu einer dihaeresis setzen* (382). With *διαρπεῖν* Socrates is announcing the kind of dialogical questioning that consists in reaching agreements about distinctions between things, a habit or method that underlay the use of the *διαλεκτική* and *διαλέγεσθαι* for the method of dihaeresis employed more explicitly in the later dialogues. Compare for instance the pattern of arguments this verb brings in at *Rep.*412B8; and cf. *διόρισον* (n.1239) and *διαρπεῖσθαι* at 500D1 (with n. 1551), referring back to this passage. The point is that we are finally moving to the *intension* of the approbatory terms (i.e., toward *logos*) rather than their extension (i.e., praise and blame): cf. nn. 1260, 1239, 1077, and cf. n. 556.
- 1450 ἀνδρείαν ... μετὰ ἐπιστήμης (C4-5): Cf. 492A1-2 and 491B2, for the ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις that according to Callicles enable the "naturally" good and just man to minister to his maximal desires. Socrates's μετὰ alludes to the combination Callicles desiderated without yet prejudging whether for him they are two ideationally separate things.
- 1451 ὡς ἕτερον (C6), not acc.abs. but a continuation of the acc. from C4-5, itself continued at C8. For the omission of ὄν even with acc.abs. (added against the mss. on the grounds it is there required, by Heindorf Bekker Ast Sauppe Hirschig Stender Feix, though its omission would easily be explained), Stallb. compares *H.Maj.*284D4; *Phlb.*57B9; *Prot.*323B1; *Rep.*358C3, 449C4. Mistriotis adds E. *Suppl.*299, T. 2.35.1, X. *Mem.*1.6.5. In all these cases what is to be kept in mind, as in the schoolboy's example ὡς φιλόν at X. *Anab.*1.1.2, is that the speaker uses ὡς to disown responsibility for the belief. It is the position of Callicles, the answerer, that Socrates is here pressed to describe: therefore not "since" they are different (Helmbold) but "thinking" they are different. Canto reverses the logic ("if two, then different"), which mistakes the method of dihaeresis.
- 1452 ᾧ σοφώτατε σύ (D1): He means to ridicule the question not as too easy to answer but as contemplating an absurdity: finding passages in other dialogues where pleasure and knowledge might be seen to have a special connection (with Dodds and Canto) would not change Callicles's answer. For such a vocative, done with adjective plus personal pronoun cf. n. 1713 and *H.Maj.*290D1-2 (ὧ σοφῆ σύ), *Euthyd.*303C4 (ὧ μακάριοι σφῶ); Ar. *Plut.*1069, ᾧ βδελυρῆ σύ. For σοφώτατε used ironically in an address cf. *Rep.*339E5. The present case, however, is different: there is special emphasis on σύ, for Callicles is echoing Socrates at 489C8 (ὧ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις).



ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ<sup>1453</sup> ἕτερον.

ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε<sup>1454</sup> ἡμῖν<sup>1455</sup> ὁ Ἄλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἦ ὁμολογεῖ; [e]

ΣΩ. οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ<sup>1456</sup> Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τούναντίον ἡγῆ πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δῆπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;<sup>1457</sup>

ΣΩ. οἶον περὶ ὅτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβῶν [496] σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλμία;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. οὐ δῆπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτούς;

ΚΑΛ. οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττεται; ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

ΚΑΛ. ἥκιστα γε.

ΣΩ. θαυμάσιον γὰρ [b] οἶμαι καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται·<sup>1458</sup> ἦ γάρ;

1453 Reading ἀγαθοῦ (D5) with mss. and edd. (ἡδέος *coni.* H.Schmidt [Beiträge {1874} 198-9, orig. argued in 1867], *leg.* Sauppe, unnecessarily): Socrates is simply incorporating into his remark Callicles's identification of pleasure with good (495A5).

1454 δέ γε (D6), again, of the minor premise (472E4, 473A2, B3 and 6, 475D4, 506E6f).

1455 ἡμῖν (D6): Callicles refers to himself and Socrates in the first person plural, in retort, as going one better than Socrates's use of the third person of him. It is not a "royal" we (the dative goes with ὁμολογεῖ *pace* Waterfield) but the we of dialogical partnership borrowed from the political motif above, continued in the identification of one's deme here. Meanwhile, of course, the position he is arguing is not really his own (A5-9).

1456 οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς (E1): *sc.* ὁμολογεῖ. Socrates goes Callicles one better, having "us" say he does not think what he thinks. θεάσῃται continues Socrates's appeal to objective insight as opposed to mere talk (B3), the feckless and futile migration from one approbatory term of praise to another, which has constituted Callicles's answers so far. It is not self-knowledge that Callicles needs (*pace* Dodds: *wenn er dass was er an sich selbst erfahren hat betrachtet* [Sauppe] is an overstatement) but a recognition of other things he believes and the fact that they contradict what he is now averring (compare 482B5-6, where Socrates likewise said οὐ σοὶ ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς) – in particular his assertions in the parrhesiastic speech that intelligence and courage are what makes his dream-man good, though the only goodness he acquires by them is pleasure (491E8-492A3). To hold the interlocutor responsible for the consistency of his own beliefs, even beliefs he does not know he has, is of a piece with the present language, as Dodds points out, citing *Alc. I* 113BC for Socrates's rather paradoxical assertion that the defeated party has really refuted himself.

1457 πῶς λέγεις (E10): It is presumably the last part of Socrates's question that Callicles finds unclear. It is paradoxical to speak of a "release" (ἀπαλλάττεται) from health, since ἀπαλλαγὴ is regularly positive (cf. 491C4 and n.) – but soon enough pain and pleasure will be found equal. His paradoxical diction enables Socrates to expatiate on the thought behind his question without abandoning or forfeiting the dialectical role of questioner. Cf. nn. 918, 1192, and contrast n. 1326.

1458 γίγνεται (496B1) in its dialectical sense (cf. n. 371) – hence the indicative, for it is an occurrence in thought, not a potential eventuality in the real world (*pace* Sauppe who emends to ἐγίγνετ' ἄν). Hence not *ce serait une absurdité* (Croiset, Chambry, Canto, Pietre), nor "would be" (Lamb), nor *wäre* (Apelt Dalfen Erler), but "it is an odd conclusion" (Dodds), or, better, "an absurd result" (Irwin).



ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει οἶμαι ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;<sup>1459</sup>

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτήτα;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὰναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει<sup>1460</sup> καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου;

ΚΑΛ. πάντως δήπου. [c]

ΣΩ. ἐὰν εὐρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν<sup>1461</sup> ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἢ δὴ ἢ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

ΚΑΛ. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢ δὴ λέγω.<sup>1462</sup> [d]

1459 Reading ἀπολλύει (B2) with BTPY, *legg. edd.* (ἀπολύει F, *legg.* Routh Beck : ἀπόλλυσι *coni.* Hirschig *legg.* Schanz Sauppe Stender Croiset Dodds Theiler : ἀπαλλάττεται Coraes). Coraes's reading (*sine noto*) perhaps due to Ficino's tr. *amittit*. It is a matter of preference for older or newer forms of ὄλλυμι, as Dodds says: the sense is unaffected.

1460 τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ... λαμβάνει (B5), literally, "taking on the goods and happiness" is an awkward expression, as is κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα ("evils and destitution"). These expressions plainly bring forward the original pair of opposites – εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν (495E2-3) – about which the intervening argument has asked whether their opposition is similar to that of the bodily examples (health and disease, strength and weakness, and swiftness and slowness). The first of these examples, health and disease, was described with intransitive verbs (ὕγιαίνει / νοσεῖ: 495E8-496A3), appropriately parallel with the intransitive verbal expression of the *investigandum* itself (εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν); but this first example as well as the subsequent ones presently come to be described with transitive verbs (ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, λαμβάνειν, ἀπολλύναι) taking abstract substantive complements (ὕγιαία, ἰσχὺς, τάχος). The return to the *investigandum* (εὖ and κακῶς πράττειν) now appropriately reformulates its intransitive expression with a transitive form (ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν λαμβάνειν) parallel with the intervening examples. In this reformulation the adverbs εὖ and κακῶς are replaced by their corresponding adjectives, ἀγαθὰ and κακά, used substantively (this much announces recursion to the *investigandum*). But "taking up (the) good things" is not the same as εὖ πράττειν: for that, Socrates needs to add καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν (as likewise he must add καὶ ἀθλιότητα for κακῶς πράττειν). It is for the sake of dialogical continuity that the expression is allowed to change; we needn't and mustn't foist upon Socrates an insinuation that happiness *results* from "taking up the good" and wretchedness "from taking up the bad."

1461 ἔμπροσθεν (C6) presupposes phases in their discussion, for it refers to a *previous* phase. With subsequent πεινῆν we immediately recognize that Socrates is pointing to 494B7ff. (and his asyndeton shows he is sure we will), where he initiated a dialectical scrutiny (with τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, *ibid.*: cf. n. 1411) a scrutiny that Callicles's excited answer (494C2-3) soon derailed. The *present* phase began at his second more careful and explicit attempt to introduce dialectic (495C1-3, culminating in διελοῦ: cf. n. 1449).

1462 Attribution of C8-D1 presents a problem complicated by variants in the mss., to-wit: καὶ ἐγὼ BTPF [*Socrati tribuens*] Bekker : ἐγὼ Ξ1Y : ἔγωγε [*Callici*] μανθάνω [*Socrati*] Ξ1<sup>2</sup> Ξ2 Steph. : *secl.* Ficinus [*ut vid.*], *leg.* Ast : λέγω post ἢ δὴ [*Callici*] *coni.* Stallb. *leg.* Burnet : καλῶ post ἢ δὴ *coni.* Badham [*Callici*]. Here are the attributions:

BTF (*legg.* Schleiermacher Bekker Hermann Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schmelzer Lodge Apelt Feix Dodds Canto Zeyl Waterfield Nichols):

Call. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢ δὴ.

Soc. καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ...

Ξ1 Ξ2 Steph. (*legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes):

Call. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε.

Soc. τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἢ δὴ;

Call. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ,<sup>1463</sup> ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρόν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ<sup>1464</sup> ἡδὺ φῆς εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὗ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα<sup>1465</sup> λυπούμενον δήπου ἐστίν; [e]

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσις<sup>1466</sup> τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονῆ;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. μάλιστα.<sup>1467</sup>

Soc. μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν...

Ficinus (*legg.* Ast Sauppe Woolsey Cope Thompson Sommer Hirschig Jowett Schanz Mistriotis Stender Croiset Helmbold Theiler Chambry Heidbüchel Cantarin):

Call. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.

Soc. μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν ...

*coni.* Stallb. (*legg.* Burnet Lamb Irwin Allen Dalfen Erler – and myself):

Call. ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ λέγω.

Soc. μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν ...

The problem with the majority reading (BTF) is that initial μανθάνω is a settled idiom, by which one announces insight (or lack thereof, with οὐ) into his interlocutor's unstated intention or meaning – cf. 447D3-6, 474C9 (and n. 842 *ad loc.*), 490D7 (with n. 1293); *Euthyph.*3B5, 9B6, 13D7; *Lach.*194D7; *Phdo.*117C1; *Phlb.*16A6; *Phdrs.*257A7, 263A5; *Rep.*332A11, 351B6, 372E2 [and my n. *ad loc.*], 382A10, 394B2, 402E2, 456D12, 511B1, 568E4, 592A10; *Soph.*221D3; *Ar. Av.*1451-63, 1529; *Lys.*1008; *Ran.*65, 195, 1444-5) – an insight he is announcing and vouchsafing to the other as if he were “teaching” him, so that καὶ ἐγώ, even with a stop added (“I agree; I get it”), leaves “I get it” nothing to refer to. The minority reading of Ξ1 Ξ2 and Steph. as well as the emendations solve this problem more or less brutally.

I accept the emendation of Stallbaum (with Burnet Lamb Irwin Allen Dalfen Erler), replacing καὶ ἐγώ with λέγω, according to the dramatic contours of the exchange: (1) In the mouth of Callicles, dismissive μέντοι (rather than δέ: cf. n. 794) characteristically glosses over the pain for the sake of stressing the pleasure it will occasion, which he then emphasizes with Stallbaum's λέγω, strictly unneeded; (2) it is this enthusiasm for pleasure, which had derailed the dialectic before and likewise threatens to do so now, that Socrates then acknowledges with the μανθάνω idiom (indeed it was to pre-empt just this that he already added αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν, above), which (3) is then followed appropriately with ἀλλ' οὖν (for which, after concession, cf. 506B7-8 and Denniston 444).

1463 ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ (D3): The two examples of eating and drinking are of course repeated from above (494B7-C1) but Socrates's deliberative subjunctive (ἐρωτῶ) as to whether he should go any further (ἔτι πλείω) also recalls what happened in that context: the dialectic was derailed by Callicles's excitement at the prospect of an omniversal gratification of pleasure (n.b. his ἀπάσας, 494C2), which led to Socrates's question about itching and scratching, and then whether he should continue all the way down (cf. ἢ ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ, 494E1-2). The back-reference is lost on Callicles but not on us (as also is Socrates's ironic echo of Callicles's ἀπάσας there, with unnecessarily emphatic ἅπασαν here) – another example of the special type of pregnant irony Plato has left us to notice all through this dialogue.

1464 Reading ἦ (D6) with mss. (*secl.* Bekker Hirschig Sauppe Theiler): cf. n. 1282.

1465 τὸ μὲν διψῶντα (D7): The neuter singular article isolates the very word, regardless of its gender, number, and case – as at *Soph.*252C2-4 and D. 18.88: τὸ δ' ἕμεις, ὅταν λέγω, τὴν πόλιν λέγω.

1466 Reading πλήρωσις (E1) with F and edd. (πλήρης BTP: πλήρη W).

1467 Attribution of E3-4 is also problematic, driven by whether we read γε φημι, present in almost all mss., *legg.* edd. (δέ φης B[*apud* Heindorf] Ficinus, *leg.* Coraes : γε φης Za Steph., *leg.* Routh : δέ *coni.* Ast[1819]). It is of course possible that several mss. simply failed to distinguish attributions after γε (δέ) and φημί (φης). Most edd. have preferred maximal distinctions, for short and cautious steps at this touchy point in the argument. Here again are the attributions laid out:

ΣΩ. διψῶντά γε.

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. αισθάνη οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον,<sup>1468</sup> ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγης; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ χρόνον<sup>1469</sup> εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ μοι<sup>1470</sup> διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.

Reading γε φημι and maximizing attributions, which I read, with edd.

Call. μάλιστα.  
Soc. διψῶντά γε;  
Call. φημί.  
Soc. λυπούμενον;  
Call. ναί.

Za Steph. (Routh):

Call. μάλιστα.  
Soc. διψῶντά γε φης λυπούμενον;  
Call. ναί.

BTWP (Heindorf Coraes):

Call. μάλιστα.  
Soc. διψῶντα δέ φης λυπούμενον;  
Call. ναί.

F:

Soc. μάλιστα· διψῶντα δέ φης λυπούμενον;  
Call. ναί.

Beck, Ast:

Call. μάλιστα.  
Soc. διψῶντα δέ λυπούμενον;  
Call. ναί.

1468 τὸ συμβαῖνον (E5): The inference Socrates makes is to replace the specific lack and correlated fulfillment, with the qualification that the lack is essentially painful and the fulfillment essentially pleasurable, which advances the description of the πάθος in question to the point of simultaneous contraries. Note that while making this point semantically he retains the ever-vague syntactical formulation of circumstantial participle with infinitive, first introduced at 494B8.

1469 Reading τρόπον καὶ χρόνον (E7) with BTWf, *legg.* edd. (τρόπον *post lacunam* F : καὶ χρόνον *secl.* Dodds : χρόνον καὶ τρόπον *coni.* Richards). With Sauppe (followed by Allen Canto Waterfield) the genitives ψυχῆς and σώματος go not with τρόπον nor with τρόπον καὶ χρόνον but are genitives of the sphere within which the assertion is being made, a use more commonly placed at the beginning of the sentence (Phdo. 78D10, Rep. 459B7), but also later (*Charm.* 165D6), as here (Stallb. would clinch this interpretation by adding *περί* after ψυχῆς). They are late because they are an afterthought, as the subsequent words explain; and they do delimit the meaning of τρόπον καὶ χρόνον (as Dodds desires) by requiring the event to be described as pertaining to the one or the other of body and soul. The question here broached explicitly, whether pleasure is bodily or psychic – which is disentangled, in *Rep.* Bk.IV by means of a highly rationalistic analysis through the principle of non-contradiction, which arouses the λογιστικόν of the soul, in Glaucon and in Plato's reader, to master the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν with its understanding – has been implicitly present since 494C2, in Callicles's reluctance or aversion to speak of pain without mentioning the pleasure its abatement occasions. Socrates's elaboration of his question, here, with the stipulations pertinent to the law of non-contradiction, point in the same direction as that taken in *Rep.* Bk.IV.

1470 Reading γάρ μοι (E8) with F (γάρ οἶμαι BTPf, *legg.* edd.). The first person pronoun is responding to second person βούλει: *ça n'a pas d'importance à mon avis* (Piettre).

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε<sup>1471</sup> πράττοντα κακῶς [497] πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον ἔφη<sup>1472</sup>  
εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. φημί γάρ.

ΣΩ. ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὠμολόγηκας.

ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον  
γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.<sup>1473</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζη, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζη,<sup>1474</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόθι γε ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ...

ΚΑΛ. ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς;<sup>1475</sup>

ΣΩ. ἴνα εἰδῆς<sup>1476</sup> ὡς σοφὸς [b] ὧν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα<sup>1477</sup> διψῶν τε ἕκαστος  
ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἅμα<sup>1478</sup> ἠδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.<sup>1479</sup>

1471 ἀλλὰ μὴν ... γε (E9) of the (simultaneous) minor premise.

1472 Reading ἔφη (497A1) with mss. and edd. (φήσ *coni.* Baiter, *legg.* edd.). Baiter challenged the form, preferring ἔφησθα (Hirschig following), and moreover wished to align the tense of the question with that of the answer. But ἔφησ does occur elsewhere: 466E6 (where again Baiter emended to φήσ), *Euthyd.*293C1 (in BTW), *H. Iliad* 22.280, *X. Cyrop.*4.1.23, *Aesch.* 2.86, *al. (pace Dodds)*. As to the matter of tense, the burden is on the emender to prove that the tense must be the same as that of the answer (cf., again, 466E6). In this case Callicles's Φημί γάρ in answer after the imperfect reflects his habit to treat whatever he says as something he will never need to change even while changing its meaning (cf. 489C2-3 [οὐ πάλοι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταυτὸν φημι εἶναι ...] and nn. 1259, 1231), whereas Socrates's question, keeping track of dialectical time, means to contrast the previous averral (in the imperfect) with the result of the intervening questions and answers (in the perfect). Similarly ἔλεγε at 496C7 (which Richards emends to the present, piggy-backing Baiter's emendation here).

1473 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (A4-5): Of course the argument depends upon εὖ again being the adverb of ἀγαθόν, as it was implicitly taken to be at 495E2-4 and 496B5-7, in comparison with D3-5 (cf. also n. 1460). Dialectical γίγνεται occurs again – as used also in geometrical proof.

1474 οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζη (A7): Socrates mirrors Callicles's wisecrack (οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζη), tolerating hiatus to make a rhyme in retort (strengthened by Hirschig's scheme of re-attribution: cf. next note). The verb ἀκκίζη – to all appearances a coinage – is particularly appropriate if the *schol. vet.* is right to see it as a reference to the moronic woman, Akka, who whiled away the time in a conversation with her reflection in a mirror while weaving (Hermippus fr.7 [1.225 Kock], *Amphis* fr.1 [Kock 2.236]). Cf. for later uses *Plut. Mor.*620B; *Themist.* 2.28B (~ θρόπτεσθα), *Julian Or.*7.223B (Wright).

1475 Reading ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς (A8) with BTWF Procl. (in *Alc.*289.9), except for their attribution to Socrates. Stallb. defends the phrase as it stands in all mss. (read also by Beck Woolsey Schmelzer), but others have found the expression too rude in Socrates's mouth. I attribute it to Callicles, as an interruption, with Badham (τί *pro* ὅτι *legens*) who was followed by edd., which is the paleographically easiest solution, in accordance also with Routh, who translates *quoniam nugaris*. It is deleted by Schliermacher Cope Thompson Sommer Burnet Wilamowitz Lamb Helmbold Irwin Allen Heibüchel, and transposed after λέγεις by Hermann (*legg.*Deuschle Feix), after νουθετεῖς [B1] by Lambertson, after οἶδα [B3], ὅτι λέγεις *deleens*, by Heindorf (*legg.* Ast Theiler Dalfen). The interruption is again mimicked by Socrates's subsequent retort (ἴνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφός), where εἰδῆς picks up οἶδα and οἶσθα from above. Hirschig, followed by Jowett, maintains the words of the mss. but attributes the previous καὶ πρόθι ... νουθετεῖς to Callicles. The suggestion "Mr. G.E.L.Owen" conveyed to Dodds, to transpose the words to A6 after Σώκρατες, ruins Socrates's rhyming retort. ὅτι means quoniam (with Routh, *pace Dodds*); and what provokes Callicles's interruption is obviously that Socrates has asked him to listen a little further.

1476 Reading εἰδῆς (A8), the perfect subjunctive, with BTP and edd. (ιδῆς F), a retort to Callicles's perfect, οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα σοφίζη (A6).

1477 οὐχ ἅμα (B1): Note the asyndeton, impatiently breaking off from the catfight.

1478 ἅμα... τε ... καὶ ... ἅμα (B1-2): The doubled ἅμα along with the bilateral linkage of τε ... καὶ makes explicit that the relation between the two cessations is bilateral, in order to avoid any suggestion that the one causes the other (the point having been made, the expression is relaxed below [C5-6]). The "further point" (ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν [A8]) is thus that we not only feel pain while we feel pleasure, but also that we cease to feel pleasure when we cease to feel pain. The force of ἕκαστος ἡμῶν is to generalize (as again at C6).

1479 οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις (B3): Echoing Socrates's οὐχ ἅμα, in retort. He does not just mean οὐ μανθάνω ("I don't get it"), which would be a request for clarification. Here, as with οὐκ οἶδ' at A6 but still more categorically, Callicles is denying the existence or meaning or reality of what Socrates is saying, as if his words were *efflatus vocis*. The remark has a function similar to Polus's ἄτοπα λέγεις, which flatly denied any legitimacy to what Socrates was saying (cf. nn. 804, 1001) – namely, to exonerate himself of having to respond to it at all (*ut sermone abrumperet ... velle videatur*, Stallb.). The corresponding somatic gesture would be to turn one's face away in silence. It is the extremeness of Callicles's behavior and remark that justifies the interruption of Gorgias.

ΓΟΡ. μηδαμῶς,<sup>1480</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ<sup>1481</sup> ἡμῶν ἔνεκα, ἵνα περανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν Σωκράτης, ὃ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾶ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.<sup>1482</sup>

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή,<sup>1483</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται. [c]

ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ<sup>1484</sup> τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπεὶπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.<sup>1485</sup>

ΣΩ. εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρὰ· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ὦμην θεμιτὸν<sup>1486</sup> εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἠδόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν<sup>1487</sup> καὶ ἠδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

ΚΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν [d] καὶ τῶν ἠδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

1480 μηδαμῶς used absolutely (B4), dispensing with the implied imperatival complement in impatient dismissal, as at *Menex.*236C5, *Phdrs.*234E1, *Symp.*175B1 and cf. bare μή at *Meno* 75B1.

1481 Reading καὶ (B4) with most mss., *legg. edd.* (*om.* NFlorY): it is responsive, not copulative. Gorgias now treats the rules of fair play (though perhaps not the subject matter, Deuschle-Cron) as more important than his client's saving face, an outcome from which he himself had been saved by Polus, at 461B3. His plural (οἱ λόγοι) and his reference to the whole group (ἡμῶν) makes the advice categorical rather than personal.

1482 ἐξελέγχει (B7): Again, defeat, not just refute (cf. n. 750). That dialectical moves by small steps is correct because it is essential to its nature (*Rep.*487B5-6); that in comparison with the rounded wholes in which oratory deals they should appear mere shavings or scraps is to be expected (cf. κνίσματα ... καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, *H.Maj.*304A5; Huit compares γνωμιῶν at *Ar. Nub.*321); but that they are therefore worthless, as Callicles says is, an unwarranted inference.

1483 Reading οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή (B8) with TWPF and *edd.* (οὔση αὕτη ἡ τιμή B). Olymp. (οὐ γὰρ σὴ ἐστὶν αὕτη ... [π]) guesses that Gorgias here encourages Callicles to continue so as not himself to be the only person Socrates refutes (148.17-18), but he was not actually refuted, and he *claims* at least that his request is for the sake of all present (ἡμῶν = τῶν παρόντων, Heindorf). Routh tr. τιμή with *munus*: 'to complain about how Socrates is playing questioner is not within your province (i.e., your only job is to answer)'. LSJ announces τιμή here means penalty: "you are not liable for his behavior" (cf. Coraes,  *censura*), but gives no parallel. Buttman (in Heindorf, ed. 2) prefers Coraes's gloss and senses a proverbial meaning, *nulla tibi multa seu nihil damni redundabit* (*sim.* Schleiermacher Ast[1819] Woodhead Feix Dalfen; Stallb.[tr. *non tibi hoc est damno*] and Thurot[*on ne saurai s'en prendre à toi*], Huit[*amende*] Jowett, "that does you no harm"; Helmbold Hamilton Nichols["your reputation is not at stake]). But Croiset Chambry Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto Waterfield Pietre and *perhaps* Lamb see that Gorgias is drawing an inference from Callicles's words, ὀλίγου ἄξια (thus translating, *Tu n'as pas à les apprecier* / "it isn't for you to put a value on it," *vel sim.*) – but since they did not mention their reason for their interpretation explicitly, it was still possible for Dodds (*ad loc.*) and Nichols (n.113) not to know why. Stallb. wrongly thinks αὕτη is here derogatory as οὐτος was at 452E6. Rather, it = τοῦτο and simply refers to the charge Callicles ὀλίγου ἄξια. Clearly Gorgias judges that the refutation Socrates wants to make is only a refutation in Socrates's mind.

1484 σὺ (C1), ousting the vocative of the proper name, the standard and polite gesture upon a change of the person addressed (as at 506B7: cf. my n. *ad Lach.*181B5) – and therefore extremely rude. He addresses Socrates as one would address a slave (Irwin: "Then go on you"). This time ταῦτα is derogatory.

1485 Accepting the attribution of οὕτως (C2) to Callicles, with F *teste* Cantarín, and *edd.* (BTWP and Ficinus attribute it to Socrates).

1486 θεμιτόν (C4): With the language of the small and the large Socrates alludes to initiation in the Mysteries (cf. schol. *ad loc.*, *Euthyd.*277E2-3, *Soph.*218C7-D2, *Symp.*210A1-2). The criticism is two-fold: first, in order to say that details are small Callicles must have something in mind more important than simple truth and the need to participate in it through sincerity; and second, that of course he does not have in mind anything at all that is truly high. The search for truth and reality (cf. οὐσία καὶ ἀλήθεια, 472B6) requires a surrender of pride: that is why Socrates is adamant in his ignorance.

1487 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν (C7): Was πεινῶν a participle as it has been, or a noun as ἐπιθυμιῶν will be? In either case what had been a participial construction in subject nominative with παύεσθαι shifts to a substantival construction in ablative genitive, in order to shift from the description of feeling pain and pleasure with verbs (διψῶν / ἠδόμενος, C5-6), to the description of them with substantives (ἐπιθυμιῶν / ἠδονῶν, C7). Because the first certain genitive is ἄλλων rather than ἐπιθυμιῶν the syntactical reformulation is simultaneous with an epagodic move to generalization. The syntax of τῶν ἄλλων is also ambiguous: it may go only with ἐπιθυμιῶν or with both ἐπιθυμιῶν and ἠδονῶν, generalizing both the correlative genera even though the sense requires those two genera to be considered separately so that they can be put together by ἅμα (for which compare *Tht.*164A7, ὅπως καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν). In any case both ambiguities become moot as soon as the sense is grasped, a striking instance of the plasticity of expression within an evolving epagodic matrix.



ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν γε<sup>1488</sup> καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὁμολόγεις;  
... νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;<sup>1489</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε· τί οὖν δῆ;

ΣΩ. ὅτι<sup>1490</sup> οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ<sup>1491</sup> γίγνεται, ᾧ φίλε, τὰγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέεσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων·<sup>1492</sup> πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἂν εἶη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς;<sup>1493</sup> εἰ δὲ βούλη, καὶ τῆδε<sup>1494</sup> ἐπίσκεψαι (οἶμαι γὰρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτη [e] ὁμολογεῖσθαι·<sup>1495</sup> ἄθρει δέ<sup>1496</sup>)· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοῦς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς<sup>1497</sup> ἂν κάλλος παρῆ;

1488 Reading γε (D2) from F, *legg.* Hirschig Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Cantarín (*om.* BTWPY, *legg.* edd.), to set apart the status of the minor premise (n. 1454).

1489 ὁμολόγεις (D3), an the imperfect of citation: at 496C1-5 he agreed “hugely” (ὕπερφυῶς). Ast (1832) detects a reluctant pause by Callicles, and I would add to this view that νῦν δέ is a second attempt to get his answer – whence his enervated τί οὖν δῆ (for which cf. 453B4). Callicles does not believe that pleasure is the good, but only that he values it above all else (his remark at 492C4-6, which Socrates is taking as an assertion of identity, is mere hyperbole): that one should value the good above all else is different from valuing what one thinks is good above all else (the latter is mere tautology). His reluctance is not due to the logical refutation of his identification – logic he continually throws out – but because along the way it has become clear that pleasure and pain are by nature a zero sum game. Commentators who have misgivings about the validity of this “argument from opposites,” from Olympiodorus (146.7-30) to Dodds (p.310), fail to see the far more important under-argument about the illusion of pleasure.

1490 Reading ὅτι (D5) with BTP and edd. (*om.* F), answering Callicles’s τί.

1491 Reading οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ (D5) from WYPF, *legg.* Stallb.[*silens*] Woolsey Sommer Burnet Dodds (οὐ ταῦτα t, *legg.* edd. : οὐ ταῦτα T : αὐτὰ B). γίγνεται is again dialectical, of a logical result (n.371).

1492 Retain ὡς ἑτέρων ὄντων (D7), with the mss. and edd. (*secl.* Deuschle [1859], *sine noto*, followed by Cron Jowett Schanz Christ Ovink : ὄντων *om.* F [*teste* Dodds]). The greatest problem in accepting the words is not that they are redundant (Dodds), but that – as participle with ὡς – it denotes a subjective assumption of the subject of παύεται (barely senseful): it cannot denote Socrates’s opinion, or an objective reason or cause (cf. 495C6) or an entailment (*parce-qu’ils sont différents*, Croiset, cf. Cary Cope Zeyl Pietre Dalfen; as well as Schleiermacher’s, *also offenbar verhält sich beides ganz verschieden* and Kratz’s *welche sonach verschieden sind*). Might it be a *marginale* in which the scribe/scholar is describing Socrates’s reasons for saying what he says?

1493 τὰ ἡδέα ... τοῖς κακοῖς (D8): Callicles identifies the good and pleasure (and pain and the bad) so that Socrates’s conversion of the proposition here (over against τὰγαθὰ ... τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς above, D5-6) is logically neutral (ἕτερον already denotes a dialectically convertible relation). The reversal is merely a chiasm of before and after, indicating the completion of the argument Socrates has now made (and will presently refer to with τῆδε), enabling him to move on.

1494 Reading τῆδε (D9) from TWPf *teste* Cantarín, on the authority of both families, *legg.* edd. (τῆδε B). With ἐπίσκεψαι – looking further (ἐπί-) – Socrates brings forward his suggestion (made twice: 495B3-6, 497A7-B1) that there were many problems with Callicles’s identification of the pleasurable and the good. The first person demonstrative sets up a leapfrogging contrast with subsequent “second person” ταύτη, making the latter refer to the argument Socrates has just completed with his chiasm (“what has gone before”: St.George Stock *ad Apol.*34C5-6: cf. *Apol.*17C4 versus 18C5, τηλικούτου and τηλικόσδε at *Apol.*25D; *Rep.*348E1, 465D6, *al.*, with Lamb Chambry Waterfield Zeyl Nichols; and n. 1301) as opposed to a new one of his (e.g. *Rep.*394E1 [where note ἄθρει]). Cf. n. 1301. Lodge Helmbold Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Allen Canto Pietre Dalfen take ταύτη to point to τῆδε, which is inherently possible, but this makes Socrates say he is giving a new argument *because* (γάρ: not ‘despite the fact that’) Callicles *does not even* (οὐδέ) agree with it, or “does not agree with it *either*” (ὁμολογεῖσθαι is present, not future [*pace* Hamilton Pietre], and lacking ἂν it does not represent an optative [*pace* Helmbold, “may fail to satisfy you”]), which is nonsense. I cannot get Jowett’s “which could hardly have been considered by you when you identified them” from the Greek. In short, with εἰ δὲ βούλη (D8-9), Socrates does not wait for Callicles to accept the conclusion he has just re-iterated so as to order to keep the discussion going – just as with καὶ μοι λέγε at 494B7 he opted not to wait for a response to his allegation that the life Callicles is advocating is that of a little gully. From here forward, for the sake of the logos, Socrates less and less protects dialogical order and strains decorum more and more, in the face of Callicles’s various attempts to derail them: 499C5, 501D1, 503A5 with n., 503D5 with n., 504A6, 505A2, 505E3.

1495 σοι ... ὁμολογεῖσθαι (D9-E1) = to agree with itself (Woolsey), or with oneself (Cary), with σοι an ethical dative, as at 480E2 and 504B6 (cf. nn. *ad locc.*): “... even by that way the refutation does not reach your agreement.” Mistrisiotis takes it as passive, with τὸν λόγον or αὐτό as subj ~ “the argument is not agreeable to you.”

1496 Reading δέ (E1) with BF, *legg.* edd., in preference to δῆ from TPwf, *legg.* Routh Beck Ast Coraes Kratz Hirschig. Socrates reasserts his hopes after granting that his first refutation was not enough. With ἄθρει (E1) and σοι ... ὁμολογεῖσθαι (cf. 495B2 with n. 1442 and 495A5 with n. 1437), Socrates refers back to the interlude at 495A2-C2 through which e was enabled to launch into his series of responses to Callicles’s identification of the two.

1497 Reading τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς (E2): with mss. and edd. (τοὺς *secl.* Hirschig, *legg.* Dodds Waterfield Nichols Pietre Cantarín). The same sense comes out, with or without the article, i.e., whether τοὺς καλοὺς represents the primary or καλοὺς the secondary predicate of understood καλεῖς in this telescoped construction. As to Dodd’s preference to read the primary and understand the secondary rather than reading the secondary and understanding the primary, compare his opposite sentiment in eschewing the definite article at 499D3, where he says, “it is easier to supply the subject than the predicate.” Woolsey, probably unintentionally, prints τοὺς οἷς without ms. support and adds “*sc.* καλοὺς καλεῖς.” The comical alliteration that phrase would have introduced might show us why Plato used the telescoped construction in the first place. Socrates’s use of καλεῖν instead of λέγειν here and at E3 and E5 is highly significant. The salient feature of this second refutation is that after the καλούμενα (E3-5), all the steps are empirical (E6-498C1): Socrates is showing Callicles, on the basis of his own observations of human behavior, that his name-calling will force him to speak nonsense (for instance, that he will have to call those he calls bad “better” than those he calls good, C7-8). Cf. n. 1514.

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τί δαί;<sup>1498</sup> ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας<sup>1499</sup> καλεῖς ἄφρονας<sup>1500</sup> καὶ δειλοὺς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

[498] ΣΩ. οὐδέν·<sup>1501</sup> ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. εἶδον.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. πότεροι<sup>1502</sup> δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἄρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἀνδρα δειλόν;<sup>1503</sup>

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

1498 Reading τί δαί (E3), with B<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Heindorf Bekker Hirschig (τί δέ mss., *legg.*edd.), by which Socrates introduces his question as absurd. The idea that the mindless should be the good is as absurd as that the temperate should be the stupid (491E2).

1499 ἀνδρας (E3) is not needed to clarify which is predicate and which subject (not this but the word order indicates it is the good being called and foolish and cowardly – see also next n.) rather than vice-versa, but rather broaches that Socrates is using Callicles's own approbatory term to refer to his opinion as expressed at 491A7-B4. This Dodds seems to miss when he counsels Callicles to refuse to admit it so as to avoid being refuted (p.314): it is his own position, a position he radically changes in his second speech at 491E5ff, a change Dodds misses entirely (p.291).

1500 Reading ἄφρονας (E4) from BTWYF, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Lodge Gercke Burnet Lamb Apelt Helmbold Woodhead Dodds Theiler Irwin Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Pietre Cantarin (τοὺς ἄφρονας Par<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Ast Bekker Heindorf Hermann Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Hirschig Schanz Mistrionis Schmelzer Christ Sauppe Stender Croiset Feix). Though anarthrous, ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς is the subject, as the ensuing alternative in τοὺς ἀνδρείους implies. The article is regular with the subject simply because the subject is already “definite” – that is, the author presumes it to be more present to the mind – whereas the grammatical predicate is not (and as such lacks the article): this is why it needs to be said. Anarthrous subject is not so rare as to justify accepting the poorly attested reading (with Heindorf), transparently a scribal correction. Word order often obviates the need to designate the subject thereby, as in *Tht.*151E2-3 (οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις) and E6 (αἴσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη) where, as here, the verb virtually announces that the word it follows is the grammatical predicate. For another case cf. *Charm.*161A11: οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς. Croiset's tr., *un insensé ou un lâche* (n.b., his *ou*) is vitiated by his accepting the article. Most important, however, is that to call A B is not really to predicate B of A: name-calling is not predication, nor is predication name-calling – a distinction generally lost on Callicles.

1501 οὐδέν (498A1): Socrates has taken Callicles's οἶμαι to be waffling and his τί τοῦτο to threaten derailing the question and answer order by arrogating to himself the role of questioner, and with οὐδέν is merely admonishing Callicles, “None of that, continue to play answerer.” We do not need to implete Callicles's question with ἐρωτᾷς (*pace* Findeisen Schleiermacher) or διαφέρει, *vel sim.* (Heindorf Stallb. Deuschle-Cron Waterfield, as at 448B1). The question is only a scurrilous attempt at diversion (for derogatory τοῦτο cf. nn. 1074, 241). Socrates continues to hold tight reins at A5 and B1.

1502 Reading πότεροι (A3) from FY with edd. (πότερον BTW).

1503 ἀνδρα δειλόν (A6) *sc.* ὄντα.

ΚΑΛ. ἀμφοτέροι ἔμοιγε [b] μᾶλλον<sup>1504</sup> εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.

ΣΩ. οὐδὲν διαφέρει.<sup>1505</sup> χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν.<sup>1506</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον<sup>1507</sup> λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. ἀμφοτέροι.

ΣΩ. ἄρα ὁμοίως;

ΚΑΛ. μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

ΣΩ. ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, [c] ὡς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρεῖων;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ<sup>1508</sup> ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

1504 Reading μᾶλλον (B1) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. (*om. Za teste Cantarin Zb teste Dodds : secl. Hermann [pref.xix], legg.* Lamb Feix Irwin : ὁμοίως *coni.* Sauppe Gercke, *legg.* Stender Apelt Woodhead Allen Waterfield). After μᾶλλον: δ' ἴσως οἱ δειλοὶ *lacunam notans, add.* Hermann (*legg.* Schanz Cantarin) : χαίρειν, ἴσως δ' ἐκεῖνοι γε *ante* μᾶλλον *add.* Dodds “*exempli gratia*” [*sic*] (*legg.* Nichols Dalfen). However we construct it, the answer means there is no significant difference, but the tone or purpose of the answer is amenable to several interpretations. Heindorf and Coraes, followed by Stallb. Sommer Huit, think it a jocular answer (as in English, “Both are better”), and Woolsey *mockingly* jocular; Deuschle-Cron as a latent threat to evade answering. Similarly, Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge take μᾶλλον with ἐδόκουν (“Which of the two do you prefer to judge joyful?”) instead of with χαίρειν, and find Callicles to be evading making a choice, as below when he answers ἀμφοτέροι (B4). With these I agree, remarking also that the brave will rejoice in a different manner or for a different reason from the cowardly, which introduces complications irrelevant for the course of the dialectic. Dodds economizes the problem by filling the lacuna Hermann reports after μᾶλλον with words that do give μᾶλλον something to modify but that should go before it – and with this stroke of wit cuts the umbilical cord to all the mss. – and then claims that the sense of Callicles’s answer he thereby produces was “already reproduced” in Olympiodorus’s paraphrase of the argument (presumably he is referring to 146.31-147.22 and in particular 147.8). But Olympiodorus’s brief and purely propositional summary conflates many steps in the induction (e.g., 147.4-7) and can hardly be cited as a witness for any *ipsisima verba*. Moreover in its brevity would have neglected to reproduce Callicles’s “tone or purpose” as being propositionally irrelevant.

1505 οὐδὲν διαφέρει (B1): This can mean, “It does not matter which enjoys more, only that (δ' οὖν) the cowards also do.” But Callicles’s answer was mocking and evasive, and Socrates is dismissing the mockery with οὐδὲν διαφέρει (cf. A1 and n. 1501), and now with δ' οὖν extracts from Callicles’s joke that he *does* grant that cowards do enjoy, which is all Socrates “needs.”

1506 Reading: Soc.– καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν. || Call.– ναί (B3), with mss. and edd. Once again Sauppe (not Hirschig, *pace* Cantarin) “improves” the text by athetizing the exchange, as being redundant after 497E and irrelevant to the present point, which is “only” about the ἀνδρεῖοι and the δειλοί.

1507 Reading μόνον (B4) from BTPF, *legg.* edd. (μόνοι F [*coniecerat* Hirschig], *legg.* Deuschle Mistriotis Dodds Cantarin). Cron, reacting against Hirschig’s claim that μόνον is *required*, reverts to μόνον, comparing 455D4, 501A7, *Apol.* 37B1.

1508 Reading οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι (C2-3) with BTW, *legg.* edd. (ἀνδρεῖοι PF *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Hermann Bekker Stallb. Hirschig Jowett Christ Sauppe Apelt Dodds Hamilton Allen). Canto with a typical looseness reads the article but drops καί, making ἀνδρεῖοι appositive to φρόνιμοι. Callicles never asserted the astute and the brave are inter-definitional or co-extensive, so both articles are needed. Hermann’s notion to delete οἱ to improve parallelism in the chiasm with subsequent οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες, and Allen’s unsupported relocation of οἱ from δειλοὶ to ἄφρονες for the same reason, neglect the fact that chiasm is, in spirit, the very antithesis of parallelism. Waterfield began at B8 to translate οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι as “heroes.” Note the absence of εἰσὶν: Socrates is bringing forward what Callicles agreed to at 497E3-5, which was not that they are bad and good, but that Callicles *calls* them so.

ΣΩ. παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ<sup>1509</sup> κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοί;<sup>1510</sup> [d]

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί<sup>1511</sup> οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθ'<sup>1512</sup> ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσία εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ<sup>1513</sup> κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοὶ εἰσὶν<sup>1514</sup> οἱ χαίροντες;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι;

ΚΑΛ. πάρεστιν. [e]

ΣΩ. κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακοὺς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῆς;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιῶνται;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

1509 Reading καὶ οἱ (C7) with BTPF *legg.* edd. (καὶ W Steph., *leg.* Routh Beck). It is now these two groups that are being compared. To pair them up into a joint subject works against that; their separateness from each other is corroborated by the chiasmic formulation of the alternative question (C7-8: see next note).

1510 Reading ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ (C7-8) with Twf, *legg.* Hirschig Schmelzer (ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ B : ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ F). καὶ after ἢ is absent from Par. Editors have sought to remedy the sentence in various ways: ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ (*coni.* Heindorf and Routh, *legg.* Schleiermacher Beck Ast[1819] Hermann Bekker Coraes Stallb. Thurot Cary Woolsey Jahn Cope Kratz Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Jowett Mistriotis Lodge Lamb Helmbold Feix) : ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ κακοὶ εἰσὶν καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ (*coni.* Ast[1832]) : ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ κακοὶ (*coni.* H.Schmidt [*Beitr.* {1874} 202], *legg.* Stender Sauppe Burnet Croiset Apelt Woodhead Dodds Theiler Hamilton Irwin Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Piettre Cantarin Dalfen) : ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ οἱ κακοὶ (*coni.* Liebhold [*Analect. Plat.* {1885} 10], *leg.* Christ) : ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ κακοὶ (*coni.* Hirschig, *leg.* Schanz). The meaning is intentionally obscure and so emendation is again something of a fool's errand (cf. n. 1321). He is asking whether men that are ἀγαθοὶ or that are κακοὶ have those predicates in degrees different from each other. The idea appears clearly at the conclusion, 499A8-B1, where it appears the bad man can not only be as good as the good man but even more good than the good man.

1511 ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' (D1), added to protest his sincerity after feigning ignorance at 497A6-C2 (*pace* Croiset, who thinks his remark an evasion parallel to that passage as well as to 505C, as a something of a refrain). Indeed, Socrates's question was meant to evade him (Cron Mistriotis)!

1512 οὐκ οἶσθ' (D2): Callicles agreed to this just above (497E1-3). With his retort Socrates goes toe-to-toe.

1513 Reading καὶ κακοὺς (D3) with F, *legg.* Burnet Dodds Theiler Cantarin (κακοὺς BTWYP, *legg.* edd. : τοὺς κακοὺς f NFlorV, *legg.* Ast[1832] Hirschig Sauppe). The reading without the article represents a chiasm (Lodge) and therefore is the *difficilior*, so I read it.

1514 ἀγαθοὶ εἰσὶν (D7): Here the logic police (e.g., Waterfield) choose to arrest the argument: "Plato" has invalidly substituted "pleasure" for "good." But within the unique conversation between Socrates and Callicles, for Callicles to call something good only means he approves of it. The actual purpose of Socrates's introduction of *παρουσία* in the present argument (a purpose from which commentators had been distracted by their extra-textual worry whether it did or did not bespeak the "Theory of Forms" of "Plato") now comes to the surface. For Callicles to call something good because he approves of it, which I have called name-calling above, is a property of Callicles and not, *eo ipso*, a property of the thing. Cf. n. 1497.

ΣΩ. οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἦττον ἦττον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;<sup>1515</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς<sup>1516</sup> φασιν καλὸν [499] εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.<sup>1517</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον [b] ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός;<sup>1518</sup> οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα<sup>1519</sup> ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταῦτα φῆ ἠδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;

... οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη,<sup>1520</sup> ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

1515 Whether we read the definite article (E4, *ter*) with BTWP, or the relative with F (which is the *lectio difficilior*), *legg.* Heindorf Beck Burnet is indifferent to the sense (Stallb.); the relatives are preferable as continuing the expression at E3.

1516 καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς λέγειν (E11): A favorite proverb of Plato's (*Phlb.*60A1; *Leg.*754C2-3, 957A1). τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι is here added (not part of the proverb, *pace* Cantarin) as a virtual exegesis on its meaning and illustrates why it is a favorite. Cf. also *Phdo.*63E1-2; *Plut. Mor.*365C, cf. 1103F; *S. Ph.*1238; *Paroem. Gr.* Z 3.33, GCL 1.96, Ap.6.26. The first καὶ goes with γάρ: for the interruption of the compound καίγαρ cf. H. *Od.*17.317, Ar. *Vesp.*781, *S. Ph.*527. For τοι inserted to couch a proverb cf. *Prot.*346C11, *Symp.*219A2; *P. Ol.*4.23; *E. IA* 312; and Denniston 542-3. Reading τὸ (B) or τὰ (TWPF) is indifferent to the sense.

1517 ἀνάγκη (499A5) indicates Callicles thinks and accepts the statement as a logically necessary entailment of the previous one. Socrates's summary of the steps (A1-7) is clean and sharp. In contrast with the argument leading up to it, the definite article is here used scrupulously to distinguish subject from predicate, and the word order for the pairs of propositions tolerates no *variatio*.

1518 ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός (B1): The juxtaposition points up the paradox.

1519 τὰ πρότερα (B1), with Jahn, refers back to the refutation reached at 497D5-8, the refutation with which this was paired by καὶ τῆδε at 497D9 (*pace* Kratz who points to 496D, and Coraes Cron Lodge Sauppe Ovink Dodds who point to 494E). Just as *alter* (Lat.) can mean "second," comparative πρότερα refers to the first of a pair.

1520 οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη (B2): We should perhaps assume a pause, or at least Socrates's anticipation of one: Callicles again needs to be goosed along: cf. 497D3 and note.



ΚΑΛ. πάλαι τοί σου<sup>1521</sup> ἀκροῶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν,<sup>1522</sup> ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἄν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ὅτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχη ὡσπερ τὰ μειράκια.<sup>1523</sup> ὡς δὴ σὺ<sup>1524</sup> οἶει ἐμέ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χεῖρους.

ΣΩ. ἰοῦ ἰοῦ,<sup>1525</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ καὶ μοι [c] ὡσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν ταῦτα<sup>1526</sup> φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ὦμην γε κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου·<sup>1527</sup> νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν<sup>1528</sup> καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον<sup>1529</sup> παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναὶ τινές<sup>1530</sup> εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἢ γάρ; [d]

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἄρ’ οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλαβεραί;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ὠφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακὸν τι;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

- 1521 Reading τοί σου (B4) from BTP Olymp.[λ], *legg.* edd. (του σοῦ F : τι σοῦ ELob and the early editions, *legg.* Heindorf Routh). τοι here expresses indignation, as at *Phdo.*63A1 (ἀεὶ τοι ...). For τι, Routh cites Hoogeveen ch.59.4.2-3, and Heindorf cites νεωστί and ἐναγχός τι as if parallels for the indefinite τι in Plato. But the latter phrase occurs only as an inferior variant at *Charm.*155B4, dropped from *apparatus critici* since Schanz (τοι BS2ParΓ); and as to νεωστί, Smyth (§344) views -τί as being an adverbial ending alongside -στί as in Ἑλληνιστί. Coraes conjectures καὶ ὁμολογῶ for καθομολογῶν.
- 1522 Reading ἀκροῶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν (B4) with mss. and edd. (ἀκροῶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ὁμολογῶ *coni.* Coraes : ἀκροῶμενος, ὃ Σώκρατες, πάντα ὁμολογῶ *coni.* Christ).
- 1523 ὡσπερ τὰ μειράκια (B6): Callicles alludes to the behavior of churlish lads debating for victory, such as Socrates elsewhere likens to puppies tearing apart their toys (*Rep.*539B2-7).
- 1524 ὡς δὴ σὺ (B6): For ironic ὡς δὴ compare Polus’s remark to Socrates at 468E6 (with n. 650), and cf. *Phdrs.*228C2, 242C3; *Prot.*342C2; *Rep.*337C2, *Tim.*26B2. By the same “pirouette” (Croiset) he used at 489B7-C7, Callicles abandons his position once its shock value has been dissipated by the dialectic.
- 1525 Reading ἰοῦ ἰοῦ (B9) from TPWF, *legg.* edd. (ιοῦ ἰοῦ B, *legg.* Schanz Burnet Croiset Lamb Theiler). “*Mirantis magis sunt voculae quam indignantis,*” says Heindorf (and Coraes Stallb.; *sim.* Routh) citing *H.Maj.*291E3, *Rep.*432D2, but Socrates can hardly admire being betrayed, whether seriously or in irony. In comedy the phrase expresses annoyance (e.g. *Ar. Nub.* 1), and so it does here. In case the Souda is right in asserting ἰοῦ perispomenon is ἐπι χαρᾶς and ἰοῦ oxytone is σχετλιαστικόν, accent the word as oxytone with edd. (rather than perispomenon with B and Schanz and Burnet) – but it must be admitted that Socrates’s habit of irony attenuates the difference.
- 1526 Reading ταῦτα (C1) from Y, *legg.* Coraes Kratz Croiset Apelt Zimmermann Helmbold Woodhead Chambry Irwin Allen Canto Waterfield Nichols Pietre Dalfen (τὰ αὐτὰ F, *legg.* Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin : αὐτὰ BTPW, *legg.* Hermann Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sommer Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ Lodge Stender Sauppe Feix : ταῦτα x *editio Bas.*<sup>2</sup> [*teste* Stallb]), *legg.* Heindorf Beck Ast Bekker Cary Cope Thompson Hirschig Jowett). αὐτὰ, though well attested, would belong in the second limb not the first (with Kratz Thompson Dodds), unless it is taken, as by Stallb. Woolsey Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Sauppe, to be referring back to 491A (Lodge recalcitrant), the last time Socrates complained Callicles changed positions (which Kratz infers even though he does not read αὐτὰ!). But not only is that too far for αὐτὰ to reach (with Dodds): Socrates is not in any case repeating that complaint. Rather, for the first time he is accusing Callicles of intentionally tricking him as if he were a child.
- 1527 ὡς ὄντος φίλου (C3-4): Not only does friendship include honesty (cf. 473A3 and n. *ad loc.*), but also Socrates had declared Callicles his ally and “touchstone” out of a reliance on his parrhesiastic candor (487A3-E6: *n.b.*, φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς, *sub fin.*). He continues the theme below (500B6). Lodge, recalling the triad at 487A2-3, notes Socrates loses faith in Callicles’s *παρρησία* at 495A, in his *σοφία* at 497A, and in his *εὐνοία* here.
- 1528 τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν (C5): Plato is said by Hesychius and Photius (*s.v.* τὸ παρὸν) to be quoting a proverb we find in Cratinus’s *Pylaea* (ἄνδρα σοφοῦς χρῆ τὸ παρὸν πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἰς δύναμιν τίθεσθαι, f.172 [Kock 1.66]). Cf. *Leg.*959C7. It seems to be absent from the *Paroem.Gr.*
- 1529 δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον (C5-6): Another proverb, for which cf. Zen.3.42 (*Paroem.Gr.*1.67), Hdt. 8.114.1; Cic. *ad Att.*6.5, 15.7; Erasmus *Adag.*4.3015: *Donum quodcumque probato*. Note that we have παρὰ σοῦ, not ὑπὸ σοῦ.
- 1530 For τινές (C7) setting up the subdivision, compare *Leg.*720A2; *Prot.*343D7-E2; *Rep.*431A4, 560A5-6; T. 5.54.4. Contrast 500B1.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα<sup>1531</sup> τούτων αἰ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν<sup>1532</sup> τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἰ δὲ [e] τάναντία τούτων κακαί;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὡσαύτως αἰ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἰ δὲ πονηραί;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. ἔνεκα γὰρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου<sup>1533</sup> ἔνεκα δεῖν πάντα τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι [500] ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμμηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων;<sup>1534</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἔνεκα δεῖ καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ γαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

1531 Reading εἰ ἄρα (D5) from BTW Stob.[*Anth.* 3.5.56 = 1.277 Wachsmuth], *legg.* Routh Beck Ast Bekker Stallb. Cary Woolsey Cope Kratz Deuschle Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis (εἰ ἄρα PF *teste* Cantarin : ἢ ἄρα *coni.* Sauppe, *legg.* Burnet Lamb Theiler : ἄρα *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* edd.), and reading ποιοῦσαι below with BTWPF Stob.[*ibid.*], *legg.* Heindorf Routh Hermann Stallb. Jahn Cron Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ Lodge Stender Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds Theiler (ποιοῦσι ZaNFlor, *legg.* Beck Ast Bekker Coraes Cary Woolsey Cope Kratz Deuschle Thompson Sommer Hirschig). The sense of Socrates's question is perfectly clear: salvaging the syntax of the transmitted text is the only problem. The well-attested subordinate particle εἰ, needing a finite verb, conflicts with the similarly attested participle ποιοῦσαι, unless we assume a periphrastic construction with εἰσιν understood; Sauppe's emendation of EI to H (accepted by Burnet) obviates that assumption and removes the conflict and is paleographically easy, but the combination ἢ ἄρα may not belong to prose (Denniston 282, 284); Heindorf's deletion of εἰ and re-accentuation of ἄρα to ἄρα (which he supports with Ficinus's tr. *Numquid enim* ..., accepted by Schmelzer) likewise removes the conflict and avoids that pitfall. Alternatively, to remedy the conflict at the other end by reading ποιοῦσι rather than ποιοῦσαι (with Ast Bekker Coraes Woolsey), making the if-clause a substitute for a relative (εἰ ἄρα τούτων = αἱ μὲν ἄρα τούτων, with Woolsey) has relatively weak ms. support. The alternative, saving the testimony of the best mss., is to take the apodosis to begin at αἰ δὲ (*sic* Stallb. *ut vid.*) rather than αὗται, for it is this, after all – the existence of bad pleasures – that Callicles newly concedes. For εἰ ἄρα as an interjection meaning “if somehow,” see Denniston, 37: ἄρα is asking for agreement, as below (500E3). Coraes's reading αἱ μὲν for αἰ μὲν at D6 and αἱ δὲ for αἰ δὲ at D7, thus forcing ποιοῦσαι as attributive to be circumstantial, does not affect the sense.

1532 ἀρετὴν (D7) here functioning as the noun corresponding to the adjective ἀγαθός (cf. *Rep.* 381C2 [cf. B10 and C8], 348E2, 588A9-10, 601D4, 618C7; *Apol.* 30B4; *Phdrs.* 253D2; *Symp.* 196B5 [referring to ἄριστον at 195A7]) – just as εὖ is its adverb.

1533 ἐκείνου (E9) refers to the good as τέλος, indirectly characterizing the πράξεις as “the latter,” setting up the converse assertion (ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων), which is a *contradictio in adjecto* (the end cannot be the means to the means).

1534 Reading τρίτων (500A2) with BTP *et F re vera* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. as the *difficilior* (τουτῶν f<sup>n</sup>NFlor). For the expression cf. *Symp.* 213B5, E. Or. 1178. The three are of course Socrates, Polus, and Callicles – if he agrees (*pace* *Olymp.* 153.23-6 and schol. who [1] include Gorgias as party to the agreement, though Socrates mentions only Polus [499E7; he adds Gorgias explicitly, and accurately, only when he recalls a different argument, at A7-8 below introducing the shift with αὖ at A7], and then [2] reduce the total from four to three by saying Socrates is treating Gorgias and Polus as one). The present reference is to the conversation between Socrates and Polus only (466D5-468E5).

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων<sup>1535</sup> ἐστὶν  
καὶ ὅποια<sup>1536</sup> κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον;

ΚΑΛ. τεχνικοῦ.

ΣΩ. ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ<sup>1537</sup> ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγγανον λέγων.  
ἔλεγον γὰρ,<sup>1538</sup> εἰ μνημονεύεις, **[b]** ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαί<sup>1539</sup> αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς,<sup>1540</sup> αὐτὸ  
τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ  
γιγνώσκουσαι ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν  
μαγειρικὴν<sup>1541</sup> ἐμπειρίαν ἀλλὰ οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην.  
καὶ πρὸς Φιλίου,<sup>1542</sup> ὧ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἴου<sup>1543</sup> δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι ἂν  
τύχης παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' **[c]** αὖ τὰ<sup>1544</sup> παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὡς  
παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν<sup>1545</sup> εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον  
σπουδάσειε τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο,<sup>1546</sup> ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν,  
πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα<sup>1547</sup> πράττοντα λέγοντά τε  
ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς

1535 τῶν ἡδέων (A5), with Lodge, an example of ἐπιφορά (for which cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §631).

1536 For ὅποια (A5), from the mss., *legg.* edd. (ποῖα Stob.) varying foregoing ποῖα, cf. n. 170. Socrates's introducing the notion of an expert seems "abrupt" to Waterfield (only because he has an idea where it might lead) but not to Callicles (who does not). On the face of it, Waterfield says, he disagrees, but then he produces a defense for "Plato."

1537 αὖ (A7), with ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ, in hyperbaton after ὧν for the sake of rhythm (Woolsey), now makes the recollection of a *second passage* in the previous discussion. The reference is to the moment after Gorgias intervenes for a clarification and Socrates, after presenting one, invites Polus to examine his clarification (463D6-466A3: cf. 463E5-464A1, 465A1, and 465D4).

1538 Reading ἔλεγον γὰρ (A8) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ἔλεγον γὰρ αὖ F, *leg.* Burnet: ἔλεγε γὰρ αὐτὸς Stob.[*Flor.* 3.5.56 = 1.278 Wachsmuth]), taking γὰρ to be merely programmatic. If αὖ is to be read it is only to enforce the previous one (A6). With the re-adding of previous agreements as a foundation for the present discussion, Socrates exemplifies Callicles's charge (490E9) that he is always saying the same things!

1539 παρασκευαί (B1): The term is new and a bit awkward. τεχνικοῦ is in the air (A6) but he does not want to say τέχνη for both kinds of "faculty." He is referring to his remarks at 464C3-D3, where also he was scrupulous to avoid calling all the activities under review τέχνη (465A2-6). The schol. considers the term halfway between τέχνη and ἐμπειρία.

1540 μέχρι ἡδονῆς (B1): Lodge, having translated παρασκευαί "contrivances," notes that with the choice of μέχρι plus gen., "the contrivances are not claimed to reach ἡδονή but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed: hence παρασκευαζοῦσαι is conative."

1541 Reading μαγειρικὴν only (B4: *sc.* παρασκευήν) from BF Stob., *legg.* Beck Hermann Stallb. Ast(1832) and edd. (μαγειρικὴν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα TWPF<sup>man</sup> *testibus* Dodds Cantarin, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Schleiermacher Ast[1819] Bekker Coraes Cary Sommer). Dodds Cantarin report that the *marginalis* in F has κατὰ, like the mss., not the περὶ reported by Burnet. For τῶν μὲν with attributive substantive (ἐμπειρίαν) cf. LSJ, s.v. § B.1.

1542 πρὸς Φιλίου (B6), reiterating his reference to the passage on the touchstone (486E-488B, cf. 499C3-4). Socrates and his interlocutors call upon this avatar of Zeus to encourage candor and sincerity in answer as beneficial to both (cf. 519E3, *Euthyphr.* 6B3-4, *Phdr.* 234E2). Cf. also 473A3.

1543 Socrates now (C1-8) inserts his admonition about the importance of the topic, as he had with Gorgias (458A1-B3) and with Polus (472C6-D1), in each case effecting a transition from a more or less aleatory dialogical sequence to something more orderly and syllogistic (cf. n. 1366). Note (with Heindorf) that his use of σπουδάσειν (C2) recalls and answers Callicles's first challenge against him (481B10-C1): just as in his conversation with Polus, Socrates does not forget the "it's" but gives each of them their "tat," as if to remove another chip from the table.

1544 Reading μήτ' αὖ τὰ (B7-C1) with BTWP Ficinus, *legg.* edd. (μή ταῦτα F : μήτ' αὐτὰ VatQE1R and Steph. : μήτε αὐτὰ Olymp.[λ]). αὖ (which here means *vicissim*) clarifies the rank of its μήτε, *viz.*, that it begins a second limb and reaches back to μήτε above and that the intervening μηδέ was a negation within the first limb (cf. Denniston, 193). The reciprocal relation between the two limbs linked with corresponsive τε was broached thematically by the opening reference to friendship (πρὸς Φιλίου).

1545 ἡμῖν (C2), ethical dative. Though it is incongruous to speak of a "we" immediately after his plea for candor, Socrates does so, to move outside the role of dialectical interlocutor momentarily and admonish Callicles that they are talking about a topic that touches deeply the human condition they share (whence his otherwise gratuitous use of ἄνθρωπος at C3): he will revert to the narrower dialectical role at D2. This theme, as well as the accumulation of back-references, leaves the impression that the argument is approaching something definitive.

1546 Reading ἢ τοῦτο (C3) with mss., *legg.* edd. (*del.* Morstadt[*Emend.* {1866} 6], *legg.* Christ Canto : τοῦτο *coni.* Hirschig). For ἢ describing the *comparandum* after it was broached by the genitive of comparison (οὗ, C2) cf. *Crito* 44C2-3; *Leg.* 738E1-2, 811D6-7; *Phdo.* 89D2-3; *Thg.* 127B3-4; *H. Il.* 15.509-10; Riddell §163 and Matthiae *Gr.Gr.* §450.

1547 ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα (C5): ταῦτα is ironical auxesis along the same lines as ἀνδρὸς: "Those many duties you wot of," Cope. He is remembering Callicles's expression at 485D4-5, 484D2, and before (*pace* Olymp. who thinks [154.11-12] the ἀνήρ is Gorgias, telling him to answer [497B4-10]!). For δὴ in quasi-quotations cf. Denniston, 234-5.

νῦν πολιτεύεσθε,<sup>1548</sup> ἢ ἐπὶ<sup>1549</sup> τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων.<sup>1550</sup> ἴσως [d] οὖν βέλτιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι,<sup>1551</sup> διελομένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν<sup>1552</sup> τούτῳ διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι τί τε<sup>1553</sup> διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοισιν καὶ ὀπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὐπω οἴσθα τί λέγω ...<sup>1554</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον<sup>1555</sup> ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὁμολογήκαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δὲ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως,<sup>1556</sup> τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ

- 1548 ἀσκοῦντα ... πολιτευόμενον (C5-6): The participles are exegetical appositives to πράττοντα λέγοντά τε (for the doublet cf. n. 2171), itself agreeing with the implicit subject accusative of ζῆν (or of the τρέπειν we might supply with παρακαλεῖς: cf. next note). The ὑμεῖς includes one πολίτης and two sophists from out of town and thereby broaches the ambivalence or incoherence of Callicles's own métier.
- 1549 Reading ἐπὶ (C7) with all mss., *legg.* Heindorf Beck Routh Hermann Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sommer Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Feix. Findeisen's suggestion either to emend it to ἐτι, or to omit it (the latter followed by Heindorf Hirschig Thompson Schanz Christ Sauppe Ovink Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Dodds Theiler Cantarín), fails to see that that ἐπὶ at C4 was already to be construed as the impletion of τρόπον (παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ [*sc.* τρέπειν] ἐπὶ), rather than leaving παρακαλεῖς with a bare prepositional phrase. τόνδε contrasts already with the ταῦτα of C5 and C6.
- 1550 ἐστὶν ... διαφέρων (C8): Of the periphrastic formulation (or use of the participle as "predicate": Goodwin, *GMT* §830), Ast provides a collection from the *Laws*: 713B3, 718C3-4, 729B3-4, 755D3(*sc.* εἶναι), 776C9, 859E9, 860E5, 895E1, 909B7, 909E3, 919B1-2, 933A1, 963A2-3, 963B2. Cf. also *Rep.* 374E1-2, 490A4, 569B7-C4 (thrice!). Croiset (only) reports that Y lacks the text from ἐκείνου (C8) to τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν, at 503C7-8.
- 1551 ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι (D1): Cron was the first to ask to what Socrates is referring with ἄρτι ἐπεχείρησα and first to note that διαιρεῖσθαι is here used absolutely (as emphasized by the absolute participle that follows – with Feix Nichols), leading him to recognize it as a reference to the method Socrates used once a real investigation was seriously embraced, as at 495C1-3 (διελοῦ [C3], and *n.b.* ἐπιχειρῶμεν [C1], as here – *pace* Dalfen who takes it here to mean not "try" but *angefangen*), or was perceived to be crucial (as here, attaching to the question πῶς βιωτέον) – namely dihaeresis, immediately signalled by the construction ἔστι διττῷ and subsequently deployed (D6-10), which begins with that same division. Cf. n. 1449 *ad* 495C3, *Olymp.* 154.18-23, and schol. *ad* 500C. Lodge notes the absolute use and even that it relies for its sense on 495C, but does not see ἄρτι as referring to that passage and instead casts about to find others. Sauppe flatly cites 464B, thematically relevant, and Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Chambry Hamilton Irwin Allen Canto Piettre add an object in translating, all these problems solved by taking διαιρεῖσθαι to be absolute. Dodds refers, too broadly, to 495D-500A.
- 1552 Reading ἔστιν (D2) with all mss. *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. Hirschig (Utrecht ed., 1873) conjectured ἐστὸν, accepted by Dodds Theiler, but later (ed. Paris 1880) went back to reading the mss. Later edd. do not report the enclitic forms that Schanz reported from B and T. Orthotone εἰ ἔστιν, if we read it, is stipulating the existence of the two lives *as a pair* (more exactly the truth of hypothesizing them: neither the absence of the dual article [as in Aldine and Stephanus] nor its presence is enough to make the verb only copulative, *pace* Thompson): neither of them is two, but that they are two then constitutes the dilemma: the discrepancy of singular and plural is mooted by the word order. O. Wilpert's argument (*N. Jahrb. philol. päd.* 155[1897]507) that the dual in the next sentence being used for comparing the two lives (διαφέρετον), after the pair has been hypothesized, is therefore not conclusive ("schliessen") for reading the dual in this previous sentence. The so-called *schema pindaricum* – a plural subject putatively joined to a singular verb (e.g., Smyth §961) – is in itself no explanation, nor "justified by Pindar's usage": Gildersleeve §§117-8 (and *ad P. Ol.* 11.6) and Starkie (*ad Ar. Vesp.* 1301) eschew that grammatical category and explain the putative instances by the flowing logic of the word order.
- 1553 Reading τε (D3) from BRP, *legg.* edd. (*om.* F) as highly preferable for its rhythm.
- 1554 οὐπω οἴσθα τί λέγω (D4) invites Callicles to reiterate his obstructionist claim of ignorance from 498D1 (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις), itself repeated from 497B3 (and 497A6). He does so, and Socrates exploits the opportunity to speak further (connective οὖν moving to the next step: Denniston 425-6) by way of clarification, indicating that given the seriousness of the topic he is willing to take over the discussion if necessary.
- 1555 σαφέστερον (D6): Socrates now takes Callicles's dismissive colloquialism (cf. n. 1479) literally, as an excuse to reestablish dialectical in place of colloquial conversation. For τὸ σαφές achieved through dihaeresis, cf. 463E1. The opposite can occur – where a colloquialism derails dialectical into casual conversation (cf. my n. to *Lach.* 193C8), but by now Socrates is immune to detours. Conversation has its pathologies for better and for worse – to acknowledge and display the importance and variegation of which Plato wrote dialogues.
- 1556 μελέτην τινὰ ... καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως (D8-9): μελέτη adds a new note, as acknowledged by τινὰ. Socrates does need a term that would bridge the divide he has introduced between τέχνη and ἐμπειρία, but just above he used παρασκευαί (B1) and earlier, ἐπιτήδευσις and its cogeners, for this purpose (462E3-463B). μελέτη introduces the dimension of subjective commitment (cf. 485E6-7 and 501B8), mildly expanding or shifting the semantic field to enable the previous argumentation, essentially epistemological or professional, to bear upon present topic, namely, the choice of life. The παρασκευὴ τῆς κτήσεως (compare παρασκευαί ... παρασκευάζουσαι, B1-2) is then pinched down into an apparatus at this subject's command, two notions then brought together under the metaphor of a θήρα. The distinction between them was at work at 448D1-10, where Socrates praised Polus as being well equipped in discourse (παρασκευάσθαι, D1), but faulted him for being more committed to oratory than dialogue (μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν, D9: cf. 471D5).



τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ<sup>1557</sup>—αὐτὸ δέ μοι<sup>1558</sup> τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ [e] σύμφαθι ἢ μή.

... σύμφης;<sup>1559</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὕτως φημί.

ΣΩ. ἴθι δὴ, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τοῦσδε<sup>1560</sup> ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαι<sup>1561</sup> μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοὶ ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον<sup>1562</sup> δέ που ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὀσοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, [501] ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ,<sup>1563</sup> λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ<sup>1564</sup> τὴν αἰτίαν ὧν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἢ ἰατρικὴ·<sup>1565</sup> ἢ δ' ἑτέρα<sup>1566</sup> τῆς ἡδονῆς,<sup>1567</sup> πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῆ ἐστὶν ἅπασα, κομιδῆ ἀτέχνως<sup>1568</sup> ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται,<sup>1569</sup> οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως<sup>1570</sup> τε παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν

1557 τὴν μὲν ... ἀγαθοῦ (D9-10): The phrase was suspected and deleted by Hirschig without argument, his suspicions ignored by subsequent edd. It is a clarification to nail down Callicles's agreement to the premisses before going on to the conclusion (Sommer).

1558 Reading δέ μοι (D10) with BTWPΞ1 *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd (δὴ ἐμοὶ F : δὴ μοι Ξ1<sup>2</sup> and the early editions, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Bekker Coraes Sommer Irwin : γέ μοι FlorNf). Dodds conjectures that the readings δὴ and γέ represent attempts to give an apodosis to the ἐπειδὴ clause, whereas in fact Socrates interrupts himself with δέ (as above at 497E1: cf. n. 1496), honoring the proviso that the first step be completed before taking the second step (D2-3 above). Indeed δὴ would suggest, and perhaps require, that the point he isolates was already isolated.

1559 Reading σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφης; (E1) with F (Heindorf Burnet Dodds Cantarin : σύμφαθι ἢ μή σύμφης BTWf (*teste* Cantarin *contra* Dodds). To accept the reading of BTWf as subjunctive (with Routh Ast[1819] Bekker Jowett) requires the punctuation σύμφαθι ἢ μή σύμφης, producing the tolerable sense “Agree or do not agree,” but awkwardly assumes present rather than aorist subjunctive with μή in negative command. However, the present indicative σύμφης is commonly misaccented on the ultima in mss. (Smyth §784), and if we read that form here (with Ast[1832] and edd.), the meaning and required punctuation is, “Agree or don't. ... Do you agree?” which includes the implication that Callicles delays answering (Stallb.: “*pro more suo non statim respondit*”). In either case, explicitly insisting on yes or no is not usual dialectical behavior (the schol. noted Socrates applying such pressure at 489A1, *q.v.*), but Callicles has behaved in an arbitrary way (πανοῦργος, 499B9) and Socrates's relation with him is strained. Cf. 501C5-6 below. With the present indicative, σύμφης, Plato risks that we not notice the pause between Socrates's two requests for an answer, thus risking our misunderstanding something he could have disambiguated with the indirect form of dialogue (nn. 1289, 1249, 553, 918, 841, 818, 640, 545, 135, 132), and this serves as an index of how serious a venture it is that he uses the direct form. A passage like *Charm.* 166B2-3 (*citt.* Heindorf, Thompson), where an assertion is followed by “συγχωρεῖς?”, asking for agreement, is different: in the present case asking for agreement comes twice, because Callicles has paused, and his answer οὕτως (“the latter way”) could not be more grudgingly perfunctory.

1560 τοῦσδε (E3), “first person,” pulls Gorgias and Polus into Socrates's camp (not “our friends” with Cope but “my friends”: cf. *Apol.* 26D7; *Lach.* 181D4; *Rep.* 345A1, 450B3-4 and my nn. *ad locc.*), which threatens to isolate Callicles. Socrates is referring to 464D.

1561 διομολόγησαι (E3): As to what is added by the prefix cf. *Rep.* 392C2 and 507A7. It is to check an argument dialectically by question and answer moving through each of its steps (διὰ: compare also *ἀνά* at *Rep.* 348B3). If at any point the answer is No, the argument fails. Socrates does not merely ask Callicles if he agrees, or if he agrees with the conclusion, but checks his attitude about each step.

1562 λέγειν (E3): The present infinitive represents an imperfect.

1563 ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ (501A1): Note compendious force of δέ – “but medicine (*sc.* does seem to me a τέχνη)” – after negative μὲν clause (which was itself corrected within by οὐκ ... ἀλλά!): compare 482E5 and 526B5-6, contrast 508B2, and consult Denniston, 168: it turns out that οὐ negates the noun, not the verb: cf. *Matthew* 9:13. The compressed expression presumes Callicles remembers or can be reminded. This presumption of remembering is next called upon to cancel the unthinking presumption that the ἢ μὲν at 501A1 resumes the ἢ μὲν of 500E5! On ἀλλά cf. 465A3: Socrates is quoting his very expression.

1564 καὶ ... καὶ (A2): Note the nesting and the chiasm [τινὸς (καὶ) φύσιν VERB (καὶ) αἰτίαν τινός]: the lapidary word order again presupposes recollection or recollectibility.

1565 ἢ ἰατρικὴ (A3) reiterates the subject of the present clause, in hyperbaton, to ensure clarity in the contrast he is drawing, since his new μὲν / δέ treats what had been second first, by dint of its importance. For such reiteration cf. 449C5, 476E5, 518A3, 520B1; *Prot.* 351A2; *Rep.* 604E1-2 (Heindorf, Stallb.).

1566 ἑτέρα (A3): ἢ δέ would have been enough, as Mr Morrissey notices. Socrates wants to stress the conceptual separateness or alterity of knack and art, just as he had the alterity of τὸ ἡδὺ and τὸ ἀγαθόν, above (ἕτερον, 500D8).

1567 Reading τῆς ἡδονῆς (A3) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς FlorNf, *leg.* Hirschig). The genitive in this δέ clause stands in parallel with τούτου (only) in the μὲν clause, and is introduced with similar proleptic abruptness while it suggests that a parallel indicative clause – φύσιν σκέπτεται (an non) – is coming, which here, as there, is delayed by an intervening relative clause (οὐ θεραπεύει ~ πρὸς ἣν ... ἅπασα). But the notion of the intervening clause, of a θεραπεία directed toward pleasure, is only speciously parallel to a θεραπεία that cares for its patient (ἅπασα acknowledging and stressing that the patient is being *ignored* for the goal), and this conceptual inconcinnity is suddenly isolated for separate treatment (φύσιν again postponed), a treatment that with ἔρχεται arrogates to itself the privileged rank of the indicative, demoting the anticipated σκέπτεσθαι to the status of a participle, in its wake (σκεψαμένη, A5). It is less an anacoluthon (Hirschig) than a *constructio ad sensum*, where the controlling affect is Socrates's indignation about this pretender to art, a feeling he discharges with a heap of derogation done by the participial phrases that follow.

1568 Reading ἀτέχνως (A4) with B<sup>2</sup>PW and edd. (ἀτεχνῶς BTF Steph.): κομιδῆ already means ἀτεχνῶς.

1569 ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται (A4-5): Artlessly vague language describing its headlong pursuit, αὐτὴν (rather than ταύτην) stressing its blinkered focus. The spatio-physical metaphor ἐπέρχεσθαι, like θήραν at 500D10, is general enough to describe both the doctor and the delicatessen while it adds an almost military aggressiveness.

1570 Reading ἀλόγως (A6) with mss. and edd., generalizing the parallel adverb, ἀτέχνως, with which it is linked by τε. The idea was stated at 465A6. Findeisen's emendation to ἄλογος was accepted by Heindorf Ast Beck Coraes by dint of Ficinus's tr. *temeraria prorsus* and talk of an ἄλογος



διαριθμησαμένη,<sup>1571</sup> τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμην<sup>1572</sup> μόνον σφζομένη [b] τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται<sup>1573</sup> τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἰκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες<sup>1574</sup> καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι πραγματεῖαι,<sup>1575</sup> αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν<sup>1576</sup> τινα ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγοροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμένα δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ<sup>1577</sup> τρόπον γίνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων<sup>1578</sup> ἢ χείρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι [c] μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακειάν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἂν τις<sup>1579</sup> τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύη, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονος<sup>1580</sup> τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι<sup>1581</sup> ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν<sup>1582</sup> ἢ ἀντίφης;<sup>1583</sup>

τριβῆ in later authors (ApuL. *de dogm. plat.* 2.8, Quint. 10.7.11) but that talk does not warrant ignoring the unanimous testimony of the mss. This phrase can be added with mere τε (*pace* Findeisen, who wanted δέ) because it continues the compare-and-contrast with the μὲν clause, redoing λόγον ... δοῦναι (A2-3).

- 1571 διαριθμησαμένη (A7), of an orderly drawing of distinctions and categories (*schol. vet.*: ἀντι τοῦ διακρίνασα ἢ διαλογισαμένη). The term comes in handy for describing the method of dihaeresis (*Phdrs.* 273E1) – the thorough enumeration of species – but is not restricted to that method (*Leg.* 818C6). It stands in contrast with ἀλόγως by dint of a latent pun on the ambiguity of λόγος as a count. Cf. also Ast, *Lex. Plat.*, s.v. ἀριθμεῖν.
- 1572 Reading τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμην (A7) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. (τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμη E1E2E3, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Routh Bekker : τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμη Par, *legg.* Coraes Schleiermacher : τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμην Vat, *legg.* Ast Cary Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Sauppe : τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμη CE1 : τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμην S1YVTJQ). Burnet's apparatus reports only “τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμη *vulg.*” The readings with nominatives abruptly introduce extenuated apposition, whereas the reading of the majority of mss., with its nouns in oblique cases, preserves and continues the syntactical pattern of circumstantial participles (σκεψαμένη, διαριθμησαμένη, σφζομένη), and so I accept them. The failures described by the first two are capped by the meagre success allowed by the third. Moreover, with Dodds, the datives of means convene nicely with the foregoing adverb, ἀλόγως.
- 1573 ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται (B1): The antecedent of (neuter) ᾧ is all that came before. Finally we get a finite verb, though dropped into a relative clause, which ends the heavily participial sentence in the manner of a just-so story (“and that is how she is enabled to provide her pleasures,” Lamb). Heindorf is right to compare the present sentence with Socrates's heap of participles about Eros at *Phdrs.* 238B7-C4, a sentence that similarly culminates in a “just so” etymology (ἔρωσ ἐκλήθη), though his reading replaces the participial structure with an appositive one. τὰς is quasi-possessive and καὶ helps the “just so” feeling, by acknowledging we already know the pleasures it provides. For the indignant heap of participles compare the sudden shift in tone and syntax when Socrates described pandering oratory, at 465B2-6.
- 1574 εἶναί τινες (B2-3): The infinitive with the nominative requires us to supply δοκοῦσι, parallel (though imperfectly so) with δοκεῖ (B2). Its implicit presence here is corroborated at C2.
- 1575 πραγματεῖαι (B3), standing in for παρασκευαί (500B1), again avoiding τέχνη (cf. n. 1539) which is undoubtedly the noun behind the idiomatic but uncritical use of the feminine suffix, -ική, for all these specialties.
- 1576 προμήθειαν (B4) includes (with Kratz Deuschle-Cron Lodge), but is not limited to, criticizing artlessness's sole reliance on memory of the past (A7): the main idea is a solicitudinous and prudently comprehensive view as opposed to a careless and even obsessive concentration on pleasure.
- 1577 Reading αὐτῇ (B6) with T, *legg.* Routh Schleiermacher Beck Cary Cope Jowett Helmbold Chambry (αὐτῇ BWPF, *legg.* edd : αὐτῇ *coni.* Heindorf). The expression continues to squint toward pleasure in itself: αὐτῇ is “itself” and does not need to be saved by Heindorf's attempt to turn it into a demonstrative (“mere gratification,” Cope, is correct). The present optative γίνοιτο (B7) represents a generalizing present indicative in “original” direct discourse. Narrating the prior agreement between Socrates and Polus and Gorgias establishes secondary sequence.
- 1578 ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων (B7), reading ἡ βελτίων on the basis of B (*h. legens, teste* Cantarin), with edd. (ἡ βελτίων TWF, *leg.* Beck). We might have expected quantity rather than quality, but for this outlook more is better. Note, again, the definite interrogative in the first clause (τίνα B6) varied with the indirect in the second, cf. n. 170.
- 1579 περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου ἂν τις ... (C3-4): With the repetition of this gratuitously general formulation (cf. 501A, τούτου οὐ θεραπεύει) we begin to wonder what category (or thing, literally: αὐτό is neuter, *pace* Irwin) there could be to administer to, beyond the exhaustive doublet of the individual man's body and soul. Soon enough we shall see.
- 1580 ἀμείνονος (C5), replacing βέλτιον / βέλτιστον above – a similar variation at 468B2, B6. The genitive is *curandi et negligendi*, with ἀσκέπτως ἔχειν equivalent to ἀμελεῖν.
- 1581 συγκατατίθεσαι (C5) suggests investing in a joint venture or agreement with Socrates, Polus, and Gorgias (cf. 500A7-8) about the two types of activity (not only with Socrates, *pace* Heindorf, who wrongly asserts “ἡμῖν *modeste pro* ἐμοὶ *adhibitum*”). It begs comparison with his allusion to Callicles voting along with himself and with Polus on the previous question of means and ends (499E7-500A2). Reaching dialectical agreement is again being compared to legislating or doing business together (484D2-5: cf. 495D2-E2) – i.e., πολιτεύεσθαι. To worry that the other two did not fully grant what the logos reached (so that ἡμῖν might better be ἐμοί: Jahn) overlooks the corporate character of conversation and dialectic.
- 1582 Reading τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν (C6) with mss. and edd. (τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἔχων J : *secl.* Thompson Christ), an accusative of respect at least (*pace* Thompson and Christ, who atheize it expecting a dative [by dint of συν-], a service performed however by αὐτῇ), or else a hearkening back to the originally transitive use of κατατίθεσθαι (Dodds, citing Theognis 717: γνόμην ταύτην καταθέσθαι, whence Irwin's ugly “deposit”), added, in any event, to close the long and complicated paragraph with a restatement of the modality of all its assertions, namely that they are *judgments* as if legislative findings (not mere opinions), and thereby take on a binding effect.
- 1583 ἀντίφης (C6): Again Socrates insists on Yes or No (cf. 500D10-E1 and n.); but note also that political voting also, to which he here alludes, is always up or down, pro or con.

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἔγωγε,<sup>1584</sup> ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ<sup>1585</sup> ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι. [d]

ΣΩ. πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο,<sup>1586</sup> περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς<sup>1587</sup> οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ,<sup>1588</sup> ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις<sup>1589</sup> ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μηδὲν<sup>1590</sup> σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἴτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις<sup>1591</sup> αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν<sup>1592</sup> ἂν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μή

- 1584 οὐκ ἔγωγε (C7), answering the whole by answering only the closing alternative, as often, though this time forgoing the disambiguating τοῦτο (“the latter,” used at 488B7, 493D4, 500E2, 502A2, 504B6; and cf. nn. 138, 1588). The sequel ensures this is what he is saying, at the same time that it suggests he believes the contrary.
- 1585 σοι καὶ περανθῇ (C7): σοι singular (vs. Socrates’s plural, ἡμῖν, B6), an ethical dative so as to make a parallel (Kratz) with dative Γοργία (*an σοί legendum?*), with καὶ ... καὶ being both/and. Callicles’s emphatic agreement (ἔγωγε ... ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ) is immediately undercut by his ἵνα clause (Lodge). Careless of the argument, Callicles is vying for alliances in the manner of a politician: with Γοργία τῷδε he claims Gorgias back to his side (vs. τοῦσδε, 500E3; cf. n. 1560, reiterated by Socrates’s ἡμῖν). For the late position of καὶ cf. Denniston 298 (and compare *Apol.*22A7, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτον...). The dative σοι, by which he wants to subjectivize the entire conversation, is reminiscent of Polus’s σοι at 480E2.
- 1586 τοῦτο (D1): Again a foggy neuter singular (cf. ἄλλο ὅσων, C4), and again what is meant to be the antecedent is unclear (cf. ᾧ, B1) The singular neuter might refer to the entire argument above (i.e., the characterization and existence of distinction of two kinds of activity), but that was just now done with the neuter plural (τούτων, C6); is it then perhaps a quasi-derogatory neuter echoing τοιούτων (at C2), thus referring only to the inartistic practice of *κολακεία*? We must allow this (i.e., what is being asked about) to remain unclear, as also what is being asked about it: περὶ is entirely vague as is its meaning with μίαν. A less insouciant and more co-operative interlocutor than Callicles would respond to this question with τί ποτε λέγεις? With πότερον Socrates ignores Callicles’s attempt to bring Gorgias over as his ally and asks what is the next question according to the logos: he also is “doing politics,” as we shall see.
- 1587 περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς (D1-2): The καὶ is illative: if for two, then for any plurality. It is different, *pace* edd., from the use at *Polit.*293A3-4 (περὶ ἓνα τινα καὶ δύο καὶ παντάσῃν ὀλίγους), where it means “or” (as at *Alc.* I 110A5; *Phlb.*16D6 [καὶ *alter*]; *Polit.*297C1; cf. also *χθὲς καὶ πρόην*). The question is as irrelevant as it is crucial: from this Socrates makes his way through the back door into portraying oratory as *public* flattery. The audience had up until now been absent from the discussion.
- 1588 οὐκ, ἀλλά ... (D3): Affirming the negatively framed alternative by denying its negative frame, as at 453D11, *Parm.*128A2, *Rep.*405C7. Compare οὐ affirming by denying alternative formulations in ἄλλοις: 477B2, *Th.*149E5; X. *Mem.*2.6.12.
- 1589 καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι (D4): χαρίζεσθαι was prepared above at B8 and with some dramatic irony was used by Callicles in his reason to agree with Socrates, just above at C8. Socrates’s question answers our question about the reference of τοῦτο above, but only implicitly. ἅμα goes with both ἀθρόαις and χαρίζεσθαι. ἀθρόος now moots the question above about a plurality of souls, for Socrates now introduces a new unity, a mob soul as it were, for the adjective combines the notion of plurality and compactness, just as in the *Rep.* it is said that when the public gathers it takes on one and the same δόξα (493A8-9, with my n. ad loc.). δῆμος, after all, is a singular noun designating many persons. Thurot’s *un grand nombre d’âmes* misses this dialectical step. Operating upon a mass mind was of course an essential characteristic of oratory, according to Gorgias (ἐν ὄγλω, 458E7; cf. nn. 247, 259, 292); and the steps of the argument will become clearer as soon as we postulate that it is thither that Socrates is tending.
- 1590 Reading μηδὲν (D4) from F, *legg.* edd., its μή being emphatic (μηδὲ BTWP, *legg.* Hermann[“*ne considerantem quidem*” *vertens*] Ast[1832] Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Mistrisiotis Schmelzer Lodge[“without” *vertens*] Stender Feix Theiler : μη NFlor *teste* Cantarin). The echo below (οὐδὲν, E3), as well as the expression at 464D1 (with Dodds), supports the reading of F.
- 1591 ἐπιτηδεύσεις (D7), varying παρασκευαί and πραγματεῖαι (cf. nn. 1575, 1539; as used above [463AB]), just as πρᾶγμα was there used instead of πραγματεῖα [463A4]: cf. nn. 489, 854), and retreating for the moment from the subjective dimension invoked by μελέτη at 500B8 (cf. n. 1556). By choosing to parcel out the question into cases, Socrates makes his question easier to answer – or harder to evade.
- 1592 ἢ μὲν...ἢ δέ (D8-9): Again requiring a yes or no answer, and involving closely defined alternatives. Reading μή, μή from T<sup>2</sup> WPf and with edd. (μή BTF): surely it is more likely the copiest left one out than added one. For μᾶλλον δέ introducing a preferred alternative, cf. 449A2 and 465C1. For the special sort of epagoge Socrates here proposes, passing through a series of “similar” toward a foreknown target (rather than for instance toward a generalization) compare 494B7-E5, *Alc.* I 111B11-E, *Charm.*173D8-4A and 174B, *Parm.*130B3-D5, *Phdo.*65D4-E1, and *Th.*153A7-D5, 178B2-9A8 (compare also the proposal at *Phlb.*36C3ff). The review of cases may serve to “smoke out” and force the articulation of a general principle at work in the series of empirical decisions (e.g. *Parm.*130BD), or it may serve to explore the reach of a general principle within the world of empirical experience, as it does here. This epagogic tactic or method is analogous to what we have elsewhere called “slips to weld the analogy” (cf. ἀμαρτήματων at 479A8, with n. 950, and my nn. to *Rep.*441A1, 442B2-3), and to the “metabatic list” (cf. *Phdrs.*262A2-3 for the term, and for exx. cf. nn. 407, 1159, 1355), and to “line-drawing” lists and arguments based on them (e.g., 511C4-512D6; *Crat.*429D8-30A5; *Phlb.*36C3ff) – all of these akin to the “substitution of similars” Shorey points out *ad Rep.*349D. The first case adduced should be the most obvious, and this explains the case of flute playing, infamously seductive, obviating any need to bring in the opinion of “Plato” whom Callicles, for instance, does not know. Dodds, with particular obtuseness, dismisses “the passage” (i.e., 501D1-502D8) as a “digression” because “no use is made of it in the subsequent course of the argument” (by this criterion any argument leading to a medial conclusion would be a digression), so as to allege instead that “Plato” is digressing to indulge in condemning “certain other types of public performance” than oratory. What we are reading, however, is not a display by Plato, whether to please himself or his readers, but an epagoge by Socrates just now designed to show Callicles how widely the theoretical distinction between knack and τέχνη he has just agreed to applies in human affairs, and which ultimately

φάθι. [e] πρῶτον δὲ σκεψόμεθα τὴν ἀύλητικὴν. οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὧς  
Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαῖδε ἅπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαρῖστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;<sup>1593</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ ἡ<sup>1594</sup> τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις;<sup>1595</sup> οὐ  
τοιαύτη<sup>1596</sup> τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγῆ τι φροντίζειν Κινησίαν τὸν Μέλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ  
τι τοιοῦτον ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίνωντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει [502] χαριεῖσθαι τῷ  
ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;<sup>1597</sup>

ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτό γε, ὧς Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε<sup>1598</sup> πέρι.

extends to his own métier, and thus to provide a principled basis for evaluating their two lives in philosophy and in politics, which is the goal of the present argument and of the balance of the dialogue, as lately resolved (500B-C8).

- 1593 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν (E6): Whereas the flute is infamously more seductive than the cithara (*Leg.* 700D7-8, *Th.* 173D5; Arist. *Pol.* 1341A18-21 [he has the present passage in mind: cf. 1341B10], 1342B4-5; Iamb. *vit.Pyth.* 111), the otherwise redundant mention of this complementary instrument (cf. *H. Min.* 374E6, 375B7-8; *Ion* 533B6, *Leg.* 764E1) provides a berth to introduce the element of public competition and crass crowd mentality (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1341B10-14), and thus takes another step toward the oratorical scenario.
- 1594 τί δὲ ἡ (E8): For examples of this syntactically abbreviated and unpunctuated introduction of a parallel question (τί δὲ plus noun in the case continued from previous question), as below at 502A4, B1, D10; 504B4, *al.*, Stallb. cites *Parm.* 132A6, *Phdo.* 65D4; *S. Ai.* 101 (τί γὰρ δὴ), *AGPS* (64.5.3.E) adds Charm. 167D4; *Phdo.* 65A9, 78D10; *X. Mem.* 3.1.10. Cf. also E. *IT* 576, and in Latin, Ter. *Ad.* 656 (*quid ipsae? quid aiunt?*). It only means “What about X?” asked in the wake of a previous question (as here, relying on forward-pointing τοιαῖδε at E5 and E1-3), or announcing that a new question will now be formulated (as at 502D10 and E2-3), or in the cases below (502B1, 504B4), where the old question is assumed by the formula and then restated, reformulated, or elaborated (B2-8): in itself the formula only introduces the subject about which a question will be asked.
- 1595 διδασκαλία ... ποίησις (E8-9): After flute and cithara playing comes a “taught” form of dancing (χορῶν διδασκαλία) “and” (καί) an entertainment that employs language διθυράμβων ποίησις. Dithyramb is a song and dance performance with a double chorus configured circularly rather than rectilinearly as in tragedy. It is not the only kind of directed dance. ποίησις here refers to the words of the song, even if the language of the dithyramb was infamous for being distracted by the music (Plut. *Mor.* 1132E; cf. “...the excessive predominance of the music tended to make the libretto vapid and silly” [Pickard-Cambridge, *DTC* 51]), and was gratuitously flowery (*Crat.* 409C3; Ar. *Pax* 827ff; Arist. *Po.* 1459A8-9; cf. Athenaeus’s quotation from Timotheus’s Cyclops at *Deipn.* 11.465C [=PMG frg.780] and the almost nonsensical passages from his *Persae* [PMG frgg.788-791]). The modern analogue might be the chromatic music-dramas of Richard Wagner, and in particular the flowing syllables of the Rhinemaidens and Valkyries. As for the expression and materials Socrates has chosen, διδασκαλία is quirky for its misdirected suggestion of τέχνη, while ποίησις introduces language, which advances toward the goal of spoken oratorical performance.
- 1596 τοιαύτη καταφαίνεται (E9), with τοιαύτη again pointing backward. Why the singular? Is the pair (διδασκαλία / ποίησις) a sort of hendiadys, as some suppose (Waterfield: “what about training choruses to sing dithyrambic poetry you’ve composed?”) || Cary: “the representation of choruses and dithyrambic poetry”), without warrant since not all χοροὶ are or were dithyrambic? Cope and Lamb ignore the singular and translate with a plural, as do Hamilton (saving his mistranslation with a footnote that Socrates is not talking about all choral poetry) and Piettre; Chambry tries for both (“n’est-il pas manifeste ... que qu’elles sont...” as if καταφαίνεται were impersonal); Irwin Zeyl Nichols translate “literally” with a singular, supplying “that” for its subject, which merely imports the problem into English; Allen translates καὶ with “or,” which shows he sees the problem, but then uses the plural with καταφαίνεται; Jahn Kratz Canto claim that the choruses are dithyrambic, which Dodds presumes without argument (which almost licenses him to remain silent about the singular). Repetition of the article tells against hendiadys. In fact, καὶ can mean “or,” as often in certain quantitative phrases (470D1, 501D1-2; *Alc.* 1 110A5; *Leg.* 902A1, 937B4; *Phlb.* 16D6; *Polit.* 293A3-4, 297C1), but also to add a preferred case in quasi-correction or explanation, a use that England in particular appreciated (*ad Leg.* 639A5, 640D6, 680E2, 690A2, 691C7, 696A1-2, 799D1, 800C3, 843E1, 845C2, 863A7) and Denniston in particular did not (noting only in very general terms a use “connecting appositionally related ideas” [291]). Cf. also n. 1587. I take the second item (δημος) to be a focussing epexegetis ousting the first (compare Jahn who takes καὶ to link *Gattungsbegriff* and *Artbegriff* citing Krüger 69.32.2 [who cites. T. 3.33.2 and 5.112.2: cf. AGPS 69.32.2.D], Kratz, and Croiset: “ainsi Socrate ne s’en prend qu’à une partie du lyrisme chorale,” and Erler): in the sequel Socrates mentions the poetry (ἐρεῖ, E10) not the dancing. Compare note *ad* 502A7-8, below.
- 1597 τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν (502A1): Note the shift of expression from the plural οἱ ἀκούοντες – envisioning individuals who as individuals might be improved by hearing, in the sense that only individuals have souls to improve – to the singular and impersonal ὄχλος of θεαταὶ crowded into a θέατρον, which is the target of the whole sequence (cf. ἀθροῖας, D4).
- 1598 Κινησίου γε (A2): A dithyrambic poet about whom Pherecrates wrote some derogatory iambs quoted by Plut. (*Mor.* 1141D-2A). Cf. also Ar. *Av.* 1373-1404, *Ran.* 153 and 1437, *Nub.* 333 (probably referring to him). He was moreover the namesake for a comedy by Strattis (Harp. *Lex.* 1.178.3-4 [Dindorf]), Athen. 12.551D), in which he is characterized as a “chorus-killer” (χοροκτονος, fr.15 [1.716 Kock], cf. schol. *ad* Ar. *Ran.* 404). Of his dithyrambs only two words survive, “Achilles of Phthia,” which he is said to have repeated *ad nauseam*. (fr.18 [1.716 Kock]. For bare τοῦτο signalling agreement with the latter alternative, cf. 493D4.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ<sup>1599</sup> Μέλῃς; ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων<sup>1600</sup> ἐδόκει σοι  
κιθαρωδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἀλλὰ  
δὴ<sup>1601</sup> σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ<sup>1602</sup> σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις  
ἡδονῆς χάριν ἠϋρῆσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε. [b]

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ<sup>1603</sup> ἡ σεμνὴ αὐτῆ καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ<sup>1604</sup> τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις;<sup>1605</sup>  
πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ,<sup>1606</sup> χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς

- 1599 ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ (A4): For accidental, irrelevant, and gratuitous connections between items brought forth in an epagoge, and even wisecrack asides – “a mere passing fling,” Woolsey – (A5-6), cf. 488E2 and n. 1244, 448B5ff and n. 151. The immediate purpose is to continue with and confirm the role of language – song augmenting the κιθαίρα ψιλή above, an internal connection between the elements of the epagoge that is relevant. Socrates’s shift to imperfects acknowledges that Callicles would have heard Kinesias’s father’s music earlier, another detail entirely irrelevant to the epagoge. But also the focus is here placed on the crowd, in this case not only not helped but not even pleased. Induction depends upon continually recognizing similarities as much as differences, and relevancy as much as irrelevancy (the reader is “left to feel his way,” Riddell §49, on *Rep.*400C7-1A8). Thus, exemplary material is presented with studious inconsistency (*Prot.*312C4-E6; *Th.*178B4-5 [cf. 171E2-3]), with overlapping substitution and stepwise progression in the selection of items (450D6-7 [vs. 451B1-C5], 468B4-469C, 517C2-3; *Charm.*165E6 [vs. 166A5-B3], 167C8-8A8, 170AC; *Euthyd.*287A6-B5; *H. Min.*373C9-5D6 *passim*; *Ion* 533B6f, 537C1-D2; *Lach.*192A4-6 [linkage provided by mouth/voice]; *Leg.*647B5-C2, 689A5-7, 709A3-7 [vs. B2-3, where sailing appropriates the argument at B7ff], 889B6-8 [vs. 892B3-4], 958C7-D3; *Lys.*215D4-E1; *Meno* 71E5-2A1; *Parm.*142A3-4 [cf. 155D6-8]; *Phdo.*70E4-71A10 [vs. 71B2ff]; *Prot.*311B5-C7 [vs. E2-3]; *Rep.*333B4-9, 335E8-9 [vs. 336A5-7], 357C5-7, 433D2-4, 494C5-7; *Symp.*200B4-D7 and cf. Shorey, *Rep.* Loeb vol. I pp.48a, 295d, variation in order (*Leg.*733E3-6, 734D2-4), inclusion of an incongruous item (ἐταῖρα at *Rep.*373A3), with varied syntax in the recitation of parallel items (*Alc. I* 106E6-7; *Crat.*411C4-5; *Leg.*709A3-7, 738C1-2, 782A5-B1, 835A7-B1, 897A1-3, 906B7, 947E5, 956E1-7; *Lys.*215E5-8; *Menex.*249B5-6; *Phlb.*11B4-6, 51B3-5, 56B8-9; *Prot.*319C3-4, 324E3-5A2, 332B6-C1, 357A7f; *Thg.*122E10-11; *Tim.*82A8-B2), with parallelism in syntax but not in sense (457D6, *Charm.*161E12-13, *Leg.*744C2; *Phlb.*53B10-C2), and with rhyme or etymology, sometimes helpful but sometimes misleading (*Crat.*388A2-7, 416D1-5; *Leg.*733B6-7, 956E1 [and Stallb. *ad loc.*]; *Phlb.*12C8-D4, 14D7; *Rep.*348C5ff, 400DE, 439E5 [n.b. ἴσως]; *Theag.*125B5-D7; *Th.*171E5-6). Cf. Campbell *ad Th.*147B1: “It is in Plato’s manner to surprise us with a fresh example at each step of the argument instead of dwelling upon one already adduced.”
- 1600 βλέπων (A5), absent only from Γ, is bracketed by Hirschig, but maintained by all subsequent edd. It is a case of “subordinate insubordination,” the main predication being carried by the subordinate participle, so distinctive in Greek (cf. nn. 340, 746, 1381).
- 1601 ἀλλὰ δὴ (A6), as if Socrates were bringing himself back to the point (cf. Denniston, 241) and back from casual irrelevancy and individual cases to the whole genre (whence πᾶσα). In all strictness, Callicles had agreed only to the case of Kinesias, but now he will accept the generalization (ἔμοιγε, A9), a generalization underscored by the essentialistic perfect, ἠϋρῆσθαι (continued by the perfects at B2 [if we are to read ἐσπούδακεν], B8, and C1), with dithyramb repeated in chiasmic closure, preparing the way for the next big step. For the perfect compare πεποιήνται, 512D6.
- 1602 δοκεῖ (A7), again a singular where we might expect a plural (as at 501A9), this time mitigated by the pairing made more intimate by the addition of τε. Compare *Rep.*568A8-9: ἢ τε τραγωδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ Ὀὔριπιδος διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ.
- 1603 Reading τί δὲ δὴ (B1) with mss. and edd. (τί δαὶ δὴ B : τί δὲ only in the early editions *teste* Cantarin, *leg.* Routh), parallel and climactic to τί δὲ as used twice above (501E8, A4). The parallelism disables or preempts it from providing an antecedent for subsequent ᾗ (even if we supply τοῦτο, *pace* edd.): see below. δὴ added to δὲ generally emphasizes or adds focus to the transition to a new term, as for instance from parallels or foil or analogues to the target case, in an epagoge (*Charm.*169E4; *Leg.*808D3, 836A6, 962A9; *Phdo.*65A9; *Polit.*295E4, 296C4 and 8; *Prot.*311D1, 312A1, 312E2; *Rep.*333A10, 342A1, 407A4, 439A1, 470E4, 523E3; *Th.*189A6), or to the conclusion of an argument *ex contrariis* (*Rep.*374C2; *Thg.*123C6 and D15, 126C3; *Soph.*221D1), or as here marking a “stronger” transition (Adam *ad Crito* 49C2) to the extreme case to which the argument pertains (cf. *Rep.*351E6). Compare use of νῦν for transitioning from the supposititious to the actual (515A1. *Prot.*311D1). With Socrates’s culminating case of tragedy, words become separable from music (in the episodes vs. the choral passages), enabling him next to “remove” music and be left with words only (C5-7), so as to complete his dialectical route to oratory.
- 1604 ἡ σεμνὴ αὐτῆ καὶ θαυμαστή ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις (B1): In this case Socrates provides not a suggestive case, as above, but a satirical and negative characterization of the whole genre. The demonstrative inserted into attributive position and the doubling of attribution with a second ἡ makes of it a breathless vaunt (cf. *Symp.*213E2 for a more inebriated breathlessness, and *Crat.*398B7, *Leg.*706A4-5, *Phdo.*64D10-11, *Rep.*565D6-7), and cf. n. 2316. The bombastic phrase recalls today’s opera productions, so high in public estimation (or expense at least), despite their appallingly uncertain quality. σεμνὴ and its cognates are almost always ironically derogatory in Plato (cf. deVries, *Mnem.*12[2]6[1944]151–156), here heightened by derogatory αὐτῆ (cf. nn. 241, 428, 437, 648, 721, 821, 1074). Nevertheless, “Plato’s” estimation of tragedy is not here at play, only Socrates’s need to gain Callicles’s acquiescence in this next step. Dodds notes that the comic Crates referred to the σεμνὸς λόγος one finds among the tragedians (frg.24 [1.138 Kock]), but the lines above suggest that Socrates is pointing to the expense and labors that go into producing tragedy for the sake of winning a contest (with Canto: compare, again, the expense of modern opera productions!). Even if the judges have better taste than the general public (cf. *Leg.*659B2-C3, criticizing Sicily for granting the prize by public acclaim) the operant question is whether they prefer morals over entertainment, as would few of Plato’s anti-puritanical critics of today.
- 1605 Deleting ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν (B2) with Cobet (*Mnem.*3[1875]141), *legg.* Schanz Christ Stender Sauppe Ovink Croiset Zimmermann Hamilton Canto Piettre, though it is present in all mss. and accepted by most edd. (there is no antecedent for ᾧ: cf. n. 1603, *supra*); and I read αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ (B2-3) with all mss. and most edd. (*secll.* Hermann, *legg.* Jahn Kratz Deuschle). For ἐπιχείρημα compare ἐπί in the derogatorily general expression ἐπέργεσθαι at 501A4-5 (with n. 1569). σπουδὴ also slums from time to time, in Plato’s usage (e.g., *Phlb.*15A4-7). ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν is perhaps a marginal exegesis meant to clarify how καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ characterizes ἐπιχείρημα (ᾧ thus neuter), using the perfect in imitation of those at A8 and B8, which properly appear at the close of the two accounts, not here. Hermann instead bracketed, as a redundant marginale, the subsequent αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, which however is syntactically blameless. Theiler cuts and pastes the words found in the mss. to produce πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα ἐφ’ ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν, also syntactically blameless – but like Dodd’s emendation at 498B1 he therewith severs any umbilical relation with the mss.
- 1606 Reading ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ (B3), emphatic, on the superior testimony of TWPF, *legg.* edd. (ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ B, *leg.* Lodge : ὡς μοι δοκεῖ *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Croiset Zimmermann Canto : *secl.* Ast, *legg.* Helmbold Piettre : ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖν *coni.* Kratz [*Correspondenzbl.*15 {1868} 130], *leg.* Dodds). Doubt as to the viability of the phrase in Greek, which led to the conjectures, is shown by the viability of translating “is it, as you think”



θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι,<sup>1607</sup> ἔάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἦ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἐρεῖ,<sup>1608</sup> εἰ δέ<sup>1609</sup> τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον,<sup>1610</sup> τοῦτο δὲ καὶ λέξει<sup>1611</sup> καὶ ἄσεται, ἔάντε χαίρωσιν ἔάντε μὴ; ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι<sup>1612</sup> ἢ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ποιήσις;

ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι<sup>1613</sup> πρὸς τὴν [c] ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὄρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον,<sup>1614</sup> ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

with Zeyl or *deiner Meinung nach* with Dalfen. Socrates's opening characterization of this ποιήσις makes the conjecture of Schanz an insipient redundancy. With his emphatic orthotone σοί Socrates is inviting Callicles to take exception to the usual exaltation of the genre he has just satirized (with Mistriotis, who also notes his epanalepsis of σοι δοκεῖ at B7), and so ποτέρον is already asking for a “No” answer, and is almost a declaration, leaving ὡς σοι δοκεῖ to be an appropriate way to put the question (*pace* Heindorf). How can we expect Callicles to esteem the motives of Sophocles above his own?

- 1607 διαμάχεσθαι (B4): The military etymology of this verb seems entirely quiescent in its usage, as in the English idiom “take up cudgels,” but nevertheless is an exaggerated way (φροντίζειν [after χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, E3, E10] is the anticipated verb) to talk about the *utile* as opposed to the *dulce* in poetry. Schmelzer goes so far as to say Socrates adopts a puritanical tone in order to elicit a contrarian hedonistic response from Callicles (so also Mistriotis), so that he can then infer tragedy is κολακεία (C2), and move on to the target case of oratory.
- 1608 ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖ (B5) brings forward the language of the previous parallel example of Kinesias (E10), corroborating the impression that διαμάχεσθαι stands in for φροντίζειν.
- 1609 εἰ δέ (B5-6): The shift from ἔάν + subjunctive (B4) to εἰ + indicative has no special force (Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis), but “has come to be a rule” (Lodge), namely that the negative of ἔάν μὲν clause is done in the δέ clause with εἰ δέ (plus future indicative in the context of a future more vivid condition and plus present in that of a present general condition, when at least the verb is expressed, which is often unneeded). Cf. 470A10-12 and 504C5-6 (with nn. 701, and 1683), but note that in those two cases the μὲν / δέ structure was announced immediately with the protasis, whereas here, the announcement is postponed to the apodosis (τοῦτο μὲν, B5). To point the contrast between the apodoses (in addition to that between the alternate protases), the apodosis characteristically gets its own δέ (“apodotic,” Denniston: cf. *Alc. I* 109A2; *Charm.* 173D5; *Phdo.* 78C8, 81B8; *H.Min.* 364E3; *Lach.* 194D2).
- 1610 Reading τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον (B6), with mss. and edd. τυγχάνειν and other such verbs constructed with the supplementary participle can omit ὄν, *pace* Hirschig who adds it here (Smyth §2119): cf. *Alc. I* 129A2, 133A10, *H.Maj.* 300A2, *Leg.* 918C4, *Phdo.* 62A4 (*pace* Heindorf), *Prot.* 313E3, *Rep.* 369B6 (*pace* Porson and Hartmann), *Tim.* 61C8; *Ar. Eccl.* 1141; *S. Ai.* 9, *El.* 46 and 313; *E. Andr.* 1113; *X. HG* 4.3.3. Dodds notes that haplography cannot be blamed at *H.Maj.* 300A2, *Leg.* 918C4, *Tim.* 61C8, but perhaps it can be, given the error at *Phdrs.* 230A4 (ὄν TW *pro* ὄν *legentes*). Note that in the presentation of a converse contrast, the apparatus for contrasting the pair (here, μὲν / δέ) can be dropped: the link between the second contrasting pair is done with flat καὶ (*pace* Deuschle, ἀληθὲς *pro* ἀηδὲς *ponens*, followed by Jowett [*ut vid.*] and Christ – there is no need therefore, with Schmidt [*Beitr.* {1874} 212] to adduce *S. OR.* 60 so as to excuse it as an example of A καὶ B = A μὲν B δέ, against which moreover cf. Jebb *ad loc.*). Similarly, καὶ is regularly used to link both two opposites (or complementaries) with each other, and the pair of opposites they constitute with another pair, in contexts where the notion of opposition or complementarity is immediately established by the semantics of the first two terms, or (as here) by the previous context (459D1-2, *Crito* 47C9-10; *H.Maj.* 292D1-3; *Ion* 540B3-5; *Leg.* 696A6, 838D7-8, 863E6-8, 896D5-7; *Parm.* 136B4-8; *Phdo.* 81B5-6, 86B8-9; *Phdrs.* 277D10-E1; *Phlb.* 14D2-3, 25C5-11, 42C10-D1; *Polit.* 295E4-5; *Prot.* 356A3-5, 357A7-B1; *Rep.* 429C9-D1; *Th.* 172A1-2, 175A3-5, 185C9-D1; *Tim.* 43B3-4; cf. also *Gorg.* 474D1-2, *Rep.* 343C1-2), as can ἢ (*Alc. I* 107B6-7; *Crat.* 389B8-9; *Rep.* 461C1-2, 463C5-7, 493B8-C1) and οὔτε (*Phdo.* 65C5-7). Finally, as to the repetition of τοῦτο before both μὲν and δέ, Dodds compares 512A4/A7 and cites Denniston, 185.
- 1611 λέξει (B6) saliently replaces ἐρεῖ (from B5 and 501E10). This alternative and less used future for λέγω is here pressed into service to denote what the artist “says” with his own voice, as before, but what the dramatist makes his characters “say,” in speech as opposed to song (note correlative καὶ’s), whence the supplemental ἄσεται for what he makes the chorus “say.” Compare his use of the first aorist infinitive with the same meaning, at 522E6.
- 1612 The perfect παρεσκευάσθαι (B8) is mere *variatio* for the perfect, ἠρῆσθαι, above (A8) – i.e., an alternate placeholder for the same slot in the epagodic matrix. The term (*n.b.*, σκεῦη) smacks of what χορηγία can smack of in Aristotle (*Po.* 1453B8; cf. *Pol.* 1331B41ff). It is not beyond Plato’s Socrates to fault tragedy for a detrimental manipulation of the spectators’ emotions (*Rep.* 605A2-6B8), but all that is needed at the present moment is Callicles’s agreement, not that of Glaucon.
- 1613 With δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε ... ὅτι (B9), Callicles readily agrees, though with limits (τοῦτό γε) so as to reassert his autonomy, just as he had above (A2). Predictably (as I believe only Mistriotis saw), Callicles presumes the motives of the tragedians are like his own, and would measure their work by the pleasure it would provide. He likewise will readily dismiss the sophists who take the trouble to teach virtue (520A1-2). Answering Socrates’s ποτέρως with μᾶλλον means they seek to entertain *rather than* to edify, not more than to edify. Still, for the first time his answer does not rule out an ingredient of edification – so much does he concede to the culture of his city, Athens.
- 1614 τοιοῦτον (C2), pointing *ipsissimis verbis* to 501C2-3.



ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοι<sup>1615</sup> τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν  
καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;<sup>1616</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον<sup>1617</sup> οὗτοι λέγονται<sup>1618</sup> οἱ λόγοι;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. δημηγορία<sup>1619</sup> ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητική. [d]

ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.

- 1615 Reading the active, περιέλοι (C5), with F Aristides (*Or.* 3.548 [=2.361.3 Dindorf]), echoed in Sopater's *Prolegomena*, 748.21 *apud* Dodds) and schol.B, *legg.* Coraës Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Erler Cantarín (περιέλοιτο BTWPF, *legg.* edd.), like the parallel the earlier commentators cited from the *Sophist* (264E3), and also *Polit.* 281D3, 288E1. Ast justifies the middle given in the other family of mss. as denoting the self-conscious decision to separate off “for oneself” – i.e., in one’s mind – quoting its use at X. *Cyr.* 8.1.47 (τὸ μὲν περιελέσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ ὄπλα ~ “the thought of disarming them”), but as Dodds notes, the passages from *Soph.* and *Polit.* also describe a mental operation. Moreover, in the Xenophon passage the middle is appropriate exactly because Cyrus decided not to pursue the thought (... ἀπεδοκίμασε, *ibid.*). Perhaps the original was περιέλοι τὸ τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης...
- 1616 τὸ λειπόμενον (C7): γίνονται in the sense of logical implication or “outcome,” the event in thought providing the apodosis for the likewise conceptual “ideal” protasis (cf. nn. 371, 1458). τὸ λειπόμενον is not really the subject as Stallb. Woolsey Sommer Huit Mistriontis *AGPS*(63.6.0.A) claim, requiring themselves thereby to explain the plural γίνονται. τὸ λειπόμενον is rather the left-over, standing in quasi-apposition, that λόγοι become when bereaved, in conception, of rhythm, melody, and meter. The syntax at *Meno* 91C4 (οὗτοι φανερά ἐστι λῶβη τε καὶ διαφθορά) is another affair, since εἶναι is not γίνεσθαι (*pace* Mistriontis). As for ἄλλο τι ἢ of all mss., against Bekker and Hirschig’s deletion of ἢ and Thompson’s justification for it – that Callicles answers ἀνάγκη rather than οὐδὲν ἄλλο – the phrase as a unit simply indicates interrogation and is interchangeable with ἄλλο τι, neither of them affecting or affected by the surrounding words and their construction: cf. n. 1282.
- 1617 πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον (C9): Another interesting καί, and we saw this coming (n. 1589). We need not decide among the fine modalities of responsive καί, brilliantly articulated by Denniston (293-323): it is the very breadth of the spectrum of those modalities that allows Socrates to use the particle to smuggle in this semantical leap (*pace* Jahn who thinks δῆμος denotes nothing but the crowd at a festival). We often see a similar use of καί in “straddling hendiadys” (cf. nn. 954 and 1035 and my notes *ad Rep.* 442B2-3 and 493B8; and cf. *Leg.* 684E8; *Polit.* 283C11-D1, 292A8; *Rep.* 343C4-5, 431D1-2, 565E6, 609A3-4; Eryximachus’s “interdisciplinary” uses at *Symp.* 186C2; 187C3-4; 188A8, C2; Protagoras’s blurring the distinction between learning and habituation at *Prot.* 323C6, D1, D6-7; 324A2-3, C4-5; 325A5-6, B5-6, C6). It is akin to the καί meaning “or,” reviewed at n. 1596. Since the reason and justification for the stretch becomes visible in his next question, we can characterize it as a “proleptic skew” (for which, in turn, see nn. 558, 910, 919, *supra*; and *Phdr.* 256A6 with my n. *ad loc.*). Jahn does recognize (as do Mistriontis and Schmelzer) that the term is transitional: once he has made his point he will apologize for the stretch (ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον ..., D5).
- 1618 λέγονται (C9) is to be understood as a *figura etymologica*: the steps of argument are entirely and even slavishly semantic. Because the “left-over” is only λόγοι, their presentation is only λέγεσθαι and because it is a λέγεσθαι to a large crowd – “i.e., a deme” – it is ἀγορᾶσθαι to a δῆμος, i.e., δημηγορία (D12).
- 1619 δημηγορία (C12): The term is reached etymologically (λέγειν πρὸς δῆμον ~ ἀγορᾶσθαι πρὸς δῆμον ~ δημηγορία), but once reached “through the back door,” it brings in with it the connotation it bore when Callicles used it to condemn Socrates for using “demagoguery” as a technique of refutation that he had used both against himself and the others (494D1, 482E4, 482C5) – another of the great ironical reversals in this dialogue, and perhaps a principle motive in the presentation of the critique of public entertainment here. In Callicles’s opening use, the term was presented as *eo ipso* derogatory, and it is so here (*pace* Deuschle-Cron Mistriontis Lodge – who think it cannot be so, since for some reason they think of Callicles as himself a “word-artist,” for which I find only contrary evidence in his slovenly way of speaking: he is not Gorgias’s student but his host, perhaps compensating him for coaching him or writing him a speech). Socrates’s warrant for introducing the term at this point is his pushy use of δῆμος as a synonym for ὄχλος (the point is hard to bring across in translation: Canto takes the trouble to do so with periphrasis: *une forme de démagogie, de discours au peuple*). Callicles’s diffident answer (φαίνεται, hardly *sehr bereitwillig*, *pace* Cron) indicates he is following Socrates’s etymological argument into new and unknown territory, Socrates’s own sensitivity to which is indicated by his subsequent use of ἄν + optative in drawing the inference (*pace* Mistriontis who takes it as Attic politesse and Croiset’s too strong tr., *C’est donc*).

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ<sup>1620</sup> δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἢ οὐ ῥητορεύειν<sup>1621</sup> δοκοῦσί σοι οἰ  
ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;<sup>1622</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ἠύρηκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον<sup>1623</sup>  
παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἦν οὐ πάνυ  
ἀγάμεθα·<sup>1624</sup> κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί δὲ ἢ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ῥητορικὴ [e] καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς  
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δῆμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν,<sup>1625</sup> τί ποτε ἡμῖν<sup>1626</sup> αὕτη ἐστίν;  
πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ<sup>1627</sup> λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες, τούτου  
στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτιστοι<sup>1628</sup> ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἢ καὶ  
οὔτοι πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι,<sup>1629</sup> καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν

1620 Reading ῥητορικὴ (D2) anarthrous, against the major mss., as suggested by Stallb.(reporting omission of ἦ in three minor mss. [namely, E3Lau<sup>1</sup>Lau<sup>6</sup> teste Cantarin]) and by Heindorf – cf. H.Schmidt (*Beitr.*[1874] 212), *legg.* edd. (ἡ ῥητορικὴ BTWPF, *legg.* Routh Beck Bekker). This is another of those passages where we should avoid translating the abstraction and its cognates with “rhetoric” or “rhetorician” (cf. nn. 174 and 178, *pace* Cary Cope Jowett Croiset Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Irwin Allen Canto Nichols Erler) which in English is an academic field or clever talk rather than an activity of and for a public gathering, and as such forecloses the question whether oratory (ἡ ῥητορικὴ) is or is not an art. At first sight it is redundant with δημηγορία, and thus needs the justification subsequently provided by ῥητορεύειν. Better, then, to translate, with Schleiermacher and Apelt, *rednerisch* and with Chambry, *discours d’orateur* and Zeyl, “popular oratory” and Piettre, *se comportent comme des rhéteurs au théâtre*. It adds nothing to say the public speaking of poetry is “rhetorical” (e.g. with Irwin Allen Canto translating as though they give to δημηγορία the article that BTWPF give to ῥητορικὴ) unless the term refers to the métier and redoubtable person of the orator (*L’act d’orateur*; Chambry; “play the part of orators,” Hamilton; “orate,” Allen), for which Plato coins the verb in the sequel (D2: see next n.). Dodds Irwin Canto guess that “Plato” has in mind the “set debates” that occur in tragedy, as if Socrates’s question were, “Do tragic poets ever do what orators do?” but his question means “Isn’t the poet doing in the theatre just what an orator does in the ecclesia?” (thus Canto’s *les poètes, au théâtre, font comme les orateurs*, though she takes it to mean tragedies can include debates [her n. 168]!). His use of the feminine adjective without τέχνη expressed or understood is another proleptic skew, effecting a transition or metabasis from theatrical declamation to political declamation in the next step, as if the only difference between them were the venue (ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις / πρὸς τὸν δῆμον), which comes full circle back to Gorgias’s original definition (nn. 236, 252, 323)! Cf. n. 1637.

1621 ῥητορεύειν (D2), an ἄπαξ in Plato as Jahn alone has noticed, but perhaps more. It is absent from Aristophanes and the tragedians, from Xenophon and from Aristotle (though once in the *Rhet.Alex.* 1444A33), and from the orators and the historians, though it later appears twice in Isocrates (*Ep.* 8.7, dated 350BC; *Ep.* 2.25, dated 346BC). It then appears in Philodemus, and seven times in Plutarch. I deem a word in Plato to be a coinage if (1) it is unexampled in the extant works of his predecessors and contemporaries, and (2) the passage in which it appears supports the need or desire to coin a term, as this peculiarly semantic passage does, having discovered theatrical poetry to be a ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία, and thus the poet an “orator in the theater.”

1622 θεάτροις (D3): The plural is “empirical,” as is ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι just below, by which time he has come back to reality. Cf. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, 466A9 (and n. 574).

1623 πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον (D5-6): The provisional likening of ὄχλος to the δῆμος above (C9-10), is brought forward conversely to imagine a “deme” that includes women, children, and slaves, so as to set up the target case of political oratory that takes place in the deme *per se*, to which he next turns. Do not translate it out (as Thurot: *l’université du peuple*; Thompson, “a concourse of people comprising...”; Jowett, “a crowd”; nor even Allen, “a public”; least of all Irwin, “the people, consisting of...”) [there is no article!]; Nichols’s “a people,” on the other hand, maintains the needed ambiguity). Plato raises the analogy again at *Leg.* 817C4-5.

1624 ἀγάμεθα (D7): As Callicles did not “admire” Polus for caving in under Socrates’s demagoguery (482D7).

1625 ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν (E2): In contrast with the rag-tag audience of tragedy, ἀνήρ is here used in Callicles’s sense, “quoted” by Socrates at 500C5 – with submerged irony. Is it too much of a stretch to remember at this moment that Gorgias advertises that his teaching will enable the orator to “enslave” his opponents (452D6, E5)? Cf. Callicles’s ἀνδρός / ἀνδροπόδος at 483B1-2 and n. *ad loc.* Deuschle astutely compares the remarks of Demosthenes at 3.30-32, where he says that the people have come to be enslaved by the demagogues (ἐν ὑπέρτου καὶ προσθήκης μέρει γεγένησθε) – but cf. also n. 1644. The purpose of the passage is to bring into short compass the inner contradiction between admiring oratorical skill for its profitability and the admirer’s consciousness that its very profitability relies upon its shameless seduction of the deme.

1626 Reading ἡμῖν (E2) from F with edd.: an “ethical” dative of theoretical/dialectical interest (ἡμῶν BTWP).

1627 ἀεὶ (E3): On the several occasions (again stressing the empirical modality), not “always.”

1628 ὡς βέλτιστοι (E4): The benefit of good public policy, which peeped through very briefly in Callicles’s penultimate speech so soon to disappear (491B1-2: cf. n. 1313), peeps through again, this time presumably for a longer stay, though presently the accent is placed on the betterment of individual souls rather than the city as a whole (cf. n. 1597). At E5, I read τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους from B with Deuschle Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe Burnet Dodds Theiler Erler (τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους TPWF). αὐτῶν in attributive position, though commonly printed by editors, is incorrect Greek (Smyth §1171, 1184), in Plato at least (*AGPS* 47.9.12 notwithstanding: at *Phdo.* 114E5 αὐτῆς is emphatic, underlining the possessive article; contrast the expression at 506E4-5 where the article is absent with κόσμον and we have exegetical τὸν ἑαυτῆς in “third attributive position”). The reflexive here successfully points back to the intentionality of στοχαζόμενοι, *pace* Hermann. For the attributive and predicative positions cf. E6: attributive αὐτῶν (B : αὐτῶν TWPF), 503C5 attributive αὐτοῦ (B : αὐτοῦ TWF); and 504D9 predicative αὐτοῦ (TWF : αὐτοῦ B). Cf. also n. 679.

1629 ὠρμημένοι (E6), in contrast to conative στοχαζόμενοι (E4) smacks, as above (C1), of the delicatessen’s artless, flat-out hunt for pleasure, unmediated by methodology and knowledge of the patient (501A4-B1). Of course it is exactly this power Polus and Gorgias (less visibly but demanding a higher fee no doubt) have come to Athens to sell; but now it is Callicles that is answering, and his answer will not be “simple.” Gorgias had dangled the prospect of celebrity and “power” before his audience of potential clients (452E4-8, 456A7-C2: cf. nn. 241, 297, 304); with τοῦ ἰδίου Socrates more frankly and less seductively calls it *self-interest* (and at 503C5-6 he becomes more explicit).

ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι<sup>1630</sup> τοῖς δήμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χεῖρους [503] διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι<sup>1631</sup> τοῦτο ὁ<sup>1632</sup> ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ<sup>1633</sup> κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἂ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ οἴους σὺ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. ἐξαρκεῖ.<sup>1634</sup> εἰ γὰρ καὶ<sup>1635</sup> τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴηκαὶ αἰσχροῦ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ<sup>1636</sup> διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα<sup>1637</sup> ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. [b] ἀλλ' οὐ πρόποτε σὺ<sup>1638</sup> ταύτην

1630 ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι (E7): The verb recalls its use by Socrates when he first groped (463A6-8) to characterize the orator's special "gift of gab" (a knack we would today approbatively dub "communication skills"), and also Callicles's more recent description of political competence as including the "savvy" of negotiating with men (484D4), against which he contrasted the childish occupation of the adult philosopher; and *παισὶ* recalls the idea, at least, of childish gullibility as to the arts providing pleasure, as mentioned by Socrates at 464D5-7; but now the orator-on-the-make speaks to the deme of adult men as if to children, with which we come close to Callicles catering to the deme that is not *παῖδες* but his *παιδικά*. Thus, another huge ironic reversal looms

1631 Reading *ἔτι* (503A2) from BTW, *legg.* edd. (*ἔστι* [sic] PF Ficinus [*haud simplex id est quod interrogas*], *legg.* Routh Coraes Cary Jowett Woodhead : *om.* F2Zb *teste* Cantarín). With *ἔτι* Callicles announces that the question "no longer" (cf. *Crat.*429B3, *Leg.*626C12, D2, "drawing the line") can be answered yes or no (it is literally duplex: cf. 468C3, *Phdo.*62A3) in the way the previous questions could be (and as Socrates has generally been careful to require him from him: cf.501B5-6, 500D10-E1), though his answer about tragedy was already not black and white (cf. n. 1613). In the case of oratory, rather than acquiesce in a generalization about the "art" itself (which it was the burden of those essentialistic perfects [502A8, B8, C1] to focus upon and stress in the other cases), he will have recourse to the empirical claim that some individuals do care about the welfare of the citizens, an assertion that enables him then to characterize Socrates's general question about oratory as an allegation about practitioners rather than the "art" itself (whence his *σύ* at A4). Note that conversely he had accepted Socrates's characterization of dithyramb by the single case of Kinesias, without cavil. With this attempt at gainsaying Socrates he ceases passively to agree with him, as he had announced he would at 501C7 ("in order that the argument might be completed"). Yet his empirical answer merely begs the question as long as it is unclear whether it is *quia* orators that such individuals care, or care *despite* being orators but by virtue of their personal "values." In other words, his answer presumes that both sets are properly called orators. Exactly this discrepancy between the "art" and the virtue of the individual who practices it was the gravamen of the challenge Socrates brought against Gorgias, to fend off which Polus intervened so that the question of personal morality could be kept out of the question (461B: cf. n. 430). The measure of Gorgias's eloquence is his success at hiding his own pecuniary motive as well as that of his prospective client, and his most powerful way to persuade that client to pay his fee is to convince him, by his own example, that the client, too, will learn from him how to cloak his self-serving motivation behind a veneer of respectability.

1632 Accepting *τοῦτο ὁ* (A2) from both ms. families (BTWPF), *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck (*τοῦτο* E1NFlor *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd.). The omission of the relative – that is, apposition of a characterizing predicate adjective – is idiomatic where it occurs (cf. *Alc.* I 109C1: *δεινὸν τοῦτο γέ ἐρωτᾷς*; *Philb.* 29C9; *Prot.*318B1 [Heindorf]) and is perhaps "neater" (Thompson), but that *ὁ* can be omitted is hardly evidence that it was. The mss. of Aristides show both readings.

1633 Reading *οἱ* (A2) with mss. and edd. (*οἱ* B), making the participle circumstantial, which it needs to be, since the sequel wants employ the idiomatic reversal of participle and finite verb: *κηδόμενοι λέγουσιν* = *κηδόνται λέγοντες*. *λέγουσιν ἂ λέγουσιν* is a euphemistic aposiopesis (*AGPS* 65.6.2, with *exx.*).

1634 *ἐξαρκεῖ* (A5): Why is it enough? Because if there really are two types, each must be true to type. In his attempt to slow down the induction by sidestepping a yes or no answer with his empirical claim that there are two groups, he saddles himself with the probably insuperable task of pointing to an actual orator who is not only altruistic and edifying rather than seductive (in the manner of his answer about tragedy: cf. n. 1613) but paradigmatically edifying, as opposed to the purely seductive ones he bluntly (with *σύ*) accuses Socrates of having in mind, or merely to be talking about (*οὐς σὺ λέγεις*) – and such would likely be something more than an "orator": against whom, other than the orators, would such a person take up the cudgels and battle?

1635 *εἰ γὰρ καὶ* (A5): Postpositive *γάρ* splitting up *εἰ καὶ* as at 484C8; compare postpositive *δέ* splitting up *ἂν γε* at 448A6 (Kratz), *pace* Nichols. Socrates does not mean "If this, too, is double," but rather, explaining *ἐξαρκεῖ*, "Even if as you say it is (no longer simple but) double."

1636 Reading *καὶ* only (A8), with both ms. families (BPWFt as well as Aristides), *legg.* edd. (*καὶ ἀεὶ* TE3S2YΓVat [*semper* Ficinus], *legg.* Heindorf Routh Beck Ast Bekker Coraes Thompson Sommer Hirschig Croiset Zimmermann Helmbold Woodhead Canto Piettre). The conative present infinitive (as at 502B4 where the metaphor was introduced) has no need of reinforcement from less well attested *ἀεὶ*. Likewise the future indicative *ἔσται* (A9) in all the mss. echoes the futures of that passage (502B6-7, *legg.* edd.) better than Aristides's *ἔστί*.

1637 *διαμάχεσθαι* ... *ἀηδέστερα* (A8-9): Socrates brings forward the more colorful language he had introduced in connection with tragedy (502B4-6), a hugely important institution in Athens, though something in which Callicles had no stake. The argument began at 501D8, and aimed not at reaching a generalization as most *epagogai* do, but at preempting refusal or easing agreement to each of the cases (cf. n. 1592). The cases are selected and ordered in a way that makes sense less for filling a genus with its species than for a continuous gradus through the examples; parallel assertions are made or implied about the items, with more or less elaboration (such as the present elaboration, brought forward from 502B4-6); the progression in the chosen parallels more or less gradually approaches the target case; irrelevancy might be introduced to create an impression of casualness or to defuse any impression of an underlying purpose (here, the digression on Meles, 502A4-6, abruptly dismissed with *ἀλλὰ δὴ*). As the interlocutor accrues a record of agreeing along the way, he is left to reject parallel inferences only by special pleading. I call this gradual method "line-drawing," something akin to the question "How many hairs make a beard?" For examples in the corpus cf. 494C4-E6 above, about itching and scratching (*n.b.*, *ἐχόμενα*, n. 1424).

1638 *σύ* (B1) responds to Callicles's *σύ* at A4: if Socrates has been too theoretical (*σὺ λέγεις*, A4), Callicles has been insufficiently empirical (whence the challenging *ἔφρασας* below).

εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν<sup>1639</sup> ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας ὅστις<sup>1640</sup> ἐστίν;

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ<sup>1641</sup> σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

ΣΩ. τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινα εἰπεῖν δι' ὄντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι<sup>1642</sup> βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χεῖρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστίν οὗτος.<sup>1643</sup> [c]

- 1639 ταύτην ... τὴν ῥητορικὴν (B1): A *constructio praegnans* in which proleptic ταύτην is emphatic. Socrates means that if someone acted in the latter way he would not even be thought to be an orator! The sentiment is the same as when, speaking from the bema in his defense, he said he was οὐ κατὰ τούτους ... ῥήτωρ, “not an orator in their way.” Schleiermacher gets the sense with “*Aber niemals gewiss hast du diese Redekunst gesehen*” (compare Nichols Lamb Pietre). Plato did not write the adjectival ταύτην (as many translate the sentence) because that would too easily countenance that this second type of behavior would properly be oratorical: that is, they beg the same question Callicles does. Schmelzer ingeniously suggests the interpretation “*Du hast aber bei deinen Behauptungen niemals die erste, gut Art der Beredsamkeit vor Augen gehabt*” which would render Callicles’s response a characteristically crass literalization – but I do not think οὐ πῶποτε εἶδες can be stretched to mean what Schmelzer needs *haben vor Augen* to mean. Rather, Socrates is taking on and meeting Callicles’s empirical challenge.
- 1640 Reading ὅστις (B3) with Zb Aristides (τίς BTPWF, *legg.* edd.) as the more correct follow-up to indefinite τινὰ, as below at B6 (cf. 483B2 and n. *ad loc.*). As for τί οὐχὶ ... ἔφρασας, nothing prevents that Socrates is pointing back to Callicles’ assertion that some do exist, with ἢ meaning *alioquin* (so, Routh Schleiermacher Irwin Nichols Zeyl). Commentators adduce the use of the aorist with τί οὐ (*vel sim.*) as idiomatically imperative emphasized by expressing urgency for an answer as being overdue (e.g., *AGPS* 53.6.2) or as reformulating a more focussed question, as at 509E3, *q.v.* – i.e., not “Why didn’t you” but “At least you can do this much” (cf. n. 1840; *Alc. I* 114B2; *Charm.* 154E5; *Menex.* 236C2; *Meno* 92D6 [and Thompson *ad loc.*]; *Parm.* 136C7; *Phdo.* 86D7; *Phlb.* 54B6; *Prot.* 310A2, 317D2; *Soph.* 251E5; *Symp.* 173B6-7; *X. Hiero* 1.3; *Mem.* 3.11.15, 4.6.14; cf. Smyth §1936 and n. 831). Thurot wants “you should have told me who he is.” For such an indirect imperative done with *future* indicative and οὐ cf. 491A4 and n. 1308.
- 1641 Reading ἔγωγε (B4) with BTP and edd. (*om.* F Aristides), as well as the sputtering γε after τῶν with BTPF and edd. (omitted by Aristides). There is some dramatic irony in the fact that Callicles has no current exemplum with which to refute Socrates, as Polus thought he himself had (470C9-E5): for Callicles, the orators of his day are his rivals, and he is not seeking clients to teach but victory by his own wits. Thus it accrues to his interest to measure favorably with the legendary (and defunct) greats of the past rather than be compared with his contemporaries. Besides, there really aren’t any!
- 1642 αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι (B7): Socrates continues to respond to Callicles’s empirical argument by allowing him a larger field than those he has personally met, and thereby allows him to rely upon their reputations. But by replacing the criterion of a speaker’s honest intentions with the criterion that he actually made the Athenians better than they were before, Socrates keeps the argument under empirical control. The usual sense of αἰτίαν ἔχειν is to “have the blame” as having harmed the αἰτιόμενος (*Lach.* 186B7, *Rep.* 565B5 – and thus to have no-one else to blame, *Rep.* 617E4) or to “receive censure” even without harming someone (*Apol.* 38C2, *Phdrs.* 249D8, *Rep.* 566C3); but also, with αἰτία positive, as here, to “have the credit” or “deserve praise” (*Alc. I* 119A2-3, *Leg.* 624A1-2, and Aristotle’s joke at *Met.* 984B18-20). The expression “was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocution for λέγεσθαι, as at *Th.* 169A4-5 or *Rep.* 435E5-6” (Lodge). Note another case of ὅστις following τίς (B6): cf. n. 170.
- 1643 οὗτος (B9): With his shift from the approbative ἐκεῖνος down to “second person” οὗτος, Socrates continues his allegation that Callicles of course has certain individuals in mind: if he avoids finding one in the present, his candidates must be from the past.



ΚΑΛ. τί δαί;<sup>1644</sup> Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις<sup>1645</sup> ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ<sup>1646</sup> Περικλέα τουτονί<sup>1647</sup> τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;<sup>1648</sup>

ΣΩ. εἰ ἔστιν γε,<sup>1649</sup> ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθές,<sup>1650</sup> τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων·<sup>1651</sup> εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω λόγῳ ἠναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν—ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, [d] ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χεῖρω,

1644 Reading τί δαί (C1) from T with Kratz Jowett Helmbold (δὲ BPWF *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. [the apparatuses of Bekker and of most recent edd. are empty]), here transitional (*AGPS* 64.5.3.H) rather than abbreviative (n. 1594 *supra*). Callicles’s surprise is feigned indignation attempting to put his ensuing claim beyond cavil. To deny the virtue of these four orators would surprise anyone at the time, as Dodds illustrates by citing D. 3.24, 13.21f, 23.196; Isoc. *Pac.* 75 and 126, *Antid.* 111 and 233f.; Lys. 30.28; and T. 2.65.1 – accounting for the often deplored corruption of orators (famous instances at Demosthenes at 3.3 and Isocrates *Pac.* 3-5) as a trend that began only in the Fourth Century. But Socrates is no indicator of trends.

Socrates’s willingness to submit their reputation to the challenge of the ὁμολογία he has reached today (C4-7), as strong and sudden as Callicles’s condemnation of tragedy above, will be further investigated when it needs to be (at 515Cff). That investigation has echoed down the centuries, as if it expressed the candid belief of Plato himself, eliciting from Aelius Aristides three “orations” (*Or.* 2, *Or.* 3, *Or.* 4) in the Second Century AD (= *Orr.* 45-47 Dindorf), on which see my Appendix III. We also may be surprised, as we were by Socrates’s ready acceptance of Callicles’s round condemnation of tragedy, above, but let us count it as paradoxical for now, and stay within the dialectical horizon of the discussion. After all, the empirical determination must now be governed by the criterion of a good orator, not public opinion: that the people should think they have been improved is no more a guarantee that they truly have been (whence their reputation is not dispositive), than is their thinking they are doing the best any guarantee that they are doing what they truly want (466D6-468E5).

1645 For the present οὐκ ἀκούεις (C1) adducing rumor or popular truism as evidence, cf. 455E5, 470D7, *Leg.* 625B2, *Rep.* 407A7, *Th.* 198C8. Cf. H. *Od.* 3.193, 15.403; D. 3.21; and κλύεις S. *Ph.* 261 – an idiom shared in Latin (e.g. Cic. *Off.* 1.6.19, *Lael.* 10.34: cf. Gildersleeve §204). It corresponds to λέγεται as used at 455E4. Just as Socrates has raised the bar from the orator’s honest intentions to his actual results, Callicles lowers it from honest intentions and astute policy to a reputation of general personal probity and manliness (the expression is ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγόνενα) to which he himself aspires and despises in others. This expression was similarly used, and thematized, at *Meno* 93A-94D. Compare also Polus at 466A10.

1646 καί (C2): With each proper name we must supply the participial phrase ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα as predicate (the participle being supplementary with verb of perception); and then at the end Callicles effects closure with an attributive perfect participle. All these perfects are empirical (cf. n. 331). For his use of bare καί in confident fullness, cf. n. 1066. He is as lavish with defunct exemplars as he is stingy with current ones. Deuschle interestingly accounts for the absence of Aristides from his list because unimpressive to Callicles, given his quiet upstanding integrity: perhaps Callicles can only hold on for so long his conscience gets the better of him.

1647 τουτονί (C2): With his deictic iota Callicles makes Socrates his witness with the flick of a hand, but the second person pronoun fathers upon him the popular belief about Pericles. With the demonstrative he attempts to build up the vividness of his exemplum, as Polus did with his use of οὗτος and αὐτόθεν (cf. nn. 721, 725).

1648 καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας (C3): Callicles refers back to Socrates’s remark to Gorgias at 455E4-6. Whereas the present means one knows by hearsay, the perfect means one witnessed him speaking. As to “recently,” because Pericles died many years before the putative dramatic date of this dialogue, Jahn and Deuschle argue that νεωστὶ is only relative (the other three candidates predeceased Pericles by twenty years and more), for which they cite 523B5 and Cicero’s use of *nuper* at *ND* 2.50.126. The point here is that Callicles, who surely did not hear Pericles, else he would have mentioned him above, wants now to rely upon Socrates’s empirical experience to prove his own empirical point! The flurry of perfects is an attempt to stress the settled empirical truth of his claims, and νεωστὶ, far from being an anachronism of Plato’s (cf. n. 719) is an exaggeration of his own, intended to preclude any claim by Socrates that he has forgotten – as if he meant to say Socrates just now said he heard him!

1649 εἰ ἔστιν γε (C4): Socrates’s dialectical strategy is to take “seriously” Callicles’s casual use of ἀγαθός, for him a commonplace approbative (C1), as if he meant it as the adjective of the noun ἀρετή (cf. n. 1532). His γε, with orthotonic ἔστιν, is strongly limitative: Socrates is disagreeing by imposing a stipulation that γε intimates is insurmountable, for we have been compelled to agree to its contrary (C6-7, referring to 499B). The apodosis is not suppressed (*pace* Woolsey Sommer), but is, rather, the assertion Callicles made in his question (with Deuschle-Cron, comparing 456A7, followed by Mistriontis Lodge).

1650 I propose ἀληθές (C5) against the ἀληθής of all mss. and all edd. The construction is εἰ τοῦτο ὃ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν εἶναι ἀληθές ἐστι (ὃ attracted into ἦν as the predicate of ἀρετὴν), leading into the subsequent clause εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο (ἀληθές ἐστι) ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ... ἠναγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι ... ἀρετὴ ἐστι ... ἀποτελεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ (ἀληθές ἐστι) τέχνης εἶναι. I thus posit two not unrelated errors in the uncial source, transmitted to all mss. ΑΛΗΘΕΣ became ΑΛΗΘΗΣ and ΤΕΧΝΗΣ became ΤΕΧΝΙΤΗΣ. On the latter emendation cf. n. 1652, *infra*.

1651 καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων (C6): Socrates’s use of “second” attributive position for (τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων), placed in hyperbaton after ἀποπιμπλάναι, places the emphasis upon the slaking of desire *per se*, regardless of whose (cf. 508A6 and n. 1807). Since Callicles’s parrhesiastic assertion that the ability to slake as much desire as possible is virtue (492A1-3, 492C5) itself presupposes that pleasure is the highest good, an ability to slake the desires of “the others” might indeed be derivatively virtuous; but it is hardly accurate to say that the brunt of Callicles’s speech was to advocate pleasing anybody but himself (as for others, he meant to be envied by them for being able to do so). Given the present context, however, Socrates’s imputation of this Calliclean goodness (ἀρετή) to the four good orators (ἀγαθοί) pertains only to their ability to flatter their audience – that is, to slaking the desires of “others” (the lately broached fact that they might be acting in their own personal interest [ἐνεκα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν, 502C6] has in itself nothing to do with pleasure). But whose pleasure is involved ends up making no difference since, as Socrates next says, he and Callicles agreed in their intervening discussion that pleasure is not the highest good, which imposes criteria of selection just as much upon one’s slaking his own desires (τὰς αὐτοῦ) and his slaking those of others (τὰς τῶν ἄλλων), and so what might have been captious in Socrates’s depiction of Callicles’s hedonism becomes moot.



μή, τοῦτο δὲ τέχνης εἶναι<sup>1652</sup>—τοιούτον ἄνδρα<sup>1653</sup> τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι<sup>1654</sup> ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;<sup>1655</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.<sup>1656</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις.<sup>1657</sup> ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως, ἀτρέμα<sup>1658</sup>

σκοπούμενοι εἴ τις τούτων τοιούτος γέγονεν· φέρε γάρ,<sup>1659</sup> ὁ ἀγαθὸς<sup>1660</sup> ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἂ ἂν λέγη ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῆ ἔρεϊ,<sup>1661</sup> ἀλλ' [e] ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι;

1652 Reading τοῦτο δὲ τέχνης εἶναι (D1-2), *coni.* Ast(1819), *legg.* Schleiermacher(tr. *und dasz es hierzu einer Kunst bedürfe*) Allen Zeyl Piettre (τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι BTPWF, *legg.* edd. [Schanz Cantarin lacunam post εἶναι *indicantes*; Dodds ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν – ἄρ' ἔχεις φάσαι *post* εἶναι *addens*, followed by Irwin Erler] : τούτου δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι YPar<sup>2</sup> [*huius rei* Ficinus] with the early editions *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Beck Bekker Coraes Ast[1832] Thurot Sommer Hirschig Shorey[C. *Phil.*10 {1915} 325f] Canto : τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι ἂν [*leg.* Stender] *vel* τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις ἐφάνη or ὁμολογῆται Heindorf : τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι *coni.* Thompson Burnet, *legg.* Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Nichols : τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις [εἶναι] Madvig : τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις ὁμολογεῖται *coni.* K.J.Liebold[*Analect. Plat.* {Rudolstaad 1885} 24] : τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις οἶε *coni.* Sauppe, *legg.* Theiler Heidbüchel : *alii alia*). The Thompson/Burnet emendation is paleographically the easiest, but with τέχνης (*coni.* Ast[1819]) Socrates is referring exactly to 500A4-6 where he used this same genitive. τοῦτο is accusative. The infinitive in my opinion is due to an unexpressed repetition of εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι from C6 (*pace* Coraes Stallb. who reach to supply ἐφάνη or [better] ὁμολογῆται). In addition we may mark the lacuna noted by Schanz after εἶναι and with Cantarin leave it empty and muse about what to add, such as ἐφάνη or εἶναι ἂν.

1653 τοιούτον ἄνδρα (D2) challenges Callicles with his own approbative expression, ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, goodness now having been redefined.

1654 Reading γεγονέναι (D2) with mss. and edd. (against Burnet's athetization), further answering Callicles's own expression (ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν γεγονότα, C1). The perfect is again empirical.

1655 Whether we read the words ἔχεις εἰπεῖν after γεγονέναι (D2) from Par<sup>2</sup> (only), as well as from the early editions *teste* Cantarin (cf. Ficinus *demonstrare mihi potes*), *legg.* edd. (*om.* mss., *legg.* Sauppe Lamb Apelt Dodds Irwin Zeyl Cantarin Erler Heidbüchel), or we dismiss them as untrustworthy for reasons adduced by Dodds, some such words as they are needed so as to supply a finite verb by which the highly proleptic sentence is finally brought to a close, and indeed made a question. I do read ἔχεις εἰπεῖν from the mss., but have shown in Appendix II that, luckily, the entire context makes the question moot.

The entire remark of Socrates (C4-D3) is studiously proleptic, so as to place maximal burden on the question with which the apodosis ends, "Can you say this?" As a whole it is a conditional sentence with a front-loaded protasis in two parts (C4-D2), which is all the more vertiginously proleptic because of its length and complexity. Within its first limb (C4-6) there is a double prolepsis in εἰ ἔστιν γε and in ἦν πρότερον making ἀληθές seem in hyperbaton; and then in the second alternative limb (C6-D3), there is a prolepsis in ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ (parallel to the one in ἦν πρότερον), and then the striking prolepsis in the relative μέν clause (αἶ μὲν ... αἶ δέ: note accents on αἶ!). The apodosis, in turn, employs a double prolepsis in placing indirect discourse (γεγονέναι) before direct (ἔχεις εἰπεῖν), and, within its indirect part, the predicate (τοιούτον ἄνδρα) before the subject accusative (τούτων τινὰ).

1656 I adopt the apparatus of Cantarin and attribute οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω (D2-3) to Callicles and ἀλλά ... εὐρήσεις to Socrates, with BTWPar<sup>2</sup> (οὐκ ... εἶπω *Socrati* / ἀλλ' ... εὐρήσεις *Callicli tribuens* F, *leg.* Burnet : οὐκ ... εὐρήσεις *Callicli trib.* P : οὐκ ... εὐρήσεις *Socrati trib.* Par. Some edd. (Burnet Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Irwin Allen Nichols Zeyl) follow F and attribute the first sentence to Socrates, as answering his own question. Attributing it to Callicles from BTWPar<sup>2</sup> (and most edd.), if it is taken to mean he cannot name such an orator, would make it an embarrassing confession since he has vouchsafed there are two kinds of orators, unless with Croiset he is simply refusing to answer (*je ne sais trop que te répondre*); but I take it to mean that he does not understand the criterion that Socrates has now articulated well enough to apply it (with Lodge: compare Canto, *je ne peu pas te répondre comme cela* [*sim.* Piettre]). See Appendix II.

1657 Continuing from the above, the same edd. (Burnet Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Irwin Allen Nichols Zeyl) attribute the next line, Ἀλλ' ... εὐρήσεις (D4) to Callicles, in turn, again from F, assuming (explicitly, Lamb Irwin Zeyl) that εὐρήσεις is not absolute but brings forward τοιούτον ἄνδρα as its direct object: Socrates has not been able to identify an orator that meets his own criterion and so Callicles can, in his usual manner, dismiss any incumbency upon himself to find one, averring that one day Socrates will do so for him; after which Socrates in his usual manner does not rise to Callicles's bait, but ignores the byplay and suggests a joint procedure for settling the question (ἴδωμεν δὴ, D5). But instead, I attribute this second sentence to Socrates (with BTWPar<sup>2</sup> and most edd.), disagreeing however with Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sauppe Canto, who take εὐρήσεις as absolute and treat the expression as a *Redensart* or a platitude of Plato's that is found in several dialogues (cf. *Alc. I* 109E4-5, *Apol.* 24B1-2; and for the idea 513C8, *Crat.* 440D2-6, *Phdo.* 78A7-9); instead, I take εὐρήσεις not to be absolute but take πῶς εἶπω as its object: it is a promise not that Callicles will find such an orator but that he will find πῶς εἰπεῖν – i.e. that he will come to understand the criterion (Lodge) or the way to answer (Croiset Hamilton), if he researches the question in a proper manner. With ἴδωμεν δὴ Socrates then promises to fulfill that promise (δέ ἐν Olymp.[λ], read by no ed., would also suit, but Olymp. has left out οὕτως). He then reminds Callicles of this suggestion by repeating εἰπεῖν below (504C2). Again, see Appendix II.

1658 Punctuate οὕτως, ἀτρέμα (D5), with οὕτως pointing backwards, not forwards (*pace* Irwin Canto Nichols Erler), nor as an instance of the idiomatic use of οὕτως as a modifier of an associated adverb essentially pointing to what has been happening – as at 468C3 (ἀπλῶς οὕτως; so simple), 494E10 (ἀνέδην οὕτω), 506D6 (οὕτω εἰκῆ: so randomly – the reading of F); *Crat.* 391A1 (οὕτως ἐξαίφνης; so suddenly); *Leg.* 633C9 (ἀπλῶς οὕτως), *Phdrs.* 235C2 (νῦν μὲν οὕτως), *Rep.* 378A2-3 (ῥαδίως οὕτως), *Symp.* 180C5 (ἀπλῶς οὕτως); *Th.* 142D6 (οὕτω γε ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος; just talking like this), 147C7 (ῥάδιον ... νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται), 158B9-10 (νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι); D. 19.197; Ar. *Vesp.* 461 – the associated adverb denotes a *denial* of difficulty, reflectiveness, taking pains, scrupulosity. According to LSJ (s.v. οὕτως, IV) this οὕτως has a "diminishing" (I would say derogatory) effect on its associated adverb. Hug (*ad Symp.* 176E2-3) says that the demonstrative is tantamount to a hand gesture that accompanies uttering the subsequent adverb, which, given the semantic range of these adverbs, would be a dismissive gesture, like a shrug. But in the present case the associated adverb is ἀτρέμα, which approbatively denotes steadiness, deliberateness, the quiet and the unperturbed (only the adjectival cognate, ἀτρεμῆ, appears in the corpus, and only once: at *Phdrs.* 250C3, describing the settled objects off in the hyperouranian). LSJ invents a special gloss for the use of οὕτως in the present passage – "casual" – perhaps to push it in the direction of the other associated adverbs and have it fit within this idiom; but the σκέψις Socrates goes on to propose is neither casual nor *sans souci* – rather, it is deliberate and methodical, as opposed to the slapdash method of proving there is a good orator by pointing to one. I therefore deny that οὕτως ἀτρέμα is an instance (or an "analogue," with Dodds) of the idiom under review, but with Theiler (who punctuates *after* οὕτως) I take οὕτως as a true demonstrative referring back to καλῶς as its antecedent. The sense is, "in just the way you indicate" (accompanied by hand gesture) "i.e.,

ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες<sup>1662</sup> πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει<sup>1663</sup> πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν,<sup>1664</sup> ἀλλ' ὅπως ἂν εἰδός<sup>1665</sup> τὴν αὐτῶν<sup>1666</sup> σχῆ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει<sup>1667</sup> ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας<sup>1668</sup> δημιουργούς, ὄντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, ὡς<sup>1669</sup> εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθησιν ὃ ἂν τιθῆ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν,<sup>1670</sup> ἕως ἂν τὸ [504] ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμένον τι<sup>1671</sup> καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὗς

καλῶς, in the sense of steadily and calmly.”

- 1659 φέρε γάρ (D6): γάρ is programmatic, beginning the ἀτρέμα σκοπεῖσθαι. φέρε invites the interlocutor to “take on,” and bear up under, an orderly line of questions.
- 1660 ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ (D6): Again the adjective for ἀρετὴ brings forward its definition as proffered above (C7-D1), and the ensuing καὶ is illative, holding Callicles to the new meaning of ἀγαθός over against his own scandalous remarks (n. 1649).
- 1661 ἐρεῖ (D7) brings forward the use of this future at 502B5 (contrast λέξει at B6: cf. n. 1611).
- 1662 Reading βλέποντες (E2) with mss. and edd. (*om. Est teste Cantarin conieceratque Sauppe, legg. Burnet Theiler Cantarin Erler Heidbüchel*), continuing the idea of ἀποβλέπων, the prefix dropped according to the I.E. rule. ἔργον means the final product and what leads to it.
- 1663 Reading ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει only (E2-3), from BTWPF, *legg. Schanz(lacunam autem post προσφέρει statuens) Burnet Erler (ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει early editions only teste Cantarin, leg. Routh : ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἂν προσφέρει coni. Hirschig[1873] Sauppe)*. The passage as quoted by Th. Magister treats ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει as a complete phrase (*s.v. ἀναλέγομαι*, p.21.16-17 Ritschl). With ἐκλεγόμενος Socrates brings forward his word from 500A5 and therefore, by incorporation, the rest of what he said there. The verb, along with προσφέρειν (cf. 465A3-5) embodies the “technical” approach.
- 1664 Reading αὐτῶν (E3) from B (Deuschle-Cron) : αὐτῶν TWPF : αὐτοῦ P<sup>2</sup>Par<sup>2</sup> : αὐτοῦ E3ZaΞ1<sup>2</sup> (edd.) || πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτῶν *secl.* Sauppe (Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler Heidbüchel) athetizes for its redundancy but the idea is important and is worth saying twice or thrice. The understood προσφερόμενον is supplied by the ὅπως clause, so that neither the variant προσφέρει (*sc. ταῦτα*) ἢ προσφέρει presented in Y, nor even the ἢ retained by Routh, is needed.
- 1665 Reading εἰδός (E4) from TPWF with edd. (εἰδώς [*sic*] B).
- 1666 Reading αὐτῶν (E4) with BTPW and edd. (αὐτὸ F : *om. Par teste Heindorf*).
- 1667 εἰ βούλει (E4): The verb is formulaic (continued at E6) in the presentation of both foil and epagoge examples (as is the bare use of οἷον: e.g., 499D4, 501E5, n. 171): cf. 472A5 and A7, *Crat.*437B4; *Euthyph.*6C6; *H.Maj.*295D5; *Meno* 71E2, 73E3; *Phdrs.*230C1, 236D10; *Rep.*344A2, 425D1, 432A4-5, 584B5 (εἰ εἰθέλει); *Symp.*220D5; *Thg.*129A1; *X. Mem.*3.5.11. As such it requires no *Nachsatz* (*pace* Beck Deuschle-Cron, Sauppe).
- 1668 τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας (E5-6): There is some excitement indicated in the doubling of εἰ βούλει as well as in the absence of connectives (see next note). The selection of items relies upon no “background list”: I believe the first item is suggested by the metaphor that came before (ζωγραφία ~ εἰδός) and the last two are meant to introduce the metaphors to come (οἰκοδομία / ναυπηγία ~ placement [θέσις] and fitting-together [ἀρμόττειν] of parts to make a sound and watertight whole, making the product χρηστόν [504A7]). The lack of connectives is notable, absent even with the culminating or generalizing item at the end, for which cf. 517D4-5; *Crito* 51C8-D1 (in summary); *H.Maj.*291D9-E2; *Phdrs.*241C2-5, 255E3; *Rep.*361E4-2A1, 373C2-4, 399C2-4, 598B9-C1; *Symp.*173B2, 186D7-E1, 197D3; *Th.*171E2-3, 178B4-5; *X. Ag.*2.12. For cases where *only* the culminating item gets a καί, cf. *Leg.*897A3; *Phdo.*65D12-14; *Phdrs.*240D2-3, 246E1; *Phlb.*19D4-5; *Polit.* 260D11- E1, 268A7-B1; *Rep.*395C4-5, 491B9-10, 580A3-5; for cases where there is no culminating item, cf. 478B4, 517D4-5; *Crat.*426E2-3; *Leg.*710C5-6 (in summary of 709E7ff), 733E5-6, 797D10-E2, 897A1-3, 964B5-6; *Phdrs.*239A2-4, 240A6, 253D4-E1 and E1-5; *Prot.*319D2-4; *Rep.*434C7-8, 471D3, 487A4-5, 490C10-11 (in *praeteritio*), 580B3-4 (in summary), 597B13-14 (in resumé); *Symp.*207E2-3; *Th.*186D10-11, 207A6-7; *X. Cyrop.*3.3.59, *HG* 2.4.33. To call the absence of connective in the last item “asyndeton” (*pace* Stallb.), is too strong, just as to say that the final copula is usually omitted (“*solet*,” Heindorf *ad Gorg.*517D) is an overstatement. Hear Denniston: “normally either connected throughout or not connected at all (asyndeton). Occasionally however, as normally in English, there is connexion between the last two items only” (289-90).
- 1669 ὡς (E6): It is an exclamation (with Kratz Piettre), as the hyperbaton of the “lilies of the field” construction is always ready to be.
- 1670 Reading πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν (E8): from mss. *legg. edd.* (ἀρμόττων *Par teste Cantarin leg. Hirschig*). Ms. testimony for the parallel participial form is vitiated by its mis-accentuation. For the periphrastic construction in εἶναι linked with τε καὶ to a simple verb for the action it enables, cf. 482B8 and 482C2-3, answering Hirschig’s question why Plato should not use a parallel construction.
- 1671 I will read τι (enclitic) after τεταγμένον (504A1) which is Ast’s report of F (*Annot.* 1832, p.367) though Burnet and Cantarin report F as reading τί (τε BTPW, *legg. edd.*). At this point the relation between τάξις and κόσμος is tenuous: as much as we can say so far is that the expression forms a chiasm of before and after with πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν (as seen by Mr Morrissey): the labor of the craftsman issues in the “systematized” outcome. Infixed τι is the more idiomatic way to introduce a tenuous new formulation (like που below, A3), whether infixed early among the items (as here and at *Alc. I* 109B1; *Leg.*808C5-6, 933A2-3; *Phlb.*51C3 – on the early positioning cf. nn. 1218, 887, 774) to broach the whole idea, or late in the list to maintain an “openness” at closure (e.g., *Lys.*216C7; *Leg.*633D2, 715C1-2, 898B5-8; *Phdo.*65C6-7; *Phlb.*56B9-C2; *Th.*174D3-5). Compare 462C7 and n. 471; *Leg.*633D5-6, 808D2-4, 935B5-8; *Phlb.*21C6-8, 42D1, 56C1; *Polit.*261D7-9, 297C1, 298D5-6, 311A8-9; *Prot.*315D5-6; *Rep.*351E10-2A1, 444D13-E2; *Symp.*221E4-5; Stallb. *ad Leg.*644A3, Riddell, *Digest* §52. The connotation of beauty in the κόσμος-words requires an extra lexeme in English (e.g., “fine”).

νυνδῆ<sup>1672</sup> ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάπτουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. ἔστω<sup>1673</sup> τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως; [b]

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ<sup>1674</sup> τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τί δ' ἡ ψυχὴ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;<sup>1675</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.<sup>1676</sup>

ΣΩ. τί οὖν ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι<sup>1677</sup> τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.<sup>1678</sup> [c]

1672 νυνδῆ (A2), referring to 501A, itself bringing forward those mentioned at 464B. οἱ τε ἄλλοι ... καὶ is a virtual ἄλλως τε καὶ construction by which he moves up to the genus of “public professionals” to move back down to another species, doctors (included as δημιουργοί at 452A1-2). It already becomes clear that it is not categories of professionals he is interested in but the categories of the items they work on: from material objects to body and then presumably to soul. που (A3) begs a privilege to adjust the meanings of the verbs to the adjacent sphere: already we will guess that Socrates is moving toward soul.

The “background” list of three types of things (material objects, body, psyche) depends upon the axiological notion of three types of goods, a topic both philosophical and rhetorical. Within the Platonic corpus, explicitly or implicitly, cf. 467E, 477A8-C5, 511D1-2, 514A5-515A1ff; *Alc.* I 130E8-1C4, 133DE; *Cleit.* 407B1-8A9; *Eryx.* 393C4-D6; *Euthyd.* 279A4-C4; *Lach.* 195E10-6A1; *Leg.* 631B6-D1, 660E2-5, 661A5-B4, 697B2-6, 717C2-3, 724A7-B3, 726, 743E3-4A3, 870B1-6; *Lys.* 207C1-D2; *Meno* 70A6-B1, 71B6-7, 78C6, 87E-8B; *Phdo.* 68C1-3; *Phdr.* 239A2-40A8; *Phlb.* 26B5-7 (with B1-2), 48C7-E10; *Rep.* 362B2-C6, 366C, 432A4-6, 591C1-D10, 618C8-D5; *Symp.* 205D1-8; *Th.* 144E5-5B6ff. Outside Plato, cf. Arist. *EE* 1214A, *EN* 1098B12-15, *MM* 1184B1-6, *Pol.* 1323A21-7; Bacchyl. 10.35-49; Cic. *de fin.* 3.13.43, *TD* 5.27.76 & 5.30.85, *de off.* 3.6.28; D.L. 3.80-1; Hdt. 1.29ff; *Lys.* 1.49-50; *Plut. Mor.* 5Cff; *Stob.* 2.7(=2.136 Wachsmuth); *Theogn.* 255-6; *Xen. Oec.* 1.1.13, *Mem.* 1.5.3-4; In the rhetorical treatises, cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1360B25-8, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1422A4-10 (cf. 1440B15-20); Cic. *ad Her.* 3.10, *Part. Or.* 22.74-5, *Top.* 23.89, and cf. Walz *Rhet. Gr.* 4.738.14-739.1, and Cope ad Arist. *Rhet.* 2.21.5 (2.207-8). Cf. also Thompson ad *Meno* 87E.

1673 ἔστω (A6): With the third person imperative Callicles finds a new way to allow Socrates to proceed without vouchsafing that he agrees, which Socrates ignores in order to proceed. “Let’s say” (Irwin Zeyl Piettre), as if a first plural hortatory subjunctive, or Erler’s “*Das soll so sein*,” are far too agreeable. Cf. 501A1 with n. 1842, Thrasymachus at the end of *Rep.* Bk.I, 351D7 and E8, 354A5 (cf. A10); and Arist. *SE* 17.176A24.

1674 καὶ μὴν καὶ (B2), moving on to a different category, a use of the collocation *not* after a strong stop (*pace* Denniston, 352).

1675 τινός (B5): The enclitic is added both to acknowledge that the “order” in question is a metaphor, and to prepare a berth to unpack the metaphor.

1676 τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν (B6): For the bare “second-person” demonstrative τοῦτο granting the latter of two alternatives in the question, cf. n. 1584. The absence of σοὶ as well as the impersonal construction of the infinitive with ἀνάγκη leaves the prefix συν- ambiguous: τοῦτο, rather than ἐμέ or τινά, may be the subject rather than the object of συνομολογεῖν, leaving the weaker interpretation that Callicles is granting that Socrates’s assertion is merely logically *consistent* with the others (i.e., “This necessarily follows” rather than “I must agree [with you] in this”). Moreover, Croiset’s *il faut en convenir* avoids personal asseveration, as does Schleiermacher’s *ergibt sich auch dieses* (cf. also Erler) Compare ἔστω above, A6. Translators should avoid personal pronouns here (such as “we must agree” *vel sim.*, *pace* Helmbold Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Zeyl Piettre) – excepting of course the impersonal personal *man* (in German) or French *on* (with Canto). Like ἔστω above, his answer allows Socrates to proceed but withholds agreement and, with Deuschle-Cron, does not even grant that his mind has been changed. Avoiding to bring this across, Waterfield adds “us” (“the preceding argument leaves us no choice”) merely to provide himself a purchase to voice his own reasons for disagreeing with Socrates and Callicles.

1677 ἐν τῷ σώματι (B7) immediately followed by τῷ is surprisingly awkward: the problem is avoided in the parallel expression for the soul (C1).

1678 Attributing the line (B9) to Callicles, with edd. (Routh, despite noting that Ficinus had given it to Callicles, gives it to Socrates, with Heindorf, Coraes later following). Socrates’s response (ἐγωγε, C1) suggests that he hears the remark as a question rather than an assertion, just as his response to Polus at 478A5-6 suggested that Polus’s remark was an assertion rather than a question (cf. n. 921). Callicles again keeps his distance, as if he were guessing from the context what Socrates might have in mind (with ἴσως) as if the obvious inference from what he has already agreed to were only an opinion of Socrates.

ΣΩ. ἔγωγε. τί δὲ αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου;  
... πειρῶ εὐρεῖν<sup>1679</sup> καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνο<sup>1680</sup> τὸ ὄνομα.

ΚΑΛ. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς<sup>1681</sup> λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εἴ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ· σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς  
λέγειν, φάθι,<sup>1682</sup> εἰ δὲ μή,<sup>1683</sup> ἔλεγε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε.<sup>1684</sup> ἔμοι γὰρ<sup>1685</sup> δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ  
σώματος τάξεσιν<sup>1686</sup> ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν,<sup>1687</sup> ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ ἡ  
ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν. [d]

ΣΩ. ταῖς δὲ γε<sup>1688</sup> τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσι καὶ<sup>1689</sup> κοσμήσεσιν νόμιμόν τε καὶ κόσμον,<sup>1690</sup>  
ὄθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη.  
φῆς ἢ οὐ;

1679 πειρῶ εὐρεῖν (C2): Given the asyndeton I infer, with Mistriotis, that Callicles has again delayed to answer. With εὐρεῖν Socrates re-encourages the passive-aggressive Callicles by indirectly identifying the whole gradual epagogic argument with his proposal above to “find” the answer by ἀτρέμα σκοπεῖσθαι (503D4-5: cf. n. 1657).

1680 Reading ἐκεῖνο (C3) from BTWPF and Π1, *legg.* Routh Hermann Stallb. Ast(1832) Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Schmelzer Lamb Zimmermann Heidbüchel (ἐκείνῳ *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Beck Bekker Coraes Ast[1819] Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Schanz Christ Lodge Stender Sauppe Croiset Dodds Cantarin : ἐκείνου *coni.* Findeisen : ἐκεῖ *coni.* Burnet, *leg.* Erler). Socrates used ἐκεῖ above to refer to the regime of the body (501B6), an expression just striking enough at that point to maintain its special meaning here (with Burnet); but Stallb.'s *ad sensum* exegesis, ὡσπερ εὐρες καὶ εἶπες καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὄνομα, cancels the need for emendation. To translate it, English needs more than one word.

1681 αὐτὸς λέγεις (C4): Callicles shows his churlish recalcitrance by speaking as if he knows that Socrates knows that he knows what the answer must be – just as above he portrayed the answer he gave as not his but merely a creature of Socrates's mind – so that who does the answering makes no difference.

1682 φάθι (C6) in its dialectical sense (e.g., 462D10-11, and recently, 497A1, C6; 498A2, C1-2, C5, E1-2; 500E1-2; 502C11; 504A9 – also cf. S. *Ant.*442), meaning that he says “Yes” to Socrates's question (or “No”: Socrates again insists on excluding middles [C9, D3, E4; 505A3-4, B5]) – i.e., he indicates whether he agrees or not, exactly what he has been avoiding to do by various means – and in so doing would take back the dialectical role of answerer from Socrates after Socrates has given this one answer.

1683 εἰ δὲ μή (C6), rather than parallel ἐάν, according to the idiom (cf. 470A12 and n. 701) though here the second limb is complete. Cf. also 502B5-6 and n.

1684 ἐπίτρεπε (C7): Socrates refers to Callicles's *καθομολογεῖν* and *ἐνδιδοῖναι* (499B4-5), and more exactly to his last three answers. Cary's “do not spare me” misses the drift by replacing the plain sense, “letting it pass,” with an invented and incorrect motive for Callicles doing so.

1685 Reading ἔμοι γὰρ (C7) with FB<sup>2</sup><sup>margin</sup> and Π1, *legg.* Hermann[*sine noto*] Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Burnet Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds Erler Heidbüchel (ἔμοιγε γὰρ B [*punctis del. corr.*] : ἔμοιγε B<sup>2</sup>TWPF, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Routh Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Sommer Hirschig Schanz Stender Sauppe Croiset Theiler). Programmatic γὰρ is needed as a connective after the intervention of his request that Callicles play the role of questioner.

1686 τάξεσιν (C7): The plural is new; its sense or force is, at the moment, unclear.

1687 ὑγιεινόν (C8): Socrates now elaborates upon Callicles's suggestion as to the name of the virtue proper to the “ordered body” (namely, *ὑγίειαν* καὶ *ισχόν*, B9) by adding the name of the ordering element that leads to that named virtue, and the name is cognate: healthiness in the ordering leads to a healthy soul. To create this link he needed provisionally to narrow the virtue of body to health (dropping *ισχόν* from above), and thereby prepared a similar inference for the contested case of soul (D1-3). Once the etymological link is exploited Socrates can zoom back out to the genus of bodily virtue (ἢ ἄλλη ἀρετή), and then re-include by implication Callicles's *ισχόν*.

1688 Reading δὲ γε (D1) from F and Π1, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Erler Heidbüchel (δὲ BTWP, *legg.* edd.), *γε* emphasizing the move to the target (soul over body). Cf. n. 1454.

1689 Reading καὶ only (D1) with the superior attestation of both families (BTF), *legg.* edd. (τε καὶ PWPar<sup>2</sup>f, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Beck Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Hirschig). τε καὶ is rather too sing-song alongside D2; but, more importantly in the application to soul, the persistent pairing will become a dyad of distinct elements, justice and temperance (contrast n. 1671, *supra*). The plural is continued from above and expanded to the well established pair, but still and again its meaning or force is unclear; in any case the plurals veto the blending of the two concepts (esp. with τε καὶ) and force them to stand apart.

1690 Emending νόμος to κόσμος vel κόσμοιον (D2) – conjectured by Kratz and favored by Huit Sauppe Ovink Dodds (νόμος mss. and Iambl. [*Prot.*86.24], *legg.* edd.), greatly streamlining the passage (cf. 506E) and avoiding what must at best be counted a redundancy (for in attributing νόμος to soul what can it mean but to be νόμιμος?). Waterfield tries to avoid redundancy by translating “law and convention” at the expense of subsequently making τὸ κόσμοιον merely conventional; Canto's tr. inverts the order of this pair as well as the second one in order to produce a plausible meaning that however is not there. On the special importance of νόμος to soul, Croiset cites *Crito* 50Aff and X. *Mem.*4.4.12ff and 4.6.6, though he has no grounds subsequently to take νόμιμοι to refer narrowly to men as citizens but κόσμοιοι to refer to men per se (*honnêtes gens*). The only virtues these highly diverse interpretations have in common is that they save the unanimity of the mss.

κόσμος is a word with a wide semantic field covered by no single English word. Translating it presents problems similar to those we encountered with νόμος, above (n. 1242). At this point the notion of decorum is finally brought into play, though up until now orderliness (*vel sim.*) was the main idea, with κόσμος as a synonym of τάξις (504A1, A3-4, A7, B5, B7-8, C2); and there, even “beauty,” could not be used though it is always a connotation of the κόσμος words. The *schol. vet.* asserts that with δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη (D3) Soc. attributes τὸ κόσμοιον to σωφροσύνη and τὸ νόμιμον to δικαιοσύνη, (and for the affinity of τὸ σῶφρον with τὸ κόσμοιον cf. e.g., *Rep.*430E), but the continual use of τε καὶ does not stress a separate attribution but instead entertains a blending.



ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.<sup>1691</sup>

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα<sup>1692</sup> βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκεῖνος,<sup>1693</sup> ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός,<sup>1694</sup> καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς ἂν λέγη, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας,<sup>1695</sup> καὶ δῶρον ἕαν τι διδῶ,<sup>1696</sup> δώσει, καὶ ἕαν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαιρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο αἰετὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ<sup>1697</sup> τοῖς πολίταις [e] δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία<sup>1698</sup> δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ ἀπίη.<sup>1699</sup>

... συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε<sup>1700</sup> κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία<sup>1701</sup> πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα<sup>1702</sup> ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ

1691 Evasive and non-committal ἔστω (D4) again.

1692 Reading πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων (D5) with mss., *legg. edd.* (πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸ βλέπων ZaYPar<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Sommer : πρὸς ταῦτα ἂ F).

1693 ἐκεῖνος (D5): “*Cet orateur que je rêve*,” Huit.

1694 τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός (D5): The order of the terms (technical ability and moral orientation) is the reverse of what it was at 503C7-D1, in a chiasm of before and after (cf. n. 1768), relying on the reader to realize that D1-3 was the turning point and affirming his realizing it. Helmbold’s “the moral artist, the true orator,” Woodhead’s “our orator, the good and true artist,” Canto’s *le bon orateur qui dispose d’un art*, and Waterfield’s “that excellent rhetorical expert of ours” are stabs-in-the-dark, unaware of the back-reference. Dodd’s remark that in calling oratory a τέχνη Socrates contradicts his “earlier denial,” remembers what Socrates said to Polus at 462B8 but forgets what he said to Callicles at 503D1, to which his chiasm here refers; and here is another “subsequent use” of the argument at 501D7-502C1 Dodds failed to see.

1695 λόγους / πράξεις (D6-7): The doublet represents political activity: cf. 481A1 and n. 1008.

1696 καὶ δῶρον ἕαν τι διδῶ (D7): Vaunting ἅπασας after πράξεις provides a berth for exemplification thereof, namely δῶρα and ἀφαιρέσεις. Compare Thrasymachus’s similar pair of political acts, εἰσφοραὶ and λήψεις, at *Rep.* 343D6-E1; and Polus’s very different list: murder, disenfranchisement, exile (e.g., 466B11-C2). διδόναι is new but ἀφαιρεῖσθαι is old. The prerogative to kill usually heads the boasting litany of power, but the prerogative to appropriate one’s wealth is always included (466B10-C1, C9-D2; 468B5-6, C2-3, D1-2, E8-9; 470B2-3; 480C8-D3; 486B6-C1; 508D1-3, E1-4; 511A6-7). By here being made to follow διδόναι, it becomes a policy (e.g., ζημία) rather than a threat.

1697 Reading αὐτοῦ (D9) with TWF and *edd.*, represented in both manuscript families (αὐτοῦ B : αὐτῶ *coni.* Deuschle, *leg.* Dodds : δι’ αὐτοῦ *excedisse susp.* Schanz, *leg.* Christ : δι’ αὐτοῦ *coni.* Sauppe : *non vertit* Ficinus). Sauppe and Dodds assert the possessive genitive should go after ταῖς πολίταις rather than before it, but cf. *Prot.* 310D2, *al.*; its proleptic position makes it emphatic (with Heidbüchel) and implies the πολῖται are fellow-citizens, which, though almost categorically implied by his use of the article (Dodds), deserves being stressed as forefront in his own mind, saliently distinct from his own interests. Deuschle’s emendation to αὐτῶ is entirely intended to stress the analogy between the statesman’s psychic therapy and demiurgic manufacture above (where he had used the dative above, at 503E4), but the analogy is clear enough without this only partial syntactical parallelism. Moreover, the genitive broaches the notion that in Athens the orator must himself be a citizen (as Callicles is, and as Polus and Gorgias are not) and therefore benefits personally if his fellows are improved (whence *civibus suis*, cited by Jahn Feix). Schanz’s intuition that the original reading was δι’ αὐτοῦ (accepted by Christ) inappropriately emphasizes the craftsman over his work; Nichols, like Ficinus, happens not to translate it.

1698 ἀκολασία (E2): The two virtues he will promote, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη, are imported from above and spelling out their opposites is a lavish and triumphant elaboration, but also enables Socrates to use the word ἀκολασία, which he will exploit in his final inference, below (505B9-12). We now limn the dialectical strategy behind the pluralization of τάξεις in the case of the body (C7: cf. n. 1686): it enabled the differentiation of τάξεις and κόσμος in the case of the soul (D1, with n.) and thereby the distinction between the two virtues (D3), among all the virtues of soul (ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετή, 504E3, brought to soul *pari passu* with body from C8-9), and thereby occasions the specific mention of ἀκολασία as the proper opposite of one of them.

1699 ἀπίη (E5): Note “catalectic” abbreviation for closure (cf. n. 1172).

1700 γε (E6) intimates that the case of the body is easy to understand and to agree about (cf. γοῦν at 516A5 and *Euthyd.* 284A3, A5, B4, *al.*), which here indirectly warns that the inevitable other case will come next.

1701 Omitting ἢ before σιτία (E7) with BTWPF, *legg. edd.* (ἢ F III Iambl.[*Prot.* 87.11] *coniecerat* Hirschig, *legg.* Dodds Nichols Cantarín) because it militates with the extenuation of σιτία by καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα: see next note.

1702 σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα (E7): ἥδιστα along with πολλὰ modifies σιτία, not ποτὰ (*pace* Ast[1819]), nor is the one modifying the one and the other the other (as in the admittedly elegant translations of Croiset Apelt Woodhead Chambray Canto). It is a variation on the πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ hendiadys (Smyth §2879). Postponement of ἥδιστα, and the insertion of the article with it, make the καὶ emphatic.



ὀνήσει<sup>1703</sup> αὐτὸ<sup>1704</sup> ἔσθ' ὅτι<sup>1705</sup> πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε<sup>1706</sup> τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλαττον;<sup>1707</sup>

... ἔστι ταῦτα;<sup>1708</sup>

[505] ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ<sup>1709</sup> οἶμαι λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς.<sup>1710</sup> ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ<sup>1711</sup> τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἐῶσιν οἱ ἰατροὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἐῶσιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτό γε<sup>1712</sup> καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. [b]

- 1703 Reading ὀνήσει (E8) from F Iambl.(Prot.87.14), legg. edd. (ὀνήση BTWP Steph., leg. Routh): the subjunctive would require ἄν. μή makes the relative clause conditional in the manner of a protasis (*pace* Lodge who sees it as generalizing); Socrates prefers the asseverative “most vivid” future condition because he is sure the condition will be fulfilled.
- 1704 Reading αὐτὸ (E8) with B<sup>2</sup>TPWf and edd. (αὐτὸν BF Iambl.[Prot.87.14] Π1, legg. Dodds Cantarin): the neuter distinguishes the body from the man who might want the pleasurable food (cf. αὐτῆ, of the soul, below at 505B7).
- 1705 Reading ἔσθ' ὅτι (E8) with the mss. and Iambl.(Prot.87.14), legg. Routh Ast(1832) Sauppe Burnet Lamb Dodds Irwin Allen Nichols Zeyl Erler (ἔσθ' ὅτε O1 Steph.[γρ.], legg. Heindorf Ast[1819] and edd.). It is an adverbial accusative: “will not benefit more *in some way*,” for which Routh compares *Tht.*209B6. Cf. also *Rep.*507C10, *Ar. Nub.*1290. ἢ = “or,” not “than” (*pace* Heindorf, Stallbaum, Cope): τοῦναντίον (adverbial, with Kratz Lodge Zimmermann) = “(or) to the contrary” will benefit it less, i.e., be less beneficial. Helmbold’s “these may sometimes do no more good than their very opposites, or rather do it even less good” translates τοῦναντίον twice.
- 1706 Reading κατὰ γε (E9) with the mss. and Iambl., legg. edd. (ἢ κατὰ γε *coni.* Cornarius Heindorf Coraes : κατὰ δέ Schleiermacher : καὶ κατὰ γε *coni.* Dodds). The surprising expression τὸν δίκαιον λόγον brings forward δικαιοσύνη ἐγγίγνεσθαι from above and suddenly presumes that it will be the (just) soul that will determine the correct and just way to treat the body – an idea that likewise arose late and without warning in Socrates’s conversation with Polus and Gorgias on this same topic (465C7-D6). If we take λόγον to be quantitative here (cf. διαριθμησαμένη connected with ἀλόγως, 501A6-7) it brings forward what was done in that earlier passage with σταθμώμενον (465D3); Dodds on the other hand gives it a moral meaning on the basis of the subsequent inference that to give such treats would actually be cruel (505A2-3: *n.b.* γάρ).
- 1707 καὶ ἔλαττον (E9): The sense is determined by πλέον, which denotes *additional* benefit, so that ἔλαττον denotes the opposite, a *diminution* of benefit. The motivation for giving the man pleasurable food was, in the first place, to benefit him. For καὶ of the climactic alternative cf. ὀλίγον καὶ οὐδέν, *Apol.*23A7, *Tht.*173E4; also *Luc. Par.*12, T. 8.76.6. Worth commemorating is M.Vermehren’s ingenious conjecture βλάπτω for ἔλαττον (*Plat.Stud.*[1870]18). G.Wendt (*Z.f.d.Gymnasialw.*30[1876]603), followed by Christ, modifies Vermehren’s conjecture to βλάπτει.
- 1708 Reading ἔστι ταῦτα (E9-10) with the mss. and edd. (ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ AugO1). Though too weakly attested to read, the aggressive ἢ οὐ of AugO1 is of a piece with a rising insistence in Socrates’s questioning throughout this passage (cf. C9, D3, E4; 505A3, A6 [*n.b.*, καί], A9-10, B5; and his exasperated remark at 505C3-4).
- 1709 οὐ γάρ (505A2): Socrates ignores any indication of evasion suggested by Callicles’s ἔστω, as he has before (cf. n. 1673), when he has a further important point to make.
- 1710 Reading καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς (A3) with B<sup>2</sup>PWF Iambl.(Prot.87.17) and Π1, legg. edd. (καὶ ζῆν καὶ μοχθηρῶς BT : ζῆν καὶ μοχθηρῶς Par *teste* Cantarin and the early editions, leg. Routh). The litotes in λυσιτελεῖ is exactly what the worker-patient uses when he speaks to his doctor, as depicted at *Rep.*406D6. μοχθηρῶς belongs to that group of terms that “transfer the signification of physical distress to moral depravity, or *vice versa*” (Cope *ad loc.*, citing also the use, esp. in poetry, of πονηρός, κακός, κακότης, δειλός, δύστηνος, μέλεος, σχέτλιος, ταλαίπωρος, τλήμων). Cf. nn. 903, 916, 950 (πονηρός); nn. 957, 1402 (ὕγιες); n. 958 (σαθρόν), n. 982 (ὑπουλον).
- 1711 Reading οὐκοῦν καὶ (A6) from F Iambl.(Prot.87.17-18) Π1 (*coniecerat* Coraes), legg. edd. (οὐκοῦν WP, legg. Routh Cron : οὐκ οὖν B) introducing a further point and expecting a Yes answer. The abstract formulation μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος (vs. μετὰ μοχθηροῦ σώματος) makes the inference to μοχθηρῶς ζῆν easier.
- 1712 γε (A10) again portends that a more controversial example is coming up (cf. 504E6, nn. 1688, 1488), requiring Socrates to get Callicles’s agreement to what will be a supportive parallel, in advance. σύ is emphatic because expressed, preempting Callicles from again answering “ἔστω” (A1, 504D4, 504A6).

ΣΩ. περί δὲ ψυχὴν, ὃ ἄριστε,<sup>1713</sup> οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἕως μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ἦ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος,<sup>1714</sup> εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν<sup>1715</sup> βελτίων ἔσται· φῆς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. οὕτω γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἐστὶν ἀφ' ὧν<sup>1716</sup> ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία,<sup>1717</sup> ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ᾧου. [c]

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις,<sup>1718</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα.

1713 ὃ ἄριστε (B1): Socrates characteristically but not always reveals his sense of the importance of the moment reached in the dialectic by the way he addresses his interlocutor, since he feels, or claims to feel, that he is his partner. In this case, ἄριστε seems to celebrate the fact that they have reached the choicest (ἄριστον) moment in the dialectic, the application of all that came before to the target case of the soul (exactly thus also βέλτιστε, 515A1; and cf. n. 2021). We may compare ὃ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων at *Rep.* 522B3, by which Socrates notes they have come to an important pass (compare *Gorg.* 517B2); compare also *Crat.* 389D4, *Lach.* 190C8, and L. Campbell, *Theaetetus*, App. F, 283-4.

The scope of vocative expressions can be illustrated by a collection of their use in the *Republic*. Sometimes a bare adjective is used, in earnest or not: ὠγαθέ: *Rep.* 344E7, 345A5; ἄριστε: 338D5, 351D8, 477D7; εὐδαιμόν: 450C6; ἐταῖρε: 450D2, 504C9, 506D6, 520E4 (Socrates only once calls Adeimantus ἐταῖρε, at 562A7); θαυμάσιε: 435C4, 453C6, 495A10 (usual with imaginary interlocutors, 366D7, 420D1, 526A1, 574B7; μακάριε: 345B2, 346A3, 354A8, 499D10, 506D8, 557D1, 589C7; φίλε (373E9, 435B9, 455D6, 485C6, 503B3, 504C1, 519E1, 563B4); γενναίε 527B9. Sometimes an adjective is added to the proper name: ἀγαθέ: 423D8 (of Adeimant.); δαιμόνιε: 344D6 (Thras.), 522B3 (Glauc.), σοφώτατε: 338D5 (Thras.); φίλε: 361D4, 416B8, 473D5-6, 518A8, 533A1, 579D5, 608B4, 618B6-7 (of Glauc.); 365A4 (of Soc.); 376D6, 388D2 (of Adeimant.). On three occasions two adjectives are combined, without a proper name: βαβαῖ ὃ φίλε ἐταῖρε (459B10 [of Glauc.]); ὃ φίλε ἐταῖρε (562A7 [Adeimantus], 607E4 [Glauc.]). Combining an adjective with a proper name often adds asseveration (*Rep.* 388D2, 423D8, 473D5-6, 533A1, 579D5, 608B4, 618B6-7) or heightens a transition, as at *Rep.* 522B3.

1714 ἀνόητός τε ... καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος (B2-3): Socrates defines knavishness with four anti-virtues (*pace* Helmbold who somehow takes οὖσα to be the result [tr. “so that”] of πονηρὰ ἦ). It is usual that the canon of virtues should comprise four, but bravery, which is not a virtue Callicles would feel he lacks as much as the others, has been switched out for piety, which he obviously does and would lack (cf. also 507AC). In fact piety often plays the role of the fifth virtue, e.g., *Leg.* 837C6-7; *Prot.* 330B4-6, 349B1-2, cf. 359B2-4; *Rep.* 395C4-5.

1715 Reading ἀφ' ὧν (B4) with BTWP and edd. (ὃ ποιῶν F : ἃ ἂν ποιῶν Iambl. [*Prot.* 87.25]): see next note.

1716 The awkward hyperbaton of ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ (B9) is meant to set into relief its opposition to ἀφ' ὧν βέλτιον ἔσται, above.

1717 Reading ἡ ἀκολασία (B11) with BTWP and edd. (ἡ *om.* F Iambl. [*Prot.* 87.28]), the article clinching a reference to 492C4-6. δὴ added to νῦν acknowledges the enduring effect of Callicles's parrhesiastic speech (491E-492C), *pace* Jahn who believes that ὥσπερ refers to κολάζεσθαι rather than ἀκολασία and that νυνδὴ refers to the position Callicles has just now accepted (to the contrary, Socrates has said ᾧου rather than οἰεῖ). To contrast the verb κολάζειν with the abstract noun ἀκολασία is logically awkward but is a scrupulously accurate depiction of Callicles's position, for he means, by ἀκολασία, having the prerogative for licentiousness more than exercising it. Cary Helmbold Nichols confuse the reference by translating κολάζειν with “punish,” which is quite irrelevant to the position Callicles held and Socrates has now refuted. Better, with Jowett, to carry across the equivocation at the heart of Socrates's argument, with “control or chastisement” and “intemperance and lack of control,” except that the latter does not capture the positive sense Callicles wants: “intemperance and license” would be better. Apelt offers *Züchtigung* versus *Zuchtlosigkeit*, and Woodhead “discipline / indiscipline” (as opposed to “lack of discipline,” with Zeyl) and Irwin “tempered / intemperance” – with all of which I think even Callicles would agree, as long as the latter term can be taken approbatively.

1718 οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις (C1): Callicles reverts to his simplest and most direct evasion (cf. 500D4-5, 498D1, 497B3, 497A6, and n. 1479), but because Socrates the last time intentionally mistook it as a request for clarification (500D6), he adds the advice (with his characteristic ἀλλά) that since Socrates's words are not reaching him, Socrates should direct them to someone else – an entirely new evasion.

ΣΩ. οὔτος<sup>1719</sup> ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸ<sup>1720</sup> τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

ΚΑΛ. οὐδέ γέ<sup>1721</sup> μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά<sup>1722</sup> σοι Γοργίου χάριν<sup>1723</sup> ἀπεκρινάμην.

ΣΩ. εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;<sup>1724</sup>

ΚΑΛ. αὐτὸς γνώση.<sup>1725</sup>

- 1719 οὔτος ἀνὴρ ... κολαζόμενος (C3): Now it is *Socrates's* turn to express frustration with his interlocutor (another ironic reversal), but his frustration is that Callicles is frustrating himself by his unbridled refusal to accept that the conclusion they have reached about what benefits the soul, is a refusal to receive that very benefit. For the expression in anarthrous οὔτος cf. 467B1 and n. *ad loc.* Cobet (*Mnem.*n.s.2[1875]141-2) and Helmbold, insensitive to the ironic reversal, athetize Socrates's entire remark as being beneath him (Cobet adducing Callicles's οὐδέ at C5 to support his bowdlerization – *sed contra*, see below – and Helmbold calling it “an odd turn to the methods of Socrates”).
- 1720 Reading αὐτὸ (C3) with Γ<sup>2</sup>E1NFlorC (*teste* Cantarín) defended by P.P.Dobree (*ad Phdo.*73B: *advers.* v.1[London 1883]151), and accepted by Buttman Coraes Thurot (tr. *l'avantage même dont nous parlons*) Hirschig Schanz Cary Christ Stender Croiset Woodhead Theiler Chambry Irwin Allen Zeyl Pietre Cantarín (αὐτὸς mss., *legg.* edd.). It is Plato's tendency to use αὐτὸ τοῦτο in connection with such moments of “self-instantiation” (Dobree *ad loc.*) – see *Phdo.*73B6-7 αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθεῖν ... περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, 103A6 αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νομῶν λεγομένων, and *Rep.*432E5-7 – and for such self-instantiation see *Meno* 80A8; *Rep.*375E5-6. Deuschle, fully recognizing the self-instantiation here (*die Untersuchung selbst eine Zucht des Denkens [ist]*), found κολαζόμενος (in apposition) redundant, and deleted it as a gloss, followed by Christ. Moreover, καὶ πάσχων is concessive, not a second complement to ὑπομένει added to ὠφελόμενος by καὶ (*pace* Lamb's “cannot endure a kindness done him, or the experience in himself of ... a correction,” and similarly Apelt Canto Pietre): for that we would expect οὔτε ὠφελόμενος οὔτε πάσχων.
- 1721 οὐδέ γε (C5) is here the “negative counterpart of δέ γε” (Denniston, 156), used to *introduce* a retort (*pace* Cobet, *vid. supra*): cf. *Lach.*195B7, 197D1 (μηδέ), *Rep.*499A4. For the “positive” use cf. *Phdrs.*230C6; *Rep.*407A9, 450B6, 487E6, 601C8. Read σύ with BTWPF and edd. (*om.* F) as going toe-to-toe with Socrates's complaint.
- 1722 With καὶ ταῦτα (C5) Callicles mocks in retort Socrates's καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο (C3).
- 1723 Γοργίου χάριν (C6): Cf. 497B4-C2. For αὐτοῦ χάριν meaning χαρισόμενος αὐτῷ cf. *Phdrs.*234E9 with 235B8. It is here a reiteration of his remark at 501C8 in abbreviated form: he answered as he did only to enable Socrates to complete his lecture.
- 1724 Reading καταλύομεν (C8) from BTWP, *legg.* edd. (καταλύομεν *in lacuna* f [*teste* Burnet] Steph., *legg.* Findeisen Routh Hirschig Schanz Christ Stender Croiset Zimmermann : καταλύομεν ZaNFlorΞ1<sup>wpf</sup> *teste* Cantarín, *leg.* Theiler : καταλύομεν Steph. Ficinus [*abruptemus*], *leg.* Schanz : καταλείψομεν Y, *legg.* Coraes[*olim*] Ast[1819] : καταλείψομεν *coni.* Cornarius, *leg.* Beck : καταλίπομεν *coni.* Buttman *leg.* Coraes[*nuper*] : *alii alia*). Compare the expression at 457D1: διαλύεσθαι τὴς συνοουσίας. Socrates's first plural presents invite the participation of the other party; Callicles's reply with the second singular future (γνώση) absents himself from participating in the decision.
- 1725 αὐτὸς γνώση (C9): Callicles matches Socrates's future ποιήσομεν with a future of his own (Mr Morrissey). The scholiast glosses ἀντι τοῦ “εἰ ἐθέλεις, ποίει· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ μέλει.” From *Lach.*187C2 (αὐτοῦς δὴ χρὴ γινώσκειν) we see that γινώσκειν means to judge what to do, and with αὐτὸς the speaker leaves the choice up to him spoken to; but the jussive future (Smyth §1917) adds more, as at *Phlb.*12A8 where the speaker indicates that he moreover does not care what choice the interlocutor makes (Thurot; *Abweisungsformel*, Jahn; *ablehnende*, Deuschle-Cron) – and so with Callicles, here (the indifference supports Gildersleeve's remarks at §269). It is therefore something very different from the polite optative, αὐτὸς ἂν εἰδείης, at *Luc. Dial.*Deor.4.5 and *Herm.*49.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις<sup>1726</sup> εἶναι [d] καταλείπειν,<sup>1727</sup> ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιή. <sup>1728</sup> ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ,<sup>1729</sup> ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

ΚΑΛ. ὡς βίαιος<sup>1730</sup> εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ,<sup>1731</sup> ἑάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέξῃ.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ<sup>1732</sup> τοι ἀτελεῖ γέ τὸν λόγον καταλίπωμεν.<sup>1733</sup>

ΚΑΛ. αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν<sup>1734</sup> ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ; [e]

1726 Reading θέμις (C10) with mss. and edd. (θέμιν *coni.* Ast). According to a recondite axiom, θέμις stays in the nominative in the set phrase θέμις εἶναι (*sic* Smyth §285.13, following Buttmann, *Gramm.* 1.232 and 2.405). The basis for the rule is however only empirical, and weak as such since the empirical evidence consists of only four passages besides the present one: S. *OC* 1191, μὴ ... θέμις εἶναι +acc./inf.; X. *Oec.* 11.11, πῶς θέμις εἶναι + inf., where note negative μή; A. *Suppl.* 335, τὸ μὴ θέμις (*sc.* εἶναι?) λέγεις; Ael. *Nat.An.* 1.60, μὴ ... θέμις εἶναι +acc./inf. The rule is moreover rejected by Jebb, Dawes, Porson, and here Ast (who read θέμιν εἶναι in 1819). But in these five passages, if only we take φασὶ as parenthetical in the present one it is no more the nominative (θέμις) replacing the accusative (θέμιν) that needs to be explained, as the infinitive (εἶναι) replacing a finite form, which would after all have taken the nominative. A tergiversation is available for the nimble (taking φασὶ parenthetical and εἶναι with μεταξὺ: K.Reisig [*Oed. in Col.* {Jena 1820} 344]), as Ast came to do in 1832, restoring the nominative), but why throw your back out when there is nothing at stake as to the meaning?

1727 Reading καταλείπειν (D1) with BTWf and edd. (καταλείπῃ PF). It substitutes for καταλύειν, C8. The choice between aorist and present recurs below (D7).

1728 Reading περίη (D2) with Tf and edd. (περιήη B : περιήη PF). The metaphor is proverbial (*Paroem.Gr.* 1.23 [Z 1.59] and 2.60 [GCL 1.46]) and therefore needs no apologetic ὡσπερ, *vel sim.* The shift from the plural (τοὺς μύθους) was forced by the intervening metaphor of the head. What remains is to decide between the life of oratory and that of philosophy, which is the purpose of the whole analysis (500B5-D4); the refutation of Callicles's scandalizing claim of hedonism, though incidental to that decision, has now exposed him as a failing orator: because the audience is present he would rather quit the conversation than try to defend that life.

Socrates's remark relies upon a distinction between μῦθος and λόγος, perhaps even their exhaustive complementarity. For him the distinction would consist in monologue instead of a joint effort of question and answer, at least in part (cf., further 521D). With this most definitive breakdown in his conversation with Callicles so far (cf. 495B1, 497A6-7, 503D3) we are pressed to wonder how things can continue. Gorgias had intervened with the advice that the day's proceedings should be given a chance to be completed (497B4-5: cf. n. 1481), and this kept Callicles going at 501C7-8, but this time he seems resolute. Will he leave? Will Polus or Gorgias intervene? Will Socrates, for the first time in the corpus with the special exception of the *Phaedo* take his leave? Perhaps our author is suggesting to us that μῦθος – a Socratic monologue – is the only way it can be brought to an end that is a completion. See next note.

1729 τὰ λοιπὰ (D2): Socrates indicates an awareness of what steps remain, a foreknowledge of what the course of the argument will be – something much more specific than *περαίνεσθαι* (497B5.). This is an exception to the usual dialectical scenario (and especially the fiction Plato maintains that his Socrates is always following the logos wherever it leads), and also sets up the coming option that he carry it out on his own.

1730 βίαιος (D4), another great ironical reversal, the pot calling the kettle black, stimulating us to ask whether Socrates's behavior might be a βιαίωv τὸ δικάσιωv (cf. 484B7).

1731 ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ (D4): The “if you please” subjunctive: cf. n. 1392 *ad* 493C4-5. Callicles is seeking to exploit the conventional contrast between force and persuasion, but note that the contrast does not necessarily imply physical force: *Apol.* 35D2-3: εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμομοκότας, of Socrates employing abject begging to persuade the jurors' emotions against their oath to administer justice. Likewise Callicles is here pleading that he is being browbeaten by the persistent Socrates.

1732 γάρ (D6) tells why he has asked who else he could talk to: he knows the answer, and knows that Callicles knows the answer – namely, that nobody will – and so shows that his question is in substance a plea that Callicles continue.

1733 Reading aorist subjunctive καταλίπωμεν (D7) with W *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Bekker Coraes Hermann Stallb. Jahn Kratz Deuschle Thompson Místriotis Schmelzer Burnet Lamb Zimmermann Dodds Theiler Erler Heidbüchel (καταλείπων μὲν F : καταλείπωμεν BTf, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Beck Ast Woolsey Cron Sommer Schanz Christ Lodge Stender Sauppe Ovink Croiset).

1734 κατὰ σαυτὸν (D9) is usually taken to contrast holding forth in *perpetua oratio* (“talking straight on,” Jowett) as opposed to the give and take of question and answer – a distinction all-important to Socrates, but not to Callicles. I follow Kratz (and Erler) with the interpretation speaking “alone” in a stronger sense, i.e., off by himself (for which cf. *Rep.* 604A3, T. 1.79.1 [ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς], 3.78.1, 4.65.1): Callicles wants not even to hear it – which implies the words *are* reaching him (cf. n. 1718)! Gorgias will take exception to this and say he wants to *hear*, at least, the rest (506B2-3). That a man who brags of his experience and ability to deal with men in public meetings cannot continue signalizes if nothing more that his claim is hot air. The suggestion of Irwin that this dramatic turn of events is a mere contrivance by which “Plato” enables himself to abandon the dialectical form, having not yet achieved arguments for claims he now wishes, nevertheless, to make (p. 219), is an index how far a close reader of Greek can be, if addicted to the notion he is reading an author who hopes to win his approval, from hearing what is being said by the interlocutors.

ΣΩ. ἴνα μοι<sup>1735</sup> τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου<sup>1736</sup> γένηται, ἃ<sup>1737</sup> πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ὢν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι, οὕτωςί<sup>1738</sup> μέντοι ποιήσωμεν, οἷμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν<sup>1739</sup> πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές τί ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος·<sup>1740</sup> κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό.<sup>1741</sup> δίειμι [506] μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ<sup>1742</sup> ἐγὼ ὡς ἂν μοι δοκῆ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἑμαυτῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι<sup>1743</sup> ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω,<sup>1744</sup> ἀλλὰ ζητῶ<sup>1745</sup> κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τι φαίνεται λέγων ὁ<sup>1746</sup> ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι

- 1735 Reading μοι (E1) with mss. and edd. since Buttman (μη QPar<sup>2</sup>E3ZaΦ *teste* Cantarin and the early editions, *leg.* Routh). Immediately, as a dialectician, Socrates embraces the second alternative – question and answer (and incidentally might in any case have rejected the distinction implicit in Callicles’s challenge, since after all thinking might well for him be a dialogue of the soul *κατὰ σεαυτόν!*) We need not take the clause to be an ironical averral (as others do: “Sure, so that I become a laughing stock,” as at *Lys.*211C2), but simply a question in deliberative subjunctive, warranting a “no” answer (therefore, punctuated with a question mark, with Kratz). In either case Socrates is expressing misgivings about taking up the challenge, which he nevertheless must because of his own loyalty to the logos, which the others do not understand. For the ethical dative in this connection cf. *Apol.*22A7-8: ἴνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο.
- 1736 τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου (E1): Athenaeus 7.308C quotes from Epicharmus the tetrameter τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δυ’ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἷς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω – as being spoken by a character whose interlocutor refuses to answer. *ἐλεγον* appears to be first singular in the quotation of Athenaeus. The *schol. vet.* also thinks it is from Epicharmus but says the other character has left the stage for a moment, during which the one must play both parts. From *Athen.* 8.362D it appears that the tetrameter became proverbial. Socrates modifies the end of the tetrameter to suit the context.
- 1737 ἃ (E1), accusative object of ἔλεγον: (its antecedent, *sc. ταῦτα λέγειν*, understood in the subsequent main clause, as often). The present sentence and the purpose clause before it are an asyndetic binary formulation (Riddell §207, noting that “the effect of asyndeton is always to make the connection close: it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence”).
- 1738 Reading οὐτωςί (E3), from F, *coniecarat* Coraes, *legg.* Dodds Theiler Nichols Zeyl Cantarin, and punctuating *before* it, with Stallb. Cary Hirschig Jowett Schmelzer Christ Dodds Theiler Nichols Zeyl Cantarin (οὕτως· εἰ BTWP, *legg.* edd. : τοῦτο. εἰ *coni.* Heindorf : οὕτως εἰ *coni.* Stallb., *leg.* Allen : οὕτω ποιεῖν. εἰ *coni.* Ast); and reading hortatory ποιήσωμεν from BTPF, *legg.* Apelt Dodds Theiler Nichols Zeyl Cantarin (ποιήσωμεν W, *legg.* edd.). μέντοι dismisses the question for being senseless. For the corruption of εἰ to ἰ, Dodds compares *Crat.*396C6, where “ταυτησί has become ταῦτης εἰ in ms.B.”
- 1739 φιλονίκως ἔχειν (E4): He *does* mean to vie for defeat each other but to “win the race” with the stipulation that once the truth is found, benefit will accrue to all, not only to the victor (cf. 457E3-5 for exactly the same idea, expressed more compactly). In proposing that reaching the truth is the purpose for winning, he introduces a new reason for the others to participate even though they have capitulated – and brings dialectic back in, thereby, through the back door. In case Stallb., reading here φιλονείκως, is right (*ad loc.*) to separate φιλονεικ- (love of contention) from φιλονικ- (love of victory), it comes to the same thing (but cf. my n. 351, *supra*, and my n. *ad Lach.*194A8).
- 1740 Reading τί ψεῦδος (E5) with the mss. and edd. (τί τὸ ψεῦδος Ξ1, *leg.* Hirschig). Lodge notes that the article would be needed with ψεῦδος only if, as with τὸ ἀληθές, it came before τί.
- 1741 αὐτό (E6) is used to isolate the truth in question from the party that can take credit for knowing it, the item stressed in the previous clause by the appositive indirect questions. ἅπασι goes with both κοινόν and φανερόν, in syntax and in spirit (*pace* Heindorf who wants only the former because of what is said at *Charm.*166D4-6, where the dative could only with more difficulty be taken with both κοινόν and καταφανές): the point is that knowing the truth is a victory even for those who fail to find it.
- 1742 Reading τῷ λόγῳ (506A1) with the mss. and edd. (τὸν λόγον *coni.* Heindorf [*Ficinus: prosequor ... sermonem*], *legg.* Thurot Huit : τὸ λόγῳ *coni.* Coraes). For the construction of ἔρχεσθαι with dative τῷ λόγῳ, cf. 492D1; *Rep.*349A4, 361D8; *Symp.*195A2 (διελθεῖν). Socrates is proposing nothing but ἀτρέμα σκοπεῖσθαι, as he did above (503D5). The constructions with acc. above (505D8) and below (B1), spoken by others, do not control Socrates’s expression (*pace* Heindorf). Coraes’s ingenious conjecture of the dual, as if Socrates would be spokesman for two arguments in the Epicharmean sense, rather mistakes Socrates’s sense that dialectic consists of only one λόγος shared by questioner and answerer (but Dodds also errs in saying the only λόγος is Socrates’s own λόγος), and that he often enough answers his own questions: most instructively 462B6-9; cf. also 453C, 458A, 487B; *Meno* 97E; and also the Athenian at *Leg.*701C, 780A. We must keep in mind Plato’s idea that thinking is a dialogue of the soul with itself (hence ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ’ ὑμῶν, A4). Mistriotis, who rather approves Coraes’s conjecture, is likewise misled into commenting (*ad ὁμολογεῖν ἑμαυτῷ*, A2), εἶναι ἀνάγκη, ἴνα ὁ ἴδιος ὁμολογῇ ἑαυτῷ. It is only *likely* that he will agree with himself: Socrates often asks questions that elicit “No”.
- 1743 οὐδὲ γάρ τοι (A3): Either, with δέ as connective, “For it is *also* not the case, I want you to know, that...” (as at 488C1) or, with γάρ as connective, “For it is not *even* the case that...” (as at *Rep.*595C7-8), with the following word emphasized. I take it in the former sense here. Denniston, in an oblique citation of these three passages (p.113, n.), calls this collocation of particles the negative of καὶ γάρ τοι, which he argues means “and in consequence,” thus presumably giving it the meaning “nor in consequence” – but the notion of consequence is absent from all three.
- 1744 Reading εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω (A3-4) with BTWP and edd. (εἰδὼς πάνν τι λέγω. ἀλλὰ λέγω F). The earlier editors take little note of this variant except for Beck and Ast(1832), citing x (and *editio Bas.*?). The reading of F is impossible so the edd have chosen BTW, which is unobjectionable except that it does nothing to account for the provenance of the reading in F. Dodds cleverly divides the witness of F in his apparatus in the following way: πάνν τι F : *om.* BTW || ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ F : ἃ λέγω BTW; and then puts the first two words of F into his text and replaced two others from F with two words from BTW – but achieves this unobjectionable result at the expense of cutting off any account for the provenance of *either* reading (compare Theiler *ad* 502B2 [n. 1605], and Dodds again *ad* 498B1 [n. 1504]). If I could have my way in his manner, I would sooner conjecture οὐκ εἰδὼς πάνν τι λέγω ἀλλ, ἐγὼ ζητῶ κοινῇ as more than unobjectionable, but I have no textual grounds for it, and so will not.
- 1745 Reading ἀλλὰ ζητῶ (A4) with mss. and edd. Heusde, followed by Heindorf and Christ, “corrected” the text to read ἀλλὰ ζητῶν on the basis of *Ficinus*’s tr., *neque enim tanquam sciens dico illa, sed verum vobiscum communiter indagans*, and Cantarin now reports that reading from O2. But neat parallelism is not needed: dismissive ἀλλὰ (i.e., *sondern*), though a coordinate conjunction, is strong enough to abandon also the syntax of what it dismisses.
- 1746 Reading λέγων ὁ (A4-5). The apparatus of Cantarin is empty but earlier editors report discrepancies among the mss., to-wit, λέγων ὁ BS1YRVatΓJQ and *Ficinus* (“*si is qui mecum contendit aliquid momenti dicere videatur*”, *legg.* edd. : ὁ λέγων ὁ ParC : ὁ λέγων E3 Steph., *leg.*



ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι<sup>1747</sup> τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῷμεν δὴ<sup>1748</sup> χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πο<sup>1749</sup> [b] ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ<sup>1750</sup> μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι σοῦ<sup>1751</sup> αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ,<sup>1752</sup> ὃ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν Καλλικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμεν, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα<sup>1753</sup> ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου·<sup>1754</sup> ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε<sup>1755</sup> ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ [c] καλῶς λέγειν.<sup>1756</sup> καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγῃς,<sup>1757</sup> οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαί σοι ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφη.<sup>1758</sup>

ΚΑΛ. λέγε, ὦγαθέ, αὐτὸς<sup>1759</sup> καὶ πέραινε.

ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν;—οὐ ταυτὸν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς<sup>1760</sup> ὠμολογήσαμεν.—πότερον δέ<sup>1761</sup>

Routh. With the participial complement (λέγων), φαίνεται takes on its “dialectical” meaning (for which cf. n. 371 and my nn. to *Rep.*334A10 and *Lach.*193D2).

1747 διαπερανθῆναι (A6): Completion, for Socrates, consists of consensus being reached, through dialectic, about the outstanding question: Which life to live? Callicles stopped arguing but he has not agreed. If Socrates is going to argue both sides of the argument he must at least have the other's consensus to continue.

1748 Reading δὴ (A7) with BTWPF and the older edd. (ἤδη F [*iam* Ficinus], *legg.* Burnet Woodhead Dodds Theiler Irwin Allen Canto Nichols Zeyl Cantarín Erler Heidbüchel). With δὴ (~ “as you said”), Socrates is referring back in semi-quotation to the alternative Callicles had proposed at 505D5.

1749 οὐ ... πο<sup>1749</sup> (A8): For postponement of πο<sup>1749</sup> to the position after the word being negated by οὐ, cf. *Meno* 72D2-3; *Lysias* 13.31; *D.* 18.18 (usually after the verb, but cf. *T.* 1.66).

1750 The δέ clause (B1-2) ends up being parenthetical. Gorgias, after a nod to the others, easily allows his own opinion to dominate.

1751 ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι σοῦ αὐτοῦ (B2-3), reading σοῦ with Heindorf Beck Allen (σου mss. and edd.). Gorgias's two uses of αὐτὸς invoke a one-on-one picture: Socrates talking and Gorgias listening – to the exclusion of both the partnership of dialogue and the other persons present – but it is a one-way street, a bit like oratory, or his own sort of ἐπίδειξις (cf. 447A7, C3) – hence “exposition,” Chambry. Is he granting/yielding the floor to Socrates, the floor he is used to being given? Is the ensuing section of the dialogue the counterpiece to his display before we arrived? More dramatic irony, perhaps.

1752 With ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ (B4) Socrates answers Gorgias's ἀλλὰ ... μὲν (adding assentient δὴ; cf. Denniston, 294), just as his καὶ αὐτὸς answers Gorgias's ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς.

1753 ἕως ... ἀπέδωκα (B5-6): The time of the continued dialoguing he desiderates (conceived in the present and durative irreal apodosis done with ἕως plus imperfect), imagines a time in which his riposte has taken place and becomes past. For the aorist with ἕως having the force of the English pluperfect, cf. Smyth §1943.

1754 With Amphion/Zethus (B5-6) Socrates refers back to 485E. He has kept his eye on the basic question, πῶς βιοτέον (Croiset), which Callicles took up merely as an *ad hominem* club, near the beginning of his conversation with him.

1755 ἀλλ' οὖν ... γε (B7-8), requesting compensation for a concession: cf. 496D1; *Apol.*27C6, 34E5f; *Prot.*327C3.

1756 μὴ καλῶς λέγειν (B8-C1): Socrates adopts the word the orator uses in praising a speech (καλῶς λέγειν), in speaking to Callicles, the would-be orator.

1757 Reading ἐξελέγῃς (C1) with BTPF Steph., *legg.* edd. (ἐξελεγχῆς fNFlor [Ficinus: *conviceris*], *legg.* Heindorf Beck Ast Bekker Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Thompson Hirschig Sauppe : ἐλέγῃς AugO1). The early position of enclitic με prepares for the coming I~You comparison.

1758 ἀναγεγράφη (C3): “Proclaimed forever” is the force of the future perfect. The dedicatory stele will be planted in Socrates's soul. For the superlatives compare the sentiment he expressed at 458A2-B2. Canto finds the declaration an ironic application of the traditional formula of a stele (e.g., *Hdt.* 8.85.3, *T.* 1.129.3).

1759 Reading αὐτὸς (C4) with the mss. and Ficinus (*dic tu ipse*), *legg.* edd. (αὐτὸ Steph., read in the early editions). Callicles now for his own purposes employs the pronominal adjective Gorgias and Socrates had exchanged. Heusde (*Spec. Crit.*95-6) supplies a list of Platonic passages where, he claims, αὐτὸς “*simpliciter notet* σύ” (*Charm.*158C2, 158E5; *H.Maj.*292B8; *Lach.*181C1, 187C2; *Lys.*204A9[where with BT he reads αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμ' ἄν]) but in all these cases emphasis is being sought, so it is not mere “denotation.” Callicles is here softening his suggestion, λέγειν κατὰ σαυτὸν, from 505D9, now to mean “by yourself” (“*i.e.* μόνος,” Ast[1832] Apelt), without his help. Cf. *Prot.*360D8. For the ironical ὦγαθέ Deuschle compares *Hor. Sat.*2.3.31 (*o bone*).

1760 ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς (C7). Who is Socrates talking to? Mentioning both names indicates that in the following he is answering for both: that is, he is reasserting their agreement; and by the way, it disproves Schmelzer's notion that Callicles is to imagine Socrates is making him the questioner. Contrast D4 below, with note.

1761 δέ (C7): The question presumes the answer to the previous one, but δέ does not say so much. The “taking up” is indeed only a review, with the previous question asked and answered at 495B2-499B8, and the next question worked up to, asked, and answered at 499B9-500A3 where the

τὸ ἥδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος;—τὸ ἥδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.—ἥδὺ δὲ ἐστὶν τοῦτο οὗ [d] παραγενομένου<sup>1762</sup> ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοὶ ἐσμεν;—πάνυ γε.<sup>1763</sup>—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γέ<sup>1764</sup> ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν, ἀρετῆς<sup>1765</sup> τινος παραγενομένης;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις.—ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ζῶου παντός,<sup>1766</sup> οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῆ<sup>1767</sup> κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ,<sup>1768</sup> ἣτις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν· ἄρα ἐστὶν

answer brought on the critical question how to decide what is good, and introduces Socrates's review of his distinction between knack and art on the grounds that while a knack might be able to produce pleasure, something more is required to determine the good (500A4-503D4).

1762 οὗ παραγενομένου and οὗ παρόντος (C9-D1): genitive absolutes inserted into a relative clause (γενομένου τοῦ ἡδέος ἡδόμεθα). This time the next step in the summary is brought forward from an earlier moment (497E1-3, during the argument about the identification of pleasure and good). Deuschle's subtle suggestion that the shift from γένεσις to οὐσία is due to the difference between *das Wesen dieser beiden Begriffe* (ἡδὺ and ἀγαθόν), is nearly refuted by the use of οὐσία indifferently for the good and for pleasure / pain in that passage (498D4-E3) as well as παραγενομένης just below, as Deuschle admits (D3). Rather, it reflects the shift from a verb describing an event (ἡδόμεθα) to the copula describing a state (ἐσμέν). And below, παραγενομένης is used even of the good, in order to open the possibility of asking how it comes to be present (παραγίγνεται, D6) – namely not automatically but through art. Some commentators seem to know their Plato too well, inserting what they take to be his permanent doctrinal preoccupations into contexts where, as here, the dialectical movement has no need for them; and yet all we have from Plato is the dialectical contexts he invented.

1763 πάνυ γε (D2): Though the argument is presented in tight summary, the conversational (dialectical) character is retained.

1764 ἀλλὰ μὴν ... γε (D2), of the minor premise (cf. 496E9): this time the summary articulates the logical basis of its next step, which adds emphasis. This step, however, though virtually tautological with the previous one, was not taken above; and Socrates acknowledges its novelty by addressing Callicles directly, not expecting him to answer. Thus we come nearer still to a dialectical event.

1765 ἀρετῆς (D3): That ἀρετὴ is the noun of ἀγαθός (cf. 499D7, nn. 1532, 1660) has to be made explicit in English.

1766 Reading καὶ σκεῦος καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ζῶου παντός (D5-6), omitting καὶ after αὐτοῦ, with ms. F (as newly reported by Dodds and Cantarín), against its presence in all other mss., as read by all edd. (*n.b. sive instrumentum sive corporis sive animae* Ficinus). The proper function of αὐτοῦ within lists is like that of our semicolon: it separates one sublist from another, whether because it is an *opposing* or *alternative* list (*Leg.* 819C4-5 [war/peace], *Phdo.* 71B1 [converse]; *Phdrs.* 268C8; *Phlb.* 26B6 [body/soul]; *Rep.* 402C2-4, 504E8f); a *complementary* list (*Apol.* 41A6 [personage/author]; *Charm.* 158A1 [father/mother]; *Leg.* 889C3-5 [sky/earth], 935B6 [god/man]; *Phdrs.* 238C1) or complementary items *within* a list, itself therefore weaker than a comma (*Leg.* 658B7-C1); a new phase of which the previous sublist is prerequisite (*Rep.* 375A5-7, 510E1-11A1); a *correlation* between elements in the sublists (*Rep.* 585C1 [cf. B13]); or simply a new list without a special logical relation (*Charm.* 168E9-9A1, *Leg.* 679B8-C2 [carrying forward the distinction between *πλεονεξία* / *φιλονικία* above], 872A7-B1, 902D7-9; *Phdo.* 105B1-3; *Rep.* 373C3; *Soph.* 222A9-10 and perhaps 253D8; *Th.* 146D1).

Closing a list with *πᾶς* is of course common for generalizing, where its term is either the genus of the previous items or is τὰ ἄλλα, τὰ τοιαῦτα, etc.; but in the present case the final item (whether *ψυχὴ ζῶου παντός* with F, or *ζῶον πᾶν* with the other mss.) is not generic relative to the others nor the criterion of the list, nor is it even more general than they. For this *πᾶς* with *coordinate* terminal item, *Phlb.* 21D9-10 immediately illustrates the meaning: *φρόνησιν ... καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων*: the redundancy bespeaks closure, and its sense bleeds back into all the previous items, especially if the items already seem to exhaust all possibilities, in which case *πᾶς* is just a quantitative confirmation of a qualitative category. Single *πᾶς* is also enough, as at *Leg.* 779D2-5, 832C5-7, 839A2-B1 [*bis*!], 899B4 [but not B3]; *Lys.* 215D4-7; *Phlb.* 54C1-4; *Polit.* 267E7-8, 290B3 [πάνθεννοι], 307A8-B1; *Soph.* 222C5-6; and our present case. Conversely, *πᾶς* with the initial correlate item can bleed forward to the subsequent correlates: *Leg.* 797D10-E2; and thus it is no surprise it can appear at both beginning and end of a coordinate series: *Symp.* 202E7-3A1.

Socrates is summarizing the assertion that *τέχνη* guides the production of houses and boats and the management of the body by medicine and gymnastic (503D6-504B3), and the subsequent *inference* from that assertion to the less obvious but targeted case of the soul (B4-6: *n.b. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν*). αὐτοῦ here commemorates this second step (just as it was used there: 504C1). Reading the *καὶ* with all mss. except F accords unwarranted prominence to *ζῶον*, which is absent from the argument, and makes it a fourth item, leaving the impression that Socrates is here drawing a division between the inanimate and the animate (*sic* Jahn Kratz), but the burden of that argument was to extend the obvious cases of artefact and body to the human soul. On the other hand, omitting the *καὶ*, with F, retains the structure of the argument, leaving *ζῶου παντός* to close the list by generalizing in the manner I described just above. There is no warrant for Jowett's translation "body or soul, instrument or creature;" and Dodd's summary, "tool, organism, or mind" (p. 333 and his n. *ad* 506D5), imports a passage from the *Rep.* ignoring the argument at 504 that Socrates is here summarizing. Moreover, *σκεῦος* does not here mean "tool" (*pace* Dodds and Irwin: tools are absent in the passage before!). Rather it means a σύνθετον καὶ πλαστόν in general (as at *Soph.* 219A11-B1): that is, an artifact in general – as at *Rep.* 510A5-6 and 596C5-9.

1767 Reading οὐχ οὕτως εἰκῆ (D6), οὕτω with or without *ς*, from FY<sup>2</sup> E1 *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Bekker Jahn Thompson Sommer Dodds (without) and E1<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Ast Coraes Hirschig (with): (οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ BTW Iamblichus [*Prot.* 88.18], *legg.* Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotes Schmelzer Huit Hermann Lodge Burnet Lamb Feix Theiler Erler Heidbüchel : οὗτοι εἰκῆ Φ, *legg.* Schanz Sauppe [*epist. crit.* 104] Christ Stender Croiset Zimmermann : ὄντως εἰκῆ Findeisen : οὐ τῷ [*sic*] P). The article in οὐ τῷ εἰκῆ (which Stallb. proved was legitimate with εἰκῆ) makes it too formal, but conversely οὗτοι is unnecessarily personal; for οὕτως εἰκῆ cf. *Hipparchus* 225B10 and *Alc. II* 143C1 and D7. With εἰκῆ Socrates leaps forward to the new wave of argumentation (in particular, 503D7) begun after the impasse over finding an orator who, by virtue of having the good of the deme in mind, might qualify as an artist instead of a hack, in the course of which practitioners of real arts are shown to rely upon the imposition of order as a means to do a good job, an order that also underlies the virtuous condition of the body and even of the soul (503D7-504C3). The initiative to delete subsequent *κάλλιστα* or replace it with *μάλιστα* (against all mss. and Iamblichus), with Routh Coraes Deuschle (but not Cron) Hirschig Schanz Sauppe Ovink Croiset Zimmermann Theiler Zeyl Canto Piettre Dalfen, does more damage than good. Even without adducing the possibility of the "spontaneous" success of Mother Nature (Thompson, citing *Leg.* 642C8-9 and *Meno* 99BD), the monkey at the typewriter is notorious for typing out all of Shakespeare.

1768 τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ (D7): The *καὶ*'s give no indication as to the constellation or relation among the three items, and various interpretations have been allowed to arise. Deuschle-Cron Lodge Stender Ovink, reacting to the subsequent relative clause in singular ἥτις, think

ταῦτα;—ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ<sup>1769</sup> φημι.— [e] τάξει ἄρα<sup>1770</sup> τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον<sup>1771</sup> ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου;—φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε.—κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον<sup>1772</sup> τῶν ὄντων;—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—καὶ<sup>1773</sup> ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;—ἀνάγκη.—ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε<sup>1774</sup> κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία;—πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει;—ἢ δέ [507] γε<sup>1775</sup> κοσμία σῶφρων;—πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.—ἢ ἄρα σῶφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθὴ.<sup>1776</sup> ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὦ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε.<sup>1777</sup>

the second and third nouns are virtually adjectival to τάξει, since in the sequel τάξις is singled out; but Schmelzer (followed by Allen and Waterfield) take the antecedent of ἦτις to be proximal τέχνη only and thinks that the former two nouns are leading up to it as their generalization. A third group evades the problem with mistranslation, bringing across the relative clause with a plural participle (*adaptés*: Chambry Canto), or introducing a periphrasis: “*d’un facon ordonné, réglé, methodique*” with the subsequent relative clause modifying “*facon*” (Piettre). The passage this list is summarizing (503E1-504A5) indicates that all three interpretations are incorrect. That passage stresses the distinctness of the several τέχνη that produce order (E2-3), not the distinctness of the orders produced, which suggests that the relative clause here stressing “eachness” goes with τέχνη only. Because τάξις, the result, is placed first in the triad we may say that as usual the summary of the previous passage adopts a chiasmic order. Once introduced in that passage, τάξις came to be extended or associated with κόσμος (504A1), and a pairing of these two was thereafter consistently repeated (504A3-4, A7, B5 B7-8, C2, D1-2). From this we may infer that κόσμος was here anticipated after τάξει and that it is varied by ὁρθότητι, budging κόσμος in the direction of the moral probity of the soul: the structure of the triad is therefore a<sup>1</sup> a<sup>2</sup> b. Olymp. (165.5) and the *schol. vet.* (ad 506e: Greene 166) understood the triad and relative clause in exactly this way, taking the clause with τέχνη only, as being the efficient cause of virtue, and taking τάξει καὶ ὁρθότητι together as virtue’s formal cause.

This being the sixteenth chiasm of before and after we have seen in the dialogue (cf. nn.307, 411, 557, 583, 643, 674, 688, 850, 923, 1097, 1124, 1246, 1493, 1671, 1694 – and cf. n. 1820), a comment may be in order. Chiasm in Plato is not only a stylistic decoration or a vestige of rhapsodic mnemonics, for it is only natural that the steps leading inductively to insight should lodge in the mind in reverse order, in the aftermath, as deducible from it: this is the basis for Aristotle’s marvelously worded distinction between the γνωριζόμετον ἡμῖν and the γνωριζόμετον φύσει.

- 1769 ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ (D8), reading μὲν γάρ (D8) from BPWF, *legg.* edd. (μὲν γάρ δὴ T, *legg.* Heindorf Routh Ast Coraes Beck Sommer). μὲν is of course *solitarium*, as often with a pronoun: “I for my part (though another may disagree)” as at 503B9, 509A7; *Apol.*23B4; *Crat.* 397A2; *Prot.* 312C5; *Th.*158A8, where one person’s idea is implicitly contrasted with that of another; but lone μὲν can also accompany what the speaker asserts with uncertainty, broaching implicitly a contrast with reality (Denniston, 382): naturally, these two uses coalesce.
- 1770 Whether to read ἄρα after τάξει (E1) from BTWPF, with Routh Heindorf Beck Stallb. Bekker(*sine noto*) Woolsey Jahn Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotes Lamb Dodds Chambry Waterfield, or ἄρα with Kratz Deuschle-Cron Jowett Schanz Schmelzer Christ Hermann Sauppe Stender Burnet(*sine noto*) Croiset Apelt Helmbold Zimmermann Feix Theiler Allen Cantarin Heidbüchel, is strictly indifferent: Socrates’s recap wavers between reproducing the dialectical content (as with ἀλλὰ μὴν γε above [D2] and below [E5], and ἄρα below [E2, E4, 507A1], and also Socrates’s momentary reversion to agreeing with himself [cf. n. 1764]), and the dialogical pragmatics of question and answer (here continued with φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε), though avoiding dialectically irrelevant personal affects (see next note).
- 1771 Reading τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον (E1) with the mss. and edd. (τεταγμένον τι καὶ κεκοσμημένον Iambl., *leg.* Coraes Dodds). After τάξις and τέχνη Socrates here associates with them the neighboring notion, κόσμος, by repeating the metabatic phrase τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον from 504A1, an association that the previous argument built and corroborated through a spectrum of examples (A3, A7, B5, C2, D1). The semantic range of the latter term is quite wide, tolerating virtual homonymy as we saw: in this question, its connection with τάξις is the issue. For the neuter adjective serving as substantivized predicate cf. *Leg.*732E4; *Rep.*368E5.
- 1772 ἕκαστος, used three times in this question (E3), points to the development in the previous argument 504B7-D3, where Socrates asked for the distinct names of the distinct virtues of the distinct things brought about by order and decorum, but where that passage gave names as it went along, this recap merely digests that the virtues are distinct.
- 1773 καὶ (E4): The next two steps strip away the “personal drama” of the original, leaving only its dialectical content. There, Callicles was first a bit reluctant to name the ordered virtue particular to body (504B9) – health of course; and then demurred to name the ordered virtue particular to soul (504C4), to which Socrates responded by proposing that he would suggest the answer if only Callicles would agree to say whether he agreed and not merely to “give in” to the suggestion (C5-7), and then repeated the name of the body’s peculiar virtue (504B9) so as also to name the ordering principle that leads to that virtue with a *cognate* term (cf. n. 1687) in order to provide a pattern for answering the same question about the soul (C7-9). In this resumé of that part of the argument, with its focussing καὶ and ἄρα, the question-and-answer purports merely to apply the generalization of the previous step to the soul in particular, but notably truncate the language of the original argument by designating the ordering principle leading to psychic virtue with κόσμον only (dropping τάξις), and then gratuitously but not quite innocently add the denial of its logical contradictory (τῆς ἀκοσμήτου), gratuitous because only logically true (and eliciting what appears to be strong agreement [ἀνάγκη, E5], though this affirmation only responds to the logical assertion of the denial), and not quite innocent since now it is the soul that is ἀκόσμητος rather than the principle of its order.
- 1774 γε (E6), *vi termini*, goes with κόσμον, resuming the etymological argument connecting the nature of the ordering principle with the virtue it confers, as broached in the original argument at 504C8 and then applied to soul in a more gradual way, 504D1-2. The self-evident look of the present etymological formulation elicits easy agreement (πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; E6) although it is perfectly fallacious, exploiting the equivocation in κόσμος!
- 1775 δέ γε (E6-507A1) of the minor premise (cf. 495D6). With this step we have moved into the moral sense of κόσμος, in which it is always associated with σωφροσύνη (*Charm.*159B2-3; *Leg.*802E9-10, 831E6-7; *Rep.*399E11, 403A7); and with the unqualified agreement (πολλὴ ἀνάγκη) the equivocation is brought past the point of no return. In the original argument, the ordering principle and the resultant psychic virtue were both two-fold – for the principle was two-fold (νόμιμον / νόμον [or νόμιμον / κόσμιον]) and the resultant virtue also two-fold (νόμιμον / κόσμιον) – and then this two-fold virtue was renamed with the traditional names of these two virtues, δικαιοσύνη / σωφροσύνη. Here, for the present at least, we have only the one virtue.
- 1776 ἀγαθὴ (A2): Its ordering principle has provided the virtue (ἀρετὴ) proper to it and thereby made it “good” (ἀγαθος).
- 1777 δίδασκε (A3): In the end, given his dialectical stripping-down of what actually happened, Socrates asks for Callicles’s buy-in, evincing his ongoing commitment to dialogue. For a similar use of διδάσκειν in a similar context, cf. *Crito* 49E2. *παρά* = contrary to, as at *Phdo.*107A2, not

ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σὺ φρον ἀγαθὴ ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦναντίον τῆ σὺ φρονονι πεπονθυῖα<sup>1779</sup> κακὴ ἐστίν· ἦν<sup>1780</sup> δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος.—πάνυ γε.—καὶ μὴν ὅ γε<sup>1781</sup> σὺ φρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σὺ φρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα<sup>1782</sup> πράττων;— [b] ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.— καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοῦ ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι.—ἔστι ταῦτα.—καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ<sup>1783</sup> ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σὺ φρονος ἀνδρός<sup>1784</sup> ἐστίν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν<sup>1785</sup> ἢ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ<sup>1786</sup> καὶ<sup>1787</sup> πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν<sup>1788</sup>

merely “besides” (*pace* Irwin).

1778 λέγ' ὠγαθέ (A4): Socrates gives him a chance to respond to his only slightly warped version of what had been said, but Callicles perseveres in his refusal to participate, with a truncated reprise of his remark at 506C4 (with its ironical ὠγαθέ), nor even will he acknowledge Socrates's request.

1779 πεπονθυῖα (A6): What it has “undergone” is a γένεσις caused by the presence of the contrary formative element. The language of the object's “undergoing” (παραινέσθαι [506D1, D3, D6, E2], παρῆναι [506D1] and παρῆχειν [506E3]), varied also with the active formulation in ἔχειν (506E4, 6), is now expressed with maximal passivity; and thus Socrates opens further the crack in Callicles's scandalous boast, between his *liberty* to enjoy pleasure (ἔαν, 491E9) and his *enslavement* to it (ὑπηρετεῖν, 492A1).

1780 ἦν (A6): The tense expresses that he is continuing his summary, whence subsequent πάνυ γε. The soul's “opposite vice” was characterized at 504E1-2 as ἀδικία καὶ ἀκολασία, the opposites of the virtues accorded to the lawful and decorous soul just above, where it was said that the virtues of the lawful and decorous soul were δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη (504D3), which the present sentence is imitating (ἦν δὲ αὕτη here echoing ταῦτα δ' ἐστίν there [504D3]). A bit later that viciousness was generalized by including more of the vices contrary to the cardinal virtues (505B2-3: see n. 1714 on the absence of ἀνανδρία and conversely its importation at B4-8, below). I take the addition of ἄφρων here to correspond to the addition of ἀνόητος there (505B2), as the mention of piety and justice in the sequel corresponds to ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος there (505B3). Of course ἐναντίον τῆ σὺ φρονονι (*sc.* ψυχῆ) should in all strictness be τῷ τῆς σὺ φρονονος (neuter, of the affecting factor) – the opposite ordering principle rather than the oppositely affected soul. But the etymological kinship between the principle and its effect has rather mooted the need to insist upon that distinction.

1781 γε (A7) again *vi termini* (cf. 506E6), this time with σὺ φρων. The shift from soul to the man characterized by his soul is marked by the shift from the (logical) indicative to potential optative used for the world of things as we represent them (*Darstellung*).

1782 τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα (A9): μὴ with participle is conditional, even when the participle is attributive as here, acting as “the abridged equivalent of a conditional relative sentence” (Smyth §2728a).

1783 καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ (B4): This is a collocation of καὶ μὲν δὴ (equivalent in sense to καὶ μὴν, as used above [A7, B1] to insist upon the “next step”: cf. Denniston 396) plus καί, which adds ἀνδρεῖον to δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον.

1784 ἀνδρός (B5) is of course not otiose (as it is left to be by Lamb who translates σὺ φρονονος ἀνδρός with “a sound or temperate mind”) given its etymological connection with ἀνδρεία. Socrates repeats this vaunting use of ἀνὴρ in a “genitive of the mark” from Callicles's use of it early on, at 483A8ff, now to very different effect: indeed, there it virtually sanctioned unjust behavior! Another chip is removed from the table. This additional inference goes beyond what had been said before.

1785 Might διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν (B6) here be studiously ambiguous, having both their moral sense of *petenda* and *fugienda* (which is Socrates's prime concern in the depiction of σωφροσύνη) and the forensic sense of advocating against or for a man or an issue (the actions Callicles is pressing upon Socrates to perform), as the list of items in the contrapositive limb (B6-8) indicate (see n. 1787, just below)?

1786 Reading ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ (B6) conjectured by Heindorf (“*mirror nondum quemquam animadvertisse*”), *legg.* edd. (ἀλλὰ δεῖ BTWYf Iambl., *leg.* Routh: ἀλλὰ δὴ PF), virtually guaranteed by the parallel ὅπου δεῖ at B8, which cannot go with both because ὅπου only fits ὑπομένοντα!

1787 καί (B6-7): With this corresponsive καί Socrates raises the register, continued with triumphant καί and τε καί (C2, C3, C4) and an unremitting sequence of inferences that demolish Callicles's position root and branch. The chiasmic ordering of the parallel phrases (διώκειν / φεύγειν / τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα // ἃ δεῖ / φεύγειν / διώκειν), spoiled by Hirschig's gratuitous deletion of φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, creates a central berth to showcase the list of four items, which reciprocates the honor by revealing the simultaneous ambiguity of the verbs (the first pair being terms of political involvement and the second of personal temperance) thereby hosting a chiasm of “before and after” the moment the reader comes to see the two senses! This effect is destroyed by the translations of Lamb Apelt Helmbold Chambray Allen Nichols, which do reproduce the reversal of the two verbs' order but place their objects after them rather than between, resulting in a vapid and redundant expression. Erler's tr. preserves the chiasmic order with four objects nested within, and interestingly varies *fliehen* before with *meiden* after. What after all does it mean to “pursue and avoid” men and things?? Waterfield's “turns away and toward” only replaces ambiguity with vagueness.

For “politics” done with πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους compare *Leg.* 859D3-4. The men in question are, in Callicles's conception, either political “clients” and dependents (cf. κήδηται, 483B4; cf. the φίλοι Socrates mentions to Polus: 479C3 and 480C3 [cf. 480B8]), or enemies; and the πράγματα are the political affairs (cf. *Apol.* 31D7-8 and *Lach.* 191D5) in which the “orator” is engaged. We see its appreciative use in Callicles: 491B1, 485D1; and in Gorgias's use at 451D7; it is an element in the vocabulary of the politically ambitious such as Alcibiades (cf. *Alc.* I 107C6-D2) and therefore prime material for Socrates to satirize (455A6). Part of Socrates's mounting message is that one's personal morality must align with one's political activity and vice-versa.

1788 ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν (B8): It is only by the claim that these words summarize the previous description of temperate political and personal behavior, that Socrates can make the argument that bravery is entailed by temperance (*pace* Deuschle-Cron). For such language in the depiction of bravery compare *Lach.* 193A9 and my n. *ad loc.* The metaphor is holding one's position on the battlefield and not running away.



ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλή [c] ἀνάγκη,<sup>1789</sup> ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σὺφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλομεν,<sup>1790</sup> δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὄσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως,<sup>1791</sup> τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς<sup>1792</sup> πράττειν ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνα<sup>1793</sup> εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη<sup>1794</sup> ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σὺφρονη, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπήνεις.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα<sup>1795</sup> ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον,<sup>1796</sup> ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαιμόνα [d] εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν,<sup>1797</sup> καὶ παρασκευαστέον ἑαυτὸν<sup>1798</sup> μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῆ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ιδιώτης ἢ πόλις,<sup>1799</sup> ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαιμόνων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν,

- 1789 πολλή ἀνάγκη (B8-C1): ἀνάγκη in the vast majority of dialectical contexts designates logical necessity (among exceptions see *Phdo.*64E1, 67A4; *Rep.*416D6, 566A5, 586C6 – where note πᾶσα), which inherently does not exist in degrees. Calling it πολλή, as here (and *Apol.*27C9; *Parm.*135A4, 147D6, 156B5; *Phdo.* 72C9, 106E4; *Rep.*515C3), or μεγάλη (as at *H.Maj.* 301A6-7, *Parm.*132D9) seems to acknowledge the insuperability of the assertion despite its being controversial or paradoxical in the context (at *Apol.*27C the logical conclusion that obliterates Meletus's charge; at *Rep.*381C Homeric “theology” is nullified; at *Rep.*485E we reach the scandalizing perfection of the philosophical type; at *Rep.*515C3 we encounter the peculiar consciousness available to those in the cave). Just so, in the present case Socrates adds πολλή to prepare for his extensive series of inferences (C1-7), which will devastate Callicles's entire outlook.
- 1790 διήλομεν (C1): The aorist announces he has completed his résumé. The previous argument, in its sequel, spelled out the implications for the good orator including the benefit of κόλασις (504D5-505C4), but now Socrates desiderates an all-around and far-reaching condemnation of everything Callicles has said.
- 1791 ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα ... τελέως (C2-3): Socrates here appropriates Callicles's expression (used of the great man of high repute at 503C1) for his own use and in his dialectically justified meaning (three of the cardinal virtues being proved to belong to him) – missed by Dodds who is distracted by speculation about the development of “Plato's” moral theory.
- 1792 εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς (C3): I read γε, the *difficilior* in F (τε BTP, *legg.* edd.). This is the adverbial version of the idiom καλός (τε) καὶ ἀγαθός (on which cf. n. 733). According to the index of uses provided by H. Wankel (*KALOS KAI AGATHOS*: cf. nn. 156, 1139), the order καλός / ἀγαθός is regularly maintained in the adjectival version; indeed the two adjectives are combined with τε καὶ or crasis or both more than half the time (not to mention the tolerance for the ugly amalgamate noun καλοκαγαθία and uglier verb, καλοκαγαθεῖν). Out of Wankel's fourteen or so listed cases of the positive adverbial formulation, as here, the order of the adjectival expression is generally preserved (with καλῶς / εὖ); cases of reversal may often be for the problem of euphony brought on by monosyllabic εὖ (e.g. *Rep.*400E2-3 and 503D7); and reversal becomes rare again in the superlative formation, where the two terms (κάλλιστα / ἄριστα) are balanced polysyllables. In the present case the reversal, along with F's γε (*vi termini*), provides a quick segue from the good man to his good (and fine) deeds.
- 1793 μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνα (C4): The inference relies upon the notion that εὖ πράττειν designates the condition of the subject that ἀγαθὰ πράττει: that he is “doing well” as we say in English; and this is for Plato tantamount to being μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνα (compare *Rep.*354A1, where εὖ ζῶν implies the pair). Compare, *ad loc.*, Schleiermacher Stallb. Ast(1832) Deuschle-Cron (or Lodge) Mistriotes Sauppe Ovink.
- 1794 οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη (C5-6): This is again the rather gratuitous inference Socrates drew at this point before (505B11-12), that their argument contradicted the position Callicles had taken in his parrhesiastic speech, the gratuitousness of which was there the final straw for Callicles (505C1-2).
- 1795 ταῦτα ... ταῦτα (C8): In a dialectical context Socrates would wait for permission from his interlocutor to proceed, but since Callicles won't participate he must keep records on his own. Hence the emphatic redundancy of ταῦτα (cf. *X.Cyrop.*8.3.48 and αὐτά at *Meno* 78D5-6) and also perhaps his use of the self-referential middle τίθεμαι (“posit for oneself,” Veitch p.546), but not to confess that it is only his personal opinion (*pace* Dalfen): he is remarking that his “posits” provide him a basis for proceeding. Compare the active at 509A7 below.
- 1796 τὸν βουλόμενον (C9): A logical inference is to be drawn after the protasis, and the accusative immediately suggests that an accusative infinitive construction is coming, perhaps dependent upon logical ἀνάγκη (*vel sim.*), but once the subject has been established in this way, verbal adjectives intrude instead of ἀνάγκη (*vel sim.*), perhaps because better suited for expressing moral duty, which however retroactively call for the dative; but the cat is already out of the bag. For the accusative with verbal adjective cf. also 512E1-2; *Crito* 49A4, *Leg.*688E5-8; *Phdrs.*247C6 (λέγοντα); *Rep.*421B6; and E. *Hipp.*491-2, *Ar. Av.*1237, *X. Mem.*3.11.1. Note particularly the cases of *Phdrs.*272E4 and *Soph.*226B1-2 which combine the verbal adjective with a construction in χρῆ, which itself is to be constructed with accusative. Smyth, citing this passage (as his only instance), asserts that the copula “(perhaps) always is omitted” in cases when the agent of the verbal adjective is placed in the accusative (§2152a), but *Phdrs.*272E4 is an exception.
- 1797 ἡμῶν (D2): The unexpected shift to the first person (missed by Chambry), emphasized by ἕκαστος, suggests Socrates is less concerned to continue his dialogue with Callicles than to garner “for the rest of us” the important moral lessons he has reached with, and also despite, him. A propensity toward this shift of focus will persist through this entire passage (cf. n. 1494 *sub fin.*, and 509B6, 510A4, 511B9, 513C3, 514E4-5 with nn.). The use of the idiom ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν (for which cf. Hdt. 6.116 [and Valck. *annot. ad loc.*] and 9.59.2) shows fellow-feeling; for the construction cf. n. 729.
- 1798 Reading ἑαυτὸν (D3) from Stob. (*sese comparare*, Ficinus), *leg.* Beck (*om. mss.* and edd.), *nam ita παρασκευάζειν active dicitur* (Beck). Though (with Heindorf, Stallb.) παρασκευαστέον would also be the form for the verbal adjective of the middle, παρασκευάζεσθαι, disambiguation by means of the reflexive pronoun is necessary for the sense.
- 1799 ἢ ιδιώτης ἢ πόλις (D4-5), in disjunctive apposition to ἄλλος (πολίτης is read only in Bas<sup>2</sup>). The contrast (in which ιδιώτης means an individual, not a “private citizen” as Woolsey explains) is not uncommon: cf. 480B8; *Alc. I* 134A6-7; *Alc. II* 150A3-4; *Crat.*385A4; *Leg.*641B2, 645B4, 864A2; *Rep.*501A5, 536A5-6. Again (with Mistriotes) the personal and the political must align: cf. D7-8 below. Consult also Socrates's closing words in the *Apology* where he asks his fellow citizens to chastise his own children if they get out of line (41E1-7).



καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα<sup>1800</sup> καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη [e] τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω<sup>1801</sup> πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἐῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν,<sup>1802</sup> ἀνήνυτον κακόν, λαισίτου<sup>1803</sup> βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλεῖς ἂν εἶη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῶ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἶη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὧ Καλλίικλεις, καὶ<sup>1804</sup> οὐρανὸν καὶ [508] γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην (καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὧ ἔταῖρε)<sup>1805</sup> οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα<sup>1806</sup> σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ<sup>1807</sup> καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα

1800 συντείνοντα (D7): For the verb used in this sense cf. *Rep.* 591C1-2, *Leg.* 903C1. It is transitive but even in the active may be intransitive (*Soph.* 239B8, *Leg.* 903C1). With Deuschle-Cron the metaphor of drawing the bow is latent (τοῖς τόξοις, *Hipp. Aer.* 20), since the phrase is exegetical to βλέποντα., for which cf. *Leg.* 903C1.

1801 Reading οὔτω (E1), with mss. and edd. rather than meaningless οὐ τῷ in ms. B. For semi-redundant οὔτω thus used to close prolepsis (“*zusammenfassend*,” Stender), cf. 457D1 (and n. 339), *Leg.* 803C8, *Menex.* 244C5, *Phdo.* 67E2, *Phdrs.* 253B3. It appears here because of the hyperbaton of πράττειν, done for the sake of allowing for an immediate exegesis of the phrase in βλέποντα with the phrase in συντείνοντα. That the local or subordinate participial construction should push out the leading and global one (for which cf. 521A4-5) is a kind of “subordinate insubordination” (cf. nn. 340, 746, 1381, 1600), in which semi-redundant οὔτω is to be expected (cf. again n. 339 and my nn. to *Rep.* 368D6 and *Phdrs.* 260D7). The leading construction (δεῖ ζῆν ... καὶ πράττειν) is rendered otiose by the heaping of participial constructions (E1-3), which pertinaciously focus on the important point regardless of their inferior syntactical status. This syntactical “going out on a limb,” in essence a shift from κατεστραμμένην to εἰρομένην, culminates by weaving in a global appositive (ἀνήνυτον κακόν), then commented upon by still another participle (ζῶντα) that returns to the dominant subordinate construction but also closes the sentence with a semantic nod to the ordinate verb, ζῆν.

1802 ἐῶντα ... καὶ ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν (E2-3): A direct swipe at Callicles’s unbridled and scandalizing boast about ὁ ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενος (contrast D6-7 here) who will allow his desires to grow and devote himself to serving and fulfilling them (491E8-492A3). ταύτας (to be read, with TWYF Stob. : ταῦτα B lambl.) rather than αὐτάς means not “them,” but “these as such” – i.e. the desires once they have become ἀκόλαστοι – closely imitating the expression of Callicles (τάς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας εἶν ... ταυταῖς δὲ ... ὑπηρετεῖν). ἀνήνυτον κακόν in apposition to the entire clause is poetic: Mistriones compares E. *Or.* 499 and *AGPS* calls the usage Euripidean, adding several more passages from Euripides, two from Aeschylus (*Ag.* 226 and 1420), and no other prose example; cf. κεφάλαιον 494E4 and n. 1425.

1803 I conjecture λαισίτου (E3) as the original reading, against the mss. (ληιστοῦ BT, *legg.* edd. : ληιστοῦ WPF), though the possibility is slim (cf. Hesychius, s.v.: λαισίτος· κιναιδός· πόρνη; cf. ὁ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, 494E4 with n. 1426). In uncials the discrepancy is small but the sense is hugely improved: piracy or theft is not prepared, at least, in the context. Socrates is referring back to the issue of insatiability raised at 494B which culminated in the κιναιδῶν βίος at 494E4.

If we must accept ληιστοῦ we can note that Callicles had spoken approbatively of “having the wherewithal” to afford catering to one’s boundless desires (with his favorite term, ἱκανόν [492A1: cf. nn. 1167, 1120]), imagining we would admire and envy him for the political astuteness and mendacity by which he could supply himself with funds though himself unqualified to produce anything good. Soon afterward Socrates alluded to the profligate that has no scruples where he gathers his rose-buds from (492D7: cf. n. 1369), and later frankly alludes to the politician designing his own gain rather than that of the people (502E6-7); but only now with greater vigor would he be calling him a mere thief. It must be admitted that ληιστός provides a tighter segue with the next thought, which is introduced by γάρ.

1804 καὶ οὐρανόν (E6): Again Socrates moves upward with καί’s in confident fullness, doubling heaven and earth with their inhabitants (gods and men), and finishing with the rare form, δικαιοσύνην, for the sake of a triumphant rhyme (Mistriones) – all of which prepares the way for a sort of peroration in which he will characterize in retrospect and reverse order all that has happened in the conversation back through Polus to Gorgias (B3-C3). Though φύσις and νόμος are not here used, Callicles’s antisocial notion of a δίκαιον φύσει is indirectly challenged by Socrates’s edifying picture of cosmic harmony.

1805 καὶ τὸ ... ἔταῖρε (508A3): Findeisen alone, of all modern commentators and translators I have seen and followed only by Beck, correctly took this as a parenthetical aside: the two subsequent feminine abstract nouns contrast with the previous four, not with κόσμος. It is the presence of these four qualities rather than that of their opposites, that inspired the wise to call the universe by this extraordinary name, κόσμος. Findeisen quotes Cic. *Lael.* 7.24 in support of his interpretation (*Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam*), and if Cicero has the present passage in mind because of his reference to the positive and negative forces in parallel (*ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam*) which is what is Empedoclean in the statement. It would have been better for Findeisen to cite Olympiodorus’s comment, which already found the passage Empedoclean (166.14-19). Right or wrong in the attribution (and I find it dubious since for Empedocles, τὸ ὅλον includes the reign of both φίλια and νεῖκος) his very assertion reveals he read the Greek as Findeisen did, i.e., took the negative forces as syntactically parallel with the four positive ones, rather than parallel with the name, κόσμον. As for the four “testimonia” here adduced by Dodds (Aristides *or.* 3.62, Plut. *vit. Dio* 10, Arist. *Frg.* 17 Rose, ps. Arist. *de mundo* 399A14), only Aristides is citing our passage (he is the earliest witness for the usual interpretation); the other three merely echo the sentiment Dodds the others have given it.

1806 καὶ ταῦτα (A5): In this idiom (“to boot”), ταῦτα is a neuter adverbial accusative referring syntactically to what came before (cf. n. 2222): thus, not “though wise in these things” (Zeyl Nichols Erler) nor “an expert in the field” (Waterfield), but “although clever.” Socrates grants Callicles his cleverness but hardly grants him wisdom in matters of world harmony, for he is uninterested in such things.

1807 ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ (A6): In criticizing Callicles’s πλεονεξία Socrates invokes “equality” not only because it is the logical alternative to it but in order to recall Callicles’s charge that *hoi polloi* use the term to hide their weakness (483C2-D2). It is the special power of the “second” attributive position to enable him to introduce the notion before specifying it (cf. Smyth §1158, and 474E7 [with n. 855], 503C5-6, 511C2, 513A2 and n. 288 to 455E1): the sense is, “you fail to see that equality – not the one you criticized but the geometrical type – is the rule among gods and men” – an effect seldom gotten in the translations. Even without the first ἡ (absent in Stob.) the effect would be the same. It is curious that Socrates sees no need to clarify what he means by geometrical equality (cf. *Leg.* 757B); is the mention of gods and men in itself an explanation?

δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶει δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς.<sup>1808</sup> εἶεν· ἢ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος [b] ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὡς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι,<sup>1809</sup> ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής ἐστίν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα,<sup>1810</sup> ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ’ οἷς σὺ με ἤρου εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἶη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑέος καὶ ἐταίρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῆ, καὶ τῆ ῥητορικῆ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὧου συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι<sup>1811</sup> τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅσῳ περ [c] αἴσχιον τοσοῦτω κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα<sup>1812</sup> δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι’ αἰσχύνῃ ὁμολογήσαι.<sup>1813</sup>

τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψόμεθα τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἂ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἢ οὐ, ὡς ἄρα<sup>1814</sup> ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ’ εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ’ ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ<sup>1815</sup> ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, [d] ἄντε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης,<sup>1816</sup> ἐάντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάντε

The allusion is too vague to be made the principle for interpreting the whole dialogue, or to be evincing some general idea with which Plato is preoccupied rather than with the exigencies of his drama, *pace* Allen (*Comment*, 191, 222ff). The main point is that another chip has been removed from the table.

- 1808 ἀμελεῖς (A8): In short, *πλεονεξία*, involving only two terms (more and less), is arithmetical; but geometrical equality involves four. Plutarch praises (*Q.C.* 8.2 [*Mor.*719AB]) Lycurgus and Isocrates (*Areopag.*20) praises Solon and Cleisthenes for introducing geometrical justice into their cities.
- 1809 Reading κακίας δεῖ οἱ ἄθλιοι only (B2) with BTWPF Ficinus[tr.], *legg.* Routh Ast[1832] Woolsey Jahn Burnet Helmbold Theiler Chambry Erler Heidbüchel. Other editors have felt a need for a predicative ἄθλιοι, whether adding it after ἄθλιοι (Heindorf, *legg.* Beck Baiter Hermann Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriones Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds), which later [1913] did indeed appear in Π2 [*teste* Burnet, Croiset *nolens*, “*ut vid.*” Cantarin]); or after δέ (*legg.* Ast[1819] Coraes Bekker Stallb. Thompson Sommer). Note that in this case the δέ clause is not adversative (“but, rather, that...”), but continuative with the previous clause (“nor that”): contrast 501A1 and n. 1563.
- 1810 τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα (B3): The asyndeton and the hyperbaton of πάντα (which is the answer to the question he just asked) constitute an abrupt break in the flow, for emphasis.
- 1811 The early placement of εἶναι (B8) in the infinitival noun phrase suggests that the first word in the direct version it nominalizes would have been ἔστι (orthotone), and therefore by its position εἶναι asseverates the proposition. For Polus, doing the evil deed is preferable to undergoing it even though the doer is more subject to opprobrium than the victim (474C5-8); but for Socrates the only thing to be ashamed of is being evil (e.g., 463D4), so that doing injustice is both worse and more shameful than undergoing it; but in comparison with these, Callicles thinks that undergoing injustice is both worse and more shameful than doing it.
- 1812 Reading δεῖ (C2) with mss. and edd. (δεῖν E2NFlor f Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes : ἔδει *coni.* Heindorf, *leg.* Beck). With ἄρα (C2) Socrates announces that the question he put to Gorgias has returned, whom he now mentions, again presuming as he did there that if a man is just, he knows what justice is. The inference is portrayed as new: Heindorf’s *coni.* ἔδει (*leg.* Beck) to make it parallel with ἦν (B8) is therefore misled, as is the poorly attested infinitive, which includes the inference among the consequences that had been reached within the conversation with Polus.
- 1813 ὁμολογήσαι (C3): Note shift of tense in *oratio obliqua* from the present συγχωρεῖν (B7), which represented an imperfect in relation to the time just before Callicles’s οἰεσθαι (expressed at 482CE), over to the aorist representing a pluperfect that takes a further step back, back to the discussion with Gorgias before Polus’s intervention (the distinction just now drawn by αὐ). The conclusions he reached dialectically with Callicles enable him to evaluate the whole discussion up to where Callicles entered; but now he will move forward from there to apply those conclusions to the long and unbridled speech with which Callicles had opened (482C-486C): we are entering the final stage of the dialogue.
- 1814 ἄρα (C5) feigns surprise at the notion he finds so alien.
- 1815 Reading ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ (C8) with BTP and edd. (ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ F : *secl.* Morstadt [*Emend.*{1866}7] : *lacuna* Π2). βούλεσθαι again connoting the arbitrary power of the orator who might decide to attack (cf. n. 1869 and Callicles at 486B3). Huit, Croiset, and Canto’s *à la merci du premier venu* is therefore completely wrong, though this could be used for τοῦ ἐθέλοντος. Routh takes βουλομένῳ substantively, as if it were βουλεύματι, giving no *similia*. Morstadt, followed by Schanz Sauppe Stender Ovink Theiler, athetizes it, thinking it redundant with τοῦ ἐθέλοντος and an invasion from the margin in epexegetis to the rather rare genitive (but in that case why not ἐπὶ τῷ ἐθέλοντι?). Cary Jowett Chambry Allen Zeyl Canto Erler translate as if the βουλόμενος were identical with the ἐθέλων (“I am in the power of anyone who chooses... if he pleases”) and Lamb translates as if only one of the expressions were there. All these fail to see that a comparison is being made: whereas for attacking the ἄτιμος a mere velleity is sufficient (and mastery over him is total: cf. *AGPS* 47.6.4 on the genitive), attacking a citizen in good standing calls for a “real orator” (compare Callicles’s “rhetorical” comparison at 486C1-2; and for βουλόμενος, cf. n. 1869, *infra*). A similar error was made by Hirschig, who excised τοῦ ἐθέλοντος instead. On the comparison (*pace* Mistriones) cf. Stallb. Woolsey Thurot, and hear Cope: “like the outlaws that are at everyone’s mercy I am in the power of anyone who chooses...”; also Irwin: “in the power of whoever wishes just as the dishonored are at the mercy of whoever feels like it.” Socrates is criticizing Callicles’s remark at 486C1-2 as an overstatement. For the genitive here used with a meaning similar to ἐπί + dative, cf. *Phdrs.*250A7 (where I read οὐκετι αὐτῶν with Hermias), *Polit.*307E9; *S. Ph.*386, *OR* 917.
- 1816 ἐπὶ κόρρης (D2): Cf. 486C3 and n. 1184 *ad loc.* I read τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου BTPY, *legg.* edd. (τοῦτο τὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου F, *legg.* Heindorf Coraes Beck Burnet Heidbüchel : τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου *scr.* Jahn [misprint?]). τὸ is an adverbial accusative, as at *Crito* 45D2, 50B2, 54C8; *Soph.*233B5,

ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάντε, τὸ ἔσχατον,<sup>1817</sup> ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις,<sup>1818</sup> πολλακίς μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι [e] οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα<sup>1819</sup> καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὀτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.<sup>1820</sup> ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω<sup>1821</sup> ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ [509] εἰ ἀγροικότερόν<sup>1822</sup> τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνους λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωσί, οὐς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστιν αἰεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα,<sup>1823</sup> ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.

241D9.

- 1817 τὸ ἔσχατον (D3), means not “what is worst of all” (*pace* edd.) but temporally “last of all,” with Ficinus (*ultra*) Findeisen Ast(1832), “*pour comble*” Croiset: Socrates is re-imagining the usual list of threats presented as a sequence, as Polus does at 473C1-5 (where note τὸ ἔσχατον in this same sense, C4; cf. the similar horror story at *Rep.*361E culminating with *τελευτῶν* 362A1), but all the harms beyond the slap in the face (*χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι* ... ἀποκτεῖναι, D2-3) are legal punishments for crimes committed – which for him are bad, but for Socrates, if one is justly condemned, are beneficial.
- 1818 ὅστις (D5), indirect interrogative (*sc.* ἐστίν), breaking the syntactical dependency upon *σκενώμεθα* from C4. Punctuate *after* ὅστις, with Hermann Stallb. Schanz Christ Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Helmbold Theiler Dodds Chambry Cantarin Erler Heidbüchel, not before (*pace* edd.). Socrates imagines being asked what *his* λόγος is. The indirect form is used when, in answering, one repeats the question he has been asked, cf. *Euthyphr.*2C2, *Leg.*662B1; *Ar. Ran.*198, *Av.*1499; *X. Anab.*3.1.40. Cf. Smyth §1263. Hirschig, punctuating before, takes ὅστις for an indefinite relative, faults it for being so, and emends it to *ὅσπερ*. The remark prepares for a long answer.
- 1819 With *γε ἅμα* (E3), Socrates begs for time to gild the lily.
- 1820 Socrates’ *logos* (E2-5) is binary. A first phase (D6-E3) laying out a matrix is followed by a second phase that expands the terms of the first (E3-6). In the first phase, setting out from the first verb of Callicles’ *logos* (jocular *τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόρρης*) now in the passive (*τύπτεσθαι*, expanded with *τέμνεσθαι* in a jocular way), he denies that to undergo these (passive) is as shameful and evil as to do them (active); in the second phase, he expands the list of verbs, as Callicles had, but now with a list of criminal acts rather than forensically attainable punishments (*κλέπτειν* ... *συλλήβδην ἀδικεῖν*, E3-4) – which for Socrates are bad but for Callicles, if one is unjustly acquitted, are good – and then reiterates his evaluation in an expanded form framed by the play of active and passive (*ἀδικοῦντι* ... *ἀδικουμένῳ*, E5-6). Strident *καί* occurs twelve times in these four lines, and is all the more climactic for adding unlike terms with indifference, now the violent crimes and then the evaluations (*αἴσχιον / κάκιον // καάκιον / αἴσχιον* – chiasitic); Pietre achieves a similar but less powerful effect with *asyndeton*. As to the chiasm, Socrates starts with Callicles’s evaluation (*τὸ αἴσχρον*, D7) and moves to his own correction of it (*τὸ κακόν*, for only evil is shameful), and then on the basis of that correction, moves in the second phase from what is for him the determinative attribute (*τὸ κακόν*) to the attribute it entails (*τὸ αἴσχρον*). It is a sort of chiasm of before and after. For the binary/chiasitic form, cf. in general Riddell §§204-230. The reader is overwhelmed (Sauppe): the presentation exhibits, embodies, and evinces the conviction with which Socrates holds his *logos* – or better, is held by it, as he will next say.
- 1821 ἄνω (E6), used similarly at *Rep.*603D5. Can it be spatial?
- 1822 *καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερον* (E7-509A1): Socrates begs leave for his own striking *metaphor* (cf. *schol. vet. ad loc.*) to match Callicles’s “slap in the face” (*n.b.*, Callicles had similarly apologized with *εἰ καὶ ἀγροικότερον*); as such the more climactic *καὶ εἰ* of BTWF *Olymp.*λ (*legg.* edd.) is preferable to *ἢ* of P (cf. Denniston 299-302): Callicles’s *εἰ καὶ* is a litotes (“though it may be”) but Socrates’s *καὶ εἰ* is “I insist regardless” (*pace* Stallb.): the “uncertainty” of Callicles’s expression is feigned. It is noteworthy that just as Socrates had referred to Callicles’s *ἀγροικότερον* as *νεανικόν* above, he here presents his own *ἀγροικότερόν τι* as valid until someone more *νεανικός* than he refutes it! Socrates envisions still another increase in petulance after that of Polus now compounded by Callicles. Deuschle hears an echo of Callicles’s description of the strong man breaking through the bonds of convention (*διαρρήξας*, 484A3), but it is Plato’s settled habit to clinch such allusions with some more telling and fine point of diction or semantics, and we find none here. Socrates calls the arguments adamant not because he thinks them irrefragable (*pace* Gercke *apud* Sauppe, and most edd.) but because as long as they stand unrefuted they bind and confine him, his conscience and his choice of life (cf. *Rep.*360B5, 618E8, and n. 2304, *infra*). After all, he immediately expresses diffidence with *οὕτωσί* and then imagines them refuted! The truth, as in the *Crito*, is that Socrates will die by the best argument he has, though still aware it does not constitute knowledge. The iron and adamant of this passage is analogous to the Corybantic flutes there echoing in his mind (54D3-5), where he expresses the very same complex as here: conviction unshakeable at the moment by the foolish sorts of arguments Crito has brought (*ὄσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα*, D5-6), right alongside openness to the possibility of worthwhile discussion (D7). Socrates recognizes that what is at stake in the Wager of Pascal is nothing less than one’s whole life. Compare also *Apol.*28D10-9A1. Dodd’s suggestion, that in giving Socrates a sudden expression of diffidence, Plato has “belatedly remembered to make his hero speak in character,” is a disgrace. The simultaneous moods of uncertainty and certainty depict the human condition in truth, and can be annealed by nothing less than the myth at the end.
- 1823 ὧν ... ἐντετύχηκα (A6): The perfect is empirical (cf. nn. 1654, 1646, 331), leaving future possibilities open. Dodds here makes the very fine observation that although the relative is rarely attracted out of the dative (*ὧν* = *τούτων οἷς*), Plato allows it with the verb *ἐντυγχάνω*, citing *Prot.*361E2, *Rep.*531E2, and *Th.*144A1.

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ<sup>1824</sup> τίθημι [b] ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον μέγιστου ὄντος, εἰ οἶόν τε, τὸν<sup>1825</sup> ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ καταγέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη; ἄρα οὐ ταύτην, ἣτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μέγιστην ἡμῶν<sup>1826</sup> βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν<sup>1827</sup> μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις, δευτέραν δὲ [c] τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ, τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου<sup>1828</sup> καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως· ὡς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ’ ἕκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧ Καλλίκλεις;<sup>1829</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. δυοῖν οὖν ὄντων, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μείζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, [d] ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν τε ἀπὸ<sup>1830</sup> τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται,<sup>1831</sup> ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν<sup>1832</sup> παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;<sup>1833</sup>

1824 αὖ (A7): Introduce here a paragraph break, with Chambry Irwin Waterfield. Just as at 507C8-9, Socrates here takes the next step in his conversation with himself by noting anew (αὖ) what it is based on, which he again *posits* in an εἰ clause. Waterfield’s “I suggest” misses what he is saying; Dalfen’s *setze ich wieder an* gets it.

1825 Reading τὸν (B3) with the mss. and Findeisen Kratz Sauppe (τὸ E3<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* edd.) as sufficiently tolerable against the very sleight testamentary weight of the corrector of E3. With his repetition of *καταγέλαστος* Socrates is comparing the shame of “losing” in court with the shame of arguing (thinking) poorly.

1826 ἡμῶν (B6): The genitive depends from the verb (Jahn). The first plural again leaves behind Callicles’s us-versus-them scenario, out of sympathy for the human condition faced by all (cf. n. 1797).

1827 ταύτην ... τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν (B7) with mss. and edd. βοήθειαν was obelized by Schanz and replaced with ἀδυναμίαν by H. Richard – an emendation with no historical support; and Morstadt (followed by Theiler and Erler) and Cobet excised words – all this after fifty years of unanimity among commentators that the expression is merely afflicted with a common solecism (by “attraction,” Stallb.), not far from that of a misplaced epithet (as Thurot notes, at 449B9-10, something even idiomatic in such phrases as δῆλός εἰμι [448D8] and δίκαιός εἰμι). We may understand it as ταύτην τὸ πάντων αἰσχιστον εἶναι βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν (with the earlier editors). Stallb. compares *Lach.* 201B2-3: οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι αἰδῶ ... παρεῖναι, meaning οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αἰδῶ παρεῖναι (the solecism stems from none less than Homer: αἰδῶς οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεκρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι: *Odyssey* 17.347).

1828 Reading τρίτην τὴν τοῦ τρίτου (C1): The ranking is more specific than the immediate context requires (only two grades of harm have been suggested just now: B1-3). Perhaps he only means first with first, second with second, and so forth (giving “third with third” gratuitously: this interpretation favors F’s omission of καὶ before τρίτην, which I here adopt, against all edd.); τᾶλλα οὕτως would then mean *et cetera* (so trr. Cary Jowett Hamilton Pietre Dalfen Erler). Alternatively if one places a full stop after τρίτου and takes οὕτω to point forward only, the sense is to insist on a triad of cases and then with the subsequent words to justify the principle that orders them. In the latter case, we must identify what these three cases are, and how they constitute a full set. The *schol. vet.* (followed by Huit) brings in the three categories of good (psychic, bodily, external) – and then accounts for the generalization beyond the three by noting the sub-hierarchy of non-psychic goods presented at *Leg.* 631C, which does recall Socrates’s ranking with Polus at 477A5-478E5, where (as here) ordinals were also used (478E1). But more pertinent to the immediate context is the suggestion of Heindorf Jahn Thompson: besides the two evils of committing injustice and of doing so without punishment, listed just above, there has been a third evil, the evil of undergoing injustice; and that this is less a bad thing than committing injustice is indeed the paradoxical thesis most important in the whole passage, adamant chains and all (cf. 508D6-E6). So there is a second graded triad: committing injustice without being punished is even worse than committing it (“if that is possible,” B3: cf. the paradox at 472E5-6), committing injustice second worst; and undergoing it least worst. This same gradation, too, was reached with Polus (474B3-5, 475B3-477A4), and ordinals were also used there (476A3, 479D3-6). The dilemma is immediately solved in the sequel since the βοήθειαι sought have to do not with saving the three goods (though this, too, was thematized in the discussion with Polus at 477E7-478B5), nor with saving one’s life, but with equipping oneself to avoid the greater and lesser evils of injustice (509C6-D2ff.).

1829 ὦ Καλλικλῆς (C4): The vocative in the terminal position is rare, and ominously closes the dialogue as well (527E7). Cf. my note to *Laches* 181B5.

1830 τὴν τε ἀπὸ (D1), i.e., τὴν τε (ὠφελίαν ἀποτρέπειν) ἀπὸ: The bare preposition brings forward the verb ἀποτρέπειν from above (B5).

1831 ἀδικήσεται (D4): The future passive sense is sometimes supplied by the future middle form in classical Greek (Veitch s.v. ἀδικέω): cf. E. *IA* 1436, T. 5.56.2, Isoc. *ad Nic.* 16, D. 20.164, *al.* Smyth gives a list of such verbs (§808-9).

1832 δύναμιν (D4): *Sc.* ἀποτρέπειν ἀπὸ. In a further truncation, the bare genitive τοῦ (A4) brings forward both the verb and the preposition that governs itself. δύναμιν governs the understood infinitive ἀποτρέπειν (not the genitive *pace* Ast; nor is it “absolute” *pace* Stallb. and Mistrisotes [citing 457E5]). μή with ἀδικεῖσθαι is the redundant μή.

1833 Reading οὐκ ἀδικήσεται (D5) with mss. and edd. (*del.* Cobet [*ubi nescio*], followed by Cantarín).



ΚΑΛ. δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε,<sup>1834</sup> ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν;<sup>1835</sup> πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν—οὐ γὰρ<sup>1836</sup> ἀδικήσει—ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ [e] τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμιν τινα καὶ<sup>1837</sup> τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι ὡς<sup>1838</sup> ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ<sup>1839</sup> καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει;

... τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω,<sup>1840</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἤνικα ὠμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον<sup>1841</sup> ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

[510] ΚΑΛ. ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες ἴσως,<sup>1842</sup> ἵνα διαπεράνης<sup>1843</sup> τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα,<sup>1844</sup> ὡς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.<sup>1845</sup>

- 1834 δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε (D6): Socrates is bringing Callicles back into dialogue and Callicles with οὐκ ἄλλως at C6 answered begrudgingly – bringing back the answer he had used twice above (502A2, B9). But now his answer is enthusiastic because he likes to praise power, though his type of power is not the type Socrates has in mind.
- 1835 τοῦ ἀδικεῖν (D7): The edd. (e.g., Heindorf, Jahn, Mistrisotes) take the bare genitive as an idiomatic genitive of the sphere or topic after τί δέ (“with a verb of saying,” Woolsey, citing S. *El*.317; or “of thinking” Dodds, citing *Rep*.459B7), as at *Rep*.470A5 and *Phdo*.78D10; Ast (*Annot*. [1832]p.523) and Stallb., similarly take it as a preparative genitive such as at *Phdrs*.261A1 and *Charm*.165D6; *Leg*.737D2, 849E1-2, 869D4; Riddell §27 on a similar theory adds *Leg*.751B8, *Rep*.576D7, stipulating an initial and preparatory function, adding A. *Ag*.950 (τούτων), *Eum*.211(γυναϊκός); cf. also *AGPS* 61.7.3. Sauppe Croiset Helmbold Chambry Piettre construct it with δύναμιν (D4), understood. But perhaps, with Hirschig, the syntax is again truncated or streamlined, as above, relying upon us to supply the governing preposition.
- 1836 γὰρ (D8) elliptically quotes the simple person who thinks one’s will is enough: why after all (γὰρ) would one do wrong who does not want and plan to do so?
- 1837 καὶ (E1): δύναμις, supported by “belligerent” ἐπί + accusative, is repeated to establish a parallel with the previous case; it is then ousted by καὶ (τινὰ having opened the door: Apelt errs to repeat *gewisse* with *Kunst* here), which specifies the power as due to art, with art then specified as consisting in knowledge and practice. The sequence is metabatic (and proceeds rapidly, Croiset [p.200-201, n.1]), from δύναμις to τέχνη to ἐπιστήμη (understood). With τέχνη Socrates is referring back to the notion of the τεχνικόν (e.g., 500A6); and then with μάθη back to ἐπιστήμη at 508C2. So it is not power but art that he has in mind: a good example of καὶ meaning “or” (cf. n. 1596), and by “art” he then means knowledge. It is the τέχνη and its knowledge that must be learned and practiced (with Dodds *ad loc.*): δύναμις has dropped out (*pace* Kratz, Deuschle-Cron, Mistrisotes, Ovink who take ἀσκήσῃ with δύναμις and μάθη with τέχνη).
- 1838 Taking ὡς (E1) to mean *ita ut*, with Buttman Deuschle-Cron (Findeisen’s ὥστε and Hirschig’s ὥστ’ are not needed to get this sense), rather than *weil*, with Ast Sauppe: it is invoked by τινὰ and the attempt by the two intervening nouns to specify the δύναμις. The subjunctive condition is admonitory.
- 1839 αὐτά (E2): For the neuter singular or plural used with feminine singular antecedent Stallb. cites *Phdo*.88A6, 109A9; *Meno* 73C7; and *Matth*.§439. Mistrisotes cites *Alc. I* 115D5 and E. *Suppl*.595 (neut. plural for masc. plural), but then too precipitously infers that the plural here refers to the two feminines, δύναμις and τέχνη. Using the neuter constitutes a mere manner of reference, says Matth. *ad loc.*, and that the plural neuter for the singular is of the same ilk. My sense is that the neuter plural here is meant to maintain the blur of δύναμις καὶ τέχνη rather than to hold them apart and carry forward their being separate and two. Furthermore, using pronoun αὐτά rather than demonstrative ταῦτα diminishes a demonstrative’s insistence upon an antecedent, thereby indirectly adding a claim of objectivity or reality to the notion Socrates is forming – as Stallbaum’s cases from *Phaedo* do for their antecedent, the soul.
- 1840 Reading ἀπεκρίνω (E3), with R *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (ἀπεκρίνου BTPWF, *legg.* Routh Irwin[“why haven’t you...”] Nichols – but taking it temporally makes no sense since Callicles has not been asked this question). The aorist is here used as at *Charm*.155A4, *Phdo*.86D7, *Phlb*.54B6, *Prot*.310A2, *Symp*.173B7, with a certain urgency (perhaps aspectually rather than temporally says Hermann [c*it*.Viger p.746]), which is strengthened by αὐτό (Stallb.: “just this”) as a request for at least a minimal answer on which all hinges. Cf. n. 1640. The asyndeton again betokens that Callicles has delayed to answer the previous question (cf. 468C7 and D6, 470A4, 473E2, 474C8, 475D5, 489A2 and 4, 490C6-7 and D2, 499B2, 500D10 [a self-interruption], 504C2).
- 1841 βουλόμενον (E6) replaces the more usual ἔκοντα so as not to blur the distinction between δύναμις and βούλησις (Deuschle).
- 1842 The testimony for οὕτως (510A1) from both families is strong (BTF), *legg.* edd. (ἴσως PWNFlor *teste* Cantarín), but Callicles like Polus shows a certain penchant for an ironic use of ἴσως that is very much in character (cf. nn. 1114, 1988; 801), and so I venture to read it. His first use of ἔστω in answer did include τοῦτο οὕτως (501A6), but since then he has echoed it without demonstratives (504D4, 505A1).
- 1843 Reading διαπεράνης (A1) with TPWF, *legg.* edd. (διαπερανῆ B : καὶ διαπεράνης R, *leg.* Bekker : διαπεράνη *coni.* Thompson). Thompson’s emendation of the less well attested reading of B (yielding aor. mid. subj.) is only ingenious. Callicles again allows Socrates to continue as if to obey Gorgias (506A8ff), and himself must be thinking Socrates is closer than ever to the end; but what he does not know (since οὐ προσέχει τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, 508A4-5) is that Socrates means still to deal with what will happen to him *after his life is over*. In his persistence Socrates is bringing Callicles closer not to the end but to hell.
- 1844 καὶ ... ἄρα (A3): Here begins a trend of Socrates using initial καὶ: As Callicles demurs or drags things down, Socrates must forge ahead on his own steam. Cf. 511C7, D3 and D4, 514D8 and 9, 516B5, and relentlessly at the end (527C1ff: n. 2308).
- 1845 Reading ἀδικήσωμεν (A4) from all mss., *legg.* edd. (ἀδικήσομεν *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.*Beck Ast[1819] Hermann Coraes Bekker Kratz Deuschle Jahn Thompson Hirschig Schanz Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Lamb Feix Chambry : ἀδικηθῶμεν *coni.* *in marg.* Steph.). Heindorf and the others want ἀδικήσομεν against the mss., perhaps to conform to the canon of Dawes (*sic* Dodds), but the subjunctive is both correct and needed since this is a purpose clause (with Goodwin, *GMT* §§363-4), not a final clause (*pace* Dodds), spelling out the modality of the verbal adjective, and the choice “we” must make is more appropriate than an object clause that merely repeats the nature of the δύναμις needed. Note



ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἤπερ<sup>1846</sup> ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε·<sup>1847</sup> ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ<sup>1848</sup> τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας<sup>1849</sup> ἐταῖρον εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. ὄρᾳς,<sup>1850</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, [b] ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εὖ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκάστω εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὄνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. οὐ καὶ σοί;

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

Socrates again readily shifts to the first plural out of fellow-feeling for the human condition (cf. n. 1797), the plane on which he has been conceiving their discussion should take place, since 508A. The question and answer are not to be athetized (*per Vretska Phil. Woch.*[1933]507 and von der Mühl *Philol.*93[1939]490, followed by Helmbold) as though Socrates, let alone Plato, is bound by the implications of what he and Polus said at 468DE. Exactly *because* committing injustice is always unwilling (509E6-7), we want and need an art for avoiding it.

1846 Reading ἤπερ (A7), *sc.* ὁδῶ, with BW Stephanus, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck (ἤπερ TPfL, *legg.* edd. : καὶ εἶπερ F). What is presently described is a “way,” not a τέχνη. Both dative pronouns depend upon ἤπερ (both the *similia* adduced by Stallb. [*Phdo.*64C10 and *Prot.*340B2] have συνδοκεῖ and thus are not adequately parallel). See next note.

1847 Reading ἥδε (A8), with PW, *legg.* edd. (ἥδε [*sic*] BTF : ἥδε Stephanus, *legg.* Routh Thurot : τῆδε *scrr.* Coraes Beck Buttman). Schanz and Dodds’s claim that reading ἤπερ at A7 requires emending to τῆδε here is unjustified: again supply ὁδός (not τέχνη), as established by the previous dative of means. To be a ruler is not an art (Jowett’s “such an art is the art of one who is either a tyrant or a ruler himself” fails to translate δεῖ) but a means or a way, and it is not learned but achieved. Lamb Canto Waterfield Dalfen soften the problem by loosely translating “taking the same view of it as I do.” (compare Chambry, *sur ce point*, and Allen “this,” Woodhead “my opinion,” Dalfen Erler “*es dieselbe wie mir*”). One must succeed to *be* friends with the regime (εἶναι, A10); the *means* will be the method by which to *become* so, namely, ἐθίζειν αὐτόν (D6-7), explicitly called a ὁδός when the argument finally reaches it (D6).

1848 Reading ἢ καὶ (A9) with mss. and edd. (ἢ QE Steph. and the early edd., *leg.* Beck : καὶ *scripsit* Coraes) on superior evidence. καὶ enables Socrates to focus on the tyrant – presumably all the more attractive to Callicles – for dialectical purposes revealed at B7.

1849 πολιτείας (A9): The term ranges from the particular regime as a power structure (*administratio*, Ast *Lex. s.v.*) to the pervasive political culture or climate (*Leg.*698B4, 817B3; *Menex.*238C1), as the entirety of *Rep.* Bk. VIII shows. Here, with Deuschle, ἐταῖρον (retrieved from F [ἔτερον BTWP and *margin.* f. for the interchange, cf. with Schanz 461C6, 482A6; and also *Soph.*216A3, where I read ἔτερον with Dixsaut]) connotes clubs (ἐταπειῖαι, Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge; and cf. Socrates’s use at *Apol.*21A1), political associations, etc., a scenario of friends and enemies and of *who* rules rather than *how* or by what policy, and therefore pushes πολιτεία toward the former extreme, which is Callicles’s view of political reality.

1850 Ὅρᾳς (A11): For the idiom, including asyndeton, cf. 475E7 and 491B5, with notes. Callicles follows the suggestion of ἐταῖρος and ὑπάρχουσα, and strongly praises Socrates, not for saying something he thinks is true (that these are the ways to prevent being mistreated), nor to “make up for his recent crossness” (Dodds), but because Socrates has voiced the “realist” attitude of power politics (as above 509D6) about which he constantly dreams (Mistriotis). In fact, his enthusiasm betokens that he imagines citizens toadying up to *himself*.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων<sup>1851</sup> ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος,<sup>1852</sup> εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ<sup>1853</sup> ἐξ ἅπαντος [c] τοῦ νοῦ<sup>1854</sup> οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' <sup>1855</sup> ἂν οὗτος· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

ΚΑΛ. καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. λείπεται<sup>1856</sup> δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοίηθης ὢν, ταῦτ' ἀπέχων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλη ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα [d] ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων<sup>1857</sup> ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

1851 ἐστιν ἄρχων (B7): The periphrastic formation continues the “situationist” notion of *ὑπάρχουσα*.

1852 ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος (B7-8): The connection or compresence of the two attributes was only hinted at in the run-up to Polus's praise of Archelaus (cf. also n. 437 regarding his entry into the discussion), but is herewith thematized; Socrates will rely upon the connection at the very end of the dialogue (527E1). That the converse attribute is βελτίων (B8) turns the pair into an hendiadys denoting the converse of ἀρετή, and the particular virtue we are meant to supply is surely σωφροσύνη.

1853 Reading τούτῳ (B9) with mss. and edd. (τοῦτο FW<sup>2</sup>: τοῦ W *teste* Cantarín): *sc.* τῷ τυράννῳ (as with τούτου). The greater man will reject the tyrant and the tyrant will reject the lesser man so that neither will have the δύναμις to become the tyrant's friend. For the sudden change of subject cf. 518E3 and n. 2062; *Phdo.* 72C1-2; *Phdrs.* 258B2-5; *Prot.* 320A; *Rep.* 331C5-6, 359E5-6; *Tht.* 148B (Mistriotis claims it is common in Xen. but gives no examples). For a survey of such shifts consult Matthiae §§296-298. Several edd. (Ast Cary Thurot Cope Lodge Sauppe Ovink Croiset Lamb Apelt Chambry Irwin Canto Dalfen Erler) take the subject of δύναιτο still to be the τύραννος, but that would call for αὐτῷ rather than τούτῳ (which Jahn takes to mean “the latter” as at 493D4 – i.e., the tyrant) which is repeated below by the demonstrative τοιούτῳ (C8), and it hardly seems appropriate to say ἅπας τοῦ νοῦ in connection with a tyrant. Moreover if the tyrant were the subject, simple γένοιτο would be the appropriate verb: according to the context it is the other man than the tyrant that needs the *ability* (δυναμὴν τινα, 509D4 and E1, brought forward by τέχνη 510A6) to befriend him, whether βελτίων or φαυλότερος (which is syntactically parallel: *n.b.*, οὐδέ, C3), which Lamb Apelt Chambry Allen Zeyl Erler are compelled to mistranslate as if οὗτος was τούτῳ and was in the dative (or worse, with Canto and others, are forced assume the sense of φίλος moves from active to passive, despite the parallelism indicated by the δέ in οὐδέ). Schanz's clever emendation, οὕτως for οὗτος (read by Waterfield), overcomes that problem but does not help (*pace* Dodds): for what is the verb we are to supply? Ast's argument that friendship is reciprocal (so that B is friend of A if and only if A is friend of B) applies not to this case but the next one (C4-5); and also should be kept in mind when one considers whether the tyrant for his part can have any friends in the first place (Piettre cites *Rep.* 576A). The expression ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ is striking and rare: along with σπουδάσειεν below it is describing the *ὑπάρχοντα* of friendship. νοῦς here means what νοῦς means in the compounds ὁμόνοια and εὐνοια. Socrates means that the superior man, though perceiving the advantage of befriending the tyrant, would be unable to do so with a clear conscience.

1854 ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ (B9-C1): For the expression compare ἐξ ἐνὸς στόματος (*Leg.* 634E1, *Rep.* 364A1): the preposition is “modal” (*AGPS* 68.17.9.C).

1855 οὐδέ γε ... οὐδ' (C3): For this doubling of the (sympathetic) negatives, general and then specific, Jahn compares *Prot.* 332A1, *Phdrs.* 278E5, and *H. Iliad* 4.512 (οὐ μὲν οὐδ' Ἀχιλλεύς).

1856 λείπεται (C7) announces an *eliminatio*: the continuum of ethical substantiality above and below has been exhausted and so now the only conceivable way to be a friend is to be of equal (i.e., “similar”) substance (ἄξιος λόγου = *als alleiniger in Frage kommender* [Apelt], referring to the logic of the *eliminatio*, not the mind of the despot [*pace* Croiset's *avoir du prix à ses yeux, similiter* Chambry Hamilton Zeyl Canto Waterfield Piettre: the tyrant after all is not looking for friends but people he will not have to kill]). But this is the condition for being, not the means to becoming, the despot's friend.

1857 χαίρων (D1): The anaphora (οὗτος / τοῦτον), here in asyndeton (*admirantis*: cf. *Menex.* 248A4; contrast *E. Bacch.* 243-4, *derogantis*), along with this litotes (idiomatic with χαίρειν after a negation, as *S. OR* 363; *E. Med.* 398; *Ar. Ach.* 563, *Plut.* 64, *Ran.* 843, *Thesm.* 719, *Vesp.* 186; *Hdt.* 3.29.2: English “get away with it” means the same but employs a different metaphor) heaps ironic praise on this man empowered by his subservience, and might bring to mind Callicles's master enslaved to his desires! This paradox of power is equally operant in a democracy, as Socrates muses at *Rep.* 493A6ff: the expert sophists only say what the crowd is already thinking.

ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ<sup>1858</sup> τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεῖς<sup>1859</sup> με ἀδικοῖ; αὕτη,<sup>1860</sup> ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν<sup>1861</sup> τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότη, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοῖος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ. οὐχ οὕτως;<sup>1862</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ<sup>1863</sup> τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα [e] δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ἡμέτερος<sup>1864</sup> λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὁμοῖος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἴμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὕτως ἢ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶψ τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα<sup>1865</sup> μὴ δίδοναι δίκην. ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. φαίνεται.

[511] ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότη καὶ δύναμιν.<sup>1866</sup>

1858 Reading ταύτη (D4) from F, *legg.* edd. (αὕτη BTWP : αὕτη ταύτη *coni.* Stallb.). The demonstrative is derogatory (*ainsi gouvernée*, Thurot; “such a government,” Helmbold Hamilton): compare the expression at 468E1 and n. 648 *ad loc.* Socrates now focusses upon the young because they are not yet all they will be, but are still in the state of becoming, as he spells out below (ἐκ νέου, D6). Mistriotis notes the irony of Callicles’s condemnation of teaching the young to be subservient from the earliest age (483E5ff); and again I recall Callicles’s question, πῶς ἂν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὄψοῦν (491E5-6). Moreover, Callicles himself is early in his climb to the top.

1859 μηδεῖς (D5): The shift to direct speech – a choice to depict the subjective state of this youth as he speaks to himself (lost by Waterfield’s reworking of the paragraph) – is reminiscent of a similar depiction at *Rep.*365B1ff, as Dalfen noticed. With Lodge, the youth’s use of μὴ rather than οὐ bleeds through from the (negative) wish he had in mind for which this path might provide the answer (*pace AGPS* 67.3.1.D).

1860 Reading ἀδικοῖ; αὕτη (D5-6) with F, *legg.* edd. (ἀδικοῖ ἢ αὕτη BTPWf and the early editions, *legg.* Jahn Cope Kratz Deuschle Mistrotis Schmelzer Hermann Feix Canto Heidbüchel : ἀδικοῖ αὕτη *coni.* Heindorf, *leg.* Beck Dodds : ἀδικῆ, ἢ αὕτη QE1 *teste* Cantarin : ἀδικοῖ αὕτη ἢ αὕτη *coni.* Ast). With the advent of F (ἀδικοῖ αὕτη), Heindorf’s ingenious notion that the η of BTP might go with ἀδικοῖ, adopted by most older editors, became moot. Absence of the article with ὁδός (BTWP : ἢ F) confirms that the concordant demonstrative, expectably proleptic, is the subject, and the substantive the predicate. Cf. *Apol.*24A8; *Meno* 71E2, 75B10; *Phdo.*97A4; *Symp.*179C6. The predicative demonstrative echoes the relief expressed by those at C9 and D1, an effect lost by Waterfield’s beginning the paragraph with “So that’s the way ...”

1861 Reading αὐτόν (D7), with P only and Ficinus (*se ipsum*) *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. (αὐτόν BTWF). All edd. back to Stephanus have printed αὐτόν though the erroneous reading of the superior mss. (αὐτόν) was not reported until Schanz (which led Croiset to attribute it to him as an emendation). One can hope the *vestustiores* found the error of the mss. too nugatory to mention.

1862 οὐχ οὕτως (D8-9): Socrates repeats the formulation (abbreviated from above, D2) and Callicles repeats his minimal answer (ναί). Throughout the passage, the indicatives (C2, D1, E1, E6) belong to the realm and regime of *Realpolitik*.

1863 τούτῳ (D11), neuter, is a dative of means, bringing forward οὕτως.

1864 Reading ἡμέτερος (E1) from E1<sup>2</sup>ZaJΦ *teste* Cantarin with Ficinus (*praesens sermo*) and Helmbold (ἡμέτερος mss., *legg.* edd.). That ἡμέτερος is a plural is often not shown in the (English) translations of those who read it. Whose then is it? It is not characteristic of Socrates to foist an argument upon his interlocutor without clear warrant (Sauptpe’s *nach deiner under der dir gleich Gesinnten* or Zeyl’s “people like you” and Waterfield’s derogatory “you and your lot” are completely unsocratic [*sim.* Hamilton], and Lamb’s “as your party maintain,” accepted by Dodds, is a disaster: it is *Callicles* who sees things in partisan terms, as at 515E8. cf. n.); and likewise I doubt (*pace* Routh Heindorf Stallb. Ast Deuschle-Cron Irwin Canto Dalfen Erler) that he is here implicitly associating Callicles’s outlook with that expressed by Polus (at 466Bff), for that outlook did not include the present notion of assimilating oneself to the tyrant (Thompson’s argument that this idea was a commonplace, citing Demosthenes and Isocrates, is quite irrelevant). Moreover, it is Callicles’s later assertion below, at 511A5-7, that commits him to agreeing with Polus (as Socrates there notes in response: 511B1-3). To the contrary, in having just said ναί, Callicles has agreed with the position taken just above by the young man as imaginary interlocutor. I do not know of another passage where the imaginary interlocutor is associated with his actual interlocutor in this way. Therefore read ἡμέτερος despite weaker testimony.

1865 Reading ἀδικοῦντα (E8) with BTPW and edd. (ἀδικοῦντι FPar<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarin). Little is at stake between the readings: for the occasional shift in mid-stream to the proximate construction calling for subject accusative, after the retention at E7 (οἶψ) of the dative of the leading construction, Heindorf compares αὐτοῦς at 492B2 and κραπαλῶντα at *Symp.*176D4. The youth will be maximally able to do wrong but, *pace* Jowett, will not *eo ipso* “contribute” to do so. That he shall go unpunished indicates that this *παρασκευὴ* fails to protect him from the damage of ἀδικεῖν (the other of the two damages against which protection is here being sought: 509C6ff), but also from the even worse damage (“if that is possible”) of going unpunished (509B1-3). Hence μέγιστον (511A1).

1866 Reading καὶ δύναμιν (511A3), with mss. and edd. (κατὰ δύναμιν *coni.* Deuschle : *del.* Christ). Deuschle finds these words awkwardly placed, “bald” (lacking an article), and redundant (not for the doctrinal reason Dodds “presumes” for him), and suggests reading κατὰ δύναμιν, comparing with imperfect relevancy *Tim.*38B8-C1 (ἴν’ ὡς ὁμοίωτατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἦ). But the awkwardness is studied and intentional: the

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπη<sup>1867</sup> στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείνον<sup>1868</sup> ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται<sup>1869</sup> τὰ ὄντα. [b]

ΣΩ. οἶδα, ὦγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι<sup>1870</sup> πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μὲν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν κάγαθόν ὄντα.<sup>1871</sup>

ΚΑΛ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;<sup>1872</sup>

idea was already adopted by Callicles above (509D4-6); this is why there is no article, and here is presented the reply (as Croiset realized between p.200, n.1 and p.202, n.1). Socrates's leading point against Callicles is to oppose his fundamental addiction to power (which Deuschle fully recognizes *ad* 509D6, 510A11, and 511C3): he would be indifferent to the habits or the nature – in short, the personality – of the despot. Socrates chose not to envision a fine and moderate despot to imitate whom would improve a man, but the despot Callicles implicitly has in mind according to his theory of “the just by nature” (cf. 483E4-484B1); and now Socrates is exposing the toadiness that is prerequisite to the wielding of power that Callicles dreams of (cf. n. 1858 and 513A7-C3).

- 1867 Reading ὅπη (A4) from F Olymp[λ], *legg. edd.* (ὅποι BTWP Stephanus, *leg.* Routh): for the dative cf. *Crat.*414C7. With μέγιστον Socrates is bringing home the climactic point that this method of avoiding to undergo injustice not will foster committing it but will have the even more negative effect of leaving unjust behavior unpunished, the very worse of evils. It is against this climactic failure that Callicles can now only chafe. With ἐκάστοτε he is reiterating his dismissive charge that if Socrates is right the world is turned upside down (ἀνατετραμμένος, 481C3-4), but στρέφειν now implies not just redirecting but twisting (cf. Jebb *ad* S. *Ph.*897). There is no specific allegation of “eristic” cheating (*pace* Dodds, though similar language is used in *Euthyd.*276D6: the crucial term there is not στρέφειν but ἐρωτήματα [cf. n. 437]): Callicles is simply dissatisfied by the implication. Nor is there justification for Canto to gloss ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους with “*tout ce qu'on a dit*” or Woodhead and Waterfield’s “our arguments” – particularly since that charge does not apply in the present case – nor does he twist his own arguments (*pace* Piettre, Dalfen)! The terminal vocative, ὦ Σώκρατες, is dismissive in force.
- 1868 τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείνον (A6): ἐκείνον is the object not the subject (*pace* Hamilton Irwin Zeyl Waterfield Nichols: by their interpretation ἐκείνον has no antecedent) and refers to the tyrant, the original (former) object of imitation from whom οὗτος, the latter, derived his power by choosing to imitate him. Woodhead and Allen translate οὗτος with “this imitator of yours” (!) as though Socrates were responsible for his becoming an imitator. μὴ is conditional and therefore implies a generalization (*tous qui ne veulent pas l'imiter*, with Canto), but Allen translates with “refuses to imitate” (as if μὴ were a strengthened οὐ). Piettre contortedly takes the second μιμούμενον as passive and extracts the meaning that the imitator has the option of killing “the unimitated tyrant” – i.e. of ceasing to imitate him once he has gotten into his confidence!
- 1869 ἀποκτενεῖ / ἀφαιρήσεται (A6): “Will,” not “would” (nor *va pouvoir*, with Canto). More *Realpolitik*, which Socrates does not “see.” Far from being worse off, the imitator has now acquired the power of the tyrant! For ἐὰν βούληται as the prerogative of power, cf. Gorgias’s uses at 456C2, 457B1; Polus’s at 473C7; and Socrates’s at 508C8 (cf. n. 1815). His use of the verb, echoing Socrates’s corrective use at 509E6 (cf. n. 1841), at the same time evinces his continuing deafness to the argument that no one errs willingly. He cannot resist imagining ἀφαιρήσεται also, though as usual in such cases the sequence is illogical (cf. 473B12-C5 with n. 808, and *Rep.*361E4-2A2 with my n. *ad loc.*), since the dead man will hardly be needing his possessions. Its postponement after ἐὰν βούληται ensures that in this case καὶ does *not* mean “or”! His sense of “reality” is overcome only by his imagination.
- 1870 Reading ἄρτι (B2), with BTWP and *edd.* (ἄρα F : ἄρα F<sup>2</sup>), referring to Polus’s similar objections and arguments at 466B11-471D2, *passim* (Callicles argued this at 486B).
- 1871 ὢν ... ὄντα (B4-5): With ἀλλά Socrates presents this reflexion as expression of incredulity by a meek and faithful man: in the *Apology* he will be more explicit, saying that Themis will not allow the less noble to harm the nobler (30C8-D1). His use of the participle in a retort to the syntactically superior assertion peculiar to Greek; its force is often to grant the leading statement only to undercut or gainsay it with a debilitating rider. Callicles will use it just below (C3: reading συμβουλευθῶν with F). Compare 451C10, 473B2; *Charm.*156A9; *H.Maj.*282B1; *Lach.*192B4; *Lys.*204A4; *Meno* 73E7; *Symp.*174E12. Socrates would hardly call the non-imitator Callicles brings up a “paragon of virtue” merely for not imitating (*pace* Waterfield), but just good and decent (on the range of meaning of καλὸν κάγαθόν and the utility of its vagueness, cf. nn. 732 and 1976). Piettre continues his interpretation by arguing that the imitator who chooses to kill his tyrant after ceasing to imitate him is a miserable double-crosser bringing down the defendant of law and order (*c'est de toute façon enfriendre la loi et la justice*, citing Polus’s vision of the tyrant unjustly overthrown at 473D)! It is sobering to encounter such ingenuity among the ranks of us philologists.
- 1872 τὸ ἀγανακτητόν (B6): This represents Callicles’s own feeling, for he sees the murdered man to be despicably helpless (Apelt) despite any claim to innocence or moral virtue, as at 486B2-3 (κατηγοροῦ τυχῶν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ). The feeling is not εὐνοια for Socrates (*pace* Dodds, citing 487A3 where Socrates hardly seriously attributes knowledge and good will to Callicles after his long speech), else all his threats that Socrates will be dragged into court are to be taken as friendly advice. Socrates seems not to think so when he combines παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζει at 515A2, but there Dodds is distracted by his notion that Socrates is speaking about Plato (p.355). Rather, Callicles is taking Socrates’s distinction between the good and the bad man not in terms of their souls but within the partisan frame of “us” (the good, the able) versus “them” (the bad, the weak). Irwin’s claim that Callicles here evinces a belief that his “ideal type” can “justly demand” more than others get, here implies that he thinks not only that his inferiors would be better off dead than alive (483B2) but that he may “justly” murder them at will! For the focussing article (τό) Deuschle compares καὶ τὰ ἐναντία at *Apol.*27A4: “the *very* opposite.” Piettre continues his exegesis by saying that Callicles despises the murdered tyrant for letting this happen to him, especially since it was an illegal murder, and interprets Socrates’s follow-up response to mean that it is better to be unjustly murdered than live an unjust life.

ΣΩ. οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.<sup>1873</sup> ἢ οἶει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἰ ἡμᾶς<sup>1874</sup> ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν [c] κινδύνων σφύζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ<sup>1875</sup> κελεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασφύζουσαν;

ΚΑΛ. ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.<sup>1876</sup>

ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ<sup>1877</sup> νεῖν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν σφύζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἷς τι τοιοῦτον<sup>1878</sup> ἐμπέσωσιν οὐ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι [d] μείζω ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σφύζει ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα<sup>1879</sup> καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορικὴ. καὶ<sup>1880</sup> αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη,<sup>1881</sup> ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη<sup>1882</sup> τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης δεῦρο σῶση, οἶμαι δὺ' ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο,<sup>1883</sup> ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ

1873 Reading ὁ λόγος σημαίνει (B7) from the mss., *legg.* edd. (ὁ σὸς λόγος σημαίνει Par<sup>2</sup> Ficino), an idiom stressing the compelling *logic* of an argument despite its courting paradox or controversy (not merely denoting *das Gesagte*, *pace* Apelt). Cf. 527C6; *Leg.* 652A5-6; *Phdo.* 66E4; *Polit.* 275E8; *Rep.* 334A9, 399D10 [with my n.], 584A11), like ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ (*Rep.* 604C7, with my n.). Compare Latin *ratio edocet*, or *declarat*, or *coget*. For the reading in Par<sup>2</sup> cf. n. 2313 *ad* 527C6, *infra*. Serranus's *tuus sermo* (*apud* Steph.) is not evidence for σός (*pace* Cantarin), since ὁ could in itself be possessive; rather, he is insensitive to the idiom, as is revealed by his translation of ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει at 527C6, with *quemadmodum hic sermo indicat*, where note his addition of *hic*.

1874 ἡμᾶς (B9): Another shift from a general reference to “mankind” (ἄνθρωπον) to “ourselves” (cf. 507D2 and n. 1797). Take ἀεὶ with σφύζουσιν in its distributive sense (*jedesmaligen*, Apelt; “when danger strikes,” Waterfield; *jeweils* Dalfen – not “always” Thurot Woodhead Allen Nichols).

1875 ἦν σὺ (C1): Emphatic prolepsis of relative clause (cf. *Rep.* 423D3, *Ar. Thesm.* 155-6; contrast emphatic postponement at *Isoc. ad Nic.* 15), strengthened by subsequent use of “second” attributive position, in chiasmus with τὰς τέχνας ταύτας αἰ (B9). The effect is only spoiled by Naber's wreckless dismissal of τὴν ῥητορικὴν as a *marginale* (“*vides interpolationem*,” *Mnem.* 36[1908] 261): like Cobet he suspects whatever he could do without, like the man in Homer's riddle who loses something when he catches it.

1876 Reading συμβουλεύων (C3) with F (*coniecerat* Heindorf), *legg.* edd. (συμβουλεύω BTP, *leg.* Routh Beck), of astute and reliable advice (cf. Socrates's criticism of unqualified counsellors at 455BD and Gorgias's praise of oratorical counsel in response at D8-456A3; and cf. 518D3, 520D9), in contrast with κελεύεις (C1) which Socrates conceives of in the context of a dialectical encounter, one on one (Coraes [p.345] is insensitive to this distinction). The participial construction is again meant to ignore and gainsay Socrates's obvious disapproval of the policy. Once again (510A11-B1) Callicles agrees with Socrates's proposition because it expresses his own opinion, regardless of the argumentative context.

1877 Reading ἦ καὶ ἡ (C4), with E3NFlorLauY and the early editions, chosen or conjectured by all edd. (ἦ καὶ εἰ F : ἦ καὶ εἰ F<sup>2</sup> : ἡ καὶ ἡ B : ἡ καὶ T : ἦ καὶ PW : ἡ καὶ ἡ L : ἡ καὶ RJ : ἡ E2 : οὐ καὶ ἡ Γ).

1878 Reading τι τοιοῦτον (C8) with F *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Burnet Woodhead Dodds Theiler Allen Nichols Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler (τοιοῦτον BTP, *legg.* edd.). It is not the presence but the position of the enclitic that is curious (*pace* Stallb.): it is almost adverbial. And its absence would not be unusual (Deuschle).

1879 Reading καὶ τὰ σώματα (D2) with all mss. (*del.* Morstadt *Emend.* 9). *ψυχὰς* means “lives” (with *Olymp.* 180.26), the lives at risk of political termination as discussed above (A5-C2); but keep in mind it is the man and not the body that undergoes execution. Socrates wants here to make the case that the navigator saves *more* than that man, for he brings his physical person and his belongings to safety (whereas oratory only saves one's life). *σώματα* is a transitional term (like a “passing note” in harmony: cf. nn. 1313, 1037, 795, 572, 467) that allows him to add this “more” to the list: there is no need (with Thompson and Dodds) to give it a special denotation such as his “family members.” Conversely, it is worth noting the special language used in English for those who die in shipwreck; they are numbered as “souls”! The reason is exactly to repress the ugly thought of what happens to their *σώματα* at sea, as likewise does the expression that such persons are “lost at sea.” Christ reads τὰς ψυχὰς σφύζει καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα without giving a warrant (cf. *Vorrede*, p. V).

1880 καί (D3): Initial καί, although *adversative* (*et pourtant* Thurot; “And yet” Cope), followed by additive καί at D4! The denial of airs in the present passage (οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη, continued below at E5-6) is simply a response to Callicles's overvaluation of oratory, and does not allude to the imitative garb of the false arts laid out at 464A and 465B, and still less to the recondite σχήματα of the τέχνη ῥητορικὴ (*pace* Irwin and Nichols).

1881 διαπραττομένη (D5) brought forward from 510E1.

1882 Reading διαπραξαμένη (D5) with F *Olymp.* (λ and π), *legg.* edd. (διαπραττομένη BTPWf, *legg.* Routh Coraes Buttman Beck Ast Cron Schanz Christ Lodge).

1883 ἐπράξατο (D7): Whatever the price is (Socrates is not an expert on that, whence οἶμαι), the aorist means that it is set and established (Matth. *Gr.Gr.* §506).



Πόντου, [e] ἐὰν πάμπου, <sup>1884</sup> ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν <sup>1885</sup> καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, <sup>1886</sup> ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι· <sup>1887</sup> λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπίσταται ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὐστίνας τε ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἔασας <sup>1888</sup> καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὐστίνας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν [512] αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἶοι <sup>1889</sup> ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν <sup>1890</sup> τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα <sup>1891</sup> συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἄθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα <sup>1892</sup> ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, <sup>1893</sup> τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ

- 1884 ἐὰν πάμπου (E1) *sc.* πράττειται. For the usage Thompson usefully compares *Apol.*26D10 as well as Eriphus Comicus *Meliboia*, frg.2.9 (Kock 2.429 *apud* Athen. 3.84C): τούτων μὲν ὀβολόν, εἰ πολὺ.
- 1885 αὐτὸν (E2), not αὐτὸν! Idiomatically singling out the *primus inter pares* (cf. *AGPS* 51.5.4.A) so as to re-incorporate him into the kit-and-kaboodle (cf. *Apol.*42A1; *Crito* 50E4; *Leg.*637E3; *Phdrs.*245A7; *Rep.*398A3, 414D7, 578E3; *Symp.*173A7, 221D2; cf. S. *OC* 462, 868, *al.*).
- 1886 γυναῖκας (E2) is read in the mss., Olymp.[π], Stephanus, *legg.* edd. (γυναῖκα *coni.* Naber[*Obs.Crit.*{1862}8] *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Schanz Sauppe Stender Helmbold Theiler). Olympiodorus's paraphrase (καὶ παῖδια καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ ἄνδρας, 181.6) is of dubious and mixed evidentiary value. Christ follows Morstadt (*Emend.Gorg.*[1866]10) and Aristides's quotation, reading καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ χρήματα, and deleting both καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, as though to make this passage more closely match the passage it claims to "quote" (ἃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον: cf. D1-3); but Morstadt's passage from Aristides (2.362 = Dindorf 2.120) is summarizing *that* passage, not this one. Finally there is the translator's stratagem of pluralizing αὐτός (e.g., with "we": e.g., Chambry Canto Piettre). Erler does not translate καὶ αὐτὸν.
- The immediate dialectical motivation of the present list is not merely to repeat that but further to embellish the value of the boat ride. Attempts to avoid "wives" (e.g., "slaves and their mistress," Dodds, *sim.* Hamilton) founder on the order of the items. Taking it as we find it, the mish-mash order, the corresponsive καὶ before αὐτός (best translated by removing all connectives, with Croiset Irwin Allen Piettre [though Allen acquiesces in "improving" the order by relocating γυναῖκας after αὐτός]), and the absence of articles here (as well as their presence at D1-2) together account for the plural, γυναῖκας: αὐτός is the captain's paying customer (with Ovink); the other items are being paid for as cargo (so Deuschle was right to feel the plural γυναῖκας was due to the influence of the immediately previous ones!). In the previous passage (D1-2), with its articles, the man's life was the focus (here saved by a captain rather than a lawyer), but the captain also saved what the man brought with him. Aristides simply missed or disregarded the rhetoric, whereas it seems from Olymp.'s plurals that Olympiodorus, at least, got it.
- "Heaping" lists are characterized by the use of plurals, connection with flat καὶ, an illogical ordering of items, and anaphora: *Leg.*669C4-D2 and E6-7, 782A5-B1, 842D3-5 ("this clattering jumble of mercantile terms is an echo of the 'busy hum' of a seaport marketplace" – England); *Rep.*573A5-6, 596E1-3. For attempts at "rationalizing" the list by substituting idioms, by Ficinus and by Serranus (see above) as well as Schleiermacher ("einem mit Weib und Kind und Habe") and Apelt ("Weib und Kind und Hab und Gut") we can compare the trs. of the "no matter who" list at *Leg.* 881C7-D1 (ἐάντε πᾶς, ἐάντε ἄνθρωπος, ἐάντε οὖν γόνυ): "man, woman, boy" Bury / "child, woman, man" Taylor, but *n.b.* the Straussian, Pangle, writes "child, man, even woman."
- 1887 ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι (E5-6), continuing (indeed, exemplifying) οὐ σεμνόνεται ἐσχηματιζομένη (D4), and therefore perhaps an indirect reference to Gorgias's manner of self-presentation (whether in dress, posture, or presumption is irrelevant – cf. Ael. *Var.Hist.*12.32): such indirection is habitual in this dialogue (cf. n. 2019). Dodds's "stretches his legs" for περιπατεῖ is perfect.
- 1888 οὐκ ἔασας (E7) means "disallowing," not "not allowing" (*pace* Jowett Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Allen Zeyl Nichols Piettre Dalfen Erler): the οὐκ is adherescent (Smyth §2692a).
- 1889 Reading ἢ οἶοι (512A1) with *corr.*T<sup>2</sup>Par<sup>2</sup> and the early editions, *legg.* edd. (ἢ οἶοι BTWPPar, *legg.* Schanz Lodge : οἶοι F), as at 516C6. Winckelmann (Zurich ed.) argued that ὅς = οἶος at *Euthyd.*283D2-3, and this was used to defend the mss. (by Schanz Lodge), but as Stallb. argues *ad Phdrs.*243E2, whereas ὅς can (as there) refer to the *nature* of its antecedent, οἶος only refers only to its quality – as here (and D4). The distinction is analogous to the semantic and logical distinction between τίς and ποῖος (cf. 447D1 and n. 136). The adjectival demonstrative also can be "incorporated" (Smyth §2536) into the correlative adjectival relative.
- 1890 Regarding ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν (A2), Denniston (371) says: "everything between the last stop and the word preceding the μὲν clause, applies to the whole μὲν ... δέ complex" (e.g., *Meno* 94C7ff). Thus do Schleiermacher and Lamb translate. Others, by restricting this οὐκ to the δέ clause, as being the principal construction (Stallb. Thurot Cary Woolsey Thompson Helmbold Woodhead Chambry Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto Nichols Piettre Dalfen Erler), erase the *a fortiori* relationship between the two clauses announced by ἄρα (see next note) and emphasized by λογίζεται (here used of weighing calculation: thus "still less," says Hamilton). It is that both have an equal claim to truth that is being denied (with Dodds). Sauppe correctly notices that the captain's estimation goes against what observers and even the persons themselves might think, for the psychic corruption is likely invisible, even to him who suffers it. In other words, most people would choose the first rather than the second.
- 1891 νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα (A3): The verbal noun is more concrete and perhaps implies that his afflictions are more visible. The redundancy of saying that the νοσήματα are κατὰ τὸ σῶμα is proleptic: it already suggests that νόσος will metaphorically extended to the soul (τῇ ψυχῇ, A6), where πολλά ... καὶ ἀνιάτα will vary μεγάλους καὶ ἀνιάτοις here.
- 1892 ἄρα (A5), portraying mild surprise in the face of the comparison, is the formulaic sign for introducing the second limb of an *argumentum a fortiori* (cf. *Rep.*374B6-D6 and my *n. ad loc.*), though it is sometimes placed in the prior clause as well, in preparation (*Apol.*37D3, *Crito* 50E7, *Prot.*325B6, *Rep.*600D5), and also can be omitted (*Apol.*28D10-9A1). Surely it does not, with Woodhead and Allen, mean "therefore." For the argument form in the Platonic corpus compare *Alc. I* 108E5-9A3, 110E; *Apol.*28E (and Adam *ad loc.*), 34C, 37C4-D4; *Crito* 46D, 50E7-51A2ff; *Leg.*647C10-D7, 890E4-6, 902E4-3A3, 931C3-D1; *Meno* 91D5-2A2 (and Thompson *ad loc.*); *Phdo.*65B4-6, 68A3-B2, 80C2-E2; *Phlb.*30AB, 41E9-2A4; *Prot.*313A2-C3, 325BC; *Rep.*336E4-9, 422C5-9, 445A5-B4, 589E, 600D; *Th.*161C; and cf. *Erastae* 133A7-B2. Hippias is made to show an addiction to it in the *H.Min.* (363C7-D4) [imitated by Socrates at 364A1-6], 365C7, 375D4-5 [imitated by Socrates at 376C3-6].
- 1893 τιμιωτέρῳ (A6): The superior value of soul is not "constantly assumed by Plato" (Dodds), but regularly *asserted* by his Socrates (and the Athenian in the *Laws*). Everything in the interpretation of the dialogues hinges on this commonly ignored distinction!

άνιατα, τούτω δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν<sup>1894</sup> καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσειεν,<sup>1895</sup> ἄντε ἐκ θαλάττης ἄντε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἔαντε ἄλλοθεν ὀποθενοῦν [b] σῶση, ἀλλ’ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.<sup>1896</sup>

διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σφῶντα ἡμᾶς, οὐδέ γε, ὧ̃ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν,<sup>1897</sup> ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σφῶζειν· πόλεις γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σφῶζει. μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ<sup>1898</sup> τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιο λέγειν, ὧ̃ Καλλίκλεις, ἄπερ ὑμεῖς,<sup>1899</sup> σεμνύνων [c] τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχῶσειεν<sup>1900</sup> ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι<sup>1901</sup> μηχανοποιούς, ὡς οὐδὲν τᾶλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἤττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὄνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ αὐτοῦ οὐτ’ ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὐτ’ ἂν αὐτὸς<sup>1902</sup> λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧ̃ν<sup>1903</sup> τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς,<sup>1904</sup> τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ [d] τῶν ἄλλων

- 1894 Reading βιωτέον ἐστὶν (A7) with all mss., *legg.* edd. Hirschig, rightly seeing the *a fortiori* structure of the passage with its ἄρα, doubly emends (βιωτέον ἐστὶν and ὀνήσει), wrongly presuming that the future indicative, though regular in this construction, must be used in the second limb (*contra*, cf. *Apol.*29A1, *Crito* 46D3, *Leg.*903A2 [ἐπιμελεῖσθαι representing a present]) – besides, βιωτέον ἐστὶν is only true of the future. Note, however, with Dodds, that in the two other places Plato uses this argument, he uses βιωτόν (*Crito* 47D9, *Rep.*445B1).
- 1895 Reading ὀνήσειεν (A7) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ὀνήσειεν F : ὀνήσει *coni.* Woolsey, *legg.* Deuschle Thompson[nuper] Schanz Christ Hermann Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Lamb Burnet Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Erler Cantarin : ὀνήσειεν ἂν *coni.* Heindorf, *leg.* Schmelzer). Stallb. and Jahn argue the indicative depicts a fact and the optative a thought or likelihood (or, with Riddell [§282], an inference: “the emergence of the optative marks the transition from fact to inference”: Dodds’s rejection of Riddell’s defense of the optative on the grounds that λογίζεται is primary, is an *ignoratio elenchi*), and they cite, for the enallage (after ὅτι) to the optative, *Charm.*156E3; *H.Maj.*301D8; *Menex.*240D6; *Phdo.*96B7; *Phdrs.*241C2; *Phlb.*41D9 (εἶτην BT *legentibus*); *Prot.*335B1; *Rep.*466A1; Hdt. 6.3, 5.97.2; X. *Anab.*2.1.3, 3.5.17. Mistriotis adds Isoc. *Zeug.*6 and *Trap.*51, where the fact of being in secondary sequence is insufficient to account for them, since there are instances of the enallage in primary sequence (e.g., *Phdo.*95D4, *Prot.*327C7).
- 1896 κακῶς ζῆν (B2): With Dodds and Canto, the ambivalence or ambiguity of εὖ πράττειν (cf. nn. 1793, 700) carries across to the contradictory case of κακῶς ζῆν: his evil life will be unhappy.
- 1897 μηχανοποιόν (B4): Stallb. notes the term is especially used of designing military equipment, citing X. *Cyrop.*6.1.22 and *HG* 2.4.27 (miscited by Sturz, *Lex.Xen.*, s.v. as *HG* 2.4.18). Mistriotis instances Archimedes.
- 1898 κατὰ (B7) For εἶναι κατὰ = to be in the same category or on the same level, usually a low level (as here, with Heindorf, Ast, Thompson Helmbold Woodhead Erler as at *Phdo.*94E5, *Phdrs.*279A3, *Rep.*466B1, *Symp.*211D3) or a high one (so here, according to Schleiermacher, Apelt, Dodds, Chambry Hamilton Allen Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols Dalfen). Since the δικάνικος is high for Callicles but low for Socrates the statement is strictly ambiguous (thus Lamb, “Can you regard him as comparable with the lawyer?”), just as at *Apol.*17B5-6 it is ironically ambiguous.
- 1899 ἄπερ ὑμεῖς (B8). We had Callicles’s long speech extolling the life of the orator and we had the formulaic praise by Polus (448C4-9), but the truly hyperbolic praise came from Gorgias himself (though he is not here mentioned by name), who worries whether despite all his eloquence he can even do it justice (451D7-8, 452D5-E8, 455D6-456C7 – esp. 456A7).
- 1900 καταχῶσειεν ἂν (C1): The metaphor is from pelting with stones, an onslaught that might be achieved by means of a military engine (Hdt. 7.225.3), and thus it is something of a pun; but it also raises the question whether sticks and stones, or swords, might be mightier than “the pen” or the tongue, as wielded by the likes of Gorgias. Surely the mechanic will think so – and that is what ἱκανός means in the next line. But likewise Callicles made nothing of philosophy and attributed to oratory the prospect of achieving something ἱκανόν (485E), one of his favorite words (see also 492A1, 491B3, 484A2), which Socrates has now several times expropriated from him (cf. also nn. 1251, 1395, 1439).
- 1901 λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι (C2): Thompson alleges pleonasm in the addition of δεῖν (thinking ἐπὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι enough) but δεῖν adds the claim that the incumbency is universal: in fact the expression is an example of binary or binocular structure (AABB~ABAB), and means (with Dodds) λέγων δεῖν γίνεσθαι καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τοῦτο. The subsequent ὡς clause then expresses the λόγος and παράκλησις, in the manner of a “lilies of the field” construction (also essentially binary: cf. Riddell §226). There is neither warrant nor need, with Heindorf, to alter the expression to the participle or the infinitive: it is a virtual quotation.
- 1902 Reading αὐτὸς (C7) with BTWF, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Cope Sauppe Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Irwin Allen Canto Cantarin Heidbüchel Erler (αὐ̃ *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Lodge : αὐτὸς τῷ σεαυτοῦ NFlor *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd.). For a similar truncation of the reciprocal clause cf. Hdt. 2.47.1. The poorly attested addition (τῷ σεαυτοῦ) is unnecessary epexegetis, despite the way Thurot Helmbold Hamilton Canto Pietre Dalfen Erler (wrongly) give it the meaning Stallb. wants to avoid – that the orator himself would not accept the engineer’s daughter in marriage! Likewise, γαμεῖν at *Rep.*362B3 means to receive a daughter into one’s family through marriage, not to marry her. For this formulation of granting permission for marriage, the daughter being the chattel traded by their fathers, cf. also Hdt. 2.47, *Lys.* 19.17, *Deuteronomy* 7:3. Confounding one’s social status with the constitution of one’s family is continued below.
- 1903 ἐξ ὧ̃ν (C7) = ἐκ τῶν λόγων οἷς ἐπαινεῖς, as subsequent τίνι δικαίῳ implies. ἐκ means “out of” (partitive), not “on the force of,” as it may well mean elsewhere.
- 1904 τὰ σεαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς (C7) refers to Callicles’s long speech praising the political life (482C-486C). Irwin (*ad* 511b-513, p.231) finds in that speech a championing (ἐπαινεῖς) of “self-respect” (a notion foreign to the Greek language and mind, let alone to Callicles), and of a “self-development against small-minded scruples,” as values for which Callicles is arguing, which then enables him to treat “self-preservation” as one of his values, and then to infer that Socrates in the present argument is criticizing that value, so as finally to move on to his own favorite exercise of devoting a page to whether Socrates’s criticism is or is not cogent. But Callicles has no “values”: these are only the terms through which he boasts

ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἷδ' ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων.<sup>1905</sup> τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, τὸ σφάζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν,<sup>1906</sup> καταγέλαστός σοι<sup>1907</sup> ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιῶ καὶ ἱατροῦ<sup>1908</sup> καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ σφάζειν ἔνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὄρα μὴ<sup>1909</sup> ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν<sup>1910</sup> ἧ ἢ τὸ<sup>1911</sup> σφάζειν τε καὶ σφάζεσθαι. μὴ<sup>1912</sup> γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσον δὲ<sup>1913</sup> [e] χρόνον, τὸν γε<sup>1914</sup> ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἑατέον<sup>1915</sup> ἐστὶν καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα

(Socrates's ἐπαινεῖς here is hardly otiose!) of possessing a natural superiority over the many (abruptly introduced and presumed at 483A8-B2), which, for him, as we finally learn in his parrhesiastic speech (491E-492C), will provide him the means to enslave himself to his own desires without limit. What Socrates here is doing is introducing moral values. Another such related and anachronistic “value” is introduced by Dodds (p.346) and adopted by Irwin (“self-destructive,” *ad* 513A) in his interpretation of Socrates’s argument here, a notion of “preserving one’s individuality,” as if Socrates thinks this is the φῦλατον (513A6) one would need to sacrifice in order to become a successful orator since true assimilation with and not just imitation of the deme will be necessary (513A7-C2). But the value Socrates advocates is avoiding to go through life harboring contradictions within one’s soul (e.g., 482B5-6); and it is the contradiction between Callicles’s threatening advice that Socrates cannot protect himself and his undervaluation of other arts of protection, and the *contradiction* between his disdain for the deme and his need to assimilate himself to them, that Socrates is here at pains to illustrate.

- 1905 βελτίων τε καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων (D1-2). Note the asyndeton. The expression and its analogues are a dead metaphor and a pabulum of approbation (or condemnation), as at *Phdrs.* 246B2-3, 249E1-2, 274A1-2; *Ar. Eq.* 185-6; *S. Ph.* 384, 874; *Andoc.* 1.14.109; *Lys.* 10.23, 13.18 (δοῦλον καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων ὄντα), 13.64; *Arist. Pol.* 1283A34-36; *D.* 18.10; *Dio Ch.* 14.19; *Ter. Phorm.* 115 (*bonam bonis prognatam*). Despite the references to marriage above, it is not to be taken literally (as Canto Waterfield Pietre do, with *tes parents sont aussi meilleurs que les leurs, vel sim.*) but refers to some imagined social hierarchy among types (as *κατά* did above, B7). The maxim comes under criticism at *Leg.* 677A ff. As at 503C4, Socrates again doggedly draws the noun (ἀρετὴ) out of the adjectives (βελτίων) and exploits the opportunity to challenge a conventional approbation (there, it was ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ). This pattern of correction recalls the extensive squabbling with Callicles that took place before his parrhesiastic revelation, in which his approbative derogatory name-calling was continually refuted by taking his evaluations “seriously” or “literally.” Cf. nn. 1456, 1449, 1273.
- 1906 ἔτυχεν (D4): For the (aspectual) aorist in place of the present for the supposititious case, Stallb. compares *Tht.* 179C5. ὁποῖός continues the kind of qualitative evaluation broached by οἷός at 512A1.
- 1907 καταγέλαστός σοι (D4) strikes a contrast with *ικανὸς αὐτῷ* above (C3).
- 1908 ἱατροῦ (D5): Thompson mildly infers from Socrates’s imputation to Callicles of a disregard for the physician that Callicles must be a man of some higher “rank,” on the grounds that the doctor’s profession, as opposed to that of the engineer, was itself “esteemed liberal” in Athens. But Callicles’s superciliousness betokens not the settled and secure prejudice of high rank but the ambitious hopes of a “new man” enamored of the magical power of Gorgian eloquence that can put a doctor out of business (456B1-C2) just as fast as cause the engineer’s harbor to be built (455D8-456A3), a pair of examples with which Socrates will soon enough continue (514A5 ff). To say his position becomes *laughable* might actually get under his skin!
- 1909 ὄρα μὴ (D7) is admonitory, as it was at B7. Contrast with condescending ὄρῳς (510A11, 491B5, 470D5-6 – and also *Rep.* 327C7).
- 1910 τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν (D7) is inspired by the approbative formula above, but where ἀγαθόν would be quite enough for Socrates’s meaning, with γενναῖον he also (with Mistriotis and Schmelzer) appropriates another of Callicles’s favorite buzzwords, from the passage where he vaunted oratory over philosophy (485C7 and E7). Perhaps γενναῖον / ἀγαθόν // σφάζειν / σφάζεσθαι is a chiasm (with Mr Morrissey).
- 1911 Reading ἧ ἢ τὸ (D7), an easy (and correct) emendation (failure to double) of the better attested readings, with Heindorf Cron Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Cantarin Heidbüchel (ἡ τὸ B : ἧ τὸ TWPF : ἧ τοῦ E3NFlor *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Ast Coraes Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle Thompson Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Hermann Lamb Feix): contrast the easy (and *incorrect* by my lights) opposite error (failure in doubling) at 513D1, below.
- 1912 Reading μὴ γάρ (D8) with mss. and edd. (ἦδὺ γάρ *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Jahn Hermann Feix : ἦ γάρ *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Stender Croiset Allen : καὶ γάρ *coni.* Buttman[*olim*], *legg.* Sommer Chambry): see next note. For the construction of μὴ with indicative, of “misgiving concerning the present rather than fear regarding the future” (Thompson), cf. *Apol.* 25A5; *Euthyd.* 290E7, 298C5; *Meno* 89C5, *Tht.* 196B4.
- 1913 Reading ὅποσον δὲ from B *legg.* Stallb. and others (ὅποσον δὴ WPar<sup>2</sup>f.M.Ant.[7.46] *legg.* edd. : ὅποσον δεῖ TPF). Stallb. (followed by Jahn) punctuates τὸ ζῆν· ὅποσον δὲ χρόνον, ... and thinks the δεῖ of TPF to be derived from δὲ. “The good might be to live, but as to how long, to let that be.” Others emend: Hermann (and Jahn Feix): ἦδὺ γάρ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ζῆν· ὅποσον δὲ... : μὴ γάρ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῆν· ὅποσον δὲ *coni.* Deuschle : ἦ γάρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὲ χρόνον Beck Schanz Burnet Croiset Dodds Cantarin.
- 1914 Reading γε (E1) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. (τε W): *vi termini* with ἀληθῶς.
- 1915 Reading ἑατέον (E1) with all mss. and Marc. Ant. 7.64, *legg.* edd. (εὐκτέον *coni.* Cornarius cf. Ficinus “*optandum*”, *leg.* Steph. Heindorf Beck Thurot). For use with bare accusative (τὸ ζῆν) without *χαίρειν vel sim.*, cf. 484C5. For the sentiment Heindorf cites *Leg.* 707D, and Ast cites *S. Ai.* 473 ff. For the accusative rather than dative subject (ἄνδρα) cf. Smyth §2152a: it is as if the construction were δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι (cf. 507C9-D1).



ταῖς γυναίξιν<sup>1916</sup> ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ<sup>1917</sup> σκεπτέον τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὄν μέλλοι<sup>1918</sup> χρόνον βιῶναι ὡς ἄριστα βιοίῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων [513] αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ<sup>1919</sup> ταύτῃ ἐν ἣ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων,<sup>1920</sup> εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὄρα<sup>1921</sup> εἰ σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μὴ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας,<sup>1922</sup> τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν<sup>1923</sup> τοῖς φιλάτοις ἢ αἴρεσις ἡμῖν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δὲ σοι οἶει ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων<sup>1924</sup> παραδώσειν<sup>1925</sup> τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἣτις [b] σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῆδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον,<sup>1926</sup> ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις·<sup>1927</sup> οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ

1916 ταῖς γυναίξιν (E3). Such a sentiment is voiced by Hector (not Andromache, *pace* Chambry) at *Iliad* 6.488, and may be taken from tragedy (cf. ἀνὴρ τραγικός, *Phdo.*115A5), including perhaps the hemistich, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐκφύγοι (Snell included a version as fig. 398b [*incerti auctoris*] in his supplement to the *TGF*). But why attribute it to women? (see also *Alc. I* 120B3; *Crat.*418C1; *Leg.*909E5-6, *Cic. ND* 1.20.55). Because women are wise: they learn from their men the blind vanity of ambition (hence Waterfield translates “*their* womenfolk”). The truth of human limitation is entrusted to the three divine Moirae (Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos), to whom εἰμαρμένη now refers (omission of μοῖρα with the participle is standard: *Leg.*904C8, *Phdo.*115A6, *Tht.*169C5, and *Isoc. Dem.*43 [πεπρωμένη]), and the commentators’ embarrassment at the honor here accorded to women is part proof of why (the other shoe will drop just below when he moves on to the Thessalian witches). Allen flatly asserts in his note, “A reference to the Eleusinian Mysteries.” Kratz Mistrionis Croiset, *et al.*, divert their wisdom into a dig against Callicles’s claim of manliness, that even the woman can teach him something; and Sauppe falls back on the prejudice of his mother tongue calling the proverb *Weibergeschwätz*. The tmesis of οὐδεὶς, sometimes merely providing a proper berth for ἂν (*Rep.*429B4) or a preposition (*Rep.*553D6, 610E10), is often emphatic, as here. Cf. 519C1; *Phdrs.*246C6; *Rep.*374C6, 516A2; note its overuse by the inebriated Alcibiades at *Symp.*214D7, 216E1.

1917 τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ (E4): The (adverbial) phrase combines the notion of sequence with that of accumulation (cf. 515E2, *Phdrs.*247E6, *Rep.*329B2).

1918 Reading μέλλοι (E5) with BTWPF *Marc. Ant.* 7.46 [ms. A], *legg.* edd. (μέλλει F *Marc. Ant.* [ms. T], *legg.* Routh Beck Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Sommer Hirschig).

1919 τῇ πολιτείᾳ (513A1): Referring back to the use at 510A9, with the language of ἐταιρότης updated to the language of ὁμοιότης by dint of the intervening argument. With that change the connotation of πολιτεία shifts toward public culture (cf. n. 1849), against Irwin who continues to translate it “political system” (also Dalfen and Erler *ad* B2). ταυτῇ ἐν ἣ ἂν οἰκῇ both generalizes and suggests sheer facticity: everyone has to live *somewhere*. The generalization sets up the shift to specifics with subsequent νῦν δέ.

1920 Reading τῷ Ἀθηναίων (A2) with T *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. (τῶν Ἀθηναίων BWPF, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Sommer Mistrionis : τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων *coni.* Deuschle): the second attributive position introduces “*nescio quid irrisionis*” (Stallb., calling it ironic apposition for which he compares *Apol.*34A7 [τῷ διαφθείροντι] and *Crito* 51A6-7 [ὁ τῆς ... ἐπιμελούμενος]), in stressing that it is the deme of the Athenians, whose ethos he in fact despises, that Callicles must please (whence the arresting ἄρα, and the shift to direct speech). In the collocation of particles καὶ ... δέ, introducing this interruption, “the former denotes that something is added and the latter that what is added is distinct from what precedes” (Denniston, 199-203). They skirted this point earlier, when Socrates inferred, from Callicles’s assertion that the just by nature is what the powerful determine, that in Athens justice is what the majority decides (488D5-489B6), to which Callicles, his shell-game of approbatory terms not yet played out, could still reply that of course by the “powerful” he meant the “better” (489C1ff).

1921 τοῦθ' ὄρα (A4) is resumptive (from D7) after his admonitory self-interruption, an index of how arresting he thought that admonition might or should have been for Callicles.

1922 καθαιρούσας (A5): These Thessalian witches were thought able to cause an eclipse (καθαίρω, not καθαίρω). The paroimion is ἐπὶ σεαυτῷ τὴν σελήνην καθέλκεις. For doing this, they were struck blind and lost their παῖδες (Zen.4.1 = *Paroem. Gr.* 1.83) or their πόδες (Apost.7.81 = *Paroem. Gr.*2.417).

1923 σὺν (A6): The remark is a specification of ὅπερ; the asyndeton suggests it is a quotation. Stallb. detects a sound play (αἴρεσις ~ καθαιρούσας). Coraes says Plato is thinking of H. *Iliad* 4.161-2, where σὺν is similarly used: σὺν τε μεγάλα ἄπειταισαν, | σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῆσιν γυναίξιν τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν. For σὺν used this way, cf. *AGPS* 68.13.1.B.

1924 ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων (A7): The partitive genitive plural with masculine singular ὄντινοῦν (for the lack of concord I know no parallel) must be taken as giving more emphasis than a concordant accusative singular i.e., ἄνθρωπον) would have, whether postpositive or prepositive (for the variation see *Leg.*762C2, *Parm.*143D6 [bis!], *Phlb.*60E1, *Rep.*350A7).

1925 παραδώσειν (A8): Zeyl and Waterfield tr. “if you think somebody will hand you” the art, adds a criticism of Callicles’s own expectations that an art could be handed over as if in monetary exchange, reminiscent of Socrates’s questions elsewhere as to whether virtue is “transferable” by teaching (παραδοτόν he says in *Meno* 93B4) or by physical contact (*Symp.*175D3-7), and τινὰ does indeed cast doubt; but the verb in itself is not always so literal. In the present case I think Socrates is referring to what Gorgias has promised Callicles. See note at B3.

1926 εἴτ' ... χεῖρον (B2): The alternative recalls the *eliminatio* above (510B7-D2), countenancing on Callicles’s behalf that of course in his plan he will be learning from Gorgias to imitate something worse than his glorious self!

1927 οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύῃ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις (B3): The terminal vocative, as again below (C3) is almost a taunt. βουλεύῃ brings forward οἶει from A7, with which our author disambiguated in advance its voice: βουλεύῃ is middle (with Ast, *Lex. s.v.*), not passive (*pace* Dalfen and Erler: *bist du schlecht beraten*; and Waterfield goes even further with past passive, “you have been misled”), else he would have written ἤγῃ. Socrates infers the οἶσις is rational in order to submit it to scrutiny, for Callicles has taken Gorgias’s promise unthinkingly (with παραδώσειν Socrates is referring to Gorgias’s muted ἐπάγγελμα at 456E3 and 457C1, as Lodge noticed); surely Gorgias’s promise did not include an assurance that he will not need to assimilate himself to the Athenians: that notion is merely a creature of the present argument. Moreover, Callicles does not intend to become powerful, let alone safe, by conforming himself to the slavish political ideology (πολιτεία: cf. n. 1919) he finds pervasive in Athens; he thinks he has nothing to worry about since for him it is “not in the cards” for a real man to get abused (483A8-B1): his ambition is blind. Our author’s scrupulous avoidance to name names – not forcing Gorgias’s cat out of the bag but requiring us to connect the dots about him and his practice – is almost fetishistically observed throughout the dialogue, as if he were an esotericist!

εἶναι ἀλλ’ αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι<sup>1928</sup> εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους<sup>1929</sup> γε πρός. ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς<sup>1930</sup> εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν<sup>1931</sup> γὰρ [c] ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ᾧ φίλη κεφαλή.<sup>1932</sup> λέγομέν<sup>1933</sup> τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις;

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ οἶδ’ ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος.<sup>1934</sup> οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. ὁ δήμου γὰρ ἔρωσ, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῆ ἀντιστατεῖ<sup>1935</sup> μοι· ἀλλ’ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ<sup>1936</sup> βέλτιον [d] ταῦτα<sup>1937</sup> διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσῃ. ἀναμνήσθητι δ’ οὖν ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἕκαστον

1928 Reading ἀπεργάζεσθαι (B5) with BTWP and edd. (ἀπεργάσεσθαι F). γνήσιον is another “insider realist” term or else, like having it in one’s bones, it connotes the “genuine” – though even then it is hugely derogatory in Socrates’s mouth.

1929 τῷ Πυριλάμπους (B6): This second mention of Demos (after the joke at 481E), a virtual contemporary of Plato, suggests at this point that Callicles conceives his alliance with Pyrilampes’s son as his entree into the higher echelons of politics (this is perhaps the implication of the *hapax* ἀντιστατεῖ below, with n. 1935). Pyrilampes, ten years older than Socrates, married Plato’s widowed mother Perictione when Plato was only a few years old, and had with her a son, Antiphon, mentioned in the Parmenides as having become interested in horses instead of philosophy. Is there perhaps a veiled analogy between Plato pinning his hopes on Socrates *versus* Callicles on Pyrilampes? Or upon Alcibiades pinning his hopes on Socrates (see also n. 2069)?

1930 Reading πολιτικὸς (B8) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (om. AugO1 Ficinus *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Coraes Ast Heindorf Jowett Schanz Christ Sauppe Stender Croiset Helmbold Woodhead Theiler Chambry Hamilton Canto). The problem is not redundancy (Woolsey calls the repetition scornful): the question raised by proleptic ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς is answered by exegetical καὶ ῥητορικόν. Dodds is right that Socrates thinks (and will later say) that a πολιτικὸς is something more than the orator Callicles admires and aspires to become. We here are given a gentle suggestion along those lines.

1931 Reading αὐτῶν (B8) with B *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. (αὐτῷ F : αὐτῶν TWPf). The sentence explains how ὁμοιότης (rather than the techniques of Gorgias, which go undescribed in this dialogue!) guarantees an orator’s favor. The doublet χαίρουσι ... ἄχθονται (C1-2), brought forward from 510D7, appallingly insinuates that the velleities of the deme are no better than those of the rough and uncultured despot.

1932 For the idiom of κεφαλή cf. *Phdrs.* 234D6 with my note *ad loc.*: it seems to be otiose, providing only a place for the adjective.

1933 Reading λέγομεν (C3) with mss. and edd. (λέγωμεν YNFlor *teste* Cantarin [*dicemus* Ficinus], *leg.* Sauppe), parallel to the idiom ἢ πῶς λέγομεν, at 480B2 (and n. 983); cf. *Rep.* 377E5, 461E9 (ms.F), 530D9 (mss.AD).

1934 τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος (C5): With Piettre, “*un ange passe*” (i.e., all fall silent). Commentators, probably on the basis of Socrates’s subsequent reply, reach over to Meno’s remark (95C7-8), that even in the face of good argumentation “most people” remain wishy-washy; Mistriotis remarks, more relevantly, that conviction in conversation *with Socrates* only comes after the halfway-house of aporia. But meanwhile we must supply for Callicles some idea who οἱ πολλοί are – perhaps his “auditeurs,” with Chambry and Waterfield. His remark is not surprisingly candid (Deuschle Mistriotis, thinking perhaps of Alcibiades’s candor at *Symp.* 216AC, cited by Canto), for Callicles is incapable of such candor, but predictably evasive: no matter how tight or true the argument, Callicles consciously decides to acknowledge only what he wants to acknowledge (Kratz Apelt). Surely he does not plan to assimilate himself to the deme. In the meanwhile he will hide behind Socrates’s infamous paradoxicality, thus resembling, if not imitating, οἱ πολλοί after all! His “confession” (πέπονθα) is a lie, but his very denial evinces his rebellious ethos and thus unwittingly shows that he falls among the ἕκαστοι Socrates has just described, so that above all, his remark presages the reaction of οἱ πολλοί at Socrates’ trial.

1935 ἔρωσ ... ἀντιστατεῖ (C7-8): ἀντιστατεῖ, a technical term in politics for loyalty to party rather than to reason, is an *hapax* in Plato (as is its noun ἀντίστασις: *Rep.* 560A: στάσις καὶ ἀντίστασις). Socrates ups the ante by blaming Callicles’s awkward reply on his love-hate ἔρωσ for (and from, Heidebüchel reminds us!) the deme, which he despises and yet wishes to rule without becoming like them. The perennial method is to affect a partisan identity (through oratory) and thereby deflect attention from one’s real motives. This self-contradictory behavior proves what Socrates said about him at the beginning (481D5-482A2, n.b. θαναμάζει ὡς ἄποτα, E6-7; and 482B5-6: οὐ σοὶ ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις), namely, that he will say whatever his “beloved” tells him to whether he can defend it with reason or not. With Rousseau, “*La domination même est servile, quand elle tient à l’opinion; car tu dépend des préjugés de ceux que tu gouverne par des préjugés*” (*Émile*, Bk. II [Paris Charpentier 1848] 82). The other shoe has dropped.

1936 Reading πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ (C8) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (πολλάκις ἴσον καὶ Par2Za : πολλάκις *coni.* Burnet, *leg.* Erler : πολλάκις καὶ *coni.* Schaefer, *legg.* Dodds Theiler Heidebüchel : καὶ *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Ovink Croiset): “if betimes we really study this, perhaps even closely” (for καὶ cf. Denniston 283). This is the use of ἴσως in false diffidence (cf. nn. 801, 1114, *supra*): with Stallb., “*cum leni quaedam irrisione, sicuti Latinus ‘fortasse’*.” Schaefer’s argument against ἴσως (*ad Ap.* Rhod. 2.582) was only paleographic. Ast (1819) trajectories the sense of ἴσως to πεισθήσῃ (i.e., ἐὰν πολλάκις καὶ βέλτιον ... ἴσως πεισθήσῃ); Heindorf treats the word as misplaced, relocating it before either ἐὰν or πεισθῆναι. The remark is merely a dismissal, echoing the one at 503D4 (ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς εὐρήσεις), again in the wake of Callicles’s demurrals to take responsibility for his own position, and now closes the section off with *epanalepsis* (πεισθήσῃ ~ πείθομαι, C6) so as to announce a “new beginning” in his argumentation with dismissive δ’ οὖν (“be that as it may”: not “however,” Cope; nor “well then,” Nichols; nor German “*also*,” Dalfen Erler), so as to bring forward the great distinctions of 464B in order now to define good politics.

1937 Reading ταῦτα (D1) with BTWP, *legg.* Canto Waterfield Piettre Dalfen (ταῦτὰ ταῦτα F, *legg.* edd.). The edd. read F, attracted by the likelihood of paleographic error (on which cf. n. 1911, *supra*) more than by the proper sense.



θεραπεύειν,<sup>1938</sup> καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὀμιλεῖν,<sup>1939</sup> τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον.<sup>1940</sup> οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἃ τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν, ἀγεννῆς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἢ γάρ; [e]

ΚΑΛ. ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. ἢ δέ γε ἑτέρα,<sup>1941</sup> ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὄν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως<sup>1942</sup> ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἔστιν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις<sup>1943</sup> θεραπεύειν, ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοῦς<sup>1944</sup> τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς

1938 θεραπεύειν (D2): The term first popped up at 464B6 to provide a genus for the items distinguished there, and now here (cf. n. 525), but ἔφαμεν refers to 500B, where the governing and still outstanding question which life to lead was first propounded. ἕκαστον may be a masculine subject accusative of θεραπεύειν (referring to the several τεχνίται), *pace* Dodds, or its neuter object, with soul and body in apposition. Hirschig Theiler Dodds worry that ἕκαστον should be ἐκάτερος because the epexegetic appositive is a dyad, but this puts the cart before the horse.

1939 ὀμιλεῖν (D3) brings forward προσομιλεῖν, connected with the less than competent competence or knack that works without principles and knowledge (463A8, 484D4[Callicles], 502E7, and n. 1639), requiring in the case of the βέλτιστον to be corrected by the two participles. A more appropriate infinitive should be supplied in the mind for the second limb (ὀμιλεῖν is definitely not to be understood, *pace* AGPS 57.10.6.A), but the two participles suffice to make the distinction clear.

1940 καταχαριζόμενον / διαμαχόμενον (E4-5): “*sans complaisance et avec détermination*” (Piettre). Because he is quoting 502B4-5 *ipsisimis verbis*, he needs not complete the construction, and does not need the improving deletions of Hirschig, he mitigates Croiset’s “*usant rudesse*” for διαμαχόμενον, and he averts the Lamb Woodhead Irwin Allen Zeyl Waterfield over-translation, “not indulging it but striving with it” (*sc.* the soul, or pleasure!), and Helmbold’s “it uses no soothing methods but combats them.” In the quoted passage διαμάχεσθαι was intransitive and it meant to try to do the right thing (with object clause at B5-7 but absolute at 503A8). The participles (subject accusative agreeing with implicit subject of the infinitive as at E7, below) retrieve the search for the βέλτιστον from the low-level ὀμιλεῖν of the previous case. With κατὰ and the repetition of the strong metaphor διαμάχεσθαι the discrepancy is becoming even more schismatic.

1941 Reading ἑτέρα only (E2). Schanz, against the unanimous mss. and thinking a positive predicate was needed at E2 to counter and complement ἀγεννῆς (plus clause) above, left a blank to add something (it was *not* a “lacuna” in some ms., *pace* Theiler Cantarín), and sent us to Aristides’s paraphrase for inspiration as to what to add; Dodds, agreeing something was needed and consulting Aristides, inserted γενναιότερα after ἢ δέ γε ἑτέρα (accepted by Zeyl; Theiler added καλή, at the end!). But Plato had already put something after ἑτέρα, namely, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται (plus clause), admittedly terse as was καταχαριζόμενον / διαμαχόμενον above, since he is again quoting himself, which Heindorf, disagreeing with someone he does not name, nevertheless had thought to be a sufficient complement to ἀγεννῆς ... , citing Aristides’s paraphrase of the passage (*Or.* 3.3 [46.157 Dindorf]) not as a source of inspiration but proof that no supplement was needed (!): μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὀμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον. καὶ τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγεννῆ καὶ κολακείαν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἑτέραν σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν. Aristides plainly substituted the flat expression σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν for Plato’s ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται (plus clause) – which, Dodds did not recognize, functions as a predicate. To top it all off, Dodds, because he took the initiative to insert γενναιότερα into the text, had to make a note in his apparatus, to-wit: *deesse aliquid vidit anonymus apud Heindorf collato Aristide: exempli gratia supplevi*. The claim “*anonymus vidit*,” especially in a critical apparatus, is the kind of evidence that gives smoke and mirrors a bad name.

1942 οὕτως (E5) points backward to the proximate alternative (E2-3), not forward to ὡς, which goes with the superlative (*pace* AGPS 69.63.0.A).

1943 Reading the datives (E5-6) with the mss., *legg. edd.* (τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς πολίτας F and Stephanus). Coraes objects (followed by Dodds) that the accusatives are an unplatonic streamlining. For the unusual dative Dodds cites old Findeisen’s “decisive parallel,” *Rep.* 416A6, ἐπιχειρήσαι τοῖς προβάτοις κακουργεῖν. The infinitive θεραπεύειν is supplementary (Stallb.) and not a *delendum* (*per* Cobet, again): Socrates repeats it from D2 (to which οὕτως points) because he is applying the principle there expressed to the world of the polis (see next note). As to the subsequent shift to acc/inf, cf. *Crito* 52B; *Leg.* 700C, 790D, 941D; *Phdrs.* 271C; and Riddell §§180, 230.

1944 αὐτοῦς (E6): “as men, in themselves,” not “those” citizens (Lamb Chambry Waterfield) as if only pointing back to πολίτας, on the basis of which interpretation Herwerden, in Cobet’s wake (*Mnem.* 35[1907]123), *deleted* τοὺς πολίτας and was followed, as it appears, by Helmbold who translates with “them.” Canto, wrongly, “*pour en faire les meilleurs citoyens qui soient*,” as if despite the article αὐτοῦς τοὺς πολίτας could be a double predicate with ποιοῦντας. Socrates’s point is to separate the citizens from the city they were just bundled up with, for only they have souls (expressed below with διάνοια [A1] denoting either soul [cf. *Rep.* 371E2; *Th.* 173B2 and E3] or the state of the soul [*Rep.* 395C3, 400E3 511A1]). Hirschig’s citation from *Apol.* (μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδένοσ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεωσ πρὶν αὐτῆσ τῆσ πόλεωσ τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, 36C5-D1) is illuminating but not quite parallel, for in that passage Socrates divides horizontally instead of vertically, so to speak, not between the men “in themselves” and the city they constitute, but between the things of the man and the man himself (not even his body but only his soul: *n.b.*, ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος), and between the things of the city and the “city itself,” which is almost saying that the city has a soul (not to mention the ensuing generalization, which almost prophesies the “Theory of Forms”!). In the present passage the distinction treats the man’s city (not his possessions, *pace* Dodds, but his involvement in it as a πολίτης; χρήματα λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τιῶν ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν) as an accoutrement of himself, of his soul, which it is the burden of the subsequent epagoge (514A5-515B4) to elaborate. Notice that here Socrates has allowed the distinction between

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἠύρισκομεν,<sup>1945</sup> οὐδὲν ὄφελος<sup>1946</sup> ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδεμίαν [514] προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κάγαθὴ ἢ διάνοια ἢ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινῶν ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἠντινοῦν. θῶμεν<sup>1947</sup> οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἦδιον.<sup>1948</sup>

ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν<sup>1949</sup> ἀλλήλους, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράζοντες<sup>1950</sup> τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ [b] ἐξετάσαι πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα,<sup>1951</sup> τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ<sup>1952</sup> ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πρόποτε οἰκοδόμημα ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν,<sup>1953</sup> καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἐστίν·

πολίτης and πολιτικός to collapse (cf. 517C2).

1945 Reading ἠύρισκομεν (E8) with P *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarín Heidbüchel Erler (εὐρήκαμεν F : εὐρίσκομεν BW, *legg.* edd.). Socrates refers to the argument with Polus according to which what one thinks is good might not be unless he knows it to be. The augment is often omitted in Attic (Veitch), as Routh again omits it below (B8). It is not a durative imperfect (a notion at odds with the semantics of the verb) but an imperfect of reference.

1946 Reading ὄφελος (E8) with TWPFB, *legg.* edd. (ὄφελος B). Note the relentless emphasis gotten by οὐδὲν ... οὐδεμίαν and ἠντινοῦν.

1947 Reading θῶμεν (514A3) from BTP *et re vera* F, *legg.* edd. (φῶμεν *coni.* Madvig, *legg.* Schanz Christ Sauppe Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Woodhead Theiler Irwin Allen Waterfield Piettre Dalfen Heidbüchel Erler). These later editors, under the influence of Schanz, emended to φῶμεν in the wake of Madvig's statement (*Advers.* I [1871]410: cf. ad 481C1) that φῶμεν requires an infinitive and θῶμεν a participle (the latter is less certain than the former: cf. n. 1021), which later received specious support from Burnet's misreporting of φῶμεν from F. But Madvig was wrong about τιθέναι. A.J.Egelie (*Obs. Crit. in Plat.* [Amsterdam 1902]45-6) adduced θῶμεν with inf. at *Leg.* 923A6; *Rep.* 331A11 and B6-7, 376B11-C2; *Soph.* 251E7 (and in particular τ. οὕτως ἔχειν, as here, at *Leg.* 897B4 and *Rep.* 532D6) to which Dodds added *Charm.* 174A6, *H. Min.* 367A8-9, and *Lys.* 222C4-5 – some of which Schanz dutifully emended to φῶμεν. Meanwhile, the question of the crucial dialectical propriety of the one term over the other in context has been ignored by commentators (though lately noticed in tr.). In the present case, for instance, Socrates's request for the posit (θέσις) is in effect to announce that an epagoge predicated upon it is about to be launched: cf. 507C8 and 509A7.

1948 ἦδιον (A4): After again taking no responsibility for allowing Socrates to proceed (as at 513E1 above), Callicles with ἦδιον now inserts a dig at Socrates's distinction between what is nobler and what more pleasurable.

1949 παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους (A5): The scenario Socrates envisions here and subsequently is artificial: it is not the duty of two persons both contemplating to enter public service that they encourage each other to do so (not “consult,” *pace* Jowett and Allen, nor even “enlist each other's aid” with Woodhead or even *nous engager* with Canto): Socrates is working up to Callicles insisting that he himself take up politics (*παρακαλεῖς*, 515A2), but that the city vet and/or encourage each of them (though famously this doesn't happen, either! cf. *Prot.* 319D and *X. Mem.* 4.2.1-7). Still, he paints the picture with contrafactuals rather than optative conditions (a distinction hard to maintain in English translation – e.g. Irwin's American “shoulds” are not first-person “woulds” and Waterfield's “the advice we're offering” versus “would be offering,” and surely not “I suppose I should” for *ἐπεσχεψάμεθα* δῆπου ἂν at D5, but “I would presumably have” [*pace* Nichols], etc.), which includes and carries a very strong presumption, whose force will be brought to bear upon Callicles with νῦν δέ at 515A1. With his ἀλλήλους scenario Socrates turns the vetting process into a dialogue between them, first as both should imagine being vetted, as a “we” (A5-D1), and then the one vetting the other (Socrates being vetted: D6-7) and vice-versa (Callicles: 515A4ff). The set-up brings within reach a discussion of Callicles's grounds for encouraging Socrates to take up politics (though of course this is not sincere), and at the same time a discussion of Callicles's qualifications for having recently done so himself (which is the actual target of the sequence of imaginary cases: *n.b.*, νῦν δέ, 515A1). As to the actual vetting practice in Athens, the first thing we learn from Gorgias is that the skill he teaches trumps any expertise you wish – and his paradigmatic cases are the very cases we shall meet below: public works (455D8-456A3), public medicine (456B6-C2), and finally Callicles, his student – though Socrates does not mention this. Cf. also 452E1-8.

1950 Reading πράζοντες (A6) with FB<sup>2</sup>P<sup>2</sup> and Stephanus, *legg.* edd. (*πράζαντες* BTWP, *legg.* Ast Stallb. Woolsey Cope Cron Sommer Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ Woodhead : *πράζοντας* YPar<sup>2</sup>, *leg.* Thompson : *τάξαντες ingenio* Cobetis [*Advers.* 1.412]). Surely πράζοντες is the *difficilior*. It here takes the genitive, as its cognate (Dodds), a genitive of the sphere (e.g. *Rep.* 445E1-2), or of the “part” (with Stallb. Ast) like that with ἄπτεσθαι. See further *AGPS* 47.15.3. Sometimes this genitive feels inceptive, as at *Leg.* 761A2, *Rep.* 485B1-2, *Soph.* 232B2 and thus is appropriate with the future participle. Several edd. (Cron Kratz Schmelzer Sauppe Stender Ovink) take it, very awkwardly, with the ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά (somewhat smoothed by Theiler's deletion of ἐπὶ) thinking that with πράζοντες it is redundant after δημοσίᾳ, but δημοσίᾳ is subjective (“going public”) and the πράγματα are objective, just as the ensuing argument stresses the difference between doing a given objective work privately or publicly (as at C4). See also below at C2.

1951 Reading τὴν τέχνην ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα (B1-2) with WPF *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (*om.* BT, *legg.* Schanz Christ Ovink). Perhaps the “do we or don't we” construction is meant to imitate the examination of each other *ipsissimis verbis*, which Socrates then imitates in putting the question to Callicles (ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ;).

1952 Reading παρὰ τοῦ (B2) with BF, *legg.* edd. (*παρὰ* του TWP *teste* Cantarín, *leg.* Routh).

1953 ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν (B6): Adding intensifying αὐτῶν (*sc.* ἡμῶν or ὑμῶν) is the usual way to indicate that the possessive adjective (ἡμέτερος [or ὑμέτερος]) is reflexive: Smyth §1200.2.b).

καὶ εἰ μὲν ἠύρισκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ [c] ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὠκοδομημένα ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ<sup>1954</sup> ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων, νοῦν ἐχόντων<sup>1955</sup> ἦν ἀνιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἶχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδειξάι οἰκοδομήματά τε<sup>1956</sup> ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὴ<sup>1957</sup> ἀνόητον ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν<sup>1958</sup> τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ’ αὐτά. φῶμεν<sup>1959</sup> ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι [d] ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

1954 Reading διὰ (C2), the conjecture of J.T.Voemel (*Zf. Altertumsw.* 7[1857]128), *legg.* Hermann Stallb.(1861) Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Schmelzer Huit Feix Waterfield (ἰδία BTPWFP2, *leg.* Canto[ut vid.] : ἰδία Par, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Cope Thompson Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Cantarin Heibüchel Erlar : ἰδία ὑφ’ V, *legg.* Ast Heindorf Bekker Cary Woolsey : ἰδία δι’ *coni.* Madvig : ἰδία διὰ *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Theiler Allen Nichols : ἰδία ἐφ’ [sic] Sommer). Hermann cites D. 13.19 for δι’ ἡμῶν meaning *sine magistro*. Cod. Bas. and Aldine have ἰδία (*leg.* Routh), which Ast argued is to be taken as ἰδία with subscript iota omitted rather than (with Routh Heindorf) as a misaccentuation of and basis for reading ἰδία (it is unclear what Irwin read in translating “buildings of our own,” but regardless the translation is incorrect: who owns the buildings is not the issue but by whom built). What is wrong with ἰδία is that ἰδιον is being used for the fundamental distinction between public work and private work, whereas in the present juncture – the δέ clause – “our” competence to build is being distinguished from building with the assistance of our teachers (the μέν clause). Canto saves mss. ἰδία or ἰδία with “*encore à titre privé*” at the expense however of not translating ἡμῶν. That ἰδία ἡμῶν should mean *nostra propria (opera)* as Ast proposes, taken up by Cope and Lodge, though good Greek (on ἰδιος plus genitive cf. n. 1980, *infra*), again diverts ἰδιον from its crucial application in the whole passage. Madvig and Schanz’s emendations needlessly ask for more than Voemel’s.

1955 διακειμένων / νοῦν ἐχόντων (C3-4): διακειμένων is an absolute genitive, οὕτω suggests its subject is the antecedent “we” (I think it not impersonal, *pace* Apelt and Helmbold), and from μέν it appears that this phrase draws up the foregoing rambling irreal protasis so as to usher in its irreal apodosis (for which we anticipate ἄν plus imperfect). The apodosis begins with a second genitive participle (νοῦν ἐχόντων) quickly seen from ἦν to be a “genitive of the mark,” (not possession, *pace* Nichols) which as such has no antecedent (it represents not persons but a category of persons) so that its subject cannot (again) be “we.” But where, at this point, is ἄν? We expect and even need the order of the expression to be νοῦν ἐχόντων ἄν ἦν (Dodds rejects Schanz’s emendation of the second apodosis below into ἀνόητον ἦν ἄν as “hardly the natural order” but is silent about the order here). In the apodosis of the parallel δέ clause ἄν is absent (C7). Though some edd. note that it can be understood or “carried over” from the ἄν in this previous clause, which is a perfectly good explanation in this case given the parallelism of the μέν / δέ construction (Ast, Woolsey: cf. Smyth §1767), most edd. (e.g. Stallb. Jahn Kratz) explain its absence as characteristic in a clause denoting “unfulfilled propriety” (cf. Smyth §2313, Goodwin *GMT* §§415-423; Matthiae §508.2, and *Charm.* 171E4, *Euthyd.* 304D9, *Rep.* 450D9, *Symp.* 190C5; X. *Anab.* 7.7.40, *H.G.* 2.3.41; T. 1.38). This same meaning however is already operant here in the μέν clause. I therefore read ἀνιέναι with BTPW *teste* Cantarin (misreported by Dodds as ἀνιέναι [sic]), which candidly I have difficulty *not* reading, instead of ἄν ιέναι which had been read even on very thin evidence by all the old editors, but is now corroborated by F (read by current edd.). The force of ἀνά is to stress the distinction between the levels of activity, from ἰδία to δημοσία, upon which this entire passage is predicated (cf. its use at *Rep.* 531C3).

Finally, because the sense of the passage ends up implying it, we may translate the second participle with “it would be intelligent for us to...”; but note that the suppression of the pronoun with διακειμένων even allows us to translate both participles impersonally: “given persons situated in this way it would be a mark of intelligence for them to move on to politics.” Under this interpretation the δέ clause (with εἶχομεν) then becomes another instance of the easy shift from third person to first (cf. n. 1797): after all the passage is articulating epagogically a general principle in contrafactually personal terms, so that Socrates in the real and present case (νοῦν δέ, 515A1) can apply it to Callicles personally.

1956 For τε (C6) instead of μήτε, after μήτε – the clause introduced rather than the connective carrying the corroborative negation – cf., with Stallb., 522B7, *Apol.* 26C6, *Symp.* 223D2. Note also Stallb.’s fine observation (correcting Heindorf but ignored by Sauppe Dodds) that πολλὰ καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια is a negative variation on the idiom that pairs quantity and quality (viz. πολλὰ καὶ καλά).

1957 Reading δὴ (C7) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (δὲ cod. Bas.<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Ast Bekker Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Deuschle-Cron Hirschig Schanz Mistriotis Lodge Stender Croiset : δ’ ἄν *coni.* Sauppe). Kratz’s argument against overwhelming ms. testimony that δὴ should be δέ falsely assumes that οὕτω alone would be impossible, but a second δέ along with epianaleptic demonstrative is not needed for the shift to apodosis (as his own examples show: Hdt. 3.108.3; Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.43, *Cyrop.* 4.5.39, *Oec.* 4.7), and so δὴ does not have to be δέ. δὴ emphasizes that the present clause gainsays the μέν clause, as μέντοι instead of δέ would have done: ἀνόητον is not merely the opposite of νοῦν ἐχόντων.

1958 Reading ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν (C7) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ἐπιχειρεῖν ἦν F : ἦν ἄν που ἐπιχειρεῖν *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Lodge Stender Thieler : ἦν δήπου ἄν ἐπιχειρεῖν *coni.* Hirschig : ἄν ἦν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν *coni.* Gercke Christ, *leg.* Sauppe). As for ἄν, it is easily supplied from the previous clause especially when as here that clause is parallel (νοῦν ἐχόντων ἦν ἄν / ἀνόητον ἦν), with Ast and Woolsey (cf. Smyth §1767); alternatively (with Stallb. Jahn Kratz) ἄν, in the apodosis of unreal condition with historical tense “denoting unfulfilled propriety” (Smyth §2313) or *impropriety*, may be omitted (but need not be: 514E3). See the fuller account in Matthiae §508.2, and for exx. cf. *Charm.* 171E4, *Euthyd.* 304D9, *Rep.* 450D9, *Symp.* 190C5; X. *Anab.* 7.7.40, *H.G.* 2.3.41; T. 1.38. Schanz’s emendation weakens the expression and is not necessary.

1959 Reading φῶμεν (C8) with BTWPf, *legg.* edd. (δῶμεν F).

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κᾶν<sup>1960</sup> εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες<sup>1961</sup> δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ<sup>1962</sup> ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δῆπου ἂν ἐγὼ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ<sup>1963</sup> ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη<sup>1964</sup> τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;<sup>1965</sup> κᾶν ἐγὼ οἶμαι περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἠύρισκομεν<sup>1966</sup> δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα [e] βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Διός, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους,<sup>1967</sup> ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν<sup>1968</sup> ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ<sup>1969</sup> τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω<sup>1970</sup> πράττειν;

### ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

- 1960 With κᾶν (D3) *sc.* ἐπεσκεψάμεθα from below. For this proleptic placement of κᾶν cf. 465C7-D4, *Menex.*236C11, *Lys.*209E5, *Prot.*318B3, *Rep.*515E1, *Soph.*265B6. For the shift from imperfect in protasis to aorist in apodosis of irreal conditions, cf. 447D3-4, *Euthyph.*12D9, *Symp.*199D5, *Meno* 72B3 (where cf. Thompson *ad loc.*). Buttmann apud Heindorf (*ad Gorg.*447D3-4) notes the shift is surprisingly common among verbs of asking, inquiring, and answering.
- 1961 Reading ἐπιχειρήσαντες (D3) with the mss. and edd. rather than Heindorf's perfectly logical but paleographically unsupported conjecture of the future (ἐπιχειρήσοντες) with the purpose of creating a parallel with A6 (accepted by Coraes Thurot Sauppe Stender). Buttmann defends the tense as parallel nevertheless on the grounds that futurity of A6 is inherent in the verb, but there is no need to insist on parallelism since something has happened since then: Socrates and Callicles have already begun their public careers, in conception at least! There is a sense of "going public" with your wits: the verb for that is δημοσιεύειν, here and below at E7 and 515B4).
- 1962 ἰατροὶ (D4): *Sc.* δημοσιεύειν with ἱκανοί. With the introduction of health as the second example of expertise, again (compare 504A2-3), now as a public enterprise, we will surely recall the doctor of Gorgias's speech, but what is front and center at present is an epagoge, and as such we should already anticipate that the third example will have to do with the soul (as was the case at 503E1-504B6) – i.e., betterment of the man (515A4-5). It is notable that the transition from public works to public medicine is achieved by generalizing the former "upward" and then focussing "downward" on the latter (here by means of τά τε ἄλλα κᾶν εἰ [D3], an ἄλλως τε καὶ construction for the sake of focussing): this is exactly the way the same transition was effected between the same two realms before, at 504A2-3 (and contrast with this the *purely lateral* inference from these two cases to the case of the soul in that passage [504B4-6]: compare here his use of the proverb [E6-9] as the transitional vehicle to soul).
- 1963 αὐτὸς δέ (D6): For this δέ added to enliven the question or strengthen its challenge in repartee, cf. *Ar.* *Av.*997, *X. Mem.*2.1.26, and Denniston 174-5. Note that the criterion of succeeding to apply one's ability in oneself (D5-7) is continued from the sphere of architecture, (ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν: B6); in the present case it is placed even before helping another person privately (D5-7 vs. D7-8); will this distinction be carried forward in the target case?
- 1964 Reading ἤδη (D7) from the E2, *legg.* edd. (εἰ δὲ BTWPF, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Thurot Sommer), with ἤδη designating an event marked in time, as almost always.
- 1965 ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος (D8): Perhaps this pair is focussed upon slave or free (contrast the wider scope of E1-2) to suggest a gradation in the evaluation of medical skill, i.e., that novice doctors were given slaves as patients.
- 1966 Reading ἠύρισκομεν (D9) from B, *legg.* edd. (εὐρίσκομεν WTPF, *legg.* Routh Ast Coraes Beck Jahn Kratz Schmelzer Hermann Feix) – but again the augment is inconsistently used. Stallb. cites *Matth.*§167, Buttm. §84.3, *Lobeck ad Phrynich.* (Leipzig 1820) 140. βελτίω is metonymy for ὑγεινότερον, in deference to its use leading up to this passage (513E6, E2, D4).
- 1967 ἀνθρώπους (E4): Heindorf (followed by Christ Theiler Piettre) wanted to athetize this word against all mss. and edd., but Buttmann defended it as a stronger generalization than ἡμᾶς would have provided, an emphasis consonant with the repeated oaths (D6, E2), which are not otiose (Deuschle bracketed all of εἰς ... ὥστε). Woolsey is right that we should not be bothered by the easy shift to the first plural below (ἐτύχομεν, E5: Buttmann wanted ἔτυχον and Thurot Cary Apelt Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto translate as if it were third plural), for we have seen this several times: cf. n. 1797 and *AGPS* 63.1.2.C. Waterfield's "us or anyone" is an excellent solution.
- 1968 ὅπως ἐτύχομεν (E4-5) often taken as a euphemism for "badly" (e.g., Dodds Irwin) – as if the action were consigned to chance, like the American idiom "It is what it is" – but the use at *Symp.*181B6 (συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο πράττειν, ὁμοίως μὲν ἀγαθόν, ὁμοίως δὲ κακόν) tells otherwise. Adam and Burnet *ad Crito* 44D make the argument it expresses indifference or fecklessness (cf. 521C8, 522C2-3; *Crito* 45D2; *Prot.*353A8 [ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν "they say just anything," LSJ]). The point here is not that in performing private work one might do well or poorly but that he might be less or more scrupulous ("with indifferent results," Woodhead; "tant bien que mal," Canto Waterfield) – in short that he would feel free to set his own standard answerable to no one. Hamilton imports for this the notion of a period of hit-and-miss "apprenticeship": it is not there but is a welcome improvement.
- 1969 ἐν πίθῳ (E6) The proverb is ἐν πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν μανθάνω (*Zen.* 3.65, *Diogen.*11.65, *schol. vet.*). The idea is skipping the simplest and starting with the hardest case (the πίθος being the largest vessel). Here it is meant literally, going from the single individual (smallest) to the polis (largest): indeed the pride of the orator is the scope of his project – Gorgias begins with the big infrastructure projects (455D8-E1), continued here (A6-8). The proverb is interestingly deepened in its application to fatherhood at *Lach.*187B, since there is no warmth to fatherhood, *per se*, though one man may be better prepared for it than another. τὸ λεγόμενον δὲ τοῦτο is adverbial accusative (as at 508D, *q.v.*).
- 1970 Reading οὕτω (E9) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (τοῦτο F).



[515] ΣΩ. νῦν δέ,<sup>1971</sup> ὃ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν,<sup>1972</sup> ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχῃ<sup>1973</sup> πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἀλλήλους, φέρε, Καλλικλῆς<sup>1974</sup> ἤδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκεν τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς<sup>1975</sup> ὢν, ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε κἀγαθὸς<sup>1976</sup> γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;<sup>1977</sup>

... λέγε μοι, [b] ἐάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζη, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἐρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον<sup>1978</sup> τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῆ;<sup>1979</sup>

... ὀκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος,<sup>1980</sup> πρὶν δημοσιεῦν ἐπιχειρεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. φιλόνομος εἶ,<sup>1981</sup> ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐ φιλονικία γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον οἶει δεῖν πολιτεῦσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν<sup>1982</sup> ἐλθὼν

- 1971 νῦν δέ (515A1): “But as it is...,” leaving behind the contrafactuals (not “Now then,” *pace* Nichols). Though the transition to the epagodic target subject is regularly done instead with δὴ (cf. n. 1603 and *Charm.* 166B5; *Leg.* 963B4; *Rep.* 374C2, 427D1, 470E4, 523E3; *Soph.* 221D1; *Symp.* 199E6; *Th.* 185C4, 189A6), in the present case Socrates moves to the target as an actual case after the contrafactual parallels leading up to it. νῦν, that is, has the force of the regular δὴ. The epagodic curve already indicated we are moving on to soul but this now is replaced with politics: that politics has to do with soul is however the hypothesis of the whole argument (θῶμεν 514A3 with n. 1947)!
- 1972 βέλτιστε (A1): Here again the vocative he chooses reveals his own attitude now that he has reached the goal of his argument (again at D9). Cf. nn. 1713, 2021. It is partly because of the tone of this vocative that Callicles calls him φιλόνομος, below.
- 1973 ἄρτι ἄρχῃ (A2): That he has just begun is not only relevant as a follow-up to the proverb, but more. If the parallels are valid Callicles should or must already have taken the preliminary steps, else he would not have begun. Only incidentally do we learn that despite all his authoritative remarks and tone, Callicles is but a novice in public affairs (though he has been active long enough that Socrates has witnessed his behavior: 481D5-E4): his interest in employing Gorgias is not to maintain or improve his stature, as we may have thought, but to create it; so much was only alluded to above at 513B7-8. Here then is another blank that Plato expects us to fill in by ourselves – as he has done so often in this drama with his Sophoclean irony of silence (cf. n. 1559). He even begins to suggest an answer to a question we had from the beginning, why we have not heard of this Callicles; and yet commentators (Dodds, Canto, *et al.*) unimpressed by the epagoge Socrates has created in order to force this question upon Callicles, bring up instead the perfectly irrelevant question whether Plato asked this question *of himself!*
- 1974 φέρε, Καλλικλῆς (A4): Socrates’ use of φέρε and the nominative Καλλικλῆς in the third person (even more abrupt without δέ: cf. n. 1963, *supra*), in this statement addressed to Callicles himself, echoes the form of his statement about himself above (D5-8) and therefore forces comparison with that passage, which in turn sets into relief that the criterion of applying the ability to oneself before to another, even privately (again cf. n. 1963), is absent.
- 1975 πονηρὸς (A5): Interposition of ὢν and insertion of τε after ἄδικός at A5 make it and the other two subsequent adjectives appositives to πονηρὸς (this lost in the trr. of Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Canto Piettre). Mistrisiotis usefully notes that πονηρὸς functions as the adjectival counterpart to ἀγαθός (cf. n. 2099), itself the adjective for ἀρετή in the generic sense, next specified by the adjectives of the vices that are the counterparts to the specific virtues (A5-6). ἀνανδρός is notably absent, leaving the list of species sufficient but incomplete at three (as was σωφροσύνη at one moment: cf. n. 1319), here perhaps to avoid Callicles becoming distracted.
- 1976 καλὸς τε κἀγαθός (A6): Socrates again uses the soft-minded idiom (cf. n. 732) to avoid the controversy he himself has incited after Callicles used the words ἀγαθός (503C4ff) and βελτίων (512D2ff). Here he would prefer to *posit* virtue rather than argue what it is. Waterfield’s formula, “a paragon of virtue,” again does not describe what Socrates means and feels (cf. 511B4 and n. 1871).
- 1977 ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστός, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος (A7): Note the natural and easy employment of a chiasm “of before and after” (cf. 514E1-2 and D8) once the real point has been made! Hamilton’s erroneous addition of slave or free to the actual text at 514E1-2, and Waterfield’s translation of ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος with “from any walk of life” weakens the effect.
- 1978 Reading ἄνθρωπον (B2) with the mss. and edd. (*om.* Kratz; Cary Apelt translate with “who” only). Hirschig’s *coni.* ἀνθρώπων is attractive.
- 1979 σῆ (B2): The possessive pronoun standing in for a “subjective” genitive (compare 486A4 and n. 1174 for an objective use). Again asyndeta (B1, B3): again Callicles demurs to answer.
- 1980 σὸν ἔτι ἰδιωτεύοντος (B3): The time of πρὶν is set by πεποιηκέναι thus designates something he is “on record of doing” before entering public life. ἰδιωτεύοντος is not a genitive absolute (with Woodhead and Nichols: “while you are still a private person”), but a genitive in apposition, “drawn out of” possessive adjective, cf. *Apol.* 22A6-7, *Symp.* 193B5, 194B1-2; H. *Od.* 11.634; Ar. *Ach.* 93, *Plut.* 33; E. *El.* 356, and Matth. *Gr.Gr.* §466.1, Smyth §977. This sort of apposition is available to several other adjectives, including κοινός (e.g., *Menex.* 241C5-6) and ἴδιος (e.g., *Menex.* 247B7, *Rep.* 580E1; D. 2.16).
- 1981 φιλόνομος εἶ (B5): He is accusing Socrates of knowing he has nobody to point to, but it could have been worse: Socrates forwent starting with his own moral condition! The term is commonly negative, denoting contentiousness and personal rivalry, but like “ambitious” in English what is negative in competitive desire naturally tends toward its own redemption in achieving something worthwhile (as Socrates says when Callicles first bows out, at (505E4). At *Lach.* 194A8, Laches feels φιλονικία because of his failure to articulate what he means. The theme was prepared at 457E4 and comes back to life here.
- 1982 Reading ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν (B8) with WPF<sup>margin</sup>, *legg.* edd. (*om.* F : ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν T : ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν B : ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν Ξ2, *legg.* Coraes Heindorf Stallb. Ast[1832] Sauppe Dodds Dalfen: εἰ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν Schleiermacher, *legg.* Ast[1819] Bekker Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig : ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν P : ἢ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῶν Za<sup>2</sup>R – all *teste* Cantarín). Here and in C2 the impatient “or’s” are not offering but suggesting and even insinuating alternatives. If Callicles has *improved* nobody (let alone himself) as a preparation for political activity, which εἴπερ above insinuates (B3),



ἐπὶ τὰ [c] τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται<sup>1983</sup> ὤμεν; ἢ οὐ  
πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα;<sup>1984</sup>

... ὠμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ; ἀποκρίνου.

... ὠμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν  
ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἶπε περὶ  
ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγω πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀγαθοὶ<sup>1985</sup> πολῖται  
γεγονέναι, [d] Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς.

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει<sup>1986</sup> τοὺς  
πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν<sup>1987</sup> ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χεῖρους ἦσαν οἱ  
Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἴσως δῆ,<sup>1988</sup> ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων, εἶπερ  
ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. [e]

ΚΑΛ. τί οὖν δῆ;<sup>1989</sup>

perhaps it is something else he has prepared himself to do, with the help of his teacher? Though the aorist ἐλθόν cannot be pressed (with Zeyl and Waterfield) to mean “now that you have entered politics,” the repetition of ἡμῖν does express the stakeholders’ standing (that of Socrates and the rest of Athens) to demand an answer. His reluctance to do so is here stronger than anywhere else in the dialogue: What after all would his true answer be? And what lie could he credibly tell?

1983 Reading οἱ πολῖται (C1) with BTPF *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. as below, D4 (πολῖται *coni.* Hirschig, *legg.* Stallb. Schanz Lodge). Croiset reported πολῖται from F and read that, taking it as predicate with βέλτιστοι (so translated by Chambry Canto Pietre). But οἱ πολῖται is appositive (Cron). The purpose is not to make men into good citizens (*pace* Croiset *et al.*), nor to make men good “as” citizens (Allen), but to make our citizens good men (cf. τῶν πολιτῶν at A5, *αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας*, 513E6-7 [with n. 1944], and 517B7). πολῖται is included in a *figura etymologica*, merely to affirm that the activity of improving men morally (as opposed to improving their health or their house), in the case of political activity (πολιτεῦσθαι, B7) is focussed upon πολῖται.

1984 πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα (C3): Socrates has by now taken over the use of ἄνδρα from Callicles (again at C5). The phrase is unique. We might translate it “statesman” in order to render its approbative connotation; it is an index of the general public confusion as to what “politics” is, that Callicles’s even less specific and fateful expression ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ (503C1) was allowed to bear this meaning, which Socrates next challenges by calling them ἐκεῖνοι οἱ ἄνδρες and asking whether they were good πολῖται. Irwin fails to see that the dialectic has focussed and united these terms (*ad* 515C, cf. also 514A1-3 and again, n. 1944), and gives an argument why “Plato” might be assuming them interchangeable.

1985 Reading ἀγαθοὶ only (C7) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ἀγαθοὶ οἱ F). Jahn notices Socrates recalls the Big Four in reverse order so as to start with Pericles, laying the groundwork for his report as eyewitness (E10: cf. 503C3, 455E5). Commentators from Aristides to Dodds and Dalfen have taken it upon themselves to evaluate Socrates’s criticism of The Four according to their own values and to its historical accuracy, even though Socrates explicitly states he is challenging *Callicles’s* estimate of them in order to make him articulate what he thinks a “real man” should do in politics (C1), if after all it is not to make the citizens better men. If the commentators did not presume, without warrant, that Socrates’s evaluations represent Plato’s opinion they would quickly recognize that their own estimations were of no relevance to the dialectical movement of the argument, since against all Socrates says (and all they say about what he says), Callicles offers no rebuttal, but only the remark that they “did big things,” as Gorgias said in praise of oratory at the beginning (455D6ff). Hamilton’s long notes (pp.131-3) exemplify the extremes to which this presumption can be taken, with the claim that “the intemperance of this criticism is explicable only by the bitterness of Plato’s feelings about politics in general.” See my Appendix III on Aristides.

1986 ἐποίει (D4): This imperfect, and those that follow (D6, D7) are conative (noted by Heidbüchler only), enabling Socrates to slip from their intention to their success, a distinction Callicles could make if he wishes, and will not.

1987 For λέγειν (D6) used absolutely to denote the work of an orator, cf. 503D7. It is tantamount to ἐρχεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα (Jahn). Socrates takes the causal argument literally: if his speaking was to make the Athenians better, they must have been worse before he began speaking!

1988 Reading δῆ (D9) from WPF (first brought in by Stallb.) and ἀνάγκη from the mss. with edd. (δεῖ BT, *legg.* Routh Bekker); Schanz’s *coni.* ἀνάγκη (followed by Lodge Ovink Croiset Zimmermann Dodds) is engaging but as nugatory as an iota subscript. For a similar correction of evasive ἴσως in answer, cf. 522A8 with my n. and (with Routh) *Leg.*965C4. Socrates is here rebutting the several cynical uses of ἴσως he has heard today.

1989 τί οὖν δῆ (E1). οὖν δῆ adds focus and eagerness (cf. 453B4, 497D3; *Crat.*409E3; *Meno* 89D1; *Rep.*360E3, 459A1; and *S. Ai.*873), meaning “Just what?” often threatening a “point of order” objection, like the question *ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο* (497E9, *Charm.*164A8, *Rep.*472B6) or *τί δὲ τοῦτο* (448B1).

ΣΩ. οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἶπε ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τὸναντίον διαφθαρήναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτί<sup>1990</sup> γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποικέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. τῶν τὰ ὄτα κατεαγόντων<sup>1991</sup> ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐδοκίμει<sup>1992</sup> Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἠνίκα χεῖρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι<sup>1993</sup> ἐγεγόνεσαν [516] ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους,<sup>1994</sup> κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

ΚΑΛ. τί οὖν; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς<sup>1995</sup> ἦν Περικλῆς;

ΣΩ. ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν<sup>1996</sup> μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε<sup>1997</sup> ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιῶντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι [b] κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητῆς ὅστισοῦν ὄτουοῦν ζῶου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξει ἀγριώτερα ἢ<sup>1998</sup> παρέλαβε;

... δοκεῖ ἢ οὐ;<sup>1999</sup>

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χάρισωμαι.

Coraes explains: τί βούλει λέγειν διὰ τούτου; τί σοι βούλεται τοῦτο; At *Rep.*349A9-10 the question is spelled out. In most or all cases Socrates begins his reply with οὐδέν, as here, to defuse the belligerence (*pace* Dodds, who takes it more literally and thinks Socrates is saying he cannot draw an inference yet: the point is, Callicles is asking for one). Callicles is responding to Socrates's pregnant postponement of the predication πολιτῆς and in particular to the impending challenge against Pericles's "goodness." After all he would rather call his heroes ἄνδρες, and surely would rather think of himself as a ρήτωρ than as a πολίτης.

1990 ταυτί (E4): The deictic iota suggests a hand gesture by which Socrates betokens his *own* experience. With ἀκούω Socrates is remembering and gainsaying Callicles's use at 503C1.

1991 κατεαγόντων (E8): Cauliflower ears are the proud mark of the boxer, who serves as the avatar of the anti-cultural Laconizers (cf. *Prot.*342B8-C1: Cary wrongly takes it to denote actual Spartans), with whom Callicles here associates Socrates, perhaps as a proponent of Spartan severity, but also to characterize Socrates's remarks against Pericles as being partisan, aligned with his opponents the Laconizers, and indirectly reveals his own partisanship with the "democrats." Cope's "broken-nosed gentry" is excellent. Callicles is ever ready to bring the argument down to his own level. But our author also wants us to notice that here is broached the opprobrium of oligarchic sympathies among his followers (evidenced in *Ar. Av.*1281ff where these types are said to Σωκρατεῖν), an opprobrium to which Socrates was probably subject at the time of his trial.

1992 Reading εὐδοκίμει (E11) with WF, *legg.* Routh Beck Ast Coraes as better attested than the ηὔδοκίμει of B (*legg.*edd.: Cantarin notes that the first syllable is done with an indeterminate compendium in TP). Both forms of the imperfect are found (Veitch, s.v., "often without augment").

1993 καλοὶ κάγαθοί (E13), again. Once "good and fine" they promptly punished him. With Nichols, his irony smacks of Polus's treatment of Archelaus (471AD)! The pluperfect (ἐγεγόνεσαν BTPF, *legg.* edd. : ἐγγόνεσαν W : γεγόνεσαν YNFLor, *leg.* Heindorf), along with ἠνίκα just above, emphasize the temporal character of the *argumentem post hoc ergo propter hoc*, adding a satirical edge (cf. n. 1987).

1994 Reading τοῦ Περικλέους (516A1) with the mss. and edd. (*del.* Hirschig, *legg.* Jowett Apelt Woodhead Theiler Chambry Allen Waterfield Piettre). Cobet, in his manner (cf. nn. 119, 288, 375, 506, 621, 674, 1827), deleted ἐπὶ ... Περικλέους followed by Christ; and Hirschig and Cobet deleted subsequent δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος as a *marginale*, depriving Socrates of his own marginal comment and cancelling his joke.

1995 τούτου ἔνεκα κακός (A4): Callicles treats the story as proof of Pericles's *competence* (the lack of which, for him, is κακόν), since regardless of public opinion he made his way to the top and survived. Of course it is his view of Socrates's criticism that is at stake, not ours. Note Callicles's rarer use of ἔνεκα (= *quantum ad hoc attinet*), throwing a bit of sand in the eyes, just as Gorgias had used it (456D8, 457A3, 457B1-2 and n. 335).

1996 Reading ἑαυτὸν (A7) with BT, *legg.* edd. (αὐτὸν WPF Aristides, *leg.* Stallb. : αὐτοὺς corr.Par<sup>2</sup>f, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Coraes : *om.* Y Aristides[ms.Q] Stephanus [*non vertit* Ficinus], *legg.* Routh Ast Thurot Stallb. Cary Woolsey Cope Deutsche Thompson Cobet Hirschig Schanz Christ Lodge Croiset Zimmermann Chambry Hamilton). Thompson's refusal of the reflexive *per se* is unexplained and seems to me unjustified.

1997 ἀπέδειξε (A7) here has the sense of ἀπεργάζεσθαι, παρασκευάζειν. X. *Cyrop.*1.2.5, 2.1.23, 8.1.35; *Mem.*1.6.3. Similar diction below, with ἀπέφηνεν (C6).

1998 Reading ἢ (B2) from PF, *legg.* edd. (*post* ἢ *rasura unius litt. ut vid.* T : ἢ B).

1999 δοκεῖ ἢ οὐ (B2-3): Again asyndeton, as Socrates prods Callicles to answer.

ΣΩ. καὶ<sup>2000</sup> τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;<sup>2001</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὠμολογοῦμεν, δικαιότερους γεγονέναι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ [c] ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί,<sup>2002</sup> ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος· σὺ δὲ τί φῆς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτούς ἀπέφηεν ἢ οἴους<sup>2003</sup> παρέλαβεν, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν,<sup>2004</sup> ὃν ἠκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

ΚΑΛ. βούλει<sup>2005</sup> σοι ὁμολογήσω;

ΣΩ. εἰ δοκῶ γε σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χεῖρους; [d]

ΚΑΛ. ἔστω.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικά Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. οὐ σύ γε φῆς.

ΣΩ. μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὠμολόγεις.<sup>2006</sup> πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οὐς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς

2000 Another initial καὶ (B5) plus τοίνυν, forging on without regard for Callicles's irrelevant wisecrack.

2001 Reading ἐπεμέλετο (B8) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (ἐπεμελεῖτο F). Both the contracted and uncontracted forms of the verb are current in Plato. Note ἐπεμελεῖτο in all mss., just below (C1).

2002 οἱ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί (C3): Routh and Coraes, followed by edd., guessed Socrates is alluding to *Od.* 6.120: ἦ ῥ' οἱ γ' ὕβρισται τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι, repeated at *Od.* 9.175. The γε is *vi termini*, and so Socrates's statement is convertible (*pace* Irwin), as indeed the Homeric formula on which it is based ("wild and not just") also implies.

2003 ἢ οἴους (C6): Again we have incorporation of the demonstrative adjective: cf. 512A1.

2004 Reading αὐτόν (C7) with *P teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (αὐτόν BTWF Aristides, *legg.* Stallb. Hirschig : *secl.* Cobet *leg.* Christ). If we read it it must be reflexive, otherwise a gloss. For the completely expectable omission of repeated preposition (εἰς) before relative pronoun (ὃν), Stallb. compares 453E1, *Apol.* 27D9, *Phdo.* 76D9, to which add *Symp.* 172A1, 172C2.

2005 βούλει (C8): In response to Socrates's satirically tedious spelling out with a syllogism (B5-C7), Callicles with equal tediousness treats the conclusion as a mere velleity of Socrates. Irwin criticizes the logic of the syllogism (cf. n. 2002) without noticing it is a joke.

2006 Reading ὠμολόγεις (D5) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (ὁμολογεῖς F Ficinus [*confiteris*], *legg.* Heindorf Coraes Beck Bekker Thurot Ast Cary Woolsey Sommer Hirschig Woodhead Nichols Piettre Heidbüchel), referring with the imperfect of citation to 515B.

φωνῆς;<sup>2007</sup> καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῆ προσεζημίωσαν;<sup>2008</sup> Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι<sup>2009</sup> εἰς τὸ βάραθρον [e] ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρῦτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; καίτοι οὗτοι,<sup>2010</sup> εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί,<sup>2011</sup> ὡς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκουν<sup>2012</sup> οἳ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἠνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἠνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτ' ἐν ἠνιοχείᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ἄλλω ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΚΑΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, [517] ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν<sup>2013</sup> ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγεις<sup>2014</sup> τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν,<sup>2015</sup> καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ<sup>2016</sup> ἐχρῶντο—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον<sup>2017</sup>—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

- 2007 τῆς φωνῆς (D7): Again parodying Callicles's notion that the essential activity of the political leader is oratory, the Athenians' disapproval of Cimon leads them to send him where they do not have to hear his voice.
- 2008 προσεζημίωσαν (D8): Here and elsewhere πρὸς as prefix to verb qualifies not the verb but the whole sentence (Riddell §129, citing *Apol.*20A2 (προσειδέναι); *Phdo.*74A6 (προσπάσχειν); *Rep.*521D8 (προσέχειν), 607B3 (προσειπόμεν); *Th.*208E4 (προσλάβη).
- 2009 Reading ἐν Μαραθῶνι (D9) with BTP and *re vera* F [*testibus* Dodds Cantarin], *legg.* edd. (Μαραθῶνι *coni.* Thompson, *legg.* Schanz Theiler Heidbüchel Erler). The bare locative (misreported as being from F by Burnet) had been anticipated by Stallb. and later by Jahn and Kratz. Mistriotis and Thompson argued that the locative is regular in Aristophanes (ἐν added only *metri gratia*) and Plato. Dodds fortifies the unanimous reading of the mss. with the information that adding ἐν makes it an honorific title (whence Hamilton Irwin translate "Miltiades of Marathon"); Allen Zeyl Waterfield Erler Nichols: "the hero of Marathon" [*vel sim.*]; Canto Pietre: *vainquer de Marathon*; Dalfen: *Sieger von Marathon*).
- 2010 οὗτοι (E2): The epagodic run-through of cases dealt with the first in great detail (Pericles: 515D6-516D3) and then could dismiss the others with dispatch (D5-E3). This sort of "pacing," whether from elaboration to brevity, from abstract to concrete, from obvious or actual to analogous but remote (cf. n. 151; *Lach.*193AC; *Phlb.*31E3-4), including an acceleration of expression once "over the hump" (*Charm.*173DE; *Euthyd.*298D4), is of course to be expected (compare 495E6-496B5; *Leg.*643B8-C1, 961E8-2A1; *Phdo.*70E6-1A10, 75C9-D2ff, 90A4-9, 105A6-B3; *Phlb.*39E10-40A1; *Rep.*438B4-C4, 442E4-3A10, 463C6-7, 507C1-5).
- 2011 ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί (E2) Socrates re-uses but also appropriates Callicles's expression.
- 2012 Reading οὐκουν (E3) with FP<sup>2</sup>QEU *teste* Cantarin, Aristides and Aldine (*coniecerat* Heindorf), *legg.* edd. (οὐκοῦν BTPW Aristidis ms.Q<sup>1</sup>). Thurot found οὐκοῦν justifiable, but Stallb. in support of Heindorf's conjecture cited many parallels in which οὐκοῦν must be replaced by οὐκουν; and finally the conjecture was affirmed by the "advent" of F.
- 2013 ἴσμεν (517A1): Fostering the continuing scandal that Socrates's argument on this occasion represents Plato's opinion of history, Dodds here finds in οὐδένα a generalized condemnation that would reach to Solon and contradict what Socrates says in at *Meno* 93A5, but ἡμεῖς and ἴσμεν both restrict the finding to the ἔμπροσθεν λόγος between Socrates and Callicles, and οὐδεῖς does not generalize but specifies that they have gone through the candidates they were "looking at" one by one. Dodds's "extreme position adopted in the *Gorgias*" regarding the Big Four is merely the outcome of a dialectical process for which Socrates and Callicles alone are responsible.
- 2014 Reading ὠμολόγεις (A2) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (ὀμολογεῖς F *teste* Dodds), an imperfect of citation (referring to 503B4-5: note that the notion of the good "orator," by dint of the intervening conversation in present context, is now a "good man in politics"). Here is the "further use" of 501D7-503A2 Dodds failed to see (cf. n. 1592), which prepared for that conclusion.
- 2015 Hirschig and Cantarin report πολλοὺς after ἔμπροσθεν (A3) from the marg. of E2, which achieves balance with οὐδένα; but the indefiniteness is a better way to depict Callicles's position than to say he had a large number of persons in mind: he mentioned them one by one by name, with strident καί (504C1-2).
- 2016 τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ (A5): For the term Socrates reaches back to 503B1 (cf. ταύτην and n. 1639). Dodds glosses it "the true political leadership" in order in his next note to identify the two aspects of its contrary, κολακικῇ in speech with διακουκῇ in action, and thereby question Socrates's assertion that they were not flatterers although he later says they were too-eager servitors. But there is "dialectical time": Socrates' distinction between flattery and service only makes sense because of what Callicles says just after this, that they were more successful than anybody because of all that they built. It would be closer to say, with Socrates, that they were not real orators of either type (which is what he does say: εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν), neither successful at flattery nor improvement. ῥήτωρ after all is a loaded term, as is "statesman," for instance, in English. Aristides tententially misunderstands in a different way (cf. Appendix III, *infra*), and Dalfen invents a third category for these men, that they were not orators but *Realpolitiker* (460). But all Socrates means in this passing swipe is that if they were using the "true" oratory, the people would have been improved, but if their competence was to flatter the citizens with lies, they were bad at that as well, so that they do not deserve the name ῥήτωρ in either sense. There is therefore no need for K. Meiser's idea (*Blätter für Gymnasialschulwesen* 35 [1899] 417-8) that words should be added to contradict what Socrates says, to wit: οὔτε <τῇ ἀληθινῇ πολιτικῇ, ἀλλὰ> τῇ κολακικῇ. (there is no "lacuna" in any ms., *pace* Cantarin: cf. n. 1941). Indeed I believe it is from this expression, invented by Meiser, that Dodds was inspired to overtranslate τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ at the beginning of his note.
- 2017 ἐξέπεσον (A6): The literal sense is that of being thrown from the chariot. Lodge notes that the verb serves as the passive of ἐκβάλλειν. Heindorf and Thurot say the term also can denote performing artists falling out of favor, and Ast insists on a political meaning (*corruere*) as it is used in the simile below (E4, E6), with Jahn and Mistriotis comparing X. *Anab.*1.1.7, used of exiles (and agreeing with Ast, I would compare ἀπόλλυνται, 519B7). But more important than to decide between the two metaphorical meanings is to appreciate the connection of either with the literal one



ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, μή<sup>2018</sup> ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα<sup>2019</sup> ἐργάσεται οἷα τούτων ὅστις [b] βούλει<sup>2020</sup> εἶργασται.

ΣΩ. ὦ δαιμόνιε,<sup>2021</sup> οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι<sup>2022</sup> γεγόνεναί καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει.<sup>2023</sup> ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν οὐδὲν [c] τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου.<sup>2024</sup> ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοὶ ὁμολογῶ δεινότερους εἶναι<sup>2025</sup> ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν.

πρᾶγμα οὖν<sup>2026</sup> γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διαλεγόμεθα οὐδὲν παύομεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ<sup>2027</sup> περιφερόμενοι καὶ

and move on.

2018 Reading μή (A7) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (οὐ μή *coni.* Madvig [*Advers.* 1 {1871} 142], *legg.* Schanz : καὶ οὐ μή *coni.* Cobet [with ἐργάσεται]). The μή construction, defended by Ast(1823), stands in place of the usual infinitive as if πολλοῦ δεῖ were here the negative of a verb of fearing. See Lodge's Appendix *ad loc.* (293-4), Riddell §259, and the parallel adduced by Dodds: *Ep.* 7 344C2.

2019 ἔργα τοιαῦτα (A8): Callicles ignores Socrates's detailed political criticism (which he began to brush off, anyway, at 516A4), as well as the primary question of the effect and nature of their oratory (μέντοι dismisses the question for something more important: cf. 456C7, 458B5, 473E1, *al.*, and n. 794) merely to intone the same "deeds" (ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσεται: anarthrous τοιαῦτα is *admirantis*) Gorgias had singled out about these greats (455D8-E6) in opening his advertisement for the "power" of oratory they had at their command. It is their sort of celebrity (ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, 503C1-2) that he has in mind for himself, and it is the desire for such celebrity that Socrates is attacking: to criticize Socrates's evaluation of these improvements is incumbent upon Callicles, not the commentators (most of whom wax long about this page), just as it is incumbent upon him, not Socrates, to distinguish διακονική from κολακική, which his own admiring comment suggests he will not and cannot do (*pace* Irwin, who wants Socrates to do this and thinks he cannot [*ad* 517D-518A, pp.237-8]). The argument again implicates Gorgias without his being named, and again Plato leaves it to his readers to notice how the Gorgias that is behind Polus and Callicles, gets off scot-free from criticism! Cf. nn. 537, 1207, 1887 *supra*; and 2091, 2149 *infra*.

2020 Reading ὅστις βούλει (A8) with F, *legg.* Burnet Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erlar (ὄς BTWP, *legg.* edd.), a case of reverse attraction (i.e. [τις] ὄν), formulaic with βούλει, and occurring only in Plato (Jahn: cf. also Riddell Digest §189β). "The verb must be regarded as coalescing with ὄς to form one notion" (ays Woolsey), so that (with Kratz) the case of ὄς takes on the role of designating the syntactical role, in the main clause, of the object of βούλει. The phenomenon may be compared Latin *quibus*. The grammarians were willing to extend the reverse attraction of the compound (as at 495E11, *Crat.* 432A10, *Ion* 533A3-4, *Phlb.* 43D10) to that of the simple relative in this single case (cf. K-G 2.415 = §515.13, A. Crosby, *Grammar of the Greek Language* [Boston 1847] §526.γ; Smyth §2527), but with the advent of F that is no longer necessary (though Croiset, having F, chose ὄς).

2021 ὦ δαιμόνιε (B2): Surely when it is not a proper name but a characterization that is vocalized, as here, the characterization tends to indicate the mood of the speaker at this point in his argument (cf. 515A1 and nn. 1713, 1972). For δαιμόνιε compare 489D, *Polit.* 277D1, *Symp.* 223A1, *Th.* 180B8; and cf. *Rep.* 344D6 (ὦ δ. Θρασύμαχε). As to the "non-pragmatic" initial position of the vocative (cf. my n. to *Lach.* 181B5) to announce a longer dissertation, especially in contentious contexts, cf. 448C4, 461C5, 471E2, 481C5 (answered by 482C4); and *Euthyd.* 275D3 (answered by 277D4), 288B4, 305B4, 307A3. See also *Charm.* 163D1; *Crito* 46B1; *H.Maj.* 304B7; *H.Min.* 369B3 and D1, 373B6; *Ion* 541C7; *Leg.* 630D2, 634C5, 637B7, 673B5, 686D7, 708E1; *Lys.* 204B5; *Meno* 70A5, 79E7, 94E3 and 95A2; *Phdrs.* 228A5, 247E7 (correcting Theuth: cf. E4); *Prot.* 328D8, 334C8, 335D6; *Rep.* 329E1 (where Soc. has told us his motive in advance: D7-E1), 336E2 (where again we get the motive: 336D5-E2), 344D7, 378E7, 450D5, 473E6, 499D10; *Symp.* 218C7. We will soon see what in Callicles conduct is striking to him (cf. οὖν, C4): Dalfen telegraphs the punch by translating *rätselhafter*.

2022 διακονικώτεροι (B3), perhaps a coinage but in any case satiric in tone. Just as Callicles has privileged the "monumental" deeds of the successful politician with the bare term ἔργα, Socrates introduces a secondary activity of the politician with the term διάκονος. His use of the adjective then draws that characteristic out, to be compared with another characteristic of a politician that is the more important. His *distinguo* in response to Callicles's attempt to dismiss the entire refutation of his "better types" continues the dialectical sequence.

2023 ἐπέθυμει (B5), an iterative imperfect, their desires (not "needs," *pace* Waterfield, as again at 518C3) as they would arise (whence the plural, ἐπιθυμίας, and the expression ἐργεται εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν below [D4-5]). καὶ is epeexegetic.

2024 Reading πολίτου (C2) with the mss. and edd. Within short compass Socrates again chooses to use πολίτης indifferently for citizen and office holder (cf. 513E7; 515C7, D4, and also D10, where Jaeger, *Paideia* 3.310 n.53, and Bury *REG* 52 [1939] 26, want to emend it to πολιτικός, citing 517A1 as if that word occurred there, though it does not – [it *does* at 515C2-3]). It is, after all, the burden of the recent argument that in a healthy democracy the difference ideally approaches zero. Hence "a good member of the community" (Waterfield). Contrast the irreconcilably different meanings of ῥήτωρ (A4-5). Dodds here interlards a warning that "Plato" does not "in the *Gorgias*" consider the limitations of political policy to effect moral improvement in citizens (and who instead by comparing the πολίτης to a doctor evinces an "absolutism" that will "later" come to the surface in the Republic), ignoring that – and how – Socrates in the *Gorgias* expends an unstinting and thankless effort to effect moral improvement in Callicles by what *he* calls political action. How easily the commentator looks past the man who died not for the positions he took but for what he said, face to face and on occasion, to individuals and to a jury, and groundlessly assumes such occasional remarks he is given by the man who took the trouble to represent him concretely, as being settled positions of that man instead, so as merely to criticize them as positions in the commentator's estimation untenable or odious!

2025 εἶναι (C3), with Lodge, represents an imperfect, like διέφερον.

2026 οὖν (C4): With the ensuing remark Socrates will thematize what he has just gone through.

2027 The regime of ἀεὶ (C6) extends to the second participle, ἀγνοοῦντες.



ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων<sup>2028</sup> ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν<sup>2029</sup> σε πολλάκις οἶμαι ὠμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι ὡς ἄρα διττὴ τις αὕτη [d] ἢ πραγματεία ἔστιν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα<sup>2030</sup> διακονικὴ ἔστιν, ἣ δυνατὸν εἶναι<sup>2031</sup> ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, ἐὰν δὲ διψῇ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ ῥιγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' ὧν<sup>2032</sup> ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν<sup>2033</sup> εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι<sup>2034</sup> ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα ἢ ἔμπορον ἢ δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν [e] τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἢ ὄψοποιὸν ἢ ὑφάντην ἢ σκυτοτόμον ἢ σκυτοδεσπὸν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔστιν ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι

2028 ἀλλήλων (C7): For the genitive as a virtual genitive of the topic constructed with a verb of understanding, cf. *Lach.*189E8 (οὐ μανθάνετε μου ὅτι λέγω); *Rep.*375E1-2, 394B9; *X. Mem.*1.1.12, 3.6.16-17 (ἐνθυμοῦ, *bis*); *Cyrop.*5.2.18, 8.1.40. Alternatively, one may take it as proleptic-possessive with ὅτι (Lodge): cf. *X. Apol.*34, *Oec.*16.3.

2029 Reading γοῦν (C7) with ZaYPar<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* Bekker Stallb. Ast Woolsey Kratz Thompson Hirschig Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarín Heidbüchel Erler (τε οὖν F : οὖν BTWP Par, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Hermann Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sommer Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Feix). Socrates gives “part proof” that they are not understanding each other by adducing his own point of view, half of the problem.

2030 ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα (D2): Together the terms make us anticipate ἡ δὲ (ἑτέρα) but instead, the construction is turned inside out by the anacoluthon in between (cf. n. 2034), and we get the second type introduced in a subaltern way, *per contrarium*, by ὅτι at E4, and then explained at 518A3 (τῆν δέ ...).

2031 εἶναι (D2): Note shift within indirect discourse from finite (ὡς ..., C8-D2) to infinitive (incidentally absent from E2). Riddell (§281) compares *Charm.*164E2 (δεῖν), *Lach.*198B8 (εἶναι), *Rep.*391CD (τολμησαι), and Dodds adds *Rep.*490C5-6 for the shift happening within a relative clause, as here. Perhaps we should take it as parallel to the accusative-infinitive constructions above (B2-3, B4, B5, C3) and supply τινὰ as subject accusative.

2032 Reading ἀλλ' ὧν (D4) with *x corr. in marg. teste* Cantarín, *coniecerat* Bekker, *legg.* edd. (ἄλλα ὧν P<sup>2</sup>Par<sup>2</sup>E1E2<sup>2</sup> Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Woolsey : ἄλλων ὧν BTPWFE1<sup>2</sup> : τᾶλλα ὧν [ceteraque Ficinus] *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Coraes Thurot Ast Cary Sommer Christ Chambry Piettre Dalfen : καὶ ἄλλα ὧν Zb : ἀλλὰ ὧν Bas2 : καὶ ἄλλα ὧν *coni.* Findeisen). Generalization by means of καὶ τὰ ἄλλα X (n.pl.), where X is the general criterion or genus, is of course very common; and καὶ ἄλλο τι X (n.sing.) is also found (e.g., *Polit.*293B2-3, *Rep.*371C1-2, 416A4-5) but this passage is only instance of bare ἄλλα X (n.pl) that I know of. Closest is the anarthrous singular at *Symp.*211E2-3: ἀνάπλεον σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρώπινων καὶ χρομάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς (n.b., *Polit.*298D5-6, εἶτε τινῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ κυβερνητῶν εἴτ' ἄλλων ἰδιωτῶν συμβουλευόντων, is a different animal: its terms are forced to be anarthrous by initial τινῶν). The absence of καὶ with generalizing ἄλλα here is also striking, as if an illogical carry-over from the asyndeton between the last three items protecting against cold; but the two items before that (σιτία, ποτά) were also in quasi-asyndeton since they were linked only indirectly through the linkage of their protases (ἐὰν μὲν, ἐὰν δέ). Compare similar carry-over of asyndeton at 503E5 and at *Symp.*186E1. The abrupt onrush of ἄλλα is continued by ἐπιθυμεῖν being replaced by ἔρχεσθαι εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν (cf. *Tim.*19B7): with Deuschle-Cron, *die Begierden allmählich sich entwickeln, wachsen, und zahlreicher werden.* Also Mistriotis, ἀναπτύσσονται καὶ γίνονται πολυάριθμοι. For the proleptic genitive cf. 492A2.

2033 τῶν αὐτῶν (D5): Announcing he is about to go through the examples he just used once again – as ensuing programmatic γάρ indicates: λέγω is “anticipatory” present (cf. καταλύομεν, 505C8, and Smyth §1879). Consult, with Mistriotis, a similar apology for doing this sort of thing, at *Phdo.*95E2.

2034 Reading τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι (D6-7) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι F *teste* Cantarín : τούτων γὰρ ποριστικὸν Sauppe). The phrase resumes δυνατόν εἶναι ἐκπορίζειν (D2) at which point the examples were allowed to intervene, but the rewording now embodies that ability in a *person* (ποριστικόν can only be masculine and predicative: “to be able to provide”). He then specifies this able person by fleshing out the subject of εἶναι according to the several exemplary services, as γάρ promised. Once the list is completed by the echoic pair σκυτοτόμον / σκυτοδεσπὸν (cf. for closure by a complementary or contrary pair [*Leg.*764C8-D3, *Phdrs.*241C1-5, *Polit.*299E1-2, *Prot.*315C2-5, *Th.*186D10-11]), sometimes also echoic as here [*Leg.*679A4-6, 783C9-D1, 865A6-B1]), he embarks upon the present assertion (οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔστιν ...) bringing forward, with ὄντα τοιοῦτον (i.e., ποριστικόν) the unspecified subject of ποριστικόν. The infinitive phrase is a pendent nominative (Smyth §§941 and 3008) that will and can be incorporated into the coming assertion as ever that assertion sees fit. At *Rep.*331B1-5, for instance, the nominative infinitive phrase is tucked in as the antecedent to a demonstrative in a prepositional phrase; at *Th.*144A3-6 it falls into place as the accusative object of the verb (ὄρω, A6). In the present case its semantics (εἶναι ποριστικόν), are incorporated syntactically as a *participle* (τοιοῦτον [i.e., ποριστικόν] ὄντα) in the sentence proper, to modify the subject of the accusative-infinitive construction under the regime of οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔστι. With Jahn, the anacoluthon *veranlasst durch die Häufung der Beispiele*. The syntax has been “suspended” by the intervention and then the repetition of the exemplary material; and the reason this material is given so much emphasis that it interrupts the syntax, is that the claim that the various servitors are likely to overemphasize the importance of their trades (οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν) becomes conceivable only as we, and Callicles, imagine them *in concreto*. Hence Waterfield: “Not surprisingly, given their jobs...” We saw the same self-inflation among the χειρότεχνα in the *Apology* (22D2-7).

Dodds rather cryptically (1) takes ποριστικὸν εἶναι to be a continuation of the indirect discourse from ὠμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι (C8), and (2) seeks to “restore” syntactical order by adding ὄν after σκυτοδεσπὸν. If I understand him, he takes the sense to be: ‘... you agreed that the one is διακονικὴ, by which it is possible to provide this for this and that for that (D2-5) ... For (as you agreed) a man is able to provide by virtue of being this or that (D7-E2), who (it is unsurprising) believes he is a caretaker... (E2ff).’ But (1) requires the intervening remark about the reuse of examples (D5-6) to refer backward instead of forward to E1-2, and this he (with Dalfen, 464) attempts to do with only partial success (citing 490C8 and 491A1-2), while it leaves unclear why or what their reuse above (D2-5) makes it easier for Callicles to understand. Moreover it leaves nothing for γάρ (D6) to explain, and militates with the notion that its sentence continues to narrate what Callicles has agreed to. Instead, this sentence is saying something new: Socrates has not suggested before that it is their involvement in their various specialties that makes the servitors blind to the limitations of what they do, nor that the man who knows gymnastics and medicine is exempt from this blindspot. And (2) is meant to make δόξαι a continuation of the indirect discourse depending on C8 (now an infinitive in a relative clause, as at D2 above), which demotes οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔστιν to a parenthesis, but this is the main assertion and is what was made easier to understand by the regurgitation of the examples at E1-2.

καὶ αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῶ μὴ εἰδότη ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ<sup>2035</sup> ἰατρική, ἢ<sup>2036</sup> δὴ τῶ ὄντι γε<sup>2037</sup> ἔστιν σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὸ<sup>2038</sup> χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἔστιν εἰς ἀρετὴν [518] σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας<sup>2039</sup> ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν<sup>2040</sup> δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους<sup>2041</sup> εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματεῖαν,<sup>2042</sup> τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν<sup>2043</sup> ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω,<sup>2044</sup> καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω· ἦκεις<sup>2045</sup> δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων ὅτι ἄνθρωποι [b] καλοὶ καγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται<sup>2046</sup> ἐν τῇ

2035 τε καὶ (E5) links the predicate “gymnastic and medicine” as though they were a single art: it is in their contrast with the others that they are so (Helmbold goes too far calling them a combination: the matrix is two-dimensional). There is no need with Cobet (*Mnem.* n.s.2[1875]151) to excise them as a *marginale*. This “singular” is continued with ἦ (E5) and τὴν (518A3), but then finally “corrected” with the plural predicate δεσποίνας at A4 (which it became incumbent upon Cobet to emend to the singular). παρά = besides, not ὑπέρ (*pace* Sauppe).

2036 Reading ἦ (E5) with PF, *legg.* edd. (ἦ BTW).

2037 Reading γε (E5) with F, *legg.* Burnet Heidbüchel Cantarín Erler (*om.* BTWP, *legg.* edd.), stressing the contrast with δόξα (E2). Theiler, from Wecklein’s adducing *Symp.* 204C4 (τὸ τῶ ὄντι), inserts ἦ after δὴ, which does about the same work as this γε, which he does not read. But Wecklein’s emendation is unneeded since τῶ ὄντι can here be taken with ἐστὶ.

2038 Reading ὅτι τὸ (E7) with BTPW, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Hermann Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Schmelzer Lodge Stender Feix Hamilton (ὅτι NFlor, *legg.* edd. : ὅτι τε F, *leg.* Dodds). For the sense and importance of the article (which Dodds rejects as a false reading without argument), cf. 521A2 with my note. ἐμπειρία is being contrasted with true knowledge (*pace* Hirschig): without the article the expertise is merely to select the correct food; with the article we get the principle for the selection (“which ... have a tendency to promote...,” Hamilton). For single article with a pair cf. next line, X. *Anab.* 2.2.8 (οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοί), *al.*, and Smyth §1143.

2039 Reading ταύτας (518A1) with the mss. *legg.* edd. (ταῦτα *coni.* Coraes, *legg.* Schanz Christ Cary Croiset : *del.* Morstadt [*Emend.* 12]). The object of ἀγνοεῖν is the ὅτι clause, understood. Compare an expression like δοκεῖν μὲν σοφὸν εἶναι, εἶναι δ' οὐ.

2040 ταύτας μὲν, etc. (A2): The oblique construction (accusative/infinitive) is continued in order to confine this inference (διὸ) within the point of view of the one who knows rather than does not know (E3-4), and in this sense, with Stender, is *dem Sinne nach von τῶ μὴ εἰδότη abhängig*. It is so confined in order to prepare for the subsequent comparison between the knowledge about body and Callicles’s belief about soul (A5ff.). For the sort of binary construction in which one thing is being described twice, the first time with a pronoun (here ταύτας, A2), Riddell (§214) compares 500C3-4, *Apol.* 24E2, *Crat.* 423E4-5 and 7-8, *Leg.* 861D2-3; *Phlb.* 38B9-10, *Rep.* 396C5-7, *Symp.* 198D7-8, 207D2-3, 222A2-3 (αὐτῶν ... τῶν λόγων); *Tim.* 22D7-8 – and of course expressions like ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.

2041 δουλοπρεπεῖς τε καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους (A2). This is an open-textured triad. Some triads have a tight logical structure such as A<sup>1</sup>, A<sup>2</sup>, B (e.g., *Leg.* 704D6-7: πολλὰ τε ἐμειλλεν ἦθη καὶ ποικίλα καὶ φαῦλα ἔξεν; also *Crito* 47B1-2), or represent an illative or genetic sequence of stages (e.g., *Lys.* 215D3-4: φθόνου τε καὶ φίλονικίας καὶ ἐχθρας; also *Leg.* 634A3-4, *Prot.* 316D2-3); but the open-textured triads present a swift diversity (e.g., *Phdrs.* 229B1-2: σκιά τ' ἔστιν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον καὶ πῶα; also *Prot.* 333E3, 338A8; *Rep.* 357C2-3, 398A4-5 [with my note *ad loc.*], 601D4; *Tim.* 82B6-7) or, conversely, seem pleonastic as if to force the point home with gratuitous redundancy (e.g., 494E5: δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἄθλιος; also *Leg.* 809D3; *Rep.* 407B8-C1, 461B6, 522C1-2, 582A5). While the usual connectives are of course A τε καὶ B καὶ C, where τε encourages the mind to see the three items in constellation, this latter open-textured type might omit τε so as to achieve greater insistence or stridency. Cf. also nn. 339, 958.

The present case is hard to classify: its redundancy is strident and disdainful (Jahn), but its third term does hint at a logical structure (suggested also by τε), in presenting a contrapositive of the first (Mistriotis). Irwin takes the second and third together as a complementary exegesis of the first (“the other crafts are slavish, with the tasks of servants not free men”): compare Allen’s dyadic version, “slavish and unfree servants” – both of which ignore strident καί. In any case, Deuschle-Cron and Dodds hear an allusion to Callicles’s derogatory language at 485BD, where a similar contrapositive figure is employed. Perhaps the first and last terms are being remembered and the middle term, a creature of the present context, brings them forward to frame it. In any case Socrates herewith means to reverse the priority of oratory and philosophy, and another chip is being removed! The reversal is continued below (C2ff.) where Socrates is an Amphion treating Callicles as his Zethos: he begins to make good on the promise he made at 506B5-6 (cf. 521E1-2).

2042 Reading περὶ σώματος πραγματεῖαν (A3) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (*del.* Dodds, *legg.* Zeyl Waterfield Cantarín : περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας *coni.* τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας *delens* Cobet [*Mnem.* n.s.2[1875]151-2], *legg.* Christ Hamilton : περὶ σῶμα πραγματείας\*\*\* τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας *legentes* Schanz Lodge Sauppe Stender). Cobet’s objection to σώματος πραγματεῖαν is based on his taking πραγματεία in too narrow a sense: he wants these pseudo-arts to be dubbed a κολακεία or a θεραπεία; also, πραγματεία is used in the plural and with περὶ plus accusative at 501B3, and Cobet imports that here. He deletes τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας for its redundancy, as though (as he seems unable not to think) a more streamlined text had greater historical warrant. He also emends δεσποίνας (A4) to δέσποιναν (followed by Theiler), to be consistent with his deletion of γυμναστικὴ τε καὶ ἰατρικὴ above (517E4-5), obliterating any evidence from the unanimous mss. that that dyad was being seen as a single kind over against the pseudo-arts of the body, but also as a pair.

2043 οὖν (A5) here answers and follows up on the οὖν at 517C4.

2044 Reading ὅτι λέγω (A6) with mss. and edd. (*secl.* Cobet, translated by neither Ficinus nor Serranus), meaning, in both instances “what I mean” or “as I mean it.” “Someone” (*sic*) advised Stallb. that ὅτε would be better, and Madvig (*Advers.* 1.412) Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Dodds Theiler Chambry Waterfield Nichols Piettre agreed. That may well be, but there is neither need nor sufficient evidence to alter the text.

2045 ἦκεις (A7): The μὲν clause leads us to expect τότε δέ but with some emphasis Socrates shifts the construction to ἦκεις, as he similarly did at 491B8-C2, where again he broke off with ἦκεις (C2).

2046 ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ καγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολῖται (B1): Though sometimes doubted (Ast Woolsey), ἄνθρωποι here, read by edd., adds a contemptuous tone = “political types” (*pace* Stender) to which Socrates refers back at E2 below (cf. also C4, παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους). Cf. X. *Cyrop.* 8.7.14; *Lys.* 4.9, 4.19, 30.28; *Isoc. Arch.* 80; *D.* 22.56: cf. LSJ s.v., A.2.4), where (conversely) ἀνήρ when added is approbatory (L. Valckenaer *Opusc.*

πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ οἴτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ<sup>2047</sup> περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος οἴτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωμάτων θεραπευταί,<sup>2048</sup> ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἄρτοκόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὄψοποιίαν συγγεγραφῶς τὴν Σικελικὴν<sup>2049</sup> καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κήπηλος,<sup>2050</sup> ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς [c] παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ ὅτι Ἄνθρωπε,<sup>2051</sup> ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαίοντας καλὸν κάγαθον οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν,<sup>2052</sup> οἷ, ἂν οὕτω τύχῳσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν<sup>2053</sup> αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας· οἱ [d] δ’ αὖ δι’ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους<sup>2054</sup> εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν<sup>2055</sup> αὐτοῖς τύχῳσι

[1808] 2.243-245), e.g. *Apol.*28B6 (vs. ἀνήρ B9), *Prot.*319A4, T. 1.74.1. Cary skirts the problem by tr. πολῖται with “in this city.” καλὸς κάγαθός again serves as the neutral term crucial for managing moral controversy (cf. n. 732, *sub fin.*).

- 2047 ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ (B3), often written together, when the εἶ is subsequently ignored, and a participial construction is allowed to substitute for a finite protasis.
- 2048 θεραπευταί (B5), as if synonymous with ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν (again repeating Callicles’s incautious and doxic expression from 503C1-2), which begs the entire question (see 517E3 and E5-6 above).
- 2049 τὴν Σικελικὴν (B7), notoriously lavish (*Rep.*404D1, Athen. 12.518C), and “featured” by being placed in second attributive position.
- 2050 Thearion, Mithaikos, Sarambos (B5-7): The individuals exemplify the trades that were adduced above to exemplify bodily διάκονοι (517D7-E2: note usual chiasmic ordering). The extra layer of specification is not uncommon in egagogic exemplification since by its nature it makes the exemplification more vivid: note how they are “featured” by prolepsis in the “lilies of the field” construction: their almost autonomous notoriety carries forward the role the personal consciousness (καὶ αὐτῶ) and notoriety (καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις) of the διάκονοι had played above (517E2-3) in their being deemed nothing less than θεραπευταί.
- 2051 Ἄνθρωπε (C2): Vocative without ὃ, here setting off something of a tirade (C2-519D7), is “passionate” (Gildersleeve §20, comparing *Lach.*197E10, *Phlb.*11A1, *Soph.*220D2[mss.BT], *Symp.*172A6, 173E4, 175A4; see also *S. Ai.*293, *E. Hel.*858, *Ar. Ach.*1097-8; *X. Cyrop.*2.2.7; and *D.* 8.34, 18.243 (ἐμβρόντητε), 20.1, 32.1). The impatience is continued by the ensuing asyndeton at C3 (compare 472A5).
- 2052 αὐτῶν (C5): The antecedent is ἐπιθυμίας, with Lamb Stender Woodhead Hamilton Irwin Waterfield Nichols Dalfen Erler (not γυμναστικῆ somehow pluralized, *pace* Lodge). Croiset Chambry tr. “*en cette affaire*” and Zeyl “in these cases,” but those translations would want τούτων; nor “the fine points” (Helmbold); nor are Canto and Pietre’s *en matière de désirs et de biens* justified. The “worthwhile” thing to know about the desires is which are healthy and to what extent, as the sequel describes: καλὸν κάγαθόν (neuter!) is again loose (as the crasis emphasizes), echoing its use at B1. Cf. 501A5-B1, and A1 above. Allen’s “without realizing there is nothing good and fine about them,” though desirable, needs words that are not there. With Deuschle-Cron, Stallb. and *AGPS* 51.1.1, the gratuitous addition of ἀνθρώπους to παρασκευαστὰς is derogatory (“the sort of person who”), as if in answer to ποίους ἀνθρώπους; – cf. n. 2046.
- 2053 Reading προσπολοῦσιν (C7) with B, *legg.* edd. (προσαπολλοῦσιν F : προσπολλοῦσι[v] TPW Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Thurot Cary). According to Olymp., ἀρχαία σάρκες means ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, 204.2), and is thus synonymous with Hippocrates’s term ἀρχαία φύσις (for one’s condition before the onset of disease: cf. *Epid.*2.1.6, Hesych. s.v.). Thurot’s *première et véritable vigueur* is the sense, but “old flesh” sets up the ἀρχαία χρήματα of the comparandum. The dead metaphor is thus brought back to a half-life in a proleptic skew; but it was never a metaphor in English and “original flesh” (Irwin Allen Zeyl Nichols Dalfen Erler) as well as “the original quality of the flesh” (Waterfield) hardly even count as translation. Rather than elaborating the physiology of dieting, with Thompson Jowett Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Chambry Hamilton Irwin Canto (with the sense, “they become thinner than they were before” – quite inappropriate after ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες – or “lose their muscles,” followed by bulimy (!) Canto, Pietre), we should merely translate with something serviceable in English – for instance with “the health they came with” so as to set up “the wealth they came with” below.
- 2054 αἰτίους (D2): The redundancy with αἰτιάσθαι is not uncommon: *Crat.*411C1-2, *Phlb.*22D1-2, since the verb is virtually a verb of speaking (“blame them, claiming...”).
- 2055 ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν (D2-3): At this point, it must be said, the front-loading and prolepsis in Socrates’s analogy almost collapses under its own weight! (I will hereunder call the *simile* the *comparans* and the target the *comparandum*). Before really stating the *comparandum* (though from A5 we can guess it will be the “true therapists of soul”) he first moves to the *comparans* (with ὁμοιοτάτους, B2) saying that the [wrong] answer for the soul he has been getting (the *comparandum*) is exactly like the wrong answer he would get for the body (the *comparans*). He then presents that wrong answer for the body (which names the food servers), quoting “directly” what he imagines Callicles would say and having him go into gratuitous detail with proper names and distinct arts of cuisine (B5-C1). And then, again postponing his *comparandum* (the distinction between true and false therapists of soul) he worries how Callicles would react (C1-2) if, to that imaginary wrong answer, he presented a very derogatory imaginary response, which again he presents in “direct” form (C2ff). This imaginary response does at least begin to fill out the *comparans*, by describing and characterizing the food servers (C3-5), but then criticizes them (C5-7) for the *effect* they have on those they serve and introduces those who are being served so as to imagine their misguided opinions about the cause of the effects they are suffering (C7-D2)! And at this point, with ἀλλά (D2), he introduces still other parties, unidentified passers-by (!) who offer some unsolicited but also unspecified advice (συμβουλευόντες τι, D3: τι implies both). Will these persons perhaps represent or embody the other term in the *comparans*, the true therapy of the body, so that we might finally move on to the *comparandum* and illustrate the very close ὁμοιότης alleged at B2?

We know, even if Callicles does not, that all this front-loading will have introduced the criteria that will illuminate the target case, the *comparandum*, because we are familiar with and expect from Socrates a deployment of his egagogic method. But since Callicles is uncooperative Socrates cannot expect to sustain a step-by-step series of questions and answers; and all this frontloading is his revenge. Socrates is giving him back some of the gratuitous complication Callicles’s own dialectical misbehavior has inflicted upon the two of them (as he did for similar reasons



τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντες τι, ὅταν δὴ<sup>2056</sup> αὐτοῖς ἤκη ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ,<sup>2057</sup> ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσιν καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν,<sup>2058</sup> ἂν οἴοι τ' ὥσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν [e] ἐγκωμιάσουσιν. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοίωτον τούτῳ<sup>2059</sup> ἐργάζη· ἐγκωμιάσεις ἀνθρώπους<sup>2060</sup> οἱ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες<sup>2061</sup> ᾧν ἐπεθύμουν. καὶ φασὶ<sup>2062</sup> μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτοῦς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὑπουλός ἐστιν [519] δι' ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται.<sup>2063</sup> ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν<sup>2064</sup> ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἢ καταβολὴ<sup>2065</sup> αὐτῆ<sup>2066</sup> τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους,<sup>2067</sup> Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν·

with Polus, and apologized for doing it at 465E). And here also he will apologize for it the end of this speech (519D5-7: cf. n. 2092).

2056 Reading δὴ (D4) with F, *legg.* edd. (δὲ BTWPf Steph., *leg.* Routh Beck), finally introducing the denouement of this grand knot!

2057 συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ (D4-5): While ὕστερον designates the *post hoc*, συχνῶ emphasizes both their entire unawareness of the continuity of the bad regime's operation and ill effect *propter hoc*.

2058 κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν (D6): This is a bit of a stretch but we shall see it explained or justified in the description of the *comparandum* below (519A7-B2) – another “proleptic skew.”

2059 ὁμοίωτον τούτῳ (E1): Despite our anticipations, everything collapses. It is not, as Socrates announced at the beginning, Callicles's preferred politicians that are exactly like the food servitors of the *comparans* (ὁμοιοτάτους ... ὡσπερ ἄν, B2ff), but Callicles's own behavior that is exactly like (ὁμοίωτον) that of those they served, as it was presently described (τούτῳ: there is insufficient warrant to read the plural from the Augustanus [and O1, *teste* Cantarin], with Cobet). He is placed in the role of those who received the food and mistakenly praised these servitors, and not the *πραγματεία* of soul in general we were made to anticipate (at A5) but the *πραγματεία* of politics moves into the place of the anticipated *comparandum*!

2060 ἀνθρώπους (E2), echoing A7, B3, and C4: “certain types” – or the way the police speak of citing “an individual toting a gun.”

2061 εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες (E2-3): Here begins the application of the exemplary and proleptic (somatic) *comparans* to the target (psychic) *comparandum*. As elsewhere it is achieved by articulating the somatic example through metaphors (cf. ἐμπεπλήκασιν, 519A3; ἀσθενείας, A4); by the introduction of new elements pertaining exclusively to the target, that boldly replace analogous elements in the description of the exemplar (e.g., ἄνευ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, 519A2 [ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, 518D5]); by the repetition of terms (παρόντας ... συμβούλους, 519A5 [518D3]; αἰτιάσονται, 519A5 [518D6]; ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, 519A6 [518E1]), even insouciant about equivocation (προσαπολλύουσι “destroy” 518C7 vs. προσαπολλύουσι “lose” 519A8) and about punning (πάροντες = presently in office, A5 [πάροντες τύχοντες = bystanders, D3!]; τὰ ἀρχαῖα *sc.* χρήματα, 519A8 [ἀρχαίας σάρκας, 518C7]); by parallel conjunctions (ὅταν οὖν, 519A4 [ὅταν δὴ, 518D4]; by shift of tense (to future αἰτιάσονται / ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, A5-6 [cf. 518D6-E1]); by parallel cognate constructions (αἰτιάσονται - αἰτίους 519A4-5 [αἰτιάσονται - αἰτίους 518D1, D6, allowing and requiring us to supply εἶναι at 519A5 for parallel εἶναι at 518D2]; καταβολή, 519A4 [ἀποβολή, 518D2]); and by shift of particles (from narrative δὴ at 518D4 to inferential οὖν at 519D4). On the special use of the demonstrative in the context of such parallelism (αὕτη, 519A4) cf. n. 2066, *infra*.

A more subtle observation about this method of comparison must also be made. Certain details presented in the *comparans* seem less likely or motivated than others, such as in the present case the gratuitously exceptional diction of ἀρχαῖα σάρκες (C7, D2), and the assertion that the slothful over-served will not only be angry but will try to do ill to the counsellors (D6-7). The unmotivated and awkward frontloading into these two details will later be redeemed by their elaboration in the *comparandum*. This is what I have called “proleptic skew” (cf. nn. 1618, 1620, 558).

2062 καὶ φασὶ (E3): The abruptness of the sudden change of subject and object from the servitors to those served and vice-versa (in order to fill in the notion of τούτους) is entirely unprepared, though idiomatic (cf. 510B9-C1, n. 1853, and H. *Iliad* 1.78). There is further confusion, since in describing these Socrates is actually continuing with his description of Callicles's likeness to them, but this is how he makes his transition from the *comparans* to the *comparandum*. The abrupt syntax and the flat use of breathless καὶ express indignation, as did his similarly abrupt *obiter dictum* at 517C1-2. Compare this reversion to the subject of the previous participle by subsequent demonstrative (αὐτούς) to the similarly breathless passage in Polus's description of Archelaus (καὶ οὐ μεταμέλησεν αὐτῷ, 471B7) as well as the calmer case at 452D4.

2063 ὅτι δὲ ... οὐκ αἰσθάνονται (519A1): This abrupt undercutting of what came before as if with an afterthought resembles παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδοῖ ... ἱατρική, above (517E3-4).

2064 τοιούτων φλυαριῶν (A3): The list of items is brought forward from Gorgias's boast at 455D8-E1 and Socrates's recalling of it at 517C2-3, but this time φόροι is added since these bold projects do not come for free: there is perhaps an allusion to the fact that Athens collected them from neighboring states and spent them upon themselves, and to some extent this self-aggrandizement under the authorization of the Delian League was the cause of the Peloponnesian War (T. 1.23.6), but as elsewhere in this argument there is no need for a close, let alone accurate, depiction of current Athenian politics for the dialectical point to be made. For the use of persistent καὶ (cf. 511E2-3; *Alc. I* 122C4-8, *Leg.* 734D2-5, 942B4-C1; *Prot.* 324C3-D1) here in exasperation, driving on to a dismissive and indignant generalization (cf. 527BE, *Crat.* 408D6-E1, *Leg.* 885D5-7, *Rep.* 360B7-C3). For φλυαρία capping such a list, cf. 490C8 and 492C7 (Callicles), *Phdo.* 66C7, *Symp.* 211E3 (contrast *Apol.* 19C4, where φλυαρία is a genuine generalization). To make it plural, as here, is even more derogatory for its verging on nonsense: cf. 490C8 (Callicles). Derogatory τοιούτων φλυαριῶν answers both Callicles's approbatory τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα (517A8) and his two uses of φλυαρία above. Dalfen helpfully remembers Plato uses the term in the Cave Allegory (*Rep.* 515D2). Lamb Woodhead Dodds Hamilton Zeyl Nichols “suchlike trash” (*vel sim.*) is wrong: the connotation of φλυαρία is vanity, not worthlessness (thus *bagatelles*, Chambry Piettre; *Unsinn*, Erler).

2065 καταβολή (A4): A medical term for the onset of chronic disease as with fever (Timaeus *Lex.* περιοδικὴ λήμψις πυρετοῦ; schol. *ad H.Min.* 372E; Galen *Gloss.Hipp. s.v.* καταβολήσι [*sic*]). Thompson helpfully adduces D. 9.29 as a further parallel.

2066 αὕτη (A4): After ὅταν οὖν had quoted ὅταν δὴ from the *comparans* (518D4), the demonstrative is enabled to point to this context, the context of the *comparandum*.

σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήφονται,<sup>2068</sup> ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῆ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου<sup>2069</sup> Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα<sup>2070</sup> προσαπολλύωσι [b] πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι<sup>2071</sup> ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν ὀρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω<sup>2072</sup> τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν<sup>2073</sup> περί· αἰσθάνομαι<sup>2074</sup> γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν<sup>2075</sup> μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων<sup>2076</sup> καὶ σχετλιαζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ<sup>2077</sup> καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεπονηκότες ἄρα<sup>2078</sup> ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψευδὸς ἐστίν·

- 2067 συμβούλους (A5), *sc.* εἶναι ἢ ὄντας: “for being their policy makers.” The postponement of this second predicate (τοὺς τότε πάροντες αἰτιάσονται *συμβούλους*) imitates a parallel postponement in the *comparans*, τοὺς ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται ... *αἰτίους εἶναι* (518D1-2), so that the copula there will easily be supplied here (with *εἶναι ἢ ὄντας*). Contrast τοὺς αἰτίους, in the subsequent parallel, which the article makes an appositive.
- 2068 σοῦ ... ἐπιλήφονται (A7): This is the corollary to κακῶν τι ποιήσουσιν ἂν οἷοί τ' ᾗσι, above (518D6-7): the diction of this threat to Callicles recalls the diction of Callicles's threat to Socrates at 486A7 (σοῦ λαβόμενος)! The loss of property now becomes the corollary to the notion of ἀρχαῖα σάρκες in the *comparans*. More chips are taken off the table as Socrates himself employs ἴσως in minatory understatement (A7, and again below at B2: cf. nn. 1936, 1114, 801) and even reverses Callicles's conception of politics against him. Cf. n. 2072, *infra*. The passage elicits guesses from the commentators as to whether Plato is here indicating the fate of an historical Callicles (about whom we otherwise know nothing, so that he would be a mask for someone else); Dodds (p.13) marvelously imagines that there was a real Callicles who died too young to be memorable, and that he would be unknown but for the fact that Plato remembers him here – pre-empting any motive for Plato to commemorate him as well (indeed to the contrary, Plato's fourth century audience would likely infer Plato means him a failure). But there is no need to go outside the text: though Callicles is in the analogy the counterpart to the foolish citizens (518E1), Socrates now shifts him into the group of “current” συμβουλευόντες – the power men he hopes to join: the citizens will blame him simply because he is holding office when the effects of the previous policies come home to roost, but in truth (given his admiration for “the greats” and a presumption that he would continue their policies) a real case could be made that he is a contributor to their demise and really does deserve their anger.
- 2069 ἐταίρου (A8): Socrates allows the political term (from 510A10) to replace παιδικά (481D6, *al.*) indicating (*mutatis mutandis*) that Callicles himself will be vulnerable to reprisals from the fickle deme against the regime he now seeks to join through his alliance with Pylilampes's son Demos (on which cf. n. 1929, *supra*), and with which he will therefore be linked.
- 2070 ἀρχαῖα (A8) *sc.* χρήματα: cf. D. 1.15 (cf. Mistriotis 397). With Helmbold I take the allusion to Alcibiades to serve as an index of the imperial decline of Athens – its accumulated stature and wealth – as the content of the “target.” Note the semantic shift in προσπολλύωσι, now denoting “lose” rather than “destroy,” the change of subject (from the previous purveyors [518C7] to the citizens being purveyed to) forcing it to mean what it here must mean – another example of the tension between repetition and variation in the proleptic strategy of *comparans/comparandum*: contrast n. 2067, where similarity was reliable instead of deceptive!
- 2071 καίτοι (B2): Kratz asks to what the sequel is adversative. Though καίτοι *can* be “continuative” (cf. Kuhner 2.2.152 and Denniston 559-61), Denniston here finds it adversative, indeed, looking still further ahead: “Yet, on reflection, no real politician can be unjustly treated” (summarizing B2-C2); more accurately, despite the foolishness of the citizenry the putative leaders complain about it as unjust.
- 2072 Reading ἀκούω (B3) with BTWPF and edd. (οὐκ ἀκούω F). The behavior he sees among present office holders (οἱ νῦν) is as mindless as that of citizens imputing “greatness” to those of the past. Part of Plato's problem in the expression here is that Socrates has no noun to use, ironic or otherwise, for the current office holders (οἱ νῦν). συμβουλευόντες has already been used for the activity of the orator rather than an officer (518D3: cf. 456A2). The shift from an incorrect praise of past greats to the presumption that oneself will be immune from foolish criticism once he has achieved power, represents a blindspot within Callicles himself, as Socrates here warns and will subsequently show: cf. Mistriotis p.398 (*ad* 518C1, ἡγανάκτεις).
- 2073 ἀνδρῶν (B3), presenting a good example of the connotative power of this term. Not “people” (Waterfield) but those same “greats.” Socrates now brings in his own example of turning on the Big Four!
- 2074 Reading περί· αἰσθάνομαι γάρ (B3-4) with B<sup>2</sup>T<sup>2</sup>W Steph., *legg.* edd. (περὶ αἰσθάνομαι BTP : \*\*\*\* ὑπερῖ αἰσθάνομαι F : περί *in lac. suppl. et ὑπερ punctis del.* f).
- 2075 ὡς ἀδικοῦντα (B5), *on the grounds of having* committed an injustice, not “because” (*pace* Zeyl): only their opinion is enough for the μεταχειρίζεσθαι.
- 2076 ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων (B5) are genitive supplementary participles with αἰσθάνομαι (for the genitive compare 481D5-E1, *Apol.* 22C5; T. 5.83.1; X. *Mem.* 1.4.13, *Cyrop.* 7.1.22). Though only one of the politicians (τινὰ) is being criticized, we must supply αὐτῶν (i.e., οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνθρωποι) as subject, partly under the influence of the parallel with the παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν (Lodge; cf. *les accusés*, Croiset): Socrates hears the entire class complain about being criticized in order to generalize. For omission of subject [Ast: “*verbum si ad nomen praegressum refertur, absolute ponere*”] cf. 510C9; *Apol.* 29B2, *Prot.* 317D7, 323A3, 347C3; *Rep.* 536D6; Smyth §931, Gildersleeve §§70-82). Jowett, however, having taken the previous sentence to mean, “A foolish piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen” (taking νῦν ὀρῶ to be pregnant for ὀρῶ περὶ τῶν νῦν), supplies τινῶν (as does Huit), as if the complaining is done not by those suddenly out of favor but by citizens who praise the good old days, as Callicles had; but the sequel (C2-3 and 520A3-6) *presumes* that the complainers are the politicians that claimed to be benefactors.
- 2077 πολλὰ (B6): If one punctuates after πεπονηκότες and reads ἄρα (Q?QbZaNFlor *teste* Cantarin and Stephanus, *legg.* Routh Ast Thurot : ἄρα mss.), the sense is, *quiritates quod gravia patientur, quippe qui beneficia in rempublicam multa contulerint. illine injuste ab illa pereunt, prout illorum fert oratio?* But the question this creates is out of place and left unanswered (Coraes and Findeisen so punctuate but avoid creating a question by re-accenting ἄρα as ἄρα, impossible at the beginning of a sentence!). Punctuating with a colon after πάσχουσι (with edd., whom I follow) introduces asyndeton at πολλὰ, by which Socrates jumps into semi-quotation of those he is talking about (though indirectly: he uses third rather than first person), and reading ἄρα (see next note) then continues the quotation credibly, and avoids the unanswered question. Heindorf and Richards escape the problem by adding εἰ before πάσχουσι or before ἄρα.
- 2078 ἄρα (B7), in indignant reflection, is late, but it can more easily be so since it is not connective (“though here, too, it tends to an early position,” Denniston 41), and it would be inappropriate earlier. It is postponed by the outburst of indignation (“after all we have done!”), already framed in asyndeton. But its (already postponed) position at the *beginning* of its own *clause* is awkward (whence Richards would insert εἰ), as also is the



προστάτης<sup>2079</sup> γὰρ πόλεως [c] οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς<sup>2080</sup> τῆς πόλεως ἥς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γὰρ<sup>2081</sup> ταῦτόν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται<sup>2082</sup> εἶναι καὶ<sup>2083</sup> ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἄτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα·<sup>2084</sup> φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις<sup>2085</sup> κατηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς,<sup>2086</sup> τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, [d] εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ<sup>2087</sup> τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώτερον εἴη πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομένους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόντας<sup>2088</sup> δὲ

fact that it *prepares* for its word (here, ἀδίκως) rather than, as usual, acknowledging the mental reaction spurred by the word it follows (Dodds does suggest relocating it after ἀδίκως). For late ἄρα, though properly *after* the words it emphasizes, cf. *Phlb.*41C2; *Prot.*355B5 (reading BTW over Γ); *Symp.* 177E7, 199A3.

- 2079 προστάτης (B8): This new term (compare, with Dalfen, its use by Thucydides, 3.75.2, 3.82.1, 4.66.3, and contrast n. 2072) raises the register: it means “a real leader” (compare Socrates’s use of ῥήτορες at 517A5 and n. 2016, and note φάσκοντες below, 520A3). The lie is not merely the claim that their demotion was unjustified, *pace* Ast Hamilton (tr. “unless he deserved it”) and Waterfield (“how can it possibly be *wrong* for any state official to be brought down...”) apparently taking a legalistic interpretation). Rather, ἀδίκως is otiose (and can with Zeyl be left out), merely quoting the complaint. Their *entire complaint*, its whole drift (τὸ ὅλον), is a crock, since they were never true leaders in the first place. The principle was enunciated as axiomatic and universal, above 516E6-7 (οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα...): their complaint is merely a contradiction in terms.
- 2080 Reading αὐτῆς only (C1) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (αὐτῆς ταύτης F Aristides : ταύτης *coni.* Heindorf). It is enough: cf. *Phdrs.*273A2, *Rep.*362D5; D. 18.19 and 129. Jowett translates ἀπολλύναι in this passage with “kill,” making the present remark a semantic problem (“assassination” surely is possible!). But it means only to destroy them in their fame, corresponding to ἐκπίπτειν at 516E1-7 and the ruinations there described.
- 2081 Reading γὰρ (C2) with the mss. and edd. Deuschle (1859) reads ἄρα without comment, a reading patently preferable!
- 2082 Taking προσποιοῦνται (C3) only with the πολιτικοί. There is no warrant to extend its regime to σοφισταί (*pace* Jowett Lodge Helmbold Hamilton Irwin Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols Dalfen Erler): Socrates immediately continues with σοφισταί, not so-called ones, and nor even with οὗτοι (though Hamilton does and must: see below); with ὅσοι σοφισταί supply εἰσίν. The προσποίησις consists of thinking they have accrued during their own reign the immunity from criticism that the foolish citizenry accords to the ἄνδρες of the past. Just as the claim of the repudiated men that they were true πολιτικοί – i.e., προσταταί – is in doubt, what is in doubt in the sequel is not the sophists’ profession of being sophists, but of being teachers of virtue: if they were, their students would not turn against them. Hamilton telescopes Socrates’s punch by taking προσποιοῦνται with both πολιτικοί and σοφισταί and persisting in translating σοφιστής with “teacher of goodness,” replacing the notoriously vague but widely used term with an interpretation (so ever since 463B6: cf. n. 498), before Socrates characterizes them as such (thus incidentally he cannot translate its second appearance at C3 without forcing Socrates into an obtuse tautology, and uses the demonstrative instead [“these latter”]) – which of course Socrates could have done. The problem of this translation becomes acutely clear both in the case of Euthydemus and Dionosydorus (*Euthyd.*273D8-9), whose performance is hardly a popular lecture though they do style themselves teachers of goodness, and in the object being searched for in Plato’s *Sophist*.
- 2083 τε ... καὶ (C2-3) connect *symmetrically* the new thing (sophists) that is being said to be the same as the previous one. It is idiomatic in Greek to forgo maintaining the logical hierarchy with an asymmetric construction (e.g., putting the previous item into the dative) – i.e., saying “This and That are the same” instead of saying “This is the same as That” (as below, 520A6-7, and Smyth §1501a and §2169; cf. *Apol.*22D5-6, *Phdo.*64C10; X. *Symp.*8.15), and Denniston 292 (7). It is not necessary, with Stallb. Ast Woolsey Huit Saupe to “simplify” by supplying τούτοις or πρὸς τούτοις before ὅσοι.
- 2084 πρᾶγμα (C4): With Ast, “*pragma*” *apponitur adiectivis ita ut pronominis indefiniti partem agat*, comparing 517C4; *Prot.*312C4, 355D1; *Rep.*531C5, *Symp.*202A6. (similarly at D2, below, except there the etymological sense of πρᾶγμα is drawn to the surface by the opposition to λόγος). Cf. 520B5 and n. 2105. Compare the idiomatic use of γρήμα with adjective and genitive (ὅς μέγα γρήμα [Hdt. 1.36.1] Smyth §§1294, 1322). It is not a “blunder” (Helmbold) – i.e., a failure to hide something of which they are aware – but an act by which, unawares, they call their own ἐπάγγελμα into question (“an absurd behavior,” Woodhead).
- 2085 πολλάκις (C5) = “occasionally” (i.e., empirically), not “often.” κατηγοροῦσιν denotes that the sophists take their students into court, its complementary clause (ἀδικεῖν plus τούς μισθοὺς ἀποστερεῖν of the offensive act) having the form of a legal complaint. Dodds notes Demosthenes does mention a charge τούς μισθοὺς ἀποστερεῖν against Aphobus (27.46), and Isocrates describes the sophists’ practice of having their fees put in escrow (*Soph.*5), clearly for avoiding this very eventuality.
- 2086 Reading σφᾶς αὐτούς (C6) with TWPF, *legg.* edd. (σφᾶς αὐτούς B Steph., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Cantarin : σφᾶς *coni.* Bekker Ast[1832] Thompson Hirschig Burnet Woodhead Dodds Theiler Chambry Hamiton Irwin Allen Zeyl Nichols Cantarin Heidbüchel Dalfen Erler), which stresses the irony (again below, with αὐτοί, B5). The question is whether the reflexive can bleed back from the *oratio obliqua* into the *recta* (*pace* Thompson and Dodds who think that αὐτούς makes σφᾶς refer to the subject of ἀδικοῦσι rather than that of the leading construction in κατηγοροῦσιν, the governance of which continues in the allegations of the subsequent circumstantial participles, expressing the opinions not of the subject of the oblique verb but of the leading one).
- 2087 καὶ (D1): Another “vigorous” use of initial καὶ (cf. 516B5, 511D3, 510A3). Heindorf Cobet Theiler are correct to want the sense “and yet,” but their emendation to καίτοι (accepted by Coraes Schanz) is unnecessary since καὶ can have this corrective force (Denniston [292], citing several examples from tragedy, to which now add 511D3, *Apol.*29B1[with mss.BTWStob.Arm. : καίτοι Euseb., *legg.* edd.], *Th.*188D10), especially in commands and questions (Ast[1832], K-G, 2.247f, Denniston 310). Conversely, καίτοι is not always adversative (519B2 above). ἄλογον stresses the logical contradiction: Isocrates uses the same word at *Soph.*6.
- 2088 Reading σχόντας (D4) of course, with BT, *legg.* edd. (ἔχοντας WFPPar<sup>2</sup>, *leg.* Naber[*Mnemos.*36{1908}262]), as the correlate required by ἐξαιρεθέντας. Naber’s justification is as perfunctory as mine (“*prorsus necessarium*”). The accusative (here, ἀδικίαν) with the passive is idiomatic for verbs whose active takes double accusative: cf. *Menex.*236B2-3, *Rep.*456D9; Hdt. 3.137.4; T. 6.24.2.

δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὁ<sup>2089</sup> οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο<sup>2090</sup> ἄτοπον<sup>2091</sup> εἶναι, ὃ ἐταῖρε;

... ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν<sup>2092</sup> με ἠνάγκασας, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΚΑΛ. σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴος τε ἦς<sup>2093</sup> λέγειν, εἰ μή τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; [e]

ΣΩ. ἔοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν<sup>2094</sup> συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων,<sup>2095</sup> ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἶπε πρὸς Φιλίου,<sup>2096</sup> οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ<sup>2097</sup> ἀγαθὸς γεγονῶς τε καὶ ὢν ἔπειτα<sup>2098</sup> πονηρὸς<sup>2099</sup> ἐστίν;

ΚΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;

[520] ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις<sup>2100</sup> ἀνθρώπων περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων;

2089 Reading ὁ (D4) with BTWP Steph., *legg. edd.* (ἀλλ' F : ὃ fQNFlor, *legg. Bekker Ast Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Sauppe Burnet Erlor*). With Stallb., an attraction to the dative only undermines the strength of expression sought by using both the demonstrative and the relative (τοῦτο ὁ = the very thing they do not have).

2090 Reading τοῦτο (D5) with mss., *legg. edd.* (om. F); and reading με (D6) with TPFb, *legg. edd.* (μὲν B).

2091 ἄτοπον (C4-D4) With feigned naivete Socrates finally replies to Gorgias's equally feigned claim that he teaches his students to be just, a deep hypocrisy that Polus with superficial bluster intervened to save him from having to explain. The paradox would be resolved by hypothesizing the contradictory: that Gorgias did not teach them to be just; but it would make even more sense if Gorgias were doing the contrary, teaching them to be unjust – which according to the entire argument of the dialogue is exactly the case! Mistreatment of himself by his students is not exactly what Gorgias complained of, but rather being blamed by the general public as being the teacher of the unjust acts they commit against their opponents. But he makes even this complaint for the sake of being seen as a teacher of civic virtue. Plato leaves it to his reader to reflect on this, just as all along the way he has left it to the reader to detect delays and silent demurrals in the replies of Polus and Callicles as well as allusions to Gorgias without mentioning his name! Cf. nn. 1559 and 2019.

2092 δημηγορεῖν (D5): Note the two asyndeta, begging for Callicles's answer. He is now responsible for what he previously accused Socrates of, *ipsissimis verbis* (ὡς ἀληθῶς δημήγορος ὢν: 482C5), whereas δημήγορος at 494D1 regards the different matter of scandalizing the crowd. The speech is truly a tirade in form (as we have noted) and length (it is the longest speech he makes in the dialogue: 507A5-509C4 was a *dialectical monologue*), and it removes several chips from the table. Jowett's tr. "claptrap," is an impertinent slur. Socrates finally gives vent to his accumulating anger at Callicles's consistent insouciance and abuse!

2093 Reading τε ἦς (D8) with F *teste* Cantarin, *legg. Helmbold Irwin Zeyl Canto Nichols[ut vid.]* (τ' εἴης BTWP, *legg. edd.*). This "answer" avoids responding to anything in Socrates's long speech, but (*n.b.*, with the past potential ἦς from F [cf. Smyth §1784]) tries belatedly to put the lie to Socrates's earlier claim (505D2-506A7) that he was unqualified to bring the argument to completion without a dialectical partner.

2094 Reading γοῦν (E1) with BF, *legg. edd.* (γ' οὖν T : δὲ in marg. t : δ' οὖν P : γὰρ Y), the γοῦν of "part-proof" (Denniston) – though perhaps the less well attested δ' οὖν is preferable, since in addition it *dismisses* Callicles's jab.

2095 συχνοὺς (*sc. λόγους*) ... τῶν λόγων (E1): For this construction (adjective with substantive stated or understood, followed by the same substantive in the genitive), compare 522D2 (αὐτῆ ... τῆς βοηθείας); *Phdo.*104A8; *Prot.*329B1; *Rep.*328E7, 416B5; *Ep.* 6 322E2-3; *Hdt.* 1.24.1; *T.* 1.2.3 (τῆς γῆς); *X. Cyrop.*3.2.2, 4.5.4; *Ar. Ach.*350 (τῆς μαρίλης ... συχνήν). We do not have this construction in English but may translate by substantivizing the adjective: "prolixity in my remarks."

2096 πρὸς Φιλίου (E3): The last time Socrates invoked that spirit was at the beginning of the section we are still in, where he set it forth that the basic question they were involved in was the choice of life (500B6). I do not believe he is reminding Callicles of that basic goal, but our author might be reminding us of it. Will Plato turn more and more to his readers (cf. n. 1559), as Callicles becomes less and less involved in the conversation, and less and less important in the process of the dialogue?

2097 Reading ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ (E4) with the mss., *legg. edd.* (ὑπ' αὐτῶν F : ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Za). ὅτι (*pace* Cary) goes with ἔπειτα πονηρὸς ἐστίν. γεγονῶς τε καὶ ὢν is concessive.

2098 ἔπειτα (E5), idiomatically linking participle with indicative to point up the contradiction (cf. n. 311).

2099 πονηρὸς (E5) is standing in as the opposite of ἀγαθός, as the adjective for the opposite of virtue (cf. 515A5 and n.).

2100 τί ἂν λέγοις (520A1) means not "why talk about them?" (*pace* Heindorf, comparing *Alc.* 118E4, etc.) but "what is one to say about them?" (as Socrates's retort ["And what would you have to say..."] shows). The worthless ἄνθρωποι might for Callicles be the ἄνθρωποι these teachers were just said to teach (519E8), whom Callicles would think worthless for hiring them to do so; but more likely (with Heindorf) they are such sophists as Protagoras who claim to teach virtue, whereas Gorgias derided such lessons (*Meno* 95C1-4), an animus Callicles shares with the likeminded Anytus of the *Meno* (91C1-5). Socrates's retort, τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις (A3), since it returns to the pretend-politicians from whom he has just now digressed so as to compare them to sophists, favors the latter interpretation. Jowett's tr. of that retort, "I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers..." misses that Callicles's dismissal makes it incumbent upon him to show reason not to dismiss *pari passu* the claimants to political prowess – as does Waterfield's mistranslation of Socrates's previous remark (τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν is not "the professional teachers of virtue," though it may be those who profess it!).

ΣΩ. τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἱ φάσκοντες προεστάναι<sup>2101</sup> τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης; οἶει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταῦτόν, ᾧ μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον<sup>2102</sup> πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν [b] τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἶει εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῆ δὲ ἀληθεία κάλλιόν<sup>2103</sup> ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικῆς ὅσπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἱατρικῆς· μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ<sup>2104</sup> ᾧμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχορεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι<sup>2105</sup> ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστὶν εἰς σφᾶς, ἢ<sup>2106</sup> τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασὶν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; [c]

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

Irwin here interposes the assertion, based on nothing and certainly nothing Callicles has said so far, that Callicles is an “Athenian gentleman” like Laches, who who as such despises sophists (*Lach.* 197D6-8); Waterfield (164) claims Callicles’ contempt is born of a perennial fear for all thinkers “on the fringe.” But Callicles shows himself far less than a gentleman in almost everything he says, while Laches from what we know of him from his dialogue would surely take umbrage at being compared with Callicles. Irwin goes on to hope that “rhetors” can be exempted from being criticized by their students on the grounds that only Socrates expects them to make their students just, but he has forgotten that it is Gorgias that spends a bit more than half his time with the issue of his students’ misbehavior (456C6-457C3) and does so only so that he might still move freely from city to city selling his wares, an issue he raises *three* times in a minute and a half (456E2, 457B7, C2-3). Surely Callicles would rather spend his money on Gorgias, to learn how to use oratory for unjust ends – the subtext of Polus’s arguments – than to listen to some edifying pabulum about virtue.

Confusing sophists with orators, σοφιστικὴ with ῥητορικὴ, was explained by Socrates above (465C). The thoughtless effect of Callicles’s typically callous remark is to cast a shadow over Gorgias, again unnamed (cf. *Olymp.* 207.15-18), by recalling his mendacious claim of teaching virtue “in case it is needed.” Callicles, thinking Gorgias something other than a sophist, fails to see that Socrates’s remark about the sophists blaming their students for mistreating them (to describe which he digressed from the politicians) is nearly equivalent to Gorgias’s denial of culpability for his students’ unjust use of his teachings, a topic on which he spent no less than half his praise of his oratorical lessons (456C6-457C3). On the face of it, how could he teach them the skill without teaching them how to use it? Callicles’s failure to see this damning implication in the very course of his trying to praise Gorgias is an index of the total lack of scruples in himself as the Gorgianic client, but also broaches the immorality of Gorgias’s own position, which again our author leaves to us to infer. What profit his students might make from governing is vulnerable to a review by the citizens, just or unjust, but Gorgias has already made off with his fees to sell his wares in the next town, from which he hopes he has not yet been blackballed (cf. *ἐκβάλλειν*, 456E2, 457B7). His blanket denial of all culpability is at once a lie to the next town and a betrayal of his clients in the last one!

2101 φάσκοντες προεστάναι (A3) brings forward the new term Socrates used above of the leader who is really leading (519B8, C2), whom these merely *pretend* to be. προσποιῶνται is replaced by φάσκοντες from the *comparans*, just as the perfect προεστάναι is borrowed from the perfect πεποιθέναι (519E4; cf. *γεγονός*, E5), stressing the logical contradiction between the claimed status and the subsequent activity. With καὶ Socrates now freights these “true” πολιτικοί with what he considers their one true duty (517C1-2). Of course Callicles would not agree, but as he becomes more and more reluctant Socrates becomes more and more a dogmatic δημήγορος, perforce (D5-7).

2102 ταῦτόν ... ἢ ἐγγύς τι ... ὥσπερ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον (A8) is an imperfect of reference. At 463B5 Socrates argued that sophistic and oratory were parts of the same thing (pandering) but by nature distinct; and later averred that despite this, both the orators and sophists themselves and the people around them mix them up because they are “close” to each other (465C3). In the present case, Hamilton translates sophist with “popular teacher” (cf. n. 2082).

2103 κάλλιόν (B2) = “more admirable,” in this context of praise and blame, drawn out of the catchword πάγκαλόν τι.

2104 Reading καὶ (B4) with the mss. and edd. (*om.* NFlor *teste* Cantarín). With Sauppe Croiset Stender Lamb Apelt Irwin Nichols Pietre Dalfen Erler I take it with ᾧμην, by which Socrates adds a further inference of his (ἔγωγε, in contrast with Callicles) about something shared by oratory and sophistic, their akinness emphasized here with τε καὶ. The statement that intervenes (τῆ δὲ ἀληθεία ... ἱατρικῆς, B2-3) obscures this connection and militates, if anything, with Socrates’s identification (as Waterfield’s correct translation with “even” shows, as an inference from his assimilation of the two, whereas Woodhead tries to reach back through the intervening sentence [τῆ δὲ ἀληθεία ... ἱατρικῆς, B2-3] by translating καὶ with “but”). Perhaps it was for these reasons that Helmbold deleted that sentence (not, *pace* Dodds, thinking his logic better than Plato’s). Initial μόνοις is already emphatic for its initial position and is hardly strengthened by an unnecessarily awkward hyperbaton of καὶ (*pace* Deuschle-Cron, Riddell §134, Denniston [327]); nor does it make sense, with Dodds, that καὶ was displaced by emphatic μόνοις, since καὶ is unnecessary after δέ.

2105 πράγματι (B5): “what they teach” (with Jowett Stender Lamb Helmbold Waterfield Pietre Dalfen Erler). It is taken by Ast Thompson Deuschle-Cron Sauppe Croiset Apelt Dodds to refer to the people or person they teach (or lecture to), but the *similia* offered for this sense (*Crito* 53D1 [τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα], *Prot.* 312C4; *Ar. Eccles.* 441, Eubulus *Chry.* fr. 2 [= Meineke *FCG* 3.260: κακὴ γυνὴ Μήδεια, Πηνελόπεια δὲ μεγα πρᾶγμα]) do not secure their point. In short, to say a woman is a troublesome thing does not make “thing” denote a person but only substantivizes the adjective, often derogatory (on which usage cf. Ast himself, quoted *ad* 519C4 in n. 2084); and there is no adjective here.

2106 ἢ (B6) = *alioquin*: cf. n. 1407.

ΣΩ. καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει,<sup>2107</sup> εἶπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον.<sup>2108</sup> ἄλλην μὲν<sup>2109</sup> γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθεὶς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀποστερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ<sup>2110</sup> μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι [d] τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆ<sup>2111</sup> βραδυτῆτι οἷμαι ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία· ἧ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ,<sup>2112</sup> τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῆ, ἀλλὰ<sup>2113</sup> μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἶπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό<sup>2114</sup> τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. φημί.

ΣΩ. διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς<sup>2115</sup> μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλάς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχροῦν. [e]

ΚΑΛ. ἔοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως,<sup>2116</sup> ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος<sup>2117</sup> εἶη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχροῦν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτῷ<sup>2118</sup> ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἧ γάρ;

2107 ἐνεχώρει (C3): The imperfect is not an irreal apodosis lacking ἄν (*pace* edd.) but simply continues in the time of Socrates's opining (ᾄμην, B4) – or with Sauppe he is talking about the complaining politicians of 519B4-8.

2108 ἔλεγον (C3) was taken as third plural by Serranus, Ast[1832], and most edd. – i.e., referring to their claim of teaching virtue as true. I take it as first singular, with Schleiermacher (1805) Ast(1819) Thurot Irwin Nichols Zeyl Erler, continuing the corroboration of καὶ ᾄμην also implicit in ἐνεχώρει (see prev. note). Of the commentators all are silent except Ast (1832), who notices the ambiguity and corrects his previous reading as first singular (1819) on the basis of D6-7 below, which however is not in itself definitive; of the translators some adopt one and some the other, severally evincing no awareness of the question.

2109 μὲν (C4): The substance of the μὲν clause extends to D11 (with resumptive μὲν at D9).

2110 Reading αὐτῷ (C7), with the mss. and the edd. (*om.* F, *leg.* Dodds : αὐτῷ B, *leg.* Sauppe).

2111 Reading γὰρ δὴ τῆ (D1) with F, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Dodds Nichols Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler (γὰρ τῆ BTWP, *legg.* edd. : γὰρ δὴ NFlor *teste* Cantarin *coniecerat* Hirschig [1873] : γὰρ Lodge *silens*), “clearing the ground by ruling out at least one possibility” (Denniston, 243). What a sophist claims to remove disables his student from treating him unjustly, but what the trainer removes does not: even a successful trainee could still mistreat him. Isocrates makes exactly the same point at *Soph.* 6.

2112 ἀφαιρεῖ (D4) brings forward ἐξαίρεθέντας from 519D2, with the standard dropping of the prefix.

2113 Reading ἀλλὰ (D5) with FPar<sup>2</sup>, *legg.* edd. (ἀλλ' ὁ BTWP : ἀλλ' ᾗ E3Zb *teste* Cantarin and the early editions, *legg.* Routh Heindorf).

2114 δύναιτο (D6): The optative questions the notion, not the individual case. Socrates pre-empts any presumption he believes in the sophistic ἐπαγγέλματα.

2115 Reading τὰς (D9) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (δὴ τὰς F). Instantiation of τέχνηι with οἰκοδομία is no accident: see next n.

2116 πράξεως (E2): The term is striking, drawn partly from ποιεῖν (D7) and πρᾶγμα (519D2, 520B5), and standing in contrast with τέχνη. Notice that the πρᾶξις is directly described with a (double) purpose clause (ὄντινα is an adverbial accusative parallel with the adverb ἄριστα), just as before it was described with a final clause (513E2 with n.). οἰκίαν διοικεῖν, in addition to being standard language for responsible conduct once πόλιν is added (the internal accusative οἰκίαν is metabatic), “cashes in” on οἰκοδομία, effectively bringing forward the distinction between διακονία and true “politics” (advanced just below). See next note.

2117 Reading βέλτιστος (E3) of course, with FPar<sup>2</sup> Olymp.[λ] Steph., *legg.* edd. (βέλτιστον BTPW Par : βέλτιστα NFlor). The easy extension beyond making a man virtuous, which has been the continual topic of the last twenty pages, to making him “best able to manage his personal assets or his city,” (or “able best to...”, with NFlor’s attractive but weakly corroborated βέλτιστα) turns the achieving of virtue into achieving “success” according to the Protagorean ἐπάγγελμα of εὐβουλία (e.g., *Prot.* 316C9-D1 and 318E5-9A2), a success Prodicus also is said to facilitate at *Rep.* 600C6-D4 – otherwise known as the teaching of “virtue” as we gather from *Meno* 91A1-B5, in the public imagination; and how from a more cynical point of view merely *moral* virtue is a waste of time. Callicles has learned the formula and apes it in the speech just before his parrhesiastic outburst (491B1-2, cf. n. 1313). Irwin notices the problem (239-240), though as usual he places the burden upon Socrates and Plato to draw the distinction between this and that, asserting that “the *Gorgias* has tried to show” that personal virtue and εὐβουλία “are not really different virtues,” while in truth it is the burden of the dialogue to stimulate the reader to see that the latter is a flattering distraction, especially detrimental in a democracy, from devoting oneself to the more difficult former.

2118 αὐτῷ (E5): Referring back to unexpressed τινα as accusative subject of μὴ φάναι (cf. 469C6 and E7, *Crat.* 389C5 [with ms. T], *Euthyd.* 273C9, *Rep.* 347C4). In English both pronouns can be elided.



ΚΑΛ. ναί.

ΣΩ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιον ἐστίν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν,<sup>2119</sup> ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον<sup>2120</sup> εἶναι ὡς<sup>2121</sup> εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν,<sup>2122</sup> ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

[521] ΚΑΛ. ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν<sup>2123</sup> τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἰατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα;<sup>2124</sup> τάληθῆ μοι εἶπέ, Καλλίκλεις·<sup>2125</sup> δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἤρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἃ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως<sup>2126</sup> εἶπέ.

2119 ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν (E8): The mss. and early edd. amalgamate both expressions (ἀντευποεῖν, ἀντευπείσεται – except that B has ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν [legg. edd.], and Steph. has ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται [legg. edd.]). LSJ treats the locution here as a tmesis, s.v. ἀντιποιέω, though omitting to do so with ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται (E10), s.v. ἀντιπάσχω. Such a “tmesis” is rare: for the split accommodating εὖ or κακῶς cf. (with AGPS 68.2.3.B) X. *Anab.*5.5.21 (ἀν μὲν τις οὐ ποιῆ ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν); Ar. *Plut.*1029; D. 8.65, 20.64, 124, and 141; and with σύν, *Phdrs.*237A9, T. 3.13.1. I agree with Matthiae (*Gr. Gr.* §594.2) and AGPS (*loc. cit.*) that rather than being in tmesis, these prepositions are adverbial.

2120 αἴτιον / σημεῖον (E7,9) Just as the present is due to a previous cause (αἴτιον), it is the cause (σημεῖον) of a posterior effect.

2121 Reading ὡς εὖ ποιήσας (E9) with the corrector of Za *teste* Cantarin (εἰ εὖ ποιήσας mss. legg. edd. : εὖ ποιήσας *coni.* Schleiermacher : εἰ ὁ εὖ ποιήσας *coni.* Heindorf, legg. Ast[1812] Beck Thurot Hirschig). As to Heindorf's idea that the subject could be implicit in πείσεται: the problem is not here but in the εἰ. Ast (followed by edd.) took the if-clause (εἰ πείσεται) itself to be the σημεῖον (*documento est doctorem ad virtutem et iustitiam instituisse discipulum*, for which he cites 520D), an indication that one has succeeded to teach virtue. This entails that the second if-clause is a second σημεῖον, and that οὐ in E10 negates καλόν in E9. Hence his translation, *quocirca pulchrum hoc videtur indicium esse, si ei, qui bene fecit, hoc beneficium redditur; sin, non est pulchrum* [1812], and the second alternative means “if one will not be returned the favor this is not a good indication that he has been taught.” (*n.b.*, he later [1832] corrected himself by taking ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν with εὖ ποιήσας, but this is irrelevant to the present question). Against his interpretation (1) the σημεῖον should be in the present and its significance should pertain to the future (that he is treated well in return would be a σημεῖον that he *will have been* taught virtue), but πείσεται is future (Ast Jowett Helmbold Chambry Irwin Allen Canto Erler *et al.* replace future with present [redditur, “receives,” “is required,” est payé, etc.]); (2) the interpretation makes the if-clause the subject of εἶναι and σημεῖον καλόν its predicate (Ast adds hoc there, to achieve this), but the article had already made σημεῖον the subject of εἶναι and καλόν its predicate (this led Allen to translate “it seems a noble sign if one returns the benefit in kind,” leaving out of what it is a sign); (3) the second alternative means almost nothing and is utterly otiose (Cope tries to save the matter by translating καλόν “favorable” [“making a σημεῖον καλόν a “favorable symptom”!] and then making οὐ at E10 denote not the contradictory but the contrary [“unfavorable”]); and (4) in 520D, brought in by Ast as telling what the σημεῖον indicates, the very teachability of virtue was called into question.

Schleiermacher (1805) for these reasons saw that εἰ εὖ ποιήσας would have to be εἰ τις εὖ ἐποίησεν (*vel sim.*), and therefore deleted εἰ: *So dass dies ein ganz gutes Kennzeichen ist, wer diesen Dienst gut erwiesen hat, dem wird auch wieder gedient werden, wer aber nicht dem nicht.* Short of deleting εἰ without ms. authority, we may now substitute ὡς for it, on the slim authority of the corrector of Za, which gives the needed meaning: “an indication that, having done good, one will be treated well.” I therefore read ὡς with Za (*n.b.*, LSJ takes ὡς as a variant for εἰ in the construction of σημεῖον).

Ficinus [1557] gives *Quapropter praeclarum videtur esse argumentum, si is qui officium eiusmodi praestiterit, vicissim ipse recipiat, contra vero nequaquam*; Cornarius [1561] gives *Quare praeclarum videtur esse signum, si is qui hoc beneficium contulit, vicissim ipse recipiat: sin minus, contra*; Serranus *apud* Stephanus translates, *quapropter praeclarum videtur esse argumentum, si is qui hoc beneficium contulit, visissim accipiat beneficium: sinminus nequaquam; similiter* Routh. The brevity of εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ allows us to take the rest in either way (witness the trr. cited above, and also Cary).

2122 Reading ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν (E10) with all mss. Sauppe deleted the phrase, thinking it cannot be the object of ποιεῖν, but it is internal (Dodds). He also thinks the only point Socrates is making is the negative case, that not being treated well in return is a bad indicator – that if one were treated poorly by his beneficiary there would be no good grounds to think he had benefited him. The interpretation is vulnerable to the criticisms above.

2123 τὴν θεραπείαν (521A2): Socrates allows himself the loose and ignorant use of the term (517E2-6), in the manner of a “passing note” (for others such passing notes, cf. nn. 467, 572, 795, 1037, 1313, 1879, and Dalfen 474). As for the article τὴν, present in most mss. and read by edd. (*om.* NFlorY, legg. Deuschle Hirschig), it creates a question within the question (“which is the,” rather than “which”: Stallb.: ποτέρα ἐστίν ἡ θεραπεία, ἐφ' ἣν με παρακαλεῖς;), for which cf. *Euthyph.*14E10, *Lys.*204A1, *Phdo.*79B4, *Phdrs.*263C7-8. By its presence Socrates is presupposing that Callicles does advocate a θεραπεία (Dodds; whence Lamb's “these ministrations”). Deuschle's example of the article omitted at *Crat.*439A7 does not apply since there the question comes *after* the specified alternatives. With παρακαλεῖν Socrates brings forward the epagoge of 514A5-515B; with θεραπεία he brings forward both the Great Distinction (463A466A) and the recent argument about διακονία linked to it (517B-519B: cf.517E3); with διαμάχεσθαι he brings forward the epagoge about public entertainments (501D-503A. esp.502B4) and with ὁμιλήσοντα the special sense that term has been given, *passim*, for soothing and pandering to the masses (see next note). With all this Socrates is bringing the entire weight of their discussion to bear on this single question.

2124 ὁμιλήσοντα (A5), really, is a verb of speaking, but means not “speaking freely” (Irwin) but saying what will please, a particular ability of the opportunistic and unscrupulous soul (463A7-8). Plato often takes for granted his sense of what is offensive rather than spelling things out. Surely



ΚΑΛ. λέγω τοίνυν ὅτι διακονήσοντα.<sup>2127</sup> [b]

ΣΩ. κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν,<sup>2128</sup> ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις

... 2129

ΣΩ. μὴ εἴπης ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Πονηρός γε ὦν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα.<sup>2130</sup> μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ

πρὸς χάριν does not mean “only for his own gain” (Allen) but continues the distinction between flattering and improving one’s fellow citizens, as formulaic διαμάχεσθαι immediately indicates (cf. 513D4-5 and nn. 1940 and 1607).

- 2125 Reading Καλλικλείς (A5) with BTPW Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck Hermann Stallb. Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schmelzer Lodge Feix Heidbüchel (ὦ Καλλικλείς F, *legg.* Heindorf Bekker Ast Woolsey Thompson Sommer Hirschig Schanz Mistriotis Christ Sauppe Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Dodds Erler), as the *difficilior*. For the “passionate” vocative without ὦ, cf. 518C2 and n. Ever since he left Callicles anarthrous in his remark to Gorgias (above, 506B5: Καλλικλεί τούτῳ), it has become burdensome for Socrates to maintain decorum in voicing his name.
- 2126 εὐ καὶ γενναίως (A7) brings forward Socrates’s οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε from 492D1, where also he used such high language in response to Callicles’s parrhesiastic speech (491E5-492C8), to be undercut just below; and now, with the imperative, he also adopts Callicles’s forceful tone. For Callicles, εὐ and γενναίως have neither moral nor aristocratic connotations but can only mean “boldly.” It gives the translator some trouble that in order to προσομιλεῖν with Callicles, Socrates must betray his own language. Finally, with ἅ νοεῖς λέγων Socrates foists upon Callicles his own peculiar description of Polus and Gorgias’s unwillingness to say not what they believed but what (in his jaded opinion) they knew to be true but were ashamed to say (483A1, 482E2).
- 2127 I read διακονήσοντα (A8) with F (ὡς διακονήσοντα mss., *legg.* edd.) as characteristically insouciant, and echoed by Socrates’s abrupt and bare κολακεύσοντα (which Heindorf, guessing it had been “absorbed” into ΣΩ at change of interlocutor, emended to ὡς κολακεύσοντα, later by Coraes Thurot Ast[1832]).
- 2128 Reading εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν (B2): The mss. are unanimous (*teste* Cantarín, Ast’s inconclusive remarks [p.447, 1832] notwithstanding); and εἴ σοι Μυσὸν is preserved as a lemma in Olymp. (215.18-24). Routh started a wild goose chase by citing the radical emendation of the great Casaubon (perhaps relying on Cornarius *Ecloga* 80): εἴ σοι μὴ Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον εἶναι λείαν (*vel sim.*), importing the substance of the proverb “Μυσῶν λεία” into the text, and Coraes and Thurot printed the emendation. The Μυσῶν λεία is booty easily plundered because the Mysians could not fight back while Telephus was away (e.g., Ar. *Rhet.* 1372B33: τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας; cf., in *Corp.Paroem.Gr.*: Zen.5.15; Diog.3.16; Ap.11.83; Mant.2.28). With this, Callicles’s meaning would be that Socrates will be easy prey in court, but that is what Callicles is about to say when Socrates interrupts and says it for him.

There is another proverb: Μυσῶν ἔσχατος (GCL 2.77, DV 2.47) or ἔσχατος μυσῶν πλεῖ (Ap.2.85) used of the cheapest or the most remote or most indifferent. Plato’s use of it at *Tht.*209B is not derogatory (*pace* edd.) but unclear; Cicero – not the paroemiographers – tells us the expression is purely derogatory (*pro L.Flacco* 27.65): *Quid porro in Graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut Musorum ultimus esse dicatur?* Several commentators have chosen this proverb about derogatory name-calling as being operant here (Ast Thurot Stallb. Cope Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Stender Croiset Lamb Apelt Zimmermann Feix Woodhead Chambry Hamilton Irwin Allen Piettre), taking Μυσὸν as predicate of understood τὸν κολακεύσοντα: *Si Mysum mavis in iudicium vocare* ~ “If you prefer, call (the flatterer) a Musian.” Lamb imagines, “[it is] work for a mean Mysian.” Heusde (97) – with Ficinus but I think without other warrant – took Εἴ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν reflexively: “*Mavisne O Socrates Mysus vocari?*” followed in this by Cope (whose note confounds and misrepresents the proverbs at issue) and by Helmbold, “call yourself the lowest of the low if it gives you any satisfaction.” Dalfen and Erler vary this by adding μέ as if in place of γε: *Nenne mich ein Myser...*

Olymp. (*ad loc.*), largely ignored in this controversy, says this is a παροιμία that is “ἐκ” (taken from or based upon?) Euripides’s lost *Telephus* (it is not included, as such, in the *Corp.Paroem.Gr.*). The proverb he has in mind is perhaps “Μυσὸν Τήλεφον” (cf. φάνα τὸ Μυσὸν Τήλεφον, Olymp.215.20). In the play E. portrays Telephus, king of Mysia, wounded by and in search of Achilles’s spear to heal him, disguised as a beggar and visiting Agamemnon who helps him get to the spear (indeed the story is alluded to at 447B1, above). Euripides’s many uses of a “beggar hero” is satirized by Aristophanes (esp. *Ach.*340 where there are several guesses who the beggar really is and Telephus is the climax). From Ar. *Ach.* and from Olymp., versions of a fragment have been constructed (=TGF f.704 Nauck, cf. Walker [1920]). Olymp. says, ἐκεῖ γάρ (in E.’s *Telephus*) ἐρωτᾷ τις περὶ τὸν Τήλεφον καὶ φησιν· τὸ Μυσὸν Τήλεφον· εἶτε δὲ Μυσὸς ἦν εἶτε ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, πῶς δὲ τὸ Τήλεφον γνωρίζεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἶτε κόλακα θέλεις εἰπεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον εἶτε διάκονον εἶτε ὄντινα οὖν, δεῖ φησιν ὁ Καλλικλείς τοιοῦτον εἶναι εἶναι περὶ τὴν πόλιν. I interpret Olymp. to be saying that calling Telephus the Mysian only works because Telephus is already known, no matter where he is from (*pace* Thompson who infers that Olymp.’s interp. somehow brings together the Μυσῶν λεία and the Μυσῶν ἔσχατος proverbs [!]). Callicles is treating Socrates’s *inference* that διακονεῖν falls into their previously established and condemned category of κολακεύειν, as it were merely a matter of nomenclature: “Call it what you will: if you don’t *do* it ...” So also Jowett and Nichols. (ὡς does mean *nam* [Routh] but as usual Callicles is being abrupt: “[I don’t care what you call it] I say that because if you don’t act that way ...”).

It is only Irwin who builds something upon the interpretation of the allusion. His interpretation, that calling something Mysian is putting it in the worst possible light – for which there is much agreement but no evidence – leads him to leap to the conclusion that Callicles is finally embarrassed by the consequences of his own “position.” But the proverb only means he does not care what Socrates calls it, and he immediately re-asserts his warning that one must be astute not only to stay alive but also to make it to the top, repeated without compunction at 521C3-6 and 522C4-6. What alone embarrassed him was much less than immorality, but being called an anal-passive prostitute (494E4 and 507E3, where cf. nn. 1803, 1426).

- 2129 ποιήσεις (B3), indicative, embarks upon a minatory future condition whose apodosis Socrates will not wait to hear still one more time. Dalfen here collects many of such instances of non-verbal communication: 447B, 465A, 497B, 506C, 515B; and also pauses 468C, 474C, 475D, 478A, 515C; but the list is hardly complete. Requiring the reader to bridge the conversation in these ways is a characteristic that distinguishes this dialogue from all others.
- 2130 πονηρός γε ὦν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα (B5-6): Again a meek ἀδύνατον whose significance is lost on Callicles, as at 511B4-5 (where see n. 1871). Cf. *Apol.*30C8-D1.

αὐ<sup>2131</sup> ἐγὼ εἶπω ὅτι ἀλλ’ ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται<sup>2132</sup> αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτω<sup>2133</sup> καὶ [c] λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχυρῶς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχυρῶς, κακῶς.<sup>2134</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν<sup>2135</sup> μηδ’ ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὥς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς<sup>2136</sup> εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.<sup>2137</sup>

ΣΩ. ἀνόητος<sup>2138</sup> ἄρα εἰμί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινον ἂν ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ [d] τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων, ὁ<sup>2139</sup> σὺ λέγεις, πονηρὸς τίς μ’ ἔσται ὁ

- 2131 Reading αὐ<sup>2131</sup> ἐγὼ (B7) with the mss. and edd. (αὐ<sup>2131</sup> καὶ ἐγὼ S1S2 Steph. and the early edd., *legg.* Routh Coraes Ast[1812]). Heindorf and Beck were first to note that the repetition (cf. B5), though of a piece with Socrates’s sing-song manner, is only weakly supported by the mss. Ast accordingly changed his mind in 1832.
- 2132 Reading χρήσεται (B7) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (χρήσεται *coni.* Schanz, *legg.* Christ Sauppe). The sense is not that he will not be able to use it but that it will be of no use to him (and this perhaps favors the subj.—cf. Woolsey *ad loc.*: with the indicative the subject is in doubt about what he will do; with the subj. he is deliberating about his reasons).
- 2133 Reading οὕτω (B8) with F (*testibus* Burnet Cantarin), *legg.* Bekker Ast Hermann Stallb. Woolsey Kratz Jahn Deuschle Thompson Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Sauppe Lamb Feix Theiler (οὕτως BTPW, *legg.* Cron Schanz Christ Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Dodds Erler Cantarin). Before the “advent” of F, Cron was first to allow οὕτως, citing another instance of terminal ζ before consonant at 460D3, but that seems a case of euphony (cf. n. 408). The grammarians deem its omission to be regular before consonants (“*gewöhnlich*,” says Kühner [ed.2 1869] 1.230) and allow it only when οὕτω is emphatic. It is only at 522C5 that Cron argues for an emphatic sense (cf. n. 2174), and indeed it seems not to be emphatic here.
- 2134 Reading κακῶς only (C2), with BTP Steph., *legg.* edd. (καὶ κακῶς F Steph., *leg.* Coraes). With sing-song pedantry Socrates takes the trouble or opportunity to summarize his entire response to Callicles and Polus with this sequence of adverbs.
- 2135 Reading δοκεῖς ὁ Σώκρατες πιστεύειν (C3) from F *teste* Cantarin and Steph., *legg.* edd. (δοκεῖς Σώκρατες πιστεύειν E1<sup>2</sup>E2<sup>2</sup> : δοκεῖ Σώκρατες πιστεύειν BTWP : δοκεῖ ὁ Σώκρατες πιστεύειν *fons codicis* R *teste* Cantarin Ald. Bas., *legg.* Thurot Sommer : δοκεῖς ὁ Σώκρατες πιστεύεις *coni.* Heindorf *leg.* Beck : δοκεῖ Σωκράτης πιστεύειν *coni.* Schanz [*Nov.Comm.*165, attempting to save B], *leg.* Christ). BTWP is not disqualified by its vocative lacking ὁ (cf. A5 just above with note), but by the absence of a subject for its infinitive; Hermann (*apud* Stallb.) intuitively argued two constructions were merged, the first (δοκεῖ μοι) attracting the second (πιστεύεις) under its syntactical regime, ‘As [ὡς] it seems to me, you believe...’, πιστεύεις attracted into πιστεύειν, for which Stallb cites Hermann *ad Viger* p.751, Matth. *Gr.Gr.*§539.2); Schanz’s conjectured nominative avoidσ the lack of ὁ in BTWP and turns the statement into an observation directed to the audience; and while Callicles resorted to a similar tactic at the opening (481B6-7) the remark lacks the requisite punch. The reading of F is free of all such difficulties, and indeed its sequence ΣΩΣΩ may suggest that the difficulties of the other mss. are due to their archetype dropping out one ΣΩ.
- 2136 οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς (C4) is equivalent to (ὁς) οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς (potential), though the participle with ἂν could also represent an irreal indicative (cf. 458A3; *Euthyd.*304D1; *Leg.*900A7; *Rep.*344A6, 562A2). Callicles continues the participial construction of οἰκῶν with ὡς, which he used to denote Socrates’s putative assumption (that he is inaccessibly “off the grid”), but ἂν makes the second participle parallel to the notion of ἂν παθεῖν and therefore part of what Socrates is trusting in (πιστεύειν). He is saying that Socrates falsely imagines himself to be “off the grid” and that he with perfect logic infers confidence therefrom (the καὶ is illative) that he will not be prosecuted. Callicles’s articulation is again insouciant.
- 2137 ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου (C5-6): Deuschle *secl.* ὑπὸ ... φαύλου (but not Cron) against all mss. and was followed by Hirschig and Mistriotis, on the grounds that adding this weakens Callicles’s statement; but ἴσως is again ironic: “and it may just be by a lowlife loser!” (Hirschig similarly misses the ironic sense at 522A8, *q.v.*; as does Canto’s *sans doute*). Although Callicles is quoting his own words from 486B3, πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ (in response to Socrates quoting himself just above, *pace* Olymp. 215.30-31), with everything he says he seems to be just such a man, himself. Surely he and his behavior are a dramatic foreshadowing of Socrates’s accusers in 399BC. Of course Callicles is not “thinking of exactly what happened to Socrates” (Irwin, *sic!*): rather, Plato has invented Callicles to make the murder of Socrates perfectly understandable. What we must learn from Callicles is how a man like him can fail to be embarrassed.
- 2138 ἀνόητος (C7): Mr Morrissey hears “Anytus.” εἰμί is “I am,” not “I would be,” the indicative referring only to the allegation of Callicles (Deuschle-Cron). All else in the subsequent lines is retort, going toe-to-toe: ἐν τῆδε τῇ πόλει vs. ἐκποδῶν; τοῦτο ὅτι τύχοι vs. μηδ’ ἂν ἐν; anticipatory subj. εἰσῶ ἂν vs. virtual potential opt. ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς; and even spacial ἄτοπον continues to answer spacial ἐκποδῶν. Ὁν πονηρὸς / χρηστός / μοχθηρὸς, see next note.
- 2139 Reading ὁ (D1) with BTPF, *legg.* Routh Bekker Ast(1819) Beck Lodge Burnet Lamb Theiler Heidbüchel Erler (ὁν *Za coniecerat* Heindorf, *legg.* edd.). I believe ὁ σὺ λέγεις (D1) points *forward*, given emphatic σύ, ὁ as often being adverbial, *pace* Heindorf (cf. 462C1, 522C7; *Phdrs.*230A2-3; *Rep.*367D3, 487B3, 527B10): Socrates is not scandalized by the meanness of his accuser, as Callicles would be, but expects and anticipates he cannot but be of low real worth: he is μοχθηρὸς because he is πονηρὸς, whereas for Callicles a πονηρὸς who gets away scot-free is χρηστός. With this and what follows the reader cannot but view Socrates as prophesying his own fate. It is therefore idle with Woolsey to ask whether the low opinion of Athenian politics here presented is more Plato’s belief than that of the historical Socrates: the former is turning his character into a prophet.

εἰσάγων—οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἄνθρωπον<sup>2140</sup> εἰσαγάγοι<sup>2141</sup>—καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἶπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν<sup>2142</sup> τῆ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῆ τέχνῃ<sup>2143</sup> καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν·<sup>2144</sup> ἄτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἐκάστοτε,<sup>2145</sup> ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς [e] τὸ ἥδιστον,<sup>2146</sup> καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα,<sup>2147</sup> οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἤκει λόγος ὄνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι<sup>2148</sup> γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίῳις<sup>2149</sup> ἰατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὀψοποιοῦ.

σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοιούτοις<sup>2150</sup> ληφθεὶς, εἰ αὐτοῦ

2140 μὴ ἀδικοῦντα ἄνθρωπον (D2): Conditional μὴ makes this circumstantial participle a virtual protasis, even though it modifies the predicate of the apodosis.

2141 Reading εἰσαγάγοι (D3) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (εἰσάγοι F Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck). χρηστὸς, here replacing ἀγαθός from the parallel passage above (B6), has not appeared in this dialogue as a descriptor of a man: it is here brought in under the local force of μοχθηρός (C5) to function as its opposite (cf. 504B6-7) while still also able to be the negative of πονηρός – an instance of the relatively neutral moral language that enables moral *pro* and *con* dialectic: cf. nn. 2046, 732.

2142 ἐπιχειρεῖν (D7) here echoes its use at 513E5 and 514D3, and πράττειν echoes its use at 515A2. Cf. Chambry, *s'attacher* and *pratiquer*; and Irwin, “undertake and practise.” Irwin, ever vigilant to catch Socrates saying he knows something (240), exonerates him here by dint of his use of ἐπιχειρεῖν, deaf to fact he is echoing for Callicles those passages in which they discussed what it might mean to enter politics. The speaker is being made a witness to his own martyrdom: it is perfect impertinence to wonder (241) whether it is the “Plato” who wrote the *Republic*, or the Socrates who will be murdered, that is speaking – while the professors merely retire and live on.

2143 τῆ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῆ τέχνῃ (D7): Take ὡς with τέχνῃ (not the true political art but the way of politics that may truly be called artful). With Místriotis, Socrates is not redefining the art of politics but denying that “πολιτικῆ,” so-called, may legitimately presume a connection with τέχνῃ (or ἐπιστήμη). That is, he is appropriating τέχνῃ to the meaning he had to introduce for it at 463Aff in order to define Gorgias’s teaching in terms of what it is not, though his teaching is called by the feminine adjective. In arrogating to itself this feminine designation, oratory there and politics here προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔδω (as he put it at 464C7-D1). Compare his expression ταύτην τὴν ῥητορικὴν, at 503B1. The neuter plural that follows (τὰ πολιτικὰ, D7-8) is a catch-all for political action that includes not only what Socrates does as a πολίτης (which he alone calls πολιτικῆ) but also how the Calliclean citizen-orators act (which Socrates could only acquiesce to call πολιτικὰ). Similarly, at 503B1 he denied – there in pregnant terms – that Callicles has ever yet witnessed a ῥητορικῆ that qualified as the τέχνῃ its feminine name implicitly and complacently claims for itself (cf. n. 1639). The overblown and unquestioned reputation of τέχνῃ was problematic also in Socrates’s conversation with Phaedrus, when a personified Madame Techne came into the conversation with her *ipsa dixit*’s although she was τέχνῃ in name only. Cf. *Phdrs.* 260Dff, circling around no less than seventeen uses of the rare adverbial dative τέχνῃ, and my *The Phaedrus of Plato* [Washington / London 2020] pp. 384-386 and 426-429, with notes. There, as here, τέχνῃ had for once to be given a real definition. The analogously bloated and problematic reputation of the sophist similarly plagues any attempt to define him, as we see in the later dialogue named after him.

2144 Reading νῦν (D8) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (νῦν F).

2145 ἐκάστοτε (D9): With this Socrates asserts that his notorious conversations in the agora are τὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικὰ (ἐκάστοτε does not generalize, *pace* Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto Waterfield Nichols Pietre, but treats the instances as characteristic and habitual).

2146 οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον (D9-E1): τὸ ἥδιστον specifies χάριν above. For such semi-redundancy to drive the point home, cf. Gorgias at 452C4.

2147 τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα (E1-2): Socrates cites Callicles’s quotation from Euripides at 486C6 (the activist Zethos criticizing his poetic brother’s κομψά: frg. 188 [Nauck] quoted at n. 1185), but now uses the words against Callicles himself, casting himself as the straight shooter against the overly subtle sophistry Callicles will have learned from Gorgias, against who the comment is more exactly and again indirectly directed. Another chip is removed. Cobet wanted to delete ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς or transpose it after ταῦτα; Ficinus translates *tu nunc*; and νῦν is found between σὺ and παραινεῖς in three related and late mss. (accepted by Heindorf Cron only, among edd.) but all these measures are made redundant or unnecessary by Socrates’s use of the second person demonstrative and pronoun.

2148 κρινοῦμαι (E3): For this future used passively cf. Veitch *s.v.* (denying however that it is passive at *H.Hymn* 3.438), LSJ *s.v.*, and Smyth §809. The alternate form of the future passive, when available, with -ήσομαι or -θήσομαι, is aorist in aspect, whereas the use of the present form is durative, as in this case (Gildersleeve *SCG* §168; Smyth §1738), as similarly with the active future – e.g. ἔξω “will have”; σήσω “will get” (Smyth §1911: see an important example of this aspectual distinction at work in *Rep.* 361E4-2A2, with my n. ad loc). I take ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἤκει to mean not that the same argument “applies to Socrates” as he used with Polus (with Schleiermacher Cope Lamb Helmbold Chambry Irwin Allen Zeyl Canto Nichols) – the dative is too weak for that interpretation (despite Chambry’s attempt to say it applies to him by using a possessive formulation) – but that the same argument *comes to his mind* (with Cary Croiset Apelt Zimmermann Woodhead Hamilton Waterfield Pietre Dalfen Erler).

2149 παιδίῳις (E4): Socrates refers to 464D5-E1. Just as the doctors will there “disappear” in a debate with the delicatessen (in the eyes of a childish or foolish audience), so will Socrates lose to an “orator” of the pandering kind before a jury of children. With this scenario we come even closer to a direct assault upon Gorgias than we had a moment ago with the paradox of being injured by those you taught justice to (though he again remains unnamed): for though Gorgias waffled on the issue of teaching justice, he asserted wholeheartedly as his paradigmatic example of the power of oratory that the orator could making the doctor’s authority “disappear” from the consciousness of the jurors! At the same time Socrates now foreshadows the charges against himself by expatiating upon the way his habitual conversations (521D9) are being or have been received. His real enemy, though implied, remains unnamed. It is not Callicles, sure to self-destruct in politics, but the Gorgianic eloquence that will bewitch his fellow citizens into executing him in 399.

2150 Reading τοιούτοις (E5) with F, *legg.* Coraes Helmbold Woodhead Chambry Hamilton Waterfield Pietre Dalfen (τοιούτοις BTP Steph., *legg.* edd.): “such as these,” or *tels juges* (Chambry Hamilton Irwin). The children are too putative to be referred to with a direct demonstrative, and just as hypothetical as the ἰατρὸς (also τοιοῦτος). Helmbold Woodhead also read τοιοῦτοις but translate it “in the toils of such a circumstance” (*vel sim.*).

κατηγοροῖ τις λέγων ὅτι ᾧ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὄδε εἵργασται<sup>2151</sup> ἀνήρ<sup>2152</sup> καὶ αὐτοῦς,<sup>2153</sup> καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθεῖρει<sup>2154</sup> τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ [522] ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ,<sup>2155</sup> πικρότατα πόματα<sup>2156</sup> διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ<sup>2157</sup> πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἠνώχουν ὑμᾶς· τί ἂν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα ἰατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ<sup>2158</sup> εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποίουν, ᾧ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς,<sup>2159</sup> πόσον<sup>2160</sup> τι οἶει ἂν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.<sup>2161</sup>

- 2151 εἵργασται (E7) taking double accusative, an idiomatic formula with κακὰ (cf. LSJ s.v. II.2).
- 2152 Reading ἀνήρ anarthrous (E7), with the mss., *legg. edd.* (ἀνήρ *coni.* Bekker, *legg.* Hirschig Schanz Sauppe Croiset : ὁ ἀνήρ Ast[1819]). The abruptly anarthrous usage is perhaps idiomatic for accusation at court: “this man here” (Helmbold), “the accused” (Hamilton), “the defendant here” (Allen), *cet homme que vous voyez* (Piettre). With the first person demonstrative (ὄδε) the accuser begins his *captatio benevolentiae* by claiming credit before the jury for bringing this redoubtable “individual” before them; consonant with this is the derogatory absence of the article. Note also the rising rhythm of dactyls and spondees, continued with καὶ αὐτοῦς. Socrates suddenly sounds an orator.
- 2153 αὐτοῦς (E7) does not generalize ὑμᾶς (*pace edd.*) but narrows them to their bodily dimension such as is treated by the physician. This is carried forward by τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, the doublet for painful medical treatment (cf. 476C3-7 and n. 889). Hence there is no reason with K. Praechter (*Hermes* 51[1916] 317) to delete καὶ after αὐτοῦς, at E7, so as to connect it with subsequent νεωτέρους. Zeyl interestingly translates “on you – yes on you”; and Waterfield tr. “your honored selves” (like *ipsos* in Latin).
- 2154 τοὺς νεωτάτους ... διαφθεῖρει (E8): The superlative is used since he is already talking to children (Deuschle-Cron); thus Jowett is right to translate with the comparative. At the same time, that the jurors are childlike does not contradict themselves having children. In the coming target case it will be the adults and the youth. Translate διαφθεῖρει with “debilitate” for the moment. Jowett’s “be the death of you” is too strong, as is Lamb’s “destroys”: clearly the term prophesies (Irwin thoughtlessly calls it parody, 241) the charge of διαφθεῖρειν that will be brought against Socrates. Croiset says *deformer*, which he can repeat below (B7). Helmbold overtranslates “amputate” because he translated διαφθεῖρειν with “maim.” Our δημηγόρος (as Socrates called himself at 519D5) is mounting a simile with a proleptic skew, and it challenges the translator to find words that play along with it: the translator must be as willing as Plato was to employ passing notes when necessary! Alternatively, Cobet characteristically deletes καὶ αὐτοῦς καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθεῖρει (followed by Schanz Christ Sauppe Stender Theiler), destroying the plays on words in order to clean things up – an initiative rightly condemned by Dodds (370).
- 2155 ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ (522A1): Hardly good diction and for this reason deleted by Madvig (*Advers.*[1871] 1.412) and then Cobet Sauppe Stender, who will not forgive what the proleptic skew requires (cf. B7)! Croiset recognizes it (p.217 n.1), but here over-translates ἀπορεῖν with *torture* which he tries to redeem in the *comparandum*, the target case (ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, B7) with the parallel (though equally inappropriate) expression, *mettant à la torture*. Piettre helpfully remembers Meno’s remark that the Socratic elenchus can paralyze (*Meno* 79E7-80B2). Dodds does us the service of finding two uses of ἀπορεῖν connected with distress, at least: Hipp. *Epid.* 5.42 (=5.232 L.), ἀπορίη ξὺν ὀδύῃ; and *Rep.* 556D4, ἄσθματος καὶ ἀπορίας μεστών – of a fat man.
- 2156 Reading πόματα (A1) with the mss., *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Hermann Coraes Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Mistriotis Schmelzer (πέμματα *fons codicis* R *teste* Cantarin : πόματα *coni.* Bekker, *legg. edd.*), as at *Phdo.* 117B6 (*all mss.*) though emended to πόματα in all modern *edd.* on the advice of Stallb. and then Schanz (v.12, pref. §2). Their decision was based on Porson’s collection of a score of Euripidean passages in which a transmitted πόμα (rather than πῶμα) is *contra metrum* (Porson *ad Hippol.* 211, in his *Adversaria* [Cambridge 1812] 218), to which Thompson adds fig. 274 of Alexis Comicus (Kock 2.398) quoted at Athen. 1.28E (Dindorf 1.65), where Porson emended the πόματος of all mss. into πῶματος, *metri causa* (Λεσβίου πόματος mss. : Λεσβίου δὲ πῶματος Porson, *leg.* Kock). Against all that, Cron cites G.Curtius, *Grundzüge Gr. Etym.* (ed.2, 1866) p.252 §371, who accepts both forms – πόμα and πῶμα – and there are no metrical considerations here. The drinks are πικρότατα not because the children-jurors would prefer sweets (Mistriotis) – prescribed medicines may well be bitter – but in order to set up πικροὺς λόγους in the target case (522B8).
- 2157 οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ (A2): i.e., ἀλλ’ οὐχ εὐωχῶν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ, ὃς ἠνώχουν ὑμᾶς. In a negative comparison the construction sometimes “shifts over entirely to the member initiated by ὥσπερ,” as here (*AGPS* 69.64.2, citing *Prot.* 341A3-4, *Symp.* 179D8-E2).
- 2158 Reading ἢ εἰ (A4) with F (εἰ *del. punctis* f) Steph.γρ., Beck Schanz, *legg. edd.* (ἢ BTWpf, *leg.* Routh : εἰ Za<sup>marginis</sup> ZbAugO1). He would either have nothing equally oratorical to say; or if, failing that, he should simply say the truth, etc. Cf. the re-do with οὔτε ... οὔτε at B9-C2, and cf. πάση (A9) with n. 2162.
- 2159 ὑγιεινῶς (A6), an imitation of the reply Socrates threatened to give Callicles above (521B5-6), accepting the charge but gainsaying it with a last-minute modifier. The defiant tone approaches that of the *Apology*, and ἀναβοῆσαι presages all the μὴ θορυβεῖτε’s thereof (cf. βοήσεσθε, *Apol.* 30C2-5).
- 2160 Reading πόσον (A6) with F, *legg.* Hirschig Thompson Dobree (*Adv.* v.1[1883]129) Schanz Christ Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset Zimmermann Dodds Theiler Heidbüchel Cantarin Erlar (ὀπόσον BTP, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Hermann Bekker Stallb. Ast Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Sommer Mistriotis Schmelzer Stender Lamb Feix). Against all *edd.* up to his time except for Hirschig, Thompson courageously read πόσον, “on the basis of a single ms.” (namely, F! compare *Rep.* 348B6). In the sequel I read οἶει ἂν with TPWb, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Coraes Stallb. Ast Woolsey Jahn Kratz Deuschle-Cron Schanz Lodge Burnet Croiset Dodds Cantarin (ποιεῖ ἂν B : οἶει F : ἂν οἶει Cobet). Thanks to the πόσον of F, we do not need Kratz’s acrobatic justification of indirect ὀπόσον with direct οἶει (as if attracted into its indirect discourse, on analogy with Latin *quod diceret*); but similar indirect interrogatives occur at *Charm.* 170C7, *Euthyd.* 271A6, *Lys.* 212C4, *Meno* 74D7, *Rep.* 348B6, often emended out, L.L.Forman, *Selections from Plato, ad loc.* explains it as requiring us to supply εἰπέ μοι, *vel sim.* Fuhr proposed τι after πόσον (on the basis of ποιεῖ in B), accepted by Burnet Dodds Theiler, Dodds citing *Rep.* 578E5 (ἐν ποίῳ ἂν τι καὶ ὀπόσω φόβῳ οἶει γενέσθαι αὐτόν), but in that passage, as at 448E6-7, τι is inserted to create a berth for the second interrogative, ὀποιοῦς; and moreover the latter is not an instance of the indirect form subject to οἶει but a local variation caused by τι and ποῖος (on which cf. n. 170).
- 2161 Reading ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή (A8), with all mss. L.L.Forman, *ad loc.* (after Thurot), followed by Lodge Theiler Cantarin, relocated οἴεσθαί γε χρή to the end of Socrates’s previous speech; and Dodds Zeyl Waterfield Nichols Heidbüchel Dalfen Erlar to the beginning of his subsequent one, both leaving Callicles with ἴσως only; Hirschig and Cobet delete ἴσως, and Christ deletes οὐ μέγα and ἴσως. All these are attempts to smooth the passage, but ἴσως here is used by Callicles in litotes (= *profecto*), bearing its ironic tone (cf. n. 801, 1114, 1842, 1936, 2137, 2302), an irony then



ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορία ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅτι [b] χρὴ εἰπεῖν;<sup>2162</sup>

ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι<sup>2163</sup> ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς ἄς<sup>2164</sup> ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἄς οὔτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ οὔτε οἷς<sup>2165</sup> πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τις με ἢ νεωτέρους<sup>2166</sup> φῆ διαφθεῖρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα,<sup>2167</sup> ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν<sup>2168</sup> λέγοντα πικροὺς<sup>2169</sup> λόγους ἢ ἰδία ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν,<sup>2170</sup> ὅτι δικαίως [c] πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω καὶ πράττω, τὸ ὑμέτερον

“unveiled” by οἴεσθαι γε χρὴ. Punctuate after ἴσως (with edd.: Routh Heindorf Coraes Ast Woolsey Hirschig Zimmermann omit punctuation, yielding the sense, “Maybe one *ought* to think so,” also ironic, since γε is after οἴεσθαι, not ἴσως!). Callicles’s words studiously border upon and flirt with unmeaning. Cary and Cope’s diffident “one must think so at least” (*vel sim.*, Lamb Helmbold Hamilton Irwin Allen) and Croiset and Piettre’s *c’est possible; c’est même probable*, etc. don’t sound like Callicles.

- 2162 Reading εἰπεῖν (B1) with BTPF, *legg.* edd. and implicit in Ficinus’s *suae defensionis* (ποιεῖν W *teste* Cantarín). The verb brings forward εἰπεῖν in A4-5 and is continued by λέγειν in B5 and sequel. πάση is not merely intensive but logical, generalizing from the polar doublet countenanced above (gainsaying with eloquence and simply telling the truth).
- 2163 πάθος πάθοιμι (B3): Plato “predicts” in the aftermath the first words of Socrates’s defense speech (ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε...), and his disavowal there of the δεινότης that may have so affected the jurors.
- 2164 Reading ἡδονὰς ἄς (B4) with TWPF, *legg.* edd. (ἡδονὰς B).
- 2165 οἷς πορίζεται (B6) *sc.* ἡδονή, a single case of the foregoing group of ἡδοναί, both of them indefinite (for the shift from plural to singular cf. 478C1-2, 505D2; *Leg.* 670A7; *Polit.* 299A2-4; *Prot.* 319D1-6, 324A6-7; *Rep.* 413E2, 496C7ff; *Ar. Pax* 640, *Eccl.* 672, *Vesp.* 554; for an instance in Latin cf. Cic. *ND* 1.19.51). I take οἷς as ταῦτα οἷς and the dative as a dative of means like ἦ at 517D2 (cf. also 501B1 with n. 1572), denoting the orators’ clever means (rather than as τούτους οἷς, masc. acc. plus dative of interest, ‘those for whom they provide pleasures,’ accepted by edd.). It is Callicles’s vaunted orators and their oratory, not their blandishments, that Socrates does not envy. It’s quite irrelevant for him to deny he envies their putative beneficiaries. As to the pleasantries in question Dalfen reminds us of adducing in one’s defense such things as liturgies and choregia: cf. 472B).
- 2166 Reading νεωτέρους only (B7), with mss. and edd. against the conjecture of Hirschig to add τοὺς before it (followed by Deuschle Mistriotis Christ Canto). Parallelism is not needed, especially given the asymmetry that the elders themselves *contrived* the charge that Socrates corrupted young men (cf. n. 2169, *infra*). Indeed, absence of the article here makes τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους their fathers (Lodge).
- 2167 διαφθεῖρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα (B7). “Cashing in” two proleptic terms from the *comparans* right beside each other: something of a *tour de force*. For ποιεῖν ἀπορεῖν cf. *Meno* 80A1-2, *Th.* 149A9.
- 2168 Reading κακηγορεῖν (B8) with BTf *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (κατηγορεῖν WPF Steph., *legg.* Routh Ast[1812] Beck). Anytus accuses Socrates of κακῶς λέγειν men in general (*Meno* 94E3), including those who cooked up the charge that he corrupted their sons and voted against him in the courtroom.
- 2169 πικροὺς λόγους (B8): The diction sounds tragic to me (cf. Nauck, *Tragicæ Dictionis Index* (1892) s.v. πικρός; Ellendt *Lex. Soph.*, s.v. *id.*). πικρότατα, above A1, was totally unsuspecting; this time the strain comes in the *comparandum*! Such a strain in the aftermath “welding” the analogy (as opposed to “proleptic skews” before): cf. nn. 1035, 950; and *Rep.* 538E5, 552C3, and 561C4 all with my nn.. Normal diction would call for ὀνειδίζειν, as at *Apol.* 30E7. The distinction between ill-treating the adults and corrupting their children (set up at 521E7-8) suggests a distinction between the motive and the charge preferred – which is exactly what Socrates will say in the *Apology* (23C7-D2). As to the special embarrassment in the face of eavesdroppers upon Socrates’s conversations (πάρωντες), cf. *Apol.* 21D1, 22B7, 23A4 and C3-4).
- 2170 ἔξω εἰπεῖν (B9) brings forward ἔχειν εἰπεῖν from A4: it is not that the truth will not avail him (*pace* Hamilton) but that he, like the doctor, will not be given a berth by the jurors even to claim that his advice is just and in their interest, which he then recites, as the doctor had. The second alternative, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν, corresponds chiasmically with τί ἂν οἶει, the first alternative, above (A3). Cf. n. 2158. Not seeing this, Piettre wrongly extends the ensuing self-quotation to include οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν.



δὴ τοῦτο,<sup>2171</sup> ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως,<sup>2172</sup> ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλῶς<sup>2173</sup> ἔχειν ἄνθρωπος ἐν πόλει οὕτως<sup>2174</sup> διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν<sup>2175</sup> αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὠμολόγησας· εἰ βεβηθηκῶς εἶη αὐτῷ,<sup>2176</sup> μήτε περὶ [d] ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοῦς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκῶς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη<sup>2177</sup> γὰρ τῆς βοηθείας<sup>2178</sup> ἑαυτῷ πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὠμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα<sup>2179</sup> ἑμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλω βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν

2171 λέγω καὶ πράττω, τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο (C1). For ὑμέτερος we of course need a second plural antecedent, as we did at 510E1 (cf. n. 1864). With edd. back to Steph. I take τὸ ὑμέτερον τοῦτο = “your interest,” referring to the jurors, an appositive as acknowledged by δὴ. Socrates is here prophesying what he will say at his trial: cf. *Apol.* 31B3. But Dodds cites Olymp. (216.5-8) as taking τὸ ὑμέτερον τοῦτο to point forward to ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, the orators’ standard way of addressing the jurors, among whom he counts the second person Callicles, and takes δὴ to be rueful, as if Socrates would be required to speak that way in court (*ἀναγκασθήσομαι*, Olymp., *ibid.*). Dodds (and Theiler Cantarin) rely upon the argument of P. Mass (*CR* 43 [1939] 58-59), that in the *Apology*, Socrates, having up until this last moment of the trial referred to his jurors uniformly with ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, reserved the use of ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί only for the jurors that voted to acquit him, as at 40A2, where he makes the extraordinary remark that only these deserve the name of jurors. From this fact, Maas infers that Socrates took the address, at all times and not merely for the rhetorical climax of his speech at trial, as something other than a neutral formality – that he held it in reserve as solely approbatory – so that his (idiosyncratic) use of it here must be ironic and condemnatory since (of course) in the present context he prejudices that his jurors will disbelieve him. On this basis Maas with Dodds (but not Olymp.) takes ὑμέτερον to be a slur at Callicles and his types (rather than at his jurors, for instance) and associates his interpretation with the “evidently right” interpretation of the ancients, namely Olymp. (though for Maas it is not only voluntary but idiosyncratic, as opposed to *ἀναγκασθῆσόμενος*, *apud* Olymp.). This argument of many steps is obviously weak at several points, perhaps the weakest that Callicles is a novice and hardly as yet qualifies, nor likely will ever qualify, as a real ῥήτωρ. Irwin Zeyl Waterfield go so far as Olymp. in saying ὑμέτερον refers to the orators through Callicles, and Irwin ponders (without attribution) whether Maas’s argument from the *Apology* is correct. Nichols (123 n.166) inverts the argument: assuming with Maas that Socrates harbors this special usage, he takes the reference to the usual use as something he is appropriating from them, in here addressing jurors that would listen to the truth!

Most have taken πράττω with δικαίως, and λέγω with τὸ ὑμέτερον τοῦτο (= “in your interest”) as a sort of pleonasm, but Dodds takes πράττω to refer to the ποιῶντα phrase above, and λέγω to the λέγοντα phrase. This rather undermines their amassing by πάντα, though his interpretation would be confirmed if Plato had employed his telltale method of chiasm, which however he did not. Instead of these interpretations I take λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, with Jowett Schmelzer Sauppe Zimmermann Irwin Zeyl Waterfield Nichols, as a doublet (removing comma before καί, with Heindorf) that links words and deeds as constituting participation in politics, cf. 481A1, 500C5, 516D7 (μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς), 521D7-9; *Meno* 99C9; *Prot.* 319A2, 325D2; *Rep.* 492B8, 494E3-4, 565B2-3; T. 1.139.4; Xen. *Cyn.* 1.18, *Mem.* 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.6; Ps. Aeschin. *Ep.* 11 init. (= *Orat. Att.* 2.151 Muller); D. 3.15, 18.54; Plut. *Mor.* 798B, 795E, *al.*; *vit. Philopoem.* 16; and λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, Isoc. *Soph.* 14; *Ant.* 36, 187, 236, 271 – going back to Homer, e.g., μύθων τε ῥήτηρ’ ἔμεναι πρηκτιῆρά τε ἔργων, *Iliad* 9.443), whence the ῥήτωρ is the paradigm of the man of power in a democracy. We also find cases of political πράττειν immediately specified as λέγειν (e.g., 521D7-8).

2172 ἴσως (C2), answering Callicles’s ironic use at A8.

2173 καλῶς (C4): Not virtue but honor is Callicles’s criterion: compare οὕτω διακεῖσθαι ... αἰσχιστον at 508D4 – but in whose eyes?

2174 Reading οὕτως (C5) from “four Florentine mss. and the Meerm [= O1]” [Stallb. *silet* Cantarin!] (Woolsey Cron Schanz Burnet Croiset Dodds Cartarin): οὕτω Steph. (edd.). Woolsey borrows from Stallb. the assertion that the sigma is kept before consonants “*ubi vi et pondere suo pollet plurimum*” (accepted by Kühner, *Gr.Gr.* [ed.2, 1869] 1.230, citing *Prot.* 351B7 and Stallb. *ad loc.*) but does not read it here. Though in Callicles’s mouth it may be emphatic, οὕτω with sigma before consonant does occur at 460D and 521B8 (cf. n. 2133) without seeming emphatic. Ensuing epxegetical καὶ is virtually equivalent to ὥστε (Mistriotis).

2175 Reading ἐν (C7) with Coraes (ἐν BTPF *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Hermann Bekker Stallb. Ast Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Sommer Schmelzer Stender Lamb Feix Heidbüchel). Suspecting ἐν goes back to Heindorf (ὑπάρχων regularly taking bare dative), who was followed in this by Thompson. But Coraes had conjectured ἐν to replace ἐν, a solution countenanced by Heindorf, accepted with modification of the word order by Hirschig (Ei ἐν γ’ ἐκεῖνο *ponens*), and read by Schanz Mistriotis Christ Lodge Sauppe Burnet Croiset, Dodds Theiler, Chambry Cantarin. With ἐκεῖνο, Socrates is referring back to 509B-E.

2176 βεβηθηκῶς ... αὐτῷ (C8): Helmbold gets the perfect tense very nicely with “he himself his defense.”

2177 Reading αὕτη (D2) with BTWP and edd. (αὐτῇ F : τοιαύτη *coni.* Madvig, *leg.* Deuschle [*et mox* τις βοήθεια]).

2178 Reading τῆς βοηθείας (D2) with F as the *difficilior*, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Helmbold Dodds Heidbüchel Cantarin Erler (τις βοήθεια BTP, *legg.* edd. : ἡ βοήθεια *coni.* Cobet, *legg.* Schanz Stender Theiler : τις ἡ βοήθεια *coni.* Hirschig, *leg.* Christ : τοι βοήθεια *coni.* Sauppe). The passage had exercised the ingenuity of the edd. until the reputation of F was enhanced. For the attraction of the part or aspect into the gender of the partitive genitive, cf. 519E1 and n., and with Dodds *Symp.* 209A6; and K.-G. 1.279. When it governs the dative, βοήθεια denotes to help *for*; when the genitive help *against*, e.g. 509C (Woolsey).

2179 ὄντα (D4): The participial construction with ἐξελέγχοι (for which cf. X. *Mem.* 1.7.2) is like that with other verbs of discovering (εὐρίσκειν, ἀλίσκεσθαι: X. *Cyrop.* 3.1.16) and showing (e.g., δηλοῦν T. 3.84.2): as a result of the argument (esp. with ἐξ-: cf. n.750) something has become palpable. As Lodge says, the refutation will show that Socrates is unable.

ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου,<sup>2180</sup> καὶ εἰ διὰ<sup>2181</sup> ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν<sup>2182</sup> ἀποθνήσκωμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν·<sup>2183</sup> εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς<sup>2184</sup> ἐνδεία τελευτῶν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἄν με<sup>2185</sup> φέροντα [e] τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκω οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς Ἄϊδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν<sup>2186</sup> ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.<sup>2187</sup>

ΚΑΛ. ἀλλ' ἐπέπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.<sup>2188</sup>

[523] ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου,<sup>2189</sup> ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήση μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοὶ λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ<sup>2190</sup> Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων,<sup>2191</sup> ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου,<sup>2192</sup> καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ [b] ὀσίως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ

2180 μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου (D6): I doubt this means “*seul avec moi-même, et sur mon propre témoignage*” (Thurot Huit), but rather, with Lodge and Waterfield, conceives of a real dialectical conversation between one questioner (ὑπὸ μόνου) and one answerer (μόνος). Thus Croiset, *en tête à tête*. Lamb and Helmbold, “man to man.” Dodds helpfully cites 471E2-472C4.

2181 καὶ εἰ διὰ (D6) with btwpF *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* edd. (καὶ ἰδίᾳ BT : ἰδίᾳ WP : ἰδίᾳ· καὶ διὰ Za [*mox* εἰ *ante* ἀποθν. *addens*] : εἰ διὰ S1YR [*teste* Bekker]). With ῥαδίως ... φέροντα. Plato grants him more prophesying, for this will have been the way Socrates bore his execution: cf. *Crito* 43B8-9 (ῥαδίως ... φέρεται); also *Phdo.* 117B3-C5.

2182 ἀδυναμίαν (D6): Sauppe notes that the negative noun recalls the quasi-oxymoronic tone of the argument at 509B3-C4, such as βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος (B4).

2183 ἀγανακτοίην ἄν (D8), predicting, prophesying, adumbrating his use at *Apol.* 35E1, and the assertion there.

2184 ἐνδεία (D7), a mordant oxymoron. For the similar one, as if here prophesied, cf. *Apol.* 38D6-7: ἀπορία μὲν ἕλωκα οὐ μέντοι λόγων ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀνασχυντίας...

2185 Reading ῥαδίως ἴδοις ἄν με (D8) with BTW, *legg.* edd. (ἴδοις ἄν με ῥαδίως F, supported by two papyri): neither word order is particularly felicitous.

2186 Reading κακῶν (E4) with BTWP, *legg.* edd. (κακῶν F Olymp[π]). Again for the sentiment cf. *Apol.* 39A6-B4, 29A, 37B, and 40Cff. Socrates here (E1-4) expresses more certainty about the afterlife than there (noted by Dodds), if for no other reason than to recommend his myth to Callicles (E5-6). With the juxtaposition of personal pronouns, he means to raise the register as Callicles had at the beginning of his parrhesiastic speech, *pace* Richards (cf. n. 1337).

2187 λέξαι (E6): In this case the alternate aorist is used for reciting a tale, speaking in another’s voice (cf. 502B6 and n.); cf. the future just below (523A3).

2188 καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον (E7-8): Again Callicles’s response answers and acknowledges nothing of what Socrates has so forcefully claimed; and again he is blind to see that Socrates’s ending remarks will constitute only the beginning of his own end.

2189 μάλα καλοῦ λόγου (523A1): The genitive suggests one is to hear the story speaking itself. While Plato mythologizes the afterlife also at *Phdo.* 107Dff and *Rep.* 614Bff, the present story or “report” was more widely admired and quoted in antiquity and so there are many testimonia, to-wit Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 12.6 (p.577A); Plutarch *Mor.* 120Eff; Stob. *Ecl.* 1.49.63 (1.449-451 Wachsmuth); and Theodoret *Therap.* 11 (= 424ff Gaisford). Socrates’s distinction between μῦθος and λόγος here is not some epistemological distinction of “Plato” invading the horizon of the conversation (such as the one at *Ep.* 7 335A2-5, even if genuine – *pace* Dodds), but his own estimation of the mental vocabulary of Callicles, who in the end might take both the report and thus Socrates’s inference as to what it implies for man (λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν, 524B1-2) as an old wives’ tale (527A5). Compare also his distinction at 505C7-D3. Saying to Callicles that he takes it as true is an admonition that what Callicles does not yet see is no less real than what he thinks he does, and that what Socrates is saying to him will not, as he hopes, release him to his own devices once Socrates finally stops talking. Nichols’s “rational account” for λόγος is a fetishistic overtranslation: it is not its rationality that would make the logos true; and Irwin and Zeyl’s “account” does not denote the needed complement or alternative to μῦθος. Erler correctly calls it a *Bericht*. For ἄκουε compare Beowulf, *Hwæt!*

2190 γάρ (A3) is programmatic (with Cary Jahn Cantarin Erler).

2191 They divided heaven, earth’s surface, and the world below between them (Olymp.226.8-10). For Homer cf. *I.* 15.187-195. On aorist for pluperfect, cf. Smyth §1943. With Mistrionis Lodge and Dodds, παρέλαβον avoids any allusion to their hateful battle, treating their assumption of rule as an orderly inheritance. The division is there described by Prometheus in connection with his dissatisfaction for being excluded (as Nichols notices), and therefore may broach the incident between them alluded to just below (D7-E1: cf. n. 2204).

2192 Coraees alone reads καὶ before ἐπὶ Κρόνου (A6), from Plutarch alone (cf. *Mor.* 120E-1D), perhaps preferable but unsupported in mss. The mss. then read καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν, *legg.* edd. (for which expression cf. *Phdrs.* 254A2, *S. Ant.* 181). ἔτι is then read by all mss. (except P *teste* Cantarin), *legg.* edd. Presumably ἀεὶ denotes the time between ἐπὶ Κρόνου with νῦν (thus Ficinus tr. *et semper et nunc etiam*. Jahn tr. *besteht auch jetzt noch wie immer*).

εὐδαιμονία ἐκτὸς κακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τίσσεως<sup>2193</sup>  
 δεσποτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι  
 νεωστὶ<sup>2194</sup> τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνη τῆ<sup>2195</sup> ἡμέρα  
 δικάζοντες ἢ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ  
 οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ<sup>2196</sup> ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόντες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία ὅτι φοιτῶέν [c]  
 σφιν ἄνθρωποι ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς· ἀλλ' ἐγώ,<sup>2197</sup> ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο  
 γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ, ἔφη,<sup>2198</sup> οἱ  
 κρινόμενοι κρίνονται·<sup>2199</sup> ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς  
 ἔχοντες ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους,<sup>2200</sup> καί, ἐπειδὴν ἡ  
 κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες<sup>2201</sup> ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν·  
 [d] οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι

2193 Reading τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τίσσεως (B3) with Plutarch, *legg.* Heindorf Beck Thurot (τῆς τίσσεως τε καὶ τῆς δίκης mss., *legg.* edd. : τῆς τίσσεως Euseb. [ms.B] Procl. : τῆς κρίσεως τε καὶ δίκης Thdt.). Cf. Ficinus in *punitiois iustique supplicii carcerem*. τίσσις is now added to δίκη (as it was at 472D8 and E6 [see n. 789]): Human misbehavior disturbs also the order of gods and men (whence ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, B2: cf. 507E3-508A8). Among men the dispensation of penalties must be properly managed so as to avoid unleashing an endless cycle of reprisals (whence the notion that punishment is meant for the future not the past: *Prot.* 324B1-5), but the repair or reparation for the assault on the divine order is the business of gods and will be managed upon the death of the perpetrator and in the afterlife without the threat of such calamity (for they do care about the affairs of men, *contra* Adeimantus at *Rep.* 365D6-6B2). To admonish mortals in this life of such vengeance in the next is meant to deter them from misbehavior they think they can talk themselves out of, in the lawcourts among the living (visions described by Glaucon and Adeimantus in *Rep.* Bk.II, 361A5-B5, 364B2-C5).

2194 νεωστὶ (B5) can be absolute (“recently” *vel sim.*, Cary Woolsey Cope Lodge Zimmermann Woodhead Waterfield Zeyl) in contrast with ἐπὶ Κρόνου, but here is not absolute but relative (=early in Zeus’s reign), to be construed with the participle ἔχοντος (with Heindorf Beck Deuschle-Cron Thompson Schmelzer Sauppe [comparing νῦν at *Prot.* 318C1] Croiset Lamb Apelt Helmbold Chambry Hamilton Irwin Allen Hamilton Canto Pietre Heidbuchel Erler); the use at 503C3 is forced into the absolute sense by the perfect tense of the participle there (*pace* Lodge). The point is not to say the old law was in place up until recently, but that it was soon to change once Zeus assumed control. The delay was due to the fact that his chosen judges, according to his very revision of the law, had to die before the new policy could be put into place. Certainly not “even later” (Jowett), as if it stressed continuation or durability of the law. “Evidence” for a tradition of this earlier form of judgment (sought by Canto) is unneeded. If it *had* been Cronos’s method of enforcement it was obviously subject to the very sorts of manipulation here described, which Zeus now seeks to annul for the sake of perfecting the enforcement of the law (523E6, 524A6-7) and ensuring the proper assignments to Tartarus and the Blessed Isles; but for mankind, eavesdropping on this council of the gods, the effect is to cancel such false hopes (on which cf. n. 2204, *infra*).

2195 Surely τῆ (B6), from F Plut. Stob. Olymp.[λ] is to be read, with the edd. (*om.* BTWP).

2196 Reading οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ (B7) with Plutarch, *legg.* edd. since Heindorf (οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ BTPF Stob. Steph., *legg.* Routh Ast[1819] Beck Bekker Stallb. Cron Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ), the second οἱ added to continue attributive position, so as to distinguish who they are from whence they arrived (for such attributive use of a prepositional phrase cf. *Apol.* 32B3; *Phdo.* 58A1, 76D9; *Symp.* 202E3-4 – which is Stallbaum’s interpretation of the phrase here), the former explaining the latter. Nevertheless ἐκ straddles over both constructions, their whence and their whither (Beck Woolsey). Given ἐκατέρωσε the easiest explanation is that Plutus rules over Tartarus which is in the Underworld (according to the division of Cronus’s universe) and certain other ἐπιμεληταὶ rule over the Islands, which are located at the outer edge of Ocean. The imperfect ἔλεγον suggests, and the dependent optative φοιτῶέν asks us to hear, many witnesses to the problem, and this sets into relief the corrective personal intervention asserted by Zeus (ἀλλ’ ἐγώ).

2197 ἀλλ’ ἐγώ (C1-2): He is none the less (ἀλλά) working on this himself (ἐγώ), as we learn with πρότερος at E7: “but already I shall, without your petition.” Contrast Woodhead and Zeyl’s “All right, I’ll put a stop to that,” which is merely reactive.

2198 ἔφη (C3): The presentation of Zeus’s speech is punctuated by “he said’s,” the force of which is to mark the steps of his thinking (cf. *Charm.* 164E3ff.). His own statements are declarative and even abrupt (note anarthrous ὄδε, A5) and stoop not so low as to attempt to justify themselves or make themselves more clear by the usual means, such as with particles and choice conjunctions. We may compare the declaration of Lachesis at *Rep.* 617D6-E5 (cf. also my notes *ad loc.*). οὖν, for instance (at B7, C1, D1 and D6, as at A5, B6, C4) is narrative, not inferential. See further Schmelzer, 175-6 and Sauppe, *ad loc.*

2199 κρίνονται (C4) *bis*: Epanaleptic repetition is again characteristic of this passage: cf. C7, E1-2, 524E1, 525B3, 525C4, 527D4-5, and n. 2247, as in story-telling λέξις εἰρομένη. The shortness of the sentences (with Mistriotis) confers a kindred simplicity onto the narrative. Note also the swift instance of chiasm at B4-5.

2200 σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους (C5-6), accusatives of respect, or internal. The listing and differentiation of the three kinds of goods in the dialogues almost always has the dialectical function of setting apart the (less visible) goods of soul. Thus, the goods of the body (such as strength health and beauty) are often bunched together with the so-called external goods (such as family and wealth), as here: cf. n. 620 for a full list. ἠμφιεσμένοι literally applies only to clothing, the third category, but with its metaphorical extension to bodily attributes enabled by this list, we are invited to see the body as a covering outside something: dialectically, we are backing up into the soul.

Other lists of goods acknowledge three distinct and co-generic kinds (e.g., 467E4, 477B1-C2, 503E-504A, 511D1-2, 514A5-515A1ff; *Charm.* 157E7-8A1; *Cleit.* 407B1-8A9; *Euthyd.* 279B; *Leg.* 697B [and Stallb. *ad loc.*], 870A8-B6; *Meno* 87E-8B [and cf. Thompson *ad loc.*]; *Phdrs.* 239A2-40A8; *Phlb.* 48E1-9A2; *Rep.* 432A4-6, 591C-2A, 618C8-D5; *Symp.* 205D4-5), their hierarchy famously articulated in a continuous analogy as goods of the self, goods of the things of the self, and goods of the things of the things of the self (*Alc. I*, 133DE). Conversely, as the present passage has it, as clothes are to the body, so is body to soul.

2201 Reading μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες (C7) with the mss. and edd. (μαρτυρήσοντες Plutarch, *del.* Cobet followed by Christ Sauppe), such repetitions here being common (*pace* Cobet). Plato is thinking of the infamous ψευδομαρτυρία of the Attic dicasterion, for which Dodds appropriately cites 471E5.

δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὄτα καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι.<sup>2202</sup> ταῦτα δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, παυστέον ἐστὶν προειδόμενος αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ<sup>2203</sup> προϊσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ [e] ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν.<sup>2204</sup> ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς<sup>2205</sup> κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων· τεθνεώτας<sup>2206</sup> γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν<sup>2207</sup> δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου,<sup>2208</sup> ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ<sup>2209</sup> καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς<sup>2210</sup> γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾗ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκῶς πρότερος<sup>2211</sup> ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐποησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, [524] ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς

2202 ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι (D3), here serving as exegesis of ἀμπερόμοι (D2) which itself brought forward ἠμφιεσμένοι, now includes nothing of the external goods (which had served as the basis for the metaphor of clothing) but only the body and in particular its sense organs.

The metaphor of clothing is dropped and the essential ingredient of an obscuring covering (προκάλυμμα) is all that remains. It is of course highly paradoxical that the aspects of body singled out for censure as obscure are the very organs of sense, but surely Zeus knows! Naturally the “line of sight” is from the judge’s soul to the soul of the judged, and so the impediments on the side of the judge are from the inside out (body blocking the ability to see) and on the side of the judged from the outside in (body or clothes blocking the ability to be seen what is within). The specification with sight and hearing adequately explains the cause of the still “embodied” judges’ errors, given the physical appearance of the man under judgment and the audible arguments of his witnesses (the generalization with ὄλον τὸ σῶμα is not a free-floating condemnation of corporeality but simply envisages the judges’ souls being contained in the body). A Platonic prejudice against bodily perception plays no role; indeed, Plato seldom if ever foists platonism upon his characters, even upon Socrates. Irwin’s citing *I Samuel* 16:7 is much more to the point.

2203 Reading νῦν γὰρ (D7) with the mss. and edd. (νῦν μὲν γὰρ fPar, legg. Woolsey Sommer Hirschig Schmelzer : νῦν μὲν Plut.). γὰρ here, like οὖν, does not give Zeus’s justification but tells us why he said what he just said (“I say that because”), as above at C2-4 and below at E2.

2204 Reading αὐτῶν (E1) with BTF Stob., legg. edd. (αὐτῶν WP teste Cantarin : αὐτό V Plutarch, legg. Ast Beck Cope Waterfield : αὐτὸ αὐτῶν E1 and the early editions, legg. Routh Coraes : αὐτοὺς coni. Hirschig[1873]). Although, with Stallb. Woolsey Jahn, αὐτῶν by normal syntax would specify τοῦτο as an aspect of the humans’ situation (for the genitive specifying the demonstrative in this way, cf. *Apol.* 17B3, *Menex.* 241B4, *Rep.* 367D2-3, *Thet.* 161B8 (the relative ὃ), still, the word order and who is speaking justify and suggest we make an exception and, short of Hirschig’s emendation, take the genitive as ablative (with Dodds).

Prometheus himself uses the verb παῦσαι at Aesch. *PV.* 248ff, which is quite enough to suggest that Zeus and Socrates have that passage in mind, announcing not a measure of Zeus but of his own, for which moreover Zeus is now punishing him. There, he says θνητοὺς γ’ ἐπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον; and he tells by what means he put an end to it: τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατώκισα. It is Prometheus’s announcement (though not his means) that Zeus here reports. Like his gift of fire, the gift was of ambivalent value to mankind, for in giving men “blind” hopes that they could avoid their just deserts and proper fates (μόρος), for instance by distracting their human judges and imagining that “nobody” could know what was going on inside them merely because it was invisible, Zeus must now introduce a supplementary correction whereby the true state of their souls, which men blindly hope will remain invisible, will be seen for what it is, in a disembodied judgment of what cannot be concealed by what cannot be deceived, in the invisible afterlife. By this measure, fate (μόρος) becomes ineluctable all over again; and the eternal divine law of gods over men, imperfectly enforced under the regime of Cronus (523A5-B6) and partly thwarted by the gift of Prometheus to mankind, is hereby restored.

2205 γυμνοὺς (E1): The metaphors have set up this broader use of nakedness to include stripping body from soul. The metaphor of soul as denuded of the body appears at *Crat.* 403B5-6 and *Rep.* 577B1 in different contexts differently developed. The soul will be accounted to be a “disembodied man” once Socrates begins explaining this oracular account (524B1ff) and thereafter (cf. n. 2262), its gender may be masculine or feminine, as witness ἔρημον and καταλιπόντα (E4-5).

2206 τεθνεώτας (E2): Here and again, without explanation (as at B5, C4, E3) and despite γὰρ, Zeus will speak of their being alive or dead without saying what it means or why it matters, and again associates death with their being stripped of obscuring veils – without explanation, for he is a god. Canto by now takes their being dead to imply they are naked (E2-3): *Et leur juge doit être également mort...*

2207 καὶ τὸν κριτὴν (E3-4): Sauppe notices the absence of δέ before δεῖ as betokening Zeus’s abrupt manner; meanwhile, Cobet (*Mnem.* n.s.2[1875]158) adds one!

2208 ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἐκάστου (E4) ~ “directly as each one dies,” with edd. For ἐξαίφνης (and αὐτίκα and εὐθύς and ἄμα) with participle used to specify the time of the participle, Stallb. cites Matthiae *Gr.* §565.2 and εὐθύς *ad Phdo.* 70A4, and Dodds cites *Crat.* 396B4 and ἄμα at 520C7. Compare also νεωστὶ with ἔχοντος at 523B5. Mistrisiotis Jowett Sauppe Helmbold Apelt construe: “they shall die suddenly” as emphasizing the new experience of death being unforeseen, like the admonition about “the thief that comes in the night” (*Matthew* 24:43), but the primary exigency for the continuing narrative is to specify that the judgment occurs immediately upon death since any delay would not only need supplementary justification (though perhaps, with Zimmermann, the experience of suddenness is also implied), but more importantly to remove any wiggle room for those false hopes to imagine evading the process. The wellsprings and ingenuity of such hopes is well illustrated by Adeimantus’s remarks at *Rep.* 365A4-6B2, which include paying off the gods with the proceeds from a crime one would be punished for committing.

2209 Reading καὶ (E5) with the mss. Euseb. Stob., legg. edd. (*om.* F Steph.[punctum inserens] Plut. Thdr., leg. Routh Beck). As to the gender of the participle and of ἔρημον (masc. rather than fem. though the subject is “really” the soul), it is perhaps impertinent to correct the grammar of a divine declaration: Zeus is making this rule for men to know, not disembodied souls.

2210 Reading τῆς (E5) with the mss. Stob., legg. edd. (*om.* Eusebius Theodoret). Heindorf gives many instances of its absence, Ast of its presence; together, their evidence makes emendation indifferent.

2211 Reading πρότερος (E7) with the mss. Stob. Olymp.[π] Steph., legg. edd. (πρότερον EstS2 Plutarch Olymp.[λ] leg. Coraes). Zeus from his heavenly clime of course recognized (ἐγνωκῶς) the problem before his subterranean brother came to him, and had set up a solution that has not quite come on board as of yet, since the new judges he is appointing must first die, so that they will be dead when they begin judging. Therefore translate ἐπειδὴν with “once” (“as soon as”) not just “when” (Zeyl).



Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν· οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ<sup>2212</sup> ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τῷ ὁδῷ, ἢ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἢ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός· Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπόρρητόν τι ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ,<sup>2213</sup> ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἢ κρίσις ἢ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

ταῦτ' ἔστιν,<sup>2214</sup> ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω [b] ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι<sup>2215</sup> συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὢν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,<sup>2216</sup> οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν· ἐπειδὴν δὲ διαλυθῆτον ἄρα<sup>2217</sup> ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἦττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ<sup>2218</sup> ἤνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἕξῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα<sup>2219</sup> τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ<sup>2220</sup> καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἐνδηλα [c] πάντα.<sup>2221</sup> οἷον εἴ

2212 ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ (524A2) stands in apposition to ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, according to the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (Lodge), another feature of the εἰρομένη narrative style.

2213 Reading ἐὰν ἀπόρρητόν τι ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ (A6) with E3<sup>2</sup> Stob. Plut. or ἐὰν ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ TWF (sc. ἢ) or ἐὰν ἢ ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ V and the early editions (ἐὰν ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ BP : ἐὰν ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ *coni.* Findeisen, *legg.* edd.). ἐπιδιακρίνειν tells against ἀπορῆτόν (dual subjunctive): how would the inability (ἀπορία) to judge by the other two leave Minos in the position of making a judgment upon (ἐπι) the judgment of the two of them? Rather, with the mss., ἀπόρρητον (adj.) denotes something “abhorrent, incorrect, counter-indicated” (hardly “*nullo prorsus sensu.*” *pace* Heindorf) calling for judicial review by Minos. Moreover, the duals (the *only* evidence for absence of iota subscr. is B) suggest that both of them are at an aporia (not that the one or the other of the two are), and this brings on board the notion that though each has his own jurisdiction, their inconclusive (ἀπορεῖν) judgments were somehow carried out *en banc* (this appears to underlie the highly allegorical interpretation of Olymp.[236.30-32], the *only* evidence for removing one rho, though indirect), whereas the dative singular ἐτέρῳ envisions something less: that something appears to one of them (ἐτέρῳ) to be a foul (ἀπόρρητον) in the judgment (of the ἐτέρου, presumably), calling for a second judgment (ἐπι), on appeal to the higher (πρεσβεῖα) court of Minos, to decide *between* (διὰ) their competing opinions. Only on this interpretation can Minos’s judgment constitute a *maximally* just verdict (ὡς δικαιοτάτη), rather than merely being success at reaching a judgment where the others could not. The problem Zeus is addressing is wrong outcomes, not a lack of outcomes. Irwin at least sees the problem but does not question the poorly attested reading (ἀπορῆτόν) accepted by edd. Dodds and Canto cite *Leg.* 767A1-4, which does envision a third and final “court” but a quite different one, for there the second court is a real court that hears cases irresolvable by a “court” consisting of neighbors, and a third hears appeals from the second, whereas here there are two parallel courts below, that somehow communicate or meet *en banc*. Thurot’s *joindre son suffrage and juger en dernière ressort* (Sommer Huit Croiset) gets ἐπι but not διὰ. Routh prints ἢ ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἐτέρῳ with Steph., but translates (with Serranus) *si quid alteri fuerit obscurum*, a mistranslation of ἀπόρρητον; so also Thompson and Jowett who speak of Minos judging “doubtful” cases on appeal, but it is not “doubt” (whose doubt?) but contention that calls for appeal.

2214 Reading ἔστιν (A8) with mss., *legg.* edd. Beck Kratz Sommer read ἐστιν (perhaps a misprint): in initial and virtually initial position this enclitic retains its accent: cf. Smyth §187b. ἀκηκοὼς answers ἄκουε (523A1) as πιστεύω ἀληθῆ echoes A2-3, for closure.

2215 λογίζομαι (B1): λόγος will now give its own tentative interpretation (τοιόνδε τι) of the *logical* implications (not “results” *pace* Cary, or “this takes place” Zeyl) of the μῦθος, since it really was a λόγος all along – though with Schmelzer (180-181) Socrates continues in an ironically naïve style. The first thing λόγος will explain is the unexplained connection between death and nakedness.

2216 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ (B2) again bespeaking his respect for the story.

2217 ἄρα (B4): If you can imagine the event of their separation, you have already conceived them as distinct from one another. οὐ πολὺ ἦττον is adverbial with ἔχει and means each part retains its condition in no significantly lesser degree than the other (*pace* Woodhead Nichols Zeyl, who translate “stays in a condition not much worse than what it was in...”).

2218 Reading αὐτοῦ (B6) with BTP, *legg.* edd. (αὐτοῦ WF Euseb).

2219 τό τε σῶμα (B6): the τε leads us to anticipate that complementary καὶ ἢ ψυχή will come quite soon, but it doesn’t. Heusde (*Spec. Crit.* 97-98) thus emends into τό τε σῶμα καὶ ἢ ψυχή τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ... Heindorf with Mistriotis refute him by noting that the psyche is treated below (it comes at D4, *infra*), but both of these fail to acknowledge the gravamen: that τε does not brook being widely separated from its καὶ. Mr Morrissey reminds me that at this point the body and the soul are, indeed, radically separated. Hirschig, announcing that this section of the dialogue has suffered innumerable interpolations (p.142 *ad* 524B) vastly modifies the passage (and other passages below), against all mss. (followed in this case by Christ).

The promise of proleptic τε by its nature fades quickly, usually fulfilled within in its phrase or at most linking with the next clause. Thus *AGPS* (69.59.0.E) precipitously, and erroneously, decides that this τε is solitarium, connecting its clause with what precedes. Dodds wards off Heusde’s call for an immediate “apodosis” to τε by citing *Phdo.* 63C1-2, *Rep.* 373B2, and *Rep.* 463D1, but in *Phdo.* 63C1 the delay is very brief, in *Rep.* 463D1 the τε-clause is appending exemplification to what came before (cf. my n. *ad loc.*); and while the case of *Rep.* 373B2 is indeed much closer, the τε after μείζονα gives no suggestion of a complementary twin (so as to make us take τε as “corresponsive”): things just keep having to be tacked on, making the city larger and larger (cf. B5, B7, B9).

In the present passage, as we await the καὶ we can say this much: in its context the τε associates σῶμα with one of the ἐκάτερα (meaning therefore “both the body ...” – and note Waterfield’s clever solution: “it isn’t just the body which displays...”), so that in addition to promising something like καὶ ἢ ψυχή, it already makes σῶμα nominative and tentatively brings forward ἔχει as its verb. If we have gathered (or supplied!) all of this quickly enough, τὴν φύσιν κτλ then takes on the status of accusative object: that is, “having its ἕξις” is now spelled out with a triad of the attributes it retains, and they are all of them said to be perfectly visible (ἐνδηλα πάντα), a loosely apposed predicate (against Theiler’s deletion, *mss. vetentes*). But now, just to understand that triad will give us a new and more considerable pause.

2220 Reading τὴν αὐτοῦ (B7) with BT and edd. (τὴν αὐτοῦ WF : αὐτοῦ *P re vera* Euseb.). cf. nn. 679, 1637.

2221 Reading τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα (B6-7) with the mss. and edd. (P omitting the second τὴν). This triad has not been adequately explained. The obtrusive repetition of τὴν αὐτοῦ in “second attributive position” (B7, cf. B5-6) forces a comparison between ἕξις



τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα<sup>2222</sup> ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύς, παχύς<sup>2223</sup> καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως·<sup>2224</sup> καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν,<sup>2225</sup> κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρὸς. μαστιγίας αὖ<sup>2226</sup> εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλάς<sup>2227</sup> ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· ἢ κατεαγότα<sup>2228</sup> εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ [d] τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ταῦτα<sup>2229</sup> ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος

and φύσις: we must quickly supply their relation, and if we succeed we will see that φύσις is the permanent substrate for variable affects and combined with them will spell out the entire ἔξις just mentioned. For instance, that it visibly was a man, not a woman, is its φύσις and this persists through death; a complement of transient “attributes” connected to that φύσις are also stable (slim, bald). Immediately we see these being presented with a pair of verbal nouns, each added with its own article, the first of which is an extremely rare word (θεραπεύματα: therapeutic actions? used elsewhere only *Leg.* 718A8 of ‘foreign ministrations to the gods’[?]). That it is a verbal noun (instead of the abstract noun used for underlying φύσις) indicates we are on the right track in thinking it transient. Uncertain as to the meaning, we move to the second verbal noun (παθήματα), which we recognize immediately – or think we do. Contemplating them together the latter seems passive and the former active (the commentators [e.g. Deuschle-Cron] have said subjective/objective). This guess as to their relation then sheds suggestive light onto the obscure active verbal noun (θεραπεύματα), which being active depicts bodily affects accrued *intentionally* (subjectively): it suggests that the intention of the action was specifically to take care of or to remedy the body. But with this we have a new problem: the active alternative is now too specific to remain the logical correlate to the entirely bland passive alternative, παθήματα (*simpliciter*), unless or until they, too, are specified. With this question hanging, our narrator moves directly into exemplification (οἶον, characteristically intruding in asyndeton: cf. n. 171) and we can only hope the lingering question will be resolved along the way, and read on.

- 2222 ἀμφοτέρα (C2): τροφή now moves in, to cover the two verbal nouns in the preceding triad, postponing our lingering question. To include both nature and nurture immediately excludes any notion that upon death one reverts to some “native” state. The adverbial accusative, ἀμφοτέρα, is, because adverbial, exempt from concord in gender or number. Let us insist that as parallel it must be dative (as at *Charm.* 153D5.), compare 477D3, *Lach.* 187A3, *Phdo.* 68C2-3); and the analogous adverbial and non-concordant uses of ταῦτα, in the idiom καὶ ταῦτα, “to boot” (508A5, 527D7, *Euthyd.* 299D3, *Leg.* 630E2, *Soph.* 238A2) and οὐδέτερα (469A1, *Thi.* 184A8). Cf. further n. 910.
- 2223 Reading παχύς, παχύς (C3) with the mss. Eusebius, *legg.* edd. But Deuschle Schanz Mistriotis Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Woodhead Ddds Theiler Hirschig (Hirschig alone also deleting καὶ ἀποθανόντος) prefer to conjecture παχύ, παχύς, against all mss., based on the assumption that the former adjective must go with σῶμα understood, in parallel with the previous construction at C1, whereas the latter, παχύς, going with νεκρός, is properly masculine; but such pedantry hardly cancels the historical evidence of the mss.: the former may just as well go with ἄνθρωπος, the understood subject of intervening ἀποθάνῃ (compare 523E5: cf. n. 2209).
- 2224 καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως (C3-4): What are τᾶλλα? Everything else? It seems a throwaway for closure of the treatment of the post-mortem bodily ἔξις; but then, with αὖ, another item (or items) will be added. Perhaps τὸ μέγα and τὸ παχύ represent nothing but vertical and horizontal measures? In which case they come close to the less intentional attributes visible in the corpse, next to be followed with intentionals (grooming and ... punishments!).
- 2225 ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν (C4): Socrates is interpreting Zeus’s ἐκέεινον τὸν κόσμον from 523E6, to prevent the distractions from which Zeus adopted the policy of “nakedness,” but at the same time he is illustrating the hitherto obscure category of bodily θεραπεύματα, as is immediately confirmed by, and developed by, subsequent μαστιγίας, which in turn specifies previously general παθήματα, which were their corollary, which now represent not the self-serving intentions of the man, but the sequelae of intentional actions of his for which he was punished. The four examples can be said to instantiate, in ascending relevancy to the soul, congenital attributes (μέγας), indifferent voluntary bodily attributes (παχύς), positive voluntary bodily attributes (κομήτης) and attributes resulting of negative volitions (μαστιγίας).

By now we are getting the drift of Socrates’s narrative: he is developing an account of the more palpable case of the body (as the *comparans*) to serve as foil for a treatment of the less palpable case of the naked soul (as *comparandum*), which is of course the target of the whole account. We may anticipate therefore that we shall see this four-step *scala* in the *comparans* mirrored in the exemplification of the *comparandum*, the soul – whether in content or semantics or even grammatical construction (cf. nn. 2053, 2055, 2061 *ad* 518Dff). Moreover we can now account for the proleptic τε, and also that triad, both suggestive and confusing: Socrates knows where he is trying to get to – the soul – but in order to make the impalpable palpable, he must depict the palpable in a way that is pregnant for the use he will make of it in connection with the impalpable. Such a chicken-and-egg logic is not amenable to traditional philological commentary and its dialectical subtlety and importance thus tend to be ignored or underrated.

- 2226 Postpositive αὖ (C5) newly invites us to view the ensuing specification as belonging to a category different from the preceding, which (perhaps) presented a *gradus* of bodily qualities “from the inside out.” The adjective μαστιγίας immediately and compactly brings front and center the punitive bodily effects of bad behavior that are inflicted from the outside. After these, however, comes an elaboration of somatic conditions without moral connotation (κατεαγότα, διεστραμμένα): in dealing with a proleptic skew, we must carry water for such things until sense will be made of them, for the sake of the *comparandum*, at the other end.
- 2227 Reading οὐλάς (C6) with the mss. and Olymp., *legg.* edd. (*del.* Heindorf, *legg.* Schanz Christ Sauppe Theiler). Heindorf deletes on the grounds that the expressions ἴχνη... τῶν πληγῶν vel sim. occur “without added explanation”; but ἴχνη τῶν πληγῶν is here the *explicans*, in proleptic apposition to οὐλάς (with Ast Jahn): the πληγαί are the inferred invisible cause of the visible fact, οὐλαί. Nichols astutely notes the term is being brought forward from 518E4 and 480B2. Hirschig again freely alters the text, placing οὐλάς before εἶχε and deleting ἴχνη τῶν πληγῶν. The use of οὐλάς here proleptically sets up its reuse in metaphor, below at E5, where καὶ is illative or exegetical (cf. Schaefer *apud* Stallb.); Sauppe, eschewing the skew, deletes it if as it were interpolated from the later passage!
- 2228 Reading ἢ κατεαγότα (C7-8) with Eusebius, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Dodds Theiler Heidbuchel Cantarín Erler (κατεαγότα BTWPF, *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck : κατεαγότα τε V, *legg.* edd. : καὶ κατεαγότα coni. Schanz, *legg.* Christ Lodge : κατεαγότ’ αὖ coni. Forman). Something must be added to avoid asyndeton. This perfect along with διεστραμμένα, predicated of the μέλη, connote the cumulative effects of habitual bodily activity associated with a trade or occupation (μέλη referring to the parts of the body that are used to do things, like the right arm of blacksmith or the legs of an athlete).
- 2229 Reading ταῦτα ταῦτα (D1) from F Ficinus, *legg.* Hermann Stallb. Ast(1832) Woolsey Jahn Hirschig Sommer Mistriotis Schmelzer Burnet Woodhead Dodds Theiler Cantarín Erler (ταῦτα BTWP, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Ast Coraes Beck Bekker Cope Deuschle-Cron Thompson Schanz

εἶναι παρεσκευαστο τὸ σῶμα<sup>2230</sup> ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα<sup>2231</sup> ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον. ταῦτὸν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα<sup>2232</sup> καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὧ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα ταῦτα πάντα<sup>2233</sup> ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴν γυμνωθῆ<sup>2234</sup> τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα<sup>2235</sup> ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν, οἱ μὲν<sup>2236</sup> ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας [e] παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθον, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδῶς ὅτου ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πολλακίς<sup>2237</sup> τοῦ μεγάλου

Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Zeyl Heidebuchel). It is not only that these be the marks but that by comparison they be the same.

- 2230 τὸ σῶμα (D2), an accusative of respect closing off the treatment of the body begun at B6, preparing for the soul to enter the conversation *pari passu* (as above, 512A3, and as usual), as there promised by τε. παρεσκευαστο (middle) emphasizes his answerability (Sauppe).
- 2231 Reading ἢ πάντα (D3) according to the conjecture of Findeisen, *legg. edd.* (ἦν πάντα BTWPF Euseb., *legg.* Routh Bekker Ast[1832]). The so-called philosophical imperfect (if one read ἦν with the mss.) is inconsistent (*pace* Ast[1832]) with the usage of the passage and is unneeded. Moreover, that the bodily record be perhaps incomplete (ἢ πάντα) or evanescent (ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον) expresses a moderation appropriate in that sphere. The bodily case is after all mere foil for the case of the soul, where conversely accuracy and completeness (πάντα, D5) will be required for a correct and proper judgment to be rendered (A6-7).
- 2232 ἄρα (D4) echoes the ἄρα at B4, voicing reliance upon the parallel he has offered (Woodhead and Zeyl's "therefore," and even Allen's "then" are too strong: no proof has been offered, only the mild remark οὐ πολὺ ἦτρον). The *comparans* (σῶμα) has been characterized as large, or fat (or wide), or well groomed, or beaten in punishment, or skewed by wear and tear: we may now anticipate an analogous spectrum of effects in the separated (i.e., dead man's) soul.

Now that we have made the beachhead of the *comparandum* let us note that Socrates has shown his awareness that he was asking us to struggle along the way. Each of these statements about body was closed in an uncharacteristic idling parallelism, moving from A to B over and over again, like a just-so story (the figure is a sort of opposite of anaphora!): B = καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως (C3-4); καὶ ὁ νέκρος (C4-5); ταῦτα ἔχον (C7); ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔνδηλα (D1). Even in the generalization with which he closes his account of the *comparans* (the body), he again moves from A to B (ἔνδηλα ταῦτα), but now treats us with mild chiasmus by putting καὶ τελευτήσαντος after instead of before it, and he provides a gratuitous elaboration for the sake of closure (ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον). For extra exegesis effecting closure (like "wherein it finds a joy above the rest," Shxpr. *Sonnet* 91.6), see n. 856 and compare 525D4-5, 526D1-2; *Alc.* I 105B4-7; *Leg.* 630B6-7, 679A4-6, 764D2-3, 776D8-E1, 779D2-5, 847D2-4; *Lys.* 215E5-8; *Phlb.* 21D9-10, 66B9; *Polit.* 293A3-4; *Prot.* 343A1-5; *Rep.* 527D3-4, 553B4-5; *Tim.* 39E10-40A2, 76E5-6; *Thg.* 124D8-9; compare also the use of periphrasis for closure: *Leg.* 625C6-8, *Phlb.* 11B7-8; *Polit.* 267E7-8, 299B3-4, 303E10-4A1; *Rep.* 439D6-7, 580A3-5; *Th.* 170A9-10; shift of number, case, order, or construction *Alc.* I 122B8-C2, *Leg.* 847B8-C4 (n.b. ἢ περὶ), 865B5-7, 888E5-6, 889C5-6; *Polit.* 305B8-C1; *Prot.* 319C3-4; subdivision of the last item: *Critias* 115A3-5, *Leg.* 744B7-C2, *Phdrs.* 241C2-5; *Rep.* 412B3-4, *Th.* 186D10-E1; and the last minute inclusion of one more example: εἶτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες (*Polit.* 293B5-6), ἢ καὶ γυναῖκα (*Polit.* 296B7), τεχνυδρίων (*Rep.* 475E1). The decks thus cleared, Socrates can move on to the target case. Notice the fresh access of interest he evinces with his ἄρα at D4 (for he had said already that the effects were no less persistent in soul than body, B5).

- 2233 Reading ταῦτα πάντα (D5) with F (πάντα BTP, *legg. edd.*). ἔνδηλα means what it meant for the body above (D1, D2): that what was visible before remains identical with what is visible when seen after. Waterfield's tr. that psychic attributes *become obvious*, since they were invisible before, is therefore an over-translation.
- 2234 γυμνωθῆ (D5) now associates the new idea of a "bilateral" separation of body from soul, with Zeus's earlier metaphor of stripping body from soul as if it were the soul's garments (523E1; 523C3-5, 523D2-5). With γυμνωθῆ Socrates takes full advantage of the asymmetry of body and soul (for body can hardly be said to be made naked of soul), and therewith re-imports the importance of nakedness to the justice of the judgment.
- 2235 παθήματα (D6): He repeats "nature" from above (B5-6) but whereas before he expressed "nurture" with a peculiar polar doublet (θεραπεύματα / παθήματα, a doublet both of active vs. passive and of choice and compulsion) he here simply expresses the doublet with a single term, παθήματα, which now has the broader meaning (*pace* Lodge), as described by the ensuing relative clause, embracing both of those as each leaving their marks on the soul. I take ἐκάστου πράγματος with ἃ, not ἐπιτήδευσιν (*pace* Woodhead and Zeyl, "pursuit of each objective"): ἐκάστων πράγμα is redone with ἐκάστη πρᾶξις below (525A1).
- 2236 μὲν (D8): We had expected him now to retail the corollary ἔξις of the soul, but instead moves back to the picture of the souls' approach to judgment. And now the μὲν, like the τε above (B6), introduces a new two-part treatment, which again will be abandoned: the δέ clause comes sixty lines later, at 526C5: we have the impression that he will give distinct treatment of each of the two judges and those over whom they judge, those from the East and those from the West, but in the event he does not. Instead, with the mention of the East, he has a golden opportunity to exemplify the purpose of the new regime by citing the case the Great King of the East, as he remembers the remark of Polus at 470E4-5 (Mistriotis): Aeacus and Minos can wait; and indeed, in the end he will give them only two lines. The self-diversion is similar to and even parallel with the problem with τε above (B6), as well as the other prolepses noted above. In the end, nothing tells against the possibility that the very division of the jurisdictions was invented merely as a means to broach the paradigmatic case of the Great King of the East! For a similar postponement in a mythical context, cf. the μὲν clauses at *Phdrs.* 246E4 resumed by μὲν at 247A4, and at 250B1-5 (resumed at C7), on which see my comments *ad locc.* and my exegesis (*The Phaedrus of Plato* [Washington-London 2020] 348-351).

But the scholars will not sit still for it. Hirschig accepts the reading ms. V, which adds οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν Δαιμόνιον after Ῥαδάμανθον, as if to mitigate the break; but with Stallb. "etsi scriptor in animo habuit ... non addendum." That Socrates immediately continues with Rhadamanthus without even a connective δέ, constitutes an appositive extension and interruption, of the "distributive apposition" (for which cf. 450D4-E1 and *Apol.* 42A2-5) that was begun by οἱ μὲν. Aeacus will behave the same as Rhadamanthus and so one may paraphrase μὲν with "for example" (*sic.* tr. Chambray Canto Waterfield), to avoid embarrassment for in translation, but it is more important to recognize the urgency that has captured the speaker's mind. Disliking the appositive repetition of Rhadamanthus given in the mss., Naber (*Obs. Crit.* {1862}8), emends ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας, to ἐκείνους ἐπιστάς, making Rhadamanthus stand whereas Minos alone sits in judgment (so does he interpret 526C7, q.v.); Cobet (*Mnem.* n.s.2[1875]159) emends it into ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας. But on the offending repetition cf. *ad* 523C4 *supra*.

- 2237 πολλακίς (E3), especially with ἀλλά and ὄτουσιν, is "betimes" and therefore "perhaps" (with Waterfield), not "often" (*pace* edd.): cf. 490A1, 519C5. The arresting case of meeting the Great King (note slight anacoluthon at his mention), is then filled out by encounters with other possible power brokers, regardless of their stature. It is not that Rhadamanthus "often" encounters a powerful man such as the Great King, though power

βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν<sup>2238</sup> οὐδὲν ὑγιές<sup>2239</sup> ὄν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην<sup>2240</sup> καὶ οὐλῶν μεστήν ὑπὸ [525] ἐπιπορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας,<sup>2241</sup> ἃ ἐκάστη<sup>2242</sup> ἢ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο<sup>2243</sup> εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιά<sup>2244</sup> ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι·<sup>2245</sup> καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας<sup>2246</sup> τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτήτος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ<sup>2247</sup> ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἳ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. [b]

προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ’ ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ,<sup>2248</sup> ἢ

brokers will indeed be corrupt much more often than “often” (as we shall see, 525DE): to make that point here is unprepared and premature. Moreover we are surely not meant to carry *πολλάκις* all the way across the participial phrase, taken conditionally, to κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιές. (i.e., ‘if it is a potentate, he often finds’ – *pace* Hamilton).

- 2238 κατεῖδεν (E4): the aorist of “too late to do anything about it” (as at 525A6, 526B7): cf. ἀνεφάνη, 484A6 and n. 1125. The judgment is outside of time and final.
- 2239 οὐδὲν ὑγιές (E4), a slang idiom like our “up to no good.” Cf. *Rep.* 496C7-8, 584A9, 589C3, 603B1-2.
- 2240 διαμεμαστιγωμένην (E5): In this case the pregnantly metaphorical sense arrives in the application of a factual feature in the *comparans* (cf. n. 2225) to the *comparandum*: the whipped body transfers easily to the soul of one deserving to be whipped, but how shall we project the disfigured bones (κατεαγότα) or bandied joints (διεστραμμένα) onto the soul? The doublet ἐπιπορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας begins to supply the middle terms, and the ensuing verb ἐξόργνυμι attempts to bridge the problem.
- 2241 ἐπιπορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας (525A1), a doublet κατὰ μέρη καὶ ὄλον, if you will (cf. n. 117), here flatly identifying a pattern of misconduct with its moral cause, or effect.
- 2242 Reading ἐκάστη (A1) with the mss., *legg.* edd. (ἐκάστου J : ἐκάστω Y Steph., *legg.* Bekker Beck Ast Cary Woolsey Cope Thompson Sommer : ἐκάστη *coni.* Deuschle[εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν *delens*], following Hermann): it matches distinct behaviors with distinct individuals. The abstract noun turns ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα (above, 524D7) into a category (behavior).
- 2243 ἐξωμόρξατο (A1): For the sense cf. *schol. ad Leg.* 775D8 and Tim. *Lex.*, which claim that ἐξομοργνύμενος has the same meaning as ἐκματτόμενος (the *Lex.* also adds ἀποτρυμώμενος). LSJ, *s.v.*, says it means ἀποματτόμενος. The range of senses denote transfer of a character from one object onto another, ranging from that of the sculptor’s hand onto his clay to the mark left by another object, the mark in all cases a blemish. ἃ (neuter) rather than ἅς in strict agreement with οὐλῶν frees the welts to be metaphorical (Feix).
- 2244 σκολιά (A2) cashes in for soul what διεστραμμένα had above depicted in the body (C8). Note that the bodily deformation was uncaused and accidental (cf. n. 2232) whereas the corresponding psychic deformation was a result of the individual’s chosen πρᾶξις (A1), which in the psychic world corresponds with τροφή in the bodily world, as is brought forward by τεθράφθαι (A3); and that the psychic deformation of crookedness now admits an axiological dimension due to the metaphorical straightness of truth (εὐθύ, A3). We may now anticipate psychic corollaries for bodily fatness and the choice of showy grooming (κομητήης, 524C4) that similarly admit an analogously value-laden condition in the soul.
- 2245 Reading τεθράφθαι (A3) with B, *legg.* edd. (τεθράφθαι TWPF Euseb. *teste* Cantarin, *leg.* Beck Sommer) accords all these faults to his nurture (τροφή, i.e., πρᾶξις [A1]) rather than his inborn nature (τρόπος, τεθράφθαι). Stallb. notes that these forms are commonly confused in mss., citing *Rep.* 405A9, *Th.* 172D2. This was the behavior that “kept him going.”
- 2246 Reading ἀκρατίας (A4) with BWPf, *legg.* edd. (ἀκρασίας T Steph., *legg.* Routh Coraes Beck : ἀκρατείας V Eusebius, *legg.* Zimmermann Dodds) as best attested. Surely, with Lodge, the complex and dense description of what Rhadamanthus “sees” in the soul (A3-6) corresponds with the coiffure, the bulkiness, and even the size of the body retailed above (524C1-5). There, the size was attributed indifferently to nature and nurture (C1), but παχύς and κομητήης were by choice, and thus closer to τροφή there and πρᾶξις here. The psychic cause of such outward bodily signs is now described by this elaborate list – or, conversely, those bodily attributes constituted a proleptic foundation for the description of soul. He sees disproportion and ugliness as effects of ἐξουσία, τρυφή, ὕβρις, and ἀκρατία, which describe the man’s πρᾶξις (A1). This pair of effects correspond with μέγας and παχύς above (which now admit a two-dimensional envisioning of height and width evoked by ἀσυμμετρία). As for the pair of effects, ἀσυμμετρία invokes the “measure” of κοσμιότης, and αἰσχροτήτης (an *hapax* in classical Greek, here employed to continue the higher register of the other abstracts in this passage) is a successfully homonymous generalization for both body and soul. πρᾶξεις, plural after the categorical singular at A1, envisions different kinds of behavior corresponding to the stages of the decline.

As to the cause of these effects the material is new. They abandon the project of “vertical” one-to-one correspondences between *comparans* and *comparandum* in order to present, “horizontally,” a decline immanent to the soul itself: *opportunity* descending into *enervated excess* giving occasion for *unbridled behavior* at which point the soul ends up *powerless* against its own weakness. This decline was in fact adumbrated in the movement of the soul of Callicles that was displayed in his parrhesiastic speech (491E5-492C8), and the connection will be made more clear with Socrates’s admonition below (D5ff), directed at Callicles E5 and 526A4 (cf. n. 2271), elaborating the effects of the first of them: the ἐξουσία Callicles imagines accruing to him by his ascendancy as a ῥήτωρ.

The imperfections and “skews” in the pattern of comparisons (namely, the variation between accident and choice, the stretching of vocabulary such that ἀσυμμετρία in body is easy to envision [μέγας, παχύς] but in soul remains a reach, the strikingly specific choice of coiffure later redeemed in this elaborate list of effects, the imperfect analogy of τροφή to πρᾶξις, and the pitiable broken or spindly limbs corresponding to the reprehensible deformation of soul by “crooked” dealings) seduces the reader into doing some work on his own (namely, to be “led on” by ἐπαγωγή), and the more work he does the more he comes to own what is being argued. Thus the imperfections constitute a mechanism of persuasion. At this point the reader, too, might be quite prepared to send him directly to prison (εὐθύ, A6)!

- 2247 ἰδὼν δὲ (A6): Such epanalepsis (as at 523C7, and again at B1, especially with abbreviation, as here in the omission of the direct object) is a feature of the story-telling style, right alongside repetition. ἀτίμως describes Rhadamanthus’s manner of dispatching the candidate in reaction to what he saw, in contrast with ἡγάσθη at 526C5, below.
- 2248 Reading ὑπ’ ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ (B1-2) with the mss. and edd. (*del.* Hirschig, *legg.* Jowett Christ Piettre: in this last section of the dialogue Hirschig becomes very free and hasty with his speculations about putative interpolations, like a horse returning to the barn). ἄλλος here is not otiose (*pace* Allen Hamilton who leave it out) but specifies that Socrates is turning to human relations for the criterion of the προσήκον. Irwin and Waterfield take the ensuing paragraph to refer only to punishment in the afterlife, which leads Irwin into a series of irrelevant *conundra* [245], and creates a need for an explanation why “Plato” leaves out any reason for improving of the dead, such as a purgatory or reincarnation [Waterfield]). Against Hirschig, the specification that the punishment “by another” be “properly done” is crucial for distinguishing in the human



βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀνίνασθαι ἢ παράδειγμά τι<sup>2249</sup> ἄλλοις<sup>2250</sup> γίνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὀρῶντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν<sup>2251</sup> ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην δίδοντες<sup>2252</sup> ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων<sup>2253</sup> οὗτοι οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ<sup>2254</sup> δι’ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἢ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἄιδου· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. [c] οἱ δ’ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα<sup>2255</sup> ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων<sup>2256</sup> τὰ παραδείγματα γίνεσθαι, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνασθαι οὐδέν, ἅτε

realm between lawful punishment and blood feuds in which the “retribution” by another risks being taken as a new offense deserving compensatory “retribution” by the one (consider for instance the elaborate provisions at the end of *Numbers* [35:9-34] and the scenario envisioned at *Apol.*33D4-8). In the admonitory frame of this story, it is the order of god and mankind that is harmed by the misbehavior of individuals (as Socrates suddenly said at 472E7 and here at B5-6), and retribution without threat of escalation can only be exacted in the afterlife and by the gods. Thus Paul’s admonition to the Romans: “Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, ‘Vengeance is mine; I will repay,’ saith the Lord” (*Rom.*12:19).

- 2249 Reading παράδειγμά τι (B2) with BTPW Steph., *legg.* Heindorf Coraes Beck Cron Burnet (παραδείγματα F Ficinus[*exempla*] : παράδειγμα Zb Olymp[λ] Euseb. Thdr̄t, *leg.* Cobet : παραδείγματι Lob, *legg.* Forster[Index, *Dial. Plat.*V {1765} s.v. Dativus] J.Davis[*apud* Routh] Heusde[*Spec. Crit.*98] edd.). The dative of the leading construction can indeed (with Forster, *et al.*) be retained in *oratio obliqua* with γίνεσθαι as it could be with εἶναι (cf. βελτίονι just above), and Heindorf cites both retention (*Rep.*341E3) and shifting back to the oblique construction (492B2, 511A1; *Symp.*176D4). Heusde and Bekker disapproved of τι, but along with exercising the shift to the accusative it serves to soften the shift from adjective (βελτίονι) to appositive noun (παραδείγμα).
- 2250 Omitting τοῖς (B3) with F Olymp.[λ] Euseb. Thdr̄t. Souda, *legg.* Cary Hirschig (τοῖς BTPW, *legg.* edd.), as evidenced by the repetition of ἄλλοι (*pace* Ast[1832] and Stallb.). If these others were a determined group, ὀρῶντες would not have needed an expressed subject (so that Sauppe, reading τοῖς, deleted ἄλλοι three words later). See also the expression at C4, below.
- 2251 With μὲν (B5) we immediately infer Socrates wants to give the basis for the ἢ ... ἢ construction immediately previous, and in particular we wonder whether and why it is exclusive. The answer will come in a more fundamental distinction between remediable and irredeemable sins (ἀμαρτήματα, B6), and this distinction is spelled out in an asymmetric but chiasmic use of μὲν/δέ, with the reversed order of subject and predicate disambiguated by the chiasmic repetition of the demonstrative, first before and then after the relative of which it is the antecedent: the benefitted ones (μὲν, of the effect) are (copulative εἰσὶν) those (οὗτοι) who committed remediable sins (the cause), but (as to) who committed the greatest sins (δέ, the cause), (it is) from these (τούτων) that derive paradigms for the benefit of others (the effect). Denniston does recognize syntactical asymmetry between μὲν and δέ clauses but does not note asymmetry for chiasmic effect (371-2). Note that the article with ὠφελούμενοι δίδοντες determines that it, not οὗτοι, is the subject (Gildersleeve §668).
- 2252 ὠφελούμενοι τε καὶ δίκην δίδοντες (B5): Reverse τε καὶ: the notion of benefit is mentioned first though it is an effect of the second notion, paying the penalty. Correctly so taken by Serranus (*qui ex illis supplicii utilitatem capiunt*) and Ficinus, who also may have read τι for τε, as Findeisen observed (*qui vero apud deos et homines ita dant poenas ut utilitatem inde aliquam referunt*); so also Thurot Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Mistriotis Lodge Zimmermann Feix. For the order, compare. 527B8-C1: γίνεσθαι (*sc.* δίκαιον) καὶ κολαζόμενον δίδοναι δίκην. Deuschle-Cron compares 460D2, on which cf. n. 407. It is the reverse order, linking effect to cause, that led Richards to excise the connectives in order to achieve a *syntactical* subordination (ὠφελούμενοι δίκην δίδοντες) that matches the logical relation: the metabatic order – δίκην δίδοντες καὶ ὠφελούμενοι – would have given him no offense. Note that if paying the penalty results in benefit, the paying is completed and therefore finite.
- 2253 ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων (B5-6): We again suddenly had this phrase at 472E7, but here it was prepared by 523A6-B1, and B2. Socrates has aimed his account at those who hear (and read) it – particularly Callicles of course – rather than exclusively at describing the afterlife (*pace* Irwin). The amelioration of souls after death may be left undescribed as being of no intrinsic interest: there is no vision of purgatory here, and no need to posit that “Plato” implicitly carries a theory of rebirth in order to understand what Socrates is here saying (*pace* Dodds). Those who hear the story are to learn that the benefit of one’s being punished on earth continues there in the afterlife, as does the harm to themselves continue in Hades for failing to be remedied here. Callicles (and many of us) imagine “getting away with it” to our dying day, in which case only the vision of eternal punishment in the afterlife might dissuade us (cf., n. 2248). The rude awakening will come upon us the moment we enter Tartarus and see those horrific παραδείγματα on display – the “writing on the wall” we had avoided to acknowledge during our lives (ἀεὶ and the tense of ἀφικνομένους [C8] are designedly vivid). The living can see them (*pace* Dodds and Canto [p.357, n. 264]), in the telling descriptions of a Homer (not to mention a Dante), and in a tale like this, and most truly in their conscience, though in Hades, as Dodds also says, “the lesson comes too late.” Compare the admonitory power we might have felt upon learning, much later, that what happened to Moses in the end was due to the fact that he struck the rock twice (*Numbers* 20:11), or to Jacob because he said “if” (*Genesis* 28:20).
- 2254 ὅμως δὲ (B6-7): The μὲν/δέ construction is interrupted by the paradoxical assertion that though beneficial, the punishment is painful and distressing, serving as foil for the statement below that for the irredeemables, by comparison, it will “no longer” be beneficial (οὐκέτι, C3), and in addition never be completed. Though all benefit is painful not all pain is beneficial. Though the meanings of ἀλγηδόνων and ὀδυνῶν largely overlap, perhaps the doublet (for which cf. *Prot.*354B2, *Rep.*413B9) is intended to compare physical and psychic pain (cf. n. 890 and Homer’s “Odysseus”).
- 2255 Reading τὰ τοιαῦτα (C1-2) with F Eusebius Theodoret and the Souda, *legg.* Routh Heindorf Beck Coraes Stallb. Ast(1832) Hirschig Sommer Burnet Lamb Dodds Theiler Cantarin Erler (τοιαῦτα BTP, *legg.* Ast[1812] Hermann Bekker Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Schanz Mistriotis Schmelzer Christ Lodge Sauppe Stender Croiset Zimmermann Feix Heidbuchel), determining this second category to be different from the first. The distinction between the curable evil (at the expense of pain) and the incurable evil needs not be theorized to meet the queries of Irwin (245-6, preoccupied with the idea that Plato or Socrates, in depicting the gods inflicting retribution upon the incurables, commits Socrates to believing in retribution, which according to Irwin Socrates does not): it is determined by Rhadamanthus (hence the need for and definitive character of his marking: 526B7). The entire purpose of the distinction is to admonish against a calculus of misbehavior in this life and to remove the “false hope” that I might allow myself to continue sinning, hoping still to be redeemable – the same reason for removing men’s knowing the time of their death (cf. n. 2204).
- 2256 τούτων (C2). In the δέ clause, the antecedent to the relative clause comes after rather than before (contrast οὗτοι οἱ in the μὲν clause just above, and cf. n. 2251).

άνιατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται<sup>2257</sup> οἱ τούτους ὀρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδνηρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα<sup>2258</sup> πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἰαίδου<sup>2259</sup> ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις<sup>2260</sup> θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. [d] ὦν ἐγὼ φημι ἕνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον<sup>2261</sup> ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ἦ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων<sup>2262</sup> ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν<sup>2263</sup> καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας·<sup>2264</sup> οὔτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα<sup>2265</sup> ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ<sup>2266</sup> Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν [e] τοὺς ἐν Ἰαίδου τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δὲ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον<sup>2267</sup> ὡς

2257 ὀνίνανται (C4): For the repetition of the verb (after C3) Heindorf cites as parallel *Lysis* 208D5-E1; it is akin to the repetitions noted above (cf. n. 2199).

2258 τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδνηρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα (C5-6): For the behavior of the article in lists, cf. n. 691. For lists that drop the article in this way (this is the reading in all mss.), cf. 450D6-7, 508E1-4; *Alc.* I 117A8-10; *Crito* 47C9-10; *Euthyd.* 298D4; *Leg.* 634A3-4 (metabatic), 645D7 and E1-2, 733D8 and E1-2, 863E6-8, 896D5-7 (and Stallb. *ad loc.*); *Meno* 79A4-6; *Phlb.* 21A14-B1; *Polit.* 258E8-9 (a true plurality), 274A2, 284E4-5, 295E4-5; *Prot.* 312B1-2, 329C4-5; *Rep.* 353D4-5, 537A9-10; *Symp.* 202E8; 207D8-E1. The dropping of the article does not imply that the items on the list are any more intimately related than the very fact of listing them together already makes them out to be, but allows such an inference to be made, as here we are given the chance to feel the metabasis rather than consider each item separately: because the greatest, these sufferings are the most distressing, and because most painful they are most deterrent.

For article repeated then not repeated, 459D1-2; *Euthyphr.* 7D1-2; *Leg.* 741A7-8, 765E5-6A1; *Phdo.* 75C9-D2 (and Stallb. *ad loc.*); *Phlb.* 11B4-8 (*bis*); *Rep.* 582C5-6; *Symp.* 207E2-3; *Th.* 202A2-5 (and Campbell *ad loc.*). Similarly the preposition might not be repeated: *Crit.* 114E10; *Leg.* 718A6-8, 777E2-4, 828B3, 830C9-D1, 957E2-3; *Prot.* 353C6; *Symp.* 192A4-5, 211D3-5; *Th.* 152D7, 172B2-3; *Tim.* 55D7-8, 84D1-2, or a common modifier like *πάν*: *Th.* 171E5-6. For resumption of the article at the end or use at the end only, cf. *Alc.* I 105B6 (but cf. B5); *Leg.* 669B2-3, 723D2-3, 728D8-E1, 837C6-7; *Phlb.* 45E5-6; *Polit.* 297C1; *Rep.* 545A2-4, 613C5; *Symp.* 179B5; and Vahlen *ad Arist. Po.* 1449A1. Though the thought can be made clearer by the use or distribution of articles (e.g., *Phlb.* 24E7-5A1 and 25A6-B1), Riddell (*Digest* §237) sees in most cases no rhyme or reason beyond the aesthetics of variation and rhythm.

2259 Reading ἐν Ἰαίδου (C7) with BTWPf Euseb., *legg.* edd. (ἐδίδου F). Again we have the schema καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος (cf. 524A2 with note).

2260 τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις (C8): For a partitive genitive constructed with a participle whose adverb stands in attributive position, cf. A. *Ag.* 809, *Isoc. Areopag.* 41 (τοὺς ἀκριβῶς τῶν νόμων ἀναγεγραμμένους), *Soph.* 19.

2261 Αρχέλαον (D1): Socrates refers to 471AD. This Macedonian would have been sent to Tartarus not by Rhadamanthus but Aeacus. Once again the opportunity to exemplify explodes the overall structure adopted at the beginning (cf. n. 2236). That Socrates feels he should doubt the heinousness of Archelaus's deeds as recounted by Polus evinces his awareness that Polus's appalling description was saturated with approbatory hyperbole (Mistriotis).

2262 Reading τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων (D3) with F Eusebius, *legg.* Beck Hermann Woolsey Jahn Cope Deuschle-Cron Thompson Sommer Schmelzer Lodge Stender Burnet Croiset Lamb Zimmermann Feix Dodds Theiler Heidbuchel Erler (τοὺς τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων B, *legg.* Ast Bekker Stallb. Hirschig Mistriotis Sauppe : τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων TWP Par : τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων τοὺς in the early editions, *legg.* Routh Coraes : τούτων τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων Par<sup>2</sup> : τῶν παραδειγμάτων J : τούτων *coni.* Heindorf, *legg.* Schanz Christ Stender (τῶν παραδειγμάτων *delentes*) : τύπους τῶν παραδειγμάτων *coni.* Madvig [*Advers.* 1.143]). The “greater number” (τοὺς πολλοὺς, masc., as if for men, though they are really souls: cf. n. 2205) are themselves on display as paradigms (neuter): the apposition of the neuter with the masculine (with Woolsey) is continued from above (B2). The construction is ἐκ τίνος γεγονός ἐστι (with Ast). Therefore (Sauppe's parallels notwithstanding) an article is necessary neither before nor after τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων. With Coraes, καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων = καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνων οἱ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἐπραξάν.

2263 δυναστῶν (D4): With Deuschle-Cron Lodge Hamilton, this term does not denote a third political office in a third species of government (even in a democracy one can rise to virtually monarchic power: T. 2.65.10), but is a placeholder giving a berth for further description by the ensuing phrase: that is, the third καὶ in D4 is exegetical. Compare the use of δυνάστης at 479A3, 524E4, and 526B3, and its generalizing “de-substantivization” with participial δυνάμενον at 526A1.

2264 γεγονότας (D5): The perfect stresses that their previous identity and celebrity would no longer be visible. Since by the nature of the case there is no evidence, it would be a matter of guesswork (οἶμαι).

2265 μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα (D5-6): Quantity and quality linked, as usual.

2266 I believe that this καὶ (D7) means neither “also” nor “even” but merely indicates an adversion from the narrative to some external source, often including a proper name (cf. n. 1127). For this use (though unmentioned by Denniston) cf. *Phdo.* 65B3 (καὶ οἱ ποιηταί), *Phdrs.* 240C1-2, *Tim.* 72A6; *Arist. de An.* 404B19, 407B29; *Mer.* 989A10, 1054A30, 1069A25, 1076B39-7A1; *EN* 1096A3, 1139B26-7; *EE* 1218A36; *Pol.* 1332A8, 1341B2; *Rhet.* 1355A1, 1402A35. Cf. Shorey *ad Rep.* 404B10 (Loeb 1.267 note f). “Even Homer” or “Homer himself” or “Homer, too,” *vel sim.*, are overtranslations; Hamilton's “I can quote Homer” and Erler's *dafür legt Homer ein Zeugnis ab* are just right. Socrates is citing *Od.* 11.576-600.

2267 συνεχόμενον (E1): For the participial construction with ποιεῖν for composing poetry, cf. Smyth §2115 (understand ὄντας similarly, in the previous sentence). The participle is also used with γράφειν denoting prose description (e.g. *Phdrs.* 227C5). τύραννοι are dropped from the previous list (D4-5) because neither the word nor the type exists in the Homeric vocabulary (*h.Hymn* 8.5 not constituting an exception).



άνιατον—οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξῆν<sup>2268</sup> αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν [526] δυναμένων εἰσι καὶ<sup>2269</sup> οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν<sup>2270</sup> κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἄγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις,<sup>2271</sup> καὶ πολλοὺ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν<sup>2272</sup> τοῦ δικαίως [b] διαχειρίζειν<sup>2273</sup> ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπη· εἷς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονεν καὶ εἰς τοὺς<sup>2274</sup> ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστείδης<sup>2275</sup> ὁ Λυσιμάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὃ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται τῶν δυναστῶν.

ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ,<sup>2276</sup> ἄλλο μὲν<sup>2277</sup> περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν οὐδὲν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὐθ' ὄντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος,<sup>2278</sup> ἐάντε ἰάσιμος ἐάντε ἀνίατος δοκῆ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος [c] τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίστε δ'

- 2268 Reading οὐ γὰρ ... ἐξῆν (E4-5) from all mss., *legg. edd. (del. Morstadt [Emend.12], legg. Schanz Christ Helmbold)*. Those who athetize either find the ellipsis (τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτάνειν) too much to supply, or want to add something (e.g., Theiler: ἐκβῆναι ἀνάτα), but the sense is obvious on first reading. As to the putative inconcinnity between εὐδαιμονέστερος here and ἀθλιότερος at 473D, with Lodge it hardly warrants cancelling the unanimous testimony of the manuscripts. εὐδαιμονέστερος (with Dodds Hamilton) here means “luckier.” Socrates’s mention of the ἰδιώτης in connection with Thersites sets up his admonitory return to the quarrel between Amphion and Zethus, below (C2-4).
- 2269 As to καὶ (526A1), Deuschle-Cron waver between whether it strengthens the coming contradiction (οὐδὲν μὴν), with Schmelzer; or correlates evil with ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων (just as they are strong so also are they evil), with Lodge. The former would constitute another interruption of the construction under the force of an emphatic “second thought” (whence designedly asseverative οὐδὲν μὴν), but I prefer the latter. With ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων Socrates now expresses generically what the nouns “kings and tyrants and dynasts” had specified above (525D4), but also goes beyond nominal titles to the heart of the matter: not mere prestige but that life of power Callicles craves. He would call it, with his puffy litotes, ἴκανος εἶναι (492A1: cf. n.) but sees its lack in others as ἀδυναμία (ibid. A3-5). Irwin invalidly infers (246) from Socrates’s empirical observation that extra privilege has a strong tendency to corruption, to attribute to him the belief, with Callicles, that the only reason the weak obey the law is because they are weak.
- 2270 Reading οὐδὲν μὴν (A2) with the mss. and edd. (οὐδὲ μὴν Y Euseb.). μὴν is here adversative-connective (Denniston 335). Ast’s suggestion to read μὲν (to be answered by δέ at A5) gratuitously introduces asyndeton. Socrates does not rule out the possibility of a good politician in theory; Callicles on the other hand was required by his own statement to produce a concrete example. There is no contradiction (Mistriotis).
- 2271 ὃ Καλλίκλεις (A4): Is there another dialogue in which Socrates reiterates the vocative in such short compass (cf. 525E5; and then again below ὃ ἄριστε [B3, biting irony] and ὃ Καλλίκλεις [C3])? We might compare the admonitory passage at 507E-508B. Socrates is here focussing the logos on Callicles himself, for it is Callicles that is hoping for this life of celebrity and power (ἐξουσία) but sees no danger in it. Where did Socrates say, according to Irwin, that “virtue requires knowledge” such that he is committed to believing the men he is here talking about have knowledge?
- 2272 Reading the τὴν after ἀρετὴν (A7) with F, *legg. edd. (om. BTWP Aristides Euseb. Thdrt., legg. Routh Heindorf Beck Ast Bekker)*. Supply αὐτοῖς with ἐπιτρέπη. The fact that καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ can be specified (and surely the ensuing accusative of respect does specify it, as Irwin guesses, though it does not “restrict” it as he also says) again shows its role as a non-specific term of moral approbation (cf. nn. 2046, 1792, 732).
- 2273 διαχειρίζειν (B1): An ἅπαξ in Plato, in metonymy for ἐπιχειρίζειν (as used at 513E5 and the subsequent epagoge 514A5-ff), with the prefix altered in sympathy with the διά in διαβιῶναι.
- 2274 εἰς τοὺς (B2): Arguing it is an enallage for ἐν τοῖς, Heindorf cites *Prot.*312A5, 349A1-2, *Tht.*178E5 (εἰς δικαστήριον); but Stallb. Jahn Cope Jowett Stender Apelt Feix draw an active sense out of ἐλλόγιμος, making the preposition denote the spread of rumor by mouth (cf. *coram*) citing *Menex.*239A7 (πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφῆναιτο εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους), *Leg.* 951C8, *Symp.*179B7, and thus account also for εἰς in the two passages from *Prot.* *AGPS* 68.21.5 adds *Rep.*539C3, *Tim.*25B5-6 and 28C4. Socrates does not assert he was good, nor even that he “acted justly to some extent” (Irwin), but that he had a wide reputation for being and doing so.
- 2275 Ἀριστείδης (B2): That Socrates should be able to name one man *thought beyond cavil to be* good gainsays Callicles’s easy mention of the usual greats. For commentators who place every burden upon Socrates because they think of him as Plato’s spokesman rather than a participant in this discussion (in which the burden of naming a good orator rested upon Callicles) it might seem Plato is guilty of contradiction. But cf. 517A1-6 and n. 2013.
- 2276 λάβῃ (B5), resuming ἐπιλαβόμενος from 524E3 (omission of the prefix with λάβῃ is usual by the IE rule), just as the aorist κατιδὼν brings forward κατείδεν from 524E4 and ἀπέπεμψεν the ἀπέπεμψεν from 525A6, and just as προσήκοντα πάσχει recalls 525A7. These repetitions may have the effect of framing and thereby emphasizing what happened in the narrative in between, or else closing all that that off so as to go on to a new point.
- 2277 ἄλλο μὲν ... οὐκ ... ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς τις (B5-6): For a negative μὲν clause with proleptic ἄλλο ushering in a telescoped construction in the δέ clause, cf. 500E5-1A1 and n. 1563.
- 2278 ἐπισημηνάμενος (B7), placing a visible mark so as to indicate to the escorting guards what only Rhadamanthus could be relied upon to see and properly judge (δοκῆ in its juridical sense).

ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας,<sup>2279</sup> ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου  
 τινός,<sup>2280</sup> (μάλιστα μὲν,<sup>2281</sup> ἔγωγέ φημι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις φιλοσόφου) τὰ αὐτοῦ<sup>2282</sup>  
 πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος<sup>2283</sup> ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων  
 νήσους ἀπέπεμψε.<sup>2284</sup> ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός<sup>2285</sup>—ἐκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων  
 δικάζει<sup>2286</sup>—ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν [d] σκῆπτρον, ὧς  
 φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν—

2279 ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας (C1-2), designedly opposing οὐδὲν εὐθὺς διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι (525A3). Devotion to truth is tantamount to a life of moral ζήτησις (cf. D6, 527D2-3).

2280 ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν ... φιλοσόφου (C2): ἀνὴρ as before is not otiose: *simple citizen* or “private person” (Croiset Allen) is too tame. The expression ἀνὴρ ἰδιώτης is for Callicles almost a contradiction in terms or at least a paradox! Heindorf (followed only by Coraes Beck Hirschig) adds *νηγὴν* after ἄλλου τινός, from Eusebius, but against all mss. of Plato. Stallb. finds the looseness *durum*, judges the diction rather free, but accepts the text as it is. I think Plato, by means of the masculine ἄλλου τινός of a person whose looks we can imagine, is avoiding to spell out the feminine adjective because it might raise a distraction as to what a soul looks like.

The greater problem here is the sense of ἄλλου τινός (Hirschig simply excising ἢ ἄλλου to avoid it, perhaps followed by Waterfield). Cary’s “or any other” and “some person or another” (compare Cope Lamb Helmbold Irwin Allen Nichols) and Canto’s *n’importe qui* or Piettre’s *tout autre homme* demean the use of ἀνὴρ (most miss its presence here; note please its corollary absence at 525E3!). ἢ ἄλλου τινός does not close off ἰδιώτου ἀνδρὸς in that way, but gives berth for a generalization done with τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος (though interrupted by μάλιστα μὲν ... φιλοσόφου): “a private man, or anyone – especially a philosopher – who keeps his nose out of others’ business (i.e., for whatever reason)” or, with Schleiermacher, “*eines eingezogenen Mannes, oder sonst eines, vornemlich, wie ich wenigstens meine, Kallikles, eines Philosophen, der in sich selbst gelebt, und nicht vielerlei äusserlich getrieben hat*” (so also Apelt Erler). Lodge interestingly glosses μάλιστα μὲν with ἢ (!) and paraphrases “whether philosopher or not but especially (*sc.* a philosopher).” Lamb Helmbold Woodhead Dodds Chambry Hamilton Irwin Allen Waterfield Nichols Zeyl Piettre Heidbuchel wrongly, I think, take the participles with the philosopher only rather than as generalizing ἄλλου τινός, leading Waterfield then to the Buddhistic overtranslation of οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος with “remained detached from things.” Socrates’s μάλιστα means that a private life is best spent in philosophy, not as Dodds asserts (383) that philosophy is the condition for spending life in private. For ἢ ἄλλος τις introducing a generalization after a single item, cf. 524E3-4 (where the same structure as here was used to describe exactly the opposite case), 525D1-2, 525E2-3, *Leg.* 916D2-3, *Rep.* 371C1-2 and compare *Polit.* 305B8-C1, *Rep.* 416A4-5. Note also that unanswered μὲν is more self-interruptive than a μὲν *solitarium*.

2281 ὃ Καλλίκλεις (C3) again a vocative focussing the argument on Callicles, this time after ἔγωγέ (with φημι more emphatic than οἶμαι, Jahn) and before emphatic φιλοσόφου, to remind him of the difference between their positions.

2282 Reading τὰ αὐτοῦ (C3-4) with T Eus. Thdrt. *teste* Cantarin (τὰ αὐτοῦ BWP : τὰ αὐτὰ F). Again, cf. n. 2218.

2283 οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος (C4): Commentators cite *Republic* Book IV, where, as here, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is contrasted with πολυπραγμονεῖν; but there, in the overarching project of that dialogue, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is identified with justice, where the parts of soul and their relations with each other is aligned with the classes of the polis and theirs, in terms of the four cardinal virtues: there, justice is identified as keeping to one’s own area of competence.

As to associating τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν with the philosopher, as here, the more pertinent passage from the *Republic* is the brief mention of the “good” man living in a well-governed city, at the beginning of the Decline in Bk. VIII, who φεύγει τὰς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην. Plato here coins φιλοπραγμοσύνη exactly to identify the motive for the term it is meant to oust: πολυπραγμοσύνη. This good man’s wife faults him for being willing to lose at court rather than become one of the “rulers,” and perceives him as εαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα ἀεὶ, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πολὺ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμαζόντα (549D1-5). Thus, πολυπραγμοσύνη is a love (and therefore a life) of “outside” action that is incompatible with inward contemplation, a contrast which it is the chief theme of the present dialogue to expose (Erler’s *nicht verzettelt* is too general). Such contemplation is plainly not the sole province of the philosopher as viewed by Socrates or Plato: in portraying this man as he is seen by his wife, Plato does everything he can to avoid calling him a philosopher (though he may very well be one!); and Socrates here inserts the philosopher only in passing, simply to express his own point of view (over against that of Callicles). There is no place here to speak of “Plato” “beatifying” the true philosopher (with Dodds).

To identify the political life with πολυπραγμοσύνη is an idea only implicit in the dialogue so far, but it indirectly recalls the test for qualifications for such “outer” activity that Socrates suggested by the inductive argument at 513E-515A, which Callicles roundly failed. Moreover that passage recalls Gorgias’s claim that equipped with oratory a citizen can arrogate to himself the authority of the physician and the architect and any other specialty (cf. n. 1949 *sub fin.*), and herein lies the deeper relevance of πολυπραγμοσύνη or φιλοπραγμοσύνη for our dialogue. A man who jumps into politics before proving himself worthy in his own dealings is the very model of a πολυπράγμων (*qui res ad se nihil attinentes agit*, J.H.Monk *ad E. Hipp.* 785 [ed. London 1840, 97-8]). In fact πολλὰ πράσσειν (as Euripides calls it: cf. *HF* 266, *Hipp.* 785, *Suppl.* 576; and *περισσὰ πράσσειν*, S. *Ant.* 68) comes in for criticism in his *Antiope*, as quoted by Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.16.2 (=2.394 Wachsmuth = fr. 193 Nauck), to-wit:

ὅστις δὲ πράσσει πολλὰ μὴ πράσσειν παρὸν,  
 μῶρος, παρὸν ζῆν ἠδέως ἀπράγμονα.

(where Nauck would replace παρὸν in the first verse with χρέων). In case these are words of Amphion in the play, Socrates would be finding the opportunity he hoped for (at 521E1-2 and 506B5-6) to respond to Callicles’s championing of Zethus. Nichols’s association of πολυπράγμων with πάνουργος is incorrect: πολὺ is quantitative, but πᾶν is here qualitative.

2284 ἀπέπεμψεν (C5): The aorist (as at B7) brings forth its use with divine action as at 524E4 and 525A6 (*bis*). ἠγάσθη, and its rapid connection with where he sends him, here corresponds to ἀτίμως and its direct connection (εὐθύ) with where he sent him in the opposite case (525A6). Read ἐς (C5) with BTWP (εἰς F *teste* Cantarin): the form as well the dactylic rhythm ἐς μακάρων νήσους smacking of Homer.

2285 Reading ταῦτα ταῦτα (C5-6) with the mss. (*silet* Cantarin), with Hermann Stallb. Woolsey Jahn Deuschle-Cron Thompson Hirschig Mistriotis Schmelzer Feix (ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα V *teste* Stallb., *legg.* edd.). With Stallb. I find the asyndeton elegant, a quick remedy for having dropped Aeacus opportunistically, at the beginning – as in English we might compendiously say, “Same goes for Aeacus.”

2286 Reading ἐκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει (C6-7) with the mss. and edd. (*del.* Heindorf, *legg.* Ast Helmbold : ἐκάτερος τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων *coni.* Gould *apud* Dodds). Heindorf: *tam nihil huc facientia tam alieno loco post gravissimas illas Socratis sententias intrudere [non] poterit*,

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,<sup>2288</sup> ὑπὸ τε<sup>2289</sup> τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι<sup>2290</sup> τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν· χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,<sup>2291</sup> τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκῶν<sup>2292</sup> πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθνήσκω [e] ἀποθνήσκειν.<sup>2293</sup> παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους<sup>2294</sup> πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον,<sup>2295</sup> ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγῶνων εἶναι, καὶ ὄνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔση σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνον,<sup>2296</sup> [527] τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὄον,<sup>2297</sup> ἐπειδὴν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος<sup>2298</sup>

doubting also the authenticity of the quotation from Homer (with Ast). Without C6-7, the re-introduction of Aeacus, who was unceremoniously dropped at 524E2 (cf. n. 2236), would be unforgivably peremptory. Instead (with Stallb.) these lines bring Socrates's interpretation of the myth (524A8-526D2) to a stately close. Dodds follows a "John Gould" in deleting δικάζει in order to avoid asyndeton before ἐκάτερος, but it stands in distributive apposition to Aeacus, with Rhadamanthus understood.

I take μόνος (C7) with ἔχων, along with Stallb. (q.v.) and edd., rather than with κάθηται (Routh Bekker Ast Cope Woolsey Sommer Naber [*obs crit.* {1862}8: cf. n. 2236, *supra*] Canto). Other editors (Coraes Schliermacher Cary Thompson Jowett Sauppe Helmbold) perhaps take it with both. Piettre's *seul* takes μόνος absolutely (i.e., "by himself"). But μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον clearly stands in contrast with ἐκάτερος ... ῥάβδον ἔχων, a contrast reinforced by the chiasmic order of verb and implement. Naber accordingly has made a mountain out of a mole-hill at 524E1.

- 2287 H. *Od.* 11.569 (D2). Reverting to the mention of Minos (524A5-7) and adding this elaboration from Homer so as to tarry gratuitously with the final item, are material and formal techniques of closure. For the latter cf. n. 856 and 524D2-3 (with n. 2232).
- 2288 ὦ Καλλίκλεις (D3): Given the μὲν οὖν of the mss., *legg.* edd. (μὲν Y Thdrt.), the vocative here reverts to its more otiose "pragmatic" use marking a structural transition within the continuous discourse (as at 524A8).
- 2289 Reading τε (D3) with F, *legg.* Burnet Croiset Zimmermann Theiler Heidbuchel Erler (*om.* BTWP Euseb. Thdrt., *legg.* edd.) depicting a close linkage between πέπεισμαι and σκοπῶ, a connection of cause with effect.
- 2290 ἀποφανοῦμαι (D4) is of course middle and (as opposed to φανοῦμαι) transitive (Stallb.), so that ψυχὴν is its object (not an accusative of respect) and the interpolation of supplementary ἔχων before ψυχὴν (present in YΞ1<sup>2</sup>Ξ2 and the early editions, *teste* Cantarin, *legg.* Sommer Allen) is unnecessary.
- 2291 Reading ἀνθρώπων (D6) with the mss. and edd. (*del.* Deuschle-Cron Stallb. Keck[*Neu. Jahrb.* 83 {1861}431]). The genitive is both objective and subjective. Compare *Rep.* 549C4-5: φεύγει τὰς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην.
- 2292 Reading ἀσκῶν (D6) with F Euseb. Thdrt., *legg.* Burnet Helmbold Woodhead Dodds Theiler Irwin Allen Canto Nichols Zeyl Heidbuchel Erler, conjectured (*olim*) by Cobet *nov. lect.* (1858) 629 (σκοπῶν BTP, *legg. ceteri*), as below (527D7). One's choice of reading should take into account the remark about μάθησις and ἄσκησις at 509E2. ἀλήθεια here means what it meant above, at C2.
- 2293 ἐπειδὴν ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν (D7-E1). The present tenses describe the being in the face of death not yet having died (*pace* Waterfield's "and after my death as well"); reminiscences from the *Apology* have to do with how one acts *facing death* and that is what Socrates is referring to here. Insertion of ἂν δύνωμαι within ὡς βέλτιστος, in comparison with direct expression at ὡς ὑγιεστάτην, achieves elevation; as again does καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι at E2.
- 2294 τοὺς ἄλλους (E1) is proleptic, forming with καὶ δὴ καὶ a virtual ἄλλως τε καὶ construction, virtually placing the case of Callicles (καὶ δὴ καὶ σέ) in hyperbaton: here begins an elevation of expression achieved through a variety of rhetorical figures.
- 2295 τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον (E3): For the alternating position of the predicate cf. *Symp.* 205A5 as well as *Phdo.* 114C8 (καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη), the alternation achieving an emphasis equal to that of anaphora, by exactly opposite means. Socrates uses similarly heartening language of an ἀγῶν before the closing myth of the *Republic* (608B4-8), but here it also has the corrective sense that the purpose of life is to not beat out others (*πλεονεκτεῖν*) but to struggle to keep one's soul healthy (cf. n. 2310, *infra*). Heidbuchel astutely draws a contrast with the sorts of ἀγῶν Gorgias referred to at 456C. ἀντιπαρακαλεῖν refers specifically to 521A (Ast) and continues Socrates's methodical reply to Callicles's argument from before, as does ὄνειδίζω (E4), with ἀντὶ echoing ἀντιπαρακαλῶ. Note ἀντὶ πάντων means not that this ἀγῶν is "superior" to all the others (Allen Erler), but equal to all of them put together; nor that it is *préférable* to all others (tr. Canto) but that its stakes are as high as the stakes of all of them put together (such as cases at court, with Canto); nor "as worthwhile as *any* other" (Waterfield) but as worthwhile as *all* the others put together. It is again the choice of lives that is at issue.
- 2296 Reading δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνον (E6) with F Euseb. Theodoret, *leg.* Dodds (δικαστὴν BTWP, *legg.* edd.). Earlier editors had seen them only in O1 (the Meermanius), Eusebius and Theodoret but not in F; this was corrected by Burnet, but still no one read them until Dodds, and thanks to him they now appear in the translations (among which I prefer Canto's "*le terrible fils d'Égine*"). We have known since Olymp. that Socrates mentions Aeacus because Callicles is from Europe (245.13-14), but only now does the advent of this variant express his monitory motive in doing so (see next note).
- 2297 τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὄον (527A1): i.e., Aeacus, in stately periphrasis. All three judges were fathered by Zeus, so the way to distinguish them by parentage is through reference to their mother. Socrates adds the reference to her (Aegina) because Callicles comes from the West. Olympiodorus (245.13-14) strangely says Socrates adds it since Callicles is Aeginetan but according to this dialogue, which is the only record we have of him, he is an Acharnian (495D3). Jahn apparently believes he is an Aeginetan and takes Olympiodorus's remark to be indicating that the reference to Aeacus's mother is a play on the name of Callicles's birthplace; Woolsey disbelieving this suggests that Olympiodorus was misled by a corrupt scholium. The postponement of Aeacus in favor of Rhadymanthus (524E1) had enabled Socrates in the short term to focus upon the paradigmatic case of the Great King (cf. n. 2236), but now it plays a role in a longer term strategy as well, reserving him for his arrival as the judge of Callicles, which above all else Socrates means by this myth to bring home to him.
- 2298 Reading ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος (A1) with F, *leg.* Dodds (ἐπιλαβόμενος BTWP, *legg.* edd.): see n. 2296, *supra*. σου ἐπιλαβόμενος repeats the language describing the judges in Hades (524E3: cf. 526B5) but also recalls Callicles's warning to Socrates that he might be latched onto by

ἐκεῖνος ἄγη, χασμήση καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις<sup>2299</sup> οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε<sup>2300</sup> σὺ<sup>2301</sup> ἐκεῖ, καὶ σε ἴσως<sup>2302</sup> τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ.

τάχα δ' οὖν<sup>2303</sup> ταῦτα μῦθος σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδὲν γ' ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πη ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν<sup>2304</sup> αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὐρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὀρᾶς ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ σοφώτατοί<sup>2305</sup> ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σὺ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ [b] Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδείξει ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖσε φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσοῦτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεγχόμενων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι,<sup>2306</sup> καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον<sup>2307</sup> ἀγαθὸν μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ [c] κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ<sup>2308</sup> πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ

some prosecutor in the face of whom he, likewise, will be of no avail to himself: 486A7 (repeated at 519A7: cf. next note and n. 2068). ἄγη likewise refers to the case Callicles envisions with Socrates, and the moment he stands before the judge. It denotes Aeacus bringing him to a stand before himself (cf. ἐπιστήσας, 524E1, λάβη, 526B5), not “dragging [him] away,” *vel sim.* (Allen Waterfield).

- 2299 χασμήση καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις (A2), reading ἰλιγγιάσεις from TWFE<sup>2</sup> *teste* Cantarín, *legg.* edd. (εἰλιγγιάσεις B, *legg.* Schanz Lodge: cf. the Souda s.v. εἰλιγγιῶ : ἰλιγγιάσης EY). This term, and ἐπὶ κόρρης below, again turn Callicles’s own expressions (486B1 and C3) against himself. Cf. 521E1. Though with Dodds τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόρρης might be a justiciable act of ἀδικία (a “major assault” as at D. 21.72), its significance throughout this dialogue involves only the ἀτιμία of undergoing it (ἀδικεῖσθαι), an embarrassment which indeed Demosthenes there explains, an embarrassment finally mastered, below (527C8-D2: cf. n. 2317).
- 2300 ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε (A2): Mistrionis notes that while Callicles used the potential optative for this eventuality (486B1), Socrates emphatically uses the future indicative; and I note in addition that, while he uses a verb for what will happen to Callicles, when he thereupon compares his own future the verb is pregnantly absent, leaving us to decide between “just as I *would*, here, according to your admonition” or, prophetically, “just as I *will*, here.”
- 2301 σὺ (A2): Dodds is first to notice the heavy use of personal pronouns in this passage: it began with confrontational ἀντιπαρακαλεῖν (E2).
- 2302 ἴσως (A3) insouciant, again, repeating exactly Callicles’s use at 521B5 – another instance of Socrates’s remarkable memory and scrupulous commitment to responding to his interlocutor, continued with the language of ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτειν (508D2) and ἀτίμως (echoing 508C9). Read καὶ before ἐπὶ κόρρης with the mss. and edd. (*om.* Y, *legg.* Croiset Zimmermann Dodds Cantarín). The deleters (disregarding mss.) were roused into action by the direct quotations: Cobet (*var.lect.*[1873]334) and Hirschig and Schanz, deleted καὶ before ἐπὶ as well as ἀτίμως; Heindorf deleted ἐπὶ κόρρης as a gloss on ἀτίμως.
- 2303 δ’ οὖν (A5) dismisses what was said in order to move on to saying something that does not depend on it either way (“be that as it may”), as at 513D1.
- 2304 εἴχομεν (A7): Note, it is unreal. Socrates feels bound to his thesis by iron chains of argument and steel (cf. n. 1822), and since he is certain that the other arguments have so far been refuted though his own has not as of yet (Helmbold’s “stands immovable” and Chambry’s *inébranlable* for ἡρεμεῖ are too strong), he will rely on his position, so eloquently spelled out in the myth, despite a lack of final certainty. The same constellation of forces is at work in him, here at the close, as were at work at 509A, and here as there it is a matter of reliance expressed in action, not “belief.” Indeed, in humility he even admits degrees of truth (though of course there are none) probably inspired by an access of strength and resolve that has been stirred up by the myth and his interpretation of it.
- 2305 σοφώτατοι (A9): It is not irony, for this is how they would characterize themselves. Lodge cites Hippias at *Prot.*337D4 (where note also Socrates’s little joke just above, 337C6-7). They are three and they are redoubtably wise, qualitative and quantitative: their failure is therefore a circumstantial credential in support of the thesis, which is unmoved. Emphatic οἵπερ (A8) and ὅσπερ (B2) elevate the constituents of the situation, further heightened by the subsequent hyperbaton of the main construction (μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ, B3-4). εὐλαβητέον and μελετητέον compendiously articulate morality in its two faces of *fugienda* and *petenda*.
- 2306 ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι (B6): This sober quotation from A. *Sept.*592 (Plut. *vit.*Aristid.3.4 says that with the recitation of these lines in the theatre, everyone looked over at Aristides!) was similarly adduced in Adeimantus’s cynical argument against virtue at *Rep.*361B7-8: ‘Let your imaginary just man wish not only to seem but truly to be good; now strip away his seeming so: how then will he fare?’ In that context the seeming is brought about by astute political behavior and speech: it is of course Gorgias who is the master of making the seeming seem true – nay, for him there is no truth but only seeming, produced by the magic of logos, though this doctrine of his goes unmentioned here. Socrates alluded to the distinction only once, in conversation Gorgias (459E6): again we have an indirect stab at the real culprit, and again he goes unnamed.
- 2307 Reading τοῦτο δεύτερον (B7-8) with mss., *legg.* edd. (τοῦτο τὸ δεύτερον *coni.* Heindorf, *leg.* Coraes). The construction is: τοῦτο (*sc.* τὸ γίνεσθαι δίκαιον) δεύτερον ἀγαθόν (*sc.* ἐστί) μετὰ τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον. For the reverse καὶ placing cause after effect cf. 525B5 and n. 2252 (which, Cary does not see, is the basis of Stallbaum’s translation) – this, along with bare γίνεσθαι, achieving elevation.
- 2308 Repeated initial καὶ (C1), here and in the sequel, closes the speech like nails in a coffin (cf. n. 1844). κολακεία brings forward the characterization of Gorgias’s ῥητορικὴ and its three analogues to condemn them as such, but also pregnantly provides a berth from a good ῥητορικὴ (C3), hitherto barely countenanced.



πολλούς,<sup>2309</sup> φευκτέον· καὶ τῆ ῥητορικῆ οὕτω<sup>2310</sup> χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεὶ, καὶ τῆ ἄλλη πάσῃ πράξει.<sup>2311</sup>

ἐμοὶ οὖν<sup>2312</sup> πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.<sup>2313</sup> καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου καὶ προπηλακίσει, ἐὰν βούληται,<sup>2314</sup> καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν<sup>2315</sup> πατάξαι τὴν [d] ἄτιμον ταύτην<sup>2316</sup> πληγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν<sup>2317</sup> πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ἦς καλὸς

2309 περί (C2-3): In the wake of heightened conviction the striding and redundant repetition of the preposition in enallage, ignores without a care its uneven suitability with the generalizing array of its objects. All pandering will, of course, be applied upon others (~τὴν περί ἄλλους) for one's own gain (~τὴν περί ἑαυτόν): the orator of course has designs on an ὄγκος. The article then drops out (with καὶ περί ὀλίγους καὶ περί πολλούς), expressing indifference, with corresponsive καί, as to how many persons one might seek to exploit. As to using redundancy for emphasis Mr Morrissey compares English "in any shape or form."

2310 οὕτω (C3): With Ast Stallb. Woolsey, the idiomatic proleptic demonstrative asseverates the resolution (compare proleptic τοῦτο just above, and n. 2307). Thus, with Cope, "for the maintenance of the right and for that alone." The reappearance of the question, πῶς χρηστέον, brings forward exactly and only the mendacious defense of oratory offered in his speech by Gorgias (467C7ff), who of course remains unnamed.

2311 Reading the *difficilior*, τῆ ἄλλη πάσῃ πράξει (C4), with BTP, *legg.* edd. (τῆ ἄλλη πράξει πάσῃ F). The singular and the attributive position of *πάσῃ* imposes upon ἄλλη the adverbial or appositive sense: "and for that matter the whole of human activity." With this phrase, and its adverbial appositive use of ἄλλη, Socrates is virtually quoting, and indeed correcting, Gorgias's treatment of proper use (n.b. τῆ ἄλλη πάσῃ ἀγωνία at 467C7: cf. n. 308), another outstanding example of his ability to remember the *ipsissima verba* of his interlocutors (cf. nn. 394, 1229).

2312 Reading ἐμοὶ οὖν (C4) with the mss. and edd. (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν E1E3 Steph. Ald. Bas., *legg.* Coraes Beck L.I.Rückert[p.53] Sommer Theiler). Deuschle-Cron see this opening as ushering in a strikingly tender conclusion (stressed by Waterfield in his very free translation of this last paragraph; cf. Mistriotis: κατέλιξεν εἰς γλώσσαν παραινετικῆν, εὐγενῆ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ; Zimmermann, *väterlich freundlich und eben dadurch eindringlich Ton*): therefore, insert a paragraph break. Rückert imagined μὲν *solitarium* with aposiopesis of εἰ δὲ ἄλλως ποιήσεις ἄθλιος ἐκεῖ ἔσει, *vel sim.* More importantly, with emphatic ἐμοὶ Socrates is bringing forward and echoing the peroration of Callicles's own speech: ἄλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου ... (486C4). Irwin closes his commentary by offering us three conclusions as to whether Socrates's reliance on his way of life is correct (having to do with his assumptions and his claims), but as Socrates here stresses to Callicles he is not trying to be correct, but live a happy life and death (C5-6).

2313 Reading ὁ λόγος σημαίνει (C6) with F and Par(?) *teste* Cantarín Steph., *legg.* edd. (ὁ σοὶς λόγος σημαίνει BTPW Ficinus, *legg.* Hermann Thurot Stallb. Cary Deuschle-Cron Sommer Mistriotis Schmelzer Feix), meaning "as reason indicates." For the idiom cf. *Rep.*399D10, 344A9, 584A11: it is something of a catchphrase for acknowledging the compelling logic of an entailment in the face of its courting paradox (often reinforced by γοῦν of "part-proof": 511B7; *Th.*160C1-2), or its empirical unverifiability (as in the present passage and at *Phdo.*66E4). Compare ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ (*Rep.*604C7, 607B3), which Plato reserves for describing the dispositive authority of reason over other considerations or criteria (*Cleit.*407D8, *Crito* 48C6-7, *Leg.*663D, *Parm.*141D6), its sovereignty over the other parts of the soul (*Rep.*440B5, *Phlb.*35D6), and a certain vertigo one feels when he acknowledges its truths. It here refers to the process of the whole dialogue, in which all the other λόγοι did not survive ἔλεγχος (cf. B3).

Schleiermacher Apelt Hamilton Allen Canto Irwin Waterfield Nichols Piettre read ὁ λόγος (not ὁ σοὶς λόγος) but take ὁ as possessive or demonstrative rather than generic and translate with *unsere Rede*, or "the argument," *vel sim.*, failing to represent the objectivity of the idiom (compare Steph. at n. 1873). Irwin and Zeyl's "as the account signifies" continues their adamant but opaque translation of *logos* with "account" ever since 523A2, and translates σημαίνει literally. Erler's unambiguous *Geschichte* restricts the sense to the myth (as he translated λόγος at 523A1) but the myth only proved the happiness of the afterlife (τελευτήσας), not this life (ζῶν). The attempt by other editors to save σοὶς, who argue that the steps leading to this conclusion were dialectically accepted by Callicles – including Thurot and Cary and Hermann (allowing that Socrates is being ironic) – also errs in reducing the objectivity of the idiom in σημαίνει down to the subjectivity of Callicles. Moreover, it is directly inconsonant with ἐμοὶ ... πειθόμενος (with Kratz), and it is totally foreign to Socrates's manner to attribute to Callicles what dialectic requires Callicles himself to concede, even in irony (*pace* Hermann citing ὡς σὺ φῆς at *Meno* 85B5: Socrates there attributes to the slave boy only what he has himself accepted dialectically!). On this see n. 1864. Schmelzer takes σοὶς to be an admonition to follow his own thought rather than be persuaded by rhetoric, but there is no danger Callicles should be swayed by rhetoric in the first place, and ὁ σοὶς λόγος elsewhere means "the argument you are making" not "your reasoning capacity" (e.g., 508D4-5). Perhaps the simplest way to account for the majority reading – as wrong as it is historically supported – is to imagine an uncial ΟΛΟΓΟΣΣ becoming ΟΣΟΣΛΟΓΟΣΣ (compare the error at 521B1: cf. n. 2127 and 460C). More ingenious emendations (e.g., F. M. Münscher σοὶς > σοφός in *Jahrb. Cl. Philol.* [ed.Fleckeisen] 101.181 : A. Göbel σοὶς > δσιος in *Jahrb. Cl. Philol.* [ed.Fleckeisen] 101.730, accepted by Christ : C. Graux σοὶς > σωὶς in *Les Articles originaux* [Paris 1893] 5) spoil Socrates's climactic reversion to the unforgiving idiom (on which cf. n. 1873 ad 511B7 where the same error occurs in one ms.).

2314 ἐὰν βούληται (C8): What had been a formula expressing the enviable prerogative of the orator (456C2, 457B1, 473C7 and nn. *ad locc.*) now reappears as the misguided velleity of a sorry wretch: still another chip removed.

2315 σύ γε θαρρῶν (C8): The nominative agrees with the subject of the imperative ἕασον (C7), reaching back through the infinitives dependent on it, which are then immediately resumed. Read πατάξαι, the infinitive, with the mss. and edd., rather than the middle imperative πάταξαι given only in E2 and the early editions (*legg.* Heusde [and Sommer Stender] who translates *sine te verberari*, against which Buttman argues the middle is not given the sense Heusde gives it). Stallb. notes θαρρῶν taking imperative as a reason to read πάταξαι (*Euthyd.*307C3, *Rep.*451B5) but Ast (1832), while adding to Stallbaum's parallels, notes also several other constructions subsequent to an intervening θαρρῶν, and persists in referring the infinitival form back to ἕασον, in which Stallb. subsequently acquiesced. Indeed, πατάξαι is the third of three dependent infinitives which together repeat the ideas of A2-4 above, with that "blow" so crucial to Callicles's argument (508D, 486C) placed last and emphasized by the intervention of ναὶ μὰ Δία and σύ γε θαρρῶν. It is something of a tri-colon crescendo.

2316 Reading τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν (C8-D1) with BTWP (ταύτην τὴν ἄτιμον πληγὴν F) as the *lectio difficilior* (the demonstrative being in attributive position). The variant in F went unnoticed until Burnet. Smyth (§1181) describes X. *An.*4.2.6 (ἡ στενὴ αὐτῆ ὁδός) as an instance of a pronoun intervening in attributive position between attribute (στενὴ) and its noun (ὁδός), comparing *Symp.*189D6 (ἡ γὰρ πάλα ἡμῶν φύσις), but this does not account for the *demonstrative* pronoun appearing in attributive position (*Symp.* inserts the genitive personal pronoun, and even demonstratives in the genitive are normal in attributive position: Smyth §1163). Gildersleeve (§§669-674: cf. also *AGPS* 50.11.20) notices irregularities in attributive and predicative position in cases where there are several attributives; among the irregularities he finds "pseudo-



κάγαθος, ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν. κάπειτα οὕτω<sup>2318</sup> κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῆ  
 χρῆναι,<sup>2319</sup> ἐπιθησόμεθα<sup>2320</sup> τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῆ, τότε  
 βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν  
 φαινόμεθα ἔχειν,<sup>2321</sup> ἔπειτα<sup>2322</sup> νεανιεύεσθαι<sup>2323</sup> ὡς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἀδοκεῖ  
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν,<sup>2324</sup> καὶ ταῦτα περὶ [e] τῶν μεγίστων – εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν  
 ἀπαιδευσίας<sup>2325</sup> – ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησόμεθα<sup>2326</sup> τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς  
 ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἄριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ<sup>2327</sup> τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν  
 ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ<sup>2328</sup> οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς

attributive position of predicative adjectives” (§674), and places the Xenophon passage there, among forty others (not including ours), all of which involve properly predicative πᾶς and οὗτος appearing in attributive position.

In most cases the sandwiched attributives each independently modify the noun (compare English “large grey house”), but of course of them one might be specifying an adjacent adjective (English “light grey house”) and thus only indirectly the noun that governs it. In the example from Xenophon the demonstrative adds an attribute to the path, not to its narrowness, a path found by accident (the very path ἐφ’ ἣ ἐκάθηντο οἱ φύλακες, identical to the location where they discovered and fell upon the enemy’s guards), which clearly (by its narrowness) was not the broad path they were seeking as an alternative to the well-fortified path through the pass, but which proved serviceable nevertheless (ἔφοδος μέντοι...) as an access to the enemy fortifications holding the pass. Presumably the Greeks would not have noticed this narrow path except for the fact that they had found the Carduchian guards there. Thus, αὕτη here merely refers to the relative clause that follows (ἐφ’ ἣ ...), and its position is simply “improper” (Tr. “that narrow path where the came upon the guards”). In the present case, however (τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν), ταύτην refers more to the attribute than the noun, so as to refer back to the characterization of the slap as humiliating (i.e., to ἀτίμως, A3). While the syntax of the demonstrative (number, gender, and case) is determined by the noun, its real “antecedent” here is the adjective ἄτιμον (compare English “light grey house”), a sense *reinforced* by its “improper” position. Tr. “that humiliating slap of yours.” Compare *Phlb.*22D1; D. 4.17, 6.21; X. *An.*5.7.29; cf. n. 765.

- 2317 δεινόν (D1): The sting of thoughtless popular opprobrium that Callicles so fears, is unfelt by such a man as Socrates describes. It is not that such a man cannot “defend himself against attack” (Irwin, 249) but that a slap in the face does not constitute an attack on his identity or values: this is what Callicles needs to see.
- 2318 οὕτω (D2), with Ast, here means *tum*, not *ita*: compare C3 above.
- 2319 ἐὰν δοκῆ χρῆναι (D3) *sc.* ἡμῖν in the first plural context broached by, continued with ἐπιθησόμεθα, and made explicit by ἡμῖν in the next line (*pace* Canto’s virtual σοί, *si tu penses qu’il faut*, in both places): Socrates is imagining a dialogue and ὁμολογία of the sort he attempted at 514A5-B4.
- 2320 For the sense of ἐπιτίθεσθαι (D3) cf. *Polit.*299C1, *Soph.*242B1, *Symp.*218B7.
- 2321 φαινόμεθα ἔχειν (D6): The infinitive softens the assertion and imports thereby a sympathetic tone. The condition in which they find themselves is a failure to reach ὁμολογία, for which by the nature of the case they are equally responsible.
- 2322 ἔπειτα (D6) after participle: the idiom seen once again (cf. n.311). The passage is pointing directly at 515A1-B4, where Socrates demurred to observe that, contrary to the criteria there established, Callicles was entering politics *before* proving himself prepared, ὡς τὸ ὄν (n. 1973). Socrates is suggesting they go back to that point and take the other fork in the road, indeed that he and Callicles continue their conversation – as he does for instance at the end of the *Laches* (201B8-C5) and maybe the *Phaedrus*.
- 2323 νεανιεύεσθαι (D6): Socrates closes by admonishing Callicles and himself not to do the very thing Callicles at the start accused Socrates of trying to do in his treatment of Polus and Gorgias (482C4), whatever it meant and means! *juveniliter nosmet venditari*, Serranus (*ad* 482C4 “*juvenili quadam iactantia haec debacchare*” *vertens*); “*nosmet iactare*” Routh (*illuc*, “*juvenili more teipsum iactare*”); “*superbire*” Ast (*illuc* “*te iactare*”); “airs of consequence” Cope; *nous enorgueillir*, Sommer; Piettre exceptionally takes it merely to mean “act like young persons” and then takes such young persons (rather than ἡμεῖς) as the antecedent of οἷς, but cf. next note. Schanz was the first editor to correctly accent the idiom of emphatic enclitic τὶ (followed by Lodge Burnet Croiset Lamb Feix Dodds Theiler Cantarin): cf. Smyth §187a.
- 2324 οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἀδοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν (D7): Despite what Socrates says about Gorgias and Polus at 487B3-5, the expression here denotes the parties’ failure, including that of Socrates, to reach ὁμολογία through dialectic, in contrast with success desiderated just above with ἢ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ. Other editors interpret “we are always changing our minds,” among them Jowett Mistriotis Croiset Lamb Apelt Helmbold, Dodds, Chambry, Waterfield. Gercke (*apud* Sauppe) cites Socrates’s own claims to self-consistency (482A, 490E10-11) as though he were pointlessly claiming himself to be exempt from such shifts! Dodd’s assertion that Socrates “politely includes himself” among those who always change in order to “disguise the positive character of the conclusion,” disregards or misses the diffidence he already expressed above at A6-8, and attributes to him a sense of politeness that borders on mendacity. The criterion for a reliable hypothesis is not merely that we are invariably fixed upon it (even ἡρεμεῖ at B4 is only tentative) but that it was reached as an ὁμολογία. Just maybe, this is what Hamilton tries to say with “we never think the same for two moments *together*”; and could it be what Irwin Nichols Zeyl mean by “we never think the same things” and Canto by *nous qui n’avons jamais la même opinion sur les mêmes questions* and Erler’s *wir niemals dieselbe Meinung über dieselben Dinge vertreten?* Implicit in the notion of ὁμολογία is the activity of κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες above, which for Socrates can only mean κοινῇ ζητοῦντες. (for which in turn cf. τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀσκεῖν, 526D6).
- 2325 ἀπαιδευσίας (E1): Deuschle-Cron detect that another chip is being removed from the table: both Polus (461C4, 462E5-8, 470E6-8 with nn. *ad locc.*) and Callicles (485A4: cf. 510B7-8 with n. 1852) had an understanding of acculturation that left them so rude that they did not recognize it was prerequisite to their own positions. Cf. also 487B.
- 2326 Reading the hortatory subjunctive χρησόμεθα (E2) from BT, *legg.* edd. (*χρησόμεθα* WPF). ἡγεμόνι again mildly personifies the λόγος, which Erler now correctly construes as the *Gedankengang* of the entire conversation (rather than the *Geschichte*, as he did at C6, above).
- 2327 Reading καὶ (E3) before τὴν δικαιοσύνην, with the mss. and edd. (*punctis del.* Par : *om.* ZaY lambl. and the early editions, *legg.* Routh Beck Deuschle [*apud* Cron] Hirschig Mistriotis). Though Socrates’s main argument with Polus and Callicles has had to do with justice (ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσχρον καὶ κάκιον), the role and the importance of each of the four virtues have each been stressed at one point or another in the dialogue.
- 2328 τούτῳ (E5): The natural antecedent is the proximate term, τρόπος (not λόγος, *pace* edd.): ‘The leader (λόγος ~ ἡγεμόν) has indicated our path (τρόπος): let us follow this.’

ἄλλους<sup>2329</sup> παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ<sup>2330</sup> ἐκείνω, ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδένοσ ἄξιος, ᾧ Καλλίκλεισ.<sup>2331</sup>

2329 τοὺς ἄλλους (E5): With τοὺς Socrates is including, among all men (526E1), the group that had listened to Gorgias's set presentation and now has stayed for this improvised three-hour conversation afterward!

2330 μὴ (E6) continuing the exhortation of ἐπώμεθα.

2331 ᾧ Καλλίκλεισ (E7): On the terminal vocative, cf. n. 1025. It is here deeply admonitory, not structural or pragmatic. Jahn is the first to see that Socrates's οὐδένοσ ἄξιος is a direct rejoinder to Callicles's expression (οὐδένοσ ἄξια) in the peroration of his parrhesiastic confession, at 492C7-8.

# APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I: The Pindar Fragment (484B)

For *Plato's* understanding of Pindar's meaning we have eloquent testimony from a series of three passages in the *Laws*. In the first (690AC), the Athenian reviews the claims (ἀξιώματα) that justify who should rule whom: parents their children, the high-born the low-born, the elder the younger, or even the stronger the weaker – a horribly forcible arrangement (the Cretan interrupts to observe), but widespread, nevertheless (the Athenian continues), as the rule of the entire animal world indeed, and Pindar once said it is “rule by nature.” And there are two more claims, that the wise should rule the ignorant, which is the “greatest” of the claims (μέγιστον, 690B9), and finally the claim of rule by lot, in which men entrust their fate to the gods. The Athenian then pauses to return to Pindar's notion that the rule of force is κατὰ φύσιν, apostrophizing the poet as follows: “O Pindar, most wise, I would hazard to say that for a rule over men who acquiesce in being ruled it is not against nature but rather quite in accord with nature, instead of a rule whose very nature is compulsion (βίαιον πεφουκῖαν).” In a second passage, twenty pages later (714B-15A), while reviewing the popular notion that lawmakers in any kind of regime fashion their laws only to preserve and advance their own power and claim as their warrant that to do so is “nature's justice” (714C3-4), the Athenian remembers those several contending ἀξιώματα, since the popular notion now in question is to be found there among them, which, he had said, Pindar took to be “according to nature” (κατὰ φύσιν ... ἄγειν, 715A1-2), and in so doing “found justice in whatever was the most compelling force,” so to say (ὡς φάναι, 715A2). Later still, and third (889E-890A), the Athenian reaches the more radical notion that laws and even the gods are inventions of human τέχνη without a basis in nature (φύσει). The very fact that there are contrary distributions of rulers and ruled succeeding one another proves that the choice is only τέχνη; and now the young are subject to hear the influential writers of the times mouthing (φασκόντων) the claim in poetry or prose that the very essence of justice (τὸ δικαιοτάτον) is whatever state of affairs one can bring about through force – that “might makes right” as we have come to put it, favoring rhyme over reason – so that the right way by nature to live (ὀρθὸν βίον, avoiding δίκαιον, καλόν, and ἀγαθόν) is to conquer the others and not be enslaved by the other party, in accordance with law.

Plato's criticism of Pindar, asserted in the first passage and presented with respect, is about the nature of nature. A βίαιος ἀρχή is not an ἀρχή κατὰ φύσιν but only βίαιος πεφουκῖα (690C3) – at bottom its “nature” is force, not rule. Conversely an ἀρχή τοῦ νόμου ἐκόντων not only may arise κατὰ φύσιν (οὐκ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἔγωγε φαίην γίγνεσθαι) but also is κατὰ φύσιν, because at bottom the “nature” of ἀρχή qua ἀρχή is a matter of acquiescence, not only for some to be ruled but also for others to lead and rule (690B9-C1). This essentially Platonic idea about the οὐσία of something is here expressed with Pindar's more “compact” language of φύσις; the idea will be used elsewhere (as in the *Cratylus*) to demolish the impoverished sophistical dichotomy consisting of φύσις (as fact) and νόμος (as belief). In the second passage, the Athenian infers that in arrogating (ἄγειν, 715A2: cf. England *ad loc.*) rule by force to be according to nature, Pindar was “finding a justification for the force that is strongest, as they say he said” (ὡς φάναι, 715A2: again cf. England). He does not quite say this was Pindar's purpose, but from the third passage we learn that this was, at least, the use that was made of the notion, in the more radical and impious outlook of the moderns; and meanwhile, the addition of ὡς φάναι, “as far as the saying goes” (whether it means “as he said” or “as they say he said”), while it may indicate a certain diffidence on the part of the Athenian, indicates a reference to Pindar's *ipsissima verba* which are quoted in a scholion to the *Nemeans* 9.35: νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιοτάτον ὑπερτάτα χειρῖ. (= frg. 169 Snell), corroborated by the version of Pindar given by Aristides.

On this basis – this fairly strong indication that Plato had δικαίων τὸ βιαιοτάτον in mind from Pindar, corroborated as Pindaric by Aristides, rather than βιαιὸν τὸ δικαιοτάτον, editors since Stallb. have replaced the reading of BTPF with the former, as if it were Plato not Callicles here speaking. We have moreover the perfectly circular suggestion of Badham that *Leg.* 715A1-2 should be emended so as to bring it more exactly in line with the emended version of this passage in the *Gorgias*, validated by Aristides; and the utterly high-wire attempt of Croiset who, having rejected out of hand the reading of the mss. as senseless (*pace* Routh and the other editors before Stallb., who instead emend βιαιὸν to βιαιῶς, while in my opinion even βιαιῶν can be justified, coming from the mouth of Callicles), doubts also the Greek of the version imported from Aristides and finds better style and sense in ἄγειν δικαιοῖ rather than ἄγει δικαίων (cf. his *Notice* in the Budé, 102-3). Faulting and thereby undermining the Aristidean support for importing the

reading, Croiset turns for support to the passage in the *Laws* in which as we saw the *ipsissima verba* are alluded to, and, taking advantage of the fact that that passage is an accusative-infinitive in indirect discourse, Croiset re-construes the Greek there to be saying, “we said that Pindar – (i.e. the law Pindar is talking about) – justifies as natural that the most violent leads highhandedly,” which he reaches by construing (1) τὸ βιαιότατον, not τὸν Πίνδαρον, as the subject of ἄγειν; (2) ἄγειν as object infinitive of δικαιῶντα, rather than the main verb of the indirect discourse under ἔφαμεν; and (3) δικαιῶντα as the governing verb of the indirect discourse under ἔφαμεν, rather than as a circumstantial participle agreeing with the subject of the infinitive ἄγειν. The sense he thereby extracts corresponds perfectly with the sense produced by his emendation in the *Gorgias*, but the Greek can hardly bear the meaning he gives it, requiring the participle in indirect discourse after φάναι, for which Croiset cites only S. OC 1580 (λέξας Οἰδίποδα ὀλωλότα), which is not parallel, the constructions permitted to φάναι being as notoriously narrow as those permitted to λέγειν are loose. Nor did Aristides fail to get his revenge for being ignored by Croiset, since it is on his (admittedly indirect) authority that another passage in the *Gorgias* has been expunged by almost all editors, including Croiset himself, for presenting the very same highly dubious construction (σε φῶμεν ... σπουδαζοντα ἢ παίζοντα, 481C1 – which incidentally I accept from all mss.: cf. n. 1062). There remains the matter of the meanings of ἄγειν in the fragment, in the passage from the *Laws* (715A2, redone with ὅτι ἂν τις νικᾷ βιαζόμενος at 890A5) and also in the later passage of the *Gorgias* in which Socrates looks back to and describes the position “Callicles and Pindar” had taken as to “justice according to nature” (488B3-4), namely ἄγειν βία τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων ...). We may start with “carry out” (accomplish) and “carry off” (including pillage), for which the τέκμαρ of Heracles’s “leading off” of the cattle (ἠλάσατο, 484B11) is a synonym or a metonym; but what of κατὰ φύσιν τὸν Πίνδαρον ἄγειν δικαιῶντα τὸ βιαιότατον, assuming, as we have now decided against Croiset, that it is Pindar, not βιαιότατον, that is its subject? England suggests the verb denotes a “forcible wresting of the truth,” and that Socrates is “applying to Pindar himself his own words” – that in giving a justification for violence, Pindar is doing the to the truth what the doctrine itself does to justice.

Now as to Pindar’s meaning, Dodds has doubted Pindar could be saddled with a nefarious relativism such as is described in the third passage of the *Laws* (where, incidentally, Pindar is not mentioned). But the relativistic and atheist theory is only an inference from Pindar’s assertion that the “rule of power” is natural; the ἀρχή of a law of willing parties is also natural, the Athenian argues (*Leg.*690C1-3), depending upon what “nature” means, which for him is the essential truth of what something is. Though Pindar’s naturalizing of a law beyond the human opens the door to the nefarious theory, the theory itself needs also to assume a dichotomy of nature and law, a dichotomy in which essential truth has no place, whereas Pindar is speaking of a law higher than men’s laws, a law governing all of nature including gods and men, to which human law subordinately belongs. Zimmermann *ad loc.* suggests that this law is for Pindar *moira*, and that his poem advocates pious acquiescence in a deed objectionable but fated. Alternatively, we may view the τέκμαρ as an instantiation of the principle ἄγειν, δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον, ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ, with Olympiodorus: as an act justified by a higher law in the sense that Heracles was *entitled* to take the cattle from Geryon without paying and without being granted them – bypassing, that is, the *regulae* of human dealings – because they already were stolen goods, this higher law beyond human law being the sovereign law for and of all, mortals and immortals.

In any event, Callicles is thinking of Heracles as the paradigm of the strong man he has just described, enabled by his physical strength to bypass human *regulae* and do whatever he will.

END OF APPENDIX I

## APPENDIX II: On the Attributions at 503D2-4.

Postponing the question of how Socrates's previous paragraph is to close (after γεγυόνα), we may focus on the fact that the manuscript authority for attributing οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω (D2-3) to Socrates and the response ἀλλ' ἐὰν καλῶς ζητῆς, εὐρήσεις (D4) to Callicles is substantially equal as for the opposite attribution.

At stake in the decision is a large question touching the dialectical drama of the dialogue, which may be boiled down to this: EITHER, with ms.F, Callicles is continuing his defense of oratory as something not essentially seductive, for which he has no proof among current orators but thinks his position can be established by indignantly pointing to the high reputations of the Four as political heroes, and at the present moment would be exploiting Socrates's own inability to name an orator that meets the high standards he has interlarded at C4-D2; OR, with the unanimous testimony of the other family of mss., Callicles announces he does not know *how to answer* (*n.b.*, οὐκ ἔχω πῶς εἶπω) Socrates's question whether there is anyone who meets the high criterion (which Socrates had presented as pre-emptive with εἰ ἔστιν γε [C4]: see my note), and Socrates would be answering that he will find a way to do so, if he investigates well (with "how to speak" rather than an exemplary orator as the object of εὐρήσεις), by which he would be obtaining a purchase on teaching Callicles how to recognize a good orator even if there are no historical examples and then, with ἴδωμεν δῆ, exhorting him to join in on the investigation.

The special advantage of this latter interpretation is that it helps to account for the paradoxical way Socrates had brought Callicles along to condemn with prejudice all forms of public entertainment for failing to promote virtue by means of τέχνη, reaching at the end the question of oratory (500E3-503A1). It is only this last "ἐπιτήδευσις" (501D7) or "παρασκευή" (500B1), and the choice of the life it leads a man into (500B5-C8), that Callicles rises at all to defend (and *n.b.*, of the lives Socrates had previously countenanced to be chosen among there were only two, the political life of the orator or the philosopher: not the life of the poet or the musician).

He had "proven" before, in the conversation with Polus and Gorgias, the two teachers of oratory, that oratory was only a seductive art when compared with the judicial art, and did so by a deep and wide-ranging set of analogies and divisions: between appearance and reality, soul and body, desire and intelligence, pleasure and knowledge. But Callicles was not party to that conversation, and Socrates had now asked him to go through it with him step by step (500E3ff) to determine whether he agrees with the steps (this is the sense of διομολόγησαι, 500E3: cf. my note), and therefore would accept what they entail. It is the rigor and comprehensiveness of this argument that has now led them (501D1ff) to evaluate and criticize the various types of public entertainment; and in the event, tragedy, having a demotic theatrical audience, could be stripped of its musical elements so as to make a segue to political oratory, with its virtually theatrical audience consisting of the deme, leading to the question whether Callicles would draw a line or allow it also to be absorbed into the morass of seductive entertainments. But with this question rides also the crucial question mentioned at the beginning, about the two lives: if Callicles includes oratory among the other entertainments, his conception of the political life goes down right along with it.

But what happened to the other life than the political/oratorical, and the choice between lives that was said to underlay the entire inquiry – not between that of the orator-politician and the musician, but the orator-politician and the philosopher (500B5–C8)? In fact it is already embodied in the person and conduct of Socrates (just as the political life is embodied in Callicles, his partner in the discussion), but also it is embodied in the very argument Socrates is making: only a philosopher troubles to distinguish between appearance and reality, to worry over the orderliness of the soul in addition to the satiation of bodily desires, and even to investigate whether the good is φρόνησις or pleasure.

That Callicles should have no idea or real understanding of the criterion a philosopher would bring for evaluating the orator is therefore no surprise. In fact, at this crucial moment where he is required by the inductive sequence of cases to draw a line, he has no valid reason or justification to draw it, at least within the terms established in the conversation that arrived at this point. He takes refuge in an empirical answer: there are some orators that care about the welfare of the city and not only to seduce the deme for personal gain, and there are also the kind Socrates has been talking about. This essentially begs the question whether these too are orators, or whether oratory itself is two-fold. His use of emphatic σὺ at this point (οἴους σὺ λέγεις, 503A4) insinuates that Socrates's picture of the orator is just his own picture, that the world is wider than his argument reaches, though from what he has said about himself all along, his motive as a politician is only his self-interest, as he sees it, namely to acquire the wherewithal to satisfy all his desires no matter how great they are – so his empirical argument is irrelevant to the empirical man we see before us.

But even though his answer is freighted with the insinuation that Socrates is merely talking, it gives Socrates enough to continue (ἐξαρκεῖ, A5), for he has granted that the philosophical criterion he has established by this long argument can in Callicles's opinion be applied. Moreover Socrates can allege, in answer to Callicles's accusatory σὺ, that Callicles's own empirical experience does not support the empirical claim (οὐ πώποτε σὺ εἶδες) he has made for drawing his line (it is noteworthy that Socrates forgoes to bring up the case of the empirical politician he is talking with, for he is interested in the logos, not in defeating Callicles) – else he would already have named an empirical case (hence the aorist ἔφρασας, B3). To this Callicles admits that merely he himself may not be able to cite a case among merely current politicians (note two γε's in false modesty, B4), and Socrates gives him a chance to dip into the empirical past, and even lowers the bar: for he does not ask Callicles to name an orator that has sought the good with τέχνη, but merely an orator



whom the Athenians *impute* (αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν) to have improved them with his oratory, *empirically* (this is why Socrates includes the stipulation, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες, B8).

Callicles now lights upon citing the high reputations of the Big Four, none of whom he himself has heard (as we may presume from his remark that Socrates has heard the most recent of them, Pericles, though did not himself mention him above), so that he foists the empirical basis for his empirical argument onto Socrates's empirical experience (with taunting σύ, C3) rather than his own.

So much for an argument from empirical experience as a basis to draw the line! Socrates grants him those Four are candidates to be exceptions to the rule that oratory is seduction, for the sake of reiterating the criterion now as a *stipulation* (εἰ ἔστιν γε) by which to evaluate their candidacy, a criterion not empirical but (again) the creature of this entire philosophical argument. Here indeed Socrates, responding in kind to Callicles's taunting σύ (*n.b.*, σύ C4), does allude to Callicles's own stated criterion, namely, satisfying one's own desires, which he called not only happiness but even dubbed "virtue," in an access of nonsensical enthusiasm in the peroration of his parrhesiastic speech (492C5-6: it is noteworthy that Socrates remembers these things and brings them back at an opportune moment: Callicles had said this half an hour ago) – for it is exactly virtue, and the art by means of which the orator determines what is good, that the argument above has required *us* to adopt as the criterion (ἡναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, C7).

It is at this point that the attribution of the subsequent lines becomes a problem; but I believe our careful reconstruction of what led up to it enables us to resolve the sense, and in particular to resolve that problem. According to the first option (following ms.F), Socrates admits failing to find such an orator and Callicles then wins his case by admonishing him that he will, if only he takes the trouble. But now we have seen that the empirical fulfillment is a red herring: Socrates has sublated it by stipulating that the criterion must be met regardless of reputation and one's personal witness of given orators. But if we follow the other mss., Callicles now says he does not know what to say (whether such a man exists – or whatever the end of Socrates question leaves him to respond to); and this makes perfect sense since it is the criterion and its philosophical profundity that left him in the lurch in the first place, when he fell back on empirical cases and accused Socrates of mere talk (σύ λέγεις, A4). To his confession that he cannot do what matters most Socrates now replies, by encouraging him that a calm investigation can and will enable him to find what to say about the question. What then follows (503D6ff.) is an elaboration of the philosophical argument and criterion for the distinction, this time emphasizing the positive side with easily accessible exemplification from common arts. I therefore adopt the attributions of BTW rather than those of F.

But there is more to say. This close scrutiny of the line-drawing moment and its aftermath also sheds some light on the epagoge series of examples leading up to it, which to Dodds at least seemed only a digression indulged in by "Plato" to condemn still other types of public performance besides "rhetoric," since (as Dodds argues) the material in question was not used "in the subsequent course of the argument," an interpretation Dodds delivers in advance of commenting on the passage as it unfolds, thereby prejudicing his reader's own outlook, as he often does (p.320). The purpose of the epagoge is initially to enable Callicles to distinguish among ἐπιτηδεύσεις that effect the betterment of men with a scientific approach and those devoted merely to pleasure that operate only by guess and by golly (ἐμπειρία, 500B4, E5). Rather than require Callicles to answer the question straight on, in general terms, Socrates interrupts himself to suggest he will give cases and Callicles can say yea or nay (501D7-9). Of course as the examples accrue, some sense of the principles by which the individual decisions are being made will come to the surface of consciousness and even be articulated in the presentation of the exemplary material, in the articulation of the questions about the cases and in the terms according to which they are accepted or rejected.

It soon becomes clear that the material is ordered from the most easily determined as merely seductive, toward candidates whose status might be less obvious. There is moreover a trend in the citation of examples to make a segue from the one to the next; and this trend is brought to a climax in the unique way that Socrates moves past the most controversial case so far, tragedy. He now imagines stripping tragic poetry of its musical elements (what a strange concept!) leaving behind logos alone, and then suggests that the delivery of such logos to a crowd resembles the action of the orator in his "political" theatre (if you will!). It becomes clear that the next candidate for an ἐπιτηδεύσις will indeed be the ἐπιτηδεύσις of the orator, and by virtue of what might initially have been an unintuitive resemblance to theatrical display, oratory becomes a legitimate candidate for scrutiny. But once Socrates broaches it *per se*, Callicles suddenly stops the sequence: That question is "no longer simple" (503A2).

The purpose of the series of examples is to make the question about oratory legitimate at all; and to all rights the resemblance that allows bringing oratory into question also stacks the cards against it, since oratory, too, is delivered to a mob just like theatre. That is, the purpose of the examples is not to give "Plato" an opportunity to indulge his prejudices (with Dodds) but to shift the burden onto the defender of oratory, and to require him to articulate how it is different from popular theatre. The only way to do so will be to say how it does something other than seduce, something better than poetry, something more scientific than poetry. In order to get there, Socrates has stressed the fatuousness of popular displays, even to the point of allowing tragedy to be pooh-poohed by his crass and self-important interlocutor who will easily agree, unaware that in doing so he will hastily bring upon himself the burden of defending oratory and the life of the politician as something more than the seduction of the deme, or of Demos, whom we already have heard are his two παιδικά. END OF APPENDIX II

### APPENDIX III: Aelius Aristides on the *Gorgias*

Aelius Aristides's voluminous "replies" to what Socrates says in the *Gorgias* about Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles<sup>2332</sup> evince an ignorance as to Plato's project in the *Dialogues* so fundamental as to render them incompetent to evaluate that project for what it is, while they clearly reveal that the author's sole interest is in being an orator, which in turn makes his criticisms of Plato of no interest to someone who wishes to compare dialectic to oratory or decide or articulate what each of them is. One small example of this sort of *ignoratio elenchi* is typical of the others: easily he contends that dialectic can hardly be greater than oratory, since it is part of oratory: orators after all have to learn to manage ἐρώτησις (3.509).<sup>2333</sup> He does not recognize or understand why Polus cannot ask dialectical questions, and the reason is that Polus is only an orator: his sole reason to open his mouth is to praise or blame something – to speak, that is, of the ποῖον ignoring the τί; and this is true, not surprisingly, of everything the orator Aristides says, too. Throughout, Aristides's arguments are so plainly captious that they make his reader crave to hear the other side: it is as if Aristides has forgotten he is not in court, but this is the fictional scenario of his uncitizenized profession in the Second Sophistic. He makes Plato out to be self-contradictory, mean-spirited, and a blowhard, all the while acknowledging he is the greatest Greek author, or second greatest (after Demosthenes). The effect on the reader is, "Wow! Plato has been taken down a notch!" but at the same time to come away recognizing it is only Aristides's opinion he has been treated to. Aristides's very belligerence calls for hearing the other side; but Plato has been dead for 500 years. The work is an exercise in rhetorical ἐρώτησις; as such it is a fool's errand to argue against it.

He thinks an "orator" is a statesman, and that ῥητορικὴ is tantamount to statesmanship – a notion of the oratorical he surely does not share with Socrates,<sup>2334</sup> nor with the author he is criticizing. Indeed it is just this identification that Socrates is challenging: Socrates is not trying to advocate "philosophy" or dialectic over oratory (such betters and worses being mere ποῖα) but to say that oratory, by its nature (its τί), is a counterfeit statesmanship: all it does is persuade; nothing does it know, as such, about justice or the good of the city and its citizens. Callicles wants not to be an orator but a δυνάμενος; oratory is for him a mere means to that end, and not an end in itself, which, however, "oratory" clearly is for Aristides. This is why he is able and content to write a criticism of Plato that is of so little intrinsic value. Callicles believes, as Socrates does, that "the oratorical" is nothing but manipulation of mass opinion. There is absolutely nothing in the epagoge at *Gorg.*501-502, with each step of which he agreed, to justify *in principle* his disagreement at the final step (moving from tragedy to oratory), and his reply that there are some orators who (in essence) practice something other than the oratory posited in the epagoge only begs the question what they do do. He adduces four men of unquestionably high reputation to prove there exists a skill he has not, after all, defined as oratorical: they are famous politicians, policy-makers and warriors whose high reputation is above cavil. For Aristides they are therefore orators in his sense of the term, and now in defending them against the philosopher Plato Aristides has become the advocate for oratory against philosophy (presumably Aristides's actual opponents are contemporary "platonists"). And by the by (2.346; 3.532), because Socrates praises Aristides the Just as a δυνάμενος who did not take unfair advantage of his power (525E-26B), our Aristides finds him contradicting himself, since (1) Aristides the Just is an orator (though Socrates adduced him as a δυνάμενος) and (2) Socrates thinks all orators are bad – both premises made up by our Aristides.<sup>2335</sup>

When, in the conclusion of the epagoge begun at 514A, Callicles is finally pressed to say what qualifies him to be the πολιτικός he is now beginning to become, he demurs to answer (515B), so Socrates brings back the men he had cited as better-than-normal orators, half an hour earlier; to apply to them the credential of the better-than-normal orators he and Callicles had just reached in the epagoge: it would be necessary that through their oratory (not their policy or their wisdom or their personal virtue) they improved the citizens of Athens – that *once they started talking, the Athenians became better* (515D6-7, the literalism almost a joke: cf. 516D7). Callicles's own picture is of course that as soon as he begins talking he will make money and accrue power. But his own adducing of examples calls for Socrates to test them with *sed contra*'s, and this very test has drawn forth Aristides's voluminous flood of ink.

Aristides also makes the mistake of attributing everything Socrates says in the several dialogues, as well as the Athenian in the *Laws*, to be beliefs resting in Plato's own mind, as beliefs he cherishes for themselves in any context, and wants to say to us, regardless of circumstance or context in his own life, let alone the different contexts of the dialogues in which the statements appear. This enables Aristides to criticize "Plato" for contradicting himself, while again at the same time it disables him from appreciating what is going on in the dialogues: that they are all tentative situational conversations blazing their own paths, and that the adventure of following the *logos* where it might lead is the very substance of Plato's compositions, with Socrates guaranteeing their continuity and vitality. Aristides's attributing to Plato

2332 The three so-called Platonic Orations: *Or.*2 (Dindorf 45): "In Defense of Oratory"; and *Or.*3 (Dindorf 46) "In Defense of the Four"; and *Or.*4 (Dindorf 47) "A Reply to Capito" – newly redone by M. Trapp in the Loeb Series.

2333 *Gorgias* likewise includes "answering" in his ἐπίδειξις (447C6). Compare Polus's remarks at 467C3-4 and 474C2-3 that he is "answering" in order to find out what Socrates is "saying."

2334 Socrates reports at his trial (*Apol.*21C3-8) that he first sought a πολιτικός to bring back to the god at Delphi: ἔδοξε μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ. He is describing a reputable and popular orator: onlookers were offended by Socrates's treatment of him, as Anytus would have been (cf. *Meno* 94E).

2335 Aristides likewise fails to recognize the distinction Socrates forces upon the reader when he speaks of a προσατής, at 519B8-C2 – a true leader – but thinks him identical to what Socrates would call a ῥήτορ! Hence Socrates, and therefore Plato, has again contradicted himself (*Or.*3.519-20).

what his characters say is not limited to Socrates (as it is for the majority of commentators, ancient and modern): at one point Aristides makes the extraordinary claim that Plato himself is of divided mind and believes *both* what Socrates is saying and what Callicles says in contradiction of it – that there are no truly edifying orators, *and* that the Big Four are! (503A5-B3)<sup>2336</sup> Because Socrates says Callicles’s claim of the existence of counterexamples would imply there is a second type of oratory, Aristides infers that Plato believes there is a second type; and with this he accuses Plato of contradicting himself.

This attribution is quite extraordinary, but orators do go out on limbs. Still, his readiness to attribute all that Socrates and the Athenian says on the occasions of the dialogues to the fixed or even the developing thought of the author Plato – which I count another error fundamental enough to vitiate all interpretation of the dialogues themselves – is not extraordinary but commonplace, going back with more or less certainty and reliance to Aristotle. Because of this, reading Aristides's treatises can be an eye-opener, in the sense that we can easily perceive the irrelevancy of his criticisms exactly because the assumptions he brings to his own reading are so very different from ours. We are quite aware that there is a huge difference between an Athenian πολιτικός of Fifth Century Athens, who fought for instance at Marathon or directed the navy at Salamis, and an itinerant teacher of rhetoric in the Second Sophistic under the Roman Empire. Think how far Plato is from thinking a philosopher is a sort of φιλόκαλος who works at wording,<sup>2337</sup> as Aristides defines it! But we in our own times have our own shared blind-spots, trends, worries, pre-occupations, focuses; and we have seen Plato-criticism go through fads, because we bring our own questions to everything we read. I come to the *Dialogues* with what used to be my hypothesis but is now my belief, that Plato has taken pains to invent conversations that “create their own horizons”: what makes them understandable is the perennial attitudes and personalities of the political animal who, according to his nature, speaks: their cognitive value is not due to fleeting currencies but well-chosen and well-represented anxieties and dilemmas to which all of us are subject. I have found that I share this orientation with more than half of the editors I have reviewed in preparing this commentary, going back to Routh (1784).

A movement in the middle and end of the last century brought to the reading of Plato a new sensitivity to confusions perhaps even inherent in our use of language, that inspired as a concomitant that we might check whether Plato had already discovered these himself, or else the Greeks might also be found to be unconsciously misled by their own language, its grammar, its predicational structures. The goal was to discover to what extent they were, rather than to see through any such disabilities to the underlying intention or meaning our noble authors had in mind. Upon reading Aristides’s treatises we get a strong impression how his profession as a teacher of rhetoric has distracted and perhaps disabled him from seeing what is happening in the dialogues. Might something analogous afflict the reading of a professional logician, or a professional historian, a “Heideggerean” or a professional academic? For whom, after all, did Plato write his dialogues? Surely none of these! The historian for instance, might be meant to be confounded by Plato’s wanton anachronisms (which Aristides faults without asking why he intentionally put them there), the intellectual biographer might be deterred from his biographical approach by Socrates’s wavering alliances in stressing one method or another, or one way of searching or hypothesis or doctrine over another (where Aristides only sees a fault of inconsistency<sup>2338</sup>); Aristides’s own preoccupation with public policy hobbles him from seeing that Socrates calls walls and harbors and alliances<sup>2339</sup> φλυαρία not because he thinks them worthless but because they are overrated:<sup>2340</sup> we need teachers, leaders, politicians, who can help us make progress in understanding the imponderables of what politics is really for, and what one must do to live a good and happy life – to learn, that is, what justice is and what it does in the soul – rather than look to our politicians as heroes when they provide us bread and circuses and then blame their successors when we soon enough find ourselves jaded by such indulgences.<sup>2341</sup>

### END OF APPENDIX III

2336 *Or.*2.344: σχίζεται περι αυτό; cf. *Or.*3.536: σχίζει την υπόθεσιν και διδωσι τα δεύτερα τῷ Καλλικλῆϊ ἀμέλει.

2337 φιλοκαλία τις ... και διατριβη περι τοὺς λόγους (3.678).

2338 On Plato’s anachronisms and factual inaccuracies, cf. 3.577-587.

2339 συμμάχους (3.657) might be a not quite innocent mis-remembering for Socrates’s φορῶν at 519A3.

2340 “ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάζεσθαι,” Callicles ceremoniously intones in praise of The Four, when he proves unable to defend their success as politicians or orators (517A8), just as Gorgias began his praise of oratory with these same achievements (455DE).

2341 *Gorg.*518C-519B.

## APPENDIX IV: Callicles' Way of Speaking

*If every speech arises from a desire and takes its objects and goals in accordance with it, every statement depends upon who is making it. The speaking subject thus reveals his nature in every word he speaks, and it is this that determines the kind of power he grants to language and the sorts of things he thinks it able to speak about. ... Plato is able to write in the way he thinks and in the rhythm of his thinking, but he is also able to make those speak who think differently from him – who think differently what thinking is – equally well as those who speak without thinking. - M.Dixsaut<sup>2342</sup>*

Of persons with whom Socrates has such a belligerent conversation as the 45-page argument he has with Callicles, the closest rival in all the *Dialogues* is the Thrasymachus of *Rep.* I, and a discussion about 18 pages long. Socrates's argument with Polus was also about 18 pages, and also pitted him against a teacher of oratory.

The argument with Thrasymachus came at the beginning of its dialogue<sup>2343</sup> and in its cheekiness it aroused emotions in Glaucon (not a teacher of oratory but an Athenian), while at the same time in its belligerence it failed to reach an adequately deep investigation of the issues it raised, as Glaucon confesses at the beginning of Book Two – issues which the ensuing nine Books would then resolve, to the satisfaction of Glaucon if not Adeimantus. The argument with Callicles, conversely, comes at the end of its dialogue: he is the last of the company of interlocutors to speak, and like Glaucon, he is an Athenian rather than a teacher of oratory like the ones that came before him, Polus and Gorgias.

Thrasymachus bursts into the argument, as Callicles did. In both cases Socrates had just then reached an inversion of the conventional outlook with his respective interlocutor – indeed in both cases a refutation of the convention that one must help one's friends and harm one's enemies, which activities, in the case of both dialogues, are among the very activities oratorical skill is thought to facilitate. Therefore Gorgias, Polus, and Thrasymachus all have a stake in arguing, and do argue, for this conventional sense of political action in order to advertise the opportunity to study with them at considerable expense, to the respective onlookers in both dialogues; and in both dialogues their discussions with Socrates motivate the conversations that follow, in both cases between Socrates and a fellow Athenian, the one hoping to engage Socrates because he is dissatisfied by the life those teachers are advocating, and the other because he wants to defend it: for Glaucon is a moral and upstanding young man and Callicles is the very model of the sophist's willing student, a novice politician on the way up.

The differences between Socrates's belligerent conversations with Thrasymachus and with Callicles outweigh the similarities, as a review of the similarities will show. Both of them burst in with a derogatory attack upon Socrates (he is merely toying with his interlocutor by being the questioner who needs give no answers, or he is joking in the argument he has made since it turns the whole world upside down), but whereas Thrasymachus criticizes Socrates's technique in winning an argument (against the technique an orator might use: 336B7-D4), Callicles expresses consternation at the content of the argument (in defense of the whole project of politics he and the fellow Athenians present might be contemplating to take up: 481B6-C4). Both of them will as soon as they can unveil a "killer thesis" – Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger and Callicles that there is a natural justice that trumps the conventional (the two positions coming to the same thing): Thrasymachus is so eager to scandalize the audience with this assertion that he cannot resist but reveal it even though he has demanded that that Socrates become answerer (337D1-8C3); whereas Callicles tucks his killer thesis (about *physis* and *nomos*) into his opening volley against Socrates (482C4-483B1). In the case of Thrasymachus, Socrates immediately inflicts upon his thesis a deflating dialectical criticism (338C4-42B11) and Thrasymachus can only recover by shifting the ground to his own wheelhouse, and delivers an inflammatory and seductive speech (343B1-4C8); but in the case of Callicles he takes not a breath but with a γάρ clause (οὐδὲ γάρ ἀνδρός) immediately goes on to tell the rest of his outlook about the political life he is embarking upon and criticizes and warns Socrates for being so out of touch (483A8-486D1). Thrasymachus's ῥῆσις will provide the motivation for Glaucon's deep question to Socrates, which will constitute the huge balance of the *Republic*, but Callicles's provides the motive and motif of all that will follow between himself and Socrates, which will constitute 40 pages.

Thrasymachus is a professional: despite his thesis being refuted by the end of Book I, he has succeeded, since Glaucon has been stung by worrying that he might just choose an unjust life anyway. At the end of the Book Thrasymachus can say to Socrates, "You have feasted us, then, with your arguments on this great holiday for Bendis" (354A10-11, cf. 352B3). But here the case with Callicles is very different: not halfway through the conversation, after his big speech and an equally deflating and infuriating dialectical criticism of his killer thesis (488A4-491E4), his inner

2342 The quotations are from the English tr. of M.Dixsaut's commentary on Plato's *Sophist*, forthcoming.

2343 See also n. 9.

motive rears its ugly head: the motive why he has been seduced into paying for the oratorical training so as to become a successful politician, the motive, indeed, that these purveyors of oratorical skill include in their training to teach their students to hide with the smooth surface of their words, namely the desire to achieve power that will enable them to get more than their share (πλεονεξία) – and this underlying motive comes to the surface in a parrhesiastic outburst (491E5-492C8), and does so in a most shocking but again not at all shocking way.

Thrasymachus on the high-wire, defending with derring-do the *adikos logos* (348B8-9C10), can admonish Socrates to refute not himself but the logos (349A9-10). But this Callicles cannot do. Hardly a professional, he reveals the all-too-human nobody he really is. He boasts, in the manner of an exhibitionist, that he wants to be master of others because he revels in being enslaved to his own appetites, though he does not put it that reflectively! With this we know we are hearing his own voice, not just a voice he might have borrowed or learned through his association with Gorgias or Polus, like the voice we meet and hear in the person of Meno. His very frank and vivid self-revelation has incited admiration in some commentators (most notably, Dodds), but whatever dimensionality his willful frankness might have achieved for him is, in my opinion at least, eaten up by his own uncontrolled concupiscence: his life is a zero-sum game at the very best, as Socrates immediately tries to convey to him with his image of soul as sieve (492E-494A). The rest of the conversation (494A-527E) unfolds, devolves, and unwinds, in fits and starts, with all the chips Callicles put on the table in his long speech patiently being removed one after the other by Socrates, until in the end Callicles is spent, intellectually and emotionally, and Socrates returns to the therapy of Callicles's consciousness by raising up the vision of a final judgment in the afterlife, which we are led to presume Callicles is still young enough to avoid.<sup>2344</sup>

Plato does not give him an opportunity to respond; and this is the climactic case of Plato's indirect strategy in this dialogue. The *Republic* is a narrated dialogue, and Socrates can describe to us how Thrasymachus is doing along the way. For all his professional polish we see him involuntarily blush (350D1-3: cf. also 346C; 344D1-5; 342E5, D2-4, and C10; 338A4-B1, 337A3, 336D5-E2, 336B1-8), but in the *Gorgias* here we are left on our own to make our own judgment. This is an index of how seriously Plato wants us to take the example of Callicles.

The means he has provided us for making our judgment is phenomenological, if I may put it this way. It is in his presenting us *how Callicles speaks* – both as an orator and as an answerer. To expose and examine this is the purpose of this fourth Appendix.

#### IV.A. Callicles *rhetor*

We may pass over his opening remark (481B6-C4), asking Chaerephon whether Socrates is serious: so much one might learn from a Thrasymachus who likewise begins by criticizing Socrates to his audience<sup>2345</sup> and move instead to his response to Socrates, which consists of what without warning or preamble will be a very long speech.<sup>2346</sup> He moves directly from a blanket insult, that Socrates has been acting like a true demagogue, to a more specific insult<sup>2347</sup> accusing him of an intentionally underhanded use of a distinction between nature and convention, a distinction only he himself draws and presumes to be valid and stipulated by all, which at first, for purposes of criticizing Socrates, is a distinction between truth and opinion<sup>2348</sup> but soon boils down to nothing more than a distinction between facts and values, then to be further narrowed<sup>2349</sup> as being between the self-serving “values” of the weak, fabricated to fight with the “fact” of naked strength which, in a final inversion<sup>2350</sup> comes full circle to be *valorized* by Callicles as alone being the true, the good, the just, the noble, the adequate, and the admirable. We find even in these few lines (482E2-483A8) that his way of talking, as if for the sake of its own momentum, rushes the expression and unapologetically requires us to agree with it in order even to follow and listen.<sup>2351</sup>

How abrupt we then find his genitive of the mark, ἀνδρός (at 483B1), with which he moves from his criticism of Socrates to his second use of the φύσις / νόμος distinction for analyzing democracy and requiring us to buy into his heroic sense of the term in order to see that the genitive is a litotes! At B4 we meet his first “asyndetic” ἀλλά which rather than contrasting one assertion with another simply dismisses what he has just said for something else he will now say. And what he now says is grammatically inconstruable, since he has placed articles with both subject(s) and predicate(s) – we are forced to make his point for him in order to construe the sentence: the ones who make the laws are

2344 Else it would have been idle to present it to him, as it would have been to present it to Archelaus (525D1).

2345 *Rep.* 336B, 337A4-5, 338B1-3.

2346 Four pages long (482C-486D). Contrast Protagoras's behavior at *Prot.* 320C2-4 preparing for his speech of eight pages (320D-8D).

2347 At 482D7 we are served his first imperative and “asyndetic” use of καί: cf. n. 1066 *ad loc.* and nn. 1090, 1092, 1100, 1150, 1173, 1275, 1411, 1416.

2348 Cf. n. *ad* 482E3-5 and n. 1071. Socrates's refutation of Polus's distinction between the αἰσχροὺν and the κακόν is based on dialectical scrutiny, linguistic use, and logic – not “nature”! And the distinction Polus was putatively defending was not his own value and what he thinks (ὡσπερ νοεῖ, 483A1), but his own sense of shame.

2349 Cf. n. 1083 *ad* 483B1.

2350 At 483C8ff. See below.

2351 Rude obscurity at 482E5 (ὡς), 483A2 (τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν), A4 (disparaging coinage: cf. A7), A4 (τὰ τῆς φύσεως loose), A6 and 7 (the constructions troubling even the editors) – cf. notes *ad locc.* On confusing hyperbaton cf. nn. 1023, 1074, 1140, 1160. Derogatory apposition: nn. 1074, 1083, 1092, 1364. Syntactic/semantic shift in midstream: nn. 1143, 1361, 1077. Quasi-anacoluthon: nn. 1094, 1115, 1143, 1148 1413. For other slovenly expressions and constructions, cf. nn. 1182, 1263, 1307, 1328, 1340, 1342, 1345, 1346, 1349, 1357(*sub fin*), 1363, 2127.



the weaker men, otherwise known as “the many.”<sup>2352</sup> We note also his inferential use of *καί*. With this we also learn that Callicles, unbeknownst to himself, is not interested in predication so much as name-calling.<sup>2353</sup>

Next we realize that “parenthetical” *οἶμαι* is a verbal tick of his,<sup>2354</sup> in his case used to accompany declarations he finds particularly scandalous, here to challenge the widely admired notion of *ισονομία*. In his explanation he inserts *τοῦτο*, a demonstrative that here points neither forward nor backward but has the effect of paralyzing the attention of his audience. While the democratic advocacy of *isonomia* and condemnation of *pleonexia* is only *νόμος* (i.e., in mendacious “values” of the many by which they hope to protect themselves in their weakness), *φύσις* herself Callicles now quotes, revealing the thing itself:<sup>2355</sup> the just thing is for the better man to have more than the worse and the stronger than the weaker. We had of course not known these two “facts,” though as far as nature is concerned we can make sense of the second revelation, that strength beats weakness; but does better and worse mean something else than stronger and weaker? Maybe not, after all! Maybe Nature does not make such mendacious “value judgments” but lives by the hegemony of contending forces alone,<sup>2356</sup> and therefore “values” only strength. It is notable therefore that Callicles puts the first proposition – the “derived” value judgment – *before* the second – the “natural” principle of force.<sup>2357</sup> It is with this willful assertion whose lack of justification is as visible as the certainty with which Callicles is asserting it, that he achieves his third interpretation of the *physis / nomos* distinction: force is the criterion of value.

With *δηλοῖ δέ* (D2), he proceeds with proofs that this is so, but who or what is the subject? Nature, still and again,<sup>2358</sup> who manifestly and unsurprisingly views man as a creature within the animal world along with his cities and races (D3-4), this last word added to swallow the conventional or man-made character and regimen of cities into the biological realm, so as next to explain the powerful dominating the weak as a natural (physic) phenomenon rather than political (nomic). With *καί* (D6), as above, he begs the question by identifying strength with getting more, and “proves” the identification with an example: since<sup>2359</sup> what sort of justice (*ποῖω δικάϊω*) could one say the Persians practiced in invading Greece? The expression of the question is conveniently ambiguous: anarthrous *ποῖος* first means How in the world could normal social norms call the invasion “just”? But it could also be taken as a real question, for which we could supply the entity Callicles is trying to establish, *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον*, which he next supplies for us, with his characteristic asseverative *οἶμαι*, though his expression for the entity is not quite what we would expect from what he has said above, for now he introduces a *φύσις τοῦ δικάϊου* (E2). Does he know what he is saying? Before we can answer, he adds *καί* with a much stronger asseveration, *καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία*, and adds, as if it were a synonym for *φύσις τοῦ δικάϊου*, nothing less than (*γε*) a *νόμος* of *φύσις*! Strength is therefore the *law* of the *nature* of *justice*. Though what he says merges on nonsense, he has found a way to grant strength to all three approbative attributes! He then covers his tracks by affirming that “of course” (*οὐ μέντοι ἴσως*) the *nomos* he is speaking of is not the sort of *nomos* that “we” institute for ourselves. With this “of course” he uses still another of his characteristic expressions, *ἴσως* in condescending understatement,<sup>2360</sup> and launches into an elaboration of “our” benighted behavior with a circumstantial participle that can only agree with *ἡμεῖς* – though after a torrent of metaphorical circumstantial participles, another indicative shows up (*καταδουλούμεθα*, E6) and we discover we are in the midst of a run-on sentence. His impulse to express himself is just too much to be contained by grammar, and that is exactly his theme: the strongest young among us are enslaved by the hypnotizing incantation of a pabulum according to which “the equal” is what is fine and what is just, but it’s just a matter of time before a real man with an “adequate” nature (*φύσιν ἰκανήν*, 484A2) will appear, who will shake off these impediments. Here we encounter what is perhaps Callicles’s favorite expression, *ικανόν*. For others the adjective will be

2352 In *καὶ οἱ πολλοί* (B5-6), *καί* is given a quasi-inferential force at the same time that *πολλοί* is derogatory: what constitutes the rabble is that they are weak. Likewise in the next sentence, *καὶ* in *καὶ δυνατούς* “explains” why the many fear those who are stronger, without questioning the motives of the stronger.

2353 Cf. n. 1091. That name calling is tantamount to the “oratorical” orientation of praise and blame (the *ποῖον* rather than the *τί*) is then confirmed when he calls the kettle black in the next lines, with the unprecedented triad *νομοὺς τιθέναι, ἐπαινεῖν, ψέγειν*, for which cf. n. 1093. and the assertion that they call things shameful and ugly because they are afraid of them, etc. See also my Introduction, §2: The Oratorical in the *Gorgias*.

2354 483C5: We encountered it with “asyndetic” *ἀλλά* just a few lines above (B4) and will see again at C8, 484A2, E1, and 485A3; and nn. 1020, 1090, 1111, 1147, 1240, 1251, 1310, 1319, 1341. In the language of the grammarians it is “parenthetical,” because it does not command indirect discourse. Its force is “pragmatic”: of course the speaker believes (*οἶεται*) what he is saying, but by adding *οἶμαι*, he invites his audience to watch him make a declaration for one reason or other (as would the particle *τοί*, but without its presumption of intimacy). It was used by Gorgias to highlight his more slippery assertions (cf. 457A4 and B5 with nn.); Callicles is using it to emphasize how very important what he is saying is – in his own view.

2355 *αὐτό* (D1), another pronoun arresting the attention before what it postpones to state gets stated. On *δέ γε* with which he introduces the factual revelation of nature in contrast to the mere *ὀνόματα* of *νόμος* (*καλοῦσιν*, C8), cf. n. 1101.

2356 Compare the contemporary sophist, Antiphon, who used the *physis / nomos* distinction to *justify* a kind of egalitarian *isonomia* and *homonoia!* (B44 = DK 2.349.18-351.22).

2357 *καὶ τὸν δυνατότερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου* (D2): This sort of “reverse *καί*” in *hysteron-proteron* is an established usage in Greek, but for Callicles its use is integral to his way of speaking. Just above he made the weak the many (B5-6): are they many because weak or weak because many? and here are the stronger better because stronger, or the better stronger because better? In his name-calling way it doesn’t matter: all derogatory attributes will be co-extended as will all approbatory ones.

2358 Continuation with the same subject is of course most natural but commentators rightly wonder if this might be a rare impersonal construction: Callicles is of little help to them.

2359 Abrupt *ἐπεὶ* (D6), rather than *γάρ*, takes his point as having already been made – a rude gesture Polus is addicted to: 461C2, 471A9 and E1, 473E5, 474B7. Cf. nn. 1109 (middle), 1333.

2360 Cf. 510A1 (read from ms. P), 521C5-6, 522A8 with my nn. Compare Thrasyarchus at *Rep.*331B1, Polus at 461B8, and Socrates at 513C8.

neutral – after all it is a relative adjective, like ἴσος – but for Callicles it is high praise because his expectations are so high above the norm that his notion of mere adequacy already constitutes a dispositive superiority relative to all others.<sup>2361</sup>

The participles continue unbridled: οἱ πολλοί had gotten five of them in their attempt to hold him back (E4-484A1), and now the great *monstrum* breaks away from them with five of his own (484A3-5) capped with the expression ἐπαναστάς ἀνεφάνη. ἐπαναστάς must at first appear to be a sixth circumstantial participle but it isn't: we are just able to keep up and see, rather, that it is supplementary, the apocalyptic complement of ἀνεφάνη: There he stands, before us, our slave has become our master<sup>2362</sup> – and with his advent shines forth “the justice of nature,” which a moment ago had been the nature of justice, but the difference by now is a mere technicality.

Callicles exemplifies his climactic revelation by quoting the wisdom poet Pindar, misquoting from memory exactly what we might expect his memory to want to remember: “Law, the king of all men and gods, establishes by force perfect justice with an outstretched arm.”<sup>2363</sup> And, Pindar said, the strong man Heracles stole the herd of Geryon without recompense, believing this to be “the just by nature” – namely that the herds and all the wealth of the worse and weaker persons belong to the nobler and stronger individual.<sup>2364</sup> With this, his *tour de force* is done.

Now, about halfway through his speech (though there is no way for us to know that), Callicles finally *responds* to the point Socrates had made in his own speech (at 481C5-482C3), that while he himself is in love with philosophy, Callicles is in love with the deme. Which life and which love to choose (as if one can choose his eros!)? Socrates would come to realize that power is the only justice if only he came out of the fog of philosophy and moved on to “the greater things.”<sup>2365</sup> To tarry there too long is the “ruin of men”:<sup>2366</sup> he will never find out what it is that suits one to become an upstanding and respected man, how the law works and how to manage men, and know where their desires lead them. He will cut a ridiculous figure upon entering any “dealing.”<sup>2367</sup> Engagingly, Callicles brings in the dispute between Zethus the musician and his activist brother Amphion, taking the side of the latter – all this by way of friendly advice. His criteria for choosing are the ridiculous, the shameful, praise and blame. He continues to show his penchant for the open-textured triad done with καί: if one avoids τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως he will never be heard delivering a speech “free and large and adequate (485E1-2)”;<sup>2368</sup> it is shameful to be at the mercy of some nobody dragging you into court: you'll cut the figure of a fool on the bema, you would be subject to the mudslinging slap: emulate not the men who refute your tiny points<sup>2369</sup> but the ones who enjoy “livelihood, fame, many other good things (486C8-D1).”<sup>2370</sup>

In this section it is more the content than the expression and way of arguing that is important to the rest of the dialogue. In his response, Socrates will revert to the first section, Callicles's “theory” that the strong deserve more; but once Callicles cashes in that theory by revealing his underlying motive for wanting to achieve power (at 491E5-492C8), it will be the content of the second part – the choice between the lives – that will be Socrates's target for the rest of the dialogue. Socrates begins his response with thanks for Callicles's concern for him, and then begins his examination. It is here that Callicles becomes an ἀποκρινόμενος – and by now he has much to “answer for.”

#### IV.B. Callicles ἀποκρινόμενος

In a bit more than a page of question and answer, Socrates has found a contradiction: Callicles had said the many are weak and their laws just only by convention, but with their vote in a democracy the many are strong, and so their laws – as for instance favoring *isonomia* – do express the will of the strong. Callicles at first will not answer (we meet with our first asyndeton at 489A4), and Socrates begs him to confirm his inference, “adequate man” that Callicles is.<sup>2371</sup> Evasively he responds: “Well, the many do indeed believe in *isonomia*”; but Socrates takes the next step: “As

2361 Compare his uses at 491B3, 492A1 and B3 when he describes his most cherished vision of heroic “adequacy.” Thrasymachus makes similar use in his ῥῆσις in the *Republic* (344C6).

2362 δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος (A6), with ἡμέτερος in a zeugma: he whom we had attempted to make our slave has now become our master!

2363 ἄγει βιαίον τὸ δικαιοτάτον (484B7) instead of ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον. Rather than “Law justifies the use of force” (λέγει οὕτω πως – τὸ γὰρ ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι, he goes on to say). See Appendix I.

2364 We encounter again a bare genitive of the superior man in prolepsis (βελτίονος, C2), like ἀνδρός at 483B1, the derived approbatory adjective, immediately spelled out with the proper description that is its grounds (κρείττονος), again using reverse καί as at 483D2 above – Callicles is unfazed by his flat contradiction (the facts of nature supersede grammatical niceties) but is most excited to say is that he is one man against all, in the singular, whereas his inferiors are in the plural.

2365 τὰ μείζω, C4-5.

2366 διαφθορά τῶν ἀνθρώπων (C7-8): no verb.

2367 πράξις (E1) will be contrasted with διατριβὰς and λόγους.

2368 ἐλεύθερον ... καὶ μέγα καὶ ἰκανόν (485E1).

2369 τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα (486C8-D1), perhaps to ring with τὰ μείζω at 484C4-5, for effect closure of this section.

2370 καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ (486D1). Cf. 484A3-4, 484D2-7, 485B4-5, 485B6-7, 485C1-2, 485C4-6, 485C6-8, 485D4-E1, 486A1-3, 492B8, 492C4-5, 492C6-8.

2371 ἰκανοῦ ἀνδρός (489A6) – already perhaps something of a taunt!

being the will of the strong, their laws (*nomoi*) are also just by nature (*phusei*); and your criticism that I am exploiting the opposition of *physis* and *nomos* was incorrect.”

To this Callicles makes his first “Calliclean” ἀπόκρισις, not unlike his initial interruption when he asks Chaerephon whether Socrates is kidding. In fact he doubles down on it: “This man of yours just won’t stop talking nonsense!” (489B7) – and goes on to accuse Socrates of a semantic quibble as well as an *ignoratio elenchi*. By the stronger he of course meant the nobler, not some rabble – “for the stronger and the nobler are the same.”<sup>2372</sup> His expression, using the article with both, again avoids distinguishing subject and predicate as we saw above (Is he asserting that the nobler are the stronger or that the stronger are the nobler?), for he continues with his use of name-calling in praise and blame and is hoping the comparative is all that matters, that they are stronger and nobler than someone else. Socrates is looking for a *logos* and so he rolls with the punches and asks Callicles to tell him who, in turn, the noble are, but already threatens to leave Callicles’s “tutelage” if he won’t teach him more gently. Callicles now answers the nobler are the better: this should mean that what makes the noble noble is that they are good, but by now Socrates is willing to infer that Callicles is just name-calling (ὀνόματα λέγεις) and offers him a more specific thesis: that a single man who is thinking among a group of men who are not is stronger thereby, and that this one must be the ruler and the others the ruled, and this ruler must “have more” than the ruled. This seems to strike a chord with Callicles, and he agrees that by virtue of his being nobler and more intelligent, the man’s being ruler and having more is the just by nature – again using the article with both. But now Socrates hears him saying more, that the ruler’s nobler and stronger intelligence will lead him to take more, and he challenges this (for an intelligent doctor will distribute food, for instance, differentially, according to the dictates of what he knows). Callicles is talking about “something else” of course, wealth, power, privilege;<sup>2373</sup> and ridicules Socrates for his example of food, as if the ruler will eat more, or the intelligent shoemaker should have the most shoes, etc.

This pointless shell-game of approbatory adjectives now ends with Callicles spelling out what he means, as though this is what he was saying all along (491A7-B4). The stronger who rule justly by nature are those more intelligent in political affairs and manly enough to carry out the policies they conceive of and not to fail out of a softness of soul. But what Socrates hears is that he has now added a fourth approbatory, bravery – so he asks Callicles finally to settle down: who are these nobler and stronger? Callicles complies with a very orderly statement: they are those who are φρόνιμοι in political affairs and ἀνδρείοι, for it is appropriate that these rule in the cities, and justice is that these have more than the others – the rulers over the ruled (491C7-D3).

A reader of Plato and a connoisseur of Socratic conversations will notice that with this statement Callicles has invoked three of the cardinal virtues: δικαιοσύνη (φύσει), φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία. In the subsequent lines there are problems with the mss. and it is impossible to be sure, but I believe Socrates’s next remark (491D4-5) makes a play on Callicles’s closing phrase, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων so as to bring in the fourth virtue, ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ or σωφροσύνη, and that in his bringing up this fourth virtue Callicles first becomes indignant (D6-E4)<sup>2374</sup> and then (the text now being reliable and clear) visibly explodes (491E5ff). Temperance, self-control, moderation has absolutely no place in the soul or life of the great man he has been trumpeting, as we now learn in a confessedly unvarnished announcement in which Callicles finally reveals the motive he imagines to be at work in this intelligent, brave, just, nobler, stronger, and better man of his.

All that praise is suddenly down the drain: Callicles reverts to his hasty and willful manner and his previous themes, and tells us that for all the man’s virtues he had touted, what Callicles truly admires in him is his resolution to let his desires run wild and his ability, wits, and drive to serve every one of them – something the many so greatly envy, he weens,<sup>2375</sup> as to hobble such a man with their moral rules. It is not out of fear of the strong after all<sup>2376</sup> but out of envy for this powerful man’s perfect surrender to his desires, that the many make their laws, and mouth their praise of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη out of their lack of ἀνδρεία. With all this παρρησία (491E7) Callicles now mounts the heady climes of Thrasymachus and his *adikos logos*, but for Thrasymachus it was a cheeky display of high-wire rhetoric meant to recruit clients, while for Callicles it is a damning self-exposure of his own perfidy: the lust has taken him over and dominates his reason. He has no idea that the mastery he has now extolled is a most abject servitude, though his very words say it (ὑπερετεῖν, 492A1). Once again he breaks into justifications with his abrupt ἐπεὶ:<sup>2377</sup> For a person that has the chance to become the top man, whether a tyrant or a dynast, whether by natural gift or inheritance, what could be more shameful and evil than moderation and justice, than installing as despot over oneself the “law and praise and blame”<sup>2378</sup> of the masses? Than to have been turned into a perfect loser by “this fine affair of justice and moderation”<sup>2379</sup> that one can distribute no more to one’s allies than one’s enemies! If it’s the truth you want, Socrates, and you say you

2372 We can compare Socrates’s first question against Thrasymachus’s “advantage of the stronger,” where again Socrates takes strength literally and brings up wrestlers (338C4-D2) and elicits a similar response (βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ) – for Thrasymachus, like Callicles, is using “strong” in a metaphorical and exclusively approbative sense.

2373 βίος, δόξα, ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ, as he had put it above (486D1).

2374 And note his reversion to using articles with both subject and predicate: E2.

2375 οἶμαι (A3) comes back, as does his abrupt ἐπεὶ, his asyndetic ἄλλα.

2376 Contrast ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρωμενεστέρους, 483C1.

2377 492B1: cf. 483D6.

2378 Referring again to his previous rant, this time without modification: 483B6-C1.

do,<sup>2380</sup> here's how it is: "Debauchery, excess, freedom – as long as it<sup>2381</sup> has adequate support – that's what virtue and happiness is, and the rest of these prettifications, conventions of humans contrary to the way of nature, are nonsense and worthless."

There is almost no appropriate *dialogical* response to such an outburst; Socrates thanks him for his candor: at least he is saying what he really thinks as opposed to the others who, as Callicles claimed,<sup>2382</sup> were ashamed to do so; and he encourages him to continue in that mode, since the question is now what sort of life to lead, a large and worthy topic – and this will be the topic for the balance of the conversation, which at this point is only one fourth of the way in. Socrates's first move is to invoke Callicles's conscience with the "myth" of the soul as sieve but Callicles continues with his headlong hedonism, and is soon enough shamed for the concrete behavior to which Socrates, with equal candor, shows that it ultimately leads (492E-495C, esp.494E4). His enthusiasm herewith dampened, Callicles next submits to a dialectical investigation of "hedonism" – the belief that pleasure is the good – which ends in his assertion that he never really believed it anyway (495C-499B); and after this Socrates makes a clever segue into focusing the conversation on the choice of lives – political or philosophical – which Callicles had raised in the second part of his long speech.

#### IV.C. Callicles *petulans*

From here on out, Socrates will elaborate the great Distinction into a positive theory of what political action should be, over against the incompetent politics of oratory *per se*. Callicles will remain his interlocutor, reluctant and by now having little reason to speak. Instead Plato has him accede to Gorgias's request that he continue in the role so that he and the company (and we ourselves) can hear the "the arguments" through to completion – as Socrates one by one removes the chips Callicles had put on the table in his long speech.

As to Callicles's verbal usage and behavior in this last section, what is to be noticed is an innovative scurrilousness in answer by which he sacrifices sense for tone. In fact commentators continually disagree as to the sense of his remarks and propose emendations for him to make his remarks clearer. We just can't be sure what he will say next. The first of these is at 503D2-4 where I would refer back to Appendix II, *supra*. At 504C4, for one reason or another (we cannot be sure which), he is asked the target question of the epagoge and answers, τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες? Is he reluctant to give Socrates the victory of his epagoge? or is he just playing as if the method of question and answer is just a game? We become suspicious at this point of a long series of one-word answers, including non-committal "ἔστω." (504C-505B), until Socrates reaches a conclusion that directly contradicts Callicles advocacy of debauchery at which point he suddenly claims οὐκ οἶδ' ἅπαντα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα (505C1-2), which might mean, "Since I do not understand what you are saying you should ask someone else who does, so that the conversation can proceed," or is simply a flat and false statement, "I do not understand, and I will not understand: leave me alone." It is utterly unclear which. His subsequent remark (οὐδὲ γε μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὧν σὺ λέγεις) might lead us to favor the latter interpretation, but the next thing he says (αὐτὸς γνώση) favors the former. And what does γνώση mean? "You will decide, so that you hardly need my advice" or "You will be talking to yourself," again seeking to disable the dialectical scenario of questioner and answerer. Socrates's persistence then draws the remark "You ought to drop the subject or else dialogue with someone else (D5-6), and even more in the next remark, does λέγων κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ mean "Go off and talk by yourself, or if you must stay then play both roles"?

For a second time Gorgias intervenes (506A8-B3) to keep Callicles playing answerer, again pleading on behalf of the audience but stressing a little more than before his own interest in what Socrates has to say (compare 497B4-5). And at this point Socrates responds to Callicles's demurrals by adopting the mode of a dialectic development on his own, on the proviso that Callicles intervene and stop him if he says something amiss. Callicles only gives him permission to proceed, though there are places where a question arises that he is particularly happy to agree with, for his own reasons that have nothing to do with the context.<sup>2383</sup> But with the next refutation, the next chip removed, Callicles objects, once again by claiming his "inability" to understand. But this time he adds a bit of *Realpolitik* (511A4-7): 'It may be the case that the man who emulates the tyrant in order to protect himself will himself become unjust, but please realize, Socrates, that it is he that will be killing the one who doesn't!' Socrates's rather meek reply is "Maybe so, but I will be able to say it was a just man that an unjust man killed." And here comes another of Callicles's ambiguous remarks: οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν; "Yes and that really galls, doesn't it?" in faux sympathy: it's only the weak-kneed justice that Socrates is defending.

2379 With the creative phrasing ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τούτου τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης (492C1) he reverts to the style we saw in his "encomium of the strong."

2380 C4: he leveled the same accusation against Socrates at the beginning of his long speech (482E4).

2381 In his impatience he treats his blessed triad as a singular subject, and then treats virtue and happiness as a single predicate. He has an encomiast's penchant for the triad (cf. nn. 1093, 1158, 1188, 1355, 1360) with imperfect care for sense. The meanings of the words just blend together under the force of his willful certainty.

2382 482E6-483A1.

2383 E.g., 509D6 τοῦτό γε (cf. n. 1834); 510A11-B1 (see n. 1850, and notice how he says "yes": ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν ἂν καλῶς λέγῃς); 511C3 ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλευέων (cf. n. 1876).

By a long argument Socrates concludes that oratory will only work if Callicles likens himself to the people he despises, and Callicles comes up with a new way to avoid granting the point, again with a feigned inability to understand, but with still another twist. This time what he claims he cannot understand is how Socrates's very unwelcome conclusion seems unexpectedly likely to him! But then he says "And yet your effect on me is like your effect on οἱ πολλοί: I am not much persuaded" (513C4-6). His refusal is a mere velleity though he believes what Socrates says!<sup>2384</sup>

Socrates moves on (513D1ff) and Callicles reverts to short answers, this time πάνυ γε over and over,<sup>2385</sup> allowing Socrates to move through another epagoge; but when the conclusion of the epagoge suddenly focusses upon himself and concludes he himself is unqualified to enter politics, his response is simply φιλόνομος εἶ (515B5). Socrates now moves to Callicles's examples of great orators and criticizes Pericles; Callicles's first riposte is "You've been listening to those men with the cauliflower ears" (referring to the right wing Spartans); and when Socrates goes on in his criticism to say Pericles was almost executed for embezzlement Callicles responds "And from this you infer Pericles was *bad*?" meaning Callicles admires him for getting away with it.

His next evasion is to answer, "I'll say yes, as a favor to you" (516B4) and then "You want me to agree" (C8),<sup>2386</sup> and then in response to the negative conclusion of a very simple and ineluctable syllogism responds, "οὐ σύ γε φής" with adherescent οὐ, and slightly cryptic: "*You say no*" – making the conclusion an opinion of Socrates only. Moving on unfazed (516D5), Socrates makes an extremely long argument that the famous accomplishments of Callicles's model orators – the large public buildings – are secondary to the primary function of the politician, which is to improve the souls of the citizens (517B-519D), at the end of which he blames his having to act like a demagogue (as Callicles had accused him of doing *about an hour earlier*: 519D5-7: cf. 482B5), upon Callicles's unwillingness to answer properly. And what does Callicles say? Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴός τε εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μή τις σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο (519D8-9). Again it is not clear if a question or a remark: it's an ideal or less-vivid condition: "Just think of it: you wouldn't be able to make an argument if someone were not playing answerer for you." Again I'm afraid we are going to have to make out his meaning for him.

Just below he answers whether he finds the sophists' complaint paradoxical, that their students do them the injustice of stiffing them their pay after being taught by them how to be just, with ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων περὶ οὐδένος ἀξίων; (520A1-2), expressing his disdain for the sophists *a propos* of exactly nothing and from out of the blue.<sup>2387</sup>

The next puzzling response comes a page later, when Socrates requires Callicles to admit that his orator is really a servitor rather than an improver of citizens, and therefore a pander. Callicles's reply (521B2-3) stumped all the commentators: Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν. I have my opinion, that it means "Call it what you will" (see n. 2128), but it must be said in any case that half the reason we cannot be sure what he means is that we never quite know what length of scurrility he will go to, nor does he want us to. After this he adds a causal clause, ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις ... which as it appears Socrates now interrupts: "Don't say it again – that anybody who wants to will kill me..." That is, Callicles has again dismissed Socrates's moral analysis of what politics should be as irrelevant in the world of Realpolitik, and repeated that Socrates himself as a mere philosopher is himself defenseless as he had argued in his big speech as if solicitous for Socrates's safety: more importantly with his future indicative (ποιήσεις) in protasis, his tone is shifting from warning to threat. This he then continues in his next remark, that even a petty and insignificant – a "nobody" in Callicles's vocabulary – man could bring him down (521C3-5): that is, even an insignificant orator could sway the jurors. Socrates disarms the threat with the reply that he would be not at all surprised that *anybody* could be dragged into court in the Athens of the day, including himself; but that surely no *worthy* man (χρηστός) would charge a man who had done nothing wrong; nor would he be at all surprised if he himself should be killed – that is, found guilty by an Athenian jury these days. Whatever ingredient of threat Callicles inserted with his future indicative, Socrates answers by laying the charge, in advance, of himself being the very μοχθηρός he is threatening him with, a really evil person no matter how great his oratorical skills. It is the Athenians that will condemn him: just imagine how they would react to the case he would make in his own defense, arguing how he had spent his whole life trying to encourage them to virtue rather than pander to them. "How great a ruckus would that arouse among the jurors, Callicles?" And now we have another indecipherable response from him: ἴσως· οἴεσθέ γε χρή. Which is it: "Maybe," or "You bet"?<sup>2388</sup>

2384 And note that in his rude petulance he does not notice that he has just now proved Socrates's point – that he does resemble οἱ πολλοί. Socrates notices this (C7-8) but moves on (ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν ..., D1).

2385 513D6, E4; 514A4, B4, D2.

2386 βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω (516C8): the bare statement without particle is probably not a question, *pace* edd.

2387 The commentators take quick refuge in the passage from the *Meno* where Meno reports that Gorgias (the oratorical teacher, in Callicles's eyes) disdained the sophists that claimed to make men virtuous rather than just clever speakers; but there is little obvious reason from the context of this dialogue for Callicles to add this remark.

2388 The passage (522A6-8) is heavily emended, including redistributions of the lines. I believe the crux of the matter is a "cynical" use of ἴσως we have seen throughout the dialogue (cf. n. 2161 *ad loc.*), but again it is more important to note Callicles's insouciance rather than join in a contest among philologists.



Callicles next asks the question, “Would you say a man in this condition holds an *admirable* position in his city, unable to help himself to come to his own aid?” And Socrates’s final answer to him is Yes if he has lived a just life that made him his own best benefactor – and now moves beyond the prophecy of his own demise to the myth of the afterlife and his prophecy of what Callicles has in store if he does not reform himself.

END OF APPENDIX IV

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